mid-term evaluation tomorrow is a new day-...the mid-term evaluation uses a mixed methodology,...

Adrienne LemonSenior DM&E Regional SpecialistEast, Central, and Southern AfricaSearch for Common Ground

[email protected]

MID-TERM EVALUATION

JULY – OCTOBER 2016

Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika PHASE IV

TOMORROW IS A NEW DAY-

Patrick Mugula Security Sector Reform Programme Coordinator Search for Common Ground

[email protected]

2 S E A R C H F O R CO M M O N G R O U N D | D R C O N G O

T O M O R R OW I S A N E W D AY - LO B I M O KO LO Y A S I K A P H A S E I V

TABLE OF CONTENTSACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 6

ABBREVIATIONS 7

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 8

Methodology 8

Limitations 8

Principal Conclusions 9

Recommendations 10

PROJECT BACKGROUND 11

Introduction to the Project 11

Revising the logical framework and alignment with the ISSSS strategy 13

Background 14

METHODOLOGY 16

Objectives of the mid-term evaluation 16

Data Collection and Analysis 17

Research Team 17Documentation Review 17Mixed Methodology 17

Respondent Profiles 20

RESULTS 21

Project Indicators 22

Overall Objective: Perceptions of Security and Role of Security Forces 26

Incidents of Misconduct and Prosecution Among Security Forces 26Popular Perceptions of the Changing Security Situation 26The FARDC and the PNC: Security Actors and Protectors of Civilian Populations 28

Specific Objective 1: Knowledge and Awareness of Security Forces and Civilians Regarding Roles, Rights and Responsibilities 29

Coverage of training and awareness activities 31Among Civilians 31Among Security Forces 31Gender Considerations in Activities 32Coverage of Media Activities 32

Committee Function 33



Awareness 33Recording Incidents and Prosecutions 34Reporting by the Committees 34

Knowledge Development Among Members of the Security Forces 35Regarding Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) 35Training Base Committees 36

Knowledge Development Among Civilian Populations 36Impact on Attitudes and Behaviours of the Security Forces 37Perceptions and Behaviour of the Security Forces Towards Civilians 37

Abuses and Accountability of the Security Forces 38Changes in the Numbers of Abuses 38Reporting of Abuses 40

Impact on the Behaviours and Perceptions of Civilian Populations 41Reporting Abuses 41

Summary of Specific Objective 1 42

Specific Objective 2: Accountability, Collaboration and Communication Between Civilians and Public Security Actors 44

Coverage of Reconciliation Activities 45Inclusion of Women in the Activities 45

Committee Function 46Changes in Perceptions and Trust Levels Between Civilians and the Security Forces 46

Civilian Perceptions and Trust in the Security Forces 46Security Forces’ Perceptions and Trust in Civilians 47Impact on Relations and Collaboration 48

Summary of Specific Objective 2 49

CONCLUSIONS 50

RECOMMENDATIONS 52

ANNEXES 55

Annex 1: Profile of Individuals Surveyed 55

Profile of Civilians Surveyed 55Profile of Military Personnel Surveyed 56Profile of Police Officers Surveyed 57

Annex 2: Explanatory note on the programme committees 59

Explanatory note on the programme structures 59

Annex 3: Obstacles to the Implementation of Knowledge Acquired by the Security Forces 60

Annex 4: Inception Report 61

Annex 5: Tools 79

Annex 6: Terms of Reference 138



TABLESTable 1: Survey Sampling (quantitative and qualitative) 18

Table 2: Dates and times of the mid-term evaluation 19

Table 3: Number and proportion of respondents by province (military, police and civilian) 20

Table 4: Table showing the completion of objectives and the expected results 22

Table 5: Activities relating to specific objective 1 and their degree of progress 30

Table 6: Programmes listened to by civilian, military and police respondents 33

Table 7: Perceptions of the reduction in the number of incidents of abuse, by province (n=418) 39

Table 8: Structures to which civilians would turn in order to report abuses by the security forces 42

Table 9: Activities relating to specific objective 2 and their level of completion 44

Table 10: Relative levels of trust in various entities among civilians 46

Table 11: Education levels of civilians surveyed, by province 55

Table 12: Education levels of military personnel surveyed, by province 57

Table 13: Military ranks surveyed (n=418) 57

Table 14: Education levels of police officers surveyed, by province 58

Table 15: Ranks of police officers surveyed (n=410) 58



FIGURESFigure 1: Map of the provinces in which the project is being implemented 11

Figure 2: Perceptions of the changing security situation over the past six months, by province (n=418) 27

Figure 3: Perceptions of the potential evolution of the security situation over the next six months, by province (n=418) 27

Figure 4: Perceptions of the contribution of the FARDC and the PNC to security, by province (n=418) 28

Figure 5: Table of military and police personnel that have participated in a training on human rights, divided by province 31

Figure 6: Knowledge of the sentence for aiding and abetting rape on the part of the security forces 35

Figure 7: Estimates of the number of acts of violence committed during the previous month, by category of respondents 39

Figure 8: Military personnel and police officers who would speak up if they heard about an abuse or an act of violence by one of their colleagues. 41

Figure 9: Participation in reconciliation activities 45

Figure 10: Do you agree with the following statement: I would accept a member of my family marrying a..? (% no) 47

Figure 11: Relative levels of trust in civilians among the security forces 47

Figure 12: Military perceptions regarding the transmission of information to armed groups by civilians 48

Figure 13: Civilian-police relations according to the civilians 49

Figure 14: Age of civilians surveyed, by province (n=418) 55

Figure 15: Employment of civilians surveyed (n=418) 56

Figure 16: Age of military personnel surveyed, by province (n=418) 56

Figure 17: Age of police officers surveyed, (n=410) 58



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The implementation of this mid-term evaluation for Phase IV of the “Lobi Mokolo ya Sika” project in the provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri and Kinshasa was carried out with the participation and contributions of the FARDC, PNC, civilian populations and our partners: the Security and Justice Sector Reform Network (RRSSJ) in Kinshasa, the Collectif Alpha Ujuvi in North Kivu, the Association for the Defence of the Military and Security Sectors (ADDROSMIL) in South Kivu and Justice Plus in Ituri. We would like to express our gratitude to all those, near and far, who have helped in the completion of this work.

First of all, we wish to thank the security forces’ senior leadership, officers, and enlisted recruits in various locations, whose cooperation allowed us to realize qualitative and quantitative data collection on the ground. We would also like to express our gratitude towards the heads of the Provincial Coordination Committees (CCP) and the National Steering Committees (CNP) of the FARDC and the PNC, to the members of the Service education civil et affaires social (SECAS), and Cellule Reforme de la Police (CRP) our partners on the ground who spared no effort to assure the success of Phase IV of the “Lobi Mokolo ya Sika” project. Our thanks and gratitude also goes to the Country Director and the SSR programme team.

The quantitative and qualitative data collected via the evaluation of Phase IV of the “Lobi Mokolo ya Sika” project remain the property of Search for Common Ground and cannot be used without its content.

All rights reserved. Copying or reproducing this material whether completely or in part and by any means is forbidden without the express consent of Search for Common Ground.



ABBREVIATIONSC(P)AJM (Provincial) Military Justice Support Committee/Comité (Provincial) d’Appui à la Justice Militaire

CCP Provincial Coordination Committee/Comité de Coordination Provincial

CdB Base Committee/Comité de Base

CLS Local Security Council/Conseil Local de Sécurité

CLSP Local Community Security Council/Conseil Local pour la Sécurité de Proximité

CNP National Steering Committee/Comité National de Pilotage

DFID Department for International Development

DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo

EUSEC European Union mission to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform

FARDC Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo/Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo

FGD Focus Group Discussions

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

IHL International humanitarian law

ISSSS International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy

KAP Knowledge, attitudes and practices

LMYS Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika

MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

MoU Memorandum of Understanding

SO Specific objective

PNC Congolese National Police/Police Nationale Congolaise

PCR Traffic Police/Police de Circulation Routière

SECAS Service education civil et affaires social

SFCG Search for Common Ground

SGBV Sexual and gender-based violence

SSR Security sector reform

SSU Stabilization and Support Unit

STAREC Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

TOR Terms of Reference



EXECUTIVE SUMMARYSearch for Common Ground (SFCG) is a non-governmental organisation (NGO) that has been present in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since 2001. Its mission is to transform the ways in which individuals, organisations and governments handle conflict, moving away from confrontational approaches and looking for cooperative solutions.

SFCG has been participating in security sector reform (SSR) since 2007. In this context and with the support of the Department for International Development (DFID), SFCG has been implementing phase IV of “Lobi Mokolo ya Sika – Tomorrow is Another Day” programme (2014-2017). This new phase has the overall objective of strengthening mutual trust between civilians and the security forces, following up on improved behaviour by the security forces and the greater power of local communities to hold them accountable for their actions.

This project was originally aligned with the ISSSS strategy and M&E framework in DRC during the design process in 2014, and has made efforts to align with the newly proposed logical framework for the ISSSS strategy in the second half of 2016.

The specific objectives (SO) of the SFCG programme are the following:

1) SO1: Increase knowledge and awareness on the part of the Congolese security forces and the civilian population regarding their roles, rights and responsibilities towards one another

2) SO2: Strengthen accountability, cooperation and communication between civilians and state security personnel around current reforms and key achievements

METHODOLOGYThe mid-term evaluation uses a mixed methodology, combining quantitative and qualitative approaches as part of a participative approach, including beneficiaries (civilians, military personnel and police) in data collection. The survey was carried out in the four provinces identified by the programme: North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri and Kinshasa. The preparatory phase, as well as the collection and input of data, was carried out by an external consultant, with the drafting of the report being carried out by SFCG’s regional Institutional Learning Team.

LIMITATIONS The mid-term evaluation team encountered some constraints during the three evaluation phases.

Data concerning the results indicators for the programme were not all collected in a systematic manner from the beginning of phase IV. Despite some monitoring of activity implementation, trainings (pre/post-tests) and certain activities themselves (reconciliation, popular discussion forums), the database system and monitoring practices have not allowed for the easy collection of results indicators from the Base Committees (FARDC and PNC) and the CPAJM/CAJM. While this posed some difficulties surrounding interpretation of results, much of the data on indicators was successfully collected in the surveys during the mid-term evaluation.

The interpretation of certain data turned out to be a complex process. First, some of the focus group data was not detailed enough to provide a full overview of the participants responses. Despite this, the answers were sufficient to triangulate the information with the quantitative data and contribute to analysis. Regarding the questionnaire, many of



the individuals surveyed skipped certain questions: data collectors noted that these people – mainly civilians – were either illiterate or did not understand the questions, which were formulated in an overly complex manner. In response, analysis focused on questions with the most representative data provided by participants.

The breadth of analysis aimed for in the terms of reference could not be maintained. This was principally due to the lack of time1, the limited quality of the data and the fact that the drafting of the document was not done by the team that carried out the data collection. Despite this, the report allows for the identification of the programmes’s successes and challenges, and points to areas needing particular attention in the last seven months of phase IV. To ensure the quality of the report at this critical time in the project cycle, SFCG relied upon its regional Institutional Learning Team to ensure quality drafting of the report.

PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONSOverall, the acquisition of knowledge on the part of the beneficiaries has been effective, and is considered by the various actors to have been at the origin of a visible change in behaviour on the part of the security forces (specific objective 1). For example, military personnel have better knowledge of humanitarian law: the baseline study showed a lack of awareness of the legislation regarding individual criminal responsibility, with 40% of military personnel saying that they could not be prosecuted for having tortured an enemy fighter as long as they were following orders from a superior officer. At this, the mid-way point, 98% demonstrate increased knowledge and awareness on this issue. Moreover, according to the CdBs and a majority of the civilians surveyed, the majority of members of security forces now act with greater respect for civilians and their rights. During the focus group discussions, girls and young women discussing military personnel mentioned, they had noticed a reduction in torture, theft, and demands that civilians carry military personnel’s baggage. Concerning the police, it was remarked that they no longer oblige families to pay to be able to give food to detainees, that they no longer “knock people down” and that they accompany women travelling at night to protect them.

However, concerning the change in the number of incidents of abuse and the reduction in unaccountability, results remain limited: nearly a quarter of civilians believed that cases of abuse have not decreased (24%), with 32% saying “it depends” and 41% feeling that there has been a reduction. Civilians also emphasised the fact that while they have witnessed many prosecutions, they later saw the accused parties walking free, and so concluded that reporting abuses has no effect. The monitoring of these cases, carried out with some deficiency by the CdBs, is not yet subject to centralisation by the CPAJMs and partner NGOs, who have encountered problems. This limits the level of analysis that can be carried out regarding abuses by the security forces.

Reconciliation and improved collaboration have been noticed by various actors, but with certain provisions related to the fact that so far relatively few reconciliation activities have been carried out (specific objective 2). Additionally, it has been noted that trust and perceptions of relations between civilians and security forces have not developed in an entirely positive manner, even though a lower proportion of respondents consider relations to be bad. Nevertheless, there has been an increase in acceptance of the security forces within local communities, with, for example, a higher proportion of civilians willing to accept a member of their family marrying a member of the FARDC (from 40% to 62%) or a police officer (from 51% to 64%). With the exception of the media activities, work was delayed by the establishment of lines of communication between SFCG and implementing partners, including developing transparent operating procedures. Despite this, radio remains the

1 Delays concerning the signature of the contract and the transfer of funds to the Consultant led to a late start in carrying out the mid-term evaluation. Moreover, the delays to humanitarian flights by ECHOFLIGHT interrupted the planning of the mission and the collection of data on the ground, which contributed to delays in drafting the report.



best way to reach the majority of the Congolese population.

These two lines of progress have contributed to improved popular perceptions of the changing security situation and the role of the security forces (overall objective). Now more than 80% of civilians believe that the FARDC and the PNC contribute to ensuring the safety of their province, and that they are acting with the aim of guaranteeing the security of local populations. However, some uncertainty concerning the future remains noticeable, something that is likely a product of the complicated situation in which the country finds itself with regards to the politics surrounding potential elections.

RECOMMENDATIONSAs a result of this mid-term evaluation, certain programme recommendations have been made to improve the implementation of activities over the coming months and reinforce their impact, which is already visible, though fragile.

Concerning the activities:

Reviewing the appropriateness of the awareness strategies for different audiences with the committees, in light of the obstacles identified. While an effort has already been made to hold awareness events in local languages, there remain opportunities to reinforce the impact of this activity by considering how to adapt the messages and the techniques to the type of audience. Additionally, there is a need for the committees to take ownership of the gender aspects in the programme. In order to strengthen the effectiveness with which the messages are broadcast, it is also important to think about working further with the trainers on techniques and the use of guides and materials.

Strengthening awareness activities concerning sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), and ensuring that awareness activities are not uniquely based around sanctions and risks, but also cover the rights of women and the positive social consequences that come from respecting them.

Balancing efforts between the centres and more rural areas. The focus group discussions emphasised that change was more visible in urban centres and suburbs than in the more isolated areas of the provinces. Here too, specific strategies should be considered to include different geographic areas in a more egalitarian manner.

Concerning the work with the committees:

Review the responsibilities of the various committees and partners, and clarify expectations in terms of regular reporting and feedback. Work on collaboration between partners and committees should be done to help them work effectively together. For its part, SFCG should improve the regularity with which funds are disbursed – notably to partner organisations – in order to ensure that the activity schedule is followed and to avoid limiting the effect of the activities. This is particularly true concerning reconciliation activities.

Concerning the monitoring and project management, SFCG should:

Strengthen the use of the monitoring and evaluation plan. This would also allow for better identification of the audiences for different activities, and their satisfaction levels, as well as making progressive improvements. This implies using the monitoring carried out by the media department to better understand listener appreciation and understanding of messages. Finally, it will be necessary to conduct in-depth monitoring of the current situation and the risks related to the project.

Develop an exit strategy in collaboration with partners and committees. While the committees say that they are prepared for SFCG’s departure, the question of the financial feasibility of the activities without SFCG support has not yet been dealt with.



PROJECT BACKGROUND

INTRODUCTION TO THE PROJECTSearch for Common Ground (SFCG) is a non-governmental organisation (NGO) that has been present in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since 2001. Its mission is to transform the ways in which individuals, organisations and governments handle conflict, moving away from confrontational approaches and looking for cooperative solutions.

SFCG has been participating in security sector reform (SSR) since 2006, with the aim of changing the attitudes and behaviour of police and military personnel when it comes to protecting civilian populations, working with leaders and influencers at the national, provincial and community level.

In this context and with the support of the Department for International Development (DfID), SFCG has been implementing phase IV of its “Lobi Mokolo ya Sika – Tomorrow is Another Day” programme (2014-2017). This new phase has the overall objective of strengthening mutual trust between civilians and the security forces, following up on improved behaviour by the security forces and the greater power of local communities to hold them accountable for their actions.

Figure 1: Map of the provinces in which the project is being implemented2

2 Note this drawing has been done by the programme for activities. Participating provinces = South Kivu, North Kivu, Kinshasa and Ituri Province

Carte de la RDC représentante le nouveau découpage territorial

Implementation Zones



The specific objectives (SO) of the SFCG project are the following:

SO1: Increase knowledge and awareness on the part of the Congolese security forces and the civilian population regarding their roles, rights and responsibilities towards one anothers

SO2: Strengthen accountability, cooperation and communication between civilians and state security personnel around current reforms and key achievements

The project is based on the following theory of change:

If the Congolese security forces and the civilian population are aware of and knowledgeable about their roles, rights and responsibilities towards one another, and if they are able to communicate and interact in a more open, transparent and constructive way, then behaviour, relations and trust between them will improve.

Three types of activities have been implemented concurrently: (1) capacity building; (2) activities to build ties in four regions of the country (Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu and activities for national level General Staff Headquarters personnel in Kinshasa); (3) fighting against impunity. All of which are supported through mass media campaigns.

SFCG and its partners have identified target zones based on the revised I4S strategy. In other words, the strategic priorities are: 1) areas in which joint MONUSCO/FARDC operations are taking place, 2) areas under the control of the FARDC, 3) areas in which the PNC has retaken control. Nevertheless, the project remains flexible as far as the types of activities to be carried out in each zone are concerned, given that the situation can evolve very quickly and in an unpredictable manner.

The target areas include:

Province Areas targeted

North Kivu Rusthuru/ Ishasha/ Sake/ Massisi/ Walikale/ Beni/ Oicha

South Kivu Bunyiakiri/ Kalehe/ Walungu/ Shabunda/ Bukavu/ Uvira/ Baraka/ Fizi

Former Orientale Province3

(Ituri Province)Irumu/ Mambassa/ Bunia/ Djugu/ Mahagi/ Aru/ Dungu (Haut Uele)

Kinshasa Kinshasa

SFCG is working with various committees that are pre-existing structures within the FARDC and the PNC. An explicatory note regarding these committees can be found in Annex 2. SFCG plans to educate 24,500 current FARDC personnel and 14,000 new recruits, as well as 60,480 members of the PNC. The programme also aims to target 100 officers and high-ranking members of the FARDC belonging to the General Staff Headquarters in Kinshasa and the targeted military regions. Additionally, 75 officers and high-ranking members of the PNC at the national and provincial level will be targeted. Lastly, the project will target at least 2,550,000 civilians in four provinces, via joint activities involving civilians and the security forces in addition to community engagement activities.

3 In 2015, the former Orientale Province was divided into four new provinces: Bas-Uele, Haut-Uele, Ituri and Tshopo.



REVISING THE LOGICAL FRAMEWORK AND ALIGNMENT WITH THE ISSSS STRATEGY

This project was envisioned from its inception to coordinate with DfID and ISSSS strategy. In its original design, Search for Common Ground incorporated indicators from the ISSSS M&E Framework to ensure alignment with ISSSS across all elements of the project. This collaboration began a discussion about possible needs for revision of some of the objectives and project indicators, whereby DfID and SFCG agreed to review the feasibility of these following the completion of the baseline study and start-up of activities. Early in 2015, discussions began between the DfID and SFCG to analyse the current state of implementation of the activities as compared with the logical framework to reconsider the manner in which the objectives were formulated in order to make them more realistic and easier to measure. The original logical framework contained three specific objectives:

1. Improve the capacity of the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) and the Police (PNC) to protect local populations within areas affected by conflicts or military operations, controlled by the military, recently placed under civilian/PNC control, or in the stabilised zones in the East of the DRC;

2. Improve the capacity of the security forces to fight unaccountability and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV);

3. Strengthen trust between civilian populations and security forces via better joint engagement and increased cooperation and communication regarding reforms and key results.

DfID’s principal questions were centred on the manner in which the project had been designed to meet the first two objectives, notably concerning institutional change and reform, as well as on the matter of the communications activities and how they were intended to maintain progress on the programme. Following these discussions, in June 2015 it was decided that the logical framework would be reduced to two specific objectives in order to reflect a more realistic set of outcomes and their contributions to the overall goal.

In 2016, following a request from MONUSCO’s monitoring and evaluation unit, the SSR programme team at SFCG began working to reconcile the logical framework with the ISSSS strategy. The programme proposed to be in alignment notably with the first pillar (democratic dialogue), the second pillar (security) and the fifth pillar (prevention of sexual and gender-based violence). For example, concerning pillar one, the ISSSS strategy has as its first specific objective “increased and inclusive support for the stabilisation and security strategy at community level”, and various indicators allowing for the monitoring of progress on this issue. Similarly, regarding the overall objective of the project, SFCG’s indicators are linked to this, in that they allow observers to visualise the evolution of the security situation and the perceptions of the population.



BACKGROUNDThe security situation in the DRC, and in particular in the East, remains unstable. Roadblocks and kidnappings of civilians by armed groups are still being reported in some areas of North Kivu. Nevertheless, there are currently no ongoing military confrontations involving heavy artillery or invasions by rebel groups – despite incidents such as the recent Beni massacre4. At the national level, recent violent demonstrations indicate the fragility of the situation. In the areas targeted by the programme, security is stable overall, with only a few incidents reported to have taken place in certain pockets while phase IV of the programme has been ongoing. Investigations showed that cities (Goma, Bukavu, Bunia) are more stable than some of the rural transport corridors where military operations are carried out.

Several structural changes were noted at various levels of the PNC and FARDC chain of command during phase IV. These changes having had an effect on the implementation of project activities including the departure of certain committee members, a lack of understanding of the programme’s logical framework on the part of the new unit commanders (necessitating time spent explaining SFCG’s approach to them and obtaining their engagement), and the loss of certain equipment following troop movements or the departure of committee members.

In South Kivu the security situation has been calm overall, despite incidents indicating a certain level of insecurity (armed robberies) reported in Walungu, Fizi and Shabunda. These incidents have had a negative impact on relations between the army, the police and the local populations. Moreover, the situation remains volatile in this province and particularly in the areas close to the border with Burundi, these communities having been affected by the crisis in Burundi (since April 2015).

Since the beginning of the project, the security situation in North Kivu has stabilised in certain previously-volatile areas, while other regions have been subject to military operations, such as those carried out in Beni, Walikale, Rutshuru and Massisi in 2015. These operations, against Mai Mai (Walikale, Rutshuru), Nyatura FPC (Massisi), ADF NALU (Beni) and foreign-armed groups (the FDLR and ADF NALU), are still causing large-scale population displacements from the affected areas to more stable zones. There have been more than 600 deaths in the Beni region since 2014 and tensions with the security forces continue: civilians accuse the FARDC of complicity with ADF NALU, while the FARDC accuses civilians of the same thing. This shows the lack of communication and understanding between the two parties. The same situation is present in Rutshuru and certain communities close to Kitshanga (in Massisi), where the security situation is having a negative impact on military-civilian relations.

In Ituri the overall security situation has been calm in the city of Bunia, as well as in several other regions, such as Mambassa and Kasenyi. However, things have been volatile in areas such as Djugu and Irumu, where armed groups remain active (FPRI, Mai Mai Morgan and Werrason). Ituri province is still subject to a certain level of instability among the security forces and the representatives of the civil service, who have been subject to new assignments and appointments in the wake of the decentralisation procedure and the new administrative divisions.

In Kinshasa, the overall security situation has been calm within the city of Kinshasa itself, but several incidents were reported following demonstrations carried out by opposition groups in 2015 and 2016. Members of the security forces were implicated in these incidents. However, the units participating directly in the programme were not involved in handling these incidents/crises, and their areas of responsibility were not directly affected. The government had tentatively scheduled a presidential election for the end of 2016. However, the Constitutional Court signed a decision on October

4 This occurred on the 13th August 2016: http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20160815-rdc-massacre-beni-deuil-national-solidarite-demission-ministres

http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20160815-rdc-massacre-beni-deuil-national-solidarite-demission-ministreshttp://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20160815-rdc-massacre-beni-deuil-national-solidarite-demission-ministres



17, 2016 and a political agreement was signed between the current government and a part of the opposition on October 18, 2016 that allows the current president to remain in office until 2018. While the opposing political parties appear to be responding strategically through joint campaigns, the popular response has been highly varied from high levels of violent demonstrations in Kinshasa to violent free civilian marches in Goma.

The unstable and largely unpredictable political environment presents a risk to the programme both from an implementation and reputational point of view. In response, SFCG is monitoring the situation closely and working with programme partners to respond appropriately.



METHODOLOGY

OBJECTIVES OF THE MID-TERM EVALUATIONThe mid-term evaluation has three principal objectives:

• Collect data on the programme indicators and determine the rate of progress towards achieving results;

• Check the relevance and coherence of the activities implemented with regard to their direct effect upon deliverables;

• Provide information regarding the sustainability of the project activities.

The following lines of enquiry were included in the Terms of Reference:

• Perceptions and opinions of local populations regarding the FARDC and the PNC, particularly concerning their behaviour;

• Perceptions and feelings of local populations regarding the situation in the East of the country (security, peace, stability);

• Abuses and human rights violations committed by the FARDC and the PNC, and the legal proceedings ongoing in this area;

• Knowledge and awareness on the part of the FARDC and the PNC regarding international humanitarian law, human rights (notably legislation against sexual and gender-based violence) and the basic principles of civilian, police and military relations;

• The security situation in targeted areas;

• Access to information, educational material and legal texts for members of Provincial Committees in Support of Military Justice (CPJAM);

• The level of cooperation between local populations and the security forces;

• The level of knowledge of local populations regarding relations between civilians, military personnel and the police;

• And finally, information regarding completed deliverables, such as the functioning of the committees, the level of synchronisation between communications activities and on-the-ground activities.



DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

RESEARCH TEAMThe preparatory phase, involving the collection and input of data, was carried out by Boumas Guennolet, a consultant selected by SFCG. In order to ensure the quality of the final report, the SFCG regional Institutional Learning Team were responsible for analysis and drafting.

DOCUMENTATION REVIEWThis stage was dominated by the examination of documents shared by SFCG’s SSR team. These included political, strategic and other documents produced concerning SSR in the DRC, as well as data and reports available on the FARDC and the PNC. As far as SFCG is concerned, this includes, notably: the logical framework document (2014), the evaluation of previous projects involving the FARDC and the PNC (2013), methodological guides, training manuals, memoranda of understanding, the baseline study for phase IV (February 2015), the project evaluation report on phase III (February 2014), the communications strategy (2014) and the project activity reports.

MIXED METHODOLOGYThe mid-term evaluation uses a mixed methodology, combining quantitative and qualitative approaches as part of a participatory approach, including beneficiaries (civilians, military personnel and police) in the data collection stage. The survey was carried out in the four provinces of intervention identified by the project: North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri and Kinshasa. More information can be found in the inception report in Annex 3.

Quantitative Methodology: In the terms of reference the population was set at 2,550,000 civilians, 60,480 members of the PNC, and 24,000 FARDC personnel. The margin of error is 5% with a confidence interval of 95%.

The questionnaires were differentiated according to their targets:

1. An individual questionnaire for military personnel and FARDC members

2. An individual questionnaire for PNC members,

3. An individual questionnaire for civilians

Qualitative Method: Focus groups support qualitative understanding of people’s ideas, beliefs, practices and behaviours. Discussion guidelines for the focus group sessions were developed during the preparatory phase and tested in Goma. These guidelines were specific to each group. The focus groups were carried out with homogenous groups of eight to twelve people: girls and young women, CLP/CLSP/CLS, FARDC, grassroots committees, women of the PNC, PNC provincial coordination committees (CCP) and joint reconciliation committees (CMR). Individual interviews were also carried out with the CAPJM/CAJM, certain partners and the SFCG team.



Table 1: Survey Sampling (quantitative and qualitative)

Quantitative Methodology

Project target Sample size Number Collected

Notes The safety margin was included in case of insecurity or inaccessibility of one of the areas to be studied. It has no effect on sampling.

2,500 FARDC personnel

∑=378 418 Safety margin =40

60,480 PNC members

∑=382 410 Safety margin =28

2.550.000 civilians ∑=384 418 Safety margin =34

Qualitative Methodology

Sampling Number Collected

Notes

3 10 Focus groups: girls and young women

- 5 Focus groups: police

8 13 Focus groups: PNC committees

8 14 Focus groups: FARDC grassroots committees

3 3 Focus groups: CLS/CLSP/CLP

- 1 Focus groups: CCP PNC

- 2 Focus groups: CMR

3 3 Interviews: CPAJM

3 3 Interviews: partners

In the case of North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri, four geographic areas were chosen through random selection by the SSR team from the zones in which the FARDC and the PNC were active. For security reasons some of these areas were not included in the final plan. Certain zones and territories, specifically Shabunda (South Kivu), Walikale (North Kivu), Dungu (Ituri), were inaccessible due to ongoing military operations. The following table summarizes the activities carried out in the various survey areas.



Table 2: Dates and times of the mid-term evaluation

ACTIVITES LOCATION DURATION

Office Phase(Consultant and SFCG)

Meeting to coordinate ways and means

North Kivu: Goma April to June

Meeting on operational planning for activities

Field Data Collection Phase

Data collection on the ground via individual interviews, beneficiary surveys, focus groups, monitoring workshops and other methods.

North Kivu: Goma, Beni, Kitshanga, Massisi, Rutshuru.

From 5th July to 18th August 2016

South Kivu: Bukavu, Baraka, Fizi, Walungu, Minova

Ituri: Bunia, Mambassa, Kasenyi

Kinshasa

Data entry North Kivu: Goma From 15th July to 22nd August 2016

Production of a mid-term progress evaluation report

Ituri: Bunia From 20th July to 25th September 2016

Synthesis Phase(Consultant followed by SFCG Institutional Learning Team)

Production of mid-term evaluation report (draft and final version)

Outside the DRC September/October

Gender issues are cross-sectional and are addressed in the project via the definition of indicators and the implementation of activities. However, there were not enough women present in the police and the military units studied to carry out a quantitative analysis by gender. Consequently, the following elements support the inclusion and consideration of the gender dimension in this evaluation:

1. Representation of women in the samples taken during the quantitative study: 31.6% of the civilian sample, 5.1% of the police sample and 1.9% of the military sample (fewer women being present in the regiments sampled due to ongoing military operations).

2. Separate focus groups organised for female police officers

3. Focus groups organised specifically for young women between age 14 and 24 years old sampled from among the civilian population.

4. Inclusion of specific questions related to gender-based violence in the survey and the interview guides.



RESPONDENT PROFILESAmong the people who replied to the survey, around one third belonged to the FARDC (418), one third to the PNC (410) and one third were civilians (418). Distribution by province was equally balanced, as the table below shows.

Table 3: Number and proportion of respondents by province (military, police and civilian)

Province Military (FARDC) Police (PNC) Civilians

Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage

Ituri 139 33,3% 135 32,9% 136 32,5%

North Kivu 137 32,8% 137 33,4% 139 33,3%

South Kivu 142 34% 138 33,7% 143 34,2%

TOTAL 418 100% 410 100% 418 100%

Details regarding the profiles of the military, police and civilian interviewees can be found in Annex 1.



RESULTSThis report is structured in accordance with the baseline study, providing a coherent analysis of each programme objective. The various lines of enquiry mentioned in the Terms of Reference have been taken into account and included in the structuring of the document. After providing an overview of the state of the results and indicators, the report summarizes the progress made towards achieving the overall objective and the two specific objectives of the project. Concerning the specific objectives, emphasis is placed upon the coverage of the activities corresponding to these objectives, the functioning of the committees working on these activities, the development of knowledge and perceptions, and a brief analysis of impact at the mid-way point in the project. The report concludes with a summary of the programme’s relevance, effectiveness and long-term sustainability.

The sections outlining contribution to the two specific objectives will demonstrate a clear evolution in terms of knowledge and a subtler, though visible, change in perceptions. While these may have been influenced by other actors like MONUSCO and other sectorial NGOs, the changes can be directly linked to training, awareness-raising and reconciliation activities carried out through SFCG programming. The awareness-raising work carried out by the Base Committees via the media shows a decrease in the level of fear among civilians and a growing consciousness both of their role and the role of the security forces.

This report presents and analyse certain behavioural changes that have been noticed. The data shows that the population has observed a decrease in abuses by the security services, and that relations between civilians and the FARDC/PNC are less bad and thus calmer. While these developments were targeted by SFCG in this project as being the product of improved knowledge and communication, it is nevertheless important to emphasise the limitations when measuring the exact contribution of SFCG’s activities to these changes. The developing situation, the internal work done by the FARDC and the PNC, and the cumulative efforts of the various security sector reform actors have, naturally, influenced these changes, which remain dynamic in the long-term.

22

SE

AR

CH

FO

R C

OM

MO

N G

RO

UN

D

|

DR

CO

NG

O

DE

MA

IN E

ST

UN

AU

TR

E J

OU

R -

LO

BI

MO

KO

LO

YA

SIK

A

P

HA

SE

IV

PRO

JECT

IND

ICAT

OR

S

Tabl

e 4: T

able

show

ing

the c

ompl

etio

n of

obj

ectiv

es an

d th

e exp

ecte

d re

sults

Base

line

Mid

-way

po

int

End

of

proj

ect t

arge

tN

otes

Ove

rall

obje

ctiv

e: S

tren

gthe

n th

e cre

dibi

lity,

effica

cy an

d ac

coun

tabi

lity o

f the

Con

gole

se se

curit

y for

ces i

n pr

otec

ting

loca

l pop

ulat

ions

aff

ecte

d by

confl

ict i

n th

e DR

C an

d pa

rtic

ular

ly in

the f

our p

rovi

nces

of N

orth

Kiv

u, S

outh

Kiv

u, O

rient

ale a

nd K

insh

asa.

Indi

cato

r A

: N

umbe

r of

pros

ecutio

ns f

or m

iscon

duct

agai

nst t

he F

ARD

C as

com

pare

d w

ith th

e tot

al n

umbe

r of

incid

ents

of m

iscon

duct

iden

tified

by

inde

pend

ent

repo

rting

mech

anism

s.

--

Incr

ease

Som

e CPA

JMs s

till h

ave t

roub

le co

mpi

ling

this

data

, but

pro

gres

s has

bee

n ob

serv

ed.

In N

orth

Kiv

u th

e Bas

e Com

mitt

ees b

etwe

en

Febr

uary

- Jun

e 201

6 re

porte

d 24

pro

secu

tions

.

Else

wher

e, ac

ross

all t

he p

rovi

nces

, mor

e tha

n 70

pro

secu

tions

hav

e bee

n br

ough

t for

ward

(B

eni,

Rut

shur

u, M

angi

na an

d M

assis

i).

Indi

cato

r B: %

of t

he p

opul

atio

n pe

rcei

ving

the F

ARD

C as

a se

curit

ising

/sta

bilis

ing

pres

ence

B.1:

% w

ho b

eliev

e tha

t the

FAR

DC

cont

ribut

e to

the

safet

y of t

heir

prov

ince

68,7

%80

,6%

+ 20

%Ta

rget

alm

ost a

chie

ved

B.2:

% w

ho b

eliev

e tha

t the

acti

ons o

f the

FAR

DC

are

take

n w

ith th

e aim

of p

rotec

ting t

hem

and

guar

antee

ing

their

secu

rity

67,0

%87

,4%

+ 20

%Ta

rget

achi

eved

Indi

cato

r C: %

of t

he p

opul

atio

n pe

rcei

ving

the F

ARD

C as

a se

curit

ising

/sta

bilis

ing

pres

ence

C.1

: % w

ho b

eliev

e tha

t the

FAR

DC

cont

ribut

e to

the

safet

y of t

heir

prov

ince

74,5

%81

,5%

+ 20

%A

chie

vem

ent i

n pr

ogre

ss.

C.2

: % w

ho b

eliev

e tha

t the

acti

ons o

f the

FAR

DC

are

take

n w

ith th

e aim

of p

rotec

ting t

hem

and

guar

antee

ing

their

secu

rity

71,9

%83

,5%

+ 20

%Ta

rget

alm

ost a

chie

ved

Indi

cato

r D: %

of t

he p

opul

atio

n wh

o be

lieve

that

the E

ast o

f th

e DRC

is p

rogr

essin

g to

ward

s pea

ce an

d sta

bilit

y

23

SE

AR

CH

FO

R C

OM

MO

N G

RO

UN

D

|

DR

CO

NG

O

DE

MA

IN E

ST

UN

AU

TR

E J

OU

R -

LO

BI

MO

KO

LO

YA

SIK

A

P

HA

SE

IV

Base

line

Mid

-way

po

int

End

of

proj

ect t

arge

tN

otes

D.1

: %

who

beli

eve

that

the

secu

rity

situa

tion

has

impr

oved

over

the p

ast s

ix m

onth

s40

,9%

70,6

%55

%Ta

rget

exce

eded

– n

eeds

to b

e con

text

ualis

ed in

ligh

t of

the d

evelo

pmen

t of t

he si

tuat

ion

in g

ener

al

D.2

: % w

ho b

eliev

e th

at th

ey w

ill b

e sa

fer si

x m

onth

s fr

om n

ow21

,3%

44,0

%+

50%

Ach

ieve

men

t in

prog

ress

Indi

cato

r E

: N

umbe

r of

viole

nt i

ncid

ents

repo

rted

with

in th

e pro

gram

me z

ones

-- 5

0%So

me C

PAJM

s stil

l hav

e tro

uble

com

pilin

g th

is da

ta, b

ut p

rogr

ess h

as b

een

obse

rved

.

Spec

ific O

bjec

tive 1

: Inc

reas

e awa

rene

ss an

d kn

owle

dge o

n th

e par

t of t

he C

ongo

lese

secu

rity f

orce

s and

the

civi

lian

popu

latio

n re

gard

ing

thei

r rol

es, r

ight

s and

resp

onsib

ilitie

s tow

ards

one

anot

her.

Indi

cato

r 1.1

: Kno

wled

ge o

f hum

an ri

ghts

and

inte

rnat

iona

l law

on

the p

art o

f the

FA

RDC

, inc

ludi

ng re

gard

ing

the p

rote

ctio

n of

wom

en (S

GBV

)

1.1.

1: %

of m

ilita

ry p

erso

nnel

awar

e th

at th

e sen

tence

for a

idin

g and

abe

tting

in ra

pe is

no l

ower

than

that

for

com

mitt

ing r

ape

57,7

%0,

0%+

50%

Prob

lem w

ith th

e phr

asin

g of

the q

uesti

on

or fa

ult i

n th

e awa

rene

ss ac

tiviti

es.

1.1.

2: %

of m

ilita

ry p

erso

nnel

who

kno

w th

at th

ey ca

n be

pro

secut

ed if

they

obey

an

orde

r fro

m a

supe

rior o

fficer

to

tortu

re an

enem

y59

,7%

99,0

%+

50%

All

mili

tary

per

sonn

el an

swer

ed co

rrect

ly.

Indi

cato

r 1.2

: Kno

wled

ge o

f the

bas

ic pr

incip

les o

f hum

an ri

ghts,

civi

lian

relat

ions

and

polic

e reg

ulat

ions

on

the p

art o

f the

PN

C

1.2.

1: %

of po

lice a

war

e tha

t the

sent

ence

for a

idin

g and

ab

ettin

g in

rap

e is

no lo

wer

than

that

for

com

mitt

ing

rape

62,2

%7,

6%+

50%

Prob

lem w

ith th

e phr

asin

g of

the q

uesti

on o

r fa

ult i

n th

e awa

rene

ss-r

aisin

g eff

orts.

Indi

cato

r 1.

3: N

umbe

r of

CPAJ

M m

embe

rs w

ho s

ay

that

they

have

parti

cipat

ed in

a na

tiona

l lev

el co

nfer

ence

on th

e figh

t aga

inst

unac

coun

tabi

lity

-0

At l

east

one

mem

ber

of ea

ch

CPA

JM

4 pr

ovin

cial w

orks

hops

hav

e bee

n or

gani

sed

for t

he

mem

bers

of C

PAJM

s and

CA

JMs (

Kin

shas

a, N

orth

Kiv

u,

Itur

i et S

outh

Kiv

u)5 i

nste

ad o

f the

nat

iona

l con

fere

nce

5 Th

ese

work

shop

s wer

e ru

n by

the

CA

JMs h

elped

to re

-mot

ivat

e C

PAJM

mem

bers

on

issue

s sur

roun

ding

the

fight

aga

inst

impu

nity,

the

mea

ning

of h

uman

righ

ts vi

olat

ions

and

the r

einf

orce

men

t of d

ata s

harin

g m

echa

nism

s bet

ween

the C

PAJM

s and

the B

ase C

omm

ittee

s.

24

SE

AR

CH

FO

R C

OM

MO

N G

RO

UN

D

|

DR

CO

NG

O

DE

MA

IN E

ST

UN

AU

TR

E J

OU

R -

LO

BI

MO

KO

LO

YA

SIK

A

P

HA

SE

IV

Base

line

Mid

-way

po

int

End

of

proj

ect t

arge

tN

otes

Indi

cato

r 1.

4: N

umbe

r of

CPAJ

M m

embe

rs w

ho s

ay

that

they

have

acces

s to t

rain

ing m

ater

ials

and l

egal

text

s-

0

At l

east

one

mem

ber

of ea

ch

CPA

JM

The t

hree

CPA

JM m

embe

rs in

terv

iewe

d sa

id th

at th

ey h

ad ac

cess

to

trai

ning

mat

eria

ls bu

t not

to le

gal t

exts.

The l

ibra

ry in

stalla

tion

activ

ity h

ad n

ot ye

t bee

n co

mpl

eted

as o

f Aug

ust 2

016.

Indi

cato

r 1.5

: Civ

ilian

kno

wled

ge o

f pol

ice is

sues

1.5.

1: %

of ci

vilia

ns w

ho sa

y tha

t the

per

sonn

el at

their

loc

al p

olice

statio

n tr

eated

them

with

cour

tesy w

hen

they

w

ent t

here

of th

eir ow

n fr

ee w

ill

48,6

%82

,8%

+ 50

%Ta

rget

exce

eded

Spec

ific o

bjec

tive 2

: Str

engt

hen

acco

unta

bilit

y, co

oper

atio

n an

d co

mm

unic

atio

n be

twee

n ci

vilia

ns an

d pu

blic

secu

rity a

ctor

s aro

und

refo

rms i

n pr

ogre

ss an

d ke

y ach

ieve

men

ts

Indi

cato

r 2.

1: N

umbe

r of

mili

tary

be

st pr

actic

es pr

omot

ed an

d ca

se stu

dies

deve

loped

and

anal

ysed

-N

/ATo

be

defin

edTh

is ac

tivity

has

bee

n m

odifi

ed an

d wi

ll be

inclu

ded

in th

e dev

elopm

ent o

f a te

chni

cal S

SR

Indi

cato

r 2.2

: % of

mem

bers

of PN

C co

mm

ittee

s abl

e to

quot

e at l

east

two c

oncre

te w

ays t

o resp

ond

effect

ively

to

SGBV

by th

e end

of th

e pro

ject

--

At l

east

60%

Indi

cato

r dat

a not

colle

cted

. 88%

of p

olice

and

mili

tary

per

sonn

el be

lieve

d th

at th

ey u

nder

stood

th

e atti

tude

s and

beh

avio

urs t

o ad

opt.

Indi

cato

r 2.3

: Lev

el of

know

ledge

of p

olice

regu

latio

ns

and

the b

asic

prin

ciples

of po

lice-

civili

an re

latio

ns on

the

part

of CL

S m

embe

rs-

-50

%

Indi

cato

r dat

a not

colle

cted

. In

prep

arat

ion

for t

he fi

nal

evalu

atio

n it

will

be n

eces

sary

to d

efine

a pr

ecise

que

stion

in

ord

er to

be a

ble t

o m

easu

re th

is in

dica

tor a

nd in

clude

qu

antit

ativ

ely

in th

e foc

us g

roup

s or i

n th

e que

stion

naire

in

orde

r to

anal

yse t

he re

sults

bas

ed o

n th

e kno

wled

ge o

f whe

ther

or

not

the i

ndiv

idua

ls in

que

stion

are C

LS m

embe

rs o

r not

.

Indi

cato

r 2.4

: % of

PN

C co

mm

ittee

s and

CLS

s/CLS

Ps

able

to gi

ve co

ncre

te ex

ampl

es of

colla

bora

tion

--

At l

east

50%

Indi

cato

r dat

a not

qua

ntita

tivel

y co

llect

ed. A

roun

d 70

% o

f the

com

mitt

ee m

embe

rs p

rese

nt in

the f

ocus

gr

oups

men

tione

d ex

ampl

es o

f col

labor

atio

n.

Indi

cato

r 2.5

: Evo

lutio

n of

opi

nion

s on

the

beha

viou

r of t

he F

ARD

C a

nd re

lated

ent

ities

at t

he

com

mun

ity le

vel

25

SE

AR

CH

FO

R C

OM

MO

N G

RO

UN

D

|

DR

CO

NG

O

DE

MA

IN E

ST

UN

AU

TR

E J

OU

R -

LO

BI

MO

KO

LO

YA

SIK

A

P

HA

SE

IV

Base

line

Mid

-way

po

int

End

of

proj

ect t

arge

tN

otes

Indi

cato

r 2.

5.1:

% o

f th

e po

pula

tion

who

wou

ld b

e ha

ppy

for a

mem

ber o

f the

ir fa

mily

to m

arry

a m

embe

r of

the F

ARD

C39

,8%

61,5

%+

30%

Targ

et ex

ceed

ed.

Indi

cato

r 2.

5.2:

% o

f th

e po

pula

tion

who

fee

l th

at

rela

tions

betw

een

civili

ans a

nd th

e FAR

DC

are g

ood

or

very

good

45,5

%37

%+

30%

Dec

reas

e – h

owev

er, t

he p

ropo

rtion

of t

he p

opul

atio

n th

at fe

els th

at th

ey ar

e bad

has

falle

n.

Indi

cato

r 2.

5.3:

% o

f th

e po

pula

tion

that

has

pas

sed

thro

ugh

one

or m

ore

arm

y ro

ad b

locks

dur

ing

the

past

year

27,1

%55

,3%

- 40%

Incr

ease

– b

ut at

the m

id-p

oint

this

cove

rs th

e %

of th

e pop

ulat

ion

that

has

"see

n" ro

ad b

lock

s.

Indi

cato

r 2.5

.4: %

of th

e pop

ulat

ion th

at ha

s exp

erien

ced

queu

e-ju

mpi

ng by

sold

iers’ w

ives

in th

e pas

t 12

mon

ths

35,3

%37

,1%

- 40%

Incr

ease

– b

ut at

the m

id-p

oint

this

cove

rs th

e % o

f th

e pop

ulat

ion

that

has

"hea

rd o

f" th

is pr

actic

e.

Indi

cato

r 2.6

: Evo

lutio

n of

opi

nion

s on

the b

ehav

iour

of m

embe

rs o

f the

PN

C an

d th

eir e

ntou

rage

at

the c

omm

unity

leve

l

Indi

cato

r 2.

6.1:

% o

f th

e po

pula

tion

who

wou

ld b

e ha

ppy

for a

mem

ber

of th

eir fa

mily

to

mar

ry a

poli

ce offi

cer51

%64

,1%

+ 30

%A

chie

vem

ent i

n pr

ogre

ss

Indi

cato

r 2.

6.2:

% o

f th

e po

pula

tion

who

fee

l th

at

rela

tions

betw

een

civili

ans

and

the

PNC

are

good

or

very

good

43,7

%36

%+

30%

Dec

reas

e – H

owev

er, t

he p

ropo

rtion

that

fe

els th

at th

ey ar

e bad

has

falle

n.

Indi

cato

r 2.

6.3:

% o

f th

e pa

pula

tion

who

hav

e be

en

robb

ed b

y po

lice o

fficer

s dur

ing

the p

revi

ous 1

2 m

onth

s (m

oney

, goo

ds or

live

stock

)30

%41

%- 3

0%In

crea

se –

but

at th

e mid

-poi

nt th

is co

vers

the %

of

the p

opul

atio

n th

at h

as "h

eard

of"

this

prac

tice.



OVERALL OBJECTIVE: PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY AND ROLE OF SECURITY FORCESThe overall objective of the project is to strengthen mutual trust between civilians and the security forces, following upon improved behaviour on the part of the security forces and greater powers for communities to hold them accountable.

INCIDENTS OF MISCONDUCT AND PROSECUTION AMONG SECURITY FORCESWhile several groups are making efforts such as the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, Human Rights Watch and UN Justice Human Right Organization, UNHCR, MONUSCO to systematically document data on incidents of misconduct and prosecutions, the data continues to be difficult to attain at a level of geographic disaggregation relevant to analysis of SFCG’s areas of intervention.

At the time of the baseline, no source could provide this information for the intervention zones, and so the relative increases and decreases in these numbers cannot be documented at this time. The current best option for analysis of impact with this indicator is for CPAJMs to continue to improve in their documentation and monitoring of this data. Another option to support analysis is for groups that collect this data currently to continue to track and disaggregate data to the territory and Cheffeire levels so that organizations can connect interventions and progress.

Another challenge of analysing programming based on this indicator is that it does not isolate one type of change, but combines several elements of change that link to SFCG activities in different ways. Because of this it needs to be analysed carefully to draw meaningful conclusions. While SFCG’s activities are designed to impact both the number of incidents reported, they are less targeted specifically towards the number of prosecutions in this same timeframe, these changes cannot necessarily happen at the same pace. For example, the number of incidents of misconduct reported may decrease as the actual incidents decrease, but may also increase with improved confidence of civilians in systems for accountability. Therefore, in order to effectively understand progress on impunity and examine the credibility, efficacy, and accountability of security forces, it is necessary to combine analysis of this indicator with indicators on perception and qualitative data to support a deeper understanding of the progress being made through the SFCG approach.

POPULAR PERCEPTIONS OF THE CHANGING SECURITY SITUATIONOne of the progress indicators for this objective is the popular perception of the security situation in general. It is necessary to emphasise here that the programme’s specific contribution to these changes is difficult to measure, and that, conversely, changes in the situation itself linked to external factors have an impact (whether positive or negative) on the implementation of the programme. According to SFCG’s own teams, while the situation in South Kivu remains relatively calm, the same cannot be said for the whole of North Kivu. In certain areas, such as Beni, repeated attacks by the Islamist group ADF NALU and the inability of the FARDC and the PNC to deal with the threat have significantly affected popular perceptions regarding the changing security situation. This trend can also be seen in certain areas of Rutshuru and Massisi, where pockets of armed fighters continue to operate.

Overall, civilian perceptions of the security situation vary little by province, with 70% of civilians feeling that their local security situation has improved. This being the case, it appears that the situation has remained stable or even improved, given that this proportion is much higher than that recorded during the baseline study (41%). This improvement was particularly noteworthy in South Kivu, where the percentage of positive responses increased from 33% to 76%.



The Harvard Humanitarian Initiative is currently tracking civilian perceptions on a range of topics from security to satisfaction of government services to contribution of international efforts to improve local quality of life. Regarding all three provinces (South Kivu, North Kivu and Ituri) in 2013 67% of civilians felt a sense of personal security within their daily activities while only 44% reported feeing safe to walk alone at night. In June 52% of civilians reported feeling a sense of personal security in their daily activities and 75% reported feeling safe to walk alone at night.6

Figure 2: Perceptions of the changing security situation over the past six months, by province (n=418)

21% 24% 16%11% 9% 8%

68% 67%76%

In the last six months the security situation has...

Has negatively evolved

Ituri North Kivu South Kivu

Has not evolved Has positively evolved

Regarding the potential for change in the six months following the survey, local populations are more optimistic than they were at the time of the baseline survey, but the change is less noteworthy than in the case of the previous indicator, having increased from 21% positive responses to 44% overall. Nevertheless, this varied widely by province. Once more, perceptions are more optimistic in South Kivu.

Figure 3: Perceptions of the potential evolution of the security situation over the next six months, by province (n=418)

23%16% 11%

25%

48%59%

52%

37%30%

In your opinion, do you believe you will be more secure in the coming six months?

No Yes Don't know

Ituri North Kivu South Kivu

6 This data and more can be found at the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative site http://www.peacebuildingdata.org/sites/m/pdf/DRC_Poll7_FinalEnglish.pdf



The demobilisation of some armed groups and the deaths of the leaders of certain militias, in addition to the policy of negotiation between the government and the armed groups within the peace consolidation context have helped to reduce popular uncertainty regarding the instability of the eastern DRC (in the three provinces surveyed). However, the 39.5% level of uncertainty about the future implies that the resilience of local communities is also fragile. As mentioned above, the future uncertainty regarding the DRC electoral processes in the next few months, and the presidential elections creating anxiety across the country.

THE FARDC AND THE PNC: SECURITY ACTORS AND PROTECTORS OF CIVILIAN POPULATIONSAnother indicator for measuring progress toward the overall objective is that of civilian perceptions of the FARDC and the PNC as being agents of security and stabilisation in their region. Even at the time of the baseline study, 69% of civilians felt that the FARDC were contributing to security in their province. Mid-way through the programme, a clear increase can be seen in this figure, with 81% of people across all provinces agreeing with this statement as far as the FARDC are concerned, and 81.5% in the case of the PNC.

Figure 4: Perceptions of the contribution of the FARDC and the PNC to security, by province (n=418)

Secure Insecure

Don’t know

Ituri - FARDC South Kivu - FARDCNord-Kivu - FARDC

77%

18%

4%

89%

8%

3%

75%

18%

7%

Ituri - PNC South Kivu - PNCNorth Kivu - PNC

77%

14%

9%

85%

12%

4%

83%

13%

5%

Secure Insecure

Don’t know

Secure Insecure

Don’t know

Secure Insecure

Don’t know

Secure Insecure

Don’t know

Secure Insecure

Don’t know



There was a positive change in the number of civilian respondents who felt that actions of the FARDC and the PNC were taken with the aim of protecting them and guaranteeing their security. At the programme mid-point, 88% felt this way about the FARDC (67% during the baseline study) and 83.5% about the PNC (72% during the baseline study). Progress was particularly notable in Ituri, with an increase in positive responses from 54% to 85%.

According to SFCG teams, it is generally easier to work with the FARDC due to their stricter and more organised command system, but also because the SECAS Regional Director was highly cooperative and involved with the programme. Moreover, the FARDC have better access to rural and isolated communities than the PNC, whose sub-stations are often under-equipped and their image is often better thanks to the protection that they provide against armed groups. The high level of involvement on the part of the local FARDC and SECAS commanders helps explain the positive results in Ituri province. The programme team also emphasised the situation in the Mambassa area, where a controversial regiment was deployed early on during programme activities. The behaviour of the regiment has changed significantly thanks to the programme activities in the area. This has had a strong positive effect on the perceptions of the local population in the central Mambassa area regarding the FARDC.

Despite this, as was emphasised in the baseline study, civilian perceptions of security actors vary with external conditions. Even the time of day can be a factor in perceptions. During the focus groups involving girls and young women it was recognised that military and police behaviour had changed since the beginning of the programme, but they were still accused of certain crimes and offenses. Regarding military personnel, participants complained notably about rapes and child marriages, while as far as the police were concerned participants emphasised the robberies that they carried out.

Additionally, while local populations appear to be aware that the role of the security forces is to assure their safety and protect them, their trust in them has not increased in the same positive manner. As seen in the section covering the second objective, perceptions regarding relationships and trust are less bad, but still not good: they remain “average”.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE 1: KNOWLEDGE AND AWARENESS OF SECURITY FORCES AND CIVILIANS REGARDING ROLES, RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIESThe first specific objective of the programme is to increase awareness and knowledge on the part of the Congolese security forces and the civilian population regarding their respective roles, rights and responsibilities towards one another. At the beginning of the programme the training and awareness strategy was reformulated by the FARDC and the PNC in collaboration with the SFCG implementation team. The Base Committees (CdB) were given a new momentum via the participative planning and evaluation approach taken during the previous phase’s activities. These meetings allowed a set of activities to be organised in such a way as to orient the implementation based on the realisation of the project objectives and the theory of change.

“We appreciate the FARDC as far as security is concerned because lots of them give their lives to protect the nation’s borders. What we have against them is that their behaviour towards civilians is hardly exemplary. They still extort money from civilians and commit abuses. We’ve noticed changes in the PNC, except for the Beni Rapid Reaction Force. We get the impression that not all police units have been trained in the same way. The night patrols commit more infractions than the daytime ones. Also, the PNC like to take our mobile phones without explaining why.” (BENI WOMEN’S FOCUS GROUP, NORTH KIVU).



Concerning this objective, the Base Committee creation/ revitalization work and the organisation of the awareness-raising activities are at an advanced stage, with targets already having been achieved in some cases, as the table below shows. The media activities have also had a good overall achievement rate. By way of contrast, other activities are still in the beginning stages, making it impossible to link them with the changes in knowledge and perceptions emphasised in this section.

Table 5: Activities relating to specific objective 1 and their degree of progress

Activities relating to specific objective 1 % complete as of 31st July 2016

Re-energisation of existing FARDC and PNC committees and setting up of new committees 118%

Training and strengthening of committee capacity on various issues 80%

Raising awareness of human rights, military-civilian relations and SGBV among new recruits 110%

Organisation of awareness sessions by the Base Committees 126% FARDC 117% PNC

Organisation of seminars for police commanders on the concept of neighbourhood policing 67%

Educating security forces and civilians on responsible behaviour via the «Vrai Djo» mass media campaign 0%

7

SMS marketing campaign 0% 8

Distribution of the «Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika» comic strip 0% 9

Production of gender-sensitive «Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika» radio and TV episodes 77%

Organisation of showings of the film «Weapon of War» 20%

Organisation of showings of the film “Nadkisa”10 0% 11

Co-production of short weekly radio programmes with RTNC in collaboration with the FARDC and the PNC 61%

Organisation of workshops with the Military Justice Support Committees (CAJM/CPAJM) 100%

Provision of each CAJM with a library of essential legal texts for the CAJM 0% 12

Organisation of conferences bringing together CAJMs/CPAJMs and human rights protection groups 75%

Organisation of fora for the exchange of ideas between police commanders, SGBV experts and PNC committees 50%

7 The film is currently being completed and will be broadcast from December 2016.8 In early October 2016 this activity was 100% complete.9 27,384 had been distributed (around 10%) by the end of September 2016.10 The title has been changed; originally it was “Lobi Mokolo Ya Sika”.11 Public showings will begin in December 2016.12 A library was installed in Bunia in late September



COVERAGE OF TRAINING AND AWARENESS ACTIVITIES

Among Civilians

Despite the fact that there have been no trainings/awareness activities aimed specifically at civilians, it has been noted that 55% of the civilians who answered the question said that they had attended an SFCG training session. Among these, 62% received the training one year previously, but others received them two or more years previously. During the focus group sessions carried out with girls and young women, among eight groups, five included members who said that they had participated in awareness or reconciliation activities covering legal texts and regulations affecting citizens. Moreover, 37% of civilians said that they had benefitted from the training programme on the roles and responsibilities of civilian populations (40% for men and 34% for women). These programmes were designed for the security forces so it is not unexpected that civilian participation was low13. In addition to this, 51% of civilians said that they had attended a mobile film showing on the subject of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV).

A large majority of the civilian respondents who had participated in the activities felt that the modules were close to lived experience (86%), thus demonstrating the relevance of the awareness activities to the context and the conflict dynamic. Participants said that the descriptions in the awareness activities corresponded to their own daily lives. However, one group of women underlined difficulties regarding the choice of language used, saying that they did not understand Lingala and would have preferred materials in Swahili and French.

Among Security Forces

76% of military personnel and 74% of police14 said that they had already undergone human rights training, compared to only 52% of military personnel and 54% of police during the baseline study.

For 44% of military personnel and 43% of police, this took place less than one year previously. For 17% of military personnel and 27% of police it took place two years previously. SFCG provided the training for 52% of the military personnel and 27% of the police who had been trained. SFCG was the principal training provider for the FARDC, but in second place when it came to training the PNC, behind MONUSCO (37%) and ahead of ICRC (5%). Among the PNC, lower-ranking officers showed lower participation rates (constables) at 69%, whereas three quarters of high-ranking officers have undergone training and notably 90% of commissioners. This effect was less visible among the FARDC, where 74% of enlisted members had received training, with similar proportions among officers (and 100% of captain-majors and commanders).

13 In principal these awareness events are held during military and police parades with no civilian participation. However, in some areas and circumstances, civilians have been invited to participate in parades, particularly when the commander or the local authorities have an important message to pass on. Moreover, given that these awareness events are often organised outdoors, they attract curious civilians to participate in the debates.

14 Within the PNC only 21 women answered the question, of whom 13 said that they had recieved human rights training.

Figure 5: Table of military and police personnel that have participated in a training on human rights, divided by province

71%80%

70%80%

87%

62%

PNC FARDC

Nord-Kivu IturiSud-KivuNorth Kivu South Kivu Ituri



Regarding the relevance of the activity, according to the participants in the training, 86% of the military personnel and 85% of police officers felt, as did civilians, that the module was close to lived experience: “The module fits with what we encounter on the ground; we understand human rights in the field” (police officer replying to the survey). Those who disagreed did not explain why.

In addition to this, 80% of military personnel and 71% of police officers said that they had participated in Base Committees’ awareness activities, though certain groups appear to have been excluded. Moreover, half of the FARDC Base Committees (CdB) have organised seminars for officers. The majority of military personnel who had not participated said that they did not have time to go, whereas police officers said that they had either not been given the information or had not been invited. Some said that their superior officers had gone, that they were stationed in isolated areas, or that certain groups were not concerned by the activities; for example, the border police, neighbourhood policing teams and communications staff. Nevertheless, according to the programme team, awareness activities were not invitation-only and the units mentioned were not excluded. This

mid-term evaluation tomorrow is a new day-...the mid-term evaluation uses a mixed methodology,...

Documents