mfr nara- t1t3- winep- levitt matthew- 10-28-03- 00685

8/14/2019 Mfr Nara- t1t3- Winep- Levitt Matthew- 10-28-03- 00685

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Unclassified - Commission Sensitive

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDEvent: Interview of Matthew LevittDate: October 28, 2003Classification: UnclassifiedPrepared by: Yoel Tobin Dan BymanTeam numbers: 1 and 3Location: K Street, Conference RoomParticipant: Matthew Levitt, Senior Fellow in Terrorism Studies at theWashington Institute for Near East PolicyParticipants - Commission: Dan Byman & Yoel TobinBackgroundMr. Levitt is currently a Senior Fellow in Terrorism Studies at the Washington Institutefor Near Policy. Before that, he served as a counterterrorism analyst at the FBI fromNovember 1998 through November 200l. At the FBI, he focused primarily on Palestinianterrorist groups, but also worked on issues relating to Osama bin Laden and AlQaeda.

Combating Terrorist FinancingMr. Levitt commented on the efforts by the United States Government (USG) to combatterrorist financing. He said that the USG has "a far way to go," although the situation hasimproved somewhat since 9/11.Mr. Levitt said that there should be no distinction between material supporters ofterrorism and those who pull the trigger or activate the bomb, i.e., they are all equallyculpable.Mr. Levitt emphasized the permeable borders between terrorist groups and the need tocrack down on terrorist financing across the board, rather than restricting our efforts to AlQaeda. He believes that support networks for Al Qaeda frequently support other Islamicterrorist groups, as well, and gave examples of overlapping assistance to both Hamas andAl Qaeda. He also believes that it is a moral imperative to have a consistent, across-the-board counterterrorism policy against groups that target civilians.The FBI



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Levitt was critical of the FBI in several respects. He said disapprovingly that before 9/11and FBI management would only prosecute persons who gave money to terrorist

groups if there was proof that the donor knowingly intended to finance a terrorist attack.He,also stated that the FBI is poorly organized and that for bureaucratic reasons it insistson pigeonholing cases into discreet categories by terrorist group, when in fact theboundaries between groups are often fluid. He noted that the information sharingproblems of the FBI missed the point: the FBI often did not share information with itself,let alone with the rest of the government. In addition, he asserted that the FBI sometimeswithheld relevant information from its analysts, and that there was a dearth of strategicanalysis because good analysts were often pulled into operational units. During crisisperiods, senior analysts were sometimes assigned secretarial duties because managerswere reluctant to ask secretaries to work late at night. He believes that many of theseproblems persist today.With regard to the Government's efforts against terrorist financing, Mr. Levittpraised the efforts of Treasury's outgoing General Counsel David Aufhauser. At the sametime, he criticized the USG's structure as cumbersome (e.g., persistence of differentterrorist lists) and said that the USG needs a senior official who focuses on terroristfmancing and chairs the PCC dealing with that issue. Also, the USG needs a culturechange so that everyone is working to contribute to the overall interagency effort.Mr. Levitt also thought that there were additional entities that should have been shutdown, even allowing for the fact that in some cases nonaction was justified because ofongoing intelligence investigations. In addition, many of the terrorism lists are notcomplimentary, with radicals on one list but not another.

Mr. Levitt also addressed the role of Saudi Arabia in financing terrorist groups. He statedthat the Kingdom is not doing everything it can and should be doing to choke off terroristfinancing. Much of the Kingdom's clerical elite is sympathetic to Bin Ladin. He singledout Prince Nayef, the Saudi Interior Minister, as a major problem. He charged that PrinceNayef does not cooperate with the USG, that he is aware of some extremist financing,and that he consciously shields himself from information that he does not agree with orwant to hear. Mr. Levitt also asserted that much of Saudi Arabia's religious establishmentwas sympathetic to parts of Bin Laden's agenda, and that Saudi diplomats have beenlinked to charities that operate as fronts for terrorist groups.

Mr. Levitt gave examples of inadequate Saudi action against terrorist financing. Althoughthe Saudis shut down two branches of the Al-Haramain charity, those branches laterreopened, and in any case the Saudis should have taken action against the entireorganization. He also expressed concern about the International Islamic ReliefOrganization (IIRO), the Muslim World League (MWL), the World Assembly of MuslimYouth (WAMY), and Saudi businessman Wael Jalaidan, (Jalaidan was apparently thesubject of a joint U.S.-Saudi terrorist designation, which Prince Nayefthen disavowed).



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Mr. Levitt also criticized other Saudi actions, including alleged Saudi funding of mosquesused by terrorists, Saudi efforts to spread Wahabi ideology, and what he said wereproactive efforts by Saudi officials to undermine counterterrorism investigations in othercountries through, e.g., the issuance of visas.There was not a major change in Saudi cooperation after September 11. The Kingdomlaunched a public relations campaign and denied charges but did not fulfill promisesrelated to a financial intelligence unit or giving FBI and IRS people on the ground directaccess to the data the Saudis receive. As a result, we don't know what we are not getting.focused on its image, not the problem. Mr. Levitt has not seen a marked improvement

in Saudi actions since the May 12, 2003 bombings in Riyadh.The FBf needs to be empowered and tasked to run a strategic analytic review of Saudilinks to international terrorism cases in the United States. The Bureau needs to know thescope of the problem and the details of groups and institutions with links to the Kingdom.

Mr. Levitt suggested that we speak with USG officials Cofer Black, David Aufhauser,and Stephen Hadley to learn more about the lack of Saudi cooperation on terroristfinancing. He added that there were no simple answers to the problems with Saudi Arabiasince the Saudi government is essentially dysfunctional.

HAMAS,HAMAS and the Palestine Islamic Jihad are not part of the al-Qa'ida "family," but it isimpossible to disentangle their logistics networks. Our Arab partners refuse todelegitimate thee use of terrorism by HAMAS and PIJ, focusing instead on the causeitself which is legitimate if peacefully articulated. More broadly, the internationalcommunity needs to delegitimate terrorist tactics and should help meet the social andeconomic needs in Palestinian society so that Palestinians will not need to rely onHAMAS and PIJ to meet those needs.Levitt believes the Muslim Brotherhood should be designated a Foreign TerroristOrganization. Brotherhood members call for jihad and otherwise aid violence.


Hizballah is an extremely capable terrorist group that gets tremendous support fromIranian intelligence and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, as well as from Syria(which is less involved in Hizballah's global network). Some al-Qa'ida members trainedwith Hizballah and learned about spectacular attacks and how to do preoperationalsurveillance. There were also meetings - but they did not progress 6ft to operationalcooperation. Hizballah has close ties to the Popular Resistance Committee in Gaza and isotherwise aiding various anti-Israel groups. Today Hizballah is building up itsinternational capacity. This is now latent, but it could be turned on if the group wants to


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use it. Iran shelters al-Qa'ida leaders, but the relationship is tactical, not intimate.Iraq and SyriaAI-Qa'ida and Iraq were always involved, and the current "open door" works well for theorganization. For have crossed from Syria, and it is documented thatmoney and supplies are coming in. The Syrians are allowing entry into Iraq and perhapsfacilitating it. Even before the war, Syria allowed Al Qa'ida operatives to transit Syrianterritory on their way to Ansar al-Islam camps in Iraq. Saddam Husayn probably had aliaison with al-Qa'ida but not necessarily sponsorship. The war with Iraq may not havebeen the best use of resources.RecommendationsU.S. diplomacy in the war on terrorism is poor. The United States cannot do everythingon its own - cutting off funding or otherwise isolating groups requires worldwide help.The Bush administration is unnecessarily unilateral. The Arab states also are necessaryto give cover on the peace process. Public diplomacy is abysmal. The MEPI is a goodfirst step, but small.Domestic intelligence should be made separate from the FBI. DHS' role in intelligenceis not clear.


mfr nara- t1t3- winep- levitt matthew- 10-28-03- 00685

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