MiG-23MLD vs Western Fighters – the Soviet Air Force View

Alexander Mladenov looks at the former Soviet Air Force concepts,

dating from the mid-1980s, for the MiG-23MLD’s employment in the

air superiority role pitted against the F-15A, F-16A, F-4E and

Kfir C.2

Although this article can be regarded as being of somewhat

historical value, in fact it still has a certain practical value

for the present day. In Russia, the other CIS republics and

Eastern Europe the aging Flogger was retired from service

completely between 1997 and 2002, but in the Third World

countries, considered hostile to the West, the type is regarded

yet as mature and capable enough design, performing useful work in

the air-to-air role, with perhaps better mission capable rates

than the early-series MiG-29s operated by those nations. As many

as 30 fighter Floggers are believed to be maintained in combat-

ready state by the Iraqi Air Force; no less than 60 more are in

service with the Syrian air arm (including more than 40 highly-

modified MiG-23MLDs); the Cuban Air Force has on strength slightly

less than three dozens MiG-23MF/MLAs; and more than 40 Flogger-Gs

continue to soldier on with the North Korean Air Force. Some of

the countries on the rogue list have determined and skilled

Flogger pilots and to underestimate them and their mounts would be

foolish, and, in case of war, potentially dangerous.

The Bekaa Valley Defeat – a Stimulus for Further Flogger Upgrades

In June 1982, the Soviet-style air superiority/air defence rather

orthodox doctrine, training and tactics have proved to be fully

inadequate and ineffective when employed against the Israeli

Defence Force/Air Force (IDF/AF). Syrian losses – fighters,

fighter-bombers and helicopters between June 6 and 11 - numbered

some 85 (between 82 and 92 according to some sources) while

Syrians claimed for some 27 IDF/AF fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft

shoot down which is obviously a bogus. It is well known that

Israelis deny losing any aircraft in air combats during the 1982

Lebanon war though such statements may also be considered, to some

extent, as dubious. According to the authoritative research

article Early MiG-23s in Operational Service, written by the

1960s-1980s local conflicts researcher Tom Cooper (published in

Air Enthusiast, Vol 100, July-August 2002, p56-67), the Syrian

fighter Floggers played only a secondary role in the conflict.

Confirmed losses during the clashes over the Bekaa Valley between

June 9 and 11 comprised four MiG-23MS’ and six MiG-23MFs, while

their pilots claimed at least five enemy aircraft shoot though

most if not all of these kills cannot be confirmed by independent

sources and thus could be regarded more as bogus rather than of

realistic reports.

MiG-23MLD’s pros and cons – the Soviet view of the 1980s

The most significant post-Bekaa Valley undertaking of the Soviet

Air Force was the crash-programme upgrade of the huge VVS-FA MiG-

23ML/MLA Flogger-G fleet to the MiG-23MLD Flogger-K standard, also

known as Izdelye 23-18 in the internal designation system of the

MiG Design Bureau. In the early 1980s, the MiG-23 made up the

backbone of the VVS (Voenno-Vazdushni Sili - the Soviet Air Force)

Frontal Aviation (FA) air defence/air superiority assets. No less

than 1,100 MiG-23M/ML/MLAs were in service with the Soviet front-

line combat units by that time and more than 600 of them used to

equip at least 15 fighter regiments based in Central Europe that

were considered to be the spearhead of the Soviet air superiority

assets at the most probable theatre of operations during the Cold

War era.

The Flogger-K’s upgrade package is known to had been prepared even

before the Lebanon war and a total of 560 VVS MiG-23ML/MLAs were

upgraded while only 66 improved interceptors (with only new

avionics) are reported by Russian sources as being newly-built

between mid/late 1982 and December 1984; these are known as the

MiG-23MLD(Export) (Izdelie 23-19 or the alternative designation

Izdelie 23-22) and were only exported to Syria and Bulgaria – 50

and 16 examples respectively. Interestingly, the NATO reporting

name Flogger-G was retained, as these aircraft were hardly

distinguishable from the basic MiG-23ML/MLA. Unlike its export

counterparts, the VVS-FA MiG-23MLDs boasted much-improved

maneuvering performance thanks to a host of airframe and flight

control system upgrades.

It would be interesting for the Western public to examine and

analyse in details the content of a Soviet Air Force supplementary

air combat manual. This particular 32-page manual titled Aide

Memorie for the MiG-23 Pilot on Air Combat vs F-15A, F-16A, F-4E

and Kfir C.2 was published not long after the Bekaa Valley

clashes. By that time both the Soviet and client states pilots

still trained mainly in the orthodox - and often described as

inflexible - air intercept tactics, derived from the 1960s and

mastered to perfection during the MiG-21 era. Traditionally, in

the 1970s and early 1980s, the Soviet and client air arms flew the

MiG-23M/ML/MLD like the MiG-21 – as a high-speed point interceptor

closely guided and supported by the GCI, and it took no less than

12 years to employ the Flogger-G/K as a true air superiority

fighter.

Aide Memorie for the MiG-23 Pilot on Air Combat vs F-15A, F-16A,

F-4E and Kfir C.2 refers to the MiG-23MLD(Export) version, powered

by the R35-300 turbojet, rated at 28,700 lbs (127kN or 13,000kg)

in full afterburner, without the aerodynamics and flight control

system improvements of the VVS-FA MIG-23MLDs. According to the

manual, the aircraft’s main parameters defining the energy

maneuverability performance turn out the fighter slightly better

than the McDonnell Douglas F-4E Phantom II and definitely better

than the IAI Kfir C.2. However, the MiG-23MLD’s air combat

performance aspects, as given in the manual, are quoted as

definitely inferior to those of the McDonnell Douglas F-15A and

General Dynamics F-16A. There are only few areas within the MiG-

23MLD’s envelope where it could boast equal or slightly better

performance aspects when pitted against the third generation US

fighters.

For example, the manual’s authors claim that compared than the F-

4E (not specified whether the slated or non-slated sub-version of

the Phantom is concerned), the MiG-23MLD has superior sustained

turn performance throughout the entire envelope, excluding the

range between 377 and 540kts (700 and 1,000km/h) bellow 21,000ft

(7,000m) as well as an edge over the Phantom II in the zoom climb

performance at all altitudes and speeds, excluding the true

airspeed range between 485 and 647kts (900 and 1,200km/h) above

18,000ft (6,000m).

Pitted against the F-15A, the MiG-23MLD has the only notable

advantage in the zoom climb performance at speeds above 620kts

(1,150km/h) while pitted against the F-16A, the manual asserts

that the Soviet swing-wing fighter boasts somewhat better

sustained turn performance above 15,000ft (5,000m) at speeds close

to the maximum as well as better zoom climb performance at true

airspeeds exceeding 590kts (1,100km/h). However, as real-world

tests have shown in Israel where the defected in November 1989

MiG-23MLD (Export) was flight-tested by the IDF/AF, the swing-wing

fighter demonstrated - somewhat surprisingly - better acceleration

than the escorting F-16s and this tends to indicate that in real

world conditions the MiG-23MLD would have a slight edge over the

early F-16s in acceleration and energy maneuverability, at true

airspeeds above 485kts (900km/h).

The IAI Kfir C.2, as assessed in the manual, is said to be

inferior to the MiG-23MLD by sustained turn performance at

airspeeds above 540kts (1,000km/h), by zoom climb performance at

true airspeeds bellow 540 kts (1,000km/h), while at altitudes

bellow 12,000ft (4,0000m) the MiG-23MLD has an edge in energy

maneuverability throughout the entire speed range.

Sensor and Self-Protection Considerations

According to the manual, the MiG-23MLD’s N008E Sapfir-23MLAE-2

pulse radar has superior performance than the Phantom’s APQ-120,

approximately equal performance compared to the F-16A’s AN/APG-66

and definitely inferior performance to the F-15A’s AN/APG-63. (See

Table 2 and Figure 1).

The manual’s authors claim that airborne radar maximum detection

range alone cannot grant any decisive tactical advantage in the

non-sterile environment of the real world air combat. It is well

known that fighter radar target detection and discrimination

performance are, in general terms, somehow limited by the

relatively low resolution offered by the radar beam with an

average width of between 2.5 and 3.5 degrees in azimuth and

elevation. In addition, the generally low reliability of the

electronic identification (EID) facilities in the early/mid 1980s

is another factor that would prevent the enemy fighters from the

full use of their superior Beyond Visual Range (BVR) capability.

However, the manual notes that the F-16A’s and F-15A’s radars have

a plethora of valuable close air combat modes with automatic

target acquisition at close ranges (up to 6-10nm [10-18km]) with

missile seeker heads slaved to the radar’s line-of-sight for

increased accuracy and missile lock-on speed.

Both the F-15A’s and F-16A’s Pulse-Doppler (PD) radars have well-

known problems with their stability of locking-on targets flying

bellow them on the beam (side-on, when in ‘snap-down’ attacks).

This particular shortcoming could be used to a good effect by the

MiG-23 pilots to escape from attacks and got away as the evasion

from the AIM-7F Sparrow SARH missile, launched by the F-15 could

be easily achieved by performing a high-g beam maneuvering.

As a rule, while operating in look-down/shoot-down mode over

mountainous terrain, the early Spafir-23’s performance in the

look-down/shoot down mode is notably degraded, but the MLD’s

Sapfir-23MLAE-2 radar has a newly added, highly useful Pulse-

Doppler mode (Non-Coherent) with somewhat improved ultra-low level

target detection (highly useful for operations over rough terrain)

requiring a minimum target altitude of 160ft (50m). Whichever the

case, the MiG-23MLD’s look-down/shoot down operations require

heavily GCI-support, and attacks against fighter-size targets in

such conditions are advised to be mounted in tail-on aspect as the

radar maximum detection range is advertised to be up to 13nm

(25km) and tracking range is up to 9nm (16km). The Spafir-23MLA-2

featuring new look-down, passive jamming countermeasures and close

air combat modes demonstrated in real world condition, a moderate

reliability performance with Mean Time Between Failures (MBTF) in

the order of 60 hours.

The MiG-23MLD’s sensor suite also incorporates the undernose TP-

26-Sh InfraRed Search-and-Track (IRST) sensor, which can be useful

for emission-free tail-on intercepts, especially as back-up sensor

in situations when the radar is rendered inoperative by heavy

jamming or technical failure. The IRST however, has a somewhat

limited search performance due to its restricted field of scanning

– only 60-degree in azimuth and 15-degree in elevation. The

average low-level detection range against receding fighter-size

targets (in tail-on aspect) with afterburner on is advertised to

be over 6nm (11km), at high level detecting range increase up to

13nm (25km).

The MiG-23MLD is equipped with the SPO-15LE Beryoza Radar Warning

Receiver (RWR). It is an analogous device, developed in the

early/mid-1970s, capable of providing a 360-degree coverage in

azimuth and 30-degree up and down in elevation, with the

capability to issue precise angular warning of emitting targets

attacking in the forward quarter though in the rear quarter the

accuracy is much lower. The SPO-15LE is advertised as of being

sensitive enough to warn on enemy’s radars and their probable type

and mode of operation. On the other hand, the manual states that

the RWRs used on the enemy fighters have 360-degree coverage in

azimuth and 60-80-degree in elevation; as a rule they are

sensitive and ‘smart’ enough to provide timely warning on the MiG-

23MLD’s radar emissions as their own detection range is

considerably better than the radar’s own detection range – i.e.

capable to detect an approaching MiG-23MLD with its radar emitting

in search mode at distances over 60nm (110km).

Unlike its archrivals, the MiG-23MLD lacks any built-in and pod-

mounted ECM systems for self-protection and namely this is

considered a huge disadvantage when pitted against the F-15A, F-

16A, F-4E and the Kfir C.2 which all boast state-of-the-art ECM

gear. The only self-protection gear onboard the MiG-23MLD is the

PKiBP-23 (KDS-23M) chaff/flare dispenser comprising two six-round

downfiring units built-in the centerline pylon. The VVS-FA

Flogger-Ks have their self-protection enhanced by two BVP-50-60

50-round chaff/flare dispensers built in distinctive fences over

the centre fuselage. As well, the Syrian MiG-23MLDs, received

additional chaff/flare dispensers, (perhaps in the mid/late 1980s)

installed in fences onto rear fuselage.

One of the MiG-23’s major advantages is its compact appearance and

relatively small size when fighting vs the F-15A and F-4E;

especially with the wings set at 72-degree swept angle; combined

with a suitable camouflage this would make low level visual

detection and tracking very difficult, particularly from above and

in head-on encounters.

Weapons

The manual’s authors claim that the MiG-23MLD’s R-24R (AA-7 Apex)

BVR Semi-Active Radar Homing (SARH) missile has a comparable range

performance when pitted against the F-15A’s AIM-7F Sparrow while

the IR-guided R-24T and R-23T are a valuable addition to the

Flogger’s weapons suite. The R-24T’s high altitude maximum range

at low level in head-on attack is 7nm (12 km) and the figure

increases to 12nm (20km) in tail-on engagements. In the same time,

the manual claims that the ‘Foxtrot’ and ‘Echo-2’ Sparrows are

known to have inferior ECM resistance compared to the R-24R; there

is also conclusion that the US BVR missiles are not considered

particularly effective in shoot-down engagements. On the contrary,

the MiG-23MLD’s R-23R and R-24R missiles boast modern monopulse

seekers with a good ECM resistance. In real world air combat,

however, it could not be impossible their lock-on to be broken by

‘smart’ jamming, produced by enemy fighter’s new generation ECM

gear. The ranges of the MiG-23MLD’s, F-15A’s and F-4E’s BVR

missiles are shown in Table 3 Figure 2.

The AIM-9L Sidewinder arming the F-15A’s and F-16A’s with all-

aspect lock-on capability is considered the best Within Visual

Range (WVR) missile as the manual authors note. On the contrary,

the MiG-23MLD’s R-60 and R-60MK (AA-8 Aphid) purposely-designed

dogfight missiles are also being quoted in the manual as somewhat

capable of head-on lock-on, but only if the target’s afterburner

is on. The R-60MK has, in general, the same launch limitations and

an equally sensitive cooled seeker head as the AIM-9L, though with

much shorter range. The R-60 and R-60MK have decisive edge in the

minimum launch range - as little as 750ft (250m) compared to the

AIM-9L’s at least 1,500ft (500m). It would be necessary to note

that a notable omission of the VVS and/or KGB intelligence

authorities was to put in the manual in question any piece of

information on the performance and employment details of the

Rafael Python 3 all-aspect missile, which was the preferred close

air combat weapon of the Israeli F-15As, credited with 35 kills in

June 1982.

It is of note that the Launch Acceptable Region (LAR) in the

horizontal plane of the close air combat missiles as given in the

manual (see Figure 3) can be considered valid for a non-

maneuvering target only, flying at 16,000ft (5,000m) at military

power; both the target and the attacking fighter maintaining at a

speed of 485kts (900km/h); if the target is turning then the LAR

would shrank considerably.

The MiG-23MLD’s Sapfir-23MLAE-2 radar has an useful close air

combat mode, a noticeable omission on the previous Sapfir-23

variants, with vertical scan in a tall ‘window’ that is

perpendicular to the aircraft’s longitudinal axis with a field of

45-degree in elevation and 6-degree in azimuth. In this mode, the

radar locks semi-automatically onto the first target to enter the

‘window’ at distances of between 0.17 and 5nm (0.3 and 9km); this

proves very useful during high-g maneuvering situations as thе

radar sends slaving commands to slave the R-60, R-60MK and R-13M

seeker heads toward the acquired target.

The manual concludes that the built-in guns of all compared

fighters have approximately equal overall efficiency - in terms of

useful range and lethality – for use against fighter-size targets.

As well, the lead-computing optical sights of the MiG-23MLD and

its opponents have the approximately the same accuracy in the gun

aiming mode.

Conclusions and BVR Considerations

The manual concludes that the MiG-23MLD(Export) armed with the R-

24/R-60MK AAM combination could be considered reasonably capable

of holding its own against all types of enemy fighters. However,

the edge over the F-15A – the most capable archrival - could be

gained only through multiple simultaneous ‘slash-and-dash’ attacks

from several directions and from long ranges, mounted in decisive

manner; with a high degree of coordination between the groups when

the engagement enter into the WVR phase, and with timely exit from

combat.

Probably the most important rule, contained into the

recommendation chapter of the manual dealing with the BVR combat,

is that on the importance of the first attack: “In order to

achieve surprise in shooting, the MiG-23MLD pilots should spend

all of their experience and aggressiveness of into the first

attack.” Undoubtedly, this is considered as critical factor since

surprise has been proved to be nine-tents of air combat success,

both offensive and defensive. The high-speed energy fighters like

the MiG-23 have the option of engaging or disengaging at will,

even in the 1980s and 1990s all-aspect BVR and WVR missile

environment.

Other critical elements in the success of a fighter sweep or CAP

operation are the command, control and communications (C3) of the

own fighter force. According to the then VVS-FA prevailing

doctrine of the 1980s – as it is believed to be still in use with

the MiG-29 and Su-27 communities, which continue to employ the

basic tactics and weapons employment techniques, developed by the

MiG-23MLD community in the mid-1980s - the CGI would have the

almost absolute authority to dictate every action of own fighters

in sweep and CAP operations in friendly, disputed or enemy

airspace, including headings, altitudes, speeds, attack and firing

clearances, ‘bugouts’ (disengagements), etc. The air superiority

operations require well-honed GCI substituting the lack of AWACS

assets. The Soviets mastered to perfection this highly redundant –

though considered far from perfect and rather inflexible -

concept, useful to some extent for the Central European theatre

only where dense ground radar coverage was available.

During the search for enemy fighters, Flogger driverrs are

strongly-advised to carry out visual search from take-off to

landing – another important lesson derived from the analisys of

the Bekaa Valley clashes where reliable GCI assistance was not

available and thus the Syrian pilots were left to fly ‘blind’ into

the ‘furball’ during the beginning of close-in encounters in the

Bekaa Valley turning out them to suffer the fate of turkey shoots.

In order to expand the search zone in a high-threat environment,

the Flogger pilot is required to fly a weaving pattern with his

main attention centered onto the visual search bellow the bottom

boundary of the own ground radar coverage (usually bellow 1,000ft

[300m] in Central Europe in the 1980s). It is well known, however,

that the MiG-23 pilot has ample problems with the rearward and

downward field of view as the fighter is designed with a low-drag

canopy, faired into the fuselage though the canopy-mounted rear-

view mirrors expand to some degree the rearward field of view.

Therefore, the MiG-23 pilots would be expected to have huge

difficulties in keeping a view on a turning bogey or during visual

search bellow his aircraft (this is possible only through banking,

but the workload on the pilot is excessively high). On the other

hand, it has to be noted that the MiG-23MLD is a quick in

acceleration thanks to the low-drag airframe and the aerodynamic

qualities of the fully-swept wings, and its high speed could

increase difficulty encountered by an unseen attacker in

satisfying his aiming requirements in the reduced intercept time;

this can be used as another defensive factor when flying in enemy

or disputed airspace.

During the BVR air combat, the manual recommends strongly that

attacks should not be initiated without offensive advantage and

the prospect of getting off the first shoot. The general rule:

‘Who shoots first – kills first, in the worst case dictates the

engagement’ should be regarded as of particular importance for the

MiG-23 community. If the MiG-23 was dictating the engagement, the

aircraft could employ to the full extent its advantages as a high-

speed ‘chaos’ fighter using ‘slash-and-dash’ attack - a preferable

and often the only available method for the MiG-23 community when

engaged vs F-16s and F-15s.

If unknown type of bandit aircraft are encountered, it should be

assumed that these may be F-15s – the most capable and hence the

most dangerous enemy fighter. The manual stresses that it is

prohibited for the MiG-23MLD to close head-on toward any bandit

aircraft of unknown type because it is likelihood these to be F-

15s possessing better radar performance and longer-range BVR

missiles. It would be also useful to note that an important

recommendation to the GCI officers contained in the manual is that

during fighter sweep operations it would be strictly prohibited

for them to vector the MiG-23s in head-on attacks against non-

identified bandits because, as noted above, these are likely to be

the dangerous F-15s. Nevertheless, if such a situation is

unavoidable, then the anti-F-15 tactics, recommended to the MiG-23

pilots and GCI officers is as follows: if the distance to the

bandits exceeds 12nm (20km) the MiGs should immediately perform a

sharp turn out of the target and got away descending and pulling

high-g and then reverting into side-on or tail-on missile attack.

If the target is detected side on, than the MiG-23MLD pilots

should use chaff and sharp turns in order to evade the Sparrow

missiles and them to revert into attack.

In order to mask the group attack, the manual recommends the own

fighters to be packed in carefully spaced formations usually

called ‘cells’ – virtual boxes in airspace with up to 1,200ft

(400m) long sides as the tracking beams of all enemy types of

airborne radars encompass all targets flying within such a ‘cell’

(however, this is valid only for the earlier PD radars without the

raid cluster resolution mode introduced in the mid/late-1980s). In

other words, such a group is to be displayed as a single target at

any airborne radar display at a distance of excess of 8nm (15km).

When tracked by the enemy radar, the aircraft within a ‘cell’ can

execute simultaneous maneuvering (the so-called ‘burst’) in the

horizontal and vertical plane in order to break the lock and

reenter into attack.

It would be always possible in real world situation that BVR

missile launched at the maximum permissible range can be

outmaneuvered by the enemy. Therefore, in head on attack the first

R-24R (R-23R) is recommended to be launched at 90% maximum range

(bellow 6nm [11km] at low level and 15nm [28km] at medium/high

level) while the second one should follow suite at 60-70% maximum

range (bellow 4nm [7.5k] and 10nm [20km] respectively). If the R-

24T IRH missile is available for employment against enemy fighters

without a known BVR capability, i.e. F—16A and Kfir C.2, then it

is strongly recommended to the Flogger community to delay the

launch down to the minimum permissible range, typically bellow 5nm

(9km). Immediately after the R-23R/R-24R launch, the MiG-23 is

allowed up to 30-degree change in course, still keeping the target

within radar’s glimbal limits, with a subsequent break in a 3-g

descending turn until missile impact, and a sharp reduction in the

closing speed relative to the target. 10-15 seconds after the

break, the manual recommends to the pilot to accelerate again in

order to gain energy which would be necessary in the close air

combat that may follow. The R-24T is a true ‘launch-and-forget’

weapon and after the launch it is recommended the pilot to perform

immediate missile-evading maneuvers in the form of a high-g roll

when progressing for a possible WVR engagement.

WVR Combat Considerations

Close air combat recommendations figured out in the manual, would

sound even more interesting than those on the BVR encounters.

These begin with an ever important remainder to the pilot to

monitor constantly his fuel state during the engagement as the low

level flight with afterburner on results in no less than 88 Imp

gallons (400-litre) per minute fuel burn. The MiG-23MLD could be

most effective in a high-speed air combat only, with one or

maximum two attack runs and maneuvering as minimum as possible. As

a rule, the difference in maneuvering performance and pilot

training level between fighters engaged in close air combat

becomes more and more evident in the follow-on maneuvering after

the first attack. If the bandits are on offensive, then the manual

recommends the MiG-23MLD to initiate as soon as possible defensive

maneuvering accompanied with flare pumping (not useful if the

afterburner is on). If attacked from the rear, the MiG-23 is

described as being a well capable of evading the attacker by

simply outaccelerating it. Both the R-60 and R-60MK dogfight

missiles are recommended by the manual to be used at distances of

between 900 and 4,500ft (300 and 1,500m); the R-13M is useful at

between 3,000 and 6,000ft (1,000 and 2,000m); and the GSh-23L

twin-barrel gun is considered a highly lethal when fired bellow

1,200ft (400m).

The manual assures the MiG-23 pilot that neither the F-15A or F-

16A have any valuable advantage in their close air combat

weapons’; however, these US generation fighters are regarded as

much more maneuverable and consequently these could achieve a

weapons employment solution in the turning engagements much easier

and earlier than the MiG-23MLD. Therefore, the MiG-23MLD pilots

are rigorously advised that prolonged turning engagements vs F-15A

and F-16A, both offensive and defensive, should be avoided by all

means. The attack maneuvering should be broken off before or at

the latest in the end of the first minute of the engagement if

there were no weapon employment solutions achieved by that time.

The manual also advices the pilot to maintain high speed (not

bellow 485kts [900km/h]) during the combat because as lower the

speed as great is bandit’s maneuvering advantage. Maneuvers which

would cause considerable loss of speed and therefore energy are

permitted only if considered necessary for weapons employment or

missile evading. As well, the manual strongly recommends the MiG-

23MLD pilots to avoid any turning combat in the horizontal plane

vs the Kfir C.2.

Real World Limitations

It is necessary to be noted that the MiG-23MLD(Export) had a

plethora of shortcomings, inherited from the MiG-23MF/ML such as

the vicious high-AoA handling characteristics, slow roll and pitch

stick response, unimpressive pitch and roll rates and

unsatisfactory turning performance in both the vertical and

horizontal plane at high subsonic and transonic speeds with the

wings set at 45-degree swept position. However, the VVS-FA top-

notch MiG-23MLD had some of these shortcomings eliminated by the

host of aerodynamic and flight control system improvements. Vortex

generators were mounted on the pitot boom and notched leading edge

roots were introduced to act as vortex generators to energise the

flow over the wings in order to delay the stall. The upgraded

flight-control system incorporated the SOS-3-4 synthetic stick-

stop or the so-called soft pitch/AoA limiter (borrowed from the

MiG-29), which restricts g, angle of attack and pitch rate. As a

result, the aircraft’s agility was considerable better than that

of its predecessor and it featured much better stall/spinning

protection and acceptably good high-Alpha handling qualities since

this particular aspect, together with driver visibility was among

the main MiG-23M/ML shortcomings limiting the aircraft’s

performance in the maneuvering air combat. Although tested on the

MiG-23MLD, there were no production-converted Flogger-Ks with the

built-in SPS-141 Siren or Gardenya-1FU active jammers.

The various MiG-23 upgrades offered by Mikoyan Design Bureau in

the mid and late-1990s – including new fire control system with

new radar and the R-77 (AA-11 Adder) active radar homing missile

and glass cockpit – have proved to be far from a cost/effective

solution for most of the existing operators, deprived of funds and

determination to launch such programmes. Most, if not all, of the

existing Flogger-B/G operators have little or no capability to

procure new equipment due to various reasons, either economical or

political. These countries, however, may go ahead - or have

already gone - to increase the combat capability of their MiG-

23MFs and ML/MLDs at low cost by integrating the R-73 high off-

bore sight missile enabling the pilot to acquire and engage an

enemy aircraft even at a high angle (up to 45 degrees) off his

aircraft’s heading. The missile was introduced on the VVS-FA MiG-

23MLDs as early as in 1983, and its integration was performed by

only replacing three black boxes into the aircraft’s fire control

system. To fully exploit the R-73’s high off-boresight

capabilities, however, it would require a helmet-mounted cueing

system (HCMS), similar to that adopted for the Indian Air Force

MiG-21-93. There are a quite few of sources in Russia, Ukraine and

Belarussia – both government and private companies, often

operating on the gray and black market - for the procurement of

new or second-hand R-73s.

With some kind of relatively inexpensive airframe/systems service

life extensions, offered by Mikoyan Design Bureau, the

MiG-23ML/MLD(Export) manufactured in the early 1980s will have

projected structural lifespan allowing the Flogger-G to soldier on

in Syria, Iraq, Cuba and North Korea for a total of 24 - 26 years

and these could serve well into the mid- and late-2000s.

Table 1

MiG-23MLD(Export), F-4E, F-15A and Kfir C.2 Comparative

characteristics and performance as given in the Aide Memorie for

the MiG-23 Pilot on Air Combat vs F-15A, F-16A, F-4E and Kfir C.2

manual.

Figure MiG-23MLD F-4E F-15A F-16A Kfir C.2

Typical TO

weight

30,800lb

(14,000kg)

45,800lb

(20,800kg)

41,440lb

(18,800kg)

23,100lb

(10,500kg)

23,500lb

(10,670kg)

Maximum

speed at

Sea level

755kts

(1,400km/h)

755kts

(1,400km/h)

782kts

(1,450km/h)

755kts

(1,400km/h)

755kts

(1,400km/h)

Maximum

speed

At altitude

1,351kts

(2,500km/h)

1,270kts

(2,350km/h)

1,325kts

(2,450km/h)

1,135kts

(2,100km/h)

1,260kts

(2,330km/h)

Service

ceiling

60,800ft

(18,600m)

57,200ft

(17,500m)

62,130ft

(19,000m)

58,800ft

(18,000m)

55,600ft

(17,000m)

Thrust-to-

weight

ratio at

typical TO

weight

0.88 0.78 1.2 1.1 0.76

Wing

loading at

typical TO

weight

88.29lb/

sqft

(430kg/sqm)

88.29lb/

sqft

(430kg/sqm)

68.78lb/

sqft

(335kg/sqm)

75.97lb/

sqft

(370kg/sqm)

62.62lb/

sqft

(305kg/sqm)

g-limit +8.5 +7.3 +8.0 +9.0 +6.5

Max rate of

climb

44,290ft/

min

(225m/s)

39,370ft/

min

(200m/s)

55,118ft/

min

(280m/s)

48,228ft/

min

(245m/s)

34,645ft/

min

(176m/s)

Time for

acceleratio

n from 324

to 594kts

(600 to

1,100km/h)

at 3,000ft

(1,000m)

19.8s 22.0s 14.0s 16.0s 22.0s

Note: Thurst-to-Weight Ratio is given for bench-test conditions

Table 2

Radar Comparative characteristics and performance as given in the

‘Aide Memorie for the MiG-23 Pilot on Air Combat vs F-15A, F-16A,

F-4E and Kfir C.2’ manual.

MiG-23MLD F-4E F-15A F-16A

Type Sapfir-23MLAE-

2

AN/APQ-120 AN/APG-63 AN/APG-66

Detection range at high

altitude

30nm (55km) 28nm (50km) 54nm (100km) 25nm (45km)

Detection range in look-down

mode – forward quarter

12.5-14nm (23-

25km)

Cannot

detect

44nm (80km) 17-20nm (30-

35km)

Detection range in look-down

mode – rear quarter

12.5-14nm (23-

25km)

Cannot

detect

17-22nm (30-

40km)

17–19nm (30-

35km)

Scan field –

azimuth/elevation

60/6-deg 120/0.4-deg;

90/10.5-deg

120/120-deg;

60/10-deg

120/4.4-deg;

60/7.9-deg;

20/15.8-deg

Autotrack filed –

azimuth/elevation

112/(-44 to

+56)-deg

120/120-deg 120x120-deg 120/120-deg

Beam width, azimuth/elevation 2.4/2.4-deg 3.4/3.8-deg 2.5/2.5-deg 3.7/4.4-deg

Close Air Combat mode Available Not

Available

Available Available

Autotrack field in Close Air

Combat mode –

azimuth/elevation

6/45-deg - 20/20-deg 10/40-deg

Notes: 1. The lock-on range is between 60 and 75 per cent of the

detection range

2. The original table in the manual included the Kfir C.2 with the

Elta EL/M 2021 Pulse Doppler radar. However, it can be considered

a fault of the Soviet intelligence services since the Kfir C.2 is

equipped only with the E/M 2002 ranging radar, hence the Kfir C.2

was deliberately omitted from Table 2

Table 3

BVR Missiles Comparative characteristics and performance as given

in the ‘Aide Memorie for the MiG-23 Pilot on Air Combat vs F-15A,

F-16A, F-4E and Kfir C.2’ manual.

R-23R/T R-24R/T AIM-7E-

2

AIM-7F

Maximum launch range

at low level

- -forward

quarter

- rear quarter

- 8nm (14km)

- 2.2nm(4km)/

- 6nm (11km)

- 2.2nm (4km)

- 9nm (17km)

- 2.2nm (4km)/

- 6nm (11km)

- 2.2nm (4km)

- 8.7nm

(16km)

- 2.2nm

(4km)

- 9nm (17km)

- 2.2-2.7nm

(4-5km)

Maximum launch range

at high level

- -forward

quarter

- rear quarter

- 13.50nm (25km)

- 4.3–5.4nm(8-

10km)/

- 6nm (11km)

- 4.3-5.4nm (8-

10km)

- 19nm (35km)

- 11nm (20km)/

- 6.5nm (12km)

- 10.8nm(20km)

- 13.4nm

(25km)

- 5.4nm

(10km)

- 22-27nm

(40-50km)

- 8-11nm (15-

20km)

Minimum launch range

at low level

- -forward

quarter

- rear quarter

- 2.2-3.3nm (4-

6km)

- 0.7nm(1.3km)/

- 2.2nm (4km)

- 0.7nm (1.2km)

- 1.4nm (2.5km)

- 0.3nm (0.5km)/

- 1.4nm (2.5km)

- 0.3nm (0.5km)

- 2.2nm

(4km)

- 0.3nm

(0.5km)

- 1.4nm

(2.5km)

- 0.3nm

(0.5km)

Maximum-g of the

launch aircraft

4 7 5 7

Maximum-g of the

target

5 7 5 7

Table 4

WVR Missiles Comparative characteristics and performance as given

in the ‘Aide Memorie for the MiG-23 Pilot on Air Combat vs F-15A,

F-16A, F-4E and Kfir C.2’ manual.

R-13M R-3S R-60 R-60MK AIM-9H AIM-9L Shafrir

II

Max range at low

level in the

forward quarter

- - - - - 1.6-

3.2nm

(3-6km)

-

Max range at low

level in the rear

1.9nm(3.5km) 1.3nm

(2.5km)

1.1nm

(2km)

1.1nm

(2km)

1.9nm

(3.5km)

1.9nm

(3.5km)

1.3nm

(2.5km)

quarter

Max range at high

level in the rear

quarter

7nm (13km) 3.8nm(7km) 4.3nm

(8km)

4.3nm

(8km)

5.5nm

(10km)

8nm

(15km)

4.8-

5.5nm

(9-10km)

Min range in the

rear quarter

0.5nm

(0.9km)

0.55nm

(1km)

0.1-

0.13nm

(0.2 –

0.3km)

0.1-

0.13nm

(0.2 –

0.3km)

0.5nm

(0.9km)

0.13-

0.3 nm

(0.3-

0.5nm)

0.3-

0.37nm

(0.6-

0.7km)

Maximum-g of the

launch aircraft

3.7 2 7 7 4-6 7 4-5

Maximum-g of the

target

5 3 8 8 4-6 6-8 4-6

All-aspect

capability

No No No Limited No Yes No

Captions

Graphs

1. (File Gr1.jpg) Detection range of the MiG-23MLD, F-4E, F-15A,

F-16A radars against fighter-size targets with radar-cross

section of 3 sqm. Horizontal axe – distance in kilometers,

vertical – altitude in kilometers.

Note: The original table and graph in the manual claimed the

Kfir C.2 is equipped with the Elta EL/M 2021 Pulse Doppler

radar. However, this is a fault of the Soviet intelligence

services since the Kfir C.2 is equipped only with the E/M 2002

ranging radar, hence the Kfir C.2 was deliberately omitted from

Table 2 and has to be omitted from the graph.

2. (File Gr3.jpg) Launch Acceptable Region (LAR) in the

horizontal plane of the close air combat missiles, valid for

a non-maneuvering target only, flying at 16,000ft (5,000m) at

military power; both the target and the attacking fighter

maintaining at a speed of 485kts (900km/h). Distances in the

axes are given in kilometers.

3. (File Gr4.jpg) Maximum launch ranges (envelopes) of the MiG-

23MLD, F-4E, F-15A, F-16A radars against fighter-size non-

maneuvering fighter-size targets with radar-cross section of

3 sqm in forward quarter (right) and rear quarter (left).

Horizontal axe – distance in kilometers, vertical – altitude

in kilometers.

MiG-23MLD vs Western Fighters – the Soviet Air Force View

(Captions – Photographs by Alexander Mladenov)

1. The MiG-23 pilot has ample problems with the rearward and

downward field of view as the fighter is designed with a

low-drag canopy, faired into the fuselage though the canopy-

mounted rear-view mirrors expand to some degree the rearward

field of view. (Alexander Mladenov)

2. The MiG-23MLD cockpit is regarded as typical Soviet design

of the 1970s, crammed with instruments and switches, which

impose a high workload on the pilot. The Flogger can be

effective in combat if only flown by pilots with above the

average handling and tactical skills. (Alexander Mladenov)

3. The MiG-23MLD ASP-17DTz HUD/sight is a considerably improved

device compared to the sight of the previous Flogger

variants, but can hardly be considered as agronomical and

effective compared to the HUDs of the US-made third

generation fighters. (Alexander Mladenov)

4. The MiG-23MLD’s Sapfir-23MLAE-2 radar, seen here on a test

bench, has a newly added and highly useful Pulse-

Doppler/Non-Coherent (probably medium PRF), mode with

somewhat improved ultra-low level target detection,

recommended for employment over rough terrain and when the

enemy use chaff to evade the intercept. (Alexander Mladenov)

5. & 6 The IR-guided R-24T (shown here) and R-23T are a

valuable addition to the Flogger’s weapons suite. The R-

24T’s high altitude maximum range at low level in head-on

attack is 7nm (12 km) and the figure increases to 12nm

(20km) in tail-on engagements. On the underfuselage pylons

this BVVS MiG-23MLD(Export) carries the R-60 dogfight

missile. (Alexander Mladenov)

7. If the MiG-23 was dictating the engagement, the aircraft

could employ to the full extent its advantages as a high-

speed ‘chaos’ fighter using ‘slash-and-dash’ attacks.

However, it rarely had happened in the real-world air combats

in the 1980s. (Alexander Mladenov)

8. In order to mask the group attack, the manual recommends the

own fighters to be packed in carefully spaced formations

usually called ‘cells’ – virtual boxes in airspace with up to

1,200ft (400m) long sides as the tracking beams of all enemy

types of airborne radars encompass all targets flying within

such a ‘cell’. (Alexander Mladenov)

9. Unlike its export counterparts, the VVS-FA MiG-23MLD Flogger-

Ks boasted much-improved maneuvering performance thanks to a

host of airframe and flight control system upgrades as well

as the R-73 high off-boresight close air combat missile.

(Alexander Mladenov)