milual 4 - philarchive
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mitchellmiller
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So it will unanalyzable and, so, partless. (But are we allowed to say of it that it is simple? Or unique?)(The theory is not really well thought through and coherent on these points. That it is partless and, so, simple conflicts with its being perceptible, for perceptibility implies extendedness and, so, divisibility. And if "we and everything else are composed" of them, can each one really be unique, when that would imply an infinite number of qualitatively distinct atoms?)
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mitchellmiller
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failing to recognize difference, i.e. taking as the same what are different — in the example in the footnote taking the b in ba for a p failing to recognize sameness, i.e. taking as different what are the same — in the example in the footnote taking the p in pa for a b
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mitchellmiller
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(a) Mistaking two wholes that are different for the same (thinking they share the same part when they do not) and (b) mistaking two wholes that are different for the same (thinking they have different parts when they do not). ((That is, (a) is mistaking the different [part] for the same, and (b) is mistaking the different [parts] for the same.)) These are the two errors that, according to Sophist 253d, the one with dialectical knowledge does not make.
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mitchellmiller
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ou proteron ge ... Theaetetus en moi doxasthEsetai, prin an hE simotEs hautE tOn allOn somotEtOn hOn egO heOraka diaphoron ti mnEmeion par' emoi ensEmEnamenE katathEtai ...
mitchellmiller
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Either the logos first adds the awareness of difference, in which case right judgment, lacking this awareness, is not of the same object that the logos is, or right judgment already includes the awareness of difference that the logos provides, in which case the logos is superfluous; so, either the logos is superfluous or, if it is it, as added to right judgment, that really achieves knowledge, then the whole definition of knowledge, as right judgment together with ... knowledge!, becomes circular.How to break this twofold dilemma? Let both right judgment and logos contain awareness of the difference, but let each both fall short, by itself, of knowledge and let the two together, by the complement that each is for — in its difference from — the other, first achieve this status.
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Relation to the wax block and the aviary?
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Here is Burt's point about what he takes to be "eidetic number": true judgment and logos are together what neither alone is, namely knowledge, just as 1 and another 1 are together what neither alone is, namely 2.
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Simplicity of the object qua cause of the whole-part structure that its instances must have.Universality across many appearances.Uniqueness.
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mitchellmiller
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M, here you seem to say that the object of knowledge must be a nature that requires the instantiation of a set of forms of parts AND that it be subject to a diairetic logos that will collect its differences. The nature that exacts a whole/part structure may well also be subject to a diairetic logos, yes. But what of the forms of parts? They must be subject to a diairetic logos, yes (thus the letter sigma must be unvoiced but sounded, and a sibilant, etc.) — but does the nature of each of the parts exact a whole of further compositional parts (no — or at least not in the example of letter-sounds) or does it, as definiendum, have its differentiating forms as its parts (yes, as we see in the case of the letter-sound sigma). So, at least in some cases, only differential logos applies to the nature of each part.
mitchellmiller
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OK, true. Here is the view that Cristina Ionescu also holds, regarding the inseparability of collection from division in bifurcatory or bisective diairesis. But keep in mind two things you've come to realize lately. First, the formula "collection and division" belongs to the Phaedrus, not the Sophist/Statesman; in these latter, he speaks of "diairesis kata genE (or kat' eidE)". Second, at 253d-e the first two clauses require of the finding of a "single form" that is "extended through" and "embraces from without" the "many" that it also separate and differentiate these; this latter operation is precisely what bifurcatory diairesis does not do.
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Note how the EV in his logos of weaving first differentiates the weaver's art from the suggenE, then from the sunerga.
mitchellmiller
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In (i) you gathered up [1] the simplicity of the nature that requires instantiation of a set of forms of parts for it, in turn, to be instantiated, [2] the self-sameness of the object across many instantiations, and [3] its being subject to a logos of difference[s]. Sensibles cannot be simple, are the cases and not that which has cases, and are not stable enough to be firmly differentiated from all else.
mitchellmiller
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Well, fifteen kinds not of art (that's shorthand) but of function played, in each case, by some group of arts.
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These remarks apply to adequate logoi: because they distinguish and collect differentiating features, they give us those features (by which the object of logos differs from other kinds) and not the object that has them. (Recall the definition of the circle in the 7th Letter.) But the set of those features, by the way it is pointedly not (= points to without being) that which has them, may remind us of that object. In the Statesman example, the features call to mind human being as that which they pointedly fail to do justice to. Not the same, is it?
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