militancy in pakistan and impacts on u.s. foreign … · concerned by the rise of religious...

Militancy in Pakistan and Impacts on U.S. Foreign Policy

Saba Imtiaz, International Security Program Carnegie Fellow

August 2014

“What is happening now, seems almost a writing

on the wall and God help us if we do not stop

these ignorant people from cutting each other’s

throat and thus bringing comfort and cheer to

our enemies.”i

Executive Summary

The state of internal security in Pakistan is a

potentially disruptive factor for the U.S.-Pakistan

relationship. Even if there is no threat posed to

the U.S. and/or American interests by Pakistan-

based militant groups, the United States is

concerned by the rise of religious militancy in

Pakistan and the risks it poses to the state, to its

ability to govern effectively, and the toll it is

taking on the civilian population.

The focus of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship in

recent years has been on the Haqqani network,

and to a lesser extent, the Tehrik-e-Taliban

Pakistan, which are based in Pakistan’s tribal

areas. These groups have been the target of the

controversial C.I.A.-run drone program, which is

largely the prism through which the U.S.-

Pakistan relationship is seen. Homegrown

militancy in Pakistan’s urban areas has not been

a major issue in the bilateral relationship, though

it has been a source of contention. But drone

strikes – including the legality of the program and

the issue of civilian casualties– have

overshadowed the U.S.-Pakistan relationship and

discussions on counter-terrorism.

However, the fact that Pakistan is still a training

and recruitment ground for militants who would

seek to attack the United States, and that

transnational terrorism plots have been traced

back to Pakistan, is a key concern. Additionally,

this is a concern because of the intensive growth

of militant networks in urban Pakistan. This

concerns the United States because these factors

together enable a network for anti-American

militancy in addition to the existing threat from

insurgent groups based in Pakistan’s tribal areas.

This was underscored by the failed bombing

attempt on Times Square in New York in 2010

that combined both homegrown radicalization

and the supporting apparatus of Pakistani

militant networks based in the tribal areas.

The main purpose of this paper is to examine the

current U.S. assessment of the threat posed by

homegrown militancy in Pakistan’s urban centers

to American interests in South Asia, as well as to

the American homeland. It will also comment on

the reported resurgence of groups such as Jaish-e-

Mohammad, which for several years went

New America Foundation

new america foundation page 2

dormant but today appears to be rebuilding a

public profile; implications for the future of

homegrown militancy groups are also assessed. It

will also look at the role Pakistan-based,

homegrown militant groups could play in

destabilizing South Asia, as seen by American

analysts and experts on the region. It will also

briefly analyze the growing transnational

ambitions of groups like the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi,

which has signaled that it could take its campaign

of attacking Shi’ites elsewhere in the region.

There is also the potent question of Pakistan’s

complicity in allowing militant groups to operate

within the country. The long-standing view in

Pakistan is that anti-India militant groups pose

no imminent or internal threat to Pakistan – yet

could be a useful proxy force in India and

Afghanistan – is still ingrained in its military

establishment and political sphere. There is little

belief amongst U.S. experts in Pakistan and

former and current policymakers that this policy

has changed. However, many do see a growing

realization in Pakistan that there is a problem

with homegrown militancy, yet no understanding

of how to resolve it.ii

For the purpose of this paper, I am studying the

threats posed specifically by two strains of

homegrown militancy in urban areas. The first is

the ‘traditional’ anti-India groups that have or

could potentially morph into anti-state groups.

The second is the sectarian groups that have yet

to express any aims of attacking the U.S. but

contribute to militancy in Pakistan.

1. Introduction

A. Militancy in Pakistan

Since Pakistan’s creation in 1947, religious

intolerance and violence has plagued the country.

The division of the Indian subcontinent that saw

the creation of Pakistan was marred by one of the

largest population displacements in the world

and religious violence amongst Hindus,

Muslims, and Sikhs. Since 1958, Pakistan has

seen protracted periods of military rule. Its first

elected Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the

leader of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), was

executed under the military regime of General

Zia-ul-Haq on charges that he had abetted a

conspiracy to murder a political rival. After a

decade of military rule, Pakistan returned to

being a “democratic” country with the election of

the late Bhutto’s daughter, Benazir Bhutto, as

prime minister. Her fractious coalition and

allegations of corruption led to her dismissal by

President Ghulam Ishaq Khan two years later.

Her rival – the conservative politician Nawaz

Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League –was voted

into power in 1990 until he too was removed

from office.

One more term followed for Bhutto (1993-1996)

and Sharif (1997-1999) respectively until General

Pervez Musharraf overthrew Sharif’s government

in a military coup on October 12, 1999.

The identity of Pakistan – whether it was meant

to be a secular or Islamic state – has long been

debated by scholars and is closely linked to the

idea of militancy in Pakistan.iii Militant groups’

goal to establish a “true” Islamic state in the

country takes root from this identity.iv It also

remains a rallying cry for right-wing groups– with

leaders of conservative parties like the Jamaat-e-


Islami criticizing secularismv – even though the

country’s “Islamic” credentials were strengthened

by the passage of the Objectives Resolution in

1949. The Objectives Resolution is part of the

Pakistani Constitution and states that all laws

must be in line with Islamic principles.vi A

Council of Islamic Ideology exists to advise

Parliament on legislation; however, it has no

binding authority but remains an influence on

lawmakers and politicians.

Successive military and democratic regimes have

used religion for political gain as well as exploited

religious fault lines in the country that had

existed since its creation. These fault lines were

not just about different religions. Intra-Muslim

conflicts began to emerge as early as 1951, when

the first reports of violence against Shi’ites began

to emerge. While many Deobandi Muslim groups

had not supported the idea of Pakistan’s creation,

they began to take charge of Pakistan’s shift to a

Deobandi state through rhetoric and riots. Of

note is the Majlis-e-Ahrar’s anti-Ahmadi

movement in the 1950s, as well as protests by

smaller religious groups like the Islam League,

“demanding the amelioration of suffering [during

a food crisis] and a greater Islamization of

government.”vii

In the 1950s, right-wing groups launched a

massive campaign against the Ahmadi sect of

Islam, calling for its followers – who they

considered apostates – to be excommunicated

from Islam in the constitution.viii

These riots laid the groundwork for what was to

become the intensely influential role played by

the clergy and right-wing politicians in Pakistani

society and governance. This has also inspired

and provided a precedent for the militant groups

that exist in Pakistan today.ix

In the 1970s, the anti-Ahmadi campaign resurged

and the Ahmadi sect was legally excommunicated

from Islam through an amendment to the

Pakistani constitution.x Prime Minister Zulfikar

Ali Bhutto’s government also sought to appease

right-wing groups by imposing a ban on the sale

of alcohol to Muslims.xi

In 1977, the Pakistan Army, led by General Zia-

ul-Haq, launched a coup and overthrew the

government. Two years later, Bhutto was tried

and executed after being convicted on charges of

abetting a conspiracy to murder a political rival.

General Zia-ul-Haq’s regime strengthened the

role of hardline Islamism in Pakistan. Measures

included legal ordinances that equated rape with

adultery, thus placing the onus on the victim,

changing the law of evidence to reduce the

standing of female witnesses, and rewriting

school textbooks to place more importance on

jihad.xii The Zia regime also further exploited

sectarianism in the country, allowing groups like

the anti-Shi’ite Anjuman-e-Sipah-e-Sahaba (later

renamed to the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan) to

flourish. The regime feared the influence of a

post-revolution Iran and its support to Shi’ite

activist groups in Pakistan, and sought to counter

it with groups such as the Sipah-e-Sahaba

Pakistan.xiii

B. Pakistan: Fighting by Proxy

Pakistan had long used the idea of militias as a

proxy of sorts in its constant war with India over

the disputed territory of Kashmir, enlisting the

support of tribes as well as battalions from

religious and political parties.xiv It also replicated

this strategy in 1971 during the war with India

that led to the split of Pakistan and the creation of

Bangladesh.


The Pakistani military and intelligence services

had provided training and funneled support to

Afghan insurgent groups during the Soviet

invasion of Afghanistan and duplicated this

strategy to the disputed territory of Kashmir in

the 1990s. There is considerable evidence that the

Pakistani military and intelligence services

recruited, trained and supported the anti-India

militias. However, these charges are routinely

denied by the military.xv These include groups

like the Hizbul Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Taiba,

Jaish-e-Mohammad and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-

Islami.xvi Their use was part of a strategy to

subvert India through proxy groups while

claiming plausible deniability, and came with a

“supreme confidence” that Pakistan could control

them in the long run.xvii

Only a decade later, however, these proxy groups

became sworn enemies of their former trainers

and paymasters, almost stoking war between

India and Pakistan and embarking on a campaign

of attacks against Pakistani civilians and military

officials.

C. Homegrown Militancy and the U.S.-Pakistan

Relationship

The issue of homegrown militancy in Pakistan

has long been a policy concern in the United

States. This precedes the events of September 11,

2001 and the ensuing Operation Enduring

Freedom mounted by NATO and U.S. coalition

forces in Afghanistan that drew the world’s

attention to Pakistan.

American policymakers and analysts feared that

the violence would destabilize a volatile region.

By 1992, there was a push to designate Pakistan

as a global sponsor of terrorism because of its use

of anti-India militant groups in Kashmir. “There

was a strong inclination inside the counter-

terrorism community, including the State

Department and the Bush Sr. White House, to

put Pakistan on the list of state sponsors of

terrorism,” said analyst Bruce Riedel.xviii The

move was scuttled because it was being mulled

during the transition period between the

outgoing Bush Sr. administration and the

incoming Clinton administration.xix

The threat resurfaced in 1993 as President

Clinton’s administration also considered placing

Pakistan on the list of state sponsors of

terrorism.xx Administration officials, including

Secretary of State Warren Christopher, warned

Pakistan that if circumstances did not change in

its support for militant groups, it would be forced

to take action against the country.

None of these warnings manifested into action

and they never led to any checks and balances on

Pakistan’s support and use of militias, even when

they began to develop transnational aims and

targeted foreign citizens. They began plotting

attacks against foreign citizens in India,

including kidnapping foreign tourists in

Kashmir, in the 1990s.xxi

This pattern – from being one of many groups

fighting in Kashmir to developing transnational

aims and then carrying out large-scale attacks –

would see itself repeat throughout the 2000s.

While the U.S. government’s moves to censure

Pakistan for its use of militant groups were

scuttled, there was also little leverage that the

United States had with Pakistan. During the

1990s, engagement between the two countries

was at a low, though the Bush Sr.

Aadministration had attempted to forge a

working relationship with Benazir Bhutto during


her first term in government (1988-1990). In

1990, sanctions were enforced against Pakistan

for embarking on a nuclear weapons program.xxii

Among other sticking issues was the sale of F-16

fighter jets to Pakistan. Nuclear tests by Pakistan

in May 1998, a tit-for-tat response to tests carried

out by India, led to a further derailment of ties as

the United States placed sanctions on Pakistan.

While the idea that militant groups in Kashmir

were under the state’s control existed,

homegrown militancy in other forms began to

manifest in Pakistan. The rise of the Sipah-e-

Sahaba Pakistan led to a spike in sectarian

killings throughout the 1990s, including that of

the head of the Iranian Cultural Centre in Lahore,

Sadiq Ganji, as well as Shi’ite professionals.xxiii

The Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan attempted to evolve

into a mainstream political party, often publicly

disavowing links to the murders of Shi’ites. It

also enjoyed electoral success, winning seats in

the lower house of parliament.

The militant offshoot of the Sipah-e-Sahaba

Pakistan, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, formed in 1996

and came into its own with a firebrand leadership

that sought to enlarge its scope of attacks on

Shi’ites.xxiv Among its plots included a failed

assassination attempt against Prime Minister

Nawaz Sharif in January 1999.

While Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, as

prime ministers and heads of the most popular

political parties in Pakistan, did not seek to

abolish the military’s role in the Kashmir conflict,

they did realize that Pakistan faced an internal

security threat. Benazir Bhutto was concerned

about the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and

admitted this to American interlocutors.xxv

By 1999, the Sharif government had begun to

take on the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. The Punjab police

launched a campaign against sectarian militants,

killing up to thirty-six in extrajudicial killings that

year.xxvi

But their short stints in power did not allow for

any long-term counter-terrorism strategy to deal

with these groups. Pakistan faced a number of

other security challenges that consumed the

efforts of the civilian governments, including

ethnic and political conflict in Karachi and a

constant, pervasive fear of the government being

overthrown. But the 1998 nuclear tests and a war

with India in 1999 overshadowed many of these

developments taking place in the heart of

Pakistan. In 1999, an embattled Prime Minister

Nawaz Sharif sought U.S. President Bill Clinton’s

support while Clinton pressed him to withdraw

troops from Kargil.xxvii

But Sharif lost his job just four months after

meeting President Clinton, and General Pervez

Musharraf’s government was only forced to

address the issue under intense U.S. pressure in

2001. In December 1999, India was forced to free

Pakistani militants, Masood Azhar (who would go

on to found the Jaish-e-Mohammad), Ahmed

Omar Saeed Shaikh, and Mushtaq Ahmed

Zargar, while negotiating the release of a hijacked

Indian Airlines plane that had been forced to land

in Kandahar.

In the days after the September 11, 2001 attacks,

Pakistan – as has been well documented– agreed

to work as a coalition partner with the United

States in the ‘War on Terror’ and support the U.S.

presence in Afghanistan.xxviii While the United

States was concerned with eliminating the al

Qaeda network in Afghanistan and required

Pakistan’s support for everything from sharing


intelligence about suspects to renditions and

interrogations, Pakistan was able to sign on

without promising the United States it would do

anything to dismantle homegrown militant

networks or to end its policy of using proxy

groups in Afghanistan and India.

While Pakistan may have acceded to the United

States’ demand to help with al Qaeda in

Afghanistan, then-military ruler General Pervez

Musharraf did not agree to work on tackling the

homegrown threat. “When I went to talk to

Musharraf on September 13 (2001)xxix and then on

September 15 (2001), he agreed to help us

unstintingly with al Qaeda in Afghanistan

because they attacked us. But he did not agree to

help us go after Pakistani groups inside Pakistan.

What he said was that was his responsibility, not

ours,” said Wendy J. Chamberlin, who served as

U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan from September

2001 to May 2002.xxx

Chamberlin recalled that the U.S. concern about

homegrown militancy in Pakistan predated the

events of September 11, 2001. American diplomats

regularly sent Pakistani officials démarches on

the issue. “When I arrived our policy was clearly

that these homegrown groups – Lashkar-e-Taiba,

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, all of those – were very, very

dangerous and we saw connections between the

Pakistani government using them as proxies,

particularly across the border with India. And we

were opposed to it.”xxxi

Even though several suspects – including alleged

al Qaeda leaders and self-confessed 9/11 plotter

Khalid Sheikh Mohammad – were detained from

the houses of supporters of mainstream political

parties like the Jamaat-e-Islamixxxii or safe houses

run by the Lashkar-e-Taibaxxxiii, Pakistan did not

act against these facilitating networks or the anti-

India militias until December 2001.

On December 13, 2001, militants launched an

attack on the Indian parliament in New Delhi.

India blamed Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-

Taiba for the attack, and reports of an armed

escalation between both countries began to

surface.xxxiv This was the first indicator of how

Pakistan’s support of anti-India groups could

potentially stoke war between two nuclear-armed

countries, and that Pakistan’s use of proxies no

longer gave it any plausible deniability. A million

troops amassed on the border and there were

reports that nuclear missiles had been

unsheathed in India, while Pakistan would not

rule out the possibility of a first strike. The

United States– fearful of a nuclear war between

the two countries – intervened, with Secretary

Colin Powell playing a key role in negotiating

with Pakistan.xxxv The United States then asked

General Musharraf to not just make a statement

against anti-India groups, but that he begin to

rein them in.xxxvi

General Musharraf made a key policy speech

against militancy and said that while Pakistan

supported the Kashmiri cause, it would not allow

organizations to “carry out terrorism under the

pretext of Kashmir.”xxxvii The government

subsequently placed bans on a number of groups:

Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Sipah-e-

Sahaba Pakistan, Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan, Tehrik-

e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi and the Tehreek-

e-Islami.xxxviii However, the Jamaat-e-Islami

remained a key ally of General Musharraf, as part

of a six-party coalition called the Muttahida

Majlis-e-Amal.

While the bans caused militant groups to curtail

their activity in the immediate short-term, each


group resurged in the months to follow. Many,

like the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and Lashkar-e-

Taiba, changed names and continued to operate.

The Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi

would go on to cause a surge in militancy in the

Swat and Malakand districts of the Khyber

Pakhtunkhwa province, resulting in a military

operation in 2009.xxxix

There was also a concern from Pakistan that the

anti-India groups – the key threat at that point in

time – could disband and ‘freelance’ with other

militant networks. The United States noted that

while training camps for these groups were being

moved away from the Pakistan-India border, they

were moving into the west and north center of

the country.xl

The red lines began to shift in Pakistan with the

evolution of militant groups. Despite the bans,

sectarian attacks continued throughout General

Musharraf’s tenure, particularly in Karachi.xli

Moreover, militant groups began to launch an

insurgency in the Federally Administered Tribal

Areas as well as in the Swat and Malakand

districts of the North West Frontier Province

(now known as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa).

Many of the groups involved in stoking the

violence in Pakistan were those that the state had

once supported.xlii That Pakistani militant groups

were able to resurge and operate is an example of

how Pakistan has been unable to ever crack down

on militancy. Moreover, because bans on the

groups came as a result of U.S. pressure and the

stand-off with India as opposed to any real

domestic opposition to them, there was little buy-

in for the policy measure or its implementation.

In 2008 the United States was willing to work

with a democratic government, offering support

to the military and the civilian government.

However, as attacks against U.S. troops in

Afghanistan intensified and began to be linked

back to the Haqqani network – which the United

States accuses Pakistan of sheltering – the

relationship worsened.xliii

“This sanctuary, it became very real. It wasn’t just

simply people who were destabilizing

Afghanistan – they were people who were directly

responsible for our guys getting killed,” said

Marvin Weinbaum, a former State Department

official, describing the mood in Washington as

reports emerged on the links between insurgent

groups operating out of Pakistan and attacks on

U.S. forces.xliv

“The big change here goes back a number of

years, which I think is a strategic change in terms

of Pakistani calculations,” said scholar Stephen P.

Cohen.xlv “In the early 2000s, when American

troops were in Afghanistan, they realized very

quickly that they were being shot at by guys who

were being supported by Pakistan. I had a lot of

contact with American military which was fresh

back from Afghanistan saying ‘Professor, why is

our ally Pakistan supporting people trying to kill

me because I’m going back for another tour?’ So

they lost their traditional alliance among the

American conservatives. Soldiers told the Bush

administration this. Congress – especially

[Senator] John McCain – was very angry with

Pakistan.” Cohen noted that American

conservatives – traditionally supportive of

Pakistan’s military – were now worried about it.

“I tell Pakistani officials here, ‘Your lobby is gone,

it’s completely wiped out. It’s not something the

Indians did. It’s something you did.”

For many in the United States, the breaking point

was when Admiral Mike Mullen testified in the


Senate that the Haqqani network was a “veritable

arm of the ISI, ”Pakistan’s intelligence service. xlvi

On the Hill, sanctions for Pakistan went under

consideration again – almost two decades after

they had first been considered by the Bush Sr.

administration.

D. Pakistan’s Relationship with Militant Groups

While the current relationship between groups

like the Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Pakistani

government, and security establishment remain

unclear, there is a historical relationship between

these groups and the state. The linkages from the

1980s and 1990s, as a result of the state’s support

and creation of the groups, are unlikely to ever

break completely. There is also a well-established

connection between Lashkar-e-Taiba and the

government of the Punjab province (which has

been controlled by the Pakistan Muslim League-

Nawaz party from 2008 to date).

Despite the evidence from the David Headley trial

that linked the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)

agency’s officers to the November 2008 attack,

U.S. officials and experts are still divided on the

full extent of culpability by the Pakistani state in

the November 2008 attacks in India.xlvii As a

result, there is a reluctance to blame the Pakistani

government for the attacks. Pakistan’s case, on

the other hand, has been bolstered by the

plausible deniability since Lashkar-e-Taiba is not

an official government organization. While there

is suspicion still at the role of the Pakistani

military, it is widely acknowledged that at least

the civilian government was completely unaware

of an attack being planned, given its willingness

to work with India on investigating the case.

President Asif Ali Zardari, for example, offered to

send then-director general of the ISI Lt. Gen

Ahmad Shuja Pasha to India in the days after the

attack, a move that was scuttled by the Pakistani

military.xlviii

After the November 2008 attacks, the United

Nations proscribed the Jamaat-ud-Dawa under

UN Resolution 1267, a sanctions regime against

Al Qaeda and associated groups and individuals.

Pakistan detained Jamaat-ud-Dawa chief Hafiz

Saeed under the Maintenance of Public Order act

and held five Lashkar-e-Taiba activists, including

Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, under the Anti-Terrorism

Act. Saeed was freed after the Lahore High Court

ordered his release in June 2009 because the

government could provide no evidence for his

detention to be extended further.xlix The trial of

the latter five suspects is still ongoing in a special

court designated for terrorism cases in Lahore,

and has been marred by extensive delays, security

risks to legal staff, including the presiding judge,

and criticism from India.l

In its implementation of the designation of

Jamaat-ud-Dawa under UN Resolution 1267,

Pakistan blocked the organization’s bank

accounts.li However, the Zardari-led federal

government believed the provincial Punjab

government had tipped off the group about the

assets freeze; as a result, the bank accounts were

nearly empty.lii

However, U.S. officials believe that even if

Pakistan does not support or completely control

the Lashkar-e-Taiba, they have a working

relationship and a set of red lines the group

cannot cross.

“You hear two arguments from the Pakistani

military,” Cohen said. “One is that ‘We have to

stay close to them to control them.’ The other is

‘Well, there are some people beyond our reach,

we are as surprised as you are.’ And I think from


the American point of view, since American lives

are at stake, we have to be much tougher on

Pakistan.”

“The first response is ‘where’s the proof,’” Riedel

said, when asked what Pakistani officials say

when confronted with accusations of supporting

militant networks such as Lashkar-e-Taiba.liii

“Which gets pretty thin and you do have the

confessions of Mr. Headley and a mass of other

evidence. Secondly, and in a more subtle way, you

get the answer ‘Well we’re keeping them under

control.’ I’ve heard this described as ‘We have the

problem corralled… We know it’s a dangerous

organization, we have influence over it and we’re

going to keep it within certain boundaries.’ It’s a

very revealing answer because it implies that ‘If

we want we can remove the restraints.’ I don’t, as

an outside observer on the other side of the

planet; don’t see a lot of corralling going on.

Maybe I’m missing it. But that’s the more subtle

response. And it’s usually given off the record.”

“It strikes me that militancy writ large in Pakistan

has gained in strength in terms of its political

influence and its ability to shape the media

message and to impact foreign relations and

domestic relations,” said Shamila Chaudhary,

former Pakistan director on the National Security

Council.liv “In the past we’ve looked at Pakistan

and said ‘there’s a state within a state’, that is the

military and the civilians. I actually think there is

a third pillar now of who is running the country.

That third group is a huge security threat for the

state. It’s not as if they’re just planning attacks

and killing Shias or attacking India. They’re

collaborating with al Qaeda, and this is not just

based on ideological connections.”

The ramifications of Pakistan’s policy of

supporting anti-India militant groups – and

whether it continues to date – were laid bare by

the November 2008 terror attacks in India and

the subsequent investigation. Investigations and

legal proceedings by the United States and India

– and a subsequent underway judicial trial in

Pakistan – have found that the Lashkar-e-Taiba

was responsible for the attacks in India and

received support from individuals associated with

the ISIS agency.lv The trial of Tasawwur Hussain

Rana in a U.S. federal court– particularly witness

David Headley’s testimony and evidence –

provided deep insight into the operational

activities of the Lashkar-e-Taiba and how the

India attacks were planned.

According to The Guardian newspaper, “‘These

groups operated under the umbrella of ISI … they

coordinated with ISI,’ Headley testified under

questioning.lvi He said that he had received

weapons and leadership training with Lashkar-e-

Taiba since 2000 and it was his understanding

that the group and the ISI helped each other.

‘They coordinated with each other and ISI

provided assistance to Lashkar,’ said Headley.”

“David Headley’s testimony, the detail that he

provided about the hands-on involvement of his

ISI handlers, the training provided and the

support that… the public description of the depths

of that relationship confirmed what some have

long stated about the nature of the relationship,”

Tricia Bacon, a former State Department official,

said.lvii “One of the things that Headley provided

was that this relationship remains intact.

Arguably, if the Haqqanis are an arm [of the ISI],

then LeT is a gland or the legs or something.”

In January 2013, Headley was sentenced for his

role in plotting the November 2008 terror attacks

in India.lviii Rana was sentenced for providing

material support to Lashkar-e-Taiba and the plot

to attack a Danish cartoonist.lix


More so than the attacks of December 2001, the

scale of the 2008 attacks – which saw direct

attacks on foreign citizens, including Americans,

as well as key Indian officials and buildings – was

a sign that Pakistan had ‘crossed a line’.

It also served to put LeT firmly on the U.S. radar.

2. Pakistan’s Militant Networks and the Risk to the United States

Since 2001, the risk posed by militancy has

largely been seen through the prism of al Qaeda.

In the United States, there has been a push to not

lump all militant networks in the al Qaeda

bracket, but this comes at the cost of ignoring the

mingling and cross-pollination of groups based in

Pakistan. There is a realization in counter-

terrorism and policy circles of the latter, but this

complicates the domestic narrative in the United

States on Afghanistan, because it undercuts the

objectives behind which the United States went to

war in Afghanistan in the first place. Moreover,

the threat posed by groups such as the LeT is

often seen as secondary, with analysts saying that

the real threat to the U.S. is still posed by groups

like the Haqqani network.

However, there is now a concerted effort in the

U.S. intelligence community to study and

understand the threat posed by Pakistan-based

militant groups and to analyze potential scenarios

that could arise as a result of a major attack on

the United States, its interests, or in South Asia

that links back to Pakistan. There has been

planning by the U.S. government to parse out

what potential scenarios could arise from such an

attack. I have attempted to outline which groups

pose a risk to U.S. national security interests and

how these are being calibrated by observers and

analysts in the United States.

A. Lashkar-e-Taiba

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is considered to be

amongst the most important homegrown

militant groups operating out of Pakistan. This is

largely based on the threat it poses to Pakistan

and the region.lx There is significant interest in

the counter-terrorism community about the

growth and threat perception of LeT, which has

been bolstered further since the attacks in India

in 2008.

While the top priority of the United States

remains al Qaeda and the Haqqani network, the

LeT is of concern because it is believed to have

links with al Qaeda. It has proven its ability to

stage large-scale transnational attacks in India,

destabilize Pakistan-India relations, and target

foreign citizens.

The key concern for many observers is how the

Lashkar-e-Taiba – believed to be operating under

the guise of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, which is led by

Hafiz Saeed and works as a pressure group – has

been allowed to expand rapidly.lxi The Jamaat-ud-

Dawa currently has an extensive presence in the

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh and Punjab

provinces through a network of seminaries,

schools and offices. It is also embarking on an

expansion in the Balochistan province.lxii The

Jamaat-ud-Dawa’s philanthropic wing, the Falah-

e-Insaniat Foundation, has played a key role in

relief and rehabilitation efforts during natural

disasters and humanitarian crises in urban and

rural Pakistan.

The threat is also crystallized by the nature and

expansion of the group. According to scholar


Tricia Bacon: “As the U.S. draws out of

Afghanistan, the LeT is one of the few groups

that I would say remains virtually entirely

unscathed by the counter-terrorism efforts of the

last ten years. Most of the groups operating in the

region have at least experienced some pressure

and some losses over the course of the counter-

terrorism campaign. LeT stands as a very clear

contrast to that as a group that’s led by its

founding leaders, still has a fairly overt presence

in Pakistan, and has a transnational network that

is still operating.”lxiii

It is also interesting to look at why there has not

been an attack since 2008 by LeT. There are

several theories: one, that the group was damaged

by the investigation and extensive details that

emerged, and would make a stronger effort to

hide its involvement in another attack. Another is

that there are stronger counter-terrorism efforts

against the group, not just by India but also by

the British and American intelligence agencies. A

third is that the Pakistani government has

warned the group against another attack because

it is directly detrimental to the state.lxiv

The Jamaat-ud-Dawa has also evolved into an

influential pressure group on channeling anti-

India and anti-U.S. sentiment, particularly

through its role in the multi-party Defense of

Pakistan Council. While the Jamaat-ud-Dawa

denies that it is linked to the LeT, the United

States believes the latter is used as a cover for the

former’s activities.

Why is the Lashkar-e-Taiba a threat to the United States

and U.S. interests?

Attack on the U.S. homeland: An attack on the

U.S. homeland is highly unlikely and would be far

more difficult to execute given the evolution of the

security apparatus in the U.S. post-2001. However,

the LeT has proven that it can recruit foreign

individuals to carry out terrorism plots, which

make it a risk.

Attacking U.S. interests in South Asia: The LeT

could also potentially attack the United States via

embassies or consulates elsewhere in South Asia.

There have been various reports and statements

since 2008 that indicate LeT is planning an attack

on the United States, including a plot to attack the

U.S. Embassy in Bangladesh.lxv

Al Qaeda: Analysts and former officials believe the

LeT has close links to al Qaeda, and can serve as a

“host” to the remnants of the group in Pakistan.

Reports of communication between Jamaat-ud-

Dawa leader Hafiz Mohammad Saeed and Osama

bin Laden have strengthened this perception.lxvi

Moreover, the groups have enjoyed a relationship

in the past when the LeT gave refuge to al Qaeda

members. However, al Qaeda in Pakistan has been

weakened extensively by an aggressive drone

campaign and reports indicate it may be refocusing

on countries such as Syria.lxvii

Afghanistan: Reported increased LeT activity in

Afghanistan could lead to an attack on American

interests – consulates, troops or officials –

emanating from Afghanistan.lxviii

State support: The LeT, or its public face as

Jamaat-ud-Dawa, is widely believed to have strong

links to the state. Pakistan has consistently denied

it was responsible for the November 2008 attacks.

But there is considerable suspicion of the Pakistani

state’s or Pakistani officials’ involvement with the

group. The David Headley testimony at the

Tasawwur Hussain Rana trial has strengthened

this perception, because it detailed the links and

training provided by serving officers of Pakistan’s

ISI agency to LeT.lxix Several experts and former


officials in the United States and Pakistan believe

that elements in the Pakistani state have close

connections with the group, though they may not

have the same relationship as they did in the

1990s. The Jamaat-ud-Dawa’s leadership, in its

public statements and rallies, is careful to not

criticize the military establishment in Pakistanlxx

Political influence: The Jamaat-ud-Dawa has,

since 2008, become a highly effective pressure

group in Pakistani politics and society. Through its

effective use of protests on political and security

developments – from the Raymond Davis caselxxi to

drone strikes and the NATO airstrikelxxii that killed

24 Pakistani soldiers in Salala – it has managed to

become a leading voice to channel anti-Indian and

anti-U.S. sentiment. It has also been a driving force

behind the Defense of Pakistan coalition of over 30

political and religious groups, which have

organized massive countrywide protests and sit-

ins since its inception in 2011. By his own

admission, Hafiz Mohammad Saeed sees the

Jamaat-ud-Dawa as a “political party,” albeit one

that does not contest elections.lxxiii

B. Jaish-e-Mohammad

Jaish-e-Mohammad has been under the radar for

several years. Its activities and recruitment in

Punjab have continued despite founder Masood

Azhar curtailing his public profile.lxxiv Jaish-e-

Mohammad publications detail the group’s

recruitment drives in urban cities such as Karachi

and reported deaths of its fighters in the disputed

Kashmir territory.lxxv

A massive rally organized by Jaish-e-Mohammad

in January 2014 has prompted fears of

‘resurgence by the group’. The rally, which took

place in Pakistan-held Kashmir – once used as a

conduit for sending fighters to the disputed

Kashmir territory – featured a recorded,

incendiary speech by Azhar.lxxvi It remains

unclear to most observers in Pakistan why Jaish-

e-Mohammad and Azhar have resurfaced. The

group has largely been overshadowed by the

Jamaat-ud-Dawa as far as being a leading voice on

anti-India and the sectarian organizations.

Why is the Jaish-e-Mohammad a threat to the United

States and U.S. interests?

Jaish-e-Mohammad is not seen as a major threat to

the United States, largely because it has shown no

transnational aims as a group. However, its

potential to cause instability in Pakistan and in

India has put it on the U.S. radar. Indian observers

fear that Jaish-e-Mohammad could stir up violence

in Indian-held Kashmir again, even though there is

little appetite in Kashmir for the kind of militancy

that plagued it in the late 1980s and early

1990s.lxxvii

C. Sectarian Groups

Sectarianism in Pakistan is a concern for the

United States, but it is not a high-ranking one by

any means. Sectarian groups have not attempted

to attack the United States or its interests in the

region or directly targeted American citizens.

They have yet to display transnational aims in the

same manner as the anti-India groups. The most

prominent sectarian group is the Lashkar-e-

Jhangvi, which has carried out a significant

number of attacks against Pakistani Shi’ites.

Why are sectarian groups a threat to the United States

and U.S. interests?

Transnational aims: There is sufficient evidence

of sectarian groups moving in this direction.

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi is believed to have been

responsible for an attack on a visiting Sri Lankan


cricket team in Lahore in 2009 and an attack on

Shi’ites in Kabul in 2011.lxxviii

Relationship with Al Qaeda: The Lashkar-e-

Jhangvi has long been believed to have links with al

Qaeda, and many analysts now say that because of

the evolution of the militant networks in Pakistan,

there is far more cross-pollination between groups

like the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and al Qaeda.lxxix

Political influence: The Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, via its

political network – the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan

(now known as the Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat) – has

considerable political influence in southern Punjab,

where it is based. This provides the group with the

legitimacy many other militant networks do not

have, and allow it to have a platform to preach

sectarianism.

3. Policy Options for the United States

Experts and officials interviewed for this paper

were asked to surmise what a potential response

to an attack by a Pakistani militant group in the

United States, against the U.S. interests, or

against India would look like after 2014 and the

diminished presence of U.S. troops in

Afghanistan. Respondents could only offer their

best hypotheses using past precedents and

attempting gauge the variables involved. Others

noted that another cause for concern for the U.S.

would be an attack by militants on Pakistan’s

nuclear facilities. The reason for this exercise was

to try and understand what potential American

policy towards Pakistan could be in the wake of

any of the attack(s) described above.

A. Investigation

The first step would be to establish a link between

the attack and the Pakistani state. This is

inherently problematic because Pakistan has and

can continue to claim plausible deniability. The

United States, as one source said, could justify

any measures against Pakistan on the grounds

that it had not acted against Lashkar-e-Taiba or

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, for example. Moreover, this

may not be a viable option for Pakistan given the

American footprint in Pakistan, as well as what

one can assume is fairly extensive surveillance of

Pakistani militant groups. “For those in Pakistan

who think that they are hiding a relationship

between these groups and officialdom is possible,

I think they should really rethink that, because

the last decade has allowed the coalition and the

U.S. to work inside Pakistan in a way which is

unprecedented. So very little is protected.

Everything really revolves around the extent to

which you can establish a link,” said the Atlantic

Council’s Shuja Nawaz.lxxx

There is also the issue of how long it would take

to establish such a link. It is likely that by the

time any Pakistani official complicity is revealed –

as it did months later in the November 2008

attacks in Mumbai – there is little political will in

the United States to proceed against another

state.

There are several other options to consider in

terms of the nature of the attack.

Attack against the U.S. homeland: In the event of

an attack on American soil, the American response

would be similar to the one after September 11,

2001. However, the possibilities of such an attack

are still considered to be highly unlikely by U.S.

officials and analysts.


Attack against U.S. interests: An attack against

U.S. interests – whether on troops, citizens, or

military or diplomatic facilities – that links back to

Pakistan-based militant groups would not be

equated with an attack on U.S. soil. It would

certainly damage U.S.-Pakistan relations, and

depending on the scale of the attack, would lead to

repercussions for Pakistan in the short term.

However, the past precedent associated with

attacks by the Haqqani network on U.S. diplomatic

facilities and troops in Afghanistan has led to the

perception that the United States has limited

options in such cases.

Attack against India: An attack against India –

akin to the November 2008 attacks – would likely

lead to the U.S. acting as an intermediary between

India and Pakistan. The United States would step in

to defuse tension between India and Pakistan, and

would ensure there is no build-up of troops on the

border or threats of nuclear war. The U.S. would be

acknowledged as having a peacemaker role in this

regard and it would act to ensure that the region

remains stable.

B. Policy Options

Military options: Any policy option that the

United States would have is undeniably

constrained by two factors. The first is that

Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state. This makes the

possibility of a military option, akin to President

Clinton ordering airstrikes in Afghanistan and

Sudan after the bombings of the U.S. embassies in

1998, difficult.lxxxi Secondly, the United States

would be highly unlikely to bomb Pakistani

military installations or hideouts of militant groups

that are based in urban Pakistan because of the

inevitable civilian casualties.

Economic assistance: The United States could

limit, delay or entirely cut down aid to the

Pakistani military or to the executive branch.

However, Pakistan’s other allies – such as the Gulf

countries or Russia – could step up to fill the gap.

The United States could also use its leverage with

international donors such as the International

Monetary Fund or the World Bank to limit

assistance.

Diplomatic ties: The United States could delay or

cancel scheduled visits by Pakistani and U.S.

officials, as well as postpone any high-level

dialogues.

Sanctions: Pakistani officials could be placed on a

list of sanctions. However, there is great skepticism

amongst foreign policymakers that this would be

ineffective because of the United States’ experience

with sanctions against Pakistan in the 1990s.

Sanctions are already in place against militant

groups and their leaders, including Hafiz Saeed.lxxxii

Any efforts to sanction Pakistan through the United

Nations could also be inevitably blocked by China

or Russia. Pakistan could be designated as a

Country of Particular Concern under the

International Religious Freedom Act of 1998,

which could involve sanctions against Pakistan by

the United States.lxxxiii The increasing violence

against religious communities in Pakistan,

including Christians and Ahmadis, has served to

highlight the role that militant networks are

playing in Pakistan. Pakistan would be forced to

confront its policy vis-à-vis militancy; however,

such a move is contingent on U.S.-Pakistan policy

after 2014 where the U.S. could enact such a

measure without stoking the expected backlash

from Pakistan that could harm the U.S. military

presence in Afghanistan. “My hope is that our

involvement in Afghanistan lessens and our

reliance on supply routes through Pakistan as well

as Uzbekistan – which is one of the worst places in

the world for religious freedom – will give us more


flexibility to push on human rights agenda,” said

Knox Thames at the United States Commission on

International Religious Freedom.lxxxiv

4. Militancy in Pakistan – The Risk to South Asia

Pakistani militant networks also pose a risk to

security in the South Asia region. All four of its

neighbors – India, China, Iran and Afghanistan –

have blamed Pakistani militant networks for

carrying out terrorist attacks. This situation

causes more foreign policy concerns for the U.S.

vis-à-vis Pakistan. India, China and Afghanistan

have all pressed the United States to get Pakistan

to do more to control militant groups, while

Iran’s Foreign Minister wrote to the United

Nations after Iranian soldiers were kidnapped by

a group reportedly operating out of Pakistan.lxxxv

But the United States can only do so much in

terms of passing these concerns on to its

Pakistani counterparts, and it only has a limited

amount of influence on Pakistan.

“How it happens is that any one of these

countries – with the exception of Iran – will go to

the U.S. and say ‘Put pressure on them’,”

Chaudhary explained. “We can because we have a

strong role right now, but we’re not going to have

that in the future. The leverage that we have is

going away and the leverage we will have is

through the security assistance to the Pakistani

military. As long as we give them money, we can

convey messages to the military on behalf of

China, India or Afghanistan. But if we don’t give

them that much money, what are we going to be

able to do? Nothing, actually. In some ways – it’s

really messed up – but it actually does help

Pakistan’s interests because having these

problematic groups in the country keeps the U.S.

engaged and money coming into the military’s

coffers. This has been my point for a long time

that assistance to Pakistan doesn’t get us results,

it gets us access and it doesn’t get us the best

access. But if we didn’t do that, we would

basically be in the dark.”

Pakistan, observers say, does realize that it risks

regional security because of the militant groups

that are using the country as a base. However,

Pakistan prioritizes these issues depending on its

relationship with other countries: if China is the

top of the list, Afghanistan is possibly the last

because of the difficult relationship between the

countries.

China has been pressing Pakistan to take action

against Uighur militants that it believes are

carrying out attacks in China.lxxxvi There have also

been a string of attacks against Chinese workers

in Pakistan. Pakistan – which considers China to

be a strong ally – has reportedly acted several

times to allay China’s concerns. China has also

been pressing the United States to get Pakistan to

act against homegrown militancy that poses a risk

to China, but the United States has indicated that

China should probably play a stronger role in

Pakistan given that it enjoys a far better

relationship with the government than the United

States does. Moreover, Pakistan has managed to

effectively portray to its neighbors that it is as at

risk from militancy as the region is. This

perception of being weak has sympathy in China.

As Vanda Felbab-Brown explained,lxxxvii based on

a recent dialogue with Chinese officials on

Afghanistan and Pakistan: “The Chinese also had

something on the same lines. I asked them how

they find this narrative and it was quite

interesting that they were quite sympathetic. ‘We

are concerned about Pakistan stability or

instability; we are concerned about militants in

Xinjiang,’ for example. ‘You cannot assume we


can push Pakistan too much. We have to be very

careful. ’ They used this phrase that ‘It’s like

holding an egg shell… you squeeze too much on

either end and it’ll break.’ It’s also a cop out. But

it also reflects some reality, or some reality of

their thinking, that they have bought into the

fragility narrative.”

The Afghan government has long blamed

Pakistan for violence in the country and for

aiding the Haqqani Network. This indicates a

larger problem – whether the Pakistani state – in

particular the military – still uses proxy groups

such as the Haqqani network or the LeT to

influence India or Afghanistan, and if it still

wields control over militant groups that it may

have supported in the past.

The idea of influencing or destabilizing

Afghanistan via proxy groups has been disavowed

over the years by many Pakistani officials,

including the military. But this claim is backed by

little action.

“Many Pakistani officials and academics disavow

it but then they’ll turn around and say

‘Afghanistan cannot be controlled by an India-

friendly government,’” Felbab-Brown noted. “The

notion of strategic depth in the sense of using

actual physical territory might not be there… but

that’s quite different from saying Pakistan does

not have a very strong interest in Afghanistan and

arguably an interest that is not consistent with

Afghanistan’s sovereignty.”lxxxviii

India’s main concern stems from the anti-India

groups such as LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammad and

their ability to recruit and work openly in

Pakistan. It has pressed for Pakistan to move

forward with the trial of suspects arrested for

their alleged role in the 2008 attacks in Mumbai.

These concerns have been relayed to the United

States and then to Pakistan several times over the

past six years.

A repeat of a November 2008-style attack in India

could destabilize South Asia. India is unlikely to

react mildly to another attack, and there remains

a risk of repeating 2001 with an escalation of

troops and/or threats of nuclear strikes. While

there are several factors to take into account – for

example, the targets and nature of the attack, the

stability of Pakistan and India at that time, and

the governments in power in both countries– the

ability of Pakistan to claim plausible deniability of

such an attack would be far reduced, given the

rapid expansion of Jamaat-ud-Dawa since 2008.

There would be inherently stronger pressure on

the U.S. and India to respond to an attack by a

group operating out of Pakistan.

However, Indian and U.S. policy towards

Pakistan will be more complicated by the election

of the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party leader

Narendra Modi as Indian prime minister.lxxxix

Prime Minister Modi brought up security issues

with Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in

their first meeting after Modi’s inauguration,xc

but it is hard to predict what the Modi-led

government’s policy towards Pakistan will be .

Many analysts believe Modi as prime minister

would not be as accommodating of Pakistan as

his predecessor, Manmohan Singh, was. U.S.

observers are also assessing what Modi’s policy

towards the United States will be, given the

countries’ fairly rocky relationship in the past few

months.xci

India is also concerned that a Pakistani military

operation in North Waziristan against the Tehrik-

e-Taliban Pakistan could drive fighters into India.

However, with an operation in North Waziristan


currently underway, there is little evidence to

support this argument. There is also a concern

that after the withdrawal of active combat troops

from Afghanistan by the end of 2014, LeT and

associated groups will refocus their attention on

India and the insurgency in Kashmir, which,

unlike Afghanistan, is still a heavily contested

issue.xcii It is highly unlikely that the civilian

government in Pakistan would support such a

shift. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is a

strong proponent of building a relationship with

India and is hoping to sign a trade agreement

with a new Indian government. According to one

observer, Pakistan would consider the return of

Pakistani militant groups to Kashmir a

disaster.xciii

Iran’s key concern is Sunni militant groups that

allegedly operate out of Pakistan’s Balochistan

province, including Jundullah.xciv A 2009 attack

on the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps led to

intense pressure on Pakistan to act against the

group. There have been reports of Pakistan’s

intelligence services cooperating with Iran over

Jundullah. However, indications that Pakistan is

currently tilting towards stronger ties with Saudi

Arabia over Iran bode badly for Pakistan-Iran

relations and any cooperation on militancy.

Prime Minister Sharif visited Iran in May, when

Iranian leaders expressed their concerns about

security issues.xcv

Moreover, a recent attack on the Iranian

Consulate in Peshawar led by Mast Gul – a

former Hizbul Mujahideen commander –

indicate how the Pakistani state’s former proxy

groups have evolved into having transnational

aims beyond India and Kashmir.xcvi

Iran has also threatened to take military action in

Pakistan and there have been numerous reports

from Balochistan indicating rocket attacks by Iran

into the province.xcvii While Iran is not going to

ask the United States to tell Pakistan to control

militant groups, it will be interesting to gauge in

the future how Pakistan will work with Iran in

the event that relations between Iran and the

United States improve.

5. Pakistan – Complicit or Stuck Between a Rock and a Hard Place?

Despite the anger at Pakistan, there is a degree of

sympathy in the United States for the degree to

which violence has pervaded the country. Many

acknowledge – whether in the U.S. government

or outside – that the Pakistani government and

military now understand that they face an

internal threat from various militant groups,

including the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, whose

goal is an Islamic state that follows the dictates of

Sharia law, and the ‘Punjabi Taliban’ – believed to

be a network of smaller militant groups that have

also declared war against the state. The key threat

is widely considered to be from the Tehrik-e-

Taliban Pakistan, largely because of its modus

operandi of attacking the state and the military.

The group has been the focus of military

operations.

Attacks against the Pakistani state have also come

from its former proxy groups, highlighting the

repercussions of Pakistan’s strategy in the 1990s.

The leadership of the Red Mosque that launched

an insurgency in Islamabad against the state had

been supported by General Zia-ul-Haq’s

regime.xcviii Among those responsible for stoking

violence in Pakistan included Ilyas Kashmiri of

the 313 Brigade, a unit of the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-

Islami. Kashmiri and the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-

Islami had once been part of the coterie of

militias that Pakistan unleashed on India.


Kashmiri instead turned on the state, attempting

to assassinate General Musharraf. He was

released from jail in 2003 because of a lack of

evidence against him and has since been

implicated in attacks on Pakistani military bases

as well as the November 2008 attacks in India.xcix

Kashmiri relocated to the tribal areas and worked

on a terrorism plot in Denmark. Rumors of his

death in a drone strike have circulated since 2011.c

The Pakistani government launched an operation

against militant groups – including foreign

militants affiliated with the Islamic Movement of

Uzbekistan – in June 2014 in the North

Waziristan area, a region where the United States

had long pressed the Pakistani government to act

against militants. However, with no independent

reporting from the warzone and the operation

still underway, it is hard to determine what the

scale of the operation against the militant groups

will be and to what extent it will decimate these

groups.ci

“I think there is an acknowledgement that there

is an internal militant threat to the Pakistani state

and the military recognizes that in the form of the

Pakistani Taliban, and some of the groups that

were once thought as proxies which have

fractured – groups like Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami

and Jaish-e-Mohammad,” Bacon said. “There are

elements within those groups – like the Ilyas

Kashmiri story. He kind of captured that [as] a

militant who was wedded to the state who very

viciously turned against it. There is that cadre of

militants that I think the military does see as a

threat. I think to some degree there is recognition

that sectarianism is related to that although

maybe not as much as we would all like. I think

Lashkar-e-Taiba stands as a very clear exception to

that because the group still eschews violence in

Pakistan. So it doesn’t present the same kind of

internal threat as the groups that the military is

looking at.”cii

What can Pakistan do? When it comes to the TTP

it has chosen to launch a military operation, as it

has done in the past. But with the groups that are

based out of key metropolitan cities and major

urban centers – groups such as the Lashkar-e-

Taiba, Jamaat-ud-Dawa, and the Lashkar-e-

Jhangvi – the options are fairly limited. Militant

groups have largely ignored the Punjab province

in recent years, where the Pakistani military and

current ruling party, the Pakistan Muslim League

Nawaz, are based, and given that these groups are

not directly attacking the state, they have been

pushed down on the priority list. However, a

recent series of attacks in Islamabad may shift

this relationship and emphasize the need to act

against militancy.

Pakistan also believes that keeping the groups

together is far better than having them fractured

and splintered as a result of an aggressive

counter-terrorism campaign or actual law

enforcement measures being taken against them.

Right now, the Pakistani state can wield influence

or control over groups that are still cohesive and

retain a central leadership.

“One of the points to make is that division

[between militant groups] no longer holds and the

state’s problem now is a very interesting paradox

where the easiest way to deal with non-state

actors is to keep them coherent,” said Moeed

Yusuf of the United States Institute of Peace. “As

soon as they become desperate in terms of how

they operate, it becomes much tougher. On the

other hand, if you want to keep them together

you’ve got to keep them weak, because as soon as

you go in and try to take them out they’re going to

splinter and splinters are tougher to deal with. I


don’t think the Pakistani state has figured out

where that sequencing lies in terms of targeting

these groups and where that balancing lies

between saying, ‘Okay, let’s not let everyone

splinter but these ones we have to take on.’ I also

want to be clear that ‘taking on’ doesn’t mean

taking military action. There are a number of

other longer-term things you have to do. But this

is why this will-versus-capacity debate is never

resolved. Is the Pakistani state not touching

Lashkar-e-Taiba because it’s an asset against

India…? Or has it decided to get rid of all groups

but because the other groups are out there and

targeting the state, this is not the time to go after

Lashkar-e-Taiba. What do you want to do? You

want to give them some space so that they don’t

come after you. There’s no winning this debate.”

“In so many ways when you talk about the

internal security problem in Pakistan and how

that has become a greater concern, it’s probably

very difficult to persuade a country to cause a new

threat which acting against Lashkar-e-Taiba could

potentially do,” Bacon said. “It’s very hard to get a

county to act directly against what it perceives as

its own interest, even if over the long term this

could be an incredible liability.”ciii

The flip side is that while the groups remain

‘cohesive’, they are also still operating and

expanding, and could potentially be planning

attacks against the United States. While analysts

hold that the fact that Lashkar-e-Taiba has not

been able to carry out a plot since 2008 is

because of aggressive counter-terrorism

operations and revelations about the group, there

is an understanding that it continues to produce

people who could attack the United States. That is

the inherent risk that Pakistan’s current strategy

holds, and it is a risk that concerns the United

States. In the short-term, this may be a viable

solution for Pakistan, but in the long run this is

inherently dangerous for Pakistan, the region and

the United States. There could be several

implications of this strategy: even without any

state action, a militant group could fracture in any

case as a result of internal divisions or frustration

with its leadership for not carrying out its goals.civ

Moreover, even maintaining relationships with

individuals who may be influential with militants

has largely been ineffective.cv

The problem, is that Pakistan does not know

what to do about militancy without suffering a

violent backlash. “I think some of the security

establishment does see it as a problem, they

acknowledge it, and they understand that they

can’t control or influence them 100 percent,”

Chaudhary said. “They may have realized that in

the past as well, and they have been comfortable

dealing with the costs of that. But the costs have

gotten too high now given the landscape of what

is happening in the region, because of the war in

Afghanistan, because there is a heightened

international focus on Pakistan and what it is

doing with India. Enduring the costs of this have

become harder and harder for the Pakistani

government. I don’t think they know what they

can do here. They know what they have to do and

yet to actually do it, they can’t deal with the

repercussions.”

6. Future U.S.-Pakistan Foreign Policy

While Pakistan and the United States are likely to

maintain a working relationship, it is evident that

there exists little appetite for supporting Pakistan

and great skepticism for its promises to clamp

down on militancy at home. However, there have

been some indications that the United States and

Pakistan are working together on counter-

terrorism: notably, that the drone program halted


while the Pakistani government was attempting

to engage the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan in peace

talks, and resumed when the government opted

for a military operation in North Waziristan.

The drone program plays a role in how the

United States and Pakistan work together in the

future. There is little political support in Pakistan

for the drone program – neither from the current

Sharif administration or opposition parties. If

drone strikes resume after the military operation

in North Waziristan, it is likely to lead to a flare-

up of the same concerns – civilian casualties and

the fact that drone strikes are a violation of

Pakistan’s sovereignty – that have loomed large

over the U.S.-Pakistan relationship since the

program began.

Moreover, drone strikes do not address the root

causes of militancy in Pakistan; whether it is in

the tribal areas or in the rest of the country. And

the Pakistani government has shown no signs of

acting against groups like the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi

or the LeT that may have transnational aims; its

counter-terrorism strategy is restricted to the

tribal areas. While urban militancy has registered

as a concern with the Pakistani government, it is

as yet unclear how it plans to deal with these

groups going forward, and whether it can stop the

groups and their transnational aims. Moreover, it

has not registered as significantly with the United

States as yet – partly because of the focus on the

Haqqani network; and partly because of the U.S.

security concerns elsewhere in the world,

including Ukraine, Syria and Iraq.

It is unlikely that the U.S.-Pakistan relationship

will cease completely. This is partly to avoid a

repeat of the 1980s, when the United States was

perceived as having pulled away from Pakistan,

but also because Afghanistan is still a factor in

the relationship. With a reduced U.S. footprint in

Afghanistan, Pakistan may still be the United

States’ first call in a crisis situation. However,

Pakistan’s much-vaunted role as a broker

between the Afghan Taliban and the United

States may have waned with the emergence of

Qatar’s role in negotiating with the Afghan

Taliban.

Pakistan’s role in a stable Afghanistan is still

largely contingent on how Pakistani militant

groups operate in the months ahead. President

Hamid Karzai blamed Lashkar-e-Taiba for an

attack on the Indian Consulate in the Afghan city

of Herat this May; if such attacks continue, this

will not only lead to destabilization in

Afghanistan but also will have a spillover effect in

how Pakistan deals with countries in South Asia

and the United States and vice versa. In essence,

these attacks will lead to the need to develop a

policy response.

i Government of Pakistan, Report of the Court of

Inquiry constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954

to enquire into the Punjab disturbances of 1953,

305 ii Interviews with experts, congressional aides and

current and former U.S. officials conducted in

Washington DC during March – April 2014. iii Ayesha Siddiqa, “The Islamisationof Jinnah’s

Pakistan,” Newsline magazine, February 2014. iv“TTP Warning: ‘Assaults to continue even after

US exit’”, The Express Tribune, May 27, 2011.Zia-

ur-Rehman, “A profile of Ansar-ul-Hind and

Ansar-ul-Mujahidin in Pakistan,” CTC Sentinel,

May 29, 2014. vNoman Ahmed, “In conversation with Syed

Munawar Hasan,” The Express Tribune, April 26,

2013.


viText of the Objectives Resolution. Also see:

Ayesha Siddiqa, “Islands in the Sand,” The

Express Tribune, January 8, 2014: “How could

liberalism survive in a country where the liberal-

secular elite ensured the death of this principle?

The liberal Liaquat Ali Khan, who otherwise

impressed his Western audience with his high

capacity to ‘hold his drink’ gave a structure to the

principle of religious nationalism by

incorporating religion as the formula for

governance in the Objectives Resolution 1949.

Subsequently, the state’s title was changed from

dominion to Islamic Republic in the country’s

first 1956 Constitution. The Objectives Resolution

established religion as the country’s

grundnorm.”Also see: Husain Haqqani, Pakistan:

Between Mosque and Military (Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace, 2010), 17:

“After the Objectives Resolution there was no

turning back from Pakistan’s status as an Islamic

ideological state.” viiSeyyedVali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the

Islamic Revolution: the Jamaat-e-Islamiof

Pakistan (University of California Press, 1994),

133. viiiNasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution,

136. Also see: “Ahmadiya Sect and Legislative

Action,”

https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974ISL

AMA06907_b.html ixGovernment of Pakistan, Report of the Court of

Inquiry constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954

to enquire into the Punjab disturbances of 1953 x The National Assembly of Pakistan,

‘Proceedings of the Special Committee of the

Whole House Held In Camera to Consider the

Qadiani Issue: Committee Report.’ xiHusain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque

and Military (Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, 2010), 123.

xii“The Islamization of Pakistan 1979-2009,” The

Middle East Institute Viewpoints. xiiiKamran, Contextualizing Sectarian Militancy in

Pakistan. xiv The Ahmadiyya sect, for example, had a

battalion in Kashmir. xvHaqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and

Military, 292. xvi Stephen Tankel, “Lashkar-e-Taiba: Past

Operations and Future Prospects,” April 2011,

New America Foundation. xvii Interview with Shuja Nawaz, Atlantic Council,

Washington DC, March 2014. xviii Interview with Bruce Riedel, Brookings

Institution, Washington DC, March 2014. xixIbid. xx Douglas Jehl, “Pakistan is facing terrorist

listing,” The New York Times, April 25, 1993. xxi Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark, The

Meadow: Kashmir 1995 – Where the terror began

(Harper Collins, 2012) xxiiAdrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark, Deception:

Pakistan, the United States and the the Secret

Trade in Nuclear Weapons (Walker & Company,

2007) Also see: xxiiiInternational Crisis Group, The State of

Sectarianism in Pakistan, April 18, 2005. xxiv Ibid. xxv Imtiaz, Saba. “Wikileaks: Militancy in Punjab,

circa 1998,” The Express Tribune, September 10,

2011. xxviOwen Bennett Jones, Eye of the Storm (Yale

University Press, 2003), 23. xxviiElias Groll, “The story of how Nawaz Sharif

pulled back from nuclear war,”

ForeignPolicy.com, May 13, 2013. xxviiiSuzanne Goldenberg, “Bush threatened to

bomb Pakistan, says Musharraf,” The Guardian,

September 22, 2006.


U.S. Department of State, Cable, "Deputy

Secretary Armitage’s Meeting with General

Mahmud: Actions and Support Expected of

Pakistan in Fight Against Terrorism," September

14, 2001. xxix The date Ambassador Chamberlin presented

her credentials to General Musharraf in

Islamabad. xxx Interview with Wendy Chamberlin, Middle

East Institute, Washington DC, March 2014. xxxi Ibid. xxxii “Top al Qaeda operative caught in Pakistan,”

CNN, March 1, 2003. xxxiiiLASHKAR-E-TAYYIBA: United Nations

Security Council Committee pursuant to

resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011)

concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals

and entities xxxiv Steve Coll, “The Stand Off”, The New Yorker,

February 13, 2006. xxxv Ibid. xxxviInterview, Wendy Chamberlin. xxxvii “Musharraf declares war on extremism,”

BBC News, January 12, 2002. xxxviii“Proscribed/banned organizations,” Pakistan

Ministry of Interior, 2012. xxxixJane Perlez and PirZubair Shah, “In Pakistan,

Guile Helps Taliban Gain,” The New York Times,

April 26, 2009. xl Interview, Marvin Weinbaum, Middle East

Institute, Washington DC, March 2014. xliOwaisTohid, “Descent into Anarchy,” Newsline

magazine, June 15, 2004. xliiThe Lashkar-e-Jhangvi was implicated in

facilitating the kidnapping of Wall Street Journal

reporter Daniel Pearl in Karachi. Pearl was

reportedly killed by Khalid Shaikh Mohammad,

alleged to be the mastermind of the September 11,

2001 attacks.

xliiiElisabeth Bumiller and Jane Perlez, “Pakistan’s

Spy Agency Is Tied to Attack on U.S. Embassy,”

The New York Times, September 22, 2011. xliv Interview, Marvin Weinbaum xlv Interview, Stephen P. Cohen, Washington DC,

March 2014. xlvi“Pakistan’s Spy Agency Is Tied to Attack on

U.S. Embassy,” The New York Times. xlviiSebastian Rotella, “David Headley, witness in

terror trial, ties Pakistani spy agency to militant

group,” The Washington Post, May 23, 2011. xlviiiZahid Hussain, Matthew Rosenberg and Peter

Wonacott, “Pakistan’s Probe Finds Local Links to

Attacks on Mumbai,” The Wall Street Journal,

December 31, 2008. xlixWaqarGillani and SominiSengupta, “Pakistan

Court Orders Release of Militant Suspected of

Ties to Mumbai Attacks,” The New York Times,

June 2, 2009. l Malik Asad, “Trial of Mumbai attacks case

suspects stalled,” Dawn, April 4, 2014. li “Dawa offices in most cities and towns sealed:

Hafiz Saeed, others in custody,” Dawn,

December 12, 2008. lii Saba Imtiaz, “Pakistan: WikiWreaks havoc,”

The Express Tribune, December 2, 2010. liiiInterview, Riedel. livInterview with Shamila Chaudhry, Washington

DC, March 2014 lvSebastian Rotella, “Four Alleged Masterminds of

2008 Mumbai Attacks Are Indicted in Chicago,”

ProPublica, April 25, 2011. Rotella, “Trial

Testimony Intensifies Allegations Pakistan Is

Playing Double Game,” ProPublica,

May 23, 2011. Colin Freeze, “Accused in India

massacre claims ties to Pakistani secret service,”

The Globe and Mail, April 11, 2011. lvi Ben Quinn, “Mumbai terror trial hears claim

that ISI and LeT coordinated with each other,”

The Guardian, May 24, 2011.


lviiInterview with Tricia Bacon, American

University, Washington DC. March 2014. lviii “David Coleman Headley Sentenced to 35

Years in Prison for Role in India and Denmark

Terror Plots,” U.S. Department of Justice,

January 24, 2013. lix “Tahawwur Rana Sentenced to 14 Years in

Prison for Supporting Pakistani Terror Group

and Terror Plot in Denmark,” U.S. Department of

Justice, January 17, 2013. lxInterview, Riedel. lxi“Amendments to the Terrorist Designations of

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba,” U.S. Department of State,

June 25, 2014.

K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan – U.S. Relations”,

Congressional Research Service, February 6,

2009, 158. lxiiAuthor was told this by Jamaat-ud-Dawa

spokesperson in 2012.Jamaat-ud-Dawa press

releases detail activities in Balochistan,

specifically setting up medical camps and relief

work during natural disasters. lxiiiInterview, Tricia Bacon. lxivInterviews, Stephen Cohen, Tricia Bacon. lxvInterview, Riedel.

Speech by Ambassador Daniel Benjamin, the

Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the State

Department from 2009-2012, at the Jamestown

Conference in December 2009: “Lashkar e-Taiba

has made it clear that it is willing to undertake

bold, mass-casualty operations with a target set

that would please al-Qaida planners. The group’s

more recent thwarted conspiracy to attack the US

embassy in Bangladesh should only deepen

concern that it could evolve into a genuinely

global terrorist threat.”

Randeep Ramesh, “Mumbai attackers had hit list

of 320 world targets,” The Guardian, February 19,

2009.

lxvi Carlotta Gall, “What Pakistan Knew About Bin

Laden,” The New York Times Magazine, March

19, 2014. lxvii Eric Schmitt, “Qaeda Militants Seek Syria

Base, U.S. Officials Say,” The New York Times,

March 25, 2014. lxviiiInterview with former U.S. government

official, name withheld on request, Washington

DC, March 2014. lxix“Interrogation report of David Coleman

Headley,” National Investigation Agency,

Government of India, 4.

“Government’s Santiago Proffer”, United States

District CourtNorthern District of IllinoisEastern

Division, United States of America v. Tahawwur

Hussain Rana, 27. Ginger Thompson, “Terror

Trial Witness Ties Pakistan to 2008 Attacks,” The

New York Times, May 23, 2011. lxxAuthor’s own observations of Jamaat-ud-Dawa

rallies and Hafiz Saeed speeches. In 2011, Saeed

said during a press meet that he didn’t single out

the military in his criticism because

constitutionally the military is controlled by the

civilian government. lxxiMark Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife: The CIA,

a Secret Army and a War at the Ends of the Earth

(Penguin Press HC, 2013), 1. Declan Walsh and

Ewan MacAskill, “American who sparked

diplomatic crisis over Lahore was CIA spy,” The

Guardian, February 20, 2011. lxxii“Pakistan outrage after ‘Nato attack kills

soldiers,’ BBC, November 26, 2011. lxxiii “Ahead of 40-party rally, JuD chief parries

questions on political ambitions,” The Express

Tribune, February 1, 2012. lxxiv Saeed Shah, “Terror group builds big base

under Pakistani officials' noses,” McClatchy

Newspapers, September 13, 2009. Mohammad

Asghar, “Ban on hides collection ineffective:

Banned outfits earned over Rs780 million,”


Dawn, December 9, 2012. Ayesha Siddiqa,

“Contextualizing militancy in Punjab,” The

Express Tribune, February 27, 2013. lxxvArchives of Jaish-e-Mohammad publication Al

Qalam. Example: “Miracle in Pulwama, Jaish-e-

Mohammad’s Abdul Waheed is martyred,” Al

Qalam, May 22, 2014. lxxvi Tariq Naqash, “Banned group holds rally in

Muzaffarabad,” Dawn, January 27, 2014. Also see

- recording of Masood Azhar speech, available on

the Jaish-e-Mohammad’swebsite. lxxviiShivamVij, “Feared this summer: Ferment in

Kashmir,” Scroll.in, February 2014. lxxviiiOmar Waraich, “Pakistan’s Sectarian Killers

Operate with Impunity,” Time, September 23,

2011. Amir Mir, “Blood flows freely in Pakistan,”

Asia Times, October 5, 2011. Rod Nordland, “Rare

Attacks on Shiites Kill Scores in Afghanistan,”

The New York Times, December 6, 2011. lxxix Interview, Shamila Chaudhry, Washington

DC, March 2014. Also see – Asif Farooqi, “Profile:

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi,” BBC, January 11, 2013. lxxxInterview, Shuja Nawaz. lxxxi “Clinton defends military strikes,” BBC,

August 20, 1998. lxxxii Bill Roggio, “US adds 2 Lashkar-e-Taiba

leaders to list of terrorists,” The Long War

Journal, September 28, 2011.“Terrorist

designations of Lashkar I Jhangvi and Malik

Ishaq,” U.S. Department of State, February 6,

2014. lxxxiii U.S. Department of State: “The designation

by the Secretary of State (under authority

delegated by the President) of nations guilty of

particularly severe violations of religious freedom

as ‘Countries of Particular Concern’ under the

International Religious Freedom Act of 1998

(H.R. 2431) and its amendment of 1999 (Public

Law 106-55). Nations so designated are subject to

further actions, including economic sanctions, by

the United States.” lxxxiv Interview with Knox Thames, United States

Commission on International Religious

Freedom, Washington DC, March 2014. lxxxv See - letter by Iranian Foreign Minister M.

JavadZarif to United Nations Secretary General

Ban Ki-Moon, March 26, 2014: “It is extremely

regrettable that all available evidence indicate that

these cowardly acts of terror targeting the Islamic

Republic of Iran and its citizens have been

perpetrated by State-sponsored extremist groups,

with similar patterns of funding, coordination,

support and direction. The entire international

community should be alarmed by the regional

and extra-regional ramifications of sectarian

tension and extremist violence, which are being

systematically organized, sponsored and

orchestrated in various parts of our region.” lxxxviInterview, Shuja Nawaz. “China details

overseas links for Xinjiang militants,” Reuters,

April 6, 2012. lxxxvii Interview with Vanda Felbab-Brown,

Brookings Institution, Washington DC, March

2014. lxxxviiiIbid. lxxxix Jason Burke and IshwarRauniyar, “India

elections: subtle foreign policy could take tougher

line under Modi,” The Guardian, April 11, 2014. xc “India PM NarendraModi presses Pakistan’s

sharif on militants,” BBC, May 27, 2014. xciFrank Jack Daniel and David Brunnstrom,

“U.S. ambassador to India Nancy Powell resigns

after diplomatic row,” Reuters, April 1, 2014. xciiInterview, Stephen Cohen. xciiiInterview withMoeed Yusuf, United States

Institute of Peace, Washington DC, March 2014. xcivAbubakar Siddique, “Jundullah: Profile of a

Sunni Extremist Group,” October 20, 2009,

Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty.


xcvMehrdadBalali, “Iran prods Pakistan leader on

U.S. ties, security, pipeline,” Reuters, May 12,

2014. xcvi “Suicide attack at Iranian consulate in

Peshawar kills two,” Dawn, February 24, 2014.

Zahid Hussain, “From jihad to terrorism,” Dawn,

February 12, 2014. xcviiInterview, Shuja Nawaz. Also see: “Iran may

send forces to Pakistan to free border guards,”

Reuters, February 17, 2014; Malik Siraj Akbar,

“Iran’s Border Violations in Balochistan,” The

Baloch Hal, December 12, 2013. xcviiiSyed Shoaib Hasan, “Profile: Pakistan’s Red

Mosque,” BBC, July 27, 2007. xcix David Gritten, “Obituary: Ilyas Kashmiri,”

BBC, June 4, 2011. Carlotta Gall, “Pakistani

Militant Chief is Reported Dead,” The New York

Times, June 4, 2011. c Carlotta Gall, “Pakistan Militant Chief is

Reported Dead,” The New York Times, June 4,

2011. ciIsmail Khan and Declan Walsh, “Pakistani

Military Wages Assault Against Militants,” The

New York Times, June 15, 2014. cii Interview, Tricia Bacon ciii Ibid. civThis has been evidenced in the case of the

Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, where its leadership has

faced a crisis as it struggles to evolve into a

political party and give up its day-to-day

operational activities, with its membership

flocking to more active leaders such as Malik

Mohammad Ishaq of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. It

could also fracture away from the state, as has

been seen with the Jamaat-e-Islami, a highly

centralized mainstream political party that has

struggled with keeping its membership attracted

to politics in the face of recruiters for militant

groups that offer more ‘attractive’ options for

acting against the state and/or establishing a

more hardline Islamic state. The Jamaat-e-Islami

– once considered as close to the military

establishment – openly revolted against the

military by questioning if soldiers who had died

while battling militants were not martyrs in the

Islamic tradition, since they were fighting a war

against their own people. cv When the Pakistan Army headquarters in

Rawalpindi were under siege by a group of

militants in 2009, the army flew in Malik Ishaq

and Ghulam Rasool Shah of the Lashkar-e-

Jhangvi – who were imprisoned as various

murder trials continued – to negotiate with the

attackers.See interview with Al Hurriya

magazine, August 2011, 14. Malik Ishaq: “I sat in

the General Headquarters and refused any ‘deal’

[for my release] and made it clear that that we will

be released via the courts. We will be released if

the courts release us and if [they] sentence us, we

will accept it.”


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