mexico tafta 1ac - ddi 2013 cm

8/12/2019 Mexico Tafta 1ac - Ddi 2013 Cm

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1ACTAFTA

Advantage 1TAFTA

TAFTA negotiations are underway and Mexico wants a seat at the table.

Moody 13[Glyn, technology journalist and consultant, TechDirt, 3/13,http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130313/10181122311/mexico-will-ask-to-join-us-eu-transatlantic-trade-agreement.shtml]Things are moving fast withthe proposed US-EU transatlantic free trade agreement(TAFTA). It was only a few weeksago that the formal announcement was made, and already another country wants to join, as pointed out by @PostActa (original in

Spanish): The Mexican government wants to be part of the negotiationsof the Transatlantic Association of Trade

and Investment(TTIP, in its English acronym), which the U nited S tates and E uropean U nion will be negotiating, with the

idea that there will be two blocks that make up the future pact. That is, alongside the EU block of 27 countries, Mexico issuggesting there should be a similar regional grouping in North America. Interestingly, the story says that the Mexican

government will ask the US President for permission to join, with no mention of asking the EU : "It is a sovereign

decision of Washington as to the approach and the negotiation strategy to be adopted", and although the U.S.

government has already referred to the idea, it issomething that is not yet included in a formal dialogue, and needs to be

defined. That suggests that the US is actively involved in this latest move -- maybe even its instigator -- and would look favorably on Mexicojoining TAFTA. There's also a hint in the article quoted above that Canada too might join TAFTA. Havingboth Mexicoand Canada onboard would be consistent with the US's past approach, where it allowed them to join the TPP negotiations, but on fairly humiliatingterms that limit their scope of action.

Specifically, Mexico is concerned that a US-EU deal will threaten their trade with the

United States.

EurActiv 13[5/27, http://www.euractiv.com/development-policy/eu-trans-atlantic-deal-seen-conc-news-520010]Mexico, which sees itself as a privileged US partner, is concerned about thepossible consequences of theTransatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership(TTIP), Spanish MEP Ricardo Corts Lastra told EurActivin aninterview. Corts Lastra, who is the author of the report on the basis of which the European Parliament Resolution On defining a newdevelopment cooperation policy with Latin America was adopted in June 2012, shared his impression from his recent visit toMexico, where he held talks with his counterparts. The Sociliast and Democrat MEP said that his Mexican colleagueswere

worried that the EU-US trade deal couldhave as a result that the EU would becomea more important to the US at the expenseof Mexico . Logically Mexico, which has the US as great business partner and has a little diversified market, watches

withsome concernwhat kind of consequence these agreements might have , he said. The ideasexpressed by Corts Lastrareflect the state of mind reported in other developing countries, especially in Africa. Both the EU and the US give trade

preferences to some African nations, but their benefit schemes differ. Therefore the expected policy harmonisationis raises thequestion on the negative consequences for someof the countries.

The risk of protectionism is increasing --- the stalled Doha round jeopardizes all of

advantages of the WTO.Oduwole, Sumer 2012(Jumoke, An Appraisal of Developing Country Coalition Strategy in the WTO Doha RoundAgriculture Negotiations, 20 Currents Intl Trade L. J., 45, p. Lexis -Nexis) [John the Stupek]

Due to the global financial crisis, which was an unforeseen event at the beginning of this Round, even prosperous, industrialized countries have

been shaken by high levels of unemployment and bankrupt economic sectors. With the rise in food prices experienced in recent times, food andlivelihood security issues have become an even greater concern for many developing countries, particularly net food-importing developing

countries. n124 Hence, as countries around the world struggle for economic survival , the multilateral trade negotiation

arena is even more challenging than it was at the beginning of the Round. In times of economic difficulty, Members

generally exhibit increased protectionist tendencies and have begun to rethink even the negotiation of current issues through this

lens. n125 Though the G-20(group of finance ministers from the world's leading economies) have repeatedly vowed not to repeat

the mistakes of the 1930s, the WTO has warned repeatedly that protectionism is creeping back up . In fact, the majorindustrialized Members, the EU and US in particular, remain preoccupied with the repair of their own domestic economic challenges. n126 As a


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result, the multilateral trade system has been relegated to the background for quite some time now. n127 However, evenbefore the financial malaise currently affecting the multilateral system, there had been a disturbing trend occurring over the last decade. The

incidence of bilateral, plurilateral and regional agreements outside of the WTO has grown exponentially . n128 Thegrowing wealth in some developing countries has increased their capacity to negotiate with industrialized countries as well as with each other.n129 With the extended delay in the WTO negotiations, several WTO Members have been entering into such agreements. n130 The China--ASEAN free trade zone is a classic case in point. n131 Similarly, the well-known Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) model entered into bythe EU with trading regions around the globe comes to mind. n132 In the likely event of other countries following a similar direction in their

trade policies, the WTO may lose influence as the organization's credibility has suffered considerably in the course of this Round. Theimplications of this trend for smaller developing countries, in particular, gives cause for concern since these countries

enjoy a significant amount of protection under current WTO rules. Furthermore, as with the relatively recent accession ofChina, the accession of Russia on July 23, 2012 after 19 years of talks, brings with it an amount of uncertainty regarding future dynamics of theorganization. Nevertheless, the WTO Director General Pascal Lamy's repeated urging in the strongest of terms to world leaders to forge aheadtoward the completion of the Doha Round seems to continually fall on deaf ears, demonstrating insufficient political engagement in the process,

particularly on the part of the key WTO Members. n133 B. CONCLUSION At present, a Doha Round Agriculture Agreement based on theDecember 2008 Revised Draft Modalities on Agriculture appears, on the face of it, to benefit developing countries, when compared to theUruguay Round Agriculture Agreement. Therefore, the new collective voice of the developing country Members displayed through the adoptionof coalition strategy in the Doha Round may prima facie be considered to be a more effective bargaining strategy--in the unlikely event that theRound is concluded with a similar outcome. In a sense, the WTO is working as it should in representing the present outlay of the politicaleconomy of international trade. Negotiations ought to reflect the global economic realities, but should also take into consideration the economicchallenges of poor Members. Also, industrialized countries may be required to accept an asymmetrical outcome at their expense in favor of largedeveloping countries such as China, India, Brazil, (and soon Russia)--despite the strong resistance from their affected domestic constituencies.More than at any other time in history, the voice of the developing world is being heard in the negotiation process, although it is yet to be

translated into firm outcomes. Despite its flaws, the multilateral trading system is extremely important for developing

countries . Therefore, effective participation[*55] in WTO negotiations has proven to be vital to achieving their

strategic goals . The recurring upheaval in the WTO negotiations does not speak well for the multilateral trading system as a whole.

However, although the credibility of the WTO may arguably have been eroded in recent times, no Member wants to see the

organization decrease in stature in favor of a multiplicity of regional and bilateral preferential trade

agreements . Regardless of the difficulties currently being experienced in the negotiation of new trade rules, the adjudication and

implementation of existing trade rules remain highly relevant to all Members today. As we wait for the required political engagement fromMembers in order to conclude the DDA "single undertaking" agreement, the agriculture negotiations continue to occupy center stage in theRound.

Perceived exclusion guts multilateral tradeincluding Mexico is key to a successful

TAFTA.Mildner & Schmucker 13[Dr. Stormy-Annika, Member of the SWP Executive Board, & Dr. Claudia, headof the Globalization and World Economy Program of the DGAP, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), GermanInstitute for International and Security Affairs, SWP Comments 18, June, Trade Agreement with Side -Effects?http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2013C18_mdn_schmucker.pdf]

However, a TTIP is not without risks for global tradeand the multilateral trade system. Discrimination against third

countries is a central problem of preferential agreements. Selective tariff abolition can eliminate protectionism and distortions betweenthe signatories of such an agreement and create trade-generating and growth-boosting effects. As the economist Jacob Viner demonstrated in the1950s, the bilateral/plurilateral abolition of trade barriers can increases trade if domestically produced goods and services or imports from third

countries are substituted by cheaper (i.e. more efficiently produced) goods and services from the partner country. But frequently such anagreement leads to discrimination against third countries with trade-diverting effects. According to Viner, trade diversionoccurs when the dismantling of trade barriers gives goods and services from the partner country a competitive advantage and consequently tradewith third countries is diverted to the partner country even if the third country can produce the relevant goods and services more efficiently. One

particular problem of preferential trade agreements is that they contain many different and contradictory rules. This applies above all to the rulesof origin in free trade agreements (FTAs), which define which goods are granted preferential treatment. To enjoy preferential market access a

particular proportion of the product must be produced in one of the FTA signatory countries. This is intended to prevent nonsignatories fromprofiting from preferential treatment without themselves making concessions. Cumulatively, the multiplicity of preferential trade agreements hasproduced a confusion of different rules of origin that tangibly obstruct trade. Small and mediumsized enterprises in particular suffer from hightransaction costs. Worries that a TTIP would exacerbate the spaghetti bowl effect identified by economist Jagdish Bhagwati in the 1990s are

certainly justified. A study by the German ifo-Institutpublished in January 2013 argues that countries geographically close to

the U nited S tates orthe E uropean U nion, countries with a high volume of trade with either or both of them, and

countries with free trade agreements with either or both must expect to lose trade through a TTIP . For the U nited

S tates this means in the first placeCanada and Mexico , primarily through erosion of the preferential access to the US


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marketboth enjoy through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), but also through trade-diverting effects. Australia, which hasa FTA with the United States, is also a loser in both liberalisation scenarios (comprehensive agreement or tariff elimination). Another problem isthat the TTIP talks could tie up a considerable proportion of EU and US negotiating capacity. Both sides are already involved in numerous

bilateral and plurilateral negotiations. The European Union is currently negotiating FTAs with Canada, Japan and Mercosur, the United States, asalready mentioned, with the TPP countries. Additional Transatlantic talks thus threaten to overstretch both executives and could further diminishinterest in a successful conclusion of the Doha Round. Should the European Union and United States fail to conclude the bilateral talks within areasonable timeframe they also risk damage to their reputations as capable political actors and their credibility as proponents of open markets. Butspeedy conclusion will be no easy matter with so many sensitive topics involved. Many European states reject liberalisation of agricultural trade,

and France has recently succeeded in excluding cultural services from the talks. Finally, a TTIP could also have unintended political

repercussions. Emerging economies and developing countries could interpret it as an instrument of exclusion or even

an attempt to blackmail them into making concessions in the Doha Round. In the worst case this threatens to blockthe already difficultWTO talks. While such scenarios are certainly plausible, the Transatlantic partners have options for counteractingthem. Ensure WTO Compatibility Their economic and political weight lends the European Union and United States a special responsibilityfor the world trade order. Thus, how must the TTIPbe designed if it is to benefit rather than harm the multilateral trading system? In the first

place it must be compatible with WTO rules and serve as a stepping stone for future global liberalisation regimes. Firstly, the TransatlanticPartnership should liberalise trade and address trade plus issues. Secondly, it should standardise rules in order to simplify the spaghetti bowl of

competing and contradictory rules. Thirdly, it should be open for new members to avoid exclusion. And fourthly, it shouldrecognise the WTO as the central arbitration instance and avoid undermining its dispute settlement procedure. Comprehensive LiberalisationPreferential trade agreements contradict the central WTO principle of most-favoured nation treatment (MFN), because they grant partners

benefits that are denied to others. Accordingly, they are permitted only as an intermediate step in the multilateral liberalisation process andsubject to rules laid out in GATT Article XXIV (for trade in goods) and GATS Article V (for trade in services). Paragraphs 4 to 10 of the GATTArticle define the conditions under which customs unions and free trade zones may be created. These involve definition of such entities, duty of

notification, treatment of third countries, etc. Paragraphs 8 (a) (i) (customs unions) and 8 (b) (free trade agreements), under which the tariffs forsubstantially all the trade must be dismantled, are especially important. Under paragraph 5 (b), the external duties of countries participating in afree trade zone must not be higher than before conclusion of the agreement. Given that these conditions would also apply to the TTIP, it would beimpossible to exclude whole sectors from liberalisation. Removing agriculture from the TTIP talks, as proposed by Renate Knast, leader of theGreen Party parliamentary group in the German Bundestag, would thus contradict WTO rules. GATS Article V defines the conditions foreconomic integration in the service sector a little more loosely . The Partnership would only need to have substantial sectoral coverage ratherthan covering all sectors. Agreements must also provide for the absence or elimination of substantially all discrimination between or amongthe parties. Exceptions are thus permitted, and GATS also provides exemptions for cultural services, but the goal should be for a TTIP to coverat least all services that are in line for liberalisation through the WTO. But the ambitions of the TTIP should not end with the scope and depth ofWTO regulation. Instead it would be desirable for the talks to reach beyond the traditional realm of the WTO and address the aforementionedtrade plus issues. New cross-cutting issues like treatment of state-run companies and stronger integration of small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs) should also be included. With these issues of broader interest a first step could be taken towards global regulation. Harmonised RulesAs already mentioned, one drawback of the numerous existing preferential agreements is that they create an increasingly complex tangle of rulesthat tend to hamper rather than ease free trade. Special attention must be given to rules of origin. The European Union and the United Statesshould ensure that any new rules of origin do not worsen the global regulatory chaos and are compatible with the pre-existing FTAs of both sides.The rules should also be as generous as possible in order to prevent the danger of trade diversion and the associated discrimination against thirdstates. At the same time it would make sense to extend market access and new rules for investment or procurement to other trade partners that are

willing in return to liberalise their markets to the same extent. Openness to New Members If a preferential agreement is not to harm

the multilateral trading order it must be open to third countries . The TTIP is no exception. Initially it will be negotiated

solely between the European Union and the United States. But in the long term it would be desirable to expand it to the whole

NAFTA region, especially given that the E uropean U nion already has a free trade agreement with Mexicoand is

currently negotiating one with Canada. The more members a preferential agreement comprises, the smaller the trade-

diverting effects and the greater the chances of multilateralisation .

Including Mexico in a successful TAFTA revives the Doha Roundthe alternative is the

collapse of the WTO and multilateral trade.

Hills 13[Carla A., Chief Executive Officer of Hills & Company International Consultants, U.S. TradeRepresentative from 1989 to 1993,primary U.S. negotiator of the North American Free Trade Agreement, New York

Times, 4/24, A Trans-Atlantic Trade Pact for the World, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/25/opinion/global/a-trans-atlantic-trade-pact-for-the-world.html?_r=4&]The opening of global marketsstarting in 1947 with the first round of trade negotiations among 23 nations and the creation of theGeneral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), through the creation of the World Trade Organization in 1995caused internationaltrade to explode and standards of living for nations rich and poor to soar. Economic studies show that the opening of global marketssince the end of World War II has added about $9,000 of additional wealth for the average American household. Developing nations have alsogained from global trade. On average, poor countries that opened their markets to trade and investment have grown more than three times faster

than those that kept their markets closed.No country has prospered by sealing itself off from global economy. The DohaRound of multilateral trade negotiationswas launched in 2001, two months after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States. Itsought to boost economic growth through trade liberalizationfor all nations, but particularly for developing nations. The


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security dimension was real, becausein addition to the projected economic benefits, past experience showed that as governmentsliberalized their trade regimes, they generally liberalized their political regimes. Adherence to an agreed set of traderules and support for the W.T.O. dispute settlement mechanism encourages nondiscrimination, transparency and ruleof law, which contribute to increased stability. The Doha negotiations broke down in 2005and have made littleprogress since. Trade commentators are declaring Doha dead and multilateral negotiations obsoleteas governmentsincreasingly have turned to negotiating bilateral and regional trade agreements that create conflicting rules and distort trade by creating trade

preferences for the signatories at the expense of those that do not participate. There is legitimate concern that theproliferation of

bilateral and regional trade agreements could render the W.T.O. irrelevant and destroy the enormous benefits

we derive from our multilateral trading system. What could bring the 159 W.T.O. members back to the table?Ironically, history demonstrates that the successful negotiation of a major regional trade agreement of high quality

can provide the necessary catalyst. In 1990, the Uruguay Round collapsed in Brussels. InJune 1991 the U nited S tates,

Mexico and Canada launched the negotiations ofa North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta). Fourteen months laternegotiations were concluded. President George H.W. Bush signed the agreement in December 1992; President Clinton secured congressionalapproval of the agreement the following year. By joining the economies of Canada, Mexico and the U.S., Nafta created a regional market ofover 400 million people. It was the first comprehensive free trade agreement to join developed and developing nations, and it achieved broader

and deeper trade liberalization than any prior trade agreement. The worlds reaction was broad, deep and fast. In just a few months

following the passage of the Nafta, trade negotiators returned to the bargaining table , completedthe UruguayRound, and

created the W.T.O.to the enormous benefit of the global economy . If we are to repeat the success of two decades

ago, we will require an even greater catalyst : a regional trade agreement of such quality and scope that the

rest of the world is galvanized . The T rans-Atlantic T rade and I nvestment P artnershiprecently announced by the

European Union and the United States could be that catalyst. That negotiation would involve roughly half the globaleconomy. The negotiation need not be protracted. The E.U. and the U.S. each recently concluded free trade agreements with South

Korea that could serve as a template upon which to build. Theproposed Trans-Atlantic Partnership could haveeven more heft if

Canada and Mexico were added which makes sense, since Mexico already has a free trade agreement with the

E.U., and Canada is in the final stages of negotiating one. Including them would avoid having different rules covering tradeinvolving ourtwo largest trading partners. The global reaction to Nafta 20 years ago shows thatcompetitive

liberalization can be a powerful catalyst . When governments see others taking economic action that generates

growth and stability, they do not want to be left out . A broad, gold-standard trade agreement across the Atlanticcould be such a catalyst for reigniting support for multilateral trade liberalization, bringing W.T.O. members back to

the table to finish the Doha Round, which would give a real boost to the global economy. It was done before with

the Nafta, and it could be done again with the successful conclusion of the T rans-Atlantic T rade and I nvestmentP artnership.

Collapse of the multilateral trade system results in an economic depression and great

power conflict.

Panitchpakdi 4[Supachai, secretary-general of the UN Conference on Trade and Development, 2/26, AmericanLeadership and the World Trade Organization, p. http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spsp_e/spsp22_e.htm]

The second point is that strengthening the world trading system is essential to America's wider global objectives.

Fighting terrorism , reducing poverty , improving health , integrating China and other countries in the global

economy all of these issues are linked, in one way or another, to world trade. This is not to say that trade is the answer to all

America's economic concerns; only that meaningful solutions are inconceivable without it. The world trading system is the

linchpin of today's global orderunderpinning its security as well as its prosperity. A successful WTO is an

example of how multilateralism can work. Conversely, if it weakens or fails, much else could fail with it. This is

something which the USat the epicentre of a more interdependent world cannot afford to ignore . These priorities must

continue to guide US policyas they have done since the Second World War. America has been the main driving force behind eightrounds of multilateral trade negotiations, including the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the creation of the WTO. The UStogether with the EUwas instrumental in launching the latest Doha Round two years ago. Likewise, the recent initiative, spearheaded byAmbassador Zoellick, to re-energize the negotiations and move them towards a successful conclusion is yet another example of how essential theUS is to the multilateral processsignalling that the US remains committed to further liberalization, that the Round is moving, and that other

countries have a tangible reason to get on board. The reality is this: when the US leads the system can move forward; when it


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withdraws, the system drifts. The fact that US leadership is essential, does not mean it is easy. As WTO rules have expanded, so too has asthe complexity of the issues the WTO deals with everything from agriculture and accounting, to tariffs and telecommunication. The WTO isalso exerting huge gravitational pull on countries to joinand participate activelyin the system. The WTO now has 146 Membersupfrom just 23 in 1947and this could easily rise to 170 or more within a decade. Emerging powers like China, Brazil, and India rightly demand agreater say in an institution in which they have a growing stake. So too do a rising number of voices outside the system as well. More and more

people recognize that the WTO matters. More non-state actorsbusinesses, unions, environmentalists, development NGOswant themultilateral system to reflect their causes and concerns. A decade ago, few people had even heard of the GATT. Today the WTO is front pagenews. A more visible WTO has inevitably become a more politicized WTO. The sound and fury surrounding the WTO's recent Ministerial

Meeting in Cancunlet alone Seattleunderline how challenging managing the WTO can be. But these challenges can be exaggerated. Theyexist precisely because so many countries have embraced a common vision. Countries the world over have turned to open trade and a rules-

based systemas the key to their growth and development. They agreed to the Doha Round because they believed their interests lay in freertrade, stronger rules, a more effective WTO. Even in Cancun the great debate was whether the multilateral trading system was moving fast andfar enoughnot whether it should be rolled back. Indeed, it is critically important that we draw the right conclusions from Cancun which areonly now becoming clearer. The disappointment was that ministers were unable to reach agreement. The achievement was that they exposed therisks of failure, highlighted the need for North-South collaboration, andafter a period of introspectionacknowledged the inescapable logicof negotiation. Cancun showed that, if the challenges have increased, it is because the stakes are higher. The bigger challenge to Americanleadership comes from insidenot outsidethe United States. In America's current debate about trade, jobs and globalization we have heard a

lot about the costs of liberalization. We need to hear more about the opportunities. We need to be reminded of the advantages ofAmerica's openness and its trade with the worldabout the economic growth tied to exports; the inflation-fightingrole of imports, the innovative stimulus of global competition. We need to explain that freer trade works preciselybecause it involves positive changebetter products, better job opportunities, better ways of doing things, betterstandards of living. While it is true that change can be threatening for people and societies, it is equally true that the vulnerable are nothelped by resisting changeby putting up barriers and shutting out competition. They are helped by training,

education, new and better opportunities thatwith the right support policiescan flow from a globalized economy. Thefact is that for every job in the US threatened by imports there is a growing number of high-paid, high skill jobs created by exports. Exportssupported 7 million workers a decade ago; that number is approaching around 12 million today. And these new jobs in aerospace, finance,information technologypay 10 per cent more than the average American wage. We especially need to inject some clarityand factsintothe current debate over the outsourcing of services jobs. Over the next decade, the US is projected to create an average of more than 2 millionnew services jobs a yearcompared to roughly 200,000 services jobs that will be outsourced. I am well aware that this issue is the source ofmuch anxiety in America today. Many Americans worry about the potential job losses that might arise from foreign competition in servicessectors. But its worth remembering that concerns about the impact of foreign competi tion are not new. Many of the reservations people areexpressing today are echoes of what we heard in the 1970s and 1980s. But people at that time didnt fully appreciate the power of Americaningenuity. Remarkable advances in technology and productivity laid the foundation for unprecedented job creation in the 1990s and there is noreason to doubt that this country, which has shown time and again such remarkable potential for competing in the global economy, will not soon

embark again on such a burst of job-creation. America's openness to service-sector tradecombined with the high skills of its workforcewill lead to more growth, stronger industries, and a shift towards higher value-added, higher-paying employment.Conversely, closing the door toservice trade is a strategy for killing jobs, not saving them. Americans have never run from achallenge and have never been defeatist in the face of strong competition. Part of this challenge is to create the conditions for global growth and

job creation here and around the world. I believe Americans realize what is at stake. The process of opening to global trade can be disruptive, but

they recognize that the US economy cannot grow and prosper any other way . They recognize the importance of finding globalsolutions to shared global problems. Besides, what is the alternative to the WTO?Some argue that the world's only superpower need not

be tied down by the constraints of the multilateral system. They claim that US sovereignty is compromised by international rules, and that

multilateral institutions limit rather than expand US influence. Americans should be deeply sceptical about these claims. Almost none of thetrade issues facing the US today are any easier to solve unilaterally, bilaterally or regionally. The reality isprobablyjust the opposite. What sense does it makefor exampleto negotiate e-commerce rules bilaterally? Who would be interested indisciplining agricultural subsidies in a regional agreement but not globally? How can bilateral deals even dozens of themcome close to

matching the economic impact of agreeing to global free trade among 146 countries? Bilateral and regional deals can sometimes be acomplement to the multilateral system, but they can never be a substitute . There is a bigger danger. By treating some countries

preferentially, bilateral and regional deals exclude othersfragmenting global trade and distorting the world economy. Instead of liberalizingtradeand widening growththey carve it up. Worse, they have a domino effect: bilateral deals inevitably beget more bilateral deals, ascountries left outside are forced to seek their own preferential arrangements, or risk further marginalization. This is precisely what we seehappening today. There are already over two hundred bilateral and regional agreements in existence, and each month we hear of a new orexpanded deal. There is a basic contradiction in the assumption that bilateral approaches serve to strengthen the multilateral, rules-based system.Even when intended to spur free trade, they can ultimately risk undermining it. This is in no one's interest, least of all the United States.

America led in the creation of the multilateral system after 1945 precisely to avoid a return to hostile blocsblocs

that had done so much to fuel interwar instability and conflict . America's vision, in the words of Cordell Hull, was that

enduring peace and the welfare of nations was indissolubly connected with the friendliness, fairness and freedom of

world trade. Trade would bind nations together, making another war unthinkable . Non-discriminatory rules would preventa return to preferential deals and closed alliances. A network of multilateral initiatives and organizations the Marshal Plan, the IMF, the WorldBank, and the GATT, now the WTOwould provide the institutional bedrock for the international rule of law, not power. Underpinning all this

was the idea that freedomfree trade, free democracies, the free exchange of ideas was essential to peace and prosperity, amore just world. It is a vision that has emerged pre-eminent a half century later. Trade has expanded twenty-fold since 1950.Millions in Asia, Latin America, and Africa are being lifted out of poverty, and millions more have new hope for the


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future. All the great powersthe US, Europe, Japan, India, China and soon Russiaare part of a rules-based multilateral

trading system, greatly increasing the chances for world prosperity and peace . There is a growing realization thatin ourinterdependent worldsovereignty is constrained, not by multilateral rules, but by the absence of rules.

Doha reduces global poverty and maintains international stabilityCarla A. Hills, CEO of Hills & Company, U.S. trade representative of George H.W. Bush, December 2005(The

Stakes of Doha, Foreign Affairs, p. http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20051201faessay84703/carla-a-hills/the-stakes-of-doha.html) [John the Stupek]

The results to date have been spectacular. World trade has exploded and standards of living have soared at home and abroad. Economist GaryHufbauer, in a comprehensive study published this year by the Institute of International Economics, calculates that 50 years of globalization hasmade the United States richer by $1 trillion per year (measured in 2003 dollars), or about $9,000 added wealth per year for the average U.S.household. Developing countries have also gained from globalization. On average, poor countries that have opened their markets to trade and

investment have grown five times faster than those that kept their markets closed. Studies conducted by World Bank economistDavidDollar show that globalization has raised 375 million people out of extreme povertyover the past 20 years. And the

benefits have not been only economic. As governments liberalizetheir trade regimes, theyoften liberalize their politicalregimes. Adherence to a set of trade rules encourages transparency, the rule of law, and a respect for property that

contribute to increased stability. Without U.S. leadershipin the eight previous rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, the

world would look very different today. The DohaRound provides another opportunity to open global markets in ways that willfurther stimulate economic growth, reduce poverty worldwide, and encourage international stability. Self-

interest alone should persuade Americans to urge their government to push the Doha negotiations to a successful conclusion. Hufbauer's studiescalculate that, going forward, open global trade would raise U.S. income by $500 billion per year, making the average U.S. household richer byan additional $4,500 per year. No other policy decision could come close to having such a positive impact on the United States' economic well-

being. In addition to boosting growth, a broad agreement in the Doha Round could help reduce poverty worldwide. The DohaRound is uniquely focused on the need to alleviate povertyby integrating poor nationsinto the global trading system. Twofactors drove this emphasis on poverty reduction. first, trade ministers launched this round of multilateral trade negotiations in Doha, Qatar, twomonths after the attacks of September 11, 2001, a time when there was widespread agreement that poverty creates conditions hostile to peace.Second, by focusing on poverty alleviation, ministers were able to persuade leaders of developing countries who were skeptical about the benefitsof a new trade round to join the negotiations. In launching the round, trade ministers signed on to the Doha Development Agenda, a documentthat explicitly recognizes that trade can help poor nations grow their way out of poverty. Today, nearly three billion people, almost half the

world's population, live below the international poverty line of $2 per day (at purchasing power parity). According to studies byeconomistWilliam Cline at the Center for Global Development, removing global trade barriers wouldyield $200 billionannually in long-term economic benefits for poor countries and lift 500 million people out of such poverty. About half of the benefitwould come from opening markets in agricultural goods. U.S. Department of Agriculture studies show that eliminating rich countries' agriculturalsupports would result in a 24 percent gain in the value of poor countries' farm exports, which account for a quarter of their total exports and

represent industries that employ roughly half their population. Also, the Doha negotiations could remove inequities that distort theinternational trading system and significantly hinder growth in poor countries. Tariffs aremuch higher on goods

primarilyproduced by poor countriesthan on those produced by wealthy countries, in part because most poor countries did not participatein earlier rounds of trade negotiations. Even in the United States, where tariffs average less than two percent, the tariffs on the goods that most

poor countries export -- footwear, vegetables, fruit juices, peanuts, and sugar -- range from 40 percent to over 100 percent. The tariffs in othercountries are even worse; some levy tariffs of up to 1,000 percent on some farm goods. And it is not only industrial countries that need to reduce

their barriers. World Bank studies point out that more than half of the burden on poor countries' exports results fromrestrictions imposed by other poor countries. That is because developing countries as a group have higher tariffs than industrialcountries, and a substantial number of developing countries mostly trade with other developing countries. These facts underscore the importance

of opening markets globally. Importantly, success in the Doha Round could help strengthen weak and failing statesthatjeopardize U.S. security. Impoverished states often lack the ability to enforce their lawsand secure their borders, making itmuch more difficult for the U.S. government to deal effectively with transnational problemssuch as organized crime,

narcotics trafficking, money laundering, illegal arms sales, disease pandemics, and environmental degradation. The Cline studies

meticulously map global poverty . Three WTO members -- Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Pakistan-- each have roughly

100 million people living below the international poverty line. Six African members -- the Democratic Republic of theCongo, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda -- together account for another 200 million people living in poverty.

All are located in regions beset by instability. Cline calculates that on average a one percent increase ina country'sratio of tradeto output eventuallyboosts its income by one-half percent, which translates into aone percent reduction in povertyand a concomitant increasein stability.


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Most qualified studies prove the Doha is the most effective solution to povertyBjorn Lomborg, director of the Copenhagen Consensus Centre, 6/28/2008, (A Great Unpopular Idea, Newsweek, p.http://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/Admin/Public/DWSDownload.aspx?File=%2FFiles%2FFiler%2FCC08%2FPresse%2FNewsweek.pdf) [John the Stupek]

Passing the World Trade Organization's Doha Development Agenda would be an astonishingly cheap way to reap the benefits of more free trade.

At the Copenhagen Consensus project, we gather some of the world's leading economistsin an effort to decide how to

do the most good for the most people at the lowest possible cost. The world's resources are limited, so choices have to be

made about how to invest: Into reducing malnourishment? Combating climate change? Improving education? This year the panelincluding five Nobel laureatesconcluded that the second most efficient actionthe planet could take (afterproviding

malnourished children with vitamins) would be to complete the Doha round. It based its conclusions on new research for theCopenhagen Consensus project, including some by World Bank economist Kym Anderson. Andersonexamined different econometricmodeling scenarios, and calculated the realistic costs and benefits of completing the Doha talks. He concluded that if developingcountries cut their tariffsby the same proportion as high-income countries, and services and investment were also liberalized, the globalannual gains could climb as high as $120 billionby 2015, with $17 billion going to the world's poorest countries. Over the long term,richer countries would invest more and grow even faster, and thus the benefits would grow very large toward the end of the century. Recast as a

steady annual benefit, a positive Doha outcome could increase global income by more than $3 trillionper year, four fifths ofwhich would go to today's developing countries. The experiences of successful reformers like South Korea, China, India and Chile suggest that

trade liberalization immediately boosts annual economic-growth ratesby several percentage points for many years.Eliminating subsidies and trade barriers would mean that resources could be used more efficiently, so there would

be more scope to reduce inequality and poverty, social tensions, environmental degradation, malnutrition anddiseases. Per capita income would grow, enabling more people in developing countries to take care of some of these problems for themselves.There would, of course, be costs. Reform will force some industries to downsize or close, although more industries will expand. The adjustment

will also bring social costs; for some people and some communities, the transition would be difficult. Yet across the board, the benefitsof a successful Doha round are likely to be hundreds of times higher than these costs. The fact that completing the

Doha round would increase global wealth is unique. No other measurethat we studied could achieve this. So more freetrade is the only step that would help finance other top investments endorsed by the Copenhagen Consensus panel, including the top choice,fighting the "hidden hunger" problem of malnutrition. For example, providing micronutrientsparticularly vitamin A and zincto 80 percent ofthe 140 million or so undernourished children in the world would require a commitment of just $60 million annually, a small fraction of the

billions that would be generated by a successful Doha round. And the investment in combating malnutrition would more than pay for itself: theeconomic gains from improved productivity and a lower burden on the health system would eventually clear $1 billion a year.

Pakistan collapse results in global nuclear warStephen J. Morgan, former member of the British Labour Party Executive Committee, 3/4/2007(Better Another

Taliban Afghansitan, than a Taliban Nuclear Pakistan, p. http://www.electricarticles.com/display.aspx?id=639)[John the Stupek]

Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style governmentwith strong Al Qaeda influence is a real possibility.

Such deep chaos would, of course, open a Pandora's box forthe region and the world. With the possibility of unstable

clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal, not only their use

against India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda.

Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America. Therefore a nuclear war wouldnow again become a real strategic

possibility. This wouldbring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It could usher in a new Cold War with China and

Russia pitted against the US. What is at stake in the half-forgotten war in Afghanistan is far greater than that in Iraq. But Americascapacities for controlling the situation are extremely restricted. Might it be, in the end, they are also forced to accept President Musharraf'sunspoken slogan of Better another Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban NUCLEAR Pakistan!

Doha is the only way to sustain developing country growthall other alternatives failAngel Gurria, secretary-general of the OECD, October 2006(Doha: The Low Hanging Fruit, OECD (Organisationfor Economic Co-Operation and Development) Observer , p.http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/1922/Doha:_the_low_hanging_fruit.html) [John the Stupek]

The DohaDevelopment Agenda is an opportunity to re -balance trade rules in favour of developing countries while

boosting the world economy. The Doha talks reportedly collapsed largely because of disagreements over agriculture, but clearly that is notthe whole story. Indeed, some rich countries were not ready to accept larger tariff cuts or bigger reductions in trade-distorting domestic subsidiesfor farm products. Emerging market countries, meanwhile, offered what some saw as only modest improvements in market access for goods and

services. The present impasse is a lose-lose situation, in which all countries suffer but where the poorest will suffer most .


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The OECD has estimated at nearly $100 billion the gains in terms of increased economic activity and hence prosperitythat could be obtained

from full tariff liberalisation for industrial and agricultural goods. The benefits from liberalisingtrade in servicesthe fastest growingsector of the world economy - could befive times higher, at around $500 billion. A Doha agreement on trade facilitation, by clearing away

procedural barriers, could contribute at least $100 billion more. Developing countries are projected to reap as much as two-

thirds of these gains . The failureof Doha would mean that these benefits are lost. More importantly, it risks undermining the

multilateral trading system and unleashing a wave of protectionism that reasonable politicians will find hard to

counter. Trade has been a powerful engine of growth in the past 50 years, contributing to lift millions out of poverty. But trade liberalisation

causes short-term pain, as some countries and workers face disproportionate adjustment costs. Open markets supported by policies whichfacilitate adjustment are crucial to ensurethat thosewho suffer short-term losses canalsoparticipate in the overall

benefits of globalisation. The multilateral trading system plays an essential function in this regard, defending and

promoting the interests of all trading nations . By building on the principles of national treatment and non-discrimination, the

WTO provides a forum for negotiating . By providing recourse in cases of violations, it embodies a rules-based system that

helps international trade workas an engine of growth and development. The alternative to a Dohaagreement is bleak. There isa

danger that the WTO will proceed by litigation instead of legislation, that dispute settlement will take the place of rule making.

Existing distortionsto trade and economic activity could become entrenched, making it increasingly difficult for developingcountries to compete fairly in world markets. Bilateral and regional trade deals would proliferate. Without the disciplines

of a strong multilateral trading system, the chance would increase that these deals would introduce strainsand

inefficiencies:by diverting tradeand investment, and through the increased costs imposed on business by the proliferation of rules of originand product standards. In fact, proposals are already being made for an APEC only Free Trade Agreement (FTAAP), given Dohas impasse.

Multiple studies prove that the risk of war is less probable in a world of economic

interdependence.Griswold, 4/20/2007(Danieldirector of the Center for Trade Policy Studies, Trade, Democracy and Peace, p.http://www.freetrade.org/node/681) [John the Stupek]

A little-noticed headline on an Associated Press story a while back reported, "War declining worldwide, studies say." In 2006, a survey bythe Stockholm International Peace Research Institute found that the number of armed conflicts around the world has

been in decline for the past half-century . Since the early 1990s, ongoing conflicts have dropped from 33 to 17 ,with all of them now civil conflicts within countries. The Institute's latest report found that 2005 marked the second year in a row that no twonations were at war with one another. What a remarkable and wonderful fact. The death toll from war has also been falling. According to theAssociated Press report, "The number killed in battle has fallen to its lowest point in the post-World War II period, dipping below 20,000 a year

by one measure. Peacemaking missions, meanwhile, are growing in number." Current estimates of people killed by war are down sharply fromannual tolls ranging from 40,000 to 100,000 in the 1990s, and from a peak of 700,000 in 1951 during the Korean War. Many causes lie behindthe good news--the end of the Cold War and the spread of democracy, among them--but expanding trade and globalization appear to be playing amajor role in promoting world peace. Far from stoking a "World on Fire," as one misguided American author argued in a forgettable book,growing commercial ties between nations have had a dampening effect on armed conflict and war. I would argue that free trade and globalization

have promoted peace in three main ways. First, as I argued a moment ago, trade and globalization have reinforced the trend

toward democracy , and democracies tend not to pick fights with each other. Thanksin part to globalization, almost

two thirds of the world's countries today are democracies--a record high. Some studies have cast doubt on the idea that democraciesare less likely to fight wars. While it's true that democracies rarely if ever war with each other, it is not such a rare occurrence for democracies toengage in wars with non-democracies. We can still hope that has more countries turn to democracy, there will be fewer provocations for war by

non-democracies. A secondand even more potent way that trade has promoted peace is by promoting more economic

integration. As national economies become more intertwined with each other, those nations have more to lose

should war break out. War in a globalized world not only means human casualtiesand bigger government,butalso

ruptured trade and investmentties that impose lasting damage on the economy. In short, globalization has dramaticallyraised the economic cost of war . The 2005 Economic Freedom of the World Report contains an insightful chapter on "Economic

Freedom and Peace" by Dr. Erik Gartzke, a professor of political science at Columbia University. Dr. Gartzke compares the propensity ofcountries to engage in wars and their level of economic freedom and concludes that economic freedom, including the freedom to trade,significantly decreases the probability that a country will experience a military dispute with another country. Through econometric analysis, he

found that, "Making economies freer translates into making countries more peaceful. At the extremes, the least free states

are about 14 times as conflict prone as the most free." By the way, Dr. Gartzke's analysis found that economic freedom was a far

more important variable in determining a countries propensity to go to war than democracy. A third reason why free tradepromotes peace isbecause it allows nations to acquire wealth through production and exchange rather than conquest of territory and


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resources. As economies develop, wealth is increasingly measured in terms of intellectual property, financial assets, and human capital. Suchassets cannot be easily seized by armies. In contrast, hard assets such as minerals and farmland are becoming relatively less important in a high-

tech, service economy. If people need resources outside their national borders , say oil or timber or farm products, they canacquire them peacefully by tradingaway what they can produce best at home. In short, globalization and the development it has spurredhave rendered the spoils of war less valuable. Of course, free trade and globalization do not guarantee peace. Hot-blooded nationalism andideological fervor can overwhelm cold economic calculations. Any relationship involving human beings will be messy and non-linier. There will

always be exceptions and outliers in such complex relationships involving economies and governments. But deep trade and investment

ties among nations make war less attractive .

The collapse of the WTO results in corporate domination and exploitation.Phillipe Legrain, special adviser to the WTO director general Mike Moore, 2000 (The WTO: Boon or Bane for theDeveloping World, p. http://www.focusweb.org/publications/2000/The%20WTOThe%20WTO-Boon%20or%20Bane%20for%20the%20Developing%20World.htm) [John the Stupek]

A convincing case for the WTOs abolition must showtwo things. First, that the world would be better offwithout theWTO. Second, that the WTO's abolition is preferable to any politically feasible reform. You fail to show either. Abolishing

the WTO would not destroy globalisation, capitalism, or US corporate power. But it would wipe outa forum for

governments to negotiate multilateral trade rules and a mechanism for holding them to those rules. That would makeevery country worse off, but the biggest losers would be the poor and the weak. One benefit of rulesis that they applyto big, rich countriesas well as small, poor ones. When America blocked imports of Costa Rican underwear, Costa Ricaappealed to the WTO. It won, and America lifted its restrictions. Do youhonestly think Costa Rica would have such clout in

Washington without the WTO?Granted, the dispute-settlement mechanism is not perfect: America has a battery of lawyers to fight itscorner, whereas small countries scrimp. It should be improved. But it is already much better than the alternative: the law of the jungle, where

might makes right. Another merit of WTO rules is that they tie governments hands. Once countries open their marketsto foreign tradeand investment, they cannot close them againat whim. Without this stability, companies would be reluctant to invest abroad, particularlyin developing countries with a protectionist or politically unstable record. Abolishing the WTO would further marginalisedeveloping countries. If there were no prospect of further multilateral liberalisation and no body to enforce existing rules, trade barrierswould creep up as protectionists gain the upper hand. The world might splitinto hostile regional blocks, with rich-countryexporters seeking captive markets in developing countries. Developing countries, which need access to rich-countrymarkets more than rich countries need access to theirs, would have to join on unfavourable termsor be left out in the cold. In anycase, there would be less trade. And less trade meansslower economic growth, stagnating living standards andmore people trapped inpovertylike in the Great Depression. Over the past 50 years, the 15-fold rise in world trade has driven a seven-fold rise in world output.Thanks to trade, Japan and South Korea are no longer developing countries. Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner of Harvard University found that

developing countries with open economies grew by 4.5 per cent a year in the 1970s and 1980s, while those with closed economies grew by 0.7per cent a year. At that rate, open economies double in size every 16 years, while closed ones must wait a hundred. Of course, in the short term,some people lose from trade liberalisation. But in the long run, everyone gains: even the poorest South Koreans today are much richer than theircounterparts 30 years ago.

Prefer our detailed and specific analysiswholesale condemnations of liberal economic

institutions are epistemologically bankrupt.

Castree 6(Noel, Professor of Geography at the University of Manchester, Environment and Planning A, volume38, Issue 1, From neoliberalism to neoliberalisation: consolations, confusions, and necessary illusions, p. 1 -5)[John the Stupek]

Yet in the slow (but enjoyable) process of reviewing the literature I have become increasingly confused as to the precise object of analyticalattention. It is not simply that the research papers I am reading focus on different kinds of natural and altered environments (hardly surprising

given the world's biophysical diversity). In addition, the political economic project driving environmental change neoliberalismseems

to alter its shape from paper to paper. So, although theauthors whose essaysand chapters I am reading appear to share acommon analytical focustheir different environmental expertises notwithstandingit turns out that this focus is rather fuzzy.This is not just an empirical issue. In theoretical termswhat counts as neoliberalism does not appear to be a matter ofconsensusamong critics in geography and cognate fields. In some cases privatisation and marketisation are the key criteria; in other casesadditional features are listed among its differentia specifica. Empirically, it is no surprise to discover that, however defined, `neoliberalism' doesnot `ground itself' unchanged from place to place. Rather, as the case studies I have been reading show so well, its embedding in real-worldsituations muddies the clean lines of its conceptual specification. So far so unexceptional. Anyone with an even passing familiarity withgeographical debates over previous grand abstractionssuch as postmodernity, post-Fordism, or globalizationwill doubtless interpret my`fuzzy concept' problem as no problem at all. Given time, it might be thought that those researchers whose empirical work I am surveying willsharpen theoretical understandings of neoliberalism by carefully specifying different modalities of `actually existing neoliberalism'. This beingearly days, it might be thought that we still have some way to go before research into the `nature' of neoliberalism reaches maturity. `Maturity',


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from this perspective, would be a situation in which a substantial body of evidence has both arisen from and altered increasingly refinedconceptualisations of what neoliberalism is all about. As this involves increased theoretical complexity, then the theoretical abstractionneoliberalism will, over time, give way to plural understandings of neoliberalisation as a really existing process rather than an ageographicalthing. The end result will be that environmental geographerslike other geographers interested in neoliberalismwill move from the heavens ofabstract theory to the nitty-gritty of empirical specifics ending up somewhere in between: with mid-range conceptualisations that have genuineexplanatory and normative purchase. Though the above scenario is not implausible, I have nagging doubts ones whose implications extend way

beyond my immediate subject of concern. My worry is that analysts of neoliberalism's environmental impacts are travelling down a

road to nowhere . The potential dead end to which I refer is not a function of the topic being researched like any political economic

project, neoliberalism will have nontrivial effects on the nonhuman world (and therefore on us). It is essential that these effects be described,explained, and evaluated. But the key questionand the basis of my concernis what precisely produces these effects. Ostensibly it isneoliberalism of course. But because geographical researchers of neoliberalism are rightly trying to complicate and dehomogenise this thought-abstraction, the issue of what, precisely, the object of analysis is arises. If, as Clive Barnett (2005, page 9) states, ``There is no such thing asneoliberalism!'', then we are forced to recognise one of two possibilities. The first apropos the mid-level theory mentioned aboveis that thereare distinct kinds of neoliberalisation whose environmental impacts can be fairly accurately understood (even though there is unlikely to be aconsistent relationship between kinds and impacts). The second is that even at this mesolevel neoliberalism can only exist as a thought-abstraction not a `real entity' because it only ever exists in articulation with actors, institutions, and agendas that immediately call into q uestionwhether a thing called neoliberalism however carefully specifiedcan be held responsible for anything. Clearly, I am touching here uponfundamental research issuesthose of ontology and epistemologythat cannot be resolved at a purely philosophical level. To date, researchersof neoliberalism in urban and economic geography have tended to resist the second possibility mentioned above (perhaps because it appears tolead to the dead end of an idiographic focus on the unique and the singular). Instead, they believe that ongoing empirical research can besynthesised and compared so that mid-level concepts will emerge. The likelihood is that the environmental geographers whose research I haverecently been reading will, similarly, see the production of such grounded concepts as their long-term objective. If so, I wish to give them pausefor thoughtso too all those other geographers undertaking theoretically informed and theoretically relevant empirical research intoneoliberalism's actually existing forms. A brief exploration of some unresolved tensions in the writings of Wendy Larner and Jamie Peck is

instructive here. Economic geographers both, Larner and Peck's overview pieces on neoliberalism have enjoyed a wide readership among criticalgeographers (Larner, 2003; Peck 2001; 2004; see also Peck and Tickell, 2002). Both authors have tried to set agendas for current and futuregeographical research into neoliberalism that touch upon the source of my concern in this commentary. Larner (2003, page 510) has argued that

neoliberalism needs to be given ``an identity crisis''. Following J K Gibson-Graham (1996) she argues that when critical

scholars reify neoliberalism as a hegemonic, unified entity they, perversely, exaggerate its power despite their

oppositional stance towards it. Her recommendation is that we take aspatial and universal conceptions of neoliberalism and render themgeographical: that we pay attention to ``the different variants of neoliberalism, to the hybrid nature of contemporary policies and

programmes...[and] to the multiple and contradictory aspects of neoliberal spaces, techniques, and subjects'' (page 509, emphasis in the original).However, perhaps aware that this argument can be seen to license the proliferation of disconnected case studies, she also stresses ``the importantcontributions of academic work focused on identifying the similarities between different forms of neoliberalism'' (page 510). The hidden tensionsin Larner's argument become manifest in Peck's excellent synoptic essays on neoliberalism. He notes that neoliberalism is a ``perplexinglyamorphous political economic phenomena'' (2004, page 394) because it remains unclear at what geographical scales and levels of theoreticalabstraction we can identify it. As he puts it, ``While the neoliberal discourses and strategies that are mobilized in ... different settings share certainfamily resemblances, local institutional context clearly (and really) matters in the style, substance, origins and outcomes ...'' (page 395). This ismore than a reiteration of Larner's apparently sensible attempt to give the grand abstraction `neoliberalism' an identity crisis. More than Larner,

Peck wants to identify commonalities within apparent difference without succumbing to ``the fallacies of monolithism ... or convergencethinking'' (page 403). As he continues, ``While geographers tend to be rightly sceptical of spatially totalizing claims, splitting differences overvarieties of neoliberalism cannot be an end in itself, not least because it begs questions about the common roots and shared features of theunevenly neoliberalized landscape that confronts us.'' What Peck seems to have in mind here is not a process of pure thought abstraction: one inwhich generic similarities among different neoliberalisms are identified yielding a `neoliberal model' that nowhere exists as such. Instead, herecognises that all neoliberalisations are hybrid from the outset [even the United States represents a case, rather than the model itself' (page

393)]. It follows for him, therefore, that in the absence of a more careful mapping of these hybrids-in-connection, the concept of

neoliberalism... remainsseriously underspecified, little morein some cases than a radical-theoretical slogan'' (page 403). Itseems to me that, despite his best efforts, Peck fails to address satisfactorily some key problems in the argument that both he and Larner areadvancing. In a sense both authors want to have their cake and eat it. They insist that we identify different modalities of neoliberalism withoutgiving up on the task of discussing the abstraction we might provisionally term neoliberalism in general' (page 395) where the latter nowarises from a comparative consideration of empirical research rather than from a priori thought-experiments or reference to the programmaticwritings of Friedman and Hayek. For my own part I see difficulties with this `both/and' agenda even as I understand the intentions behind it. Letme explain. First, part of neoliberalism's perplexing amorphousness whatever geographical scale or level of theoretical abstraction we aredealing withstems from a fairly intractable inability to fix the term's meanings and real-world referents. Unlike, say, waterwhich in one ofits three states remains water wherever and whenever it isneoliberalism does not possess stable characteristics. We only know that a given

phenomena is neoliberalor has a more than trivial degree of neoliberal content (page 403) because we have selected from among severaldefinitions that other researchers or real-world actors use to specify what neoliberalism is. Because these definitions are multiple as I notedearlier, critics usually offer between two and several criteria when defining what counts as a neoliberal idea or policy then `the real world' canonly partly function as a court of appeal to resolve competing claims as to what is (or is not) neoliberal in degree and kind. Second, even if thiswere not an issue, neoliberal practices always, as Larner and Peck rightly argue, exist in a more-than-neoliberal context. The context matters

because it introduces difference, path dependency, and unevenness in terms of process and outcome: neoliberalisations in the plural. But this thenbegs the question: what does it mean to abstract from context (again, whatever geographical scale or level of theoretical abstraction we aredealing with) in the way that Larner and especially Peck recommend? Even in Peck's subtle reading of neoliberalism in general we confront the

possibility that we are simply listing genericalbeit historically specificcharacteristics found in multiple geographical contexts. Because the

effects of these characteristics can only ever be understood contextually then the suspicion arises that neoliberalismdepicted over and above

context is a pure archetype: something unreal that has no consequences or existence in itself. This, of course, raises the


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key question of where context begins and where it ends. Phrased differently, it raises the question of geographical scale: at what sociallyconstituted scale(s) does (do) discrete modes of neoliberal policy and practice exist? The answer, as the growing empirical literature shows, isthat it very much depends. One of the reasons that critics see neoliberalism as tendentially hegemonic is because it has been `rolled out' by globalinstitutions (such as the World Bank) with the (apparent) power to impose their will on whole countries. But this does not, of course, mean that itis implemented uniformly over space because of preexisting differences in the configurations of state, business, and civil society. What is more,national, regional, and local level actors in various parts of the world have enacted their own neoliberal policies in relation to specific sets of

people, places, natural resources, industries, and so on. So even if neoliberal ideas have, these last twenty years, diffused out from globallypowerful bodies this does nothing to alter the fact of hybridity and variety that Larner and Peck both discern. My third point, in light of this, is

that it is wrong to believe that larger geographical scales(for example, the North American Free Trade Agreement area)constitute a more uniform neoliberal landscapeoverlaying more regionally and locally variable ones. The point, surely, is that evenglobal policies and rules bite differently all the wayfrom the continental down to the local scales. In other words,difference does not begin (or somehow `deepen') at the local scale alone (as implied by Perreault and Martin, 2005). Neithe r Larner nor Pecksuggest that it does, but there is nonetheless the risk that their arguments can be seen to imply that there is a scale or scales where geographicaldifference ends and spatial similarity begins. As I suggested in the previous paragraph, neoliberalism is impure at all geographical scales,

meaning that the search for similarities can easily become a formal rather than substantive exercise. The way to avoid this last possibility is to dowhat critical realists in human geography have been doing for years. Supposing that we can agree on what neoliberalism's defining characteristicsare, we start by recognising that it exists in an overdetermined socionatural universe. We therefore acknowledge that it never acts aloneonly ina fairy-tale world where everything is privatised, marketised, and commodified would this not hold true. Therefore, when we identify specificvariants of neoliberalism we are not examining varieties of a really existing, homogenous genus. Instead, we are doing two things. First, we areseeing how a really existing and quite widespread set of policy ideas are having conjoint effects at specific geographical scales (up to andincluding the global). In other words, we are examining contingently occurring processes and outcomes that may well have operated differently ifthe neoliberal component had not been present. Second, this means the object of analysis in any given research project is not a mere temporaryvariant of something more enduring and solid but rather a qualitatively distinct phenomenon in its own right: namely, an articulation betweencertain neoliberal policies and a raft of other social and natural phenomena. Rigorously pursued, a critical realist approach to neoliberalism or any

other topic resists the violence of abstraction: that is, the habit of confusing epistemic discussions about a phenomenon abstracted from itscontexts of operation with ontological discussions about its actual behaviour and its material effects. As the now-distant localities debateshowed, the best critical realist research does not doubt that certain phenomena cover wide spans of space and time. Instead, it insists that such

phenomena are likely to be impure at all scales and this impurity must be respected not seen as a deviation from some norm or essence. How doesthis relate to attempts to compare different variants of neoliberalism? The answer is that critical realists would look for substantial (not formal)similarities in causal processes and contingent similarities in how those processes work out on the ground. In other words, geographicaldifference matters to critical realists all the way down which is not the same as saying that the world is necessarily a pa tchwork of unlike parts.Critical realists, though not discussed by Peck in his recent work (though further back in time see Peck, 1996), would doubtless approachneoliberalism in the way he recommends. They would identify similarities between neoliberalisations not to suggest that the differences can be

bracketed but to suggest, instead, that even with these differences substantial commonalities of process and outcome occur. Equally, though, theywould be open to the evidence telling them a different story: one in which the differences make such a difference that the commonalities existonly in name (conceptually) not in actuality. In either case, it would be axiomatic that it is never `neoliberalism' alone that causes anything, butalways neoliberalism-plus begging the empirical question of at one point of impurity it becomes impossible to use the term neoliberal in anymeaningful analytic sense. What is the relevance of all this to the relatively new research literature exploring neoliberalisms and the nonhumanworld? In a recent critical review of work by Larner, Peck, and other geographic analysts of neoliberalism, Barnett (2005, pages 9-10) has made

the following observation. For all its apparent critical force', he argues, the vocabulary of neoliberalismand neoliberalization in

fact provides a double consolation for leftist academics: it supplies us withplentiful opportunities for unveiling the real workings ofhegemonic ideologies in a characteristic gesture of revelation. In so doing, it invites us to align our own professional roles with the activities ofvarious actors out there, who are always framed as engaging in resistance or contestation.'' If Barnett is right (and I think he might be) then it isimportant that the still-young geographical research literature on neoliberalism and nature avoids the consolations to which he refers. In a recenttheme issue of this journal on neoliberalism in Latin America in which several essays examine environmental impactsThomas Perreault andPatricia Martin (2005) seem drawn to these consolations despite themselves. On the one side, like Larner and Peck, they deny that neoliberalismtout court exists (only specific versions of it). Yet they also make plenary claims about its' implications for the environment and its governance

(page 193). What is the appeal of continuing to talk in terms of grand abstractions , even as they are being called into question? One

answer is that the `bad' (that is, aspatial) habits of social science thinking continue to affect geographical thinking. As Barnett implies,

academic criticsare made to feel important if the object of their animus appearsto be hegemonic, global, and

powerful: something that demands urgent critical scrutiny. It is far lessglamorous and `sexy' to have constantly to describe onesobjects of analysis as multiple, complex, and varied through time and space. As David Harvey (1985, page xi) argued manyyears ago, spatiotemporal specificity appears to paralyse the generalising impulses of mainstream and radical social scientists (like economistsand social theorists).

A constant focus on epistemological and ontological questions undermines theory and the

ability to develop real-world policy solutions.Owens 2002(Davidprofessor of social and political philosophy at the University of Southampton, Re-orientingInternational Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning, Millenium, p. 655-657) [John theStupek]

Commenting on the philosophical turn in IR, Wver remarks that [a] frenzy for words like epistemology and ontology

often signals this philosophical turn, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, looselydeployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one


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respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse toreflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable rolein making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is notwithout its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory

wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first dangerwith the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to

prioritiseissues of ontology and epistemology over explanatoryand/or interpretive poweras if the latter two were

merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatoryand/or interpretivepowerof a theoretical account is not

wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not

be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical

commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to r ational c hoice t heory to recognise that it can

provide powerful accounts ofcertain kinds ofproblems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action

are foregrounded. It may, of course,be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of

why this type of theory is powerfulin accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit

features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a

philosophical weaknessbut this does not underminethe point that, for a certainclass ofproblems, rational

choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical

accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not

the only or even necessarily the most important kind . The second dangerrun by the philosophical turn is that becauseprioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles , it

cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approachto IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like

this: sinceit is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptionsof a given action, event or phenomenon, thechallenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event orphenomenonin question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, theory-driven work is part of a

reductionist program in that it dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows

from the preferred modelor theory.5 The justificationoffered for this strategy rests on themistakenbelief that it is necessaryfor social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similarterms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since whether there are general

explanationsfor classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before

conducting that inquiry .6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over

that of empirical validity . The third danger is that thepreceding two combine to encourage the formation of a

particular image of disciplinary debate in IRwhat might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) the Highlander viewnamely, an

image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic

achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view becausethe turn to, andprioritisation of, ontology

and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right,

namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. Thisimage feeds back into IR

exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises .

The burden of truth claims is to disprove the factual claims of the 1AC --- no amount of

theory can replace well-warranted evidence and analysis.Yudkowsky 2008(Eliezerresearch fellow at Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence, Cognitive Biases

Potentially Affecting Judgment of Global Risks, Global Catastrophic Risks, p. 111-112) [John the Stupek]

Every true idea which discomforts you will seem to match the pattern of at least one psychological error. Robert Pirsig said: "The world's

biggest fool can say the sun is shining, but that doesn't make it dark out." If you believe someone is guilty of a

psychological error, then demonstrate your competenceby first demolishing their consequential factual errors .

If there are no factual errors , then what matters the psychology? The temptation of psychology is that, knowing a

little psychology, we can meddle in arguments where we have no technical expertise - instead sagely analyzing the

psychology of the disputants. If someone wrote a novel about an asteroid strike destroying modern civilization, then someone


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might criticize that novel as extreme, dystopian, apocalyptic; symptomatic of the author's naive inability to deal with a complex technological

society. We should recognize this as a literary criticism, not a scientific one ; it is about good or bad novels, not good or bad

hypotheses. To quantify the annual probability of an asteroid strike in real life , one must study astronomy and

the historical record: no amount ofliterary criticism can put a number on it. Garreau(2005) seems to hold that a

scenario ofa mind slowly increasing in capability, is more mature and sophisticated than a scenario of extremely rapid intelligence

increase. But that's a technical question , not a matter of taste; no amount of psychologizing can tell you the exactslope of that curve. It's harder to abuse heuristics and biases than psychoanalysis. Accusing someone ofconjunction fallacy leads

naturally into listing the specific details that you thinkare burdensome and drive down the joint probability . Even so, do

not lose track of the realworld facts of primary interest; do not let the argument become about psychology. Despite all dangers and

temptations, it is better to know about psychological biases than to not know. Otherwise we will walk directly into the whirling helicopter bladesof life. But be very careful not to have too much fun accusing others of biases. That is the road that leads to becoming a sophisticated arguer -someone who, faced with any discomforting argument, finds at once a bias in it. The one whom you must watch above all is yourself. JerryCleaver said: "What does you in is not failure to apply some high-level, intricate, complicated technique. It's overlooking the basics. Not keeping

your eye on the ball." Analyses shouldfinally center on testable real-world assertions . Do not take your eye off the ball.


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1ACPlan

The United States federal government should facilitate Mexicos entry in the Transatlantic

Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations.

mexico tafta 1ac - ddi 2013 cm

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