micro for consulting
TRANSCRIPT
-
7/29/2019 Micro for Consulting
1/28
Microeconomicsin 25 Slides or Less
Professor Michael Gibbs
-
7/29/2019 Micro for Consulting
2/28
2
Overview
Tools supply & demand curves
Industry Types perfect competition, monopoly, oligopoly,
monopolistic competition
Advanced Topics pricing strategies
network effects & lock-in
Notes
http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/fac/michael.gibbs/teaching/micro.htm
-
7/29/2019 Micro for Consulting
3/28
Capitalist Tools
-
7/29/2019 Micro for Consulting
4/28
4
Cost Curves
TC = FC + VC
ATC = TC/Q = AFC + AVC
MC = TC/Q = VC/Q
[ = dTC/dQ = dVC/dQ ]
MC generally rising in Q MC intersects ATC &AVC at their minimums
ATC
AVC
AFC
MC
FC
TC
VC
-
7/29/2019 Micro for Consulting
5/28
5
Economies of Scale
Economies of Scale: ATC declining with Q
Dis-economies of Scale: ATC rising with Q
EOS are driven primarily by FC
EOS determines efficient size of firm
extreme EOS can lead to oligopoly or natural monopoly
Typical Natural Monopoly
ATC
ATC
Q
$
Q
$ Minimum
Efficient Scale
-
7/29/2019 Micro for Consulting
6/28
6
Economies of Scope
Economies of Scope: producing one good lowers costs
of producing another (synergies)
When a firm has economies of scope, it is often optimal
to produce both goods
What can drive economies of scope? sharing assets or management (esp. support
functions) sharing customers or distribution
related knowledge / expertise
production by-products
-
7/29/2019 Micro for Consulting
7/287
Supply Curves
In competitive industries,
firms are price takers
Firm should only produce if P min AVC in short run
(FC sunk in short run)
P min ATC in long run
Continue selling if P > MC
since MC is typicallyrising, produce until P =MC
thus MC = supply curve
$
Q
Supply
-
7/29/2019 Micro for Consulting
8/288
Demand Curves
DCs plot what someone is
willing to pay for each unitpurchased or how many can be sold at
each price
Always slope down (why?)
2 useful properties elasticity
consumer surplus
$
Q
Demand
-
7/29/2019 Micro for Consulting
9/289
Elasticity of Demand
= %Q/%P = (Q/Q)/(P/P) = (Q/P)(P/Q)
[ = (dQ/dP)(P/Q) ]
Intuitively % change in sales for a given % change in price
measures price sensitivity of your customers
A units-free measure of how sales vary with price
always negative; often referred to informally inabsolute value terms
inelastic demand: small elasticity close to zero
elastic demand: large elasticity approaching
-
7/29/2019 Micro for Consulting
10/2810
Determinants of Elasticity of Demand
Availability of substitutes
Use with complements
Budgets & incentives of customers
-
7/29/2019 Micro for Consulting
11/2811
Why Elasticity is Useful
Monopoly
Oligopoly
Monopolistic Competition
Perfect Competition
| | smaller
| | = A simple, rough measureof monopoly power
Very important in pricing
-
7/29/2019 Micro for Consulting
12/2812
PS
CS
Consumer Surplus
CS = difference between: maximum someone is
willing to pay (height ofdemand curve)
what they actually pay(price)
Why do we care? measure of welfare
business opportunity!
PS area above supply, below
price
equals profit ignoring FC
of less practical use
$
Q
Demand
P
Supply
-
7/29/2019 Micro for Consulting
13/2813
Market Equilibrium
How does a market come toequilibrium?
How does it adjust if S,D shift?
What are PS, CS before &
after?
What happens if governmentregulates P? Q?
$
Q
S
2
D
2
P2
Q
2
D
1
S
1
Q
1
P1
-
7/29/2019 Micro for Consulting
14/28
Industry Types
Monopoly
Oligopoly
Monopolistic Competition
Perfect Competition
| | smaller
| | =
-
7/29/2019 Micro for Consulting
15/2815
The Extremes
Perfect competition theoretical ideal that industries gravitate toward over
time no barriers to entry or exit; firms are price takers strategy is simple
short run, produce if P min AVC; long run, if P minATC
produce until MC = P competition drives P to min ATC profit = zero
Monopoly
rare outside natural monopoly barriers to entry, or large EOS; not a price taker strategy relatively simple
protect barrier to entry produce until MC = MR
P = MR(1+1/) P < MC profit > 0
more sophisticated pricing strategies possible
-
7/29/2019 Micro for Consulting
16/2816
Oligopoly
Small # of firms w/ large market share
Strategy becomes complex
each firms action has large direct effects on theother
game theoretic intuition applies develop strategy considering competitors strategy &
likely reactions
considerations include: first mover advantage pre-commitment
tacit collusion
expectations; credibility of threats
-
7/29/2019 Micro for Consulting
17/28
17
Monopolistic Competition
Many firms, few if any dominate market share but not perfectly competitive
each firm has some monopoly power, if only a little
Firms too small to have large effects on each other game theoretic intuition not as important
Strategy product differentiation, switching costs, etc., to get
(some, short run) monopoly power
pricing strategies
-
7/29/2019 Micro for Consulting
18/28
Advanced Topics
-
7/29/2019 Micro for Consulting
19/28
19
Pricing Strategies
Offering a single price ignores 2 profit opportunities CS implies some paid less than they were willing to
other customers didnt buy b/c price was too high
More elaborate pricing strategies allow the firm toconvert CS into PS: profits
-
7/29/2019 Micro for Consulting
20/28
20
Two-Part Pricing
One approach: charge fixed
entry fee F, &per-unit fee P revenue = F + PQ
For given P, largest possible
F = CS profit = F + (PMC)Q FC
Profit max at P=MC, F=CS set P to maximize value/
usage of product toconsumer
use F to turn CS intoprofit
Problem: 2PP ineffective w/
heterogeneous customers
CS
P
MC
Q
Pro
fit
-
7/29/2019 Micro for Consulting
21/28
21
P1
P2
Price Discrimination
Another approach: charge
different prices to different
customers
1st
degree: charge downdemand curve e.g., Priceline; auctions;
college aid
3rd degree: segment marketinto groups; monopoly pricing
in each (e.g., P1,P2) e.g., airlines
Pk = MC(1+1/k) > MC
markup of Pk over MC is higher,
the more inelastic is segment k( |k| closer to 0)
$
Q
D
P0
MC
-
7/29/2019 Micro for Consulting
22/28
22
Notes on Price Discrimination
Requires 3 conditions must have some monopoly power must sort customers, or get them to self-sort, by
willingness to pay check IDs how much of, where, or when good is bought discounts to better informed customers bundle
must prevent arbitrage across segments restrict resale
adulterate the product to make it less valuable to others limit purchases
Special cases quantity discounts (2nd degree) intertemporal p.d.; peak-load pricing
Closely related: quality discrimination
-
7/29/2019 Micro for Consulting
23/28
23
Bundling
Bundling: selling 2 or more goods together
many reasons to do so economies of scope: shoes evading price controls
assuring quality: Kodak film
Tying: selling 2 goods in some combination, but notfixed proportions
e.g., copiers & toner
often used to meterdemand for 2nd degree PD
sometimes illegal
-
7/29/2019 Micro for Consulting
24/28
24
Making a Bundle
Gone With
the Wind
Getting
Gertie's Garter
A 12,000 3,000B 10,000 4,000
Suppose 2 theaters are willing to pay these prices for 2 movies sold separately, max revenue = 2$13K ($3K for Gertie;
$10K for Wind)
sold together, max revenue = 2$14K in effect, extracts extra $1K CS from A on Wind, B on Gertie
Thus, bundling can be a subtle form of price discrimination requires negatively correlated demands for 2 goods
-
7/29/2019 Micro for Consulting
25/28
25
Network Effects
Network Effects exist if a product is more valuable to
consumers, the more others also use it a standard is important
how is it set?
if the standard is privately owned, network effectscreate monopoly power
Strategic implications first-mover advantage
price wars possible winner take all
coopetition
Monopoly network effects are often hyped too much evidence suggests usually short term
-
7/29/2019 Micro for Consulting
26/28
Notes
-
7/29/2019 Micro for Consulting
27/28
27
Economic Attitude
Opportunity cost
Whats your market? Think broadly!
Competition always wins in the end
but exploit short-run monopoly power
The Coase Theorem: Lets Make a Deal A little analytical thinking can go a long way
-
7/29/2019 Micro for Consulting
28/28
Good Luck!