Lino Vs Pano

FACTS:On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor’s permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995which was issued on September 18, 1995.As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. In the said complaint, respondent Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the following reliefs: (1) a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, ordering the defendants to refrain from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Paño, promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.

ISSUE: WON Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 is valid

HELD: As a policy statement expressing the local government’s objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part of the local government’s autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national government’s. However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.n our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress. As held in Tatel vs. Virac, ordinances should not contravene an existing statute enacted by Congress. The reasons for this is obvious, as elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp

NG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec

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G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001

BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec

Facts

Petitioners challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

1. Whether or not petitioner’s recourse to the Court was proper.

2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.

3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.

Ruling:

1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other remedies "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." The facts attendant to the case rendered it justiciable.

2. Political parties – even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections subject to the requirements laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to the Party List System.

Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations” . It is however, incumbent upon the Comelec to determine proportional representation of the “marginalized and underrepresented”, the criteria for participation, in relation to the cause of the party list applicants so as to avoid desecration of the noble purpose of the party-list system.

3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of respondents in the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations was necessary which was beyond the pale of the Court. The Court not being a trier of facts.

However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution, the Court decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. The Court ordered that the petition be remanded in the Comelec to determine compliance by the party lists.

Aquino V comelec

Aquino vs. ComelecAgapito A. Aquino, petitioner vs. Commission on Election, Move Makati, Mateo Bedon, and Juanito Icaro, respondentsSept, 18, 1995Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

Relevant Provisions:Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 ConstitutionNo person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.

Facts: On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new (remember: newly created) Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10 months. Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less than one year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the election. Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed a resolution that dismissed the petition on May 6 and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes. Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter acted with an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence. Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.

Issue: 1. Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant the disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just residence (not in the

sense of the COC)in the district he was running in.

Held:1. Yes, The term “residence” has always been understood as synonymous with “domicile” not only under the previous constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court cited the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission wherein this principle was applied.Mr. Nolledo:I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of elections. …What is the Committee’s concept of residence for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?Mr. Davide:This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 constituition, the interpretation given to it was domicile.Mrs. Braid:On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that resident has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.…Mr. De los ReyesSo we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and actual residence. Therefore, the framers intended the word “residence” to have the same meaning of domicile.The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a given area for meeting election law requirements, this defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify. Which brings us to the second issue.

2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running in. The SC agreed with the Comelec’s contention that Aquino should prove that he established a domicile of choice and not just residence. The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of residency prior to the elections in the district in which he seeks election to .Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. His birth certificate indicated that Conception as his birthplace and his COC also showed him to be a registered voter of the same district. Thus his domicile of origin (obviously, choice as well) up to the

filing of his COC was in Conception, Tarlac. Aquino’s connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City.Aquino’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his lack of one year residence in the district.DecisionInstant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent Comelec from proclaiming the candidate garnering the next highest number of votes in the congressional elections of Second district of Makati City made permanent. Dicta:I. Aquino’s petition of certiorari contents were:A. The Comelec’s lack of jurisdiction to determine the disqualification issue involving congressional candidates after the May 8, 1995 elections, such determination reserved with the house of representatives electional tribunalB. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction ceased in the instant case after the elections and the remedy to the adverse parties lies in another forum which is the HR Electoral Tribunal consistent with Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. C. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded to promulagate its questioned decision despite its own recognition that a threshold issue of jurisdiction has to be judiciously reviewed again, assuming arguendo that the Comelec has jurisdiction D. The Comelec’s finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of one year against the petitioner is contrary to evidence and to applicable laws and jurisprudence.E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal impossibility of enforcing the one year residency requirement of Congressional candidates in newly created political districts which were only existing for less than a year at the time of the election and barely four months in the case of petitioner’s district in Makati.F. The Comelec committed serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ordered the board of canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates after the erroneous disqualification of the petitioner in disregard of the doctrine that a second place candidate or a person who was repudiated by the electorate is a loser and cannot be proclaimed as substitute winner. II. Modern day carpetbaggers can’t be allowed to take advantage of the creation of new political districts by suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts, prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of taking advantage of existing conditions in these areas.

III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one year residence requirement as a qualification for a candidate of the HR, by establishing a commencement date of his residence. If a oerfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by itself establish a domicile of choice, this particular lease agreement cannot be better.

Avelino vs Cuenco (G.R. No. L-2821)

Posted: July 25, 2011 in Case Digests

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FACTS: The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court to declare him the rightful Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco. In a session of the Senate, Tanada’s request to deliver a speech in order to formulate charges against then Senate President Avelino was approved. With the leadership of the Senate President followed by his supporters, they deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada from delivering his speech. The SP with his supporters employed delaying tactics, the tried to adjourn the session then walked out. Only 12 Senators were left in the hall. The members of the senate left continued the session and Senator Cuenco was appointed as the Acting President of the Senate and was recognized the next day by the President of the Philippines.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction of the case.2. Whether or not Resolutions 67 & 68 was validly approved.

HELD:1. The Court has no jurisdiction of the case because the subject matter is political in nature and in doing so, the court will be against the doctrine of separation of powers. To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We refused to take cognizance of the Vera case even if the rights of the electors of the suspended senators were alleged affected without any immediate remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affect only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court.

2. It was held that there is a quorum that 12 being the majority of 23. In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned,the said twelve senators who approved

the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.

BANAT vs. COMELEC , GR 17927 [ April 21, 2009 ]

Post under case digests, Political Law at Thursday, February 23, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party list representatives provided by the Constitution. However, the recommendation of the head of the legal group of COMELEC’s national board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic was approved by the COMELEC en banc, and declared further in a resolution that the winning party list will be resolved using the Veterans ruling. BANAT then filed a petition before the SC assailing said resolution of the COMELEC.

Issues:

(1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?

(2) Is the 2% threshold and “qualifier” votes prescribed by the same Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

(3) Does the Constitution prohibit major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can major political parties participate in the party-list elections?

Held:

(1) Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more then 20% of the members of the House of Representatives.

(2) No. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party-list seats when the available party-list seat exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the-broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”

(3) No. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. However, by vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly