Migration in the 21st century: a third demographic transition in

the making? Plenary Address to the British Society for Population Studies

Annual Conference, Leicester, 13 September 2004.

David Coleman

Department of Social Policy and Social Work, University of Oxford

Outline

• Migration marginalised? migration study in broader context of demography.

• Migration paramount? the importance, or insignificance,of migration in demographic change past and present.

• Migration as the motor of a ‘third demographic transition’?

Why (most) demographers don’t do migration

• A fuzzy category: repeatable, reversible• Terrible statistics –defined by 57 varieties

of laws.• Big errors in both directions.• The ‘weak sister’ of demography – or is it?• Theory and prediction even more difficult

than in fertility and mortality.• Politicised and unappealing.

Duff statistics- some examples

• Most ‘migration’ data isn’t.

• Invisible ‘foreigners’.

• You pay your money…..three examples.

• Bondi beach and ‘unattributable demographic change’: a plague on both houses.

Most ‘migration’ data isn’tNet 'migration', selected countries, 1960-2001

(thousands). Source: Eurostat. Note time-scale.

-200

-100

0

100

200

300

400

60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84 85-89 90-94 95-99 1996 1999 2000 2001

Greece France Italy Austria Portugal

The Amazing Disappearing 'Foreigners' 1991-2001 (thousands)

Source OECD (2004) Tables B.1.4, B.1.5

0200400600800

10001200140016001800

Den

mar

k

Fin

land

Net

her

land

s

Nor

way

Sw

eden

Foreigners 1991 Foreigners 2001 Immigrants 1991 Immigrants 2001

Netherlands: foreigners and persons of

foreign origin. Source: Statistics Netherlands Foreign citizen and foreign origin population, Netherlands 1950-2003

(thousands)

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

1955

1957

1959

1961

1963

1965

1967

1969

1971

1973

1975

1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

Foreign citizens

All foreign origin

First generation

Second generation

Additions to the British labour force through immigration, 1991

– four definitions. Source: Salt 1992 UK SOPEMI Report

Work Permit 28978

Labour Force Survey 50500

International Passenger Survey 75000

Dept of Social Security 81503

Foreign workforce in Germany - two estimates (thousands).

Sources: Social Security, Microcensus.

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002Microcensus - includes unemployed and self employed. OECD 2003 table A.2.3. Social Insurance statistics. employed foreigners liable for social insurance (Salt 2003 table 11)

Lost en route - immigration within the EU, late 1980s.

Source : Poulain 1990.

Total possible sets of data on migration between EC countries (in 1990)

132

Sets of data available on immigration

96

Sets of data available on emigration

88

Number of possible comparisons

62

Comparisons where data match

6

Demography rules OK – 2001 Census versus IPS

Net Immigration to UK, thousands (3 estimates) 1981-2002. Source: ONS

-100

-50

0

50

100

150

200

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

thou

san

ds

Net balance corrected Census-based (1, interim) Census-based (2)

‘Unattributable Demographic Change’: The New ONS Miracle Ingredient!

or ‘Honey, I shrunk the migration estimates’.

• Amaze your audiences!• Lose 290,000 people per decade!• Shrink your migration estimates overnight!• Banish that annoying population growth!• Remove those awkward inconsistencies!• Keep the 2001 Census (nearly) infallible!•

http://www.statistics.gov.uk/about/methodology_by_theme/revisions_to_population_estimates/implications.asp

Migration paramount – Palaeolithic globalization

Globalisation of people, cultures, disease.Migration essential survival strategy for animal populations

Universal early human characteristicConstant movement of most hunter-gatherers, transhumance of

pastoralists.Colonisation of the Earth – ‘Out of Africa’; wave of advance’Human racial variation from lack of migration – isolation by

distance.Volkerwanderung period up to 15th century (?)

Can ancient migration be reconstructed?

• Migration perpetual; everyone a migrant? – up to a point.

• Large scale. Most modern European mtDNA variation from European Upper Palaeolithic, latest Neolithic 6500 BC

• Anglo-Saxons: Genetics and language favours ‘mass migration’ over ‘elite dominance’, but little Y -genetic evidence for later contributions.

• Ancestry of most European populations lies in ‘remote past’.

Migration marginalised?

• Eurocentric view – migration minor between settled wealthy states in peacetime Europe from 15th c; within EU in late 20th.

• A residual category - migration activity mostly outside Europe; partly European emigration.

• ‘Macrocentric’ view – migration effects dominant at local level: but a question for geographers?

• In 19th , 20th centuries, migration effects mostly overwhelmed by birth / death differentials of first demographic transition.

The end of immigration, 1960-84. Source : Eurostat

EU 15 net foreign immigration to EU 1960 - 1984 (thousands)

-600

-400

-200

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

tho

usa

nd

s

Migration paramount (2); the present and future.

• Renewed population growth post-1980s: main source of growth in most developed countries, change of trend in population.

• Migration expected to increase.• Modest changes in age-structure,

substantial changes in composition.• New populations of mixed origin.

UK Population projections 2002 - 2050. Source GAD 2002- based projections

UK population projections 2002 - 2051 (thousands). Source: GAD 2002-based projections

48,000

50,000

52,000

54,000

56,000

58,000

60,000

62,000

64,000

66,000

68,000

70,000

72,000

2002

2006

2011

2016

2021

2026

2031

2036

2041

2046

2051

2002 Principal Projection

2002 Natural Change

2002 163k migration

Projected population growth by component,

United Kingdom, 2002-2031, thousands. Source:

GAD 2004.High

migration variant

Principal projection

Low migration

variant

Total population increase 2002 - 2031 (thousands) 7,822 5,606 3,389

Assumed net migration 5,500 3,790 2,080

Natural change with no migration 966 966 966Additional natural change from

net migration 2,139 1,633 1,126Other changes (UDC) -783 -783 -783

Migration effect (%) 97.7 96.7 94.6Migration effect without UDC 88.8 84.9 76.8

Resulting from:

Projected effect of immigration on US population growth 1999 - 2100 .

Source: US Bureau of the Census.

US Population Projections 1999 - 2100. Middle Series and Zero Migration (millions)

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

600

1999

2003

2007

2011

2015

2019

2023

2027

2031

2035

2039

2043

2047

2051

2055

2059

2063

2067

2071

2075

2079

2083

2087

2091

2095

2099

Middle

Zero migration

Population projections, Sweden, 2004 - 2050,

(millions); standard and zero-migration. Source: Statistics Sweden

Population projections, Sweden 2004-2050, standard and zero migration. Source: Statistics Sweden.

8.0

8.5

9.0

9.5

10.0

10.5

11.0

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

2020

2022

2024

2026

2028

2030

2032

2034

2036

2038

2040

2042

2044

2046

2048

2050

Zero-migration projection (millions)

Standard projection (millions)

Population projections, Netherlands 2003-2050,

medium variant and zero-migration (millions). Source: Statistics Netherlands

Netherlands 2003-2050 projections, medium variant and zero-migration (millions). Source: Statistics Netherlands.

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

2040

2045

2050

total-medium variant total-zero migration native - zero migration

Why migration may continue to increase: the UK example.

• Hydraulic ‘lavatory cistern’ model should be rejected but - • Upward trend in most components.• UK government policy to expand migration e.g. increase

work permits: aim 200,000, actual 129,000 in 2002.• Growth of political influence of ethnic minority populations.• Growth of marriage migration with growth of ethnic minority

populations, and other chain migration.• Some new inflow from EU Accession countries.• New diversity-oriented policy (e.g working holidaymakers)• Amnesties (see Demography 2003)

• But asylum claims declining in 2004.

GAD Net immigration assumptions, and reality, 1996 - 2002 (thousands).

-100

-50

0

50

100

150

200

1980

1983

1986

1989

1992

1995

1998

2001

2004

2007

2010

2013

2016

2019

2022

2025

2028

2031

2034

2037

2040

2043

2046

2049

GAD PP 1996

GAD PP 1998

GAD PP 2000

Actual (pre-2001 census)

Actual (post-2001 census)

GAD 2002-based

GAD Net immigration assumptions, and reality, 1996 - 2002

-100

-50

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

1980

1983

1986

1989

1992

1995

1998

2001

2004

2007

2010

2013

2016

2019

2022

2025

2028

2031

2034

2037

2040

2043

2046

2049

GAD PP 1996

GAD PP 1998

GAD PP 2000

Actual (pre-2001 census)

Actual (post-2001 census)

GAD 2002-based

Fitted logarithmic curve to actual post-census data (r2=0.83)

Another (semi) official view (Home Office RDS Occasional Paper no 67).

More work permit migration from outside EU

Work permits holders and dependants admitted, UK 1973-2003. Source: Home Office

0

20000

40000

60000

80000

100000

120000

140000

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

≥12 months <12 months dependants total

Family and dependent migration

• Main reason for growth of immigrant populations in Europe, N. America post 1970s.

• Marriage migration overtakes ‘family reconstitution’ migration from 1980s.

Components of gross immigration inflows to

Western Europe (blue is family; OECD 2003)

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Australia 2

Switzerland

United Kingdom 3

Portugal

Canada

Norway 4

Denmark

France 5

United States 6

Sweden 7

Workers Family reunification Refugees

Spouse migration to the UK 1973 - 2001 (gross inflow).

Spouse migration by sex and NC origin, UK 1973-2003. Source: Home Office acceptances for settlement.

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

35000

40000

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

All husbands All wives NC wives NC husbands

Displacement of family re-constitution migration by family formation migration UK 1982 - 1996

Entry clearance for wives from the ISC by length of marriage 1982-96, percent. Source: Home Office Control of Immigration Statistics table 2.12

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

Up to 1 year

1 to 10 years

Over 10 years

Growth of male South Asian ethnic minority populations of marriageable age, and entry-clearance

applications for wives/fiancees 1981-2001.Trends in age-group size and spouse entry applications from Indian sub-

Continent, Great Britain 1981-2001. Source: LFS, Census, Home Office.

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

1981 1986 1991 1996 2001

Wives/fiancees entry clearance applications, ISC South Asian Males 15-24 / 10

Family re-unification migration and family formation migration, Netherlands 1995, 2002

Non-asylum immigration to the Netherlands by purpose, percent, 1995, 2002.

Source: Statistics Netherlands.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70M

oroc

co 1

995

Mor

occo

200

2

Tur

key

1995

Tur

key

2002

perc

ent o

f no

n-as

ylum

tota

l

Labour Family re-unification Union formation Dependants accompanying core family member

Other transformations: ethnic groups of mixed origin, England and Wales 2001.

Source: 2001 Census.

All born in born born in born % of % of

birth- UK overseas UK overseas total non-white

places (1000s) (1000s) (1000s) (1000s) pop. pop.

All Mixed groups 661.0 524.3 136.7 79.3 20.7 1.3 14.6W/ Black Caribbean 237.4 222.9 14.5 93.9 6.1 0.5 5.3W/ Black African 78.9 52.9 26.0 67.1 32.9 0.2 1.7W/Asian 189.0 144.5 44.6 76.4 23.6 0.4 4.2Other mixed 155.7 104.0 51.7 66.8 33.2 0.3 3.4

Births of mixed origin by ethnic group of mother, Great Britain 1992 - 2000 (LFS)

40.7

35.3

16.6

12.8

8.9

4.11.5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45C

hine

se

Car

ibbe

an

Bla

ck-

Afr

ican

Indi

an

Pak

ista

ni

Ban

glad

eshi

Whi

te

Ethnic Group of Mother

% M

ixed

Birt

hs

Source: Quarterly Labour Force Surveys, 1992-2001 (Autumn Quarters)

Current marriages / unions outside own group, Great Britain 1981, 1991 (percent)

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Mix

ed/O

ther

Wes

t Ind

ian

Afr

ican

Oth

er

Chi

nese

Indi

an

Ban

glad

eshi

Pak

ista

ni

per

cen

t m

arry

ing

outs

ide

own

gro

up

Females 1981 Females 1991 Males 1981 Males 1991

Current unions outside own group, Great Britain 1991-96, 1997-02 (percent).

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Black-Caribbean

Black-African Indian Pakistani Bangladeshi Chinese

perc

ent

Women 1991-1996 Women 1997-2002 Men 1991-1996 Men 1997-2002

Population of mixed Caribbean origin compared with all Caribbean origin (numbers

and percent), England and Wales 2001.(source 2001 Census).

Unmixed Caribbean origin and Mixed Caribbean origin population, England and

Wales 2001 (thousands).

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

0-4

10-1

4

20-2

4

30-3

4

40-4

4

50-5

4

60-6

4

70-7

4

80-8

4

90 +

Unmixed Caribbean origin Mixed white/Caribbean

Mixed and non-mixed population as percent of total Caribbean ethnic population, England

and Wales 2001

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

0-4

10-1

4

20-2

4

30-3

4

40-4

4

50-5

4

60-6

4

70-7

4

80-8

4

90 +

Mixed as percent of all Caribbean origin

Non-mixed as percent of all Caribbean origin

A new demographic transition in the ‘West’?

• First transition - vital rates

• Second transition (?) - family, living arrangements

• Third transition - population composition?

- new ethnic groups of mixed origin

- possible replacement of ‘majority’ group

Dirk van de Kaa’s model of the ‘Second

Demographic Transition’. Source: European Journal of Population 15, p. 313, 1999.

Ethnic change in the USA, projected 1999 - 2100

US population 1999 - 2100 Middle Series, ethnic group. Source; US Bureau of the Census 2000.

0.000

50.000

100.000

150.000

200.000

250.000

1999

2002

2005

2008

2011

2014

2017

2020

2023

2026

2029

2032

2035

2038

2041

2044

2047

2050

2053

2056

2059

2062

2065

2068

2071

2074

2077

2080

2083

2086

2089

2092

2095

2098

Hispanic White non-Hispanic Black NH American Indian NH Asian and Pacific NH

US 1999 - 2100: projected percentage of all ethnic minorities

US Population 1999-2100 Middle series projection. Total, and percent ethnic 'minority'. Source: US Bureau of the Census 2000.

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

600

199

9

200

2

200

5

200

8

201

1

201

4

201

7

202

0

202

3

202

6

202

9

203

2

203

5

203

8

204

1

204

4

204

7

205

0

205

3

205

6

205

9

206

2

206

5

206

8

207

1

207

4

207

7

208

0

208

3

208

6

208

9

209

2

209

5

209

8

po

pu

lati

on

(m

illio

ns

)

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

pe

rcen

t e

thn

ic m

ino

rity

Total population

Ethnic minority percent

US 1999 - 2100: projected proportion of immigrant-origin minorities onlyUS population 1999-2100 Immigrant minorities only.

Source: US Bureau of the Census 2000 NP-T6-A

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

600

1999

2004

2009

2014

2019

2024

2029

2034

2039

2044

2049

2054

2059

2064

2069

2074

2079

2084

2089

2094

2099

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

Total population

Immigrant minoritypercent (excludingBlack and AmericanIndian)

Percent of population foreign, Netherlands 2003 – 2050; medium variant and zero-

migration projections. Source: Statistics Netherlands.

Netherlands 2003-2050. Percent of population foreign, medium variant and zero-migration projections. Source: Statistics Netherlands.

10

15

20

25

30

35

1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050

Percent population foreign - medium variant percent population foreign - zero migration

Foreign -born and foreign origin population in Sweden, 1980 - 2002, percent of total population. Source: Statistics Sweden 2003

5

7

9

11

13

15

17

19

21

23

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020

Foreign birthplace

Foreign background

Projected growth of population of foreign origin 2000-2050, selected countries, as % of total

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050

perc

ent

Germany medium variant

USA medium variant (excludes black population)

Netherlands base scenario

Denmark 2002- based medium variant

Austria: Restricted immigration: percent foreign origin with no naturalisation.

Sweden percent population of foreign background 2004 based

Ethnic replacement:

• Continued migration from one population, into another with sub-replacement fertility, must eventually replace one with the other.

• If incoming populations have higher fertility, the process will be accelerated.

• Migration, not differential fertility, dominant effect.

British Pakistani population projections 2001-2051 (thousands)

700

900

1100

1300

1500

1700

1900

2100

2300

2001 2006 2011 2016 2021 2026 2031 2036 2041 2046 2051

S 6 No mig, TFR 1.75 2016 S 8 Mig 12k, TFR 1.75 2016

S 9 No mig, TFR 2.05 2046-51 S 10 Mig 12k, TFR 2.05 2046-51

Migration can go down as well as up… (EU, Germany)

Migration to Germany 1954 - 2003, by citizenship. Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden. Up to 1990 German Federal Republic only.

- 300 000

- 200 000

- 100 000

-

+ 100 000

+ 200 000

+ 300 000

+ 400 000

+ 500 000

+ 600 000

+ 700 000

+ 800 000

1954

2)

1956

2)

1958

1960

1962

1964

1966

1968

1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

Net migration Germans including aussiedler Foreigners

Growth of foreign-origin population in Denmark, three projections, showing projected consequences

of recent restrictions (green line). Source: Statistics Denmark

Denmark - percent population foreign origin ; three projections. Source: Statistics Denmark

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050

2002-based 16 - 12k migration 2004 based 1997-based zero migration 1997 - based 13.2k migration

Projected growth of population of immigrant or foreign origin 2000 - 2050 as percent of total population, with zero net

migration

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

2040

2045

2050

perc

ent

Germany medium variant USA medium variant Denmark base scenario

Germany zero mig US zero mig Denmark zero mig

Why is it interesting?

• A new development, and asymmetrical• parallels abroad attract attention• change of direction in total pop trend• cultural, political change incl. foreign policy• what happens to original ‘dominant majority’• implies major change of social traditions, identity• a future of mixing or segregation or both• Sensitive to policy change

Really a transition?

• Not yet - only in early/middle stages

• Reversible? Most new populations permanent; and inter-ethnic unions create new populations

• Universal? Only in developed countries. Elsewhere minorities diminishing , especially white and ‘dominant’ minorities;

• New? Displacement not new; pervasive in first millennium and earlier; extreme in colonisation of ‘New Worlds’; deportations , ethnic cleansing of WW2 and later.

• Novelty is peaceful change, with (partial) acquiescence

Migration to Netherlands 2000-2050Year First

generationSecond

generationTotal

Total Foreign Origin 2000 1431 1445 27762050 2637 3268 5904 2000 545 822 1367Total ‘Western origin’ 2050 833 1178 20112000 886 523 1409Total ‘non-Western origin’

including: 2050 1804 2090 38942000 178 131 309 Turkey2050 201 304 5052000 153 110 262 Morocco2050 237 333 5702000 102 50 151 Africa2050 278 318 5962000 169 57 226 Asia2050 696 614 8872000 33 18 51 Latin America2050 102 136 238

Source: Alders 2001 page 30.

Some conclusions

• Union migration biggest open-ended migration channel, may define national ethnic composition.

• Trends in partner choice a major factor in future migration flows, and isolation / assimilation of ethnic populations.

• Inter-ethnic union may diminish or increase group size, but will generate in the long run a variety of new populations of mixed origin.

• Utility and propriety of ethnic classification may be questioned.

Why does it matter?• Ethnic replacement would attract attention elsewhere

(Estonia, Latvia, Amazon)

• Demographic, cultural, political implications in the marginalisation of formerly majority traditions.

• Does this infringe human rights of natives?

• Trend is mostly policy-driven, and at least potentially controllable (e.g. Denmark).

• Implies a future of mixing or segregation or both

• No remaining ‘nature reserve’ for populations concerned.

Really a transition?

• Only in early/middle stages, but elements can be projected.

• Reversible? Most new populations permanent; inter-ethnic unions create new populations.

• Universal? Only in developed countries. Elsewhere minorities diminishing , especially white and ‘dominant’ minorities;

• New? Displacement not new; pervasive in first millennium and earlier; extreme in colonisation of New worlds; deportations , ethnic cleansing of WW2 and later.

• Peaceful change, with (partial) acquiescence