military geography-the balkan peninsula

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THE BALKAN PENINSULA


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IN PREPARATION

SOUTH-WEST ASIAJN THE SAME SERIES


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AMILITAEY GEOGRAPHY

OF

THE BALKAN PENINSULABY

LIONEL W. LYDEM.A., F.R.G.S., F.R.S.G.S.

PROFESSOR OF ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY, UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON ;AUTHOR OF 'GEOGRAPHY OF THE WORLD,' 'A COMMERCIAL GEOGRAPHY,' ETC.

ANDLIEUT.-COL. A. P. MOCKLEB-FEBBYMAN

F.R.G.S., F.Z.S.FORMERLY PROFESSOR OF MILITARY TOPOORAPHY, R.M.C., SANDHURST;

OF TnE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW JAUTHOR OF 'MILITARY SKETCHING AND RECONNAISSANCE,' 'BRITISH NIGERIA,' ETC.

LONDONADAM AND CHARLES BLACK1905


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PREFACEAs this series is intended specially for military students,we ought to explain at once that it should not be re-garded by a student as in any sense exhaustive of thesubject, though we hope that it will be found completefrom the point of view of the general reader. Thatsuccess in war without previous geographical study ofthe theatre of operations is difficult, if not impossible,is our firm belief ; and in this volume we have attemptedto outline, for one small area, the sort of geographicalknowledge that is required.The choice of the particular area for the first volume

was dictated by the fact that it is not only part ofthe (politically) most important continent, but also thepart in which complications are, unfortunately, alwayspresent, and most likely to cause active trouble.Two mechanical difficulties have presented themselvesto usthe spelling of place-names, and the use ofduplicate terms having very different meanings ingeographical and military science.

With regard to the former, we have followed, as far


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vi PREFACEas possible, Mr. Chisholni's admirable ' Gazetteer." Thenames of well-known placese.g.. Belgradewill befound in the conventional spelling, while those of com-paratively unknown places appear as nearly as possiblein their native form, but in Roman charactersthenormal ts sound of final c in the Slav names beingmarked only in the index, not in the text. This,of course, is not logical ; but we believe that it is auseful compromise for military students who may have

serve in the particular area.With regard to the second difficulty, we did not

think it necessary to avoid the use of duplicate termse.g., "line of least resistance'simply because theyhave quite different meanings in the two sciences :but wherever there seemed to be a reasonable possi-bility of confusion, the geographical use has beenemphasized by inverted commas, as above.We desire to acknowledge much courteous helpin the compilation of Appendix I. from H.B.M.'sConsuls at Belgrade, Buchar-r?:. Sofia, Athens. aDdConstantinople, and from Professor E. A. Gardner.

A. F. MOCKLER -FERRYMAN'L. W. LYDE.


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CONTENT-CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY- .

Geographical problemsImportance of studyTheory andpractice of warForeknowledge of countrvStrategvand tacticsPlan of campaignCollection of informa-tionMilitary history and geographyPractical ex-perience a necessityTransportInvasion routesRoads and railwaysFortressesSea-p:wcrDefen-sive operationsParallel routesCanalsObstacl Mountains Water Climate Inhabitants offoreign countries 1-24

CHAPTER IIBALKAN PENINSULA

Provinces enumeratedIntricate geographyIberian andBalkan Peninsulas comparedTrafficCoast-line andharbours Islands Topographical considerationsMilitary and political centresMountain svstemBulgaria as a buffer StateCharacteristics of thecountryRailway routesTne DanubeThe Bal-kansPassesStrategic railwaysThe Plain of theBlackbirdsClimatic conditionsRains and windNature of the soilSupplies .... 2517

vii


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viii CONTENTSCHAPTER III

BULGARIA PAGEArea and populationMilitary organizationFlotilla

Coast and harboursThe BalkansStrategic centresPhysical featuresMountain systemRiver systemRoadsRailwaysFortificationsThe Orient-Ex-press lineCommunications discussed in detailTheDobruja plateauEffect of weather on the roadsClimate and diseaseSupplies - 48-69

CHAPTER IVROUMANIAA tongue of RussiaArea, population, and religionCom-

mercial developmentMilitary organizationSea-coastand portsThe Danube and the PruthFortifiedpointsMountain frontierPassesNature of thecountryRiver systemDistribution of the armyRoadsRailwaysThe fortifications of BucharestThe great bridge at CernavodaStrategic centresRailway communicationsThe Dobruja garrisonClimateSupplies - 70-87

CHAPTER VSERVIA

Area and shapeFrontiersRough countryRiversPopulation Military organization Belgrade Strategic centresFortifications at NisRoads andrailwaysMilitary districtsBad roadsClimate andweatherSoilSupplies 88-98

CHAPTER VIMONTENEGROOrigin of its nameConfigurationPeculiarities of the landRiversMilitary organizationNo standing army-ArmamentRussian influenceStrategic centres-

Difficult communications 99-103


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CONTENTS IXCHAPTER VII

TURKEYPAOESSea-coastTho BosporusThe DardanellesConstanti-nople The Golden Horn Fortifications iEgean

coastAdriaticMountainsRivers Lakes Salo-nicaRailways and roadsAbsence of bridgesClimateTurkish armyStrategic centres in Mace-donia Garrisons in AlbaniaThraceKossovoAdrianople and its fortifications - - - 104-118

CHAPTER VIIIGREECE

Description of the countryHarbours and coastsMoun-tain systemPlainsRapid riversClimate andsuppliesDistribution of the armyRailways androads 119-125

CHAPTER IXEARLIER MODERN CAMPAIGNS

Russo-Turkish wars, 1700-1811Russian fines of invasionOperations discussedCampaigns of 1828-1829Plans of campaignDiebitsch's advanceCommentsRusso-Turkish campaign of 1853-1854Theatre ofoperations transferred to the Crimea - - - 126-148

CHAPTERSLATER MODERN CAMPAIGNS

Russo-TurkishWar,1877-1878DispositionsPlans of cam-paignRussians cross the DanubeSiege of PlevnaGourko at the Shipka PassTurks assume the offen-siveFurther fighting at the Shipka PassFall ofPlevnaThe winter campaignPassage of the BalkansTreaty of San StefanoRemarksGrseco-TurkishWar, 1897Theatre of operations Defeat of theGreeks 149-1 G4


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CONTENTSCHAPTER XI

HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL SKETCH PAGESOutline of the Eastern QuestionTurkish conquestsTreatment of ChristiansTreaty of KarloviczTur-

key in the eighteenth centuryChanges of the nine-teenth centuryThe balance of power in the EastAmbitions of Russia and AustriaThe new reformschemeLord Palmerston's viewsSlavonic provincesThe relationship of the Balkan States discussedTurkish army 165-180

APPENDICESI.

Useful Words in the Languages of the BalkanCountries 181-185

II.Comparative Table of the Armed Strength of the

Balkan Countries 186III.

Weights, Measures, and Money of the BalkanCountries 187-190

IV.A List of Modern Books dealing with the Countries

of the Balkan Peninsula (with a List ofModern Maps) 191-193


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LIST OF MAPSThe Balkan Peninsula fIn Pocket at{front of hook '

SECTIONS OF THE ABOVE MAPBulgaria - - Facing pac/e OS f -Roumania - - - 86 /^CServia >< f4~**lf . 98 fCTurkey - " - 118 (=Greece - M 124 f

XI


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MILITARY GEOGRAPHYCHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORYThe great land features which make history repeatitself are the essential subject-matter of MilitaryGeography ; and the problems which they present areeternally the same, though genius may from time totime find some new solution of them.

These problems are of three kinds, concerned respec-tively with the general control exercised by the earthon human activities, the planning of some particularprojected campaign, or the actual distribution of troopsin time of war on or near an enemy's territory ; butin each case the fundamental problem is geographical,and even the last of the three may to a certain extentbe studied beforehand.The sole reason for the soldier's being is war, and it

is with a view to prepare him for war that his peace-timeis occupied largely with drill and instruction in militaryduties. If, when war comes, he is found wantingifhe is physically unfit to face the rigours of a campaign,


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2 INTRODUCTIONthe professional knowledge required of him, then hehas defrauded his country.

But, if that is true of the private soldier, it is stillmore true of the officer, who is aware of the fact thathe is responsible for the lives of his subordinates, andaware also that the art of war is a science calling fordeep and constant study. In the annals of war thereis no instance of an officer having risen suddenly on thebattlefield to lasting fame ; the ' military genius ' andthe ' born soldier ' do not exist of themselves ; andinquiry into the early lives of the great generals showsthat each one of them devoted years of careful studyto his profession, reading greedily all the availablemilitary literature, in order to learn what others beforehim had done.

In this manneri.e., on past experiencehave beenbuilt up the laws of strategy and the rules of tactics,none of which, therefore, can be considered creationsof an imaginative writer. The general principlesunderlying the laws of strategy remain fairly goodfor all time ; but in the matter of tactics moderninventions are always introducing modifications andvariations, and the goal of the military student is togain an understanding of all possible variations andcombinations.

Military history, systematically studied, is the founda-tion of military knowledge ; but its systematic study,and the proper application of the knowledge so gained,are only possible to the man who has a thorough ac-quaintance with military geography. Even apart from


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IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT 3its intimate connection with military history, militarygeography as a separate study is of vital importance tothe officer ; and for statesmen it is a necessity. In theirhands lie all the preliminary arrangements for war, ifnot the actual plan of campaign ; on their responsibilitytreaties are made ; and in all treaties concerning territoryboundaries are the principal consideration. How cana statesman ignorant of military geography understandthe strategic value of a proposed boundary or frontier-line ? So it is in daily life with the whole community ;the newspaper each morning tells us of military opera-tions, or of political situations likely to culminate inmilitary operations, in various quarters of the globe.The man who writes of these matters, and the readerwho wishes to understand them, must each have a clearknowledge of the general principles of military geo-graphy ; otherwise the one will be at fault in what hewrites, and the other will fail to grasp the importanceof the subject about which he is reading.War has been compared with the game of chess, butthe comparison is a poor one. In chess the player seeshis adversary's moves throughout ; and, except in sofar as the various pieces are restricted to certain routes,the moves are made on a level surface, without obstaclesof any kind. This may be war in theory, but in practicewar is an outdoor gamea rough-and-tumble played inthe open ; and the man who would win must knowdirectly or by analogythe ground on which the gameis to be played. A veilthe ' fog of war 'is drawnover his adversary's intentions ; they can only be sur-

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4 INTRODUCTIONmised ; but a knowledge of the country in which theenemy is operating, will assist materially in lifting theveil.

Deeply-laid plans are of little use without a know-ledge of the ground on which they are to be put intoexecution ; on the contrary, ignorance of the geographyof a theatre of operations has before now wrecked acampaign, and ignorance of the topographical detailsof a comparatively small area has cost thousands oflivese.g., in Natal, in January, 1900. The countrybetween the Upper Tugela and Ladysmith, although ithad been in British possession for upwards of half acentury, was unsurveyed and unknown. Yet groundalone is not everything ; for into military geographythere enter a hundred and one other things, each oftenseemingly in itself unimportant, but, when taken incombination with the others, producing results of thegreatest value.At one time the term ' military topography ' was

used in a wide sense to embrace everything connectedwith military geography ; now, however, it has cometo be regarded as perhaps a branch of military geography,but having more to do with survey work and reconnais-sances carried out during the course of a campaign.Used in this latter sense, therefore, it might almost besaid that military topography bears to military geographythe relation that tactics bears to strategy ; it deals withthe same materials, but under different conditions. Inthe planning of a campaign, the objects demandingmost attention are : the general ' relief ' of the theatre


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PLACE OF TOPOGRAPHY 6of war, especially with regard to ' lines of least resistance 'i.e., river-routesand natural centrese.g., railway-junctions; the general climate, with special reference tofrost hard enough to facilitate or interfere with trans-port, and rain heavy enough to damage roads or floodstreams; and economic questionse.g., the probablesupplies of food, remounts, etc., which can be relied on.

In the carrying out of this plan, items may have to bechanged, owing to immediate needs and particular con-ditions ; but it is always possible to apply to the newcase the general principles underlying the main scheme,whether the question is one of local geographical' relief ' and route or of local food and water supply.Now, strategy has been defined as ' the art of making

war upon a map'

(Jomini),and as ' the movements of

two armies before they come in sight of each other, orbefore they come within cannon-range ' (Biilow) ; whilethe term ' tactics ' is applied to all movements andoperations within striking distance of the enemy. In'Combined Training' (1902), strategy was defined as' the methods by which a commander seeks to bringhis enemy to battle,' and tactics as ' the methods bywhich he seeks to defeat him in that battle.' That isto say, strategy is concerned with the whole theatreof war, tactics with the battlefield ; though, as withgeography and topography, the one must of necessitycut into the other, and it is not possible to drawa hard - and - fast line between the two. Militarytopography, in fact, is part and parcel of militarygeography.


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6 INTRODUCTIONWithout good physical maps no strategist is able to

plan a campaign, and no general is able to carry theplan through ; but even the best maps fail to convey allthe necessary information. Besides the plan of cam-paign, the strategist has to consider the safest and mostsuitable situation for the base of operations, how thetroops will reach the base, how they can be suppliedwhen there. He has to consider the routes by whichthey can advance from the base into the enemy'scountry, how the supplies can follow them, and,when the army gets deeper into the enemy's country,where fresh supply-depots can be established and main-tained from the original base. He must know also thenature of the country, in order to decide the propor-tionate strength of the various arms of the service tobe employed, as well as the class of transport to beused ; which are the decisive strategical points ;* wherean endeavour should be made to give battle ; to whatextent an army can subsist on the country ; and howthe climate will affect the health of the troops. Inaddition, he has to calculate with considerable accuracyhow all his contemplated movements will be met by theenemy ; and he must therefore have some knowledgeof the temperament of the enemy. Neither can he

* The Archduke Charles says : ' A point is deemed strategicalwhen the possession of it secures important advantages for theintended operations. But it is decisive only when it assures thecommunications which lead to it ; when it is likely to be main-tained, and when it cannot be turned with impunity by theenemy; and, finally, when its position is such that we maystart from it in different directions.'


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NECESSARY INFORMATION 7neglect to consider the possibility of defeat and theconsequent retreat of his army.

These and many other matters have to be fully ap-preciated and carefully weighed before the first unit isput in the field. Then, when the plans of the strategistare completed, and the commanders of army corps,divisions, brigades, and battalions, take up the threadand commence operations, each one of them is con-tinually thinking of what is before him ; he is on strangeground, and if he has not studied its geography, he willbe working in the dark.To know all that can be known about the country

over which it is intended that an army shall operate,requires the collection of a mass of information, whichit would be impossible to put together in a hurry atthe last moment ; and such information, therefore, isalways being gathered in by the Intelligence Staffattached to the War Department of every civilizednation. The bulk of the information thus collected,however, is treated as private property, so that theordinary officer and the public are unable to benefitby it. The soundness of this policy it is not withinour province to discuss, though we would point out thatto be ignorant and unprepared is to court disaster, aswitness the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), for whichthe Germans had prepared themselves by long years ofcareful geographical study, while the French had neg-lected to make themselves acquainted with the militarygeography of even their own country, though they aresaid to have studied that of Germany. However, it is


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8 INTRODUCTIONno longer necessary to emphasize the teaching of theFranco-Prussian "War as to the value of geographicalknowledge, though one may still be amazed at theFrench inability to form an effective plan for the defenceof the Moselle, one of the most tortuous rivers of Europe.During actual hostilitiesi.e., when in touch with

the enemyminor reconnaissances are undertaken overlimited areas, in order to collect information which ithas been found impossible to collect beforehand ; butit is on his previous knowledge of the military geographyof the whole theatre of operations that the officer mustrely, if he is to successfully cope with the many diffi-culties likely to arise during the course of a campaign.To all intents and purposes, therefore, military geography,in its widest sense, may be considered to be a great re-connaisance report, concerning a wide area of country,prepared beforehand and available to the militarystudents of all nations ; and, other things being equal,victory will ultimately rest with the army of that nationwhose officers have realized in time of peace the im-portance of the study of the geography of war.

In order that the student of military history andmilitary geography may fully appreciate the worksthat he reads, he should already have acquired someelementary knowledge of strategy and tactics. Thusequipped, he can enter on his further studies with aclear understanding of the reasons for the movementsof each commander throughout a campaign ; but, untilhe has learnt the geography of the country in which theparticular campaign has taken place, he will be at a


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THEORY AND PRACTICE 9loss to understand why certain movements were or werenot made. The object of the present series is to dosomething to assist the student of military history

inhis course of reading ; it is hoped that it may suggestsuch lines of training in geography in general, and inmilitary geography in particular, that, for instance, onreading in his newspaper of a possible outbreak of hos-tilities between two Powers, an officer may be able, withthe aid of his maps, to form just opinions as to the planof campaign likely to follow the declaration of war. Inthe event of a man able to form such opinions beingcalled upon to take the field in a foreign country, hewould be able to anticipate the actual course of eventsin that countryhow the strategy of the campaignwould be influenced by the natural features of the land,as well as by such artificial things as fortresses, railways,roads, and telegraph-lines,how the tactical dispositionswould have to conform to the topographical details ofthe ground,and countless minor matters.

It is not, of course, imagined thatall difficulties in

warfare can be overcome by the previous study of mapsand military geography. It is at best only theory thatcan be propounded in this manner, and it is not at alldesirable that the military student should confine him-self to arm-chair study. The best school is practicalexperience in the field ; but, even if a man were ableto spend the whole term of his natural life on activeservice, he would still fail to meet with scores of theordinary problems of warfor they are innumerable ;and the officer who would be proficient in the art of


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10 INTRODUCTIONwar should know something of them all. Certainly,theory comes first ; but, when one's mind is ripe forthe acquirement of practical details, theory must becomplemented by travel in foreign countries, battle-fields should be visited, campaigns worked out on theactual ground. Then one realizes how far theoreticaltraining has been a benefit. ' The object of theory,'says Clausewitz, ' is to spare a fresh student the troubleof classifying and subdividing the subject he studies,in order that he may carefully examine it in allits bearings. Theory brings the subject before himclassified and arranged ; it forms the mind of thefuture commander, or, rather, it points out how he mayform it for himself.'

All that we are attempting to do in this series is toclassify and analyse the geography of past and prob"able theatres of war, and to present the result to thestudent in such form as will enable him to obtain afair starting-point for further study ; but there arecertain matters connected with military geography thatapply equally to nearly all countries.

In the first place, it cannot be too much emphasizedthat war has become in modern times very largely amatter of transport. Battles are vital, but occasional,crises ; marching is a normal condition ; food andmedicine for man and beast are daily necessaries.Indeed, the connection between war and commercemay become so intimate as to make the former an almostimpossible extravagance.In reading military history, one soon becomes aware


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LINES OF INVASION 11of the fact that, in Europe and elsewhere, certain generalroutes have from time immemorial been adopted bysuccessive invading armies.

The cause of this is notfar to seek ; the invader masses his troops on his ownfrontier, but the frontierwhether a natural one suchas a river or mountain range, or an artificial line ofboundary-posts on an open plaincan only be crossedby large armies at certain points, viz., where goodroads are to be found entering the enemy's country.Even the possession of a seaboard by the defenderdoes not naturally alter these conditions : an invaderarriving by sea desires only to land at points adjacentto roads; and, for the greater facility of landing histroops and for the safety of his transports, he willendeavour to possess himself of one or more of theenemy's harbours.Good roadsnowadays supplemented by railways

are essential to the movements of an army, and the oldmain-roads of most countries will be found to followthe course of the valleys, thus minimizing the engineer-ing difficulties of the early road-makers. So invadinglines have usually taken the valleys as the best meansof reaching the theatre of war, and railways have madelittle alteration in the general lines of invasion, for thesimple reason that the natural features of the landnever change, and therefore the main frontier crossing-points are practically the same to-day as they were athousand years ago. Moreover, the railways, wherethey have not been made purely for strategical purposes,tend to adhere to the course of the original roads. In


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12 INTRODUCTIONmountainous countries this is especially noticeable ; adeep narrow valley will frequently contain, by the sideof the river, the old main-road, and parallel with it themodern railroad, the latter only separating from theformer when the valley has to be left. The old roadthen crosses into the neighbouring valley by a mountainpass, while for the railroad a tunnel is cut through theobstructing hillside.That railways have increased the facilities for the

supply and movements of armies is, of course, undeni-able ; and that all the great European Powers have oflate years displayed immense energy in developingtheir military railway systems is true ; but at thesame time it must be understood that, when once theinvader enters the theatre of war, he cannot rely onbeing able immediately to use the enemy's railways,and he must, therefore, employ roads for the move-ment of his troops and supplies. This must always beso, and the importance of having good and many roadsfor military purposes will rather increase than diminishas the advantages of motor traction become recognised.

The general lines of invasion being so well known,everything has been done to close the avenues ofapproach ; the main crossing-places of rivers, the defilesand passes of mountains, and other points on probableinvasion routes, have all (in civilized countries) beenstrengthened by fortifications, in order to check theinvader's progress ; strategic railways have also beenconstructed with a view to expedite concentration atthreatened points. Still, the plans of a determined


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SEA-POWER 13enemy, though they may be delayed for a time, are notfrustrated by fortifications. He knows where they are,and he makes his arrangements accordingly. If, forexample, the passage of a river cannot be forced at onepoint, there are usually other points ; and, if all are equallystrongly fortified, and if the passage of the river cannotbe effected by surprise or other means, the invader hasrecourse to bombardments and sieges. But it is seldomthat the forces of a defending nation are sufficientlypowerful to admit of several large garrisons being lockedup in fortresses, and so debarred from acting on theoffensive. To say more about this, however, would beto go beyond the scope of the present work.Nor in a work dealing with geography rather than with

strategy would it be advisable to enter into such wideand interesting subjects as the command of the seaand the influence of sea-power on land campaigns.Many valuable books have in recent years been writtenon these matters,* and the whole question of sea-poweris in the minds of all maritime nations. So far asmilitary geography is concerned, it is the coast-linethat is of supreme importance to an invader ; and aboutthis a great deal can, of course, be discovered from goodmaps and charts. From these it is not too much toexpect to obtain full information as to the harbours,roadsteads, anchorage, soundings, tides, and currents ;but this will not suffice. It is necessary to know also* Notably by Captain A. T. Mahan, U.S. Navy; Lieutenant-

Colonel C. E. Caldwell, R.A. ; Sir G. S. Clarke; Dr. T. MillerMaguire ; etc.


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14 INTRODUCTIONabout the coast defences, e.g. even, if possible, where sub-marine mines or batteries are concealed, and how theseare armed. It is helpful to know also the nature of thewhole coast-line, whether sandy, rocky, shelving, orwith cliffs, and the country for some few miles inland,with the roads, hills, and commanding positions likelyto be taken up by the defenders. Some coast-lines arestudded with islands, while others are exposed to thefull force of the sea

; and all such things are important,since it is not only disembarkation that the invader hasto provide for, but also the possible re-embarkation ofthe army at some other point in the event of defeat.Similarly, a maritime power acting on the defensivemust be well acquainted with its own coast-line, mustknow where to expect an enemy to attempt a landing,and how best to oppose him. Again, when troops areto be conveyed long distances by sea, the coaling-stationsof the world have to be taken into consideration, for thecoal-carrying capacities of steamships are limited.Such necessary preliminaries of war are, however,

less important, for our present purpose, than study ofthe theatre of actual operations ; and, as far as that isconcerned, it cannot be too strongly impressed on themilitary student that, without a practically completeknowledge of the routes available for the movement oftroops, it is absolutely impossible to formulate anysuccessful plans. The whole essence of strategy istimely concentration for a decisive stroke. If theroutes to be followed are not known, or if their conditionis a matter of uncertainty, the best plans are likely to


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TRANSPORT 15fail ; and information is required not only about themain routes, but also about good branch or cross roads.Such information must be full ; everything must beknown about the roadway itself, the surroundingcountry, the bridges, and similar things.

The length of road occupied by an army on the marchis often forgotten ; but, to give an idea of what it is,we need only say that in Europei.e., under the mostfavourable circumstancesthe transport by rail of anordinary English Army Corps (say 40,000 men) wouldrequire at least one hundred very long trains for thecombatant section, and at least fifty more for baggage.By road the same unit would cover a continuous stretchof fifteen or sixteen miles, and in bad weather it wouldmake the road impassable for a second corps.Now, an Army Corps is, in European warfare, a mere

handful of men ; and it is obvious, therefore, that aninvading force must move by several roads, more orless parallel to one another. Moreover, each columnmust keep up communication with its neighbouringcolumn, or risk destruction by the enemy without thepossibility of support. As the campaign progresses, theimportance of being able to time a concentration ofseveral columns at a given point increases, and a faultycalculation of a few minutes may result in the loss of abattle. Again, it must be remembered that an armyrequires food, clothing, and ammunition ; sick have to beconveyed to the rear, and reinforcements sent forwardto replace them. Consequently, the roads must be notonly numerous, but also good, otherwise constant


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16 INTRODUCTIONtraffic will speedily destroy them. There are countlessinstances in modern warfare of the difficulties broughtabout by culpable ignorance of the condition of theroads, or how the weather would be likely to affect them ;much of this ignorance could have been avoided by aprevious study of the geography of the country, and bysome acquaintance with the general principles of land' relief ' and climate. Many of these instances will bereferred to later, when the various theatres of war andcampaigns are dealt with from a geographical andtopographical point of view.An army on the defensive also operates by severalroads. The object of the defender is, as a rule, the pro-tection of the capital or some strategic point ; and, asthe invader will be moving on his objective by

severallines, it is obviously necessary for the defender tobe able to oppose him on each principal avenue ofapproach.With regard to railroads, there is no great difficulty

in discovering all the routes that exist in the world,since modern maps show them clearly enough ; but thereare matters connected with them that are not so easyto discover, and which in warfare are importante.g.,the gauge, gradients, cuttings, embankments, tunnels,bridges, stations, rolling-stock, stores, and fuel depots,how and where the line can be destroyed or obstructed,and how repaired in the event of its destruction by theenemy.The importance of railways lies mainly in the fact

that both time and cost demand that all general, as


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ROADS AND RAILWAYS 17opposed to detailed, supplies should be sent by railnot by road, still less by by-roads ; and it seems probablethat this difficulty of supply, whether from the baseor from depots provided in the theatre of operations,will cause all great wars in future to be conductedstrictly along geographical 'lines of least resistance';indeed, the magnitude of the operations will be sogigantic that this will be the only possible means ofkeeping the large bodies of troopsmoving on more orless parallel linesin touch with one another, andproperly supplied with necessaries.

These ' lines of least resistance ' in all civilized landsare now the routes of trunk-railways ; and, as the invaderwill not be able to rely on local supplies of food even inthe most fertile districts, any more than the defendercan make certain of closing the railway by the destruc-tion of tunnels or viaducts, branch lines, especially thosewhich command the invader's road home or to his base,will be sometimes the objects of the finest strategy andthe scenes of the fiercest fighting.

Still more important will be transverse trunk-linescommanding the routes which would probably be usedas lines of operation. In Europe these routes certainlyrun east and west, and therefore the great ' isthmian 'railways will be of immense strategic importancee.g.,that from the Baltic to the Black Sea (Pillau to Odessa),where Europe suddenly narrows from 1,600 to 800 miles,with a water-parting between the two seas of under500 feet ; or that from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean(Bordeaux to Narbonne), where the distance is not

2


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18 INTRODUCTION250 miles, and the water-parting is not much over600 feet.

In both cases the countries concerned are movingtowards a large canal system, Kiev playing the part ofToulouse ; but Spain still commands the Garonne basin,as Constantinople commands the Black Sea, though inthe former case it is really a question of sea-power, andin the latter a question of land-power.The relief of the Garonne-Aude water-parting, especi-

ally in the Naurouze Pass, gives France no choice asto the route of such a canal, although the necessaryroute is commanded at both ends by the Ariege andUpper Aude valleys, which are dangerously convenientto the Segre tributary of the Ebro. But the ' relief ' ofWestern Russia allows the route of the proposed canalto be laid well within the western frontier, and almostevery section of it is behind some place of strength.Dunamiinde and Dvinsk (Diinaburg) protect the Diinaportion, and the connection with the Beresina is coveredwest and east by Vilna and Vitebsk ; the Beresina itselflies behind the unhealthy Pinsk marshes ; the fortressesof Bendery and Akkerman command the west flank ofthe Lower Dnieper ; and the two ends of the whole routeare controlled by the great naval stations of Libauand Nikolaiev. On the other hand, the Canal du Midiwill be perennially open, while the Russian waterwaywill be closed by ice for at least 130 days every year.

Canals such as these and large rivers, when availablefor transport, play an important part in a campaign ;but, as in the case of railways, it is necessary to know


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CANALS AND RIVERS 10full details concerning them, such as width, depth,rate of current, position of locks, liability to flood orto be frozen in winter, as well as the number anddescription of steamers and boats likely to be foundon them.

It is as obstacles, however, to the advance or retire-ment of armies that rivers or canals affect most theoperations of war. It may be necessary to bridge orford them, or to take up a defensive position alongtheir banks ; they may be so situated as to be a sourceof great annoyance, or as to materially assist the opera-tions. In any case their peculiarities should be known,and as much information as possible should be gatheredby everyone who is likely to operate in the neighbour-hood of a river, on such points as the bridges, ferriesand fords, the nature of the river bed and banks, whichbank commands the other, the situation of the bends,islands, tributaries, and the fortifications along itscourse.

Other natural obstacles to the operations of an armyare marshes, forests, and mountains. Of marshes, theprincipal information required is their extent, the roadsthrough them, their depth, whether they dry up insummer, and whether they are frozen over in winter,and, if so, sufficiently for the passage of troops. Forestsare of more importance : they may impede the progressof troops ; they may provide good cover, and thusconceal movements ; and their extent, shape, and natureenter into the serious matter of ' wood-fighting.' As asource also of fuel for the troops and of timber for

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20 INTRODUCTIONbridging and other purposes, their value is often con-siderable.

But it is the distribution of mountains that affectsmost directly the operations of war. A mountain rangemay form an obstacle or barrier to the one side, and atthe same time a strong defensive line to the other side ;if the range is formidable, it will probably be passableonly at a few points, which will, of course, be carefullyguarded. Again, mountains may be useful for screeningthe movements of troops, but they may also be dangerousas necessitating columns marching without the possi-bility of mutual support. Indeed, in mountainouscountries the usual methods of warfare cannot befollowed, and mountain warfare is a science of itself,complicated by the fact that mountaineers are speciallydangerous when on the defensive. The numerousobstacles and varied surface of their mountainoushomes have given them a lifelong training in the sub-division of armies and the handling of different kindsof troops, and such an experience develops exceptionalintelligence and resourcefulness in the individual soldier.But even low hills and undulating ground enter into

strategical and tactical calculations to a considerableextent ; and the more that is known about such features,the easier will be the conduct of the operations. Mapsof countries that have been properly surveyed, shouldshow clearly the height and all the ramifications of themountains, as well as the routes across them ; butmore information than this should be forthcoming, forit is important to know the nature of their slopes,


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MOUNTAINS AND SOIL 21whether wooded or rocky, whether in places precipitous,whether snow renders them impassable, and, if so,during what months of the year.Such approach to geographical ' omniscience ' impliesvery arduous study, but it should be aimed at, for ignor-ance of one vital detail may be fatal to the prospectsof a campaign, and ignorance of what can be discoveredwith a little trouble is the one unforgivable sin. Conse-quently, an officer should concern himself also withgeological or semi-geological matters, in order to get anidea of the general land-forms likely to occur, to arrangefor the construction of temporary roads, to make certainthat the water-supply will always be ample, to selectsites for camps, etc. Practice in sketching should havegiven him a fair working knowledge of the shape whichparticular formations of rock usually take ; but, thoughsuch knowledge may be very usefule.g., recognitionthat the water-supply is coming from magnesian lime-stone may prevent a serious epidemic of goitreit isnot essential. It is not the classified geological characterof the soil so much as its physical properties that oneneeds to knowthe properties which influence the dis-tribution of disease, e.g., temperature, dryness, porosity,freedom from organic impurity. There must sometimesbe no alternative to camping on damp, impervioussoil ; but the knowledge that it is impervious, which canbe proved by the spade in three minutes, enables someprecautions to be taken against diphtheria and lungdiseases, as against dysentery and enteric.The latter may be further guarded against by a


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22 INTRODUCTIONprevious study of even a single river-basin at home.There is scarcely one within 100 miles of Aldershotwhere a few experiments will not proveby usefulobject-lessons in testing waterthe main stream to bea much more dangerous source of water-supply than itstributaries ; and such experiments can be confirmed onlytoo easily by statistics of the actual spread of diseaseby a large main streame.g., the spread of cholera in1892 by the Volga, Don, Vistula, and especially the Elbe(at Hamburg).

Again, a fair working knowledge of ' climate ' may beof infinite use. Knowledge of the time when the rainyseason may be expected in any particular country,enables special precautions to be taken against entericsuch as might have saved many lives in and roundBloemfontein in 1900. So, warm weather, especiallywhen and where there has been considerable disturbanceof soil, may warn one against attacks of malaria, suchas the ' railway ' epidemics of 1893 in the Transvaaland 1895 at Galle ; colder weather, especially if foodhas run short, may be a hint that every possible cheeringinfluence should at once be employed to strengthen themen against attacks of typhus, such as were rampantin the Russo-Turkish and Franco-Prussian wars,especially in Metz.A severe winter, a scorching summer, heavy rains,sudden changes of temperature, bad water, will each andall swell the sick-rolls ; and it must be borne in mind that,even with the improved arrangements of modern times,for every man killed or wounded, ten will be invalided


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CLIMATE AND SUPPLIES 23to the rear. Climate and weather are factors in warfarewhich cannot be disregarded ; in no two countries arethey alike, and, since they are never constant, theyrequire peculiar attention, even apart from their effecton local supplies of food.

If provisions can be found on the spot, the labour offorwarding supplies from the base will be lessened ; butan army passing through even the most fertile provincesof Europe can subsist only for a very short time on thecountry. Still, in most civilized countries there aregranaries and supply depots of considerable size, andthe situation of all these should be known to the com-missariat officers of an invading army, who shouldlikewise be acquainted with the nature and amount ofthe growing crops, the timber available for fuel, thewater-supply, and other matters. Even in uncivilizedcountries there is usually something to be found ; apastoral people will have animals, and an agriculturalpeople will grow crops of some kind, and in both casesthe particular kind of food will probably be peculiarlysuited to the locality.

Lastly, there are the people, whose importance is atleast equal, if not superior, to that of the land on whichthey dwell; for not to know the enemy is to reckonwithout one's host. But it is not the enemy alone thathas to be studied, for an army may form part of anallied force, and the theatre of war may be in a friendly,though foreign, country. The racial peculiarities offriend and foe alike should, therefore, be studied, aswell as their numbers, religion, language, mode of living,


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24 INTRODUCTIONand habitations, the strength of their forces, theirarmaments, and their methods of warfare.

It is useful, also, to be acquainted with the tempera-ment of one's adversaryto have some idea, for instance,whether he will take the initiative or incline, rather, to apassive defence ; and this temperament is often theappropriate expression of the effect of the place on thepeople : it was not an accident that the deep ravinesof Aragon and wild mountains of Catalonia bred a raceof warriors, or that men like Henri IV. and Soult shouldcome from a land famous alike for its light infantry andcavalry horses.To the British officer more than to any other is such

information of importance ; for his campaigning-groundsare all over the world, and the conditions under whichhe takes the field are ever varying. He must be pre-pared for all eventualities ; therefore to him, more thanto any other, a good working knowledge of militarygeography is a matter of supreme importance.


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CHAPTER IITHE GENERAL GEOGRAPHY

The area here treated as the Balkan Peninsula is at oncemore and less than is generally included in the name ;for Roumania is included, and the ' Balkan ' provincesof Austria-Hungary are excluded. Reasons for theinclusion of Roumania will appear later ; the Austro-Hungarian provinces are excluded because they formnow such an important outpost of the dual monarchy,especially with reference to the command of theAdriatic, that they can scarcely be treated apart fromthe monarchy. On the other hand, the peculiar fitness ofthe area, especially in Herzegovina, for guerilla warfare,as well as its Servian sympathies, may almost be inferredfrom what is said about Montenegro and Servia.The latter is the only country in Europe except

Switzerland that has no sea-coast ; and, therefore, evenif it did not contain an enormously important inter-national through-route, its relations with its neighbours,more particularly those on the ' Continental ' side,would be delicate and difficult.To a certain extent this is also true of Roumania and

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26 THE GENERAL GEOGRAPHYBulgaria, with their common control of the internationalwaterway of the Lower Danube ; but the waterway,though much improved in late years, has becomerelatively less important since the completion ofthe Orient-Express route to Constantinople, the onecentre in the peninsula where land and water controlare equally important, and can be exercised with equalease.

The whole peninsula is, of course, a natural linkbetween the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, as wellas between Europe and Asia, and its typical featuresemphasize this ; but its intricate geography was alwaysadverse to its becoming a satisfactory political unit,and its history as the Vanguard of the West still furthercomplicated the matter by an unblending intermixtureof peoples. Consequently, both the political difficultiesand the commercial possibilities are focussed round theGolden Horn.The different destinies of the Iberian and Balkan

peninsulas might almost be read in the difference of theirlinks with Continental Europe ; for the one is essentiallyisolated by the formidable double range of the Pyrenees,while the other is closely joined by a waterway whichhas mountains on both sides of it nowhere except atone pointthe Iron Gates of Orsova. The Danubeis deep enough and broad enough to be very usefulfor trade and a great military obstacle, thoughinformation has been carried across it by a strongswimmer with impunityunder a hail of bullets fromthe northern bank ; but every facility for access inland


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SEA-COAST 27is given by its Morava tributary, the valley of which isthe real land-link between north and south.The sea-link has a double importance. As far as

north and south traffic is concerned, the Austrian goalof Salonica is the terminus of the shortest route betweenthe Suez Canal and Central or Eastern Europe, and itneed not fear competition from Corinth. The Corin-thian Canal is, indeed, a shorter and safer route fromBrindisi than the one south of the Morea, and has theattraction of very fine scenery ; but, even if it couldbe used at all in time of war, the bed of the canalonly 52 feet wide, compared with 72 on the Suezistoo narrow for the really important traffic. At present,no doubt, there is a somewhat similar objection to theport of Salonica, which is being silted up by the Vardarafter its tumultuous descent from the 10,000 feet ofShar Dagh ; but the cost of dredging would be com-paratively insignificant.As far as east and west traffic is concerned, there is

a paucity of harbours except on the constricted partsof the route, and the length of these parts is often notrealized. For forty miles west, i.e., foewards, of thegreat naval station of Gallipoli, the Strait of the Dar-danellesknown to the Turks as Bahr Sefid Boghaz(the Mouth of the White Sea)is never more thanabout 7,000 yards wide, and sometimes less than 1,500 ;and for twenty miles east, i.e., again foewards, of Con-stantinople the Bosporusor Boghaz (the Mouth)isgenerally less than 3,000 yards wide, and in some placesless than 800.


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28 THE GENERAL GEOGRAPHYThe deficiency of harbours, of course, increases the

importance of the few which are available, as Volos ;but political considerations demand the use of very-inferior ports, most of which are mere roadsteads.The Balkan coast of the Black Sea, reflecting thepeculiar features of the Danube trough, is low andmarshy in the north, and barren and rocky in the south ;in the one case Sulina monopolizes attention, while inthe other neither Varna nor Burgas reaches even secondrank as a port. A similarly rocky coast girds theMorea from the Gulf of Nauplia to the Gulf of Patras ;the Akrokeraunian coast is simply precipitous ; andelsewhere most of the natural landing-points are eithersurrounded by low and unhealthy marshes, as at Artaand Mesolonggi, or front on to very shallow water, asnorth of Cape Glossa.The deficiencies of the mainland are, no doubt, more

or less compensated by the islands ; but the importanceof the latter, especially of Crete, has been exaggerated.The Cretan soil is fertile, and the climate is much moresalubrious than is generally supposed ; but the supplyof ports is very scanty. In calm weather the roadsteadsof Sphakia and Hierapetra* can be used for peacefulpurposes, and large vessels can anchor with safety inSitia Bay except during an easterly gale ; but the onlysafe refuge for vessels of all sizes in all kinds of weatheris Suda Bay.

Again, Delosprobably from historical associationshas a reputation beyond its merits. Its old impor-* Or Gerapetra or Kasteli.


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SEA-COAST AND PORTS 29tance, outside the sphere of superstition, was due to itscentral position between Corinth and Miletus rather thanto any command of the iEgean Sea. Melos, with atleast an equally good harbour, has a better strategicalposition, and the commercial centre of the area iscertainly Hermoupolis (Syra).At the same time, perhaps, more attention is due to

the islands immediately off the coast, such as Corfu,which is at once fertile, very near the mainland, and pro-vided with an excellent harbour off an otherwise harbour-less coast ;Poros, which commands the approach fromthe south to the Gulf of iEgina, as Zante commands thatto the Gulf of Patras ;and Thasos, with availableports in both the north-east and the south-west, orEuboea, equally valuable as a bulwark from the absenceof such ports. But almost everywhere the islands,with their coves, caves, and wooded denieslike alarge proportion of the mainlandare much moresuitable for smuggling, piracy, and guerilla warfare, thanfor formal military or naval operations.

In this respect Greece is a typical area. The coastis at least twice as long in proportion to the size as thateven of Great Britain, and the surface is an intricatesystem of mountains, most of which run out into thesea as bold peninsulas. It was always easiest, therefore,to conduct even domestic trade by sea ; and the windingbays and wooded islands offered every facility forillegitimate trade and informal hostilities. Internallythe valleys are so near to one another that intercoursecould not be avoided, which encouraged trade, but so


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30 THE GENERAL GEOGRAPHYsmall and compact that they could easily be governedfrom single centres, which developed faction, thoughcommon

speech,common

religion,and common gamesdid tend to unity.

This is more or less true of the whole peninsula, andhelps to explain the far from scientifically accurateethnological statistics. The general character of thearea is that of a series of mountain-crowned plateaus,furrowedlike the Iberian plateauwith very deepriver-valleys ; and it is scarcely an exaggeration to saythat every important fluvial basin has its own distinctspeech, creed, and political interests, resulting naturallyin the profound unrest which is such a terrible drag onsocial and economic progress. Hope lies in the rulingout of minor interests.In this expanse of mountainous tableland there arethree knots round which definite interests seem to befocussed, or where rival interests clash. Of the three,the Bulgarian knot, with its trinity of heights inMuss-Alla, Rila, and Vitosa, is really the most im-portant ; and its features are a curious comment on, ifnot a reasonable explanation of, Bulgarian ambitions.

Its river systems drain to the four winds, and dominatethe eastern half of the peninsula. The two least im-portant, the northern and southern, those of the Iskerand the Struma, far overlap, and approach withintwenty miles of each other, though the actual gorge ofthe Isker is not passable, and the Struma gorges belowKostendil are as difficult as the pass over the shoulderof Vitosa (7,518 feet) to Sofia. The two most im-


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MOUNTAIN SYSTEM 31portant, those of the Nisava (Morava) and Maritsa,make the Sofia basin the strategic centre of the peninsula.Their typical valleys are too narrow and too steep forany natural routes n.e.s.w., except at Sofia, wherethe projected Bucharest - Salon ica route crosses theBelgrade-Constantinople route ; and, therefore, trafficis forced into the Dragoman and Vakarel Passes. TheOrient-Express route goes round, not actually through,Trajan's Gatethe old landmark between Illyrium andthe Orient ; but that point is the epitome and climaxof the controlling forces in the funnel-head where theBalkan and Rhodope (Despoto Dagh) ranges meet.What Muss-Alia is to Bulgaria, Shar Dagh is to Servia ;and there will be no permanent peace in Servia so longas ' Old Servia ' is more correctly known as the Turkishvilayet of Kossovo, or the Austrian garrison of Novi-Bazar can picnic on the site of Raskha. In the mean-time the traditions of Prizren and Ipek, facing eachother across the White Drin Valley from the base ofShar Dagh and of Shlieb, lose nothing by retelling inthe Monastery of Studenica, at the base of theKopaonik.Again we have rivers draining to every point of the

compassthe Drin, Vardar, Morava, and Ibar ; and informer times Prizren, which more or less commands theupper basins of all the four, was the natural militaryand political centre. Now Skoplje (Uskiib) is moreimportant than Prizren, as Mitrovitsa is than Novi-Bazar ; for the gully between the Shar Dagh and Muss-Alla knots is a great commercial route, while the old


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32 THE GENERAL GEOGRAPHYRoman road across the rugged Albanian highlands haslittle or no value even for military emergencies.The strategic centre of the Hellenic area is theMetsovo Pass, below the Zygos knot of the Pindus.The old Roman and military road to Byzantium, theVia Egnatia, naturally started from Dyrrhachium(Durazzo), and used the Shkumbi and Vardar valleysas the shortest route to Salonica ; and in those days,as in the time of the Crusades, the command of thesetwo valleys and the convergence of roads on the lowerend of Lake Okhrida made Albanon (Elbasan),Herakleia (Monastir), and Lychnidos (Okhrida), theimportant centres. The Shkumbi valley is still the mostvulnerable point of Albania, which is split by it intotwo portions; but Albania has no separate politicalexistence, and the key even of a large part of it lies inthe easier valley of the Viosa (Voyutsa), which practi-cally commands the strategic centre of Berat north-wards, and leads southwards directly up to the MetsovoPass. This pass is also the natural objective of theArta and Aspropotamo (Mesolonggi) valleys from thesouth-west, the lower Vistritsa valley from the north-east, and the Salamvria vallev from the south-east :and the last is already provided with a railway fromKalabakaacross the battlefield of Pharsalosto theport of Volos and the great grain-market of Larissa.The head of rail between Kalabaka and Trikkala com-mands, therefore, the natural routes between Thessalyand Albania, Epirus (Yanina), and Macedonia (Salonica).The mountain systems of which these knots are the


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'BUFFER' STATES 33vital points, may be roughly described as lying in twoanglesobtuse in the west, and acute in the east\< ], converging precisely at the point where now

Serb, Bulgarian, and Turkish frontiers meet ; and, whenpolitical maps begin to shadow geographical features,as commercial maps must always do, it may be assumedthat the settlement is at all events more or less a naturalone. The balance of power lies, therefore, considerablyto the north of the peninsula ; and it is noticeable thatthe whole mass deliberately turns its back on Italy,even the Ionian islands doing the same. In any case,the Pindus is suitable only for guerilla warfare ; and,as the Rhodope range is utterly impracticable, theBalkans remain as the one possible area for formalmilitary operations. That is to say, as far as themountain system is concerned, Bulgaria is the mostimportant factor in the political problem.The real importance of a ' Buffer State ' depends on

the risk of its neutrality being violated either by itsown Government or by a victorious neighbour. In thecase of a country like Switzerland, which is entirelycut off by other nations from the outside world, itsneutrality is guaranteed by the fact that its very exist-ence depends on its remaining neutral ; but in the caseof a country like Bulgariaespecially when its neigh-bours are at a stage of civilization considerably belowthat of France, Germany, Italy, and Austriathere isno such guarantee.

It happens, too, that Bulgaria is physically a typical,or ideal, Buffer State, consisting essentially of the Balkan

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34 THE GENERAL GEOGRAPHYMountains with their ' Russian ' and ' Turkish ' fore-grounds. This position and ' relief ' make it an admirablebase for offensive operations or defence against them,especially northwards ; but the instincts of the people,following the richer and lower slope of their land, are forexpansion southwardsi.e., the annexation of the Slavpart of European Turkey, especially Macedonia. Thatis to say, the national ambition conflicts with that ofServia and Greece as well as with that of Austria-Hungary.Northwards the Balkan foreground consists of a

terraced plateau of limestone and sandstone largelycovered with loose and porous, but very fertile, soil(loess) ; and the rivers which descend to the Danubethrough this formation, in the normally dry climate,have naturally ploughed for themselves narrow steep -sided channels (canons). This characteristic, added tothe fact that both summer and winter are very dry,causes the plateau to be curiously deficient in water,and therefore in good fodder ; and, though the fertilesoil produces abundance of grass under the spring andautumn rains, the loose soil is converted by them intoa sea of mud. From the military point of view, how-ever, there are compensations, for it is only necessaryto watch the few fords or bridges across a river wherethe gulley can be ascended, in order to guard the wholeline.

It adds to the difficulty of locomotion that the riversconstantly change their direction, and flow, with amarked independence of one another, to separate con-


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BULGARIAN ROADS AND RAILWAYS 35fluences with the Danube, involving at least half a dozenserious crossings on a journey from east to west acrossthe country ; and therefore the essential object ofroad-making was to skirt the Danube from Vidin toSilistria, and the Balkans from Vraca to Varna, withlinks between the strategic centres on both lines. Withthe advent of railways, less dependent than roads onthe ordinary ' relief ' of the land, it became feasible tomake the shortest (in time) route between Sofia andVarna a railway, capable of supplying either of theroad-routes between, and parallel to, which it runs,and covering the 300 odd miles between capital and port,via, the fortress-depot of Plevna, in less than twenty-fourhours.

This railway is of supreme importance, because itascends the valley of the Iskerpreviously impassablethe only river which cuts across the Balkans, and inthe valley of which, therefore, there must be one of thegreat strategic centres of the peninsula. This centrewas bound to be where the Belgrade-Constantinopleroadthe Orient-Express linecrosses the Tsker-Struma roadthe projected Bucharest-Salonica linei.e., Sofia.The railway connects (cf. p. 58) with the Danube at the

centre of the river-frontier near Nikopoli, the river-bankbeing in itself an excellent bulwark and very easilyfortified. In the first place, it is hard and high, whilethe opposite shore is low and swampy ; and the naturalcurve of the riverwhich represents, as in the case ofthe Po, the exact superiority of the northern tributaries

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36 THE GENERAL GEOCxRAPHYover the southern in pace and volumemakes the southbank always command the north. Further, as almostall the islands lie along the north bank, there is no coverin the southern waters for an attack on the Bulgariancoast. The chief ' passages ' are, however, also pro-tected by fortresses, especially at the frontier posts ofSilistria and marsh-girt Vidin, and at Rushchuk, thefarthest point eastward from which a railway can runat a safe distance inside, but parallel to, the Roumanianland-frontierto the port of Varna, i.e., from theDanube to the Black Sea, in direct rivalry of the Cer-navoda-Kustenji line.Rushchuk is, of course, not the only fortress between

Vidin and Silistria. Wherever a convex reach of theriver ' holds a pistol to the opposite bank 'e.g., atTutrakan (Turtukai), opposite the estuary of the Arges(Arjish) and the Arges valley route to Bucharestsomeattention has been paid to defensive works, just ascommercial ports have been developed where concavereaches give a certain amount of access inlande.g., atLorn Palanka and Svistov (Sistova). But Rushchuk,like the submontane positions of Shumla and Vraca,is a divisional headquarters, and needs special defenceat the same time that it has special advantages.The main routes from the fortresses and passages of

the Danube converge in the first instance on railway(old road) stations in the central zonee.g., Plevna andRazgradprevious to concentrating on bases of opera-tion for the Balkan passese.g., Trnovo and Shumla,Lovca and Osman - Bazar, Pravadia and Bazarjik ;


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BULGARIAN FORTRESSES 37and the distribution of these bases reflects the differencebetween the eastern and western sections of the rangeand between their northern and southern slopes.The extreme length of the Balkans is from Cape

Emine to the Tirnok, the valley of which was the oldRoman thoroughfare to and from Transylvania. Theyare rounded hills, richly wooded, and rocky only towardsthe base ; and there are at least thirty more or lesspracticable driving-roads across them, though most ofthem are of very little importance. The position of theBulgarian quadrilateral (Rushchuk, Silistria, Shumla,and Varna), now unimportant, would suggest that theeastern section of the range is naturally the weaker ;and none of the numerous eastern roads seem to reachany height above 1,600 feet. But there is more in theproblem, and it is not a new problem. The passes ofthe Hindu Kush (Killer of Hindusby avalanches)have been for centuries the chosen routes for traffic, inspite of the well-earned name of the range, because asingle great scramble, though necessary, is sufficient tocross the whole range ; and the choice of Andermatt as amilitary centre, and of the Brenner Pass as the routeof the first Transalpine railway, are comments on thesame problem.

In the case of the Balkans, the route from Sliven toTrnovo or Shumla (Sumen) through the Demir Kapu(Iron Gate) Pass is the most easterly pass which givesaccess between Bulgaria proper and Roumelia, with asingle climb of 3,600 feet. In the west the whole StaraPlanina section of the range is a single ridge, and even


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38 THE GENERAL GEOGRAPHYthe longitudinal route from Sofia to Lorn Palanka, viaBerkovica, ascends to over 4,700 feet in the GinciPass.The considerable height of even the most important

passes is a feature common to the whole range. It isusually at least as great as that of Snowdon, and theShipka is nearly 1,000 feet higher than that. West ofthe Yantra valley, too, they are overhung by peaks oftwice that height, which are covered with snow till themiddle of June. Apart from climatic results, this ismore important on the south than on the north of therange, for the slope to the low Maritsa plain is muchsteeper and rougher than that to the comparativelyhigh Bulgarian plateau ; and this, so long as there isunity of race on both sides of the range, increases itsstrategic value to the principality.

Obviously, however, the possession by an enemy ofVarna or Burgas turns the east end of the range, as thepossession of Sofia turns the west end ; and it mightseem from the decreasing height of the ' Little ' Balkanseastward that it could also be easily turned by a Varna-Burgas land-route. There is such a route, and it is ofa double character ; but it contains a series of verystrong, though low, defensive positions, and, even ifundefended, offers serious obstacles. Its only advant-ages are that the actual coast-road, via Misivri, is moreor less commanded from the sea, and that communica-tion with the parallel Aiwajik road can be kept upby the transverse valleys of the rivers which both routescross at right angles.


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THE BALKAN MOUNTAINS 39In any case, the Nadir Derbend Pass between Aitos

and the road and rail junction of Pravadia offers abetter route only a few miles to the west. The Nadirowes its alternative name of Kiskgetshid (Forty Fords)to the fact that it can be forded almost everywhere atany season of the year ; and again there are parallelroutes connected by transverse valleys. The Koprikoiroute goes through one very dangerous defile, butcrosses the main stream of the Kamcik or Kamchyk(The Stony) below the confluence of its two head-streams (The Wild and The Tame) ; the Jenikoiroute avoids the defile, but crosses the two head-streamsseparately. The pass is inferior to the Dobral (1,465feet), but has often been used by artillery ; and theroad surface is certainly not worse than it used to be.The really critical points, however, are the two ends

of the Great Balkansthe Upper Isker valley and theShipka Pass, and the central route across the LittleBalkansthis Dobral Pass. The construction of therailway has made the Upper Isker much the easiestand most important, even apart from its command ofthe Orient-Express route ; Sofia and Tatar Bazarjikcontrol the whole road system through or round Trajan'sGate, and the Maritsa valley is the natural ' line of leastresistance ' on Adrianople and Constantinople.The Dobral Pass, though the most difficult, is most

convenient for a line of advance supported by sea. Theprincipal roads from Rushchuk and Silistria as well asfrom Varna and the Dobruja converge on Shumla, andfrom Shumla there are two routes on the pass, the sea-


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40 THE GENERAL GEOGRAPHYward route, via Smadova, being the better for guns.The landward route via Eski Stambul,* can be supported,however, from farther west by a road from Osman-Bazar, via Kazan, the latter avoiding the Dobral alto-gether, and joining the other road at Karnabat. Inboth cases the difficulties of the route decrease south-ward. (Cf. The Koja Balkan Pass, p. 52.)The Shipka Pass also has a comparatively easy,

though very winding, approach from the souththeKazanliik valley ; and the northward Yantra valleypresents few of the difficulties presented farther east-ward by the two transverse branches of the Kamcik.Trnovo is also an even more important road-junctionthan Shumla ; and so this pass is the most used andthe most important strategically. But the route itselfis not easy, and the Demir Kapu support debouchesfifty miles east of Kazanliik. It may be added that theimportance of the Shipka Pass has been magnified bythe vast military operations of which it has been thescene ; but the reputation of the most extensive wasoriginally due to Suleiman's despatches about his ownexploits, and their extent was the result of his disgrace-ful incompetence or deliberate treachery rather than tothe geographical importance of the position.The mountain system thus gives the balance of

power to Bulgaria, but the river system gives it toServia, though the Serbs must bestir themselves if theymean to keep it. Their rivals are the Austrian rulersof the sister-land of Bosnia, which resembles Servia very

* Prjeslav.


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THE RIVER SYSTEM 41closely in the character of its rivers, its climate, itseconomic products, and its Slav inhabitants ; but itsTeutonic rulers have developed a fine road system,which is sorely lacking in Servia, to feed the railway,and are projecting a fine railway system. The Bosna-Narenta line already connects the main Austro-Hun-garian system with the fortresses of Sarajevo, Mostar,and Trebinje, and through them with the ports ofMetkovicz, Gravosa (Ragusa), and Zelenika (Cattaro) ;and Russian intrigues in Herzegovina and Montenegrooffer sufficient reason, on strategic grounds, for extend-ing the line from Sarajevo through the ' Austrian 'Sanjakof Novi-Bazar to the Mitrovitsa terminus of theTurkish branch-line from Uskiib. This extension willgreatly strengthen Austria's strategic and commercialposition as against both Servia and Montenegro. Aslight manipulation of rates will followon the initiationof the large Austrian capital in the Turkish linewhichwill kill the Salonica traffic of the Servian section of theline ; and passengers may find the Austrian route toSalonica the more beautiful and the less subject tounpleasant interruptions from the local ' brigands.'The main water-parting of the peninsula is so high

and so near the west coastwithin five miles in Monte-negrothat all the westward rivers are short and tor-rential, even those which trend northward or south-ward, as the Viosa and Aspropotamo, being of no usewhatever for navigation, and having no very importantroads along their banks. But there is a secondarywater-parting between Shar Dagh and Muss-Alla,


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42 THE GENERAL GEOGRAPHYthrowing off rivers northward and southward from aminimum height of only 1,300 feet between the Moravaand Vardar, and of not much more than 2,300 feetbetween the Isker and Maritsa.The history of the romantic Kossovo-Polye (Plain of

Blackbirds), even before it was known by its hatedalternative Teutonic title of Amselfeld, suggests thatthe Upper Ibar valleythe precise route of the pro-jected extension of the Bosnian railwayturns thevallev of the main stream of the Morava ; and the low-ness of the water-parting implies easy and cheap work-ing of the railway, though at Vranya, a mile or two westof the river, the line rises above the minimum of thewater-parting.The result is that the political and commercial rela-

tions of the three chief rivers, the Morava, Maritsa, andVardar, which may roughly represent Serb, Bulgarian,and Turkish influences, give the balance of power toServia. Sofia, like Uskiib, controls only one of thegreat through-routes. Nis, although it can be turnedvia the Ibar

valley,controls both. Belgrade not onlycontrols both, but also commands the Lower Ibar

valleyby rail to the arsenal of Kraguyevac, and byroad past the site of Pompey's old fort at Kralyevoandhas, like Nis, easy access to the only good supplies ofcoal in the whole peninsula.The height and position of the main water-parting,besides being a great obstacle to east and west traffic,

put the peninsula climatically and commercially intorelations with the Black Sea rather than the Mediter-


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CLIMATE AND TRANSPORT 43ranean. This involves the certainty of very heavy snow,and the almost more trying uncertainty of the timeand intensity of frost. For instance, in 1902 the frostcame so early (December 6) and so suddenly thatthirty-eight steamers were frozen up for the winterbetween Braila and the coast, and considerably over120 loaded barges suffered a similar fate betweenBraila and Rushchuk. (Of. p. 160.)

Another result of the ' continental ' exposure is theprevalence of bleak, dry north-east winds, which raisestorms of dust, especially off the loose, porous soil ofthe Bulgarian plateau. Winds of this kind blow acrossRoumania on five days out of twelve throughout thewhole year, when the passage of a flock of sheep alonga typical road may raise enough dust to screen themovements of quite a large body of men. These dust-storms are, naturally, worst on the plains, and muchworse on the exposed loess plain of the Danube than onthe sheltered alluvial plain of the Maritsa ; but theyare not confined to the plains, as was shown by theexperiences of 1885 on the steep descent from theDragoman Pass to Slivnica.

Again, the absence of protection on the north-east,coupled with the low atmospheric pressure over theDanube basin in early summer, favours the accessinland of strong currents of humid air off the chillysurface of the Black Sea

;and this causes constant

rainsprecisely at the season otherwise most suitablefor operationswhich convert the loose soil into aliquid the colour and consistency of porridge. Only


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44 THE GENERAL GEOGRAPHYa gunner, perhaps, can fully appreciate the meaningof ' Coming up the hill, after leaving Voditzka, all theguns stuck in the mud, and we had to put fourteenhorses to each gun and caisson, and so bring them upone by one.'

In the south and south-west, on the other hand, theclimate is ' Mediterranean,' and movement of troopsfrom the one belt to the othere.g., of Suleiman's forcefrom the Montenegrin coast to the Shipkamust beaccompanied by the strictest sanitary precautions, forthe conditions are almost diametrically opposite. Inthe ' Mediterranean ' area the rain can come only fromsouth and south-west winds, and these winds are' traded ' into the north ' Etesian ' winds when thesource of the Trade-winds moves northward with theincreasing heat, so that dry, healthy weather prevailsthere at the very time when the rains are commencingin the north-east. In autumn and winter, when thesource of the Trade-winds moves south with the sun,the south-west winds blow undisturbed over a sea whichis still evaporating against land which is already cooled.The consequent rains bring a perfect scourge ofmalaria, not only to lowland areas such as the plainsof Kampania and Kopais, but also to the sunken' saucers ' of the highlandse.g., the Monastir basin.In the latter the disease seems to be endemic ; in theformer it is due partly to bad tillage, especially in theregulation of surface water, and partly to the historicexodus of the lowlanders into the less accessible hills toescape from their Turkish oppressors.


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CLIMATE AND DISEASE 45Perhaps the greatest climatic danger, however

greatest because most underratedlies in the greatextremes and sudden changes of temperature fromday to night in the ' continental ' area, especially withinreach of the Danube fogs ; and the essential and soleprecaution is good food combined with good woollenclothing. Baker's splendid, but little remembered, actionat Tashkessen, if it proved nothing else, proved thevalue of such precautions.The supply of good food is a matter of some difficulty.

even if the natives are sympathetic ; but the cause isnot want of fertility. In Servia, for instance, there aretwo crops of hay, wheat, and barley every year, whichsufficiently explains the otherwise puzzling superabun-dance of

(very primitive) flour-millsin the countryand the great stores of grain in the State granaries.

The truth is that the relation of climate to ' relief ' inthe various parts of the peninsula has led to a gooddeal of specialized agriculture on lines not calculated toguarantee large supplies of necessaries at least, fortroops whose standard of comfort is measured by wheatenbread ; and the great extension, for political reasons, inCentral Europe of east-and-west trunk railways, con-verging on a single huge port such as Hamburg, haschecked the natural gravitation of products on thenearest ' line of least resistance.' That is to say, theroute is decided by the destination ; and the destina-tion is in the big markets of North-western Europe.Thus, necessaries drain north-westwardi.e., awayfrom the peninsular massby rail ; and luxuries, such


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46 THE GENERAL GEOGRAPHYas currants and salad-oil, raw silk and attar-of-roses,are not regarded as equivalents by the authorities ofthe Army Service Corps.The soil is very poor on the dry exposed uplands, but

remarkably rich in the sheltered river-valleys ; and inmost parts of the peninsula animals are usually ob-tainable, though not always of the most desirable kind.For instance, in the regions of summer rains, where thehills are covered with dense forests of oak and beech,and the lowlands with miles of maize, there are enormousherds of swine, especially in Servia and Roumania.Indeed, it has been said that, since the days of PrinceMilosh the Pig-driver, 'the foreign policy of Serviaalways brings us back to pigs.' On the dry, treelessslopes of the central and southern hills, on the otherhand, sheep and goatsof poor qualityare equallynumerous. Game, too, is plentiful almost everywhere ;deer and wild-pigs haunt the wooded districts ; fish-generally of a coarse kindare so abundant, especiallyin the Danube, that they attract vast flocks of water-fowl ; pheasants and geese are characteristic of theavifauna, and Servia is famous for its partridges ;poultry and eggs are incredibly abundant in the graindistricts, especially in Roumania ; and the small andugly native horses are wonderfully hardy and sure-footed.The export of maizethe staple of home consump-tion alsofrom the Lower Danube basin is larger thanfrom any other country in the world except the United

States, and nearly all of it comes from the low Wal-


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PRODUCTS AND SUPPLIES 47achian plain and the Morava valleyi.e., the banks ofthe two most important waterways in the peninsula.The higher and drier Bulgarian plateau produces wheatrather than maize, but in sufficient quantities forexport ; and the sheep and cattle are of good quality,though small in size. Even in this area, however, thereare difficulties of supply. All the surplus grain isgenerally exported as soon after harvest as possible,partly to insure its getting away before the Danubeis frozen ; and the numerous caves in the limestoneand the abundance of scrub offer great facilities tothe natives, if unsympathetic, for secreting both grainand cattle.A greater difficultyas already statedis the use of

the land for other purposes than the production of neces-saries. For instance, a very large proportion of the bestsoil in Servia, as in Bosnia, is devoted to plum-orchards ;in the Tunja basin the special product is roses, for scent;in the Maritsa basin it is the mulberry, for silk produc-tion ; in the Vardar valley it is opium or tobacco ; andround the Gulf of Patras it is the currant crop. Conse-quently, invaders would have to bring supplies with themfrom the north by rail, and from the south by sea.


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CHAPTER IIIBULGARIA

What is now called United Bulgariai.e., Bulgariaproper and Eastern Roumeliais a rectangular countryrather larger than Ireland, less than 250 miles in extremelength from west to east, and less than 150 miles inextreme breadth from north to south.Within this area there is a population of nearly

3,000,000 persons, as mixed in race and creed, andtherefore as difficult to govern, as in other typicalareas of Eastern Europe. The masssome 2,900,000are Bulgarians, descendants of a ' Yellow ' race whocenturies ago adopted the language, customs, and creedof the Slav ' White ' races whom they conquered, andwho may now be regarded as Slavs ; but south of theBalkans a typical Bulgarian might still easily be mis-taken for a Finn, and the temperament of the peoplestill has an undercurrent of the ' Yellow ' elementeven in such an insignificant detail as a ' Chinese 'aptitude for gardening. Their language is somewhatsimilar to the Russian, and the Russian characters are

48


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POPULATION 40used ; but many of the better educated persons speakEnglish fluently.Next in number to the Bulgarians come the Turkish

inhabitants, who are found mainly in three ' strategic 'areasbetween Silistria and Varna, Shumla and Yam-boli (Jambol), Sofia and Plevna; they are the de-scendants of settlers encouraged if not actuallyimportedby the rulers of Constantinople to act aspro-Turkish and pro-Muhammadan leaven.There is also a fair sprinkling of gipsies, Roumanians,and Greeks, distributed more or less generally over thewhole area, along with small groups of Jews, Tatars,and Armenians, and still smaller units of Germans andAustrians, Albanians, Russians, Czechs, Servians, andItalians.Of this motley crowd the vast majority belong to theOrthodox Greek Church ; but, in consequence of apolitical demand for religious autonomy (in 1870), theBulgarian Greek Church was declared by the Patriarchof Constantinople to be outside the Orthodox Com-muniona declaration as mischievous as it was mis-guided. The Turks and some of the Albanians areMuhammadans, the Albanian Moslems showing char-acteristic ' pervert ' zeal ; the Jews belong to theMosaic Communion ; and the Armeniansof whom itis said in the East that ' an Armenian is worse than nineJews 'are Gregorians.On all the adult and able-bodied males of thispopulation, whatever their race or creed, military ser-vice is obligatory from the age of twenty (eighteen in

4


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50 BULGARIAtime of war) to that of forty-seven, the only exceptionsbeing men found physically unfit and ministers ofreligion.This gives the army a peace footing of about 2,000officers and 44,000 men, and a war footing of about5,000 officers and 290,000 men (including mountedgendarmerie and partly-trained men *) The cavalryform about one-ninth of the total, and the artilleryconsists of seventy-two field batteries and nine mountainbatteries, with three fortress battalions. It is estimatedthat a field army of 150,000 could be mobilized withinten days, consisting entirely of well-trained and well-disciplined men, most of them really good marksmen.To this must be added a small naval contingent ; but

the navy is limited to one gunboat of 700 tons (with sixquick-firing guns), three armoured gunboats of 500 tonsapiece, two torpedo-boats of 300 and 600 tons respec-tively, five transports, and a few small steamers. Thisseems to be sufficient for the 200 miles of coast on theBlack Sea, where there are only two vital pointssomefifty miles apartVarna and Burgas, though troops havebeen landed on each side of Burgas, viz., at Sizebolu(Sozopolis) and at Misivri ; and a few words may showhow even these two points are matters of ' land power.'Though chosen as the Franco-British depot in the

Crimean War, Varna is by no means an ideal harbour.It offers no shelter from north and north-east winds ; theanchorage is only 3 to 5 fathoms, and loading or dis-charging must be done by lighters. The town is covered

* For number of actual soldiers, see Appendix II.


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PORTS 51by Lake Devna, and commanded by heightsnow in-cluded in the recently renovated fortificationson bothsides of the Pravadi Valley, in which it lies, and near thehead of which stands Shumla. From Cape Emine toVarna, hills, averaging 2,000 feet in height, and brokenonly by the marshy outlet of the Kamcik, slope steeplyto shallow shore-waters ; and there is a similar coastfrom Varna to Balcik. North of the latter the hillsare uniformly lower, and the sea increases in depth ;but the only road inland is that from Balcik to (HajiOghlu) Bazarjik*i.e., the neighbourhood of the Dobriccavalry barracks ; and, though there is a good roadfrom Dobric to Varna (thirty miles), the road to Murzah(for Silistria) is bad.From Varna itself the road inland (to Shumla and

Silistria), like the railway, at once breaks away from thecoast, and leans to the Balkans, running almost parallelwith the railway, but a few miles farther north, as far asYeni-Pazar (Novi-Bazar), where it turns south-west-wards to Shumla. There is also a poor road huggingthe coast from Varna to Burgas ; but the direct road-indifferent as far as Stara Orlehomo, but good beyondthatcrosses the

military geography-the balkan peninsula

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