mfaf - comprehensive research report on national integration and cohesion v3(1)_timothy mahea

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Comprehensive report on

NATIONAL INTEGRATION AND

COHESION

Desktop Research, Thematic Research & FGD Report

July, 2009 Commissioned by: the Media Focus on Africa Foundation (MFAF) Conducted by: Centre for Independent Research (CIR), Strategic PR and a desk research team lead by Isaack Okero Otieno.

Funded By:

The Interchurch Organisation for Development Co-operation (ICCO) and

The Royal Netherlands Embassy © Copyright Media Focus on Africa Foundation All rights Reserved. No part of this report may be reproduced except for critical review.



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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

As a Lead Consultant, am indebted for this report to various individuals who participated in one way or the other towards making this report possible.

While it is not possible to name all those who contributed to the success of the exercise, I wish to extend my gratitude in a special way to the Media Focus on Africa Foundation (MFAF) staff led by Frank Klein, Linda de Kooning, Marten Schoonman, George Rubiik Misore and Jeremiah Kiwoi for the opportunity to provide the service and for the invaluable support they gave in the course of undertaking the exercise. I am equally indebted to the team of very competent colleagues who conducted the Desktop study including Caroline Meres, Belinda Njiru, and George Rubiik Misore. This report has been enriched by the support offered by the consultant opinion pollster, Jeremiah Owiti of the Centre for Independent Research. I am equally grateful for the comprehensive Focus Group Discussion study conducted by the Strategic Public Relations and Research Limited (SPRR)

The independent expert research team who conducted Desktop review, the team from the CIR and those from the SPRR who endured long hours in the field to ensure collection of data and those who spent countless hours transcribing, and analyzing the results deserve special mention. I thank you all for your contributions to this very important exercise.

Isaack Okero Otieno

Lead Consultant



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LIST OF ACRONYMS ACK Anglican Church of Kenya AU African Union CIPEV Commission of Inquiry of the Post Election Violence CJPC Catholic Justice and Peace Commission CSOs Civil Society Organizations DCs District Commissioners ECK Electoral Commission of Kenya FBO Faith Based Organizations FGD Focussed Group Discussions GCG Grand Coalition Government ICCO Inter-church organization for development cooperation IDPs Internally Displaced Persons IREC Independent Review Commission KAMATUSA Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, and Samburu communities KANU Kenya National African Union KES Kenya Shillings KNCHR Kenya National Commission on Human Rights MOU Memorandum of Understanding MPs Members of Parliament NARA National Accord and Reconciliation Act NARC National Rainbow Coalition Party NCCK National Council of Churches of Kenya NERRC National, Ethnic, and Race Relations Commissions NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations OCS Officer Commanding Station ODM Orange Democratic Movement ODM-K Orange Democratic Movement –Kenya PCs Provincial Commissioners PEV Post Elections Violence PNU Party of National Unity PPO Provincial Police Officer SGBV Sexual and Gender Based Violence TJRC Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Programme



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Table of Contents Executive Summary ....................................................................................................................... 8 What is being covered ........................................................................................................................ 9

Overview of Findings .................................................................................................................... 10 Section A – Desk review ................................................................................................................ 17 1.0 Underlying structures and causes that created grounds for the recent conflict in Kenya .... 17 1.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 17 1.2 Background ................................................................................................................................. 17

1.2.1 Inequitable wealth distribution .................................................................................... 17 1.2.2 Historical Injustices and the land question in Kenya .................................................... 18 1.2.3 Historical injustices, Ethnicity, and Conflict in Kenya ................................................... 19 1.2.4 Institutionalized violence, failed institutions, corruption and the culture of impunity 20 1.2.5 Marginalization ............................................................................................................. 22

1.3 OTHER CAUSES OF CONFLICT ................................................................................................ 22 1.3.1 Personification of the presidency and presidential power ........................................... 22 1.3.2 Youth unemployment ................................................................................................... 23 1.3.3 Nepotism ....................................................................................................................... 23 1.3.4 Presence of illegal gangs ............................................................................................... 23 1.3.5 Lack of national dialogue and peace policy .................................................................. 23

1.4 The abortive NARC dream and the new constitution ........................................................... 23 2.0 Recent causes of conflict .................................................................................................... 24 2.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 24 2.2 Perceived mismanagement of the 2007 Elections ................................................................ 24 2.3 Inflammatory statements .................................................................................................... 24 2.4 Harassment by security organs ............................................................................................. 25

3.0 Actors and the stakeholders in the conflict ........................................................................ 25 3.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 25 3.2 The Parties and the Politicians. ............................................................................................. 25 3.3 The Media ............................................................................................................................. 25 3.4 The State Security Agencies and the provincial administration ........................................... 26 3.5 Civil society organizations and faith based organizations. ................................................... 27 3.6 The Role of the church .......................................................................................................... 28 3.7 Neighbouring States .............................................................................................................. 29 3.8 Western Nations and the international community ............................................................. 29 3.9 Youth groups ......................................................................................................................... 30 3.10 Why they are conflict stakeholders. ................................................................................. 31

4.0 Attitudes that breed conflict and their sources .................................................................. 31 4.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 31 4.2 What attitudes do people have that inflict conflict? ............................................................ 32 4.3 Cultural/ Ethnic Stereotypes ................................................................................................. 32

5.0 The context of violent behaviour, intolerance, and consequences of conflict ..................... 33 5.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 33 5.2 Background ........................................................................................................................... 33

5.2.1 Historical Injustices and Land Grievances ..................................................................... 33 5.2.2 Widespread Poverty and Inequality .............................................................................. 34 5.2.3 Ethnicised Politics ......................................................................................................... 35 5.2.4 Past Election–Related Violence and the Deep‐Seated Culture of Impunity ................. 36 5.2.5 Stalled Constitutional Reforms ..................................................................................... 37



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5.2.6 Rural‐Urban Migration .................................................................................................. 38 5.2.7 Low wages for civil servants .......................................................................................... 38

5.3 Consequences of the conflict on the context ....................................................................... 38 5.3.1 National level ................................................................................................................ 39 5.3.2 Local level ...................................................................................................................... 40

6.0 Behavior and conflict ....................................................................................................... 41 6.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 41 6.2 Ethnic Animosity ................................................................................................................... 41 6.3 Exploitation of resources ...................................................................................................... 41 6.4 Ethnic Profiling ...................................................................................................................... 41 6.5 Entitlement Behaviour .......................................................................................................... 42

7.0 Dynamics and linkages between local and regional conflicts .............................................. 42 7.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 42 7.2 The geopolitical analysis of conflict ...................................................................................... 42 7.3 How the bigger conflict influences local dynamics and conflicts ......................................... 43 7.4 How the local conflict relates to the bigger national conflict ............................................... 43

8.0 The roles, positions, ambitions, and frustrations of the youth in society ............................ 44 8.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 44 8.2 Youth and Politics in Kenya ................................................................................................... 44

9.0 Religion and conflict ................................................................................................................ 47 9.1 Background ........................................................................................................................... 47 9.2 Role of religion and religious leaders .................................................................................... 47

10.0 Gender dynamics, attitudes, behaviour, and conflict. ........................................................ 48 10.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 48 10.2 Gender dynamics .............................................................................................................. 48 10.3 Attitudes of Men and Women before and during conflict .................................................. 49 10.4 Behaviour of men and women after and during conflict .................................................. 49 10.5 Context .............................................................................................................................. 49

11.0 The horizontal and vertical linkages between actors in society .......................................... 50 11.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 50 11.2 State Actors ....................................................................................................................... 50

11.2.1 The Security Agents ........................................................................................................... 50 11.2.2 Political leaders .................................................................................................................. 51

11.3 Civil society................................................................................................................................ 51 12.0 The Current Human Rights Situation .................................................................................. 52 12.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 52 12.2 Human rights in post conflict Kenya ......................................................................................... 52

12.2.1 Political murders ................................................................................................................ 52 12.2.2 Gender based violence ...................................................................................................... 53 12.2.3 Extrajudicial killings ............................................................................................................ 54 12.2.4 Insecurity ........................................................................................................................... 54 12.2.5 Internally Displaced Persons .............................................................................................. 55

12.3 Effects of violations by different actors on the conflict and society: ................................... 56 13.0 Positive changes that conflict triggered in kenya................................................................ 56 13.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 56 13.2 Summary of Positive Changes ............................................................................................... 57 13.3 The formation of a grand coalition government .................................................................. 58 13.4 Commissions of Inquiry ......................................................................................................... 58 13.5 WAY FORWARD ......................................................................................................................... 60

Section B – Opinion Poll Survey ..................................................................................................... 61 1.0 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 61 1.1 Methodology ......................................................................................................................... 61



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2.0 Key Findings ...................................................................................................................... 61 2.1 Evaluations of Socio‐economic conditions and insecurity .................................................... 61 2.2 Underlying structures that create ground for conflict .......................................................... 62 2.3 More recent sources and triggers of conflict ........................................................................ 63 2.4 Main actors and instigators of the Conflict ........................................................................... 64 2.5 Role of religion and religious leaders .................................................................................... 65 2.6 Role of Youth in the conflict and frustrations of youth ........................................................ 66 2.7 Attitudes that breed conflict and the source of the attitudes .............................................. 67 2.8 Consequences of conflict ...................................................................................................... 68 2.9 Current Human rights situation ............................................................................................ 69 2.10 Actors in Conflict Resolution and their performance ........................................................... 70 2.11 Potential for Future Conflict and Early Warning Signs .......................................................... 70 2.12 Solutions to Violent Conflict and the Search for Common Ground ...................................... 72

3.0 Analysis of the key opinion poll findings ............................................................................ 72 Section C ‐ Focus group discussion report ...................................................................................... 75 1.0 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 75 1.1 Research objective ................................................................................................................ 75 1.2 Scope and methodology ....................................................................................................... 75

2.0 Key findings of the focus group discussion ......................................................................... 76 2.1 Perception of critical issues facing the country .................................................................... 76 2.2 Perceptions on Kenyan politics ............................................................................................. 77 2.3 Perceptions on multiculturalism ........................................................................................... 78 2.4 Perception of ethnicity/ ethnic communities ....................................................................... 79 2.5 Perception on enhanced national reconciliation among Kenyans ....................................... 80 2.6 Root causes of conflict .......................................................................................................... 81 2.7 Sources of information on matters of ethnic relations and nationhood .............................. 82 2.8 Cohesion among Kenyans ..................................................................................................... 82 2.8 Suggestions on inter‐ethnic interactions .............................................................................. 84 2.9 Source of greatest fear in Kenya ........................................................................................... 85

3.0 Analysis of the focus group discussion findings .................................................................. 86 3.1 Perceptions on Kenyan politics ............................................................................................. 86 3.2 Sources of political information ............................................................................................ 86 3.3 Citizenship, Nationhood and Identity ................................................................................... 87 3.4 Perceptions on multiculturalism ........................................................................................... 88 3.6 Root causes of conflict .......................................................................................................... 89 3.7 Cohesion among Kenyans ..................................................................................................... 90 3.8 Perception on reconciliation efforts ..................................................................................... 90

Section D ‐ Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 91 BIBLIOGRAPHY .............................................................................................................................. 93 Appendix I ‐ District of origin......................................................................................................... 95 Appendix II – FGD guide ................................................................................................................ 97



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Executive Summary Media Focus on Africa Foundation (MFAF) is implementing a comprehensive multi disciplinary media program, ‘A Platform for Dialogue towards National Integration and Cohesion,’ which aims to contribute to conflict mitigation through the enhancement of inter-communal dialogue and the search for common ground. For this purpose, MFAF has designed a comprehensive communication strategy. The specific objectives of the program is to facilitate inter-tribal dialogue, through media, with the purpose of searching for common ground between communities on the root causes of the post-election conflict and its consequences with special emphasis on dialogue in the conflict affected areas. MFAF commissioned three different types of researches to bring in to surface important information requisite for comprehensive national integration and cohesion. First was the Desk Review on issues related to the Post Elections Violence (PEV). This Desk review was conducted by a team of expert independent researchers. Second study was that of comprehensive Opinion Polls conducted in various parts of the country. The Centre for Independent Research (CIR) was contracted by MFAF to conduct the Poll survey. The third study was a qualitative Focus Group Discussion (FGD) targeted at persons affected by the PEV. Accordingly, Strategic Public Relations and Research Limited (SPRR) was contracted by the MFAF to conduct the FGD. The desktop study served as the basic document while the Opinion Polls Report together with FGD study reports were used to confirm or dispute the findings of the Desktop review. All these studies were contextualized on the aftermath of the 2007/8 post election violence. The PEV was triggered following the disputed 2007 presidential polls. The violence that followed in to the first quarter of 2008, resulted in nearly 1,200 deaths, 600,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs), and widespread destruction of land and property. Mediation efforts by former United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan, led to formation of the Grand Coalition Government (GCG) and a power-sharing arrangement in February 2008 leaving Mwai Kibaki with the presidency while creating the post of prime minister for Raila Odinga. Three documents were a priori selected for the review. They include: The Commission of Inquiry on Post Election Violence (CIPEV Report) also known as the Waki report; the Independent Review Commission on Elections (IREC report) also known as the Kriegler Report and lastly, the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) report titled ‘On the Brink of Precipe: A Human Rights Account of Kenya's Post 2007 Elections Violence’. Other relevant publications were also reviewed albeit as secondary data. The review of these documents was based on the need to test the relevance andf applicability of the Inter-Church Organization for Development Cooperation (ICCO) Conflcit Analysis Tool Kit. This is practiocal tool that aims at analysisng conflcit order to priorities and strategies Conflict Transformation Programmes. The ICCO tools, with its pointed questions derived from a set template formed the basis of the desk review.



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What is being covered In line with Media Focus’s on going comprehensive project whose aim is to contribute to conflict mitigation through the enhancement of inter-communal dialogue and the search for common ground, the three studies were therefore aimed at complimentary addressing both underlying and consequential issues related to the post election violence. The Desk review for instance was purposeful designed to serve as basic document whose data and findings would be critical in isolating issues related to causes and triggers of the PEV. The Desk study would also surface information on the status of conflict and peace situation in Kenya following the 2007 post-election violence while at the same time proving solid building blocks upon which a comprehensive conflict transformation tools can be developed in order to inform policy. On the one hand, the Opinion Poll survey was designed to deal with ssources of conflict and approaches towards conflict transformation and sustainable peace in Kenya. Additionally, the Opinion poll survey was designed as a gauge of public perceptions about the sources of conflict, both underlying and proximate, and about the opinions of antagonistic communities, with a view to establishing the issues around which inter-communal dialogue and the search for common ground can be facilitated through media debates and public broadcasts. On the other hand, the FGD was utilized in order to get an in-depth understanding of the views and perception of the people on other tribes and what they see as the root causes of the conflicts. The choice of composition of the focus group discussions in various locations was informed by the events during the post-election violence and an understanding of which groups were major players and influencers of the violence. The Desk-top research, the poll survey and FGDs have been guided by the ICCO Conflict Analysis Tool kit on Conflict Transformation. Since the main objective of Conflict Transformation is to transform the underlying structures of conflict, the Tool Kit provides a framework that facilitates in-depth description and analysis of attitudes, behavior, perceptions, context and the underlying structures (the political, economic and social –cultural) of conflicts condensed in thirteen thematic questions. The questions help in analyzing specific conflicts and their linkages with other conflicts and provide answers for strategy development, the identification of conflict transformation actions and priorities which help in developing relevant conflict transformation interventions. Following post-election violence in Kenya, Media Focus has been involved in the analysis of the structural causes the conflict by unveiling both the contextual issues and the behavoir and attitudes that generate violence. This has been followed by various interventions through the media aimed at changing the behavioutrs and attitudes of antagonistic communities and groups in the Kenyan society.



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Overview of Findings

I. Unresolved historical injustices/ Underlying structures and causes that create ground for conflict

The post elections crisis of 2007/8 was the lowest moments of the country. The desk review study major findings in line with the ICCO conflict transformation tool kit suggest that the underlying factors that informed the PEV had never been addressed nor resolved by the post independent regimes. On the contrary, the study reveals that the socio-economic divides, historical injustices associated with inequity, landlessness, poverty, insecurity and corruption among others progressively conspired and eventually fuelled the PEV. The unresolved historical injustice progressive led to unresolved anger and resentment against the state and against rival ethnic communities. This bubble of years of collective anger, frustration, and fear bust on the day presidential poll results were announced. On its part, the Opinion Poll findings confirm the fact that the underlying sources of conflict in Kenya include tribalism / ethnicity (22.7 percent), poverty (15.4 percent), politics (14.6 percents); land (10.6 percent), un-employment (8.1 percent) and corruption (5.8 percent). Other causes for conflict are negative attitudes towards other tribes (4.8 percent) poor governance (4.2 percent), insecurity (3.2 percent), and inequality / unequal distribution of national resources (3.4 percent). Accordingly, the survey findings suggest that there exists disquiet among Kenyans, given the general failure by the government to address the major underlying causes of conflict that nearly led Kenya to a state of total anarchy. The critical findings of both the desk review and the Opinion poll survey are that the underlying factors that led to PEV are neither new nor original. The issues of land, impunity, corruption, bad governance, insecurity, and weakly institutions of governance have always existed. Whither state institutions The desk review has surfaced useful data suggesting the fundamental state failures in addressing the question of land, citizenship, security, impunity and unemployment among the youth, marginalization and inter ethnic discrimination as part of the serious problems that the country has faced since independence. In addition, the study has revealed systemic rot in the institutions of governance. The Kenyan government is one that was been plagued by weak organizational and institutional frameworks. This problem traces its root in a non-responsive constitution, political and legal dispensation. This weakness has allowed corruption, nepotism, and tribalism to snowball effectively weakening the nation-state. Official corruption of the state has meant that only those in power or closer to institutions of power enjoy the benefits of the state while majority watch on the periphery. Yet, the study shows that corruption is not only a state problem but is also practiced by citizens in their own right and space. Consequently, the medley of official and private corruption has over the years led to suspicions, marginalization, deep-seated sense of insecurity and the institutionalization of both culture of corruption and impunity.

II. Negative Ethnicity The desk study has equally exposed Kenya as a nation-state. Equally questionable is the whole question of citizenship. The desk study has exposed negative ethnicity as a problem that has existed over the years and one that has been conveniently and periodically manipulated by the political elites. Kenyans feel strongly secure within their



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own ethnic community. Ethnicity is used as the tool for identity, socialization, and networking, access to power and to the economic goods. The desk study therefore question what has generally passed that Kenya is stable nation-state. Related to this is the question of citizenship. Reviewed literature suggests that most Kenyans have low confidence in their citizenship. This vindicates the prime finding that Kenya is indeed a country composed of rival nations struggling to be a nation-state. The question of impact of negative ethnicity at both local and national level is best exposed in the Focus Group Discussion report. The FGD report exposes Kenya as a country of historical and continued contradictions, simmering conflicts and competitions especially amongst the larger ethnic groups. The competition and rivalry is informed by political competition for capture and control of political and economic resources on the one hand. On the other hand, the negative stereotypes and cultural misinformation have affected inter ethnic relationships especially at individual levels. The most important finding from the FGD is the reality that ethnicity continue to be used as mask and a cover-up for addressing shared critical national issues such land, constitutional review, leadership, poverty and national unity among others.

III. Potential for future violence The Opinion poll survey suggest that situation on the ground is therefore very fluid, and can change for the worse anytime. Indeed, discussions with citizens in most of the conflict areas suggested that the antagonist communities see themselves as merely observing “a temporary cease fire”. This may be because as the underlying issues that led to post-election violence are yet to be addressed. A discussion group in Eldoret captured the situation in Rift Valley thus: “…The situation in the region has never improved since the post- election violence as the host community i.e. Kalenjins have not been properly consulted on a number of critical issues including the resettlement of the IDPs, the government compensation Programme and the re- integration attempts by the government.”

IV. Evaluations of Socio-economic conditions and insecurity The poll finding suggest that Kenyans express general disappointment with the socio-economic situation in the country and all the criteria used (availability of consumer goods, job opportunities, people’s standards of living, conflict between different groups, corruption of public officials and tribalism) were rated as worse than one year ago by huge margins.

V. Underlying structures and causes that create ground for conflict On the one hand, according to the desk review causes of conflict in Kenya are related to failure by post independence regimes to deal with the question of land (ownership); impunity and corruption. Particularly critical is ethnicity. Indeed, tribalism/ethnicity scores very highly in view of the fact that even claims to land, political power, or resources are coded in negative ethnicity. As such, in Kenyan parlance, whether allocations of land to individuals in settlements are unfair, or key state jobs are given, it is the tribe rather than the individual that is respectively aggrieved or rewarded. Similarly, historical injustices in relation to land or even political marginalization and exclusion in national resource allocations are therefore primarily viewed from ethnic lenses, and it is the tribe that gains or losses, fights or negotiates politically.



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The Poll survey findings suggest that the underlying sources of conflict in Kenya include tribalism / ethnicity (22.7 percent), poverty (15.4 percent), politics (14.6 percents); land (10.6 percent), un-employment (8.1 percent) and corruption (5.8 percent). Other causes for conflict are negative attitudes towards other tribes (4.8 percent) poor governance (4.2 percent), insecurity (3.2 percent), and inequality / unequal distribution of national resources (3.4 percent).

VI. What are the more recent causes of conflict and why is the conflict continuing?

Most recent conflict in the country was triggered by the disputed 2007 presidential polls and subsequent creation of the Grand Coalition Government (GCG). The triggers of violence are also related to issue related to the management of the GCG and its mandate, which is largely perceived to below expectations. Other areas that led to violence include failed institutions of governance such as the former Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK); leadership wrangles within the coalition government and hate speech and incitement. Indeed, according to the survey , the main triggers of the post election violence that rocked the country are seen as the discredited results of the 2007 elections, related to an outdated electoral process / system (33.4 percent), the fight for leadership / power (12.2 percent), ethnicity or tribal differences (11.0 percent), and incitement by political parties (10.2 percent)..

VII. Main actors and instigators of the Conflict In general, politicians are identified as the main instigators of political violence in Kenya. Other actors include political party supporters; ethnic groups, state security agents; the Media and the Non State Actors (Civil society groups and Religious Organizations). The Media is cited as having played a role in informing the people about the violence but also as villains to the extent that some media houses especially vernacular radio stations used hate speech language and or incited their listeners to violence. Religious platform were used as avenues to mobilization and passing of information that contributed to heightening the tensions and or promoting violence. On the other hand, church leadership also contributed to conflict transformation and healing of the nation just as the Media during and after the cessation of post election violence. Significantly, the post election violence also affected Kenyan neighbors especially those that rely on Kenya port of Mombasa for the export and import of the commodities. Some Kenyans found refuge in neighboring country of Uganda as refugees fleeing from the violence targeted at them. Therefore, the finding of the report is that PEV had the largest participation from political parties’ supporters and the state security agents. The media, the Religious organizations also contributed to the violence both as villains and as peacemakers. There was however, minimal contribution from the Kenyan’s neighboring countries save for the fact many that rely on Kenya for their exports and imports were severely affected as transport was practically paralyzed during the period of PEV. The international community link to the PEV was through the various mediation efforts under the auspices of the African Union (AU) led b Dr. Kofi Annan and the Council of Eminent African Personalities that eventually brokered an agreement that led to the creation of the GCG.

VIII. Role of religion and religious leaders According to the survey findings, there is divided opinion as the role played by the religious leaders during the PEV. In some cases, the religious leaders are accused of having preached hatred between communities. In other instances, religious leaders’ role



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especially in post crisis era is accepted as being that of peacemaking. Not surprisingly, the study suggest that religious leaders role in the PEV was largely positive. The religious leaders remain highly regarded and respected by the highly religious Kenyan communities. The study seems to suggest that Kenyan desire a higher role for religious leaders in politics.

IX. Role of Youth in the conflict and frustrations of youth The Desk review find the youth as having actively participated as both villains and victims during the PEV. Because of high levels of poverty and unemployment in the area used by politicians to intimidate opponents and instill fear in them. During the post-election violence, many youths were engaged in demonstrations and running battles with law enforcement agencies as the country slowly slipped into violence. The situation was worsened by violent and indiscriminate reaction of the security agencies targeting the youth in most of the cases. The situation makes the youth easily influenced through meager handouts to do all sorts of things. The existence of hard drugs and cheap alcohol has fuelled the violence and reaction of the youth involved. The survey report suggest the youth are mostly associated with negative things during the post election violence, with the issues that were most noted being looting and theft (46.9%), Violent attacks and killings (31.6%), protests and blocking of roads (29.8%) and general destruction, such as that of the Nairobi-Kisumu railway line (12.6%). The youth were also associated with atrocities such as gang rape (9.0%). Some positives, albeit by much smaller proportions, can also be identified in the role that the youth played during the conflict. For instance, it is noted that the youth also organized for self defence of communities, and also that they demanded for their rights. Significantly, it was also noted that the youth were used by political leaders to get power by a considerable proportion of respondents (9.33%), meaning that their actions were not always spontaneous but often based on actual reward/payment, or the perception of potential material benefit. The desk review findings suggest that the youth in Kenya today face many frustrations that render them very vulnerable to easy manipulation by politicians, and also makes them an easy target for recruitment into political militias or criminal gangs that are used by politicians in the heat of elections or in the aftermath to cause violence, and then easily dumped. The majority of youth languish in poverty, joblessness, and ignorance. Educated youth are frustrated by lack of jobs and young school dropouts formed the majority of marauding gangs that caused the most mayhem during the post election violence. A young participant in the discussion summed up the anger of the youth as arising from what he termed the “bouncing of a promissory note”, which arose after change did not happen, and with it, went the jobs and the better life (maisha bora) they had been promised. To make it worse, he noted, the leaders they trusted to bring the change were soon absorbed into the gravy train of privileges that comes with top government jobs.



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X. Attitudes that breed conflict and the source of the attitudes Self-identity, tolerance and interpersonal trust, and perceptions of the treatment of communities’ vis-à-vis others, including common explanations or stereotypes around such explanations were also tested to provide insights into attitudes that may breed conflict. According to the survey, 24.8 percent identified themselves with tribe / ethnic group as the group they belonged to or identify with first. 20.9 percent of Kenyans identified with their occupational group or class, while another 38.9 percent did not suggest any grouping, implying that they are content to be identified as Kenyan. While, another 11.9 percent preferred identification by religion with another 2.3 percent preferring the gender classification and 1.2 percent wished to identify by race. The Desk review found that most ethnic communities in Kenya are generally disenchanted by the current political dispensation. Ethnicity is used to explain exclusion and marginalization especially with respect to access to political power and to economic goods such as employment opportunities. Significantly, Kenyans exhibit low inter-personal trust, even for members of their religion, whereas religion ought to be a high-trust institution.

XI. Consequences of conflict Both negative and positive consequences of conflict were identified. The negative consequences included: Loss of lives with over 1,200 deaths, over 600,000 internally displaced persons; Loss of livelihoods; Increased cost of living; massive human rights violations such rape, violence against women, Destruction of property and displacement of people resulted in loss of jobs. Additionally, access to basic facilities such as medical/health services, education, social and economic services, became difficult and especially for IDPs and their families than it was in general due to the violence being experienced at the time. Many rape victims and those who were HIV+ did not have access to essential medical services. Simultaneously, learning for displaced children was disrupted the worst affected being secondary school going children. According to the Survey, in order of priority, loss of lives (16.1 per cent), poverty (12.4 percent), loss of property (10.5 percent), displacement (6.1 percent), loss of job or unemployment (5.5 percent), insecurity (5.1), hatred of neighbors (4.9 percent) and entrenched tribalism (4.2 percent) were ranked as the most significant negative consequences. The positive consequences of the PEV according to the Desk review include: the greater respect/appreciation of Kenyan ethnic groups of one other; awareness of the importance of peace improved security and formation of the Grand Coalition Government (GCG) and its priority agenda of implementing the provision in the National Accord and Reconciliation Act together with its attendant four reform Agendas. Accordingly, the creation of the GCG and revival of constitution review reform among other reforms as perceived as a positive consequence to the PEV.

XII. Current Human rights situation According to the desk review findings, there has been significant increase in the violation of right to life through extra judicial killings by the state security organs. Additionally, violations have been experienced in form of gender and sex based violence against women, limitation to freedom of movement, as well as the right to own property and to



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live in any part of the country. The violation of constitutional and human rights is largely perceived to be related to state complicity or inaction. According to the poll findings, but more so the focus group discussions reveal that the most challenging human rights problem in Kenya today is related to the predicament of Internally Displaced Persons. In many of the areas worst affected by post election violence, IDPs continue to live in dehumanizing conditions, unable to fully regain their livelihoods and relate harmoniously with neighbors. As one participant in a discussion pointed out, “… Life is difficult and crime/insecurity has grown to uncontrollable levels, for example, the mere ownership of livestock is now a major security risk in places such as Molo. As such, normal life is yet to resume, despite all the outward appearance of calm… Education has not gone back to normal, with many schools remaining closed, while government promises to offer monetary and other forms of support remain unfulfilled. Genuine IDPs worst affected by the conflict remain not catered for, and many live in rented houses”.

XIII. Actors in Conflict Resolution and their performance The Non State Actors made credible contribution to the PEV conflict resolution. The Media, the civil society organizations, Religious organizations as well as the community-based organization initiated activities and projects that contributed to healing and reconciliation process. Indeed, accordingly to survey report respondents gave better rating to a number of actors (i.e. ranked as “done very well / well”), including civil society organizations NGOs / CBOs (81.6 percent), media (76.6 percent), religious leaders (76.2 percent) and elders (62.1 percent) on their performance “very well or well” in addressing inter-communal conflicts following the post election violence. The concerted action by media houses helped calm the nation down with messages of peace and the refusal to air some of the more disturbing images from the post election violence may have contributed to its positive rating, even though the role of media (particularly vernacular stations) in fanning hatred is widely acknowledged.

XIV. Potential for Future Conflict and Early Warning Signs According to the poll, 44.6 percent of those interviewed reported that they foresee situations leading to conflict in future while 55.4 percent think otherwise. This finding suggests that even though the power sharing deal between ODM and PNU managed to restore peace and the coalition is still holding, the future is still uncertain given that the root causes of the violence have not been properly addressed (i.e. land distribution, inequality, constitutional review, ethnic cohesion, electoral system) etc As potential sources of future conflict, tribalism (21.2 percent) still remains a big issue among communities, with another 17.9 percent reporting dissatisfaction with the current government arrangement, and another 5 percent noting that bitterness arising from the allegedly stolen presidential elections in 2007 has not died down.

XV. Solutions to Violent Conflict and the Search for Common Ground Asked to suggest what can be done to address sources of conflict, the highest proportion (cumulatively 19%) would want to see better relations between communities (through among other things, improvement in understanding between people, curbing of tribalism and encouraging inter-communal marriages). The next highest proportion (a cumulative 17.4%) wanted historical injustices around land and inequality addressed (including



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through equitable sharing of national resources, the Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission, and addressing land issues). About 14.3 percent want the government to create jobs, and another 13.1% would like to see government playing its role more effectively and leading the peace, co-existence and reconciliation effort by example. The role of leaders was also given strong weight, with a cumulative 6% advocating that leaders work together and their statements be regulated.



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Section A – Desk review 1.0 Underlying structures and causes that created grounds for the recent conflict in Kenya

1.1 Introduction This section covers the findings from the desk review with regard to underlying causes of the post elections violence in Kenya. The section analyses the historical yet unaddressed factors that flared up in to full conflict as result of the disputed 2007 presidential polls. This section analyses the contextual issues that contributed to the country’s worst violent episode. Central to the perennial causes of conflict in Kenya are issues related to land, wealth (re)distribution, politicised ethnicity, bad governance, impunity and the legal and constitutional fibres that define the Kenyan nation-state.

1.2 Background The underlying structures that engender conflict in Kenya are traceable to the colonial economic, political, and social structures and their continuities in the post-colonial period. This is where we can find the answer for the polarization of Kenyan communities. They are not divided because of their ethnicity, the polarization is a product of the fact that Kenyan communities relate to national resources differently. This has been amply captured by scholars of Kenya’s Political Economy (Brett, 1973; Leys, 1980) and recognized by Waki Commission Report, (pp.20-35). Leys study has emphasized how colonialism has impacted on political, economic, and social transformations in post-colonial Kenya and on post-colonial policy options. Thus, the underlying structures or systemic factors that have generated conflict in Kenya stand out clearly as (i) inequitable wealth distribution;(ii) the unresolved land question tied up with historical and unresolved land grievances; (iii) institutionalized violence, failed institutions, corruption and the culture of impunity; (iv) ethnic-based political mobilization and concentration of power in the presidency (v) historical marginalization and (vi) the abortive NARC dream.

1.2.1 Inequitable wealth distribution The transformation of the Kenyan economy and the gradual concentration of wealth in the hands of the emerging African capitalists is documented by various scholars. Following the footsteps of white settlers, today, ten percent of the population own 90% of the land. Income disparities are also extreme by world standards. Class based conflict is probably then, the most potentially explosive source of conflict in Kenya in the future even though it has not been well captured by the various commissions as a key structural factor. The potential conflict is embedded in the economic inequality, acute income differentials, and consequent general poverty. Precisely because of their pre-occupation with ethnic related conflict, both the Waki (2008) and KNCHR (2008), reports fail to unearth class dimension in the post election violence of 2008. Ethnic schism in Kenya is thus informed by the colonial legacy that was



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informed by a divide and rule policy. The subsequent post independent government failed to engage in comprehensive polices that targeted dismantling of British colonial legacy and creating a country that is based on civic culture and not ethnic consideration. Accordingly, in Kisumu for example, the middle class estates adjacent to slum areas were invaded. This forced residents to recruit militias for protection before the situation got out of hand. The war cry of the invaders was “sisi kwa sisi.”1 Property was taken away in broad daylight by slum dwellers. Here, youths and women including children carried the violence beyond ethnic identity. The youths demanding for a “fee” for road users within their ethnic community were “rent seekers” engaged in re-distributive justice not ethnic chauvinists. The fact that land, which is the major source of wealth in this country, is highly concentrated in few hands with large tracts often-left fallow for speculative purposes especially in the coast denies landless Kenyans the opportunity to put land in productive use. This coupled with high levels of unemployment and extremely high taxation and high poverty levels, constitute a critical source of conflict.

1.2.2 Historical Injustices and the land question in Kenya Land related injustices form the core of the land question in Kenya. Today, land remains the most emotive issue in Kenya and the source of many conflicts primarily because agriculture supports the largest segment of the Kenyan population (Waki, p.30). The prevailing sharp inequalities in land ownership, is regarded as one of the sources of extreme poverty in Kenya (Kenya Land Alliance Report; KNCHR Report, p21). The land question in Kenya originates from colonial land alienation in which nearly all communities in Kenya lost land. Some like the Maasai, Kikuyu and Nandi, Mijikenda and Pokot lost large tracts of their ancestral lands to the British colonizers (Kanyinga, 1998). The Maasai for example, lost nearly half of their customary land. Political independence did not result in the restoration of the alienated land to their original owners, instead an emerging African middle class, mainly of Kikuyu origin some who had some capital and others who had close proximity to the Kenyan state under President Kenyatta acquired these farms (Klopp, p36) while others were settled through land buying companies (Kenya land Alliance, “National Land Policy in Kenya: addressing historical injustices”, Issue Paper no. 2/2004). For instance, where the farms were used to settle the landless as in the case of the Million acre scheme” initiated in 1962 (Klopp, 2008), corruption and self-aggrandizement overshadowed the process. Even though by 1977, about 95% of the former “white highlands” had been transferred to black African ownership, it largely went to the up-coming middle class in the form of large scale farms (Odinga, O, 1969). The skewed manner in which the large scale farms were allocated and the fact that rift valley and coast provinces were the epicentres of this resettlement has ignited resentment among original owners at the coast and rift valley resulting in hostility against the new occupiers referred to in Rift valley as “foreigners” or “madoadoa” and in the coast as “Wabara”. The hostility has been worsened by indigenous population growth and increase in the number of immigrants. It is estimated that by 1989, incomers or immigrants constituted 35% of the rift valley population and 95% of land related violence was reported in areas of immigrant concentration.

1 Literally meaning ‘us versus us’



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However, hostility to immigrants beyond the Kikuyu was reflected in Nandi District where Mtetei farm purchased by the Kikuyu, Kamba, Luhya, Luo, and Kisii had to be vacated when locals demanded to be allowed to re-purchase it (Klopp, 2008; p.53). The fact that these migrants have not integrated well with the host communities and have tended to associate politically with their ethnic brethren during elections partly explains this “host” hostility. However, this kind of hostility has created conflict between civic rights to land and rights granted by ethnic citizenship (KNHRC Report, p 22).

1.2.3 Historical injustices, Ethnicity, and Conflict in Kenya A wide body of literature on the underlying issues accounting for latent conflict in the country, including the report by the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (Report on Post Election Violence, August 2008) attests to the veracity of the findings from this survey in respect to underlying causes of conflict. Particularly critical is ethnicity. Indeed, tribalism/ethnicity scores very highly in view of the fact that even claims to land, political power, or resources are framed and understood in ethnic terms. As such, in Kenyan parlance, whether allocations of land to individuals in settlements are unfair, or key state jobs are given, it is the tribe rather than the individual that is respectively aggrieved or rewarded. Thus have emerged common refrains such as “it is our turn to eat,” to mean that when a leader from particular tribe ascends to power, his tribesmen have to enjoy the goodies that come with it. Historical injustices in relation to land or even political marginalization and exclusion in national resource allocations are therefore primarily viewed from ethnic lenses, and it is the tribe that gains or losses, fights or negotiates politically. Political mobilization coinciding with region is a feature of Kenyan politics in the absence of ideologically based parties. The appeal to ethnic identity as the basis of political mobilization is indicative of the ethnic base of previous regimes in Kenya and the practice of politics of exclusion. Almost all political parties in Kenya have their primary bases in one particular ethnic group and where this is not the rule, the party is built by ethnic blocs. Parties fail then to be institutionalized, be issue oriented to facilitate national integration and instead revolve around personalities, ethnicity and become divisive in character. ODM Kenya for example is primarily a Kamba based party going by its elected members of parliament. PNU was essentially a Kikuyu dominated Party and was hurriedly crafted as a voting machine for Mwai Kibaki as the Presidential candidate. ODM was a conglomeration of three major ethnic groups, namely Luo, Kalenjin, and Luhya. Precisely because political parties are not institutionalized, they can find immediate mass membership and dissolve at will depending on where the leader is headed. This explains why and how Kenyan leaders have been members of many parties and political parties have died instantly! The resulting political configuration is one that is not regionally representative, one that does not provide room for democratic praxis, debate, and open competition and encourages political intolerance and territorial homogeneity. It is no wonder therefore that immigrants in rift valley find it difficult to integrate with local communities and urban slum residents have created segregated ethnically homogeneous residential areas that acted as the springboard for ethnic cleansing in the slums during the post-election violence. Politicians have found these arrangements useful during election as they provide readymade voting machines.



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It is paradoxical that the political class does not live under similar segregation in the urban areas. The Presidential system of governance with its absolute power has provided a safe haven for the practice of politics of patronage (Waki, p.28). This explains why the 2007 presidential elections were a clear-cut contest between PNU (mainly Kikuyu and GEMA tribes) versus an alliance mainly of Luo, Luhya, and Kalenjin. The state is instrumental in accessing state resources and economic power. The use of political power to acquire wealth both legally and illegally then becomes the preserve of those with close proximity to state power who rule through political patronage. The Political Parties Act (2008) is an important instrument that may contribute to ensuring a national outlook in the composition of political parties in Kenya.

1.2.4 Institutionalized violence, failed institutions, corruption and the culture of impunity The use of violence by the state as a means of control has been an integral characteristic of the Kenyan state since the colonial period (Brett, 1973; Berman, 1990). Violence was an essential instrument of control precisely because the colonial state was not only illegitimate but also oppressive. The middle class, which inherited the colonial state from white settlers, did so intact. In deed when they inherited the state, they also inherited the large-scale farms. To ward off hostility from the landless, they embarked on a resettlement exercise that they turned into a gravy train. That is why and how today, rift valley constitutes the epicentre of violence and resenting voices from the Pokot, the Maasai, the Nandi etc, because the land question was never resolved. Violence as an instrument of control has been exercised by successive post-colonial regimes and adopted by non-state actors such as politicians and the citizenry with impunity. State orchestrated violence in the form of political assassinations as an alternative to democratic contest is rich in our history and has consumed such renowned Kenyans as Gama Pinto, Tom Mboya (1969), J. M. Kariuki (1975), Robert Ouko (1991). More recently, two newly elected MPs in the 2007 election were killed under mysterious circumstances. In all these cases, the state failed to take tangible action. During the 1990s, violence was directed at immigrants in rift valley for supporting the introduction of multi-party politics against decades of single party rule by Presidents Kenyatta and Moi. KNCHR report estimates that in 1991, an estimated 1500 Kenyans died and nearly 300,000 were displaced KNHCR Report, p.23), for being sympathetic to the multi-party crusade while living in the rift valley, home to President Moi. Even though a Commission of Inquiry formed to investigate the violence under Judge Akiwumi identified the politicians behind the violence, no action was taken. Instead, the report was attacked for being partisan and anti-establishment. The same inaction also characterizes the violence in Kuresoi just before the 2007 elections. The use of non-state violence to resolve disputes is today widespread. A proliferation of militia groups in the country, all products of economic deprivation, a malfunctioning economy and an anti-democratic political system has broadened to encompass Mungiki, KamJesh, Baghdad, Sungusungu, Chinkororo, Baghdad, Saboat Land Defence Force, Mombasa Revolutionary Republican Council, Jeshi la Darajani, Siafu, Bukhungu etc. Waki Report recognizes them as the “increasing population of poor, unemployed and



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youth, educated and uneducated who agree to join militias and gangs” (Waki Report, p23). The fact is they do not agree. They are forced by material circumstances to engage in crime as a way of reproducing themselves. Their continued existence and high drive activity prior to and during elections and crises point to state connivance in their operation and connections with the political elite and security forces. Their existence and proliferation have added additional cynicism among Kenyans on the efficacy of state institutions in dealing with justice and security. The fact is that they cannot be eliminated because they are products of a system that cannot guarantee employment, they can only be transformed into productive citizens through job creation. Some of these militias have been used by the state and politicians to further their quest for political power and silence their opponents into submission. The fact that these groups have acted with impunity and have at times enjoyed state protection has encouraged a culture of violence in Kenya. The mayhem caused by Mungiki gangs for example both against Kikuyus and other Kenyans since 2006 (KNHRC Report; p.24) bear testimony to this fact and so has the extra-judicial executions of the Mungiki by state security agencies. The physical assault of ODM leaders during a rally in Kisii during the election campaigns of 2007 in broad day light under TV cameras without perpetrators facing the law is part of this history of impunity and failed institutions both investigative and prosecutorial. In fact the suspects were all released after arrest under instructions from above according the Nyanza Provincial police Commissioner (Waki Report, pp.133-5). This incident provided ammunition for revenge attacks on the Kisii by the Kipsigis in the Sondu area during post-election violence (Waki Report, p133). The state security agencies are also highly regarded in corruption indices. The Kenyan police have been leading in all opinion polls conducted by the media on corruption, while the judiciary has not faired better. Successive elections in Kenya point to increasing reliance on violence as a strategy for achieving political ends and resource grievances, which the citizenry believe the electoral process has been unable to resolve (KNCHR, p.7). This increasing resort to violence illustrates the lack of faith by political contestants on democratic processes as a means of realizing political power. Prior to 2007, elections have been characterized by pre-election violence of one form or another. The scale of political violence has graduated to higher levels following the repeal of Section 3A of the constitution in 1991, which ushered in multi-party democracy. Elections held in 1992 and 1997 were predictably associated with violence. The violence that occurred after the 2007 election was however unique in its ethnic configuration, magnitude, longevity, destruction to property, displacement, death and human suffering (KNCHR Report). Corruption cases such as the Goldenberg, Anglo-Leasing etc provide another arena for the culture of impunity. Despite the huge amounts of public money involved, to-date, no “big fish” has been arraigned in court and sentenced. The cases have brought to the fore, the lack of independence by the judiciary, the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission and are proof that a culture of impunity prevails in cases involving those allied to the regimes in power. This has set a dangerous precedent in Kenya and has encouraged the proliferation of other mega scandals.



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1.2.5 Marginalization Both the KNHRC and WAKI reports address only the land element in historical marginalization. This focus neglects the skewed allocation of budgetary resources for projects in regions that have been politically correct and which has been a bone of contention throughout Kenya’s political history. There are debates in parliament that have challenged the relatively excessive direction of resources for roads and water to regions where incumbent Presidents or powerful Ministers hail. Concurrently, a common feature of Kenya’s post-colonial history has been complaints from opposition regions of being denied equitable development funds by the regime in power. Marginalization of communities on the periphery of the power centre is common knowledge in Kenya. Complaints from Nyanza during the Kenyatta era; the Kikuyu during Moi era and the Kalenjin during Kibaki’s rule reflect this tendency of economic strangulation and political persecution by successive regimes in Kenya. Similar grievances have been aired by minority groups, who because of their numerical insignificance, have been ignored in the resource allocation such as the Ogiek, El Molo etc. Coastal communities have also alleged economic negligence by successive regimes in spite of the fact that the tourist industry has been a major contributor to the GDP; they have received adequate re-investment to improve the living conditions and get access to land. The Luo have similarly complained of historical marginalization by successive regimes because of their role in opposition politics and so have residents of North Eastern who during the post-colonial period endure near total neglect in terms of national resource distribution. Instead of looking at this more broadly in terms of regional development, the elite from these regions have reduced the phenomena to exclusion from eating! This perceived marginalization explains why these areas were supportive of devolution of power or “ugatuzi” as corrected by ODM to diffuse the bastardized “majimbo” term.

1.3 OTHER CAUSES OF CONFLICT

1.3.1 Personification of the presidency and presidential power The Presidency is a very important institution in the country. It is the institution that unites the country. The holder of the position serves as both Head of State and Head of Government. The perception of entitlement where particular communities view their position as belong exclusively to them contributed to the PEV. The presidency as an institution is regarded as the office through which a given ethnic community can benefit from (un)limited state resources. This is partly due to widely held perception of ‘our own occupying ultimate state power’. The personification of the presidency over the years has contributed to highly charged political campaigns with various ethnic groups attempting to support ‘one of their own’ to the highest office. The political contest for occupation and control of the office of the presidency has often led to violence especially during the election years and specifically during elections campaign period.



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1.3.2 Youth unemployment The high level of unemployed makes them vulnerable to mobilization and manipulation. This was experienced during the PEV where political parties incited the youth to participate in the conflict. Because of high levels of poverty and unemployment in the area used by politicians to intimidate opponents and instil fear in them. During the post-election violence, a lot of youths were engaged in demonstrations and running battles with law enforcement agencies as the country slowly slipped into violence.

1.3.3 Nepotism The culture of political patronage has led to marginalization of especially minority ethnic groups when it comes to appointment to various positions in government. The culture of nepotism is not only practiced in the civil service, which remains highly politicised but is also experienced in the private sector. However, the perceived lack of fairness in the country with regard to recruitment in key positions coupled with the reality that such positions are held by members of a particular ethnic group also contributed to conflict.

1.3.4 Presence of illegal gangs The recent upsurge of illegal gangs and militias such as the Mungiki, Taliban, and sungu sungu also contributed to the PEV. These gangs who are largely patronised by politicians participated in the post election violence along ethnic and party lines.

1.3.5 Lack of national dialogue and peace policy Kenya lacks comprehensive national dialogue policy and structures. Lack of the policy and attendant mechanism has contributed to the lack of amicable reconciliation and trust building measures with inter and intra community. The consequences of this are that there exists continued mistrust among various communities and this contributes to fragile and frosty relations among communities in the country.

1.4 The abortive NARC dream and the new constitution A better understanding of the frustrations Kenyans had with the Kibaki government is best captured by the NARC dream symbolized in the swearing-in of Mwai Kibaki as head of state in 2002. The display of popular support during the swearing-in at Uhuru Park was symbolic of a revolution in the making. That revolution revolved around three interlinked issues, a new constitution, anti-corruption, and job creation. These were the key agenda issues for NARC during the 2002 general elections. In fact, NARC came to power because of a promised break with dark past of Kenyan politics. Hence, the coming into power of NARC in the year 2002 was to Kenyans, a guarantee that the political leadership was going to address the myriad socio-economic problems facing the country. Unfortunately and contrary to the expectations of Kenyans, the NARC dream collapsed as the coalition of parties, which represented various voting blocs that brought it to power fell apart (KNCHR, p 24). Thereafter, the regime became more and more ethnicised and the coalition partners representing other communities were dropped from the government following the defeat of the government in the national referendum for a watered down constitution. This was



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probably lost opportunity for Kenyans had for many years failed to address negative ethnicity, corruption, and unemployment - with promised job creation of 500,000 annually. Not only did the government emerge with a narrow social base, but it embarked on a journey of one scandal after another including the Anglo-Leasing, the Artur Brothers fiasco, the passports scandal and navy patrol boats scandal, police and army recruitment scandals just to mention some. This reversal in Kenya’s political journey full of sacrifices dealt a major blow to national cohesion and may partly explain the recklessness with which violence erupted when the election results were announced. 2.0 Recent causes of conflict

2.1 Introduction In order to objectively understand the nature and substance of the post election violence in Kenya, it is important to understand the triggers. It is thorough analysis of these factors that conflict transformation strategies can be engaged. This section presents the various aspects and unresolved issues that informed the post election violence with a view to providing explanation as to reasons behind the persistent conflicts especially those linked to political processes like elections.

2.2 Perceived mismanagement of the 2007 Elections It has been documented widely in media and in literature that the electoral process and the composition of the election management team for the 2007 elections were flawed and highly manipulated. In the run up to the 2007 General Elections, the opposition and other observers began questioning the independence of the Electoral Commission after President Kibaki ignored the 1997 IPPG agreement and named new commissioners without consulting the opposition. It did not help that some of the newly appointed commissioners were perceived as friendly to the government of President Kibaki (KNCHR, 2008; IREC Report, 2008)2. When the ECK therefore appeared to bungle the vote tallying exercise, it only served to confirm the fears of the opposition that the electoral process and management was designed to ensure the re-election of the incumbent.

2.3 Inflammatory statements Other triggers that contributed to the violence were the hate speeches by politicians and media houses especially vernacular stations serving the big ethnic groups (IREC Report, 2008: 101; Semetko, pp, 9-10). Hate speech and inflammatory statements by the political elites has been one of the most recent contributors to conflict. According the KNCHR report3 (2007) political incitement by politicians and other community leaders largely contributed to the post election violence. Careless pronouncements of politicians and incitement of the public to hate the antagonist parties and communities, coupled with hate propaganda given expression over especially vernacular radio served to fuel the violence. The content of the statements by politicians during the run up to the 2007 elections was both condescending as it was coded in negative ethnic stereotypes involving various communities. 2 See the KNCHR Report on Post Elections Violence 3 In 2007 KNCHR published a Report titled ‘Still Behaving Badly’, in which political hate speech was cited as a trigger for violence during political campaign period.



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2.4 Harassment by security organs

The regular security raids carried out by the police and other security agencies is perceived as contributing factor to the conflict. The persistent police operation in low-income areas such as Kibera slums was is interpreted as intimidation and provocative. The presence of the police in the area during the post election violence exacerbated the situation and led to the many deaths of civilians who were felled by security organs. Additionally, the indiscriminate use of police and other security agencies in interfering with the activities of the locals in the pretext of providing security provokes violence. 3.0 Actors and the stakeholders in the conflict

3.1 Introduction For effective and sustainable conflict transformation strategy and mechanism to be designed, it is important for the role played by actor(s) to be understood and proper mechanisms to be put in place to prevent future conflicts. This section describes the role played by the different actors and stakeholders during the post election violence with a view to surfacing the underlying issues that led to their actions.

3.2 The Parties and the Politicians. In general and historically, politicians have been associated with electoral violence playing the role of instigators. Politicians have equally used political parties as not only vehicles for mobilization of supporters but also as avenue for recruitment of ‘armies’ most of whom have been used as instigators of political violence. With regard to the 2007/8 PEV the primary conflict actors were politicians in the two main political formations, the PNU (a conglomeration of political parties under president Kibaki mainly constituted by the Kikuyu and GEMA sub-tribes) and the ODM under Raila Odinga representing three main ethnic groups – the Luo, Kalenjin sub-tribes, the Luhya, and other marginalized minority tribes. They were the primary contenders for political power. The parties planned, financed, instigated, and organized the violence whether offensive or defensive. They worked through a second tier of mid-level perpetrators who gave the actual instructions or orders locally to the final tier of perpetrators who were the youth and militias (KNCHR, 2008: 1-17).

3.3 The Media The Kenyan media has played a significant role in public discourse since independence. In has been particularly buoyant since 1992 with the coming to an end of the one party state when it was pivotal in assembling the voices of opposition to single party rule and the challenge to Moi era dictatorship. Since the ushering in of multi-party democracy, the media has been at the forefront of unearthing the excesses of the regimes especially corruption cases. However like the political culture of any country, the media is neither static nor homogeneous, it is both proactive and responsive to developments in the political and broadcasting systems (Semetko, 2008, p2). The media are not immune to the conflicting struggles going in Society. It is in this context that the assumptions of objectivity, balance, accuracy, impartiality, fairness as goals of media service delivery must be viewed.



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Like in previous elections, in the 2007 campaigns, the media became one of main arenas in which the political battles between PNU and ODM were fought (Kriegler, p-63-65). Kenyan media has in the past through ownership or editorial teams been known to respond to their constituencies during elections with a mirage of utmost fairness. Due to this concern and in view of the assumption that there might be effects, intended or unintended, on public opinion and political behaviour and ultimately, electoral outcomes by the media (Semetco, p, 1) the UNDP alerted all stakeholders that it had decided to contract Strategic Public Relations and Research Ltd to monitor balance, accuracy, impartiality and fairness with a focus on equitable access to media by political parties. UNDP hoped that this was to facilitate free, fair and democratic elections and that the media assisted voters in making informed choices (Semetco, p7). Monitoring done between the launching of manifestoes and nominations of the respective candidates of the three main parties between September-December 20th 2007 revealed a number of trends and patterns in media coverage. Both print media and broadcast stations were found to be generally biased towards the incumbent President though the former was less biased. The KBC a public broadcasting institution was found to be overly biased towards Kibaki and PNU. Citizen TV was found to have given the ODM candidate the most negative coverage and was extremely biased towards Kibaki. Only KTN gave Raila Odinga more coverage than Kibaki. Vernacular stations were generally biased towards PNU and its candidate. More notable was the little coverage given to women and the physically challenged candidates. Only 6% of total coverage given to candidates was given to women. (Semetko, p. 8). Vernacular stations were aligned in their coverage by region and accorded opportunities to callers to air hate speeches especially during live talk shows. This was particularly so with Vernacular FM Radio Stations such as Kass FM (Kalenjin), Radio Lake Victoria (Luo), Inooro (Kikuyu) where callers made inflammatory statements (BBC Report; KNCHR Report; Waki Report; International Media Support, Jan, 2008) Mobile telephony christened “the fifth estate” had a major influence in galvanizing ethnic solidarity, communicating hate messages with ethnic and gender overtones as well as providing avenue for falsified information prior to and after the 2007 elections. Mobile telephony became even more central after the ban on live coverage of post election events primarily because it had the capacity for anonymity for those who conducted hate messages. More importantly, it became a tool for organizing the violence that rocked Kenya. In general, print media fared relatively better than Television stations while vernacular stations fared worst. Mobile telephony though not similarly monitored was used by supporters of both parties to communicate hostile messages. The media was perceived in the same way as the church as being partisan.

3.4 The State Security Agencies and the provincial administration The task of state security agencies is the maintenance of law and order both by pre-emptive measures and by quelling occurrences that may threaten peace and security for the citizenry from within the country. There is unanimity in the reports by Waki, Kriegler, and the KNCHR that despite some instances of display of professionalism, the



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security agencies were disorganized, unprepared, and partisan in executing their security duties during the campaigns, elections and post-election violence. During past elections, apart from maintaining law and order, the agencies including the provincial administration have often been used to disrupt opposition rallies and activities. This has become part and parcel of their de facto role in all past elections in Kenya. During the campaigns in the 2007 elections, they disrupted meetings organized by the ODM with the notable one being a rally by the ODM leader in Kibera slums where they tear-gassed those in attendance. In Kisii, they stood by as a local militia chased ODM leaders’ intent on attending a rally organized by Simeon Nyachae. During the post election violence, state security agents conducted extra-judicial killings of protesting citizens especially in Nyanza, Western and Rift valley provinces killing 405 of the total 1,133 persons who lost their lives (Waki Report, pp.342). Some members of the GSU, administration and regular police were involved in sexual violence-rape (Waki Report, p252-257). There were however, cases in which the police and prisons officers played critical roles in providing security and shelter to those who were in distress. Reports of police brutality, sexual abuse of women, torture, and extra-judicial killings of peaceful protestors and citizens have however clouded their positive contribution during post-election violence across the country. Falling prey to the cancer of ethnicity, some officers were involved through acts of commission and omission in the violence (Waki, pp. 354-441; KNHRC, pp. 67-69). In Nyanza, they contributed to over 79 % of the deaths while playing a similar fatal role in western and Rift Valley provinces as well as in Kibera in Nairobi.

3.5 Civil society organizations and faith based organizations. Issa Shivji (2007) has attempted to provide the origin and role of NGOs in Africa. His main thesis is that NGOs are a product of neo-liberalism. He argues that the structural adjustment policies of the international financial institutions namely the World bank and the IMF gave birth to NGOs in the 1980s to take over the work of the retrenching state that had been persuaded to disengage from the provision of social services to its populations in the 1980s (Shivji, 2007). Besides locating this historical point in the emergence of NGOs, Shivji has gone further by categorizing NGOs into five categories depending on origin, character, and mission. Broadly however, the NGOs are two in nature, advocacy types that act as pressure and advocacy groups that seek to pressurize the powers that be to create conditions that enable participation of the peoples themselves in the institutions of policy making or that of critiquing shortcomings in government policies and their implementation (p, 57-58) and philanthropist NGOs consumed with assisting the poor Shivji, pp57-58). The political history of Kenya provides a good barometer of Shivji’s work and cannot be complete without recognition of the contribution of CSOs in the restoration of Multi-party democracy and other democratic struggles. The national NGO council, the National Council of Churches, Kenya National Human Rights Commission, the Ufungamano Initiative, Law Society of Kenya etc all played a vital role in building the momentum for change in Kenya. These institutions were particularly active in the reform struggles of the 1980s and 90s. However, in 2002 following the coming to power of NARC, many of the CSO’ key leaders were incorporated into the government thus leaving a leadership vacuum that led to low key activity on the part of CSOs in the



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political terrain thereafter. Many of those incorporated believed they would make a difference from within the establishment and keep the politicians on their toes. Such was the case of John Githongo who worked in the office of the President as Governance and Ethics Permanent Secretary, Ezekiel Mutua etc. Mr. Githongo was later to resign when his efforts to blow the whistle on corruption went unheeded. It is equally important to recognize the shift in the influence and formation of the civil society after the coming to power of the NARC regime. The NARC regime was elected on the platform of democratic governance reforms premised on such issues as: new constitutional dispensation, zero tolerance on corruption, radical reform of the judiciary and creation of employment opportunities, and effective civil service among others. These reform agendas were erstwhile dominated by the then civil society. To inject these reform areas in government, many civil society activists were recruited by government to spearhead the relevant agendas. The exodus of erstwhile CSOs activists in to state weakened the leadership, structure, and capacity of the emergent reformist CSOs. Activist like John Githongo left Transparency International to head the Ethics Department within the office of the President. Simultaneously, it is important to note that CSOs have important role to play in providing checks and balance especially in the absence of credible political opposition. During the run up to the 2007 elections, many of the CSOs participated in voter registration, civic awareness, and election observation and in monitoring use of public resources among other things. The Vijana Tugutuke initiative funded by AUSAID had a major impact in promoting voter awareness and registration among the youth. The same efforts were made by UNDP-EAP who assisted civil society in voter education. Civil society organizations are an important link with the citizenry. Most are involved in non-bureaucratic social programs and projects that directly impact on the living conditions of the socially excluded. International NGOs such as Care- Kenya, Action-Aid, Transparency International, and Plan International among others have been part of this process.

3.6 The Role of the church The church is supposed to provide spiritual guidance to its flock and society in general. In Kenya, the church was the key voice in challenging the excesses of successive governments and especially during the era of single party dictatorship. It was the elements from within the leadership of the Catholic, Anglican and Moslem faiths that stood firm against the state especially before 2002. Bishops Kewasis, Okulu, Manasses Kuria, Mwana Nzeki and Rev. Timothy Njoya etc who challenged the state from the pulpit when human rights abuses occurred and joined forces with civil society advocates and opposition politicians in demands for a multi-party democracy. They have similarly spoken strongly in the past on human rights abuses both by the state and militia gangs. However, like civil society advocates, the church leaders were partly incorporated in the government. Several church leaders among them, Bishop Mwana Zeki and Rev. Wamugunda were given government jobs or assignments leading to their silence on matters of national importance. Prior to the 2007 elections, the church was involved in civic education across the country. They also played a monitoring role during elections. During the 2007 elections, religious



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leaders adopted positions that signalled partisan ethnic affiliation. Each side of the political divide relied on partisan religious leaders in their divine references during the launching of their respective manifestos and nominations. It is no wonder then that Kenyans believed religious leaders across the country were partisan depending on their ethnic community (while PNU supporters viewed NGOs, domestic and international observers as partisan (Kriegler Report, p.72). The collaboration between the Kenyan and American governments on the war on terror and subsequent arrests of a number of Kenyans mainly of Moslem faith in the second half of 2007 evoked intense resentment against the government and hence the PNU among Moslems across the country while the ascendancy to the top leadership of the Catholic church by Cardinal Njue and the toning down of the church’s voice in challenging the government on a variety of social issues and his perceived closes association with the state and the position of PNU on the Majimbo debate created a confidence crisis for the church across ODM strong holds that led to hostility and attempts to burn Catholic institutions in Kisumu and the region at large. Some priests in Nyanza such as Homa denounced his stand on majimbo as ethnically biased. Other churches took positions perceived to be for or against each of the protagonists depending on the ethnic origin of their leaders.

3.7 Neighbouring States The economies of the three East African states are connected and interdependent given their colonial and post-colonial histories. There is both trade and migration among these states. It is in this context that the neighbouring states of Uganda and Tanzania together with countries in the Great lakes region were stakeholders because the conflict had ramifications for their countries. The PEV was a threat to their stability, negatively impacted on the flow of goods and services to their countries from the port of Mombasa and affected regional trade especially oil supply. The uprooting of the Kenya Uganda rail lines led to serious fuel shortage in Uganda and the other countries in the great Lakes region. This not only affected their economies in general but also posed a serious threat to their political stability due to gridlock in transportation and escalating food and other commodity prices. In the cases of Tanzania and Uganda, they were threatened by the potential influx of Kenyans seeking refuge in their countries. Uganda was in fact a recipient of nearly 30,000 Kenyan refugees. Allegations of Ugandan soldiers entering Kenya in support of the PNU government caused tensions especially along the western border.

3.8 Western Nations and the international community Nation States adopt and use foreign policies to enhance their interests regionally and globally. These interests are normally economic, geo-political, cultural, and military in nature. By virtue of being members of the United Nations Security Council, the major powers of the west have additional roles of ensuring international peace prevails since the establishment of the United Nations. Apart from its economic significance to the west, Kenya plays an important role in western nations’ security calculations together with the fact that Kenya hosts two important UN agencies, UNDP, and UNEP headquarters. Additionally, the United States values Kenya’s geo-strategic location in the horn of Africa.



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As major economic partners in terms of investments and trade ties with Kenya, Britain, United States, Germany and Scandinavian countries have of necessity been involved through their embassies in putting pressure on successive governments. The international community, specifically the Western democracies have consistently piled pressure on issues relating to multi-party politics, human rights, corruption, freedom of speech etc. Because of the influence they assert on the multi-lateral financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF, they have used their muscles in these institutions to set up conditionalities to influence Kenya’s respect for human rights and democratic change and governance. During Moi’s rule, American, British, German, Norwegian, and Swedish ambassadors joined forces with opposition parties, civil society organizations, the media, and the general public to put pressure on President Moi to accept multi-party democracy through the repeal of section 3A of the constitution. Thereafter, focus has shifted to corruption and press freedom during Kibaki’s rule. Unlike Japan and China who have adopted foreign policies of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, Western nations and the United States have shown some level of consistency in attaching bilateral and multi-lateral assistance to respect for human rights. Their continued support for a reform agenda has often brought them at loggerheads with the government of the day. In fact, they have in the past and during the last election been perceived as being supportive of the opposition. Western nations used the significance of their investments in the country to demand for a peaceful resolution of the conflict and an end to the use of violence by the state and the opposition. It was the threat to withdraw this economic stake and freeze foreign accounts held by leaders in the country abroad as well as travel bans that forced protagonists to agree to a peaceful settlement that led to the National Accord. It is evident from the role played by western nations in finding a negotiated settlement to the conflict. The west offered political pressure, ensured legitimacy of the Mediation Team and ensured that the processes was conducted in accordance with internally accepted democratic norms and standards.

3.9 Youth groups Politicians hired the many unemployed youth to fight for and protect their respective personal and partisan interest. As noted by both the Waki report and FGDs Report4, youth participation in post election conflict is precisely due to their vulnerable status of unemployment and despair. The massive number of the youth also meant that they were a rich hunting ground for votes by the political elites which led most politicians to employ various strategies including hiring and arming the former to hunt their opponents. The youth groups that were targeted were the one organised in the form of militias and illegal gangs such as the Mungiki, the Talibans and Kosovo boys. The desire for change by the majority of the youth led to their active involvement in the PEV. The youth in Kenya today face many frustrations that render them very vulnerable to easy manipulation by politicians and targets for recruitment into political militias or criminal gangs that are used by politicians in the heat of elections or in the aftermath to cause violence, and then get isolated. 4 See also MFAF commissioned FGD Reports from Molo, Kisumu , Kibera and Mombasa



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3.10 Why they are conflict stakeholders. These institutions and groups in the Kenyan society have a greater stake in the country’s social and economic future. In addition, they are conflict stakeholders because the conflict had potential to negatively impact on their varied interests. In the case of domestic non-state actors, the continuation of the conflict threatened their enjoyment of fundamental freedoms. Organised groups such as parties and non-state actors collectively influence policy and governance issues in the country. In the case of foreign nations represented by their embassies and multilateral institutions, they were stakeholders because of the threat posed to their economic and strategic interests as well as their important role in ensuring international peace and security as well as respect for human rights. It is important to note that; Kenyan politics has historically been ethnic based. Successive regimes have conducted political mobilization on the basis of ethnic affiliation and thus the regimes have been dominated by particular ethnic groups even though they have incorporated elements from other ethnic communities to develop a façade of national outlook. It is only the degree of their ethnic content that has differed from one regime to another. The collapse of the NARC dream following the national referendum on the constitution in 2005 resulted in further ethnic polarization of the Kenyan political landscape and witnessed the narrowing of the support base of the regime. The government was increasingly perceived as being predominantly constituted by one ethnic community from the Mt. Kenya region. Given the historical association of state power with tribe, the developments led to a schism between power centre held by politicians from Mt. Kenya region depicted by the banana symbol and the rest of the big tribes and other minorities under the orange symbol championing periphery grievances such as land, national resource allocation, recruitment in the civil service and in the disciplined forces. Competition for political power characteristically became a zero-sum-game. The disintegration of the coalition of parties that formed NARC sent shock waves among Kenyans. NARC had through its manifesto and promise of a new constitution, captured the dreams and hopes of Kenyans as witnessed by attendance during the swearing in of Mwai Kibaki as president. This left a bitter memory on many Kenyans especially those who were expecting major constitutional reforms that would lead to sharing of power between the president and Prime Minister (KNCHR Report, 2008: 32). 4.0 Attitudes that breed conflict and their sources

4.1 Introduction Central to conflict transformation analysis is the importance of understanding the prevailing attitudes the actors, stakeholders and communities at large. Attitudes towards for instance institutions of governance, shared space, land, cultural symbols etc help in predicting and preventing conflict. This section analyses the attitudinal issues related to the post election violence of 2007/8.



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4.2 What attitudes do people have that inflict conflict? The attitudes people have towards others are a product of historical relations in the political, economic, and socio-cultural domains. Consequently, the attitudes of protagonists during the post-election violence mirrored the relations that Kenyans of differing cultural and economic backgrounds have had since the coming into being of the Kenyan state and how, as the dominant force, that regulates these relations, the state has related with the people. Transformations in the economy, the historical debates relating to ethno-cantered political power, land grievances and perceived marginalization by successive governments by some communities have been important in determining relations between various ethnic communities in Kenya and with successive regimes. The dominance of ethnic ideology seeks to maintain ethnic and territorial homogeneity leads to the development of intolerance against other communities. Ethnic based political mobilization, stereotyping leads to intolerance and exclusion since it is exclusivist in nature This is then used to fight off outside communities successful in business, transport, trade etc. The success of the later in business has been perceived to be a consequence of their closeness by virtue of ethnic background to financial institutions and the state. This was the attitude of locals against the Kikuyu and Kisii in Nyanza, western and rift valley and upcountry people in the coast (KNCHR Report, 2008). A culture of impunity for those who have used political violence be they state agencies or militias encourages others to organize and use violence as an instrument of resolving perceived conflicts. This is especially prevalent in rift Valley where every election is associated with violence against immigrants and counter violence by the later. Historical marginalization of communities has created resentment against the state and those ethnic communities associated with it. This was the case with the Kikuyu against Moi when he took over power in 1977 and sought to destroy the economic base of the Kikuyu elite, it was the case in the coast between the Mijikenda against upcountry people and the Luo against successive governments. Intolerance towards those with opposing political views originating from the establishment and long reign of the one party state under President Moi and KANU which did not allow for dissenting voices on national issues. Dissenting voices were often expelled from the party to political Siberia. Those who challenged the state found their way into political detention or went into exile, while others were jailed on trumped up charges.

4.3 Cultural/ Ethnic Stereotypes Kenya is country of 42 ethnic communities with diverse cultures and traditions. Many ethnic groups in the country have over the years retained stereotypes against others communities. Such stereotypes have been passed down through oral tradition over the years from one generation to another. These stereotypes informed by history such as wars, culture and rituals practiced by specific people groups within specific time and space. For instance, historically Kikuyu community is known to be hard working and driven by pursuit for monetary gain. Commerce has thus been at the heart of Kikuyu upbringing and this has contributed to the evident success and wealth within the community. Other communities perceive Kikuyus as lovers of money and power. This stereotype is widely held by other communities and in part informed the post election violence in parts of Rift Valley. Luos on the other hand are perceived to be ‘proud’ and driven by pursuit for ‘academic excellence’. Kamba women are perceived to be ‘good in bed’ while their men are perceived to be ‘honest’ and therefore strong candidates for accounting



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and or money related matters. The Luhya on their part are perceived to good for security guard because of their ‘loyalty’.

5.0 The context of violent behaviour, intolerance, and consequences of conflict

5.1 Introduction In order to objectively undertake and design contextualized conflict transformation strategy for a country, it is important the contexts that communities live be understood. Additionally, it is important to note that social economic and political realities of a particular situation largely inform people’s behaviours, perceptions, and attitudes. Attitudes and manifestation of intolerance do not occur in vacuum but feed from specific fodders within the society. This section discusses the above subject with the view of isolating and analysing contextual issues that provided fodder for the emergent culture of intolerance and violent behaviour.

5.2 Background The violence that engulfed the country following the disputed 2007 December elections was a consequence of both the mismanaged tallying process and underlying issues predating the 2007 election. While the management of the elections and other events surrounding the process triggered the violence, years and even decades of wrong policies and failed policy implementation had already prepared the ground for the post election violence5. Broad national level socio-political and economic dynamics as well as localized state-society and community contexts interacted to generate the conditions germane to the crisis. Kenyans have for decades lived in an environment characterized by deep economic injustices, skewed distribution of political power, political manipulation of ethnic identities and the persistent failure by government to respect civil liberties and democratic processes. The long simmering frustrations caused by these economic and political problems reached a boiling point and the bungled election served as a perfect platform for venting. On a more specific note, the following are some of the situations predating the December 2007 election underlying the post election violence in Kenya;

5.2.1 Historical Injustices and Land Grievances This stretches back to the colonial era where the existing land policies and laws resulted in the disinheritance of communities from their land. The colonial government alienated most of the agriculturally productive land for settler agriculture largely in Rift Valley and Central Provinces, a situation that generated a large number of squatters mostly Kikuyu. At independence, the Kenyatta government created a land market of “willing seller-willing buyer.” Rift Valley Province was earmarked for settlement of the landless through this scheme. However, those who had lost their land through colonialism did not necessarily get it back. The resettlement exercise was also riddled with corruption with senior individuals in the Kenyatta government allocating themselves huge tracts of land. Over the years, as the population of the Kalenjin who view Rift Valley as their “ancestral

5 KNHCR Pg 20‐21



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home” increased, the perception also grew that the post-colonial land policies had disadvantaged the community. These resentments came to the fore during 1990’s violence and 2002 elections. 6 The Kalenjin view the Kikuyu community as not only unscrupulous and greedy, but also manipulative in their intent to dominate commerce and politics.7 In 2004, the Kibaki (NARC) government appointed a commission of inquiry on irregular allocations of public land (Ndung’u Commission). The Ndungu commission was equally tasked with the role of unearthing details related to corruption in land allocation. 8 It noted that there was an increase in the illegal allocation of land during the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s – subject to plunder by a few at the expense of the greater public.9 However, even after the report was handed to the president, the government failed to act on it, dampening public hopes for land reforms.

5.2.2 Widespread Poverty and Inequality On the one hand, the reality of many Kenyans is shaped by the hardship of inequality and the indignity of poverty, which all too often lead to frustration and hopelessness. The Kibaki government managed to resuscitate Kenya’s ailing economy to an impressive 6-7 percent growth by 2007. However, this did not translate to improved real incomes especially for those Kenyans living in extreme poverty. On the other hand, Kenya is riddled with widespread corruption and systemic abuse of office by public officials10 – who are also perceived by the public as being only interested in their personal welfare and lavish lifestyles. Even with a notable growth of the economy of up to 6-7% in 2007, benefits of this growth did not translate into better livelihoods and incomes especially for the urban poor living in extreme poverty.11 According to the UN Human Development Report on Kenya, the poverty incidences vary in the country’s eight provinces i.e. Nyanza 65-80%, North Eastern 64%, Western 61%, Eastern 58%, Coast 57.6%, Rift Valley 48%, Nairobi 44% and Central 31%.12 These figures represent the multi-dimensions of poverty and vulnerability i.e. income, education, health, tenure (land and housing), personal (family ties that provide safety nets), disempowerment (social fragmentation) and financial (lack of access to credit). 13 Further, because of a lack of good alternatives and the prospects of upward mobility, the issue is not one of poverty alone. Instead, this situation intersects with other phenomena, including that of weak institutions, ethnic polarization.14 This made the potential for violence much higher, as was noted in Coast Province i.e. 6 KNCHR “On the Brink of the Precipice: A Human Right’s Account of Kenya’s Post 2007 Election Violence” 2008 Report. Pg. 21 7 International Crisis Group “Kenya in Crisis” Report No 137, Feb 2008 Pg. 11 8 KNCHR 2008 Report “On the Brink of the Precipice: A Human Right’s Account of Kenya’s Post 2007 Election Violence” 2008 Report. Pg. 21 9 Human Rights Watch “Ballots to Bullets: Organized Political Violence and Kenya’s Crisis of Governance” Vol. 20 No 1 (A) March 2008, Pg. 13‐14 10 Human Rights Watch “Ballots to Bullets: Organised Political Violence and Kenya’s Crisis of Governance” Vol. 20 No 1 (A) March 2008, Pg. 3 11 KNCHR 2008 Report “On the Brink of the Precipice” Pg. 21 12 Kenya Human Development Report 2007, Pg. 5‐6 13 Ibid, Pg. 6 14 Waki Report 2008, Pg. 35



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As noted by King'ori Mwangi Coast PPO, “My Lords, our assessment of the Coast Province was that there was a potential violence much higher than any other part of the country because of the underlying issues of poverty, their political feeling of being excluded and a lot of unemployment. All these going by the history of the Coast… we felt the issues here, the threats were higher than other parts of the country.” 15

At the same time, the public perception that the benefits of the rapid economic growth were concentrated among a small elite served to reinforce the notion that the government was out of touch with the economic reality of the most vulnerable. In light of this, the opposition ran an effective campaign against the government painting it as removed from the daily realities of the poor Kenyan. Many Kenyans who had invested hopes of better economic times in the NARC government of 2002, felt betrayed. Consequently, the ODM message of itself as the saviour from the ills of the Kibaki government resonated well with many Kenyans, who upon the announcement of the presidential results turned against one another in protest.16 The post election violence also had an unmistakable class dimension where the poor looted from those they perceived as rich. There was heavy looting in all the areas where violence occurred. In Kisumu for instance, some affluent Luos had their property looted and destroyed in what was seen as a class struggle, 17 and in Kibera gangs bragged that they were going “shopping” while some even illegally occupied residential houses belonging to ‘enemy’ communities18. Underlying this problem of poverty and inequality is the issue of unemployment especially among the youth. There are currently an estimated two million youth19 and failure by successive regimes and society as a whole to implement youth economic empowerment strategies is majorly to blame for the explosion of such violent gangs as Mungiki, Chinkororo, Sungu Sungu, Taliban, Kamjesh, the Kalenjin warriors and many others that regrouped to cause terror after announcement of the presidential results. These gangs according to CIPEV are devoid of ideology and operate on willing buyer-willing seller basis. The promise of power and wealth renders them vulnerable and can, therefore, be mobilized for a number of reasons and not just to make ends meet. This as noted by CIPEV, is a dangerous situation that indeed explains why since the 1990’s they have sprung up all over the country.

5.2.3 Ethnicised Politics Political manipulation of ethnicity – a tradition in Kenyan politics that has its links in the historical land grievances (ensuing criminal theft of land), perceived/actual dominance in commerce and politics of certain ethnic groups. Because the violence surrounding elections has been ethnically directed, this has increased distrust among different groups

15 Ibid, Pg. 220 16 KNHCR Pg 21 17 KNHCR Pg 89 18 KNHCR Pg 40 19 CIPEV pg 45



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and vastly eroded any sense of national identity. Hence, ethnicity has now taken on a dangerous and negative connotation.20

For instance, in the South Rift areas of Kipkelion, Sotik and Borabu, political leaders (both civic and parliamentary aspirants) used idioms such as “kuondoa madoadoa” – Kiswahili for “removing the stains or spots.” This was the phrase used in the region to refer to people from the other communities that were considered “foreigners” in the region.21 The former MP for Limuru, George Nyanja, said that the Kikuyu cannot be led by a ‘Kihii’ (uncircumcised man in the Kikuyu language), in reference to Raila Odinga.22

Ethnic politics in Kenya can be traced back to the colonial era where the colonial authorities, in safeguarding their interests, allowed Africans to form ethnic based associations and never nationalist parties. The post independence period saw this perpetuated by politicians who mobilized supporters along ethnic lines to ensure political survival. This gained an even sharper edge after re-introduction of multi-party politics in the 1990’s and virtually all the political parties formed thereafter had ethnic leanings.23 The excessive constitutional powers enjoyed by the president have further entrenched ethnic politics in the country because of the perceived benefits to the tribe the president comes from and has reduced political competition in Kenya into an ethnic zero-sum game. An attempt to reverse this was made in 2002 when members of NARC signed an informal MOU in a bid to create the position of prime minister but this was dishonoured after president Kibaki ascended to power thus, aggravating the already polarized politics of the country along ethnic lines. 24

5.2.4 Past Election–Related Violence and the Deep-Seated Culture of Impunity Election violence is a common phenomenon in Kenya. Practically all election periods have been characterized by violence and especially in the Rift Valley province which as was established by the KNHRC was one of the epicentres of the most recent election related violence. The quest for the reintroduction of multiparty politics in the 1990’s saw violence break out in Rift valley targeting perceived opposition supporters (the Luo, Kikuyu, and Luhya and Kisii communities). The post-election violence which left an estimated 1500 Kenyans dead and 300,000 others displaced was preceded by threats by politicians allied to the then president Moi that communities seen as pro-multiparty politics would be ejected from the province if the agitation for reforms did not stop.25 The violence ended in 1994, but in 1997, violence broke out again, this time even in coast province. The target again

20 Human Rights Watch Pg. 11, 17; International Crisis Group, Pg. 8; KNHCR Report, Pg. 27‐30, Waki Report, Pg. 35,36 21 KNCHR “On the Brink of the Precipice: A Human Right’s Account of Kenya’s Post 2007 Election Violence” 2008 Report. Pg. 51 22 Ibid, Pg. 112 23 KNHCR pg 22 24 CIPEEV pg 28‐29 25 KNHCR Report pg24



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was largely people from the Kikuyu, Luo, Luyha, and Kisii communities perceived to be sympathetic to the opposition. Reports from various CSO’s along with those from the Kiliku parliamentary Committee and the Akiwumi Commission tasked by the government to inquire into the violence point out that the violence was planned and instigated by senior politicians named in these reports, who to date have not been brought to justice. This has had the effect of entrenching a culture of impunity besides creating a fertile ground for violence in many parts of the Rift Valley province.26 The underestimation and/or disregard of the magnitude of violence in different parts of the country by the government has also made it an almost permanent feature in some areas and as established by the KNHCR, violence was already raging in Kuresoi and Mt. Elgon months before the general election27. Reports indicate that, violence in Kuresoi and the wider Molo region was planned long before the elections and pitted the Kalenjin against the Kikuyu and the Kisii who are the minority group within Rift Valley. The communities live in neighbouring farms, which are either mixed, or homogeneous .KNHCR established that there was a plot to evict members of the Kikuyu and the Kisii communities who were perceived to be anti-ODM, particularly after the 2005 referendum. The period between 2006 and 2007 was characterized by attacks by the Kalenjin community on the other communities. These attacks reached a peak after the presidential results were announced.28 In Mt. Elgon, the Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF), allegedly seeking redress for irregular allocation of land at the Chebyuk settlement scheme, were already staging attacks on members of the local community perceived as hostile to their cause long before the elections. As in the Kuresoi violence, the Mt. Elgon violence was not only wrapped up in the politics of land but also in electoral demographics29.

5.2.5 Stalled Constitutional Reforms At the national level, the unfinished constitution reform in a significant way underlies the events leading to the post-election violence30. The clamour for a new constitution in Kenya dates back to the 1990’s and was prompted by the need to have an effective and efficient government whose three arms were balanced and independent in executing their mandate. This was, however, not achieved and in 2002 even though, the NARC government led by President Mwai Kibaki was elected on the wave of the promise of comprehensive reforms. Priority among these was the constitutional reform that had over the years become the assumed panacea to the country’s problems. However, problems with the NARC coalition began when President Kibaki dishonoured a Memorandum of understanding that his party, the National Alliance of Kenya, had signed with the Liberal Democratic Party. The falling out of these two parties in 2005 diminished hopes of a new constitution and the final setback came when Kenyans rejected the draft constitution in 26 CIPEV Pg 33 27 KNHCR Pg 24 28 KNHCR Pg 74v 29 In Mt. Elgon, there were divisions amongst communities that occupy the constituency. The Luhya community was perceived to be friendly to the PNU while the Kalenjin community who are the majority supported the opposition party, ODM. 30 KNHCR Pg 24



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the 2005 referendum31 that was highly politicized and ethnicised. The collapse of the coalition and the outcome of referendum campaign set the stage for a highly ethnicised the kind of ethnic polarization that was to characterize the 2007 campaigns.32

5.2.6 Rural-Urban Migration The persistent migration of people from rural areas in search of jobs is one of the contexts that provide fodder for potential conflict. This situation is real because the urban centre often has no sufficient jobs for massive number of migrants. Lack of well paying jobs, and lack of centred efforts by government to create employment opportunities in rural areas (mine) means that many youthful Kenyans are forced to move to cities and towns in search of elusive jobs setting stage for potential conflict.

5.2.7 Low wages for civil servants Government is the biggest employer in the country. Yet, government employees’ i.e. civil servants are most poorly paid. The poor remunerations of the civil servants has contributed to the state of corruption in the country. The annual Bribery Index reports by the Transparency International –Kenya Chapter has consistently cited corruption in the rank and file of the various government Ministries, Departments, and Agencies (MDAs) as leading in corruption. Among the persistent perpetrators of corruption are the Police, the Local Authorities, and the Teacher Service Commission33. Corruption in the government MDAs has meant poor revenue collections, low salaries, and eventually potential and active ground for conflict.

5.3 Consequences of the conflict on the context The violence had profound humanitarian and economic effects particularly to the poor and most vulnerable in society. It destroyed lives and livelihoods, bred feelings of fear and terror among Kenyans and aggravated social exclusion. It imposed huge costs to individuals, communities and the nation as a whole. It affected learning, destroyed markets and overstretched health services as well as other social amenities. The violence displaced families and weakened the rule of law. More specifically, the consequences of the violence manifested itself in many forms including:

• Rise of organised ethnic-driven illegal gangs – In Nairobi certain gangs existed long before the election violence started and were well known to control crucial services such as security in some neighbourhoods. These gangs took the law into their own hands during the post‐election violence as a means of gaining further control of their neighbourhoods. Gangs such as Siafu and Bukhungu, which are predominantly Luyha gangs, were supported by local politicians such as councillors in the Kibera area. The Nubian community on its part had Jeshi la Darajani. In Mathare, violence particularly against the Kikuyu was undertaken by a group known as Taliban and another known as the Huruma Youth Group. In Kibera, particularly in Laini Saba and Soweto as well as in Mathare, Kariobangi and Dandora, members of the Mungiki engaged in violent attacks on non‐Kikuyu

31 KNHCR pg 24 32 KNHCR Pg 25 33 See Transparency International Bribery Index Reports from 2000 to 2007



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people. These Mungiki members were involved in forced circumcisions of Luo people.34

• Deaths and displacement of people - Six weeks after the contested results were announced, protest riots, repression by security forces and revenge killings by supporters of both political camps caused over 1,000 deaths and led to the internal displacement of more than 300,000 people.35 The inter-ethnic hatred and animosity, and excess force and extra judicial killings by the police forces account for the noted deaths.36 In tandem with the killings and displacements were the looting and burning of farms, homes and property.37 A year later and IDPs are still languishing in so-called transit camps.38 The government and development partners have neglected them, thus exposing them to deplorable living conditions bordering on gross human rights violations; poor housing, lack of food, lack of safe water and insecurity.39

• Deepened suspicion, mistrust and hatred between ethnic groups/individuals and across all actors (representative of the three track actors) – raises security woes and weakens national cohesion;

• Other consequential effects include: extreme psychological traumas; increase in HIV/AIDS – prevalence and new cases.40

• Economic losses:

5.3.1 National level o Loss of the country’s food rations - as much as 20 per cent (300,000 tons)

of the cereal crop has not been harvested. It is estimated that as much as 2,800 metric tons of maize, beans, and wheat were either destroyed or stolen.41

o Decline in horticulture exports – Flower income losses since early January are estimated to be in the KES. 1 billion ($14.5 million) range and overseas customers are expressing concern about Kenya’s long-term supply reliability. The tea sector has similar problems, in addition to rising transport costs and diminished production due to worker scarcity has already resulted in losses in the billions of shillings.42

o The tourism sector, which is the largest foreign exchange earner, saw Coastal resorts and game parks nearly deserted, with occupancy rates around 20 per cent instead of the usual over 85 per cent. Layoffs ensued in the 250,000-strong workforce, and the industry, which normally generates roughly KES. 20 billion ($295 million) in annual tax revenues requested

34 KNCHR “On the Brink of the Precipice: A Human Right’s Account of Kenya’s Post 2007 Election Violence” 2008 Report. Pg. 122 35 International Crisis Group “Kenya in Crisis” Report No 137, Feb 2008, Pg. 1 36 Human Rights Watch “Ballots to Bullets: Organised Political Violence and Kenya’s Crisis of Governance” Vol. 20 No 1 (A) March 2008 37 KNCHR, Human Rights Watch, International Crisis Group reports 38 39 Kenya Human Rights Commission (2008) “A Tale of Force, Threats and Lies: Operation Rudi Nyumbani”, Pg. 10 40 All reports 41 International Crisis Group “Kenya in Crisis” Report No 137, Feb 2008, Pg. 19 42 Ibid, Pg. 20



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KES. 1 billion ($14 million) from the government to help in the recovery. 43

o An unprecedented suspension in trading on the Nairobi Stock Exchange on 29 January 2008 strongly indicated a rapid decline in investor confidence. The suspension happened at 11:52am, when a lack of buyers and midday selling pushed the market near the fail-safe point of 5 per cent loss and invoked a previously unused rule to halt trading. The exchange lost KES. 40 billion ($590 million) that day. Even when business resumed after the midday halt, demand was low.44

5.3.2 Local level o Loss of livelihoods – people lost the economic resources e.g. The Waki

Report noted that there was destruction of motor vehicles reported in Nyandarua, Homa Bay, Kipkelion, Uasin Gishu, Nandi North, Trans Nzoia West, Trans Nzoia East and Kericho Districts. The total given of vehicles destroyed in these areas is 160 i.e. 128 saloon cars, 8 buses, 6 tractors 15 trucks and 3 PSV Matatus.45 The Report also details the loss of private property in each district, highlighting further the economic resources lost. For instance, in Kipkelion, there was a notable loss of agricultural produce - 36566 bags of maize, 8100 bags of beans, 800 bags of Irish potatoes, 40 tonnes of cabbages, 30 tonnes of kales, 20 ha of sugarcane, 3219 plant of coffee. 46

o Increased cost of living – exacerbated by the increase in prices of basic commodities such as flour, milk, bread and vegetables. Maize flour for instance, prior to the 2007 elections, was retailing at KES. 52 for the 2kg packet. Currently, it is going for KES. 95 – 107.

o Over 1100 people were killed during the post election violence and about 350,000 were uprooted and rendered internally displaced.47

o Property worth an estimated 90 billion Kenya shillings (about 1/3 of GDP or 1/6 of the Annual national budget) was destroyed and many sectors of the economy crippled. The economic growth rate shrunk from 7.2% to 2.4%.48

o Destruction of property and displacement of people resulted in loss of jobs. In Lang’ata constituency for instance, more than 3,000 stalls in Toi market were destroyed and property worth millions of shillings lost. Before being razed to the ground, this market housed over 3,000 traders. A similar or bigger number of people were employed by the traders, and many others depended on the market as suppliers or customers. It is estimated that, besides property worth millions of shillings that was destroyed, the destruction of the market affected over 200,000 people.49

o Access to basic facilities such as medical/health services, education, social and economic services, became difficult and especially for IDPs and their

43 Ibid, Pg. 20 44 Ibid, Pg. 20 45 Waki Report 2008, Pg. 336 46 Ibid, Pg. 338‐340 47 KNHCR Pg 21 48 Who is Guilty? Youth Perspectives on the 2007 Pre‐Polls Electoral Violence in Kenya; Pg 59 49 KNCHR Pg 40



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families than it was in general due to the violence being experienced at the time. A lot of rape victims and those who were HIV+ did not have access to essential medical services.

o Learning for displaced children was disrupted the worst affected being secondary school going children. The Free Primary Education Programme made it possible for those in primary to be admitted to schools neighbouring their camps in places like Nakuru 50while in some camps like the Eldoret ASK show ground camp, schools, although ill equipped to handle students, were set up within the camps.

6.0 Behavior and conflict

6.1 Introduction Violent outbreaks are often consequences of deep-seated unresolved conflicts. Violence is also often a function of spatial and episodic provocation that involves individuals and or communities against each other or against institutions and or symbols of authority perceived to be oppressive. The post election violence experienced in Kenya was characterised by both organized and spontaneous violence. In what follows, we examine the kind of behaviours that fuelled the violent outbreak following the disputed presidential poll in the country.

6.2 Ethnic Animosity There exist deep-seated ethnic rivalry and animosity amongst different ethnic people groups in the country. The larger communities such as the Kikuyus, Luos, Luhya, and Kalenjins have ensuring legacy of exhibiting rival behaviour against each other. This kind of rivalry is fed by political ideology and competition for power. The net result of such rivalry has been expression of bitterness and to some extent contemptuous relations between and amongst rival people group. On the other hand, the smaller/ minority people groups often in the peripheral end of social political and economic power equally perceive the larger ethnic groups with suspicion and mistrust.

6.3 Exploitation of resources Political and economic success in areas that are not traditionally or originally homeland of certain ethnic community has been interpreted as a form of exploitation and subordination. To some extent, Kenyans who have migrated beyond what is originally understood to be their original/ ancestral land and have succeeded economically are treated with jealousy and suspicion. The jealousy and suspicion has been hyped by the political class leading to negative tense relationship between communities residing in particular political / geographical boundaries

6.4 Ethnic Profiling There is characteristic behaviour by most people in the country to profile each other according to ethnic background. The ethnic profiling is also officially sanctioned through schooling system where pupils are forced to attend schools within their home regions. At

50 CIPEV Pg 280‐281



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the level where citizens qualify to apply for Official Identity Cards, the relevant application forms by default propagate the behaviour of ethnic profiling. This official and unofficial behaviour of ethnic profiling over the years has weakened the national unity and national identity (‘Kenyaness’) as most people tend to identify and relate strongly within their own ethnic community.

6.5 Entitlement Behaviour There is a perception of entitlement by specific people group in Kenya especially the Kikuyus and the Kalenjins who have produced individual to the highest political office. This entitlement behaviour is often felt by the other communities who perceive the two as being arrogant and proud because of their historical linkage to political and economic power. 7.0 Dynamics and linkages between local and regional conflicts

7.1 Introduction The post election violence in Kenya was a localized conflict that was spontaneous in nature. The conflict involved both state and non-state actors and was triggered by political differences manifest in the disputed presidential election results in 2007. This section briefly explains the fact that the post election conflict was largely an internal conflict with no direct relation with conflicts beyond the country’s territorial boundaries.

7.2 The geopolitical analysis of conflict As a country, Kenya has not faced armed civil conflict of any nature. The country has largely been peaceful and has not fought any wars with her neighbours. What is significant to note is that the conflict in Kenya was largely fought at different sites and platforms and for various reasons. The greatest factor in the PEV was anger against run away impunity and state failure to deal with historical injustices. Additionally, failure by the state to deal with and manage the emergent political differences, corruption in the institutions of governance aggravated the situation. In the case of Kenya, there was no issue of local versus national conflict as the reality was that the violence took place at various in the country. The PEV was largely informed by politics and economic failures of state policies and institutions. It was fought both at national and local level in areas where there have been deep-seated political and economic rivalries and in areas of multiple ethnic habitation. While Kenya’s neighbours have faced some form of armed rebellion from a section of its own people, the PEV cannot be said to be linked with conflict in or between the neighbouring states such as has been experienced in Somalia, Uganda, South Sudan, and Ethiopia. The PEV can thus be categorized as the post elections conflict was through ethnic expression. There is no evidence that there was any interference or reference to regional geopolitical reality.



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7.3 How the bigger conflict influences local dynamics and conflicts

• The growing politicization and proliferation of violence in Kenya over the years, specifically the institutionalization of violence following the legalization of multi-party democracy in 1991. Over time, this deliberate use of violence by politicians to obtain power since the early 1990s, plus the decision not to punish perpetrators has led to a culture of impunity and a constant escalation of violence. This, in turn, has caused a further diffusion of violence in the country, which now is largely outside the control of the State and its security agencies.

• The growing power and personalization of power around the Presidency. This has had a twofold impact. First, it has given rise to the view among politicians and the general public that it is essential for the ethnic group from which they come to win the Presidency in order to ensure access to state resources and goods. Second, it also has led to a deliberate denudation of the authority and legitimacy of other oversight institutions that could check abuses of power and corruption and provide some accountability, and at the same time be seen by the public as neutral arbiters with respect to contentious issues, such as disputed elections results. As a result, in many respects the state agencies are not seen as legitimate.51

• Violence was part and parcel of the colonial state, which used it to ensure control. After independence, President Jomo Kenyatta used both the carrot and the stick to maintain power, with the use of violence mainly concentrated in the hands of the State, rather than outside of it. Opposition parties were subjected to political harassment and those individuals who refused to support the status quo experienced various types of repression and even detention without trial. Rallies, by students and others, were dispersed by the GSU using force. For a variety of reasons, repression under Kenya’s second President, Daniel arap Moi, became more draconian, which in turn generated a groundswell of dissent against his rule by a growing opposition movement, including politicians, lawyers, students, and others from all parts of the country, as well as members of the Kikuyu from Central Province whose economic power he tried and partially succeeded in decimating. President Moi’s actions were designed to destroy the economic base of his opponents and to bolster his own position and that of his supporters, who were mainly drawn from his KAMATUSA (Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, and Samburu) allies from the marginal areas.52

7.4 How the local conflict relates to the bigger national conflict • A feeling among certain ethnic groups of historical marginalization, arising from

perceived inequities concerning the allocation of land and other national resources as well as access to public goods and services. This feeling has been tapped by politicians to articulate grievances about historical injustices, which resonate with certain sections of the public. This has created an underlying climate of tension and hate, and the potential for violence, waiting to be ignited and to explode.53 The infrastructure of violence was financed and sustained mainly by local

51 Waki Report 2008, Pg. 22‐23 52 Ibid, Pg. 24,25 53 Ibid, Pg. 22‐23



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politicians and business‐people to support costs such as transport of attackers, weapons and other logistics.54

• The increasing problem of a growing population of poor, unemployed and youth, educated and uneducated, who agree to join militias and organized gangs. These gangs have been alleged to intersect with parts of the Government and the security forces. These groups now have become “shadow governments” in the slums and even in other parts of the country and have been used by politicians to attack their opponents; to secure their own security, and to gain power. Furthermore, these proliferating militias also are said sometimes to dovetail with the State and its security apparatus thereby not only reducing the State’s capacity to control the violence but also increasingly threatening the integrity of the State and the nation. This underlying endemic situation has created a climate where violence is increasingly likely to be used and where its use is increasingly unlikely to be checked.55

• Widespread dissension and discord stemming from perceived and/or actual dominance of certain ethnic groups in key sectors of commerce and politics. Political contests have become all the more charged because of what is at stake; those who achieve political power benefit from widespread abuses including impunity for political manipulation of violence, criminal theft of land, and the corrupt misuse of public resources—indulgences which occur at the expense of groups who are out of power.56

8.0 The roles, positions, ambitions, and frustrations of the youth in society

8.1 Introduction Youth played a very important role in the post election violence. Youth were heavily informed in the election process as voters as well as candidates for the various political positions. With the highly emotive nature of the 2007 election, the youth were caught in the thickness of the crisis largely as villains but also as victims. This section, discusses the roles, ambitions and frustration faced by the Kenyan youth and how that relates to the post election conflict. The better understanding of youth issues is important in the operationalization of conflict transformation tool and mechanism.

8.2 Youth and Politics in Kenya The Kenyan youth are products of a society that is characterized by inequalities and lack of opportunities for social advancement. They too are victims of social exclusion through unemployment and limited access to basic social amenities.

54 KNCHR “On the Brink of the Precipice: A Human Right’s Account of Kenya’s Post 2007 Election Violence” 2008 Report. Pg. 7 55 Waki Report 2008, Pg. 22‐23 56 Human Rights Watch “Ballots to Bullets: Organised Political Violence and Kenya’s Crisis of Governance” Vol. 20 No 1 (A) March 2008, Pg. 11



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The Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence (CIPEV) established that there are an estimated two million unemployed youth. It further established that while universities in Kenya produce about 40,000 graduates every year, only 150,000 informal jobs have been created since 2003.It goes further to say that, between 1992 and 1996, the number of street children increased by 300% in just four years. Many of these initially rootless children who are now adults are the product of displacement by ethnic violence. Failure by successive governments to comprehensively address the issues facing the youth has rendered them frustrated and therefore vulnerable. They are particularly exposed to crime and violence both as victims and perpetrators. In a bid to survive in such a harsh environment many youth have found themselves recruited into violent gangs-such as; Mungiki-largely based in Rift valley, Nairobi and parts of Central, Kalenjin warriors-Rift Valley, Sungu sungu-Nyanza, SLDF -Mt. Elgon, Huruma youth group-Kasarani, Bukhungu-Kibera etc are easily manipulated, particularly by politicians.57 The gangs as earlier noted have no clear ideology and operate on a willing buyer-willing seller basis. Given the hierarchical nature of gangs and the upwardly mobile hopes of their members to become as well off as their leaders, youth can be mobilized for a variety of reasons, not just to meet their daily needs. This, in itself is a very dangerous situation, helping to explain why since the 1990s violent gangs have proliferated all over Kenya.58 The youth were, for instance, at the forefront of post election violence and both CIPEV and KNHCR established that in the second and third wave of violence, which involved a lot of planning, youth gangs were mobilized into ethnic outfits and hired to execute killings, destruction and looting of property and eviction of communities perceived to be “foreign.” These youth were provided with food, arms ranging from guns to arrows and paid as little as fifty shillings.59 However, while the youth have been condemned for committing most of the atrocities during PEV, what is less acknowledged is that they were also the biggest victims and casualties. Most of those who lost their lives were youth.60 Law enforcement agencies also focus their attention on the youth while protecting the principal perpetrators of violence.61 Although the youth in their frustration may seem as easy targets for violence and crime, they can also be mobilized to undertake worthy causes. A large number of the new voters registered in 2007 consisted of youth who had initially, as established by IREC, shown extreme apathy. This was realized through a voter education campaign dubbed ‘ Vijana Tugutuke’. According to Kagwanja (2005), the revolution of the youth in Kenyan politics is nothing new. He asserts that the “youth identity, like ethnicity, was instrumentalised and transformed by patrimonial politics into a weapon in the hands of elders” - prior to independence, during which the two main parties, KANU and KADU, both mobilised

57 CIPEV Pg 33‐34 58 CIPEV Pg 33 59 KNHCR Pg 119 60 Who’s Guilty? Youth Perspective on the 2007 Pre‐Polls Electoral Violence in Kenya; Pg 18 61 Who’s Guilty? Youth Perspective on the 2007 Pre‐Polls Electoral Violence in Kenya; Pg 19



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youths in the fierce struggle for state power62 and even at the height of the Nyayo era (1982–1990), when then President, Moi, “revitalised the KANU youth wing as a powerful instrument for monitoring and punishing public dissent and asserting his authority.”63 The youth in Kenya are a misconstrued lot – defined as apathetic, rudderless, disinterested, tools-of-violence-for-hire and easily manipulated.64 On the contrary, they have managed to mobilise themselves to not only protest and resist against poor governance and oppression, but also to demonstrate their qualities of leadership and capacity to respond to national democratic demands. The current crop of political leaders for instance, have ascended to their present status through the public universities’ student politics and activism.65 The point is that while the youth play important role in the determination of political leadership, they have not been well organised and strategic to fill such positions with one of their own. In 2003, the Kenya Youth Parliament was launched. Its hopes have been to contribute towards the achievement of a strong and effective youth voice in the country for the development of open societies in all constituencies, and to foster collaboration, partnerships and networks to inspire and support youth in their struggle for human rights, equity and peace within their communities; as well as to exchange best practices between the networks and their organisations.66 The youth’s role and ambition as articulated by the Media Focus on Africa report on the 2007 Elections, reveals that although young people have been involved a lot in mobilizing for what they have normally believed to be social and political change for the better, this has not translated into achievement of a voice in the state. There is yet no tangible evidence that the youth of Kenya have been heard by and their needs and interests placed at the centre of government and political party policy. Although political party and government documents confess youth marginalization and make promises on how they will champion the aspirations of the majority who have been disadvantaged by undemocratic rule like the youth, such intentions have hardly been translated into youth-centred policies and actions. With regard to the frustrations the youth face, the Media Focus Report notes that the ‘Vijana Tugutuke’ concept, initially defined by young people as a way of articulating where they want to be in Kenyan politics, was hijacked by their mothers and fathers who have gradually redefined it. Further, unemployed youth have not only been mobilised, incited and paid by leaders to commit anarchy and create chaos,67 but they also exploit their own, especially the poor by forcing them to join gangs.68 The Kriegler Report notes that 62 Kagwanja, P. M. (2005) Power to Uhuru’: Youth Identity and Generational Politics in Kenya’s 2002 Elections African Affairs, 105/418, 51–75 20 October 2005, Pg. 54-55 63 Ibid, Pg. 55 64 Media Focus on Africa (2007) “Media Strategy on the 2007 General Elections: Thematic Research ad FGD” Pg. 49 65 Amutabi, Maurice, N. (2002) Crisis and Student Protest in Universities in Kenya: Examining the Role of Students in National Leadership and the Democratization Process African Studies Review, Vol. 45, No. 2, Special Issue, Pg. 159‐160 66 http://www.kenyayouthparliament.org/pages/history.htm 67 KNCHR “On the Brink of the Precipice: A Human Right’s Account of Kenya’s Post 2007 Election Violence” 2008 Report, Pg. 76; Waki Report 2008, Pg. 35 68 Waki Report 2008, Pg. 35



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they are also heavily underrepresented in the voter register – a basis drawn from the ECK reports’ findings.69 This could be attributed to the fact that their right to participate in governance is not only inhibited by difficulties in obtaining a national identity card, but also that political processes and institutions in Kenya have systemically failed to engage the youth in any meaningful manner.70 The foregoing notwithstanding, the youth in Kenya today face many frustrations that render them very vulnerable to easy manipulation by politicians, and also makes them an easy target for recruitment into political militias or criminal gangs that are used by politicians in the heat of elections or in the aftermath to cause violence, and then easily dumped. 9.0 Religion and conflict

9.1 Background Religion and religious leaders play a very important role in the society. Religion is often perceived as the spiritual oasis from which humanity gets refreshing ingredients for the management of other aspects of life. In Kenya, religion plays a very important role on the promotion of spiritual, social, cultural, and political growth. In the recent years especially during the existence of the one-party state dictatorship when dissent was suppressed, religious leaders played a very important role in advocating and mobilizing their respective followers in key governance and human rights reforms areas as one of the few institutions to do so together with the students in the Universities. However after the NARC government came into power in 2003, an important constituency of the religious community especially from the Catholic church were incorporated into the government thus undermining the Catholic chrch’s watchdog role on issues of justice and governance. During the period leading to the 2007 election, religious leaders actively participated in public discourse on thematic areas that informed the voting exercise. Religion was used as platform for advocacy, education, public information, as well as lunch podium for politicians who vied for the various elective positions.

9.2 Role of religion and religious leaders The collaboration between the Kenyan and American governments on the war on terror and subsequent arrests of a number of Kenyans of Moslem faith in the second half of 2007 by the government in collaboration with the US security agencies evoked intense resentment against the government and hence the PNU among Moslems across the country while the ascendancy to the top leadership of the Catholic church by Bishop Njue and the toning down of the church’s voice in challenging the government on a variety of social issues and his perceived closes association with the state and the position of PNU on the Majimbo debate created a confidence crisis for the church across ODM strong holds that led to hostility towards Catholic institutions in the region especially Kisumu prior to and during the post-election violence period. Other churches took positions perceived to be for or against each of the protagonists, a situation that started

69 Kriegler Commission Report, 2008 Pg. 80 70 Media Focus on Africa (2007) “Media Strategy on the 2007 General Elections: Thematic Research ad FGD” Pg. 49‐50



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with the referendum of 2005. The partisanship became more pronounced in the heat of post-election violence when religious leaders reverted into supporting their communities and ethnic emotions superseded reason. Religious leaders not only found it risky to call for reason then but became sympathetic to their communities. Almost all areas of worship became ethnicized and some services initially conducted in Kiswahili and English were switched to local dialects of the dominant ethnic groups in the respective areas. This perceived partisanship of religious leaders was broken after post-election violence when the religious leaders began to intercede in the restoration of peace in the country. All across the country, the leaders extolled the virtues of peaceful co-existence and assumed the lead role of mobilizing both material and financial support for IDPs as well as availing their physical facilities such as buildings and compounds of worship for sanctuary. The activities of the religious groups was strengthened with the formation of a network of organisations known as Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice to provide a unified voice on the crisis. Other groups included the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (CJPC), National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), National IDP Network and the Evangelical Alliance of Kenya. 71 Religious institutions such as St. Stephen’s ACK Church and St. Teresa’s Catholic Church worked together with the KRCS and KNCHR respectively to meet the needs of the IDPs.72 10.0 Gender dynamics, attitudes, behaviour, and conflict.

10.1 Introduction Gender is an important element of any social-cultural analysis of conflict. In any conflict study and or peace-building efforts, it is very important that in-depth gender study analysis be conducted so that there is disaggregated baseline and understanding of the gender dynamics of conflict. This chapter discusses the gender dynamics, attitudes, and behaviour of men and women in conflict situation.

10.2 Gender dynamics Gender studies reveal couple of dynamics that inform the relationship and conditions that men and women find themselves. First, unequal power relations characterised by competition (especially in contest relating to political processes, property ownership, access to other productive resources- credit, market , skills) and conflict (evidenced as Gender Based Violence against women and girls being more prominent). Women are marginalised in political and economic processes and institutions. Marginalization of women is known as marginalization of the majorities by the minorities. The skewed access to power and to economic productive resources has impacted negatively on women thus slowing down sustainable development and providing grounds for tensions and conflict between the genders. Second, there is male resistance especially due to the pervasive nature of patriarchy. Patriarchy, the situation of male domination of both women and environment pervades every aspect of daily life. This male domination implies that women operate in very stringent conditions. The women environment is defined through male lenses and interpreted by the same. Patriarchy that is practised in

71 KNCHR Pg. 34, 85 72 KNCHR Pg. 96



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almost all communities of the country has led to subjugation of women whose consequential end is conflict.

10.3 Attitudes of Men and Women before and during conflict 1. Hostility: Women are treated as outsiders and thus face hostile reception from men

who are privileged. The hostility against women is characterised by intolerance for cultural/ethnic/gender diversity – evidenced by Sexual Gender Based Violence (SGBV), rape; forced circumcision; burning of houses; executions; revenge missions; antagonism towards certain groups (communities; women hence victimization).

2. Culture of silence: Secrecy especially around issues of violence- promoted by community false sense of “honour” – evidenced in reporting patterns; prioritisation of medical management for rape including psychosocial care; stigma towards victims/survivors

3. Polarised dichotomy: Love /hate relationship between citizens and the security forces – evidenced by alleged involvement in SGBV (rape); executions;

4. Sexual violence: Sexual violence against women is perceived as a ‘ women’s issue’ – hence low reporting and presentation for medical management for sodomy; forced circumcision

10.4 Behaviour of men and women after and during conflict During and after conflict the gender behaviour is characterised by the blow: • Personal safety always under threat – people live in fear • Non inclusion – as seen in the failure to include IDPs (esp. Women)in camp

management often leading to inequities in provisions within the camp- especially on non food items such as sanitary towels; delivery kits; condoms;

• Apathy especially among men due to threat or real loss of their ascribed role of provider/ changing gender roles as well as reduced privacy for intimacy within families hence evidence of backlash especially towards spouses – seen in spousal violence ; rape

• Increased incidences of commercial sex work as a coping mechanism

10.5 Context • Displacement then Flight then encampment • Vulnerabilities especially due to livelihoods; Gender Based Violence (GBV) especially

Trafficking in persons, forced and child labour; sexual exploitation; early marriage • Limited mobility especially within encamped contexts- worse for women who form

the majority of IDPs • Increases inaccessibility of basic services esp. Health options- maternal child care;

family planning; HIV treatment and management esp. ART/ARVs; water; firewood • Heightened insecurity • Poor sanitation especially due to overcrowding including women specific sanitation-

lack of lighting; close proximity of washroom/toilets; lack of basic locks/latches; • Limited knowledge on how to deal with sexual violence among communities; service

providers- including police • Increased incidences of gang rape



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11.0 The horizontal and vertical linkages between actors in society

11.1 Introduction As the opposition to Moi’s regime grew, pressure to move to have Kenya adopt multi-party democracy. Moi’s reluctance to allow multi-party democracy was pegged to the notion that through this he might lose the presidency. Thus, it was in this period in the 1990s that violence became institutionalized during presidential and parliamentary elections.73 Violence thus became the means of securing political power and winning elections.74 This in turn has continued to affect the relationships and dynamics of approaching conflict issues between and amongst all actors – state and non-state, political leaders and the Kenyan communities. From national actor perspective, this section analyses the dynamics and manifestation of the various linkages in the society.

11.2 State Actors

11.2.1 The Security Agents Horizontal

• The police have weak systems i.e. no professional standards capability within their structures or an internal investigative group charged to oversee these roles – this was established by the Waki Commission and explains in part the police involvement in the deliberate killing of innocent civilians and their use of excessive lethal force.75

• Generally inconsistent in their response to post election violence i.e. their responses varied considerably.76 For instance, there are situations that the police is accused for being indifferent or missing in action where they were needed e.g. In Kericho and Trans Mara most interviewees stated that a majority of the police officers were Kalenjin, and that they deliberately neglected and or failed to offer protection to the non‐Kalenjin.77 In another instance, it is alleged that the police in Langas area are purported to have shot the highest number of people in Eldoret area – the OCS alone is alleged to have personally killed 23 people.78

• Reinforcements were facilitated from the military in certain instances where police units were overwhelmed.79

• Lack of planning by the Police resulted in de-limiting available tactical options.80 Waki Report notes that implementing preventive measures that would include

73 Waki Report Pg. 25 74 Ibid Pg. 26 75 Waki Report 2008, Pg 420 76 Waki Report 2008, Pg. 377, 410‐5; HRW Report, Pg. 60 77 KNCHR Report 2008, Pg. 57 78 Ibid, Pg 68 79 Waki Report 2008, Pg. 382 80 Ibid



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facilitating the military’s help could have meant fewer deaths, injuries, or property destruction.81

• Impunity within the police forces and provincial administration – notable witness accounts of their excessive, lethal force and collusion with raiders have been provided in the reports. For instance, the KNCHR Report tells of two schoolteachers shot dead by police as they tried to make their way home.82

• The Administration Police have no independence i.e. are subjected, within current structures and operating arrangements, to multiple lines of command and control including from the provincial administration.83

Vertical • Interference from politicians - the Waki Report details a report recounted by a

Senior Police Officer on how cowardice and a pious sense of self-preservation in public service has kept the police from carrying out arrests of anarchists because of the political backing they enjoy, which in turn frustrates the police forces efforts to curtail impunity.84

11.2.2 Political leaders Horizontal and vertical

• Politicians throughout the campaign period instigated violence via the use of incitement to hatred.85

• Politicians used/colluded with civil society organisations to campaign divisively along party and/or ethnic lines.

• Politicians have colluded with the police force to enforce impunity.

11.3 Civil society Horizontal

• Formation of a network of organisations known as Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice to provide a unified voice on the crisis. Other groups included the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (CJPC), National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), National IDP Network and the Evangelical Alliance of Kenya. 86

• Religious institutions such as St. Stephen’s ACK Church and St. Teresa’s Catholic Church worked together with the KRCS and KNCHR respectively to meet the needs of the IDPs.87

• Donors also added their voice to strengthen the civil society position – calling for national healing, dialogue and reconciliation. Programme funding is currently pegged on these causes.

81 Ibid 82 KNCHR “On the Brink of the Precipice: A Human Right’s Account of Kenya’s Post 2007 Election Violence” 2008 Report. Pg. 53, 56, 57, 83 83 Waki Report 2008, Pg. 422 84 Ibid, Pg. 457‐60 85 KNCHR, HRW 86 KNCHR Pg. 34, 85 87 KNCHR Pg. 96



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Vertical • Preaching/fostering peace in collaboration with local administration, religious

leaders.88 • The partisanship of some FBOs had become apparent during the 2007 election

campaigns; and such organisations lost the credibility necessary for them to be impartial arbiters of the post‐election violence. Even after the violence began, some FBOs simply chose to defend the positions of the ethnic communities with which they were associated.89

• Civil society is working in collaboration with public (statutory) bodies in the Truth and Justice Reconciliation Commission to push for a people-centred, effective and credible Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission for Kenya and advance transitional justice. The task force has undertaken various events, including technical workshops and public fora, to draw out concerns regarding a TJRC, an operational framework for a TJRC and to review the draft TJRC legislation.90

• NGOs participation in policymaking processes is illusory and this also makes their position of representing the people in the same processes equally pretentious.

12.0 The Current Human Rights Situation

12.1 Introduction Long-standing grievances and failures of governance that run deeper than electoral politics, have constituted the basis for the violence experienced in the 2007 Elections and other previous elections. This section discusses the human rights situation as obtaining in the country in post conflict situation.

12.2 Human rights in post conflict Kenya The human rights violation was much more widespread in the 2007 Elections than it was in past elections.91 To be sure, the PEV witnessed massive violations of fundamental rights e.g. the right to life, right to own property etc for so many people. Incidents of brutality and extra judicial killings were also documented. For instance, according the Human Rights Watch Report 2008, gross human rights violations were perpetrated in the 2007 General Elections.92 Further, the IDP issue that ensued is still to date – a year on, plagued with problems of resettling and reintegrating of the displaced persons.

12.2.1 Political murders These were more widespread compared to those of previous elections. In terms of figures, findings are not conclusive as to the exact numbers of people who died – the Waki Report documents 1,133, whereas the Police documented 616 deaths.93 Each one

88 Ibid, Pg. 58 89 KNCHR “On the Brink of the Precipice: A Human Right’s Account of Kenya’s Post 2007 Election Violence” 2008 Report. Pg. 9 90 Multi-Sectoral Task Force on Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission [MSTF], 2008, Pg. 2 91 Waki Report 2008, Pg. vii, 304‐350 92 Human Rights Watch “Ballots to Bullets: Organised Political Violence and Kenya’s Crisis of Governance” Vol. 20 No 1 (A) March 2008, Pg. 11 93 Waki Report, Pg 305‐6



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claims legitimacy. Previous elections’ reports have either been conservative in the figures or given none at all. The killings in the 2007 Elections stemmed mostly from the incitement by politicians and organisation of violence in various parts of the Rift Valley Province, when the presidential election results failed to turn out as per expected.94 Examples of some of the gruesome murders include the Kiambaa church burning in Eldoret where 35 Kikuyus were killed, the burning of a house in Naivasha where 19 individuals from the Luo community were killed. In Coast Province, cases of arson were reported in the Miritini area. In Magongo area a member of the Luo community was said to have broken into the house and set it on fire killing eight family members. 11 people, most of them from one family, were killed when a murderous mob locked them in a house and set it ablaze in Malindi.95

12.2.2 Gender based violence Sexual and other forms of gender-based violence (SGBV) encompassing a wide range of human rights violations in the chaos of the post election period reached epidemic proportions in Nairobi and this area proved the most problematic in terms of determining the extent of violations.96 The rape of women and girls was however widespread– women were gang-raped in Cherengany and one in Kabete97, the forcible circumcision of Luo men in Naivasha and parts of Central, Nairobi and Rift Valley Provinces;98 Nairobi women’s hospital reported 324 cases examined in its mobile clinics across the country up to February 24 2008.99 Moi Referral Hospital, Eldoret, revealed that 21 cases of sexual violence had been reported during the month of January 2008. The youngest victim was one year six months old, while the oldest was 70. Rape took an ethnic angle in Nairobi’s informal settlements where sexual violence was meted against members of “enemy communities.”100 Gender based violence also expressed itself in the undressing of women and girls wearing trousers and short skirts by Mungiki members particularly in Naivasha in late February 2008. In addition, there were some cases of rape of men by men during the period of violence in the country. 101 Sexual violence was used to force people out of their homes, retaliate against them, as punishment for having voted for the wrong candidate (by either tribe or party), to humiliate them and their communities into a pit of powerlessness. An act of revenge in the form of forced circumcision as recounted by a witness to KNCHR is as follows:

“One night soon after the announcement of the presidential results members of the Mungiki cell moved around the houses in the area calling on all male members of the Kikuyu community to come out and defend their people. They claimed that our women and children were being raped and killed while we slept. I was forced out of the house and joined them ….That night I personally witnessed the members of this group led by their commander forcefully and crudely cut the foreskins of eight male

94 Human Rights Watch “Ballots to Bullets: Organised Political Violence and Kenya’s Crisis of Governance” Vol. 20 No 1 (A) March 2008, Pg. 69 95 KNCHR “On the Brink of the Precipice: A Human Right’s Account of Kenya’s Post 2007 Election Violence” 2008 Report, Pg. 8, 107, 129 96 Waki Report 2008, Pg. 196, 261‐4 97 Ibid, Pg. 135, 112 98 Ibid, Pg. 8 99 Human Rights Watch “Ballots to Bullets: Organised Political Violence and Kenya’s Crisis of Governance” Vol. 20 No 1 (A) March 2008, Pg. 35 100 KNCHR “On the Brink of the Precipice: A Human Right’s Account of Kenya’s Post 2007 Election Violence” 2008 Report, Pg. 135 101 Ibid, Pg. 121



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adults, mainly the Luo community. They would stop Matatus and force them to alight-some of the Matatus drivers helped them identify the Luo passengers. The Mungiki then ripped the trousers and underwear of the person using sharp pangas, exposing the person’s private parts. If the person was found to be uncircumcised, they crudely pulled out and cut the foreskin.”102

In other areas, however, perpetrators of such violence took advantage of the prevailing lawlessness and the vulnerability of those affected to gratify their own selfish needs. For example, a witness at CIPEV testified that some women in IDP camps in Naivasha were reduced to trading sex for money to buy food for their families while others were raped by individuals who invaded IDP camps as was the case in Nakuru.

12.2.3 Extrajudicial killings The violence was also characterized by use of excessive force and extra-judicial killings by the police. This happened after the government issued a ban on all public demonstrations and to enforce this, the police resorted to using brute force. There were instances where police used excessive force without any initial attempt to use non-lethal force. Police in Kisumu for instance used live ammunitions to disperse protestors. About 405 people died of gunshot wounds and 557 treated for gunshot wounds.103 Significantly, excess and extra-judicial killings by police, and their failure to protect lives: These took place as police subsequently tried to contain in the slums persons they believed might try and join demonstrations. Police action included the shooting of unarmed protesters and bystanders, including women and children, without any initial attempt to use non-lethal force, and in situations where there was no apparent imminent threat to life or property.104 Police shootings in places including Kisumu and Kericho are a manifestation of extra judicial killings.105 Police action included the shooting of unarmed protesters and bystanders, including women and children, without any initial attempt to use non-lethal force, and in situations where there was no apparent imminent threat to life or property.106

12.2.4 Insecurity Failure by the Government of Kenya to intervene in the prevention of the conditions that led to insecurity and lack of safety that in turn forced hundreds of thousands to flee their homes. The government failed in its duty to protect individuals, families, and communities who were evicted from their home as punishment for their belonging to a particular ethnic group or because of their political beliefs.107

102 KNCHR Pg 39 103 CIPEV Pg 346 104 Human Rights Watch “Ballots to Bullets: Organised Political Violence and Kenya’s Crisis of Governance” Vol. 20 No 1 (A) March 2008, Pg. 24,25 105 KNCHR “On the Brink of the Precipice: A Human Right’s Account of Kenya’s Post 2007 Election Violence” 2008 Report, Pg. 8 106 Human Rights Watch “Ballots to Bullets: Organised Political Violence and Kenya’s Crisis of Governance” Vol. 20 No 1 (A) March 2008, Pg. 24,25 107 KNCHR “On the Brink of the Precipice: A Human Right’s Account of Kenya’s Post 2007 Election Violence” 2008 Report, Pg. 147



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12.2.5 Internally Displaced Persons Internal displacements of persons – this has been a permanent feature of Kenya history from colonial times onwards. Starting with the eviction of natives from their ancestral land to make way for settlers in colonial Kenya to recent violent evictions accompanying the 1992, 1997, and 2002 election, IDPs have been a constant feature of the country’s political landscape. Even before the 2007 General Elections there was already a problem of population displacement.108 The loss of lives, livelihoods, property, homes has left many seriously psychologically traumatised. Their plight has been inadequately addressed by the Government – many cannot return to their homes and are awaiting resettlement; monetary compensation for their losses was paltry; inadequate social services provided.109 Forceful evictions and mass displacement of people perceived as not indigenous to particular regions were carried out. An estimated 350,000 people were displaced. The violence also saw over 1100 people killed. Rift valley province recorded the highest number of deaths at 744, followed by Nyanza with 134, Nairobi 125, Western 98, Coast 27, and Central 5.110 CIPEV established that 82% of victims of sexual and gender based violence did not report their experiences especially to the police. This was attributed to a number of reasons including; the fear of being attacked again, thinking that nothing would be done, inability to identify attackers and inaccessibility of hospitals because of the prevailing lawlessness. However, while, a few of the cases were reported, the police committed to not having collected any information or statistics on crimes such as rape. Efforts are, however, ongoing to see to it that normalcy is restored and justice done. • A political settlement that was signed by the parties (ODM and PNU) in February

2008 saw an end to post election violence in the country. • In April 2008, the government engaged in operation rudi nyumbani (operation return

home). The aim of the operation was to encourage the IDPs to return to their homes. As part of operation rudi nyumbani the following interventions were made;

o Payment of KES. 10,000.00 to persons leaving the camp. o Provision of transport to home o Relocation to transitional camps nearer farms and areas of

displacement while awaiting provision of proper housing. o Provision of building materials. o Provision of seed, fertilizer, and ploughing services. o 210,594 of the displaced persons had been resettled as of July 2008.111

Worth noting is that for the first time in the country’s history, a commission of inquiry isolated sexual and gender-based violence for special attention. The Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence (CIPEV) took time to establish if indeed there were cases of SGBV during PEV and the extent to which this happened. One of the reasons that prompted the Commission’s action was the compassion it felt for the victims of sexual abuse: 108 Waki Report 2008, Pg. 279 109 Ibid, Pg. 291‐3, 288‐90 110 CIPEV Pg 308 111 CIPEV Pg 294



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“At the very least the Commission thought it would be appropriate to look in depth into the sexual violence that had occurred. Its reasoning was twofold. First, sexual violence is a form of violence and as the Commission was about violence, it felt strongly that there should be a focus on it in the Commission’s investigations. Secondly, being ordinary lay people from various walks of life, the members of the Commission also were personally horrified by the stories of sexual violence that came to our attention. Like others, members of the Commission too felt compassion for the victims of post election sexual violence and wanted to learn and expose what had happened. The Commission also felt that it should do something to make sure that the scourge of sexual violence that happened after the election did not become an endemic in Kenyan life that could one day recur in the lives of ordinary people.”112

12.3 Effects of violations by different actors on the conflict and society:

• Sexual violence: effects include (increased) infection with HIV/Aids, physical injury and psychological trauma, desertion by their spouses, unwanted pregnancy, and loss of trust that they might have had previously in state security agencies.113

• Internal displacement: Psychological trauma resulting from forced displacement –

under emergency conditions and with the necessity to save lives. This displacement meant not only the loss of a home but loss of friendships and other relationships, economic and personal, built over many years, dispersal of relatives, a loss of memories that constituted one’s being. That most of the displacement was violent in nature aggravated the loss.114

• Insecurity, fear, and mistrust of and amongst individuals and communities along ethnic lines – suffered by all directly affected especially the IDPs.115

13.0 Positive changes that conflict triggered in kenya

13.1 Introduction Following the disputed presidential polls and the violence that ensued, efforts were made to try to find political solution to crisis that was strengthening the stability of the country. The most significant attempt was the mediation effort, the National Accord and Reconciliation Agreement, which was brokered by the Dr. Kofi Anan-, led Panel of Eminent Personalities under the auspices of the African Union (AU) on 28 February 2008. With the signing of the National Accord Kenya’s 10th parliament enacted the National Accord and Reconciliation Act (2008) and simultaneously the Constitution of Kenya, to entrench the Act. This section briefly analyses the broad areas of the positive changes that the post election violence triggered with a view to expose the fundamental areas that need attention by all actors and stakeholders in the society.

112 CIPEV Pg 238 113 Waki Report 2008, Pg. 261‐4 114 Ibid, Pg. 274 115 All reports



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13.2 Summary of Positive Changes The Post Election conflict led to loss of many lives and billions worth of property. Probably the reminder of the severity of the conflict is manifest in many homes that were burnt and the over 350,000 internally and externally displaced persons. However, the PEV also led to positive changes albeit very few. First, it increased the momentum for the need for review of the country’s constitution. The relevant constitutional amendments were passed by parliament in 2008 setting stage for eventual review and possibly enactment of a new constitution for the country. Second, it led to a negotiated democracy that has institutionalized power sharing as antidote for weak democracies like Kenya. It is possible that Kenya will henceforth be ruled by coalitions thus eliminating the culture of the ‘winner take it all’. Third, it led to the passage of significant pieces of legislation especially ones that deal with National Reconciliation. Fourth, it heightened need for dealing with historical issues and injustices thus importing national reconciliation as strategy for governance. A truth justice and reconciliation commission (TJRC) will be instituted in 2009 and it will deal with historical injustices and in part run away culture of impunity. Fourthly, focus on the performance and weakness of government and its institution of governance has become in focus as result of the conflict. Institutions such as the disgrace Electoral Commission of Kenya ECK have since been disbanded and there is debate raging about the need for reforms in the security sector. Renewed hopes of achieving the much awaited new constitution – this is currently in a precarious situation given the recent rejection of the Special Tribunal Bill, which was anchored to the constitutional reform. Additionally, Creation of platforms that seek to promote inter-tribal/ethnic dialogue and establishment of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission – it is noteworthy though that although the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission bill was signed accented by the President in November 2008, the drafting of the Bill was done with little public and civil society consultation. It is characterised as deeply flawed - several aspects of the Bill do not comply with international law, standards and best practices such as provisions allowing the Commission to recommend amnesty for gross human rights violations such as torture, enforced disappearance and extrajudicial executions; provisions creating obstacles to prosecutions of gross human rights violations; procedures for nominating Kenyan Commissioners, which does not ensure their independence, impartiality and competence; lack of provisions for the establishment of a comprehensive, long term and effective protection program for victims and witnesses; lack of provisions authorising the Commission to recommend a broad range of reparations for victims.116 Citizen empowerment on the constitutional reform by the ‘Citizens Assembly’117 – these uptakes by both local and international civil society organisations have a two-fold goal i.e. to ensure that Parliament commits to the reforms, and to create awareness and build citizens capacity around the reform issues.

116 See: http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=ENGAFR320092008&lang=e 117 See: http://www.peoples‐parliament.org



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13.3 The formation of a grand coalition government The Kofi Annan-led mediation process culminated in the signing of the ‘Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government’ and a ‘National Accord and Reconciliation’ Agreement’ as part of a wider set of agreements. Specifically, the Agreement on a Coalition Government noted that ‘neither side can realistically govern the country without the other. There must be real power sharing to move the country forward and begin the healing and reconciliation processes.118 The signing of the National Accord and the enactment of the same in to the constitution of Kenya led to the eventual formation of the Grand Coalition government. This coalition government was the first in the history of the country in the pure understanding of coalition governments.119 The formation of the Grand Coalition within the spirit of the National Accord created two centres of power. For the first, time Kenya had to executive sites of power i.e. of the President and that of the Prime Minister. According to the agreement President Kibaki retained most of the executive powers while Prime Minister Raila Odinga was ascribed the ‘authority to coordinate and supervise the execution of the functions and affairs of the Government’.120 The Grand coalition can thus be argued to be a product of the emergent political phenomenon especially within the African continent where the incumbents manipulate the electoral process in order to weaken its functioning, legitimacy, and credibility of elections held under such system. In the Kenyan situation, the ECK, which was composed of commissioners largely sympathetic to president Kibaki, contributed to the disputed presidential polls result. The negotiated democracy phenomenon shattered the democratic progress that Kenya had anchored itself since the return to multi party democracy in 1992. It is noteworthy that since 1992, Kenya had held multi party elections every 5-years and though they were characterized with rigging and modicum of violence, the results were respected as credible especially given the reality that a clear winner was determined. The negotiated democracy through the Annan led process led to the formation of the largest government in Kenyan history albeit in the context of what is known as the Grand Coalition Government. The formation of the GCG is considered a positive outcome of the Annan led mediation efforts.

13.4 Commissions of Inquiry Four commission of Inquiry were proposed by the Annan led mediation team. The independent Review Commission (IREC); Commission of Inquiry into Post –Elections (CIPEV); Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC); the National, Ethnic and Race Relations Commissions (NERRC). IREC Report did not tell Kenyans who won the presidential elections of 2007. It sidestepped assigning criminal responsibility to anyone at the ECK or any other quarters including the main rival political parties. However, IREC recommended the dismantling of the ECK through legal and constitutional amendments. 118 Kenya Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government and the National Accord and Reconciliation Act (NARA), 28 February 2008, preamble 119 Grand Coalition government was formed post 2007 elections and took several weeks of negotiation. 120 NARA



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The CIPEV report is one, which was received with mixed reactions across the ethnic-social and political, divide. Waki and his team set in place automated implementation timelines of the report and the ‘secret list’, which threw political elites in to panic. The NARA articulated the mandate of CIPEV to ‘investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the violence, the conduct of state security agencies the handling of it, and to make recommendations concerning these and other matters’.121 CIPEV also known as the WAKI Commission commenced its work on 23 May 2008 and investigated the ‘facts and circumstances related to the acts of violence following 2007 presidential elections’ as well as ‘the actions or omissions of ate security agencies during the course of violence’. The most important task of the Waki commission was to make recommendations concerning measures to be taken to prevent, control, and eradicate impunity and promote national reconciliation. The Waki commission recommendation was to play a vital role in determining the institutionalization of transition justice in Kenya. Significantly, the Waki report noted in part that the violence surrounding elections had been ethnically directed leading to distrust among the different groups and vastly eroded any sense of national identity. The report also noted violence had reached endemic proportions and out of control. Violence Waki reported noted is routinely used to resolve political differences. On the institutions of the police, the Waki government notes that state security agencies failed institutionally to anticipate, prepare for, and contain the violence. The state security officials are also accused for in some cases participating in the gross violations of human rights. To confront impunity, the Waki report called for the establishment of a Special Tribunal of Kenya to try selected sponsors and organizers of the post-election violence. This tribunal was to serve as in country legal framework for the adjudication and demonstration of justice for the alleged suspects. During the mediation talks, the two parties agreed to undertake reforms including; an overhaul of electoral system, constitutional reform, strengthening of human rights protections and the transformation of Inter-ethnic relations. Both parties also agreed to the creation of a Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) that would comprise of eminent persons, both local and international. The government has already embarked on reforms albeit at a slow pace. The establishment of the two commissions of inquiry (IREC&CIPEV) was a step in the direct direction. The two reports give recommendations that will go along way in informing the reform process in Kenya. They recommend among other things:- o The need for the country to stop the culture of impunity- CIPEV came up with a list

of perpetrators and gave proposals on how they should be brought to justice o The need for a new constitution that will among other things; transform the

presidential election system from a winner takes all system to one that allows losers to participate in national politics after elections

o The need for institutional reforms especially with regard to the police force and all the other state security agents.

In line with these recommendations:

121 Government of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post Elections Violence (CIPEV‐ The Waki Commission), Nairobi, Kenya, 2008



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o The Electoral Commission of Kenya has since been disbanded. This followed a presidential the enactment of the Constitution of Kenya Review Bill, 2008. This will see also the creation of an Interim Independent Electoral Commission and an Interim Boundaries Commission. The former, a team of nine commissioners, will oversee the anticipated referendum on the new constitution and also compile a whole new voter register while the latter will be charged with reviewing constituencies and districts boundaries.

o The Act is also set to jumpstart the constitution review process that will ensure that the country gets a new constitution.

o With regard to ending impunity in the country, parliament on 12/2/2009 rejected a Constitution Amendment Bill that sought to set up a special tribunal to try financiers and instigators of post election violence. The rejection of the Bill means that government will not beat the 1st march deadline to set up a tribunal as recommended by the Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence (CIPEV). The Commission had recommended the setting up of a local tribunal to try PEV, failure to which the names of the suspects will be forwarded to the International Criminal Court, ICC.

13.5 WAY FORWARD The government has already embarked on a series of reforms that will see to it that some of the issues underlying post election violence in Kenya are addressed. However, seeing as the government has focused more on efforts towards constitutional review and reforming institutions of governance, much more needs to be done to ensure that lasting peace and harmonious living is restored in the country.

Early warning signs of conflict • Poor relationship & bad blood between the local community and security agencies • Indiscriminate compensation of the businesses • The continued existence of various militia groups • The senseless security operations often carried by the police and other security

agencies



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Section B – Opinion Poll Survey 1.0 Introduction The survey on Sources of Conflict and Approaches towards Conflict Transformation and Sustainable Peace in Kenya was commissioned by the Media Focus on Africa (MFAF) and conducted by the Centre for Independent Research (CIR) in late February to early March 2009. The survey was a national sample survey that covered all the eight provinces in Kenya (with special emphasis on the conflict areas) with 1,600 interviews, yielding overall results that are accurate to within +/- 3 percent margin of error at 95% confidence level. This report presents the findings of the survey and offers comparative perceptions analyzed across provinces, age and sex, religion and even ethnic communities. The purpose of this research was to establish the status of conflict and peace situation in Kenya following 2007 post-election violence. The ICCO tool kit on Conflict transformation whose objective is to change negative relationships between the conflicting parties and the political social and economic factors that cause such conflict formed the basis of the research. Media Focus on Africa (MFAF) commissioned this survey in order to gauge public perceptions about the sources of conflict, both underlying and proximate, with a view to establishing the issues around which inter-communal dialogue and the search for common ground can be facilitated through media debates and public broadcasts.

1.1 Methodology The methodology used was that of sampling of given population groups using standard opinion polls standards. Questionnaires were administered to these selected respondents who were screened according to their gender, age and social class. 2.0 Key Findings

2.1 Evaluations of Socio-economic conditions and insecurity Kenyans express general disappointment with the socio-economic situation in the country and all the criteria used (availability of consumer goods, job opportunities, people’s standards of living, conflict between different groups, corruption of public officials and tribalism) were rated as worse than one year ago by huge margins. Kenyans are also gloomy about prospects for the country, and project the following will be worse: Table 1: Description of the Socio-Economic situation in Kenya Description of the Socio-Economic situation in Kenya

Worse/Much Worse (%)

Same (%) Better/Much, Better (%)

Availability of consumer goods 84.4 8.0 6.9 Availability of job opportunities 90.9 6.5 1.7 Gap between the rich and the poor 86.9 10.3 1.7 People’s living standards 81.5 12.1 5.2 Agricultural extension services 54.7 19.2 11.9



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Security situation in the community* 51.0 21.2 27.0 Conflict between different groups* 45.8 24.2 23.0 Corruption of public officials 90.1 5.3 3.1 Tribalism* 70.1 16.7 12.0 The table above shows that the young (35 and below) are more pessimistic about the future. Indeed, in 5 out of 6, variables measured related to the prospects for change in the socio-economic situation (including availability of consumer goods, job opportunities, people’s standards of living, conflict between different groups and tribalism), the young were more likely to see these as worsening by larger margins than the older. It is only in respect to corruption among public officials that the young were marginally more optimistic than the older folk.

Availability of consumer goods -84.4% Availability jobs -90.9% People’s standards of living -81.5% Corruption among public officials-90.1% Tribalism-70.1%

The findings suggest that Kenyans must frequently look to other sources other than their own individual efforts to secure their livelihoods. The fact that more use is made of social capital (53.7% borrowed from family and/or friends and 45% there is dependence on remittances from family working elsewhere) than is made of wages or salary is further evidence that a majority of Kenyans live in want at the periphery of the cash-economy.

2.2 Underlying structures that create ground for conflict The poll results indicate regionally specific parameters that are historical as leading to conflict. In areas, which have long ethnic tensions such as Rift valley (29.9%), Nairobi (28.9%), Western (20.8%), and Coast (32.1) consider ethnicity as the main source of conflict, while more ethnically homogeneous regions such as Nyanza view poverty (31.1%) and Central land (25.4%) as the main sources of conflict. According to the poll results, the underlying sources of conflict in Kenya include tribalism / ethnicity (22.7 percent), poverty (15.4 percent), politics (14.6 percents), land (10.6 percent), un-employment (8.1 percent and corruption (5.8 percent). Other causes of conflict are negative attitudes towards other tribes (4.8 percent) poor governance (4.2 percent), insecurity (3.2 percent), and inequality / unequal distribution of national resources (3.4 percent). According to the poll results, the underlying sources of conflict in Kenya include tribalism / ethnicity (22.7 percent), poverty (15.4 percent), politics (14.6 percents), land (10.6 percent), un-employment (8.1 percent) and corruption (5.8 percent). Other causes for conflict are negative attitudes towards other tribes (4.8 percent) poor governance (4.2 percent), insecurity (3.2 percent), and inequality / unequal distribution of national resources (3.4 percent). Figure 1: The perceived most important causes of conflict in Kenya



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Negative ethnicity is particularly is perceived as being critical in creating conflict. Indeed, tribalism/ethnicity scores very highly in view of the fact that even claims to land, political power, or resources are framed and understood in ethnic terms. As such, in Kenyan parlance, whether allocations of land to individuals in settlements are unfair, or key state jobs are given, it is the tribe rather than the individual that is respectively aggrieved or rewarded. Similarly, historical injustices in relation to land or even political marginalization and exclusion in national resource allocations are therefore primarily viewed from ethnic lenses, and it is the tribe that gains or loses, fights or negotiates politically. These perceptions are reinforced by instances of allocation of public resources such as employment opportunities on ethnic basis. (needs additional discussion especially raising issues of

2.3 More recent sources and triggers of conflict The main triggers of the post election violence that rocked the country are seen as the discredited results of the 2007 elections related to an outdated electoral process / system (33.4 percent), the fight for leadership / power (12.2 percent), ethnicity or tribal differences (11.0 percent), and incitement by political parties (10.2 percent).



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Table 2: Evaluating the Fairness of the 2007 Elections by province (percent) Evaluating the Fairness of the 2007 Elections by province (percent) N

airo

bi

Nya

nza

Rif

t V

alle

y

Cen

tral

Wes

tern

Eas

tern

Coa

st

Nor

th E

aste

rn

Ave

rage

Very unfair 58 70.5 66 35.2 68.3 44.2 36.4 34.5 55.5

Somewhat unfair

27.4 12 23.4 33.2 13.9 12.7 24.3 15.5 20.7

Fair 11.4 9.2 2.5 15.3 14.9 12.1 24.3 21.4 11.9Very fair 3.2 8.4 8.1 16.3 3 30.9 15 28.6 11.9 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 A majority of respondents in this survey (76.3 percent), reported that the past election was “very unfair or somewhat unfair,” with only 23.7 percent describing the election as “fair or very fair.” The most dissatisfied regions with the 2007 election results were Nyanza (70.5 percent), Western (68.3 percent), Rift Valley (66.0 percent), Coast (60.7%), and Nairobi (58.0 percent). These provinces also happen to be the ones where the ODM party won the majority of parliamentary seats as well as the presidential vote. Intriguingly, an equal proportion of people in North Eastern, that is about 50% each, consider the elections to have been either fair or unfair corresponding with the outcome of the outcome of the presidential vote in the province in the 2007 elections, which was almost evenly divided.

2.4 Main actors and instigators of the Conflict In general, politicians are identified as the main instigators of political violence in Kenya (32.6 percent), followed by political party supporters / agents (21.4 percent), indigenous ethnic groups (19.3 percent), security agents (9.4 percent), and members of other ethnic groups that have settled in different regions (9.4 percent). Thus, politicians and political party supporters account for over half (54%) of instigators of post-election violence. Table 3: Main instigators of violence by province (percent) Main instigators of violence by province (percent)

Nai

rob

i

Nya

nza

Rif

t V

alle

y

Cen

tral

Wes

tern

Eas

tern

Coa

st

Nor

th

Eas

tern

Politicians (e.g. MPs and Councillors)

88.5 83.5 95.0 91.8 92.0 55.1 91.2 89.3

Security forces 33.0 21.4 29.3 15.8 28.4 10.9 16.1 23.8 Provincial administrators

9.2 8.6 10.1 4.6 17.9 18.6 1.5 4.8

"Indigenous” 75.7 23.9 75.7 32.1 43.3 17.9 40.9 59.5



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ethnic groups * Political party agents/supporters

53.7 28.4 54.9 81.1 74.6 35.3 39.4 53.6

Members of ethnic groups that have settled in the region

23.9 12.8 44.8 21.4 14.9 20.5 11.7 16.7

Religious leaders/organizations

1.8 .8 3.5 4.6 5.5 10.9 3.6 2.4

Others 1.8 3.7 .3 .0 1.5 30.1 2.9 .0 Total respondents 218 243 317 196 201 156 137 84 Analysis by province shows that politicians are seen as the main instigators of violence in Rift Valley (95 percent), Western (92 percent), Central (91.8 percent), Coast (91.2 percent), North Eastern (89.3 percent), Nairobi (88.5 percent), Nyanza (83.5 percent) and Eastern (55 percent). Indigenous ethnic groups are considered the main instigators in Rift Valley and Nairobi (both at 75.7 percent), while security forces were considered key instigators of violence in Nairobi province (33 percent), with members of other ethnic groups who have settled in Rift valley (44.8 percent) also held responsible for instigating violence in that region.

2.5 Role of religion and religious leaders About one in four respondents (24.1 percent) think that religious leaders preached hatred between communities, while the majority (75.9 percent) thinks otherwise. The stronger one is committed to religion, the less likely they are to see the role of religious leaders in preaching hatred between communities. Not surprisingly, the highly committed to religion were the strongest advocates of a greater role for religious leaders in politics, with the moderately committed (67%), and the lowly committed (only 58%) following in descending order. Table 4: Impact of the Opinions of religious Leaders (percent) Religion Tota

l Participation on religious activities

Average

Muslim

Christian

Traditional

Others

Highly

Moderately

Lowly

Yes

17.1 25.1 40.0 23.1 24.2 22.3 28.8 33.3 24.0

No 82.9 74.9 60.0 76.9 75.8 77.7 71.2 66.7 76.0 The above Table illustrates that the stronger one is committed to religion, the less likely they are to see the role of religious leaders in preaching hatred between communities.



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Again, the results indicate that findings on this particular issue are much more dramatic when specific religions are brought into focus. For example, Muslims (17.1%) were the least likely to see the role of religious leaders in preaching inter-communal hatred, and adherents of traditional African religions most likely to see the role of religious leaders in preaching inter-communal hatred (40%), with Christians (25.1%) falling in between. More interesting however is the variation in perception by different religious groups’ especially traditional religious groups who have very strong feelings about tribalism / Nepotism as a major factor in conflict generation. Most traditional religious groups are culturally homogeneous and view conflicts is narrow ethnic terms while those national in character have milder responses such as Muslims (17.2%) and Christians (21.2%).

2.6 Role of Youth in the conflict and frustrations of youth The youth are mostly associated with negative things during the post election violence. These include looting and theft (46.9%), violent attacks and killings (31.6%), protests and blocking of roads (29.8%) and general destruction of physical infrastructure (12.6%). The youth were also associated with atrocities such as gang rape (9.0%). The youth are identified with some positive attributes, albeit by much smaller proportions during the conflict. For instance, it is noted that the youth organized for self-defence of communities and demanded for their rights. Significantly, it was also perceived that the youth were used by political leaders to get power by a considerable proportion of respondents (9.33%), meaning that their actions were not always spontaneous but often based on actual reward/payment, or the perception of potential material benefit. Table 5: Youth’s Role in Post Election Violence Youth’s Role in Post Election Violence Counts Percentage

of Cases Looting/Stole properties 718 46.9 Killings/Violent attacks 484 31.6 Protests/Blocked the roads 456 29.8 General destructions i.e. Railway line 193 12.6 Used by Leaders to get power 142 9.3 Gang rape 137 9.0 Fought against others 91 5.9 Self Defence 55 3.6 Issued threats 37 2.4 Demanded for the rights 34 2.2 Caused hatred 26 1.7 Brought Peace 25 1.6 Drug Abuse 4 0.3 Cattle rustling 5 0.3 The youth face many frustrations that render them very vulnerable to easy manipulation by politicians and this makes them an easy target for recruitment into political militias or criminal gangs that are used by politicians in the heat of elections or in the aftermath to cause violence, and then easily be dumped. The majority of youth languish in poverty, joblessness, and ignorance. The youth are frustrated by lack of jobs no wonder young school dropouts formed the majority of marauding gangs that caused the most mayhem



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during the post election violence. This frustration was expressed in various discussions with the youth during the course of this research.

2.7 Attitudes that breed conflict and the source of the attitudes Self-identity, tolerance and interpersonal trust, and perceptions of the mistreatment of communities’ vis-à-vis others, including common explanations or stereotypes around such explanations were also tested to provide insights into attitudes that may breed conflict. 24.8 percent identified themselves with tribe / ethnic group as the group they belonged to or identify with first. 20.9 percent of Kenyans identified with their occupational group or class, while another 38.9 percent did not suggest any grouping, implying that they are content to be identified as Kenyan. Another 11.9 percent preferred identification by religion with another 2.3 percent preferring the gender classification and 1.2 percent wished to identify by race. This is a major departure from a previous afro barometer finding in 2004, which registered a lower identification by ethnicity among Kenyans. Table 6: Treatment of Members of your community compared to others Treatment of Members of your community compared to others K

alen

jin

Kik

uyu

Lu

o

Lu

hya

Em

bu

/

Mer

u

Kam

ba

Kis

ii

Oth

ers

Tot

al

Much Worse 11.8 21.7 19.1 8.4 13.6 4.9 5.8 21.1 14.9Worse 33.3 32.7 29.2 28.0 18.6 17.3 30.2 29.1 28.6About the Same 36.6 34.7 33.2 46.7 22.0 35.2 44.2 32.9 36.5Better 8.1 4.7 7.9 8.8 13.6 12.3 14.0 5.5 8.1Much Better 4.3 0.7 5.1 1.9 1.7 2.5 1.2 0.4 2.3Don’t Know 5.9 5.7 5.4 6.1 30.5 27.8 4.7 11.0 9.7 Large sections of all the major communities, the Kikuyu (54.4%), the Luo (48.3%) the Kalenjin (45.1%), followed by the Luhya (36.4%) and the Kisii (36%) communities all see members of their communities as being treated worse than others, therefore defying assumptions about the “comfort” of those communities close to power, perhaps indicating that the perception of victim hood is a sentiment that is felt strongly across board. The communities that are widely held to be most disenchanted by the current political dispensation such as the Kalenjin and the Luo are most likely to explain their treatment as arising mainly from exclusion. The Kikuyu on the other hand explain their treatment vis-à-vis other communities as resulting primarily from tribalism (24.1%), and negative perceptions of other communities (20.2%) about them. Kenyans exhibit low inter-personal trust, even for members of their religion, whereas religion ought to be a high-trust institution. Low interpersonal trust often signifies weak commitment to democratic practice. Respondents were evenly divided (48.4% trust members of their congregation less, and 50.6% trust them more/equally to others).



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2.8 Consequences of conflict Both negative and positive consequences of conflict were identified. In order of priority, loss of lives (16.1 per cent), poverty (12.4 percent), loss of property (10.5 percent), displacement (6.1 percent), loss of job or unemployment (5.5 percent), insecurity (5.1), hatred of neighbours (4.9 percent) and entrenched tribalism (4.2 percent) were ranked as the most significant negative consequences. Figure 2: The negative consequences of conflict in Kenya

Among the positive consequences of the conflict, the highest ranking were for the greater respect/appreciation of Kenyan ethnic groups for another (cumulatively 25.1%), awareness of the importance of peace (20.7%), improved security (11.1%), and relative peace (10%). Other significant responses were greater pro-activeness/interventions of government (5.2%), the creation of jobs (4.4%), and people being more able to question their leader (3.1%). It was also noted that the conflict resulted in the sharing of power on 50: 50 basis. Given the magnitude of violence experienced in the recent past, this survey sought to establish if there was anything that would be considered a positive development in Kenya arising from the conflict experienced following the disputed 2007 elections. Conflict is analyzed here as an opportunity that triggered positive changes and the results are summarized in table 23.



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Table 7: Positive Consequences of conflict in Kenya Positive Consequences of conflict in Kenya

Percentage

Kenyans became aware of the importance of peace 20.7 Kenyans now appreciate each other more than before 15.5 There is improved security 11.1 There is relative peace 10.0 Kenyans respect each other across the various ethnic groups 9.6 Government has become more proactive / interventions 5.2 Jobs have been created 4.4 The cost of living has improved 3.3 People can question their leaders / demand accountability 3.1 Created Coalition Government in which power is shared 50:50 3.1 Construction of roads 3.1 People now know of their rights 2.2 Realized that leadership does not belong to one tribe 1.7 100

2.9 Current Human rights situation The poll findings, but more so the focus group discussions reveal that the most challenging human rights problem in Kenya today is related to the predicament of Internally Displaced Persons. In many of the areas worst affected by post election violence, IDPs continue to live in dehumanizing conditions, unable to fully regain their livelihoods and relate harmoniously with neighbours. Table 8: Human Rights Situation: What has been done for the IDPs? Human Rights Situation: What has been done for the IDPs?

Percentage

Compensated in monetary form 15.3 Established / settled in the IDP camps 14.3 Their human rights were violated including being sexually assaulted

14.2

Supported by humanitarian agencies / bodies including local NGOs

12.3

Personal intervention by citizens 12.0 Resettled in the former farms 10.1 Were forcefully evicted from the camps 9.0 Given free farm in-puts 6.4 Repatriated to ancestral homes 6.0 Kenyans are evenly split in the manner in which IDPs have been treated. 52.4 percent express satisfaction (very / moderately satisfied) with the manner in which they have been treated, another 47.3 percent say that they are either very or just dissatisfied with the manner in which IDPs have been handled. The people of Central are the least satisfied (27.4 percent) and also most dissatisfied (72.7 percent) with the manner in which the IDP question has been handled followed by Eastern province (70.1 percent) and Nairobi province (60.3 percent).



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2.10 Actors in Conflict Resolution and their performance Respondents gave better rating to a number of actors ranking them as having “done very well / well”). These include civil society organizations NGOs / CBOs (81.6 percent), media (76.6 percent), religious leaders (76.2 percent), and elders (62.1 percent) or “very well or well” for their performance in addressing inter-communal conflicts following the post election violence. The concerted action by media houses in calming the nation down with messages of peace and the refusal by some to air the more disturbing images from the post election violence may have contributed to its positive rating, even though the role of media (particularly vernacular stations) in fanning hatred is widely acknowledged. Table 9: Performance of Peace Actors in resolving Inter-communal conflicts (percent) Performance of Peace Actors in resolving Inter-communal conflicts (percent)

Done Very well

Done well

Done poorly

Done very poorly

Don’t know/NR

NGOs / CBOs or community orgs

39.8 41.8 3.7 2.8 11.9

Media 39.2 37.4 8.6 5.0 9.9 Religious leaders 28.4 47.8 9.7 4.2 9.9 Elders 17.2 44.9 14.6 7.1 16.3 Government officials (Provincial administrators- chiefs, Dos, DCs PCs)

11.1 37.3 24.3 16.4 11.0

Police 7.2 22.9 31.9 31.9 6.2 Courts 4.7 19.4 30.1 23.9 22.0 Elected leaders (parliamentarians and councillors)

4.4 96 26.9 48.4 10.8

Political parties 2.4 8.9 30.1 45.1 13.5 Various arms of the government were largely rated as having performed “poorly or very poorly” in their effort to resolve inter-communal conflicts. The contribution of elected political leaders and their parties has been largely ineffective in resolving conflict, given that they get, 75.3 percent and 75.2 percent respectively as actors that have performed “poorly or very poorly” in helping restore peace between communities.

2.11 Potential for Future Conflict and Early Warning Signs There are regional variations in responses to perceptions about potential for future conflict with provinces that witnessed violence and had sympathies for ODM tending to express such fears more at between 37.4% for rift valley to Nairobi at 72.9%. 44.6 % of those interviewed reported that they foresee situations leading to conflict in future while 55.4 percent think otherwise. This finding suggests that even though the power sharing deal between ODM and PNU managed to restore some degree of peace and the coalition is still holding, the future is still uncertain given that the root causes of the violence have



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not been properly addressed (i.e. land distribution, inequality, constitutional review, ethnic cohesion, electoral system) etc Table 10: The early warning signs of conflict The early warning signs of conflict Percentag

e Tribalism / formation of tribal alliances by leaders 22.4 Dissatisfaction with the current government and its leadership 18.6 Insecurity 8.4 Famine and the rising food prices 5.9 Corruption 5.7 Greedy leaders 5.3 Problems facing residents are yet to be addressed 5.1 Stolen elections 5.0 Unemployment 4.9 High cost of living 4.7 The growth of vigilante groups 3.6 Land issues 3.0 Politicking and hate speeches by political leaders 1.9 Drug abuse 1.6 Unfair distribution of national resources 1.1 Refusal of the settled tribes to move out of the illegally acquired land

0.9

The Hague / ICC issues 0.6 Overpopulation 0.6 Potential sources of future conflict include, tribalism (21.2 percent) which still remains a big issue among communities, with another 17.9 percent reporting dissatisfaction with the current government arrangement, and another 5 percent noting that bitterness arising from the allegedly stolen presidential elections in 2007 has not died down.



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2.12 Solutions to Violent Conflict and the Search for Common Ground Asked to suggest what can be done to create common ground and address the above sources of conflict, the highest proportion (cumulatively 19%) would want to see better relations between communities established through among other things, improvement in understanding between people, curbing of tribalism and encouraging inter-communal marriages. The next highest proportion (a cumulative 17.4%) wanted historical injustices around land and inequality addressed (including through equitable sharing of national resources, the establishment of Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission, and addressing land issues). About 14.3 percent want the government to create jobs, and another 13.1% would like to see government playing its role more effectively and leading peace efforts, co-existence and reconciliation efforts by example. The role of leaders was also given strong weight, with a cumulative 6% advocating that leaders work together and their statements be regulated.

3.0 Analysis of the key opinion poll findings The Poll survey confirmed most findings of the Desk Review. To this regard, several analytical points can be adduced. First, as a state Kenya is vulnerable to constant and persistent forms of violence. These violence forms are linked to the country’s ethnic composition as well as its socio-economic indicators. The Poll findings suggest that there is increasing divide between the rich and the poor. Politics and economics are dominated by a minority group of powerful wealthy individuals while the majorities languish in the margins of despair. Specifically, the Youth who are the majority age group in the country remain generally pessimistic about the future. The pessimism by the youth is largely due to the increasingly worsening soci0-econiomic conditions. Unemployment, poverty and state’s official corruption and bad economic governance have all conspired against the promise of a bright future for the Kenyan youth. Second, the critical underlying factors for the Kenyan post-election violence were unresolved historical injustices concerning land ownership that successive Kenyan regimes not only failed to address, but also exacerbated for political reasons. In Kenya, land remains a very sensitive and emotive issue. Many of the 42 ethnic communities view land from a cultural and social perspective. Land defines communities’ identity and power. Furthermore, land is not just an economic resource but a deeply held and revered cultural gem and heritage. It is from a given geographical land that a community delineates its boundary. Thus, it is common for land in Kenya to be regarded as ancestral. Yet, since independence, many communities have migrated beyond what was and has been perceived as their ancestral land Third, the Poll findings confirm the generally held perception of low confidence in the institutions of governance. While Kenyans demonstrated faith in the democratic electoral process by registering as voters in large numbers and indeed, by turning out to vote in equally large numbers, many voters remain disillusioned with the result and hold the view that the election was stolen. Specifically, the Poll survey confirms the widely held perception that the presidential polls resulted was unfair. The implication of this finding is the low confidence that Kenyans have in their institutions of governance. The findings



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of the Kriegler report exposed institutional weakness and patronage in the ECK a key indicator of degree of political interference, weak institutional and organization setup that characterise governance institutions in Kenya. These maladies have led to confidence crisis with regard to institutions of governance and made them natural sites and triggers of conflict Fourth, the form and substance of Kenya’s politics is largely characterised by ethnic consideration, patronage, and occasional anarchy. Political power competition is strictly determined by ethnicity and not ideology or the majoritarian principle. Politics finds its expression through ethnic codification and language. Ethnicity is the tool that is used for recruiting, mobilizing, strategizing, planning, and executing political matters in the country. Over the years, this phenomenon has essentially weakened the national fabric. Elections have often served to advance the ethnic polarization in the country. The 2007 elections were held in an atmosphere of deepened ethnic schism with many political parties recruiting their membership along strict ethnic considerations. The strong ethnic feeling is also characterised by a deep perception of victim-hood cutting across all Kenyan communities Fifth, human rights situation post 2007/8 in Kenyan remains dire. Incidences of extra judicial killings especially by the security personnel remain a reality1. Related to the PEV, the most challenging human rights problem in the country is manifest in the manner in which the whole question of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) has been managed by the government. The IDPs predicament is one which is both dire and desperate. IDPs continue to live in dehumanizing conditions, unable to fully regain their livelihoods and relate harmoniously with neighbours. Sixth, politics as a major source of conflict and politicians, political parties and agents as the main instigators of post-election violence. The post-election violence was part of a conflict between politicians played at both national and local level. At the national level, the different political antagonist, most importantly the Party of National Unity (PNU) and their archrival ODM (Orange Democratic Movement) disagreed, which was manifested in various political statements and exchanges at the national level. At local level, the conflict was fought more violently, more physically and with deadly weapons. Rival political groups evicted their perceived rivals from their homes, properties were set ablaze, and many were killed in the aftermath. Battles for political supremacy in various parts of the country followed. Seventh, the post-election violence revealed the weakness of state formation. While Kenya had been perceived as a strong democratizing country, its institutions of governance remained in fact weak, fragmented, corrupt, and unable to deal with underlying causes of conflict and the emerging violence. Successive Kenyan regimes politicized state institutions and used the various offices as political tools for maintaining a system of patronage. The corruption at highest level of governance created a political, economic, and social barrier between the citizens and their rulers. In the post-election violence, it became clear that citizens refused to recognize the state institutions and legal mechanism for addressing their differences and instead decided to demonstrate their anger by attacking the state and its apparatus. Anger was significantly directed at the state and its symbols



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Lastly, the Poll survey in general confirms that the post-election violence, however, also motivated very few positive change processes. On the one hand, it increased the momentum for the need for reviewing the country’s constitution. The relevant constitutional amendments were passed by parliament in 2008, which was setting the stage for an eventual review and possibly enactment of a new constitution for the country. On the other hand, it led to a negotiated democracy that has institutionalized power sharing as a possible antidote for weak democracies like Kenya. The critique towards the model of negotiated democracy has been summarised earlier in this article. Nevertheless, the positive element of this model of governance is its semblance of inclusiveness. The Grand Coalition is curved along ethnic consideration as much as political power bargaining amongst the political elites. This situation has contributed to some modicum of stability in the otherwise fragile and weakened Kenyan state. The formation of the Grand Coalition suggests an emergent political reality that opens the opportunity that Kenya will be ruled by coalitions and thereby could eliminate the culture of the ‘winner take it all’. Additionally, it led to the passage of significant pieces of legislation especially dealing with National Reconciliation, though they have yet to be filled with substance through implementation. Fourth, it heightened the need for dealing with historical issues and injustices thus importing national reconciliation as strategy for governance. A Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation commission (TJRC) will be instituted in 2009 and will deal with historical injustices and the culture of impunity. Lastly, the performance and weakness of government and its institution of governance has become a focus as result of the conflict. Institutions such as the disgraced Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) have since been disbanded and there is debate about the need for reforms in the security sector. In addition, there is greater appreciation of peace among Kenyans. In sum, the Poll finding suggest that the current atmosphere of modicum of peace is temporary truce unless and until all factors that informed PEV and its attendant triggers are fully addressed. In addition, it is important that the provisions of the National Accord and Reconciliation Act be fully implemented together with the provisions of Agenda 4. The country needs to make a deliberate and firm departure from the dark past that continues to shadow the promises of a bright future. Until, individuals and state and state actors take responsibility and actively participate in addressing the dark past, the promises of the future will not be realised.



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Section C - Focus group discussion report 1.0 Introduction MFAF commissioned Strategic Research Limited to undertake qualitative research in the various locations to establish the level of impact of the interventions among test groups. The qualitative approach was utilized in order to get an in-depth understanding of the views and perception of the people on other tribes and what they see as the root causes of the conflicts. The choice of composition of the focus group discussions in various locations was informed by the events during the post-election violence and an understanding of which groups were major players and influencers of the violence. The FGD took place in eight study locations across the country including Kibera, Mathare, Kisumu, Nakuru, Eldoret, Naivasha, Mumias, and Mombasa. A total of 94 respondents participated in this survey.

1.1 Research objective MFAF has commissioned Strategic Research Limited to undertake qualitative research in the various locations to establish the level of impact of the interventions among test groups.

1.2 Scope and methodology Qualitative Interviews – The qualitative approach was utilized in order to get an in-depth understanding of the views and perception of the people on other tribes and what they see as the root causes of the conflicts. Focus group discussions as a research method were used. This approach allows MFAF to understand the mind sets of the different categories of target population and how they view their relationships with people from different ethnic communities. FGDs are discussions with 6-12 respondents using pillar guide questions that address the objectives of the study. The discussions were directed by qualified and experienced moderators from Strategic Research. FGD participants were recruited from the population who have access to Citizen Television and therefore able to view the programs when they are aired. Strategic liaised with MFAF to recruit participants through the CBOs they are working with on the ground. The basis for recruitment was access to Citizen TV and the program. However, the recruitment also took cognizance of other demographics including:

‐ Age ‐ Gender ‐ Ethnic background

The choice of composition of the FGDs in various locations was informed by the events during the post-election violence and an understanding of which groups were major players and influencers of the violence. The scope of the FGD was based on the effect of the 2007/8 Post Elections Violence that was witnessed in various parts of Kenya. The choice of the eight study locations was deliberate i.e. areas chosen for the study witnessed the worst cases of the PEV. Accordingly, the settings of the FGD included, Kibera, Mathare, Kisumu, Mombasa, Mumias, Eldoret, Nakuru, and Naivasha. In Kibera for instance, youths were the main players in the post-election violence and both organized and perpetrated the violence.



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Even though the violence affected women perhaps more than any other group, the situation on the ground was and is still today dictated by the youths. On the one hand, while youths also played an active role in Mathare, the effect on the women as families were evicted overshadowed the role played by the youth in escalating the violence. It is for this reason that FGDs will focus on youths and women in Kibera and Mathare respectively. On the other hand, the roles played by the youths in Kisumu and Nakuru as well as the effects of the violence on women in Eldoret and Naivasha necessitates that for the same reason, similar groups are chosen to form the FGDs in these towns. In Kakamega, Mombasa, and Nakuru, the role of men in directing the cause of violence has been documented. In Mombassa, the role of men in cooling tensions due to their religious influence makes them key participants in FGDs. In Kakamega, traditional Male dominance gives them a special place in community issues while in Nakuru, the historical land question and which has been the centre of inter-ethnic conflicts in the region has largely been handled and dictated by Makes. 2.0 Key findings of the focus group discussion

2.1 Perception of critical issues facing the country Voices of the respondents on perception of critical issues facing Kenya. “They lied to us that children will get free education” Mathare At the national level, the critical issues mentioned revolved around food shortage, environmental degradation and the economic recession. When asked for the most important issue facing Kenya today the respondents mentioned; Table 1: Critical issues facing Kenyans Issues affecting the whole country Issues affecting area/location of study Poverty due to lack of resources (clean water, infrastructure) and lack of education

Unemployment thus crime and insecurity as youth are grouping to commit crime

Political and government breakdown/ poor governance due to corruption and disagreements of selfish, dishonest leaders

Tribalism, leading to fighting in Kibera and Mathare

Food shortage and lack of basic means of livelihood

Lack of love/hatred among people of different ethnicity and classes

Diseases such as HIV and Aids due to malnutrition and inadequate medical facilities

Inequitable use of resource leading to inadequate development in some areas such as CDF, port revenue

Environmental degradation particularly forests exacerbating environmental degradation and causing hunger due to rain failure

Low education standard due to broken families, inadequate schools and teachers for children

Tribalism in politics encouraging corruption and unemployment

Rampant narcotic use



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Clashes due to uneven resource allocation, greed by the wealthy, resource mismanagement by the powerful leading to the poor getting poorer. Regional disparities, poor land and agricultural policies

Lack of resources namely electricity, infrastructure, water and pastures

Ignorance leads to deception by politicians

Recession in the economy

Unemployment of mostly the youth leading to insecurity/crime attacks by idle youth anytime and fear by investors

Nepotism for example in awarding stores and tenders

Exploitation by employers Fear of investment as no knowledge of what might happen in 2012

Economic recession, increased prices and cost of living, low income

Presence of militia groups e.g. Mungiki undertaking murder and rape cases

Media exposing youth to indecent programmes and unwillingness of the youth to work hard in blue collar jobs

Female circumcision, early marriages and lack of priority in their education

Expensive education for youth, poor standards in public institutions and overpopulation in schools

Land problems,

Lack of national values and respect for fellow Kenyans

Kadhi laws on divorce frustrates men

Constitutional reforms

2.2 Perceptions on Kenyan politics Voices of citizens on what they like about the Kenyan politics “We like that they sat down and reconciled and peace came when they formed a coalition” Mathare When most respondents were asked for opinions on Kenyan politics, they described the political scenario as being very interesting. The table below shows the mentioned likes and dislikes on Kenyan politics Table 2: Likes and dislikes on Kenyan politics by respondents Likes on Kenyan politics Dislikes on Kenyan politics Kenya elects leaders through democracy. Existence of IDPs amidst political

wrangles Through reconciliation, Kenya was able to form a coalition government.

There is political disunity in the coalition leading to citizen's suffering and politics based on ethnicity

Youthful leaders are taking over political leadership

Politics of leadership based on tribe and succession rather than qualifications

Politics has improved from Moi era and a few politicians are doing their jobs

Constitutional loopholes where losers become president and issue of immediate swearing in

There is transparency as politicians disclose each other, and parliament

Recycling of past unreproductive politicians due to family and parties who



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sessions are live on television return them to powerThere is freedom of expression Selfish politicians don't want to pay taxesPeople are wiser and are electing promising politicians

Politicians exchange words, wash their dirty linen in public but do nothing about it, there is inadequate development as politicians do not work together

Politicians change the moment they are in power

Kenya should decrease parties from 300 to 2 or 3 avoiding family parties because they have same manifestos

In Kenya, there are heavy allowances for MPs while poverty persists

Youth paid by politicians to cause violence

2.3 Perceptions on multiculturalism Voices of citizens on acceptance of immigrants as community members “I am 43 years in this town. For sure I don’t know where Kiambu is; I thought I identify with this community until the other day when people started calling us wageni/visitors” Eldoret Respondents were asked on the criteria of belonging to a cosmopolitan community and acceptance of immigrants to the various localities. The responses included; According to the findings, persons are considered members of a community if;

• One is born and raised there or has lived there for a long time • One is a members of the majority tribe of that area • Depending on the role one plays in the community for example working for the

communities’ welfare • All who can identify with the problems of that area and shares same ideology • One of unquestionable character • Every tribe before post election violence • One with economic power to foot bills • Friends and people known in the locality • One who has bought land and developed the area

Table 3: Perceptions on multiculturalism Considerations based on birth/ marriage/ immigration

Acceptance of immigrants as community members

Intermarriage is a basis for acceptance Immigrants are acceptedDepends on the duration one has stayed in a locality, that is, for long and motive of the inhabitant

As long as the immigrant does not undermine the natives and follows their values, religion and cultures

The person must pass through a process and adopt the culture of the area

It is difficult due to suspicion about why one migrated from another place

Inhabitants who were in an area before post election violence

Immigrants who works in the specific locality



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Birth qualifies one as a member of the community

Immigrants are accepted because Kenyan land is meant for all not particular tribes

Change has to be gradual, as you get more generations Being cosmopolitan, people migrated into the area after white settlers so immigrants are considered members of the community From the study, the youth and older women are more accommodating than the older men accepting immigrants by virtue of staying in an area for a long time and developing the area. The men are stricter tying acceptance of immigrants to culture and marriage.

2.4 Perception of ethnicity/ ethnic communities Voices on perception of ethnicity “I am a kikuyu married to a Luo. During the PEV, I was ostracized by my husband’s relatives. I took my children and clothes and went to my place but some of my relatives disowned me saying I am married to the enemy” Kibera Most of the participants had experienced post election violence they described a few forms of the violence and discriminations as tabulated below. Table 4: Perception on ethnicity Ethnic violence experienced Instance of discrimination between

community and non-community memberWitnessed murder of one by another ethnic groupies kikuyu, Luos, Kalenjins, betrayal by friends and family

Beating of elders and burning of villages

Fighting and beatings between Luos and GEMA

Fighting among community members

Tribal discrimination by doctors and police

Assistance of fellow tribesmen from other communities e.g. in work places - Mijikenda in Kenya ferry

Rape and forced circumcision Division of estates on tribal lines Chasing of opposing tribes and wives married in community due to 'bad blood'

Sending of people to their ethnic homes during elections

Farm grabbed and home and businesses including Matatus, shops and livestock burnt

Incitement to warring communities by police and politicians

Locals turning against those from country side in 1997 forcing them to escape upcountry, from the coast till fighting was over

Marginalizing of kikuyu by Kalenjins and Luos and killing of Luos by Mungiki in pondamali,

In 1992, 1997 and 2007 where lives and property was lost

Luos being discriminated against because they do not undergo circumcision

Discrimination by in-laws and own relatives due to ethnicity

Breaking of marriages

Children were psychologically affected Refusal to sell land and property to



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due to violence certain communities and grabbing of opposing tribe's plots

Some people were forced to join fighting groups such as Mungiki

Parents talking ill of other tribes to their children e.g. kikuyu are thieves; Luhya eat too much among other stereotypes

2.5 Perception on enhanced national reconciliation among Kenyans In order to enhance national reconciliation among Kenyans respondents were asked for possibility of forgiveness and acceptance by perpetrators of violence as well as actions to be used to reconcile affected communities. The responses are tabulated below; Table 5: Enhanced national reconciliation among Kenyans Possibility of forgiveness and acceptance by perpetrators of violence

Actions to reconcile affected communities

Many respondents have forgiven but they do not dialogue and they feel that the leaders’ wrangles are reviving dis –unity.

Peace, reconciliation meetings, barazas and churches to promote reconciliation Politicians should concentrate on healing not politicking in public functions

Most respondents can only forgive, if the perpetrators seek forgiveness and the government compensates the victims

Forgiveness between Raila and Kibaki, should involve various leaders namely MPs and elders from different regions to meet, dialogue and make peace

Some respondents can forgive but they must first get the root of the problem through a reconciliation committee and dialogue between warring communities

Citizens shouldn't ape bad habits of leaders because the citizens are the ones who suffer

Those who lost property and loved ones say they can forgive but cannot forget and perpetrators must be punished or promise not to repeat the violence

Women should talk to the youth and spread peace

Some respondents can forgive as long as nationalism comes before tribalism

Compensation of victims by the government and prosecution of offenders. Also provision of job opportunities to the youth and to victims of the violence to help in rebuilding lives

Other respondents say that it is not easy to forgive due to lack of dialogue

Reduce MPs salary to reduce their desire to cause mayhem

Some respondents cannot forgive due to a lot of tribal incitement and threats they feel that there is still a lot of hatred for kikuyu by Kalenjins leading to fear

Opinion leaders and the academia should come up with their resources and experience to be used in redeeming the country

Leaders should resolve land issue for example a few people like Lord Delamere owning a whole province and resettle all the IDPs



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Educate all communities on peace, love and unity through the media which should highlight all the peace initiatives

Most of the respondents are willing to forgive but with conditions such as the perpetrators owning up to their offences, and the government compensating the PEV victims. The actions to be undertaken for reconciliation are focused on the need to bring together warring communities and engaging them in dialogue so as to address the underlying issues

2.6 Root causes of conflict Voices on root causes of conflict “Mt Kenya region people feel they alone can be leaders yet they have bad leadership” “Appointing of leaders based on friendship Malice between tribes Hatred, don’t want a leader from another community” Nakuru Consistent with the findings from the Desk Study Research and that of the Poll, the causes associated with the Post Elections Violence revolved around the historical socio-political and economic factors. The FGD reports show that the causes of the PEV included:

• Poverty leading to hatred for wealth of neighbour • Election fraud such as incompetence in vote counting; Kikuyu stealing votes and

Luos looting/PNU and ODM conflict • Unemployment thus idleness • Land ownership issues, rich own land that they leave lying idle and the poor

invade and live in land that does not belong to them, colonialists divided land unfairly

• Lack of focus and incitement by leaders and hate language in campaigns, political rallies contributed 70% of animosity

• Past grudges and rumours • Tribalism and voting based on tribe. • Bad politics even in our homes • Insecurity • Drug abuse • Unequal distribution of wealth and resources such as the issue of Kikuyu owning

all houses causing anger among the Luos • Media highlighting extremes of communities causing tension • Illiteracy

The root causes of conflicts are linked to underlying socio-economic issues, politics and incitement and bribery by leaders. This is expressed across all ages. Table 6: Root causes of conflicts National causes of conflicts Local causes of conflictsFighting for power e.g. president and prime minister yet election year is far

Poverty when one has and another lacks

Economic disempowerment for minority tribes

Unemployment thus idleness



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Ignorance and illiteracy so Kenyans believe in bribery to vote for a party

Income disparity and need to bridge the economic gap

Poverty, thus some tribes thinks successful tribes are overshadowing them

Deep seated hatred among different ethnic communities

Poor leadership that is the use of divide and rule strategy

Fighting for shared resources

Land grabbing in post colonial era by kikuyu

Jealousy for tribes who came poor in a region and later became rich

The root causes of conflicts are socio-economic in nature both at the national and local levels. This is manifested in terms of distribution of resources and political inclinations.

2.7 Sources of information on matters of ethnic relations and nationhood Table 7: Sources of information on matters of ethnic relations and nationhood What informs you on matters of nationhood?

What informs you on matters of ethnic relations?

Television Programme on ethnic conflict

Leaders’ speeches Reporters from the community

Fist to five

Print and electronic media namely newspapers, television

Print and electronic media namely; newspapers, television and radio

Louis Otieno live'

Public meetings e.g. Fund drives

Sports bringing communities together e.g. world cross country

Makutano Junction'

Interrelation with other communities e.g. Schooling

Rumours and tales from friends

K24'

Civil societies Civil societies Agenda kenya in KBC Churches and mosques Politicians when they are

campaigning in rallies The team

National day celebrations e.g. Jamuhuri, Madaraka

Parents in homes

Uraia

Barazas, word of mouth Barazas and youthmeetings

Moving the masses

The media and politicians were mentioned as a source of information on ethic relations and nationhood.

2.8 Cohesion among Kenyans Voices on cohesion among Kenyans “As a Luo, I am happy that even if I live here if anything happens, I will go back home unlike kikuyu and Kalenjins who settle permanently in town” Nakuru “Luo have Wife inheritance and burial rites” Nakuru “The Luos are arrogant and proud. The pride is excess” Nakuru The survey sought to find out the cohesion and tolerance levels amongst different Kenyan ethnic communities. Stereotypes amongst communities, misinformation, and rumours influence inter communities’ relations and perceptions related to the same. According to the FGD findings, cohesion amongst community members was



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significantly weak especially due to stereotypes and misinformation related to the cultural practices between and amongst communities. Table 8: Cohesion among Kenyans Differences between ethnic communities

Offensive practices by different ethnic communities

Are other communities better off and why?

For Luos and Luhya - Sons cannot live or marry in their fathers rural homes Luo mothers cannot sleep in the same house of a married son / daughter Luos and others can help but kikuyu never help others Luos involved in fishing Luos bury their dead at home while kikuyu bury anywhere Luos are polygamists and feel they are more superior and learned Luo wife inheritance and payment of dowry Taboos in planting that the first person plants first then the rest follows

Payment of dowry in cattle form among the Luo while in cash in other tribes Luo beliefs that women have to sleep with their husbands before shaving children and a week after child birth Wife inheritance Luo men can’t marry a woman plus her children Belief in praying only and not hospitalizing sick people Expensive burial ceremonies in western Kenya tribes

Luos are learned people

Luhya practice circumcision on men as Luos pluck six teeth

In Luhya land the child belongs to the father while for Kisiis the child belongs to the mother

Luhya know how to fend for their families

Mungiki who are mostly kikuyu circumcise women Kikuyu acquire leadership positions in even foreign territories Some tribes have superiority complex and feel superior i.e. kikuyu Kikuyu are said to be thieves, so we aren't to marry from them

Kikuyu recruiting young people to join Mungiki Senseless divorces after short periods Arrogance by some tribes who speak to everyone in their vernacular

Kikuyu don’t have to bury at rural home nor slaughter in burials Kikuyu and Kambas don't have many beliefs Kikuyu are rich and hardworking Kikuyu and Kalenjins both produced presidents and were



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thus favoured Kambas can circumcise younger children unlike Kikuyu Kambas were mostly neutral during elections and not fighting

Belief in ‘kamute’ or love portion

Kambas can marry cousins’ thus spreading wealth in house.

More farmers than others i.e. Kisii

Dependence on sorcerers Kisiis ask for too much dowry e.g. 400000 while Nandi are fairer

Maasais are humble in nature Wife sharing among the Maasai

The respondents mostly described the differences between the larger ethnic communities as shown on the table above. For the other tribes they generally said that there are no problems between Luos and Kalenjins; there are different religions that is, Christians in Nyanza and Muslims in north eastern; dress codes that define one's ethnicity; Women and men sitting separately during weddings in different cultures; different languages spoken and variety in food preference e.g. matoke for Kisiis. Most of the respondents seem to have stereotypes depicting particular ethnic communities. Some of the cultural practices associated with particular tribes are not necessarily true but depending on their ethnic communities’ the perceptions are entrenched and further compounded by parents who stereotype tribes to their children.

2.8 Suggestions on inter-ethnic interactions The different forms of interethnic interactions suggested included; Table 9: Perceptions on inter-ethnic interactions Acceptable forms of inter-ethnic interaction

Unacceptable forms of inter-ethnic interaction

Intermarriages among communities Peace brokers should go to all areas rather than selected individuals and spread peace to all tribes

Intertribal festivals e.g. sports, games, fundraisings, clean up exercises, Religious affairs, church meetings

Regulate tribal radio stations, organizations and football teams since Interactions via vernacular mostly create animosity.

Intertribal groups and meetings promoting unity and development e.g. Maendeleo ya Wanawake

Discourage exploitation by certain tribes e.g. kikuyu

Seminars and workshops on importance of co-existence, and poverty eradication

Get rid of destructive beliefs such as use of mother tongue in an area with many tribes

Introduce quota system for equal employment. Find jobs to avoid idleness

Discourage forced practices on other communities e.g. circumcision



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and do business together Discourage tribalism and encourage Kenyaness. There is need for decency on how people relate and talk i.e. 'matharau'

Dissuade trying to take over all land for oneself in area other than yours leaving others without any

Land owners to accommodate all tribes Discourage use of derogatory language e.g. wale wajaluo

Resettlement of IDPs Forming reconciliation groups only in times of conflict

Ensuring interethnic balance in school selections

Unfair distribution of resources

Most of the respondents suggested that intermarriages and intertribal festivals are acceptable. They also suggested that there should be interethnic balance in schools through the quota system and there should be promotion of Kenyaism rather than ethnicity.

2.9 Source of greatest fear in Kenya Table10: Sources of greatest fear across age groups Sources of greatest fear by the youth aged 20-28

Sources of greatest fear by men aged 29 and above

Sources of greatest fear by women aged 29 and above

Eruption of tribal violence come 2012

Eruption of election violence come the next general election and use of Young people by politicians to cause chaos come 2012

Eruption of election violence come the next general election in 2012

Increase in insecurity in some areas

Poverty Becoming IDPs again

Corruption where there is unequal distribution of resources

Increase in corruption in the country

Land grabbing

Tribalism

Tribalism That kikuyu have never forgiven other tribes perceived to be against them

Dirty politics Insecurity Economic recession Increase in Unemployment rate

Disintegration of our country along regions

Kenya becoming divided along tribal lines

Increase in poverty levels

Religious leaders have becoming politicians.

Political divisions where politicians fight among themselves instead of focusing on developments



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The source of greatest fear in Kenya is eruption of violence in the next general elections come 2012. This is felt across all age groups. Other sources of fear is increase in corruption, increase in unemployment rates among others. Most of the older women fear becoming IDPs again. 3.0 Analysis of the focus group discussion findings

3.1 Perceptions on Kenyan politics Democracy thrives in part when the publics are knowledgeable about their chosen governments, participate in governance and collectively decide on the policies that will guide both their (re)actions and that of their government. Central to democratic governance is thus the degree to which citizens participate in decisions that involve acquisition and redistribution of political and economic goods. Simply, the degree of participation and perception about politics is an important indicator of democratic governance. The FGDs study report suggests mixed reaction with regard to perception about politics. On the one hand, most of the respondents dislike the status of Kenyan politics associating it with tribalism, bribery and a disconnect between politicians and the common citizen. On the other hand, Kenyan politics is described positively by some respondents as being open and improving bench marked against the previous Moi regime. Most Kenyans are actively engaged and informed about both positive and negative sides of politics. For instance, when most respondents were asked for opinions on Kenyan politics, they described the political scenario as being ‘very interesting’. The study additionally suggests in-depth analytical knowledge of salient issues that inform politics in Kenya. These issues include personalities, the question of nation unity, quality, and type of leadership, the question of the youth, political parties, and governance reform agendas such as the need for constitution review. The implication of these findings is that there are prospects for building a viable democracy based on the increasingly interesting and open Kenyan politics.

3.2 Sources of political information Key to building a sustainable democracy is the issue of political socialization through an effective open and participatory political information. During the on going multiparty era various channels of political information have emerged. Key sources of political information include print and electronic media; airing of parliamentary proceedings; new media; political rallies; religious institutions and the emergent civil society organizations. The media has however emerged as a critical player in political education. Both print and electronic media continue to play important role in both informing, educating and crystallizing issues necessary for democratic governance. The media has innovatively developed products such as talk shows, drama series, as well as the live coverage of parliamentary proceedings as a way of opening up the political space for debate and dialogue. Notably, the PEV has provided opportunity for debate on the underlying issues that led to the post 2007/8 crises and its impact on democracy and development. Free media is important indicator for thriving democracy. Additionally, the vibrancy of the emergent civil society groups as well as the reality that Faith Based Organizations openly



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debate political issues is a key indicator of the degree to which stability, peace and democratic development can be secured.

3.3 Citizenship, Nationhood and Identity The PEV significantly contributed to the change in perception with regard to the question of citizenship, nationhood vis- a-vis ethnic identity. While the period before the 2007 most Kenyans youth were happy to identify themselves as citizens, the PEV led to retreat to ethnicity as only identity source. Thus, ethnicity plays a very important part in the social, economic, and political arrangement in the country. To be sure, since independence, ethnicity has been used as a platform upon which political and economic decisions are made. Partly because of the historical reasons, ethnicity has been used as the preferred mode of identification. The ethnic comes first before the question of citizenship. The concept of citizenship and nationhood identity is one, which has consistently withered since independence in 1963. The FGD Report indicates significant crisis of confidence with regard to the perception towards nationhood and citizenship. While the findings were varied with regard to age, the FGD report suggest that PEV significantly impacted on the youth with most retreating from sense of nationhood to that of using ethnicity as the basic foundation of their identity. Reasons offered by those who favor ethnicity as preferred platform for identification point to the state failure in guaranteeing security, peace, justice and fairness with regard to management of political and economic resources. For instance, those Kenyans who favor ethnic background as basis for identity cite several reasons as justification for their position. However, as results of the PEV, varied responses obtained from the FGD with regard to the issue of ethnicity, citizenship, and nationhood. For instance, those who favor citizenship argue that PEV has led to the fear of one identifying with his/her ethnic community. The reasons offered are borne more out fear as opposed to understanding legal and constitutional guarantees of citizenship. Several reasons explain why PEV led to solidification of ethnicity as preferred mode of identification. First, political indifferences and incitement among leaders of different ethnic communities. Second, need for collective community safety and security is cited as a reason. Individuals find safety as members of a given ethnic community as opposed to being citizens of the nation-state. Third, the violence associated with elections in Kenya has forced communities to retreat in their ethnic cocoons. Lastly, the fear associated with the expected 2012 elections has led many Kenyans to elevate their ethnic identity as strategic measure for collective security and safety. Central to the nation-state building is a question of citizenship. Citizenship is guaranteed sense of identity and belonging through natural, legal and constitution safeguards. For multi ethnic nation-states like Kenya, there has been competing corpus of knowledge is as far as the understanding of identity typology is concerned. A priori, culturally people from most communities in Kenya prefer to be identified by the ethnic background. Citizenship identity has historically been ascribed by the state through the issuance of Identity Cards upon one acquiring majority age. However, it is important to note that PEV presented many communities with multiple challenges of identity. The effects of PEV have contributed to the mixed feelings in as far as the question of identity is concerned. Arising from the FGD, four main issues obtain from the FGD report.



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First is the problem of widespread citizens’ denial about their nation-state identity. The FGD report confirm that there is a sense of nationhood mostly by adults who posses national Identity Cards. Accordingly, it can be inferred that PEV further confirms that fact citizens lack sufficient knowledge about the benefits and responsibilities that obtain with citizenship. Additionally, the fact that most Kenyans do not identify as citizens suggest that schools, mass media, official institutions and other channels of public information have generally failed to provide people with adequate information with regard to citizenship and nationhood. A second source of lack on nationhood loyalty and confidence in ethnic identity relates to lack of state’s responsibility to protect her citizens’ and their properties. Security and safety of all citizens is cardinal responsibility of any government. The PEV exposed many individuals and communities. While the irony exists that most victims of PEV were targeted based on their ethnicity, the perception of most Kenyans is that ethnic community provides collective sense of security and safety. It is within ethnic community that individuals are able to exercise collective self-determination and access sites of decision making, involve themselves (in) directly in the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of public policy through various channels including elections. A third general shortfall with regard to nation-state building vis-à-vis increase in ethnic identity in part as result of PEV arises from the ethnic and structural inequalities that continue to pervade Kenya. Different communities in Kenya perceive that they do not have equivalent chances sufficient for them to identify themselves as citizens of the republic of Kenya. The ethnic inequalities is largely due to historical accidents of how, where and when persons were born. As a result the structural and ethnic inequalities that is reality across generation and across various ethnic groups in Kenya, strong feelings of ethnic identity as opposed to nation-state identity is reproduced, if not exacerbated, embedded structures of domination and subordination between the state and its citizens and amongst various competing ethnic groups. The PEV simply confirmed the uncomfortable reality that Kenya is increasingly a state deeply divided along sharp ethnic divide that is struggling to be a nation-state where all citizens feel equal and have enduring sense of belonging.

3.4 Perceptions on multiculturalism Multi culturalism as concept is not one that is fully accepted by most communities in Kenya. Consistent with deep sense of ethnic loyalty and identity, the FGD findings suggest that the concept of multiculturalism is narrowly understood within socio-cultural confines. Accordingly, multi culturalism is defined by birth, cultural orientation; ascribed roles in the society, embracing ethnicity as the supreme ideology, marital status and ownership or residence in particular communally defined boundaries. Consequently, when it comes to acceptance of immigrants, conditionalities exists. These conditions include such factors as inter marriage, conformity as opposed to cultural relatively and acceptance for ethnic diversity, enculturalization. However, the FGD reports suggest mixed feeling with regard to the question of immigrants. There is both a sense of acceptance and rejection of immigrants. Additionally, the FGD study suggest that the youth and older women are more accommodating than the older men accepting immigrants by virtue of staying in an area for a long time and developing the area. The



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men are stricter tying acceptance of immigrants to culture and marriage. Immigrants are consequently less accepted beyond their original communal boundaries. Significantly omitted is the place of education, common language, modernity aspects as industrialization and urbanization as factors necessary in deepening understanding of multi culturalism. As was with the question of ethnic identity vis- a -vis nationhood, the PEV simply withered the attempts and or gains that had been achieved with regard to multiculturalism. In the immediate aftermath of the PEV, most communities have become more protective, reclusive and intermarriage is discouraged. 3.5 The question of national reconciliation The question of effective and lasting national reconciliation remains largely elusive. Whereas there are signs of acceptance and reconciliation especially in cities like Nairobi and Mombasa, doubts continue to exist with regard to comprehensive national reconciliation. The findings of the FGD study suggest that a section of Kenyans will only forgive conditional to root causes of conflict being addressed and perpetrators seeking forgiveness and or facing justice. In some instances, forgiveness and reconciliation remains elusive especially manifest in continued deep-seated hatred and fear amongst communities most affected and involved in PEV. Additionally, according to the FGD study report, most of the respondents are willing to forgive but with conditions such as the perpetrators owning up to their criminal acts and the government compensating the PEV victims. The actions to be undertaken for reconciliation are focused on the need to bring together warring communities and engaging them in dialogue so as to address the underlying issues. The above findings obtaining from the FGD suggests a state of fragility and potential instability in the nation-state. Consequently, there is urgent need for priority measures and actions to be undertaken to comprehensively promote inter ethnic healing, peace and national reconciliation. It is equally apparent that national forgiveness, healing, and reconciliation are not a panacea to stability, democracy, and development. It is important that underlying issue of inequality, impunity and historical injustices be addressed. The Kenyan government has passed in to law a Bill that will establish a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC). The formation of the FJRC will be symbolically important as it will allow the publics to openly ventilate their immediate, existing and past hurts against each other and against the state and possibly use the same platform to find lasting solutions necessary for unity and development.

3.6 Root causes of conflict Consistent with the general findings of the FGD, there is lack of clarity with regard to how communities understand the underlying causes of the post elections violence. There exists general acceptance however that the root causes of conflicts are linked to underlying socio-economic issues, politics, incitement, and bribery by leaders. This perception is expressed across all ages. The FGD study report suggests that PEV was caused by such varied factor including: Poverty, elections fraud, unemployment, land, political rivalry between especially ODM and PNU members; political incitement, tribalism, insecurity, drug abuse, inequity, incitement by media and illiteracy. This varied itinerary of causes of conflict is not helpful in analytical clarity. There seems to be generalized understanding of perceived causes of conflict with less evidence obtaining that van analytical be used to clarify root causes to in the finest original specificity.



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3.7 Cohesion among Kenyans The survey sought to find out the cohesion and tolerance levels amongst different Kenyan ethnic communities. Stereotypes amongst communities, misinformation, and rumours influence inter communities’ relations and perceptions related to the same. According to the FGD findings, cohesion amongst community members was significantly weak especially due to stereotypes and misinformation related to the cultural practices between and amongst communities. Such stereotypes include Luos being perceived as being proud and practicing cultural repugnant practices while Kikuyu are generally perceived as both proud and thieves. It is important to note that stereotypes and misinformation are deeply embedded in various communities and was aggravated during the PEV when adults negatively portrayed rival ethnic community. The FGD study report suggests that there exist stereotypes depicting particular ethnic communities. Some of the cultural practices associated with particular tribes are not necessarily true but depending on their ethnic communities’ the perceptions are entrenched and further compounded by parents who stereotype tribes to their children.

3.8 Perception on reconciliation efforts The findings show that, contrary to the common perception that the root cause of ethnic conflicts is known and straightforward. Accordingly, ethnic conflict is a complex phenomenon. Ethnic conflicts are triggered by a myriad of underlying politico-socio-economic issues at play. The emerging issues are tied to politics, land policies, distribution of natural resources, health, education, environment, employment, and economic recession. For effectiveness, there is need for a multi-faceted approach in the platform for dialogue towards national cohesion and integration. The exercise should involve various players in the politico-socio-economic fabrics of the society. However, change does not come easy and can only be enforced through the efforts of citizens themselves. The media can play an important role in educating the public, raising issues, breaking taboos, exposing shortcomings of governments and many other critical issues. The study shows that Kenyans watch and appreciates the different programmes on ethnic relations and nationhood aired in different television channels. This is therefore a platform for MFAF to jumpstart and sustains reconciliatory dialogue towards national integration and cohesion.



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Section D - Conclusion The 2008 post-election violence in Kenya has exposed the systemic weaknesses of the Kenyan state. It also confirmed the reality of the artificial unity characterized by superficial inter-ethnic relations. Additionally, probably the biggest lesson learnt is the exposure of how weak national fibre. Many years after independence achieved in 1963, ethnicity remains a significantly preferred mode of identity. Citizenship remains weakly developed concept whose only support is found among those who posses the national identity card. Simply, the comprehensive study has revealed the reality that few Kenyans have low confidence in their Kenyaness. Another important significant finding from the three studies is the indictment of the state. The Kenyan state remains the most culpable institutions partly because of its failure to provide security for all Kenyans. The post independence regimes failed to institute conflict early warning systems, failed to address long-standing disputes around land, and failed to deal firmly with perceived historical injustices. The inaction by the former regimes led to progressive decay of national ethical issues such probity, unity, respect for rule of law, justice, safety, reconciliation and healing. Instead, the country progressively degenerated in the murk of deep corruption, impunity, poverty, and retrogressive leadership based on ethnic configuration. The violent confrontation witnessed after the disputed presidential polls in the country echo the communal but small-scale violence that also characterized the multi party elections f 1992, 1997, and 2002. In an important sense, the 2007 violent confrontation is an additional warning sign that there is need to re open the debate on how to establish democratic institutions that can manage ethnic cleavages and moderate the instrumentalization of ethnicity as a tool for achieving political power.1 Kenya now needs to develop institutions that are appropriate to governing a multi ethnic democracy. This means that the Kenyan system of governance has to be reconstituted in order to balance the competing ethnic interest that have threatened and that remain a threat to the future peace and stability of the country. Kenya is still a state composed of fragmented ethnic communities struggling to become a stable nation-state. Following the crisis, the faultiness of the national body politic is still very much defined along ethnic lines. The government is characterized by grand corruption scandals, inefficiency, and nepotism. One year after the signing of the National Accord and subsequent formation of the Grand Coalition Government, it is obvious that the currently is yet to move back in to the ‘narrow path’ of democratic trajectory. The leadership that took over post 2007 has not delivered the promises of reforms upon which they acquired power. Thus, unless concrete measures are taken, the nefarious forces that have over years manifested themselves will most likely re-surface and haunt the country come 2012 elections. The immediate operatinalization of the special tribunal of Kenya to confront impunity and the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission to ensure an appropriate amnesty process is therefore vital and will determine national survival.



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The study reports, besides addressing what has been familiar in the social construction of state and national politics i.e. the prime place that ethnicity plays in national politics, it has also revealed what can be termed as superficial inter ethnic relations. The relationship between individuals from various ethnic backgrounds is characterized by fear, stereotype, contradictions, and is therefore superficial. It is contradictory because the relationships display split personality. On the one hand, there is significant desire for most youthful Kenyans to support national goals and to identify as citizens; yet at the same time, it is this very group of people that participated in the PEV. Simultaneously, while Kenyan adults possess national identity card, it is clear that more value is placed in their ethnic identity against national identity. While, there is rise in inter ethnic marriages and inter cultural contacts, these efforts have not been enough to alter the deep-seated ethnic loyalty. Conflicts take ethnic dimensions precisely because of the way in which Kenyan communities relate to national resource distribution. There is therefore need for equitable distribution of national resources. Land reform agenda addressing landlessness and redistribution must be put in place to arrest future land-based conflicts. Secondly, the violence and its ethnic configuration provided ample evidence that Kenya is still far from a nation state. The study reports clearly show that the PEV was the lowest moments for Kenya, a nation-state considered as erstwhile paragon of peace and stability in the East and Central Africa. The bubble of peace bust after the announcement of the results of the disputed presidential polls. The outbreak of the PEV was not entirely a surprise. The underlying causes were always existent and were continuously nurtured by the state (in) action and by individual citizens themselves. A political formula must be found that can ensure political and economic power is devolved so that each region of this country feels part of Kenya. Secondly, accountability in general and political accountability in particular must be part of Kenya’s political culture so that impunity does not remain a cancer in Kenya’s body politic. Thirdly, public institutions must be strengthened and become independent so that there is certainty in the way institutions run. Fifthly, in view of the extent of gender violence perpetrated during post-election violence and the inability of various agencies to address these cases, it is important that affirmative action be seen as even more urgent so that women are part of decision-making in Kenya. Lastly, conditions that enhance national character and identity must be put in place to ensure that parties and leaders who aspire to lead this country meet a basic threshold that guarantees national cohesion and service to all Kenyans. Yet, beyond these significant findings of the study, Kenya remains a nation-state with huge potential for growth, unity, and prosperity. The importance of the country in geo-political matters is equally important. Kenyans, have a rich history of courage and endurance characterized in part by her rich long distant athletes. The distance that the country needs to cover to achieve comprehensive peace, national healing, unity, and prosperity for all is a long one. All Kenyans must now prepare with that knowledge, that for them, the race towards reclaiming national glory, healing, and development is a long and torturous marathon. In this marathon, no one should be excluded, nor should anyone not exclude him/herself. All must carry their weight and in the words of the Kenyan national anthem, all must aspire to ‘…. dwell in unity, peace and liberty, plenty be found within our borders…



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BIBLIOGRAPHY Amutabi, M.N. "Crisis and Student Protest in Universities in Kenya: Examining the Role of Students in National Leadership and Democratization Process." African Studies Review, Vol. 45, No.2, 2002: 150-169. Bank, World. Kenya Poverty Assesment: Report No. 13152. Country Report, Washington: World Bank, 2007. BBC World Service. The Kenya elections and thier aftremath: the role of the media and communication, Policy Briefing No.. 1. Policy Report, Nairobi: BBC, April 2008. Berman, B. Control and Crisis in colonial Kenya: The Dialectic of Domination. London: James Currey Publishers, 1990. Government of Kenya. Kenya Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government and the National Accord and Reconcilliation Act (NARA). Parliament Act, Nairobi: Government of Kenya, February 2008. Government of Kenya. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post Elections Violence. CIPEV Report, Nairobi: Government Printers, October 2008. Government of Kenya. Report of the Indepedent Review Commission (Kriegler Report). Kriegler Report, Nairobi: Government Printers, May 2008. Hornsby, David Throup and Charles. Multi Party Politics in Kenya. Oxford: James Currey, 1998. Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Report, New York: Human Rights Watch, " Ballots to Bullets: Organised Political Violnce and Kenya's Crisis of Goverannce" Vol 20 No 1 (a) . International Crisis Group. "Kenya in Crisis" Report no 137. Periodic Report, Nairobi: ICG, February 2008. Isaack, Otieno. "Mobile Telephony and Democratic Elections in Kenya: A case of 2002 Elections." Reactivism Journal, 2005. Kagwanja, P.M. "Power to Uhuru: Youth Identity and Generational Politics in Kenya's 2002 Elections." African Affairs, 105/418, October 2005: 50-55. Karuti, Kanyinga. "Struggles to Land: The squatter question in coastal Kenya." Danish Institute for Interantional Studies CDR Working Paper, 1998. Kenya Human Rights Commission. "A tale of Force, Threats and Lies: Operation Rudi Nyumbani". Human Rights Report, Nairobi: KHCR, 2008.



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Kenya Youth Parliament. Kenya Youth Parliament. October 16, 2008. http://www.kenyayouthparliament.org/pages/history/htm (accessed February 19, 2009). Klopp, J.M. ""Militarization of resource conflcitcs"." African Studies, 2008: 35-69. KNCHR. On the Brink of Precipe: A Human Rights Account of Kenya's Post 2007 Elections Violence Preliminary Edition. Nairobi: KNCHR, 1998. KNCHR. On the Brink of the Precipice: A Human Rights Account of the Kenya's Post Election Violence. Nairobi: KNCHR, 2008. Leys, Colin and Pratt Cranford. Underdevelopment in Kenya, the Political Economy of neo-colonialism 1964-1971. London, 1978. Media Focus on Africa Foundation. Focussed Group Discussion Report for Molo. MFAF, 2009. Media Focus on Africa Foundation. Focussed Group Discussion Report for Kibera. MFAF, 2009. Media Focus on Africa Foundation. Focussed Group Discussion Report for Kisumu. MFAF, 2009. Media Focus on Africa Foundation. Opinion Poll Survey Report. MFAF, 2009. Media Focus on Africa Foundation. Media Strategy for the 2007 General Elections: Thematic Research and FGD. Research Report, Nairobi: MFAF, 2007. Sametko, Holli A. 'Elections campaigns, balance and the mass media'. Workshop Report, Washington: World Bank, May 2008. Stephen, Ndegwa. "'Citizenship and Ethnicity: An Examination of Two MOments in Kenya Politics'." American Political Science Review, 91 (3), 1997. Violence, Commission of Inquiry on Post Election. Report on 2007 Post Elections Violence. Nairobi: CIPEV, 2008.



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Appendix I - District of origin Locaton Freque

ncy Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

Baringo 1 1.0 1.0 1.0Bondo 2 2.0 2.0 2.9Bungoma South 1 1.0 1.0 3.9Busia 1 1.0 1.0 4.9Gucha 2 2.0 2.0 6.9Hamisi 1 1.0 1.0 7.8Kakamega 4 3.9 3.9 11.8Kiambu 3 2.9 2.9 14.7Kianja (Nyanza) 1 1.0 1.0 15.7Kisii 3 2.9 2.9 18.6Kisii Central 3 2.9 2.9 21.6Kisumu 4 3.9 3.9 25.5Kisumu West 1 1.0 1.0 26.5Kitui 2 2.0 2.0 28.4Koibatek 3 2.9 2.9 31.4Luanda 1 1.0 1.0 32.4Machakos 4 3.9 3.9 36.3Makueni 1 1.0 1.0 37.3Marakwet 1 1.0 1.0 38.2Marsabit 1 1.0 1.0 39.2Meru Central 1 1.0 1.0 40.2Meru South 1 1.0 1.0 41.2Migori 1 1.0 1.0 42.2Mombasa 2 2.0 2.0 44.1Mombasa Highland

1 1.0 1.0 45.1

Mumias 9 8.8 8.8 53.9Mumias Butere 2 2.0 2.0 55.9Muranga 2 2.0 2.0 57.8Muranga South 1 1.0 1.0 58.8Mwingi 1 1.0 1.0 59.8Nairobi 3 2.9 2.9 62.7Nakuru 8 7.8 7.8 70.6Nakuru (Molo) 1 1.0 1.0 71.6Nakuru Baharini 1 1.0 1.0 72.5Nandi 2 2.0 2.0 74.5No Response 1 1.0 1.0 75.5Nyakach 2 2.0 2.0 77.5Nyamira 2 2.0 2.0 79.4Nyando 1 1.0 1.0 80.4Nyanza 1 1.0 1.0 81.4Nyeri 3 2.9 2.9 84.3Rachuonyo 3 2.9 2.9 87.3



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Samburu 1 1.0 1.0 88.2Siaya 2 2.0 2.0 90.2South Kisii 1 1.0 1.0 91.2Suba 1 1.0 1.0 92.2Taita 1 1.0 1.0 93.1Uasin Gishu 7 6.9 6.9 100.0Total 102 100.0 100.0



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Appendix II – FGD guide PLATFORM FOR DIALOGUE TOWARDS NATIONAL INTERGRATION AND COHESION QUESTIONNAIRE Focus Group Guide Introductions and warm up Self-introduction My name is…………………….and I work for Strategic PR and R. SPR&R is an independent research firm, carrying research project for clients all over East Africa. Currently we are carrying out research on inter-ethnic relations and how people from different groups perceive each other. Confidentiality and consent: During the discussion we’ll talk about your opinions on other ethnic groups, how communities have related in this area and what you perceive to be the causes of ethnic conflict. Your honest answers to these questions will help us better understand the general public perceptions on these matters. Please note that the recorder is just to help us keep accurate records of our proceedings, the report will not make any reference to you as an individual Moderator: Thank respondent for coming and assure him / her confidentiality of the discussion Warm up and introduction / Ice break Please tell me about yourself, anything you would like to share with us regarding yourself. For example what you do, your family and what you do in your free time. SECTION 1: ENHANCED NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AMONG KENYANS 1. What is the most important issue facing Kenya today?

a. Probe for issues facing the country that affect the individual and also community as a whole

b. Probe for issues that uniquely affect the area and that are not necessarily national issues.

2. What is your opinion regarding Kenyan politics? (Likes and dislikes) a. Probe on how they get to know about latest happenings in politics

On citizenship/nationhood / ethnic identity and attitudes towards multiculturalism 3. How would you identify yourself?

a. Probe for identification as Kenyan vis a vis reference to ethnic identity b. Probe for reasons behind such identities

4. Who is considered a member of this community? a. Probe for considerations based on birth / marriage / immigration etc b. Probe for acceptance of immigrants as one of the community members.



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5. Have you ever experienced or know someone who has experienced ethnic violence in this community?

a. Probe for ethnic violence experienced b. Probe for instances of discriminations between community members and non

community members c. Probe for possibility of forgiveness and acceptance of perpetrators of ethnic

violence d. What can be done to reconcile affected communities

6. What do you see as the root causes of ethnic conflict?

a. Probe for differences between local causes and national causes b. Probe for genesis of ethnic tension in the community

7. What informs you on matters of ethnic relations and nationhood?

a. Probe source of information for each e.g. political rallies / civic education, television channels etc.

8. Is there a particular television program that has particularly addressed issues of ethnic

conflict that you relate to a. Probe for name of program, station, presenter, and key issues brought about by the program 9. What in your opinion are the major differences between your ethnic community and

other ethnic communities living around here a. Probe for major differences in cultural practice b. Probe for if there is any of the practices that they find offensive c. Probe for if they feel other communities are better off than theirs and why d. Probe for cases of inter-marriages and other forms of interaction such as

children attending same schools and what they feel about it. 10. After the last general elections, there was violence in this area. Was the violence

targeted at particular communities a. Probe for reasons why particular communities were targeted b. Probe if there was justification for such violence c. Probe for reasons used by some people to justify violence

11. Have their been attempts to reconcile ethnic communities living in this area

a. Probe for what such attempts have involved b. Probe for the groups that have led such initiatives c. Probe for effects of such efforts.

12. Should inter-ethnic interactions be encouraged

a. Probe for what forms such interactions should take b. Probe for what would be unacceptable forms of interaction

CLOSURE What gives you the greatest fear and / or optimism in Kenya? Thank you

mfaf - comprehensive research report on national integration and cohesion v3(1)_timothy mahea

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