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051810

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

NATIONAL DRUG INTELLIGENCE CENTER

May 2010

Mexican Drug Trafficking OrganizaTiOns:

DevelOpMenTs iMpacTing The uniTeD sTaTes

Product No. 2010-Q0317-002 National Drug Intelligence Center

Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations:

Developments Impacting the United States

NATIONAL DRUG INTELLIGENCE CENTERU.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

May 2010

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE—LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


ii

Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations: Developments Impacting the United States






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Table of Contents

Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1The Growing Strength of Mexican DTOs in the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Drug Production by Mexican DTOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Marijuana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Heroin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6Methamphetamine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Drug Smuggling into the United States by Mexican DTOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8Overland Smuggling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8Cross-Border Drug Smuggling Through Indian Country by Mexican DTOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Alternative Smuggling Methods: Tunnels, Trains, Airplanes, and Maritime Vessels . . . . . . . . . 11Domestic Drug Distribution by Mexican DTOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12National Security Threats Posed by Mexican DTOs Operating in the United States . . . . . . . . . . 12

Drug-Related Crime and Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Violence Against U.S. Law Enforcement Officials From Mexican DTOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Weapons Trafficking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14Public Corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Illicit Finance Operations of Mexican DTOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17Intelligence Gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18Appendix A . Overviews of Major Mexican DTOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Sinaloa Cartel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23Juárez Cartel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25Beltrán-Leyva Organization (BLO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26La Familia Michoacána (LFM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28Tijuana Cartel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Appendix B . Maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43





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U.S. Department of JusticeNational Drug Intelligence Center

Product No . 2010-Q0317-002

1


Scope(LES) This report discusses Mexican drug

trafficking organization (DTO) activity in the United States with an emphasis on the activities of the most significant Mexican DTOs: the Sinaloa Cartel, the Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas, the Juárez Cartel, the Beltrán-Leyva Organiza-tion (BLO), La Familia Michoacána (LFM), and the Tijuana Cartel . These organizations are the principal suppliers of illicit cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine to U .S . markets and are widely acknowledged by law enforcement and the intelligence community as a significant drug threat—and a growing transnational organized crime threat—to the United States . To provide context for the reader, this report also contains information on these groups’ activities in Mexico .

Executive Summary(LES) Mexican DTOs represent the greatest

drug trafficking threat to the United States and control most of the wholesale cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine distribution in the United States, as well as much of the mari-juana distribution . Mexican DTOs are more deeply entrenched in drug trafficking activi-ties in the United States than any other DTOs . They are the only DTOs operating in all nine Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) regions and in all 32 High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs).

Mexican DTOs are active in at least 1,286 U .S . cities .a In at least 143 cities and 36 states, drug trafficking activity has been linked to one or more of the major Mexican organizations that supply illicit drugs to U.S. markets.

(U) The strength and resilience of Mexican DTOs, as well as the persistent threat posed by the organizations, is evidenced in the following strategic findings:

• (U) In the past few years, Mexican DTOs expanded their operations in the Florida/Caribbean, Mid-Atlantic, New York/New Jersey, and New England Regions, where, in the past, Colombian DTOs were the leading suppliers of cocaine and heroin .

• (U) Mexican DTOs are increasingly using U .S .-based gangs to smuggle and distrib-ute drugs, collect drug proceeds, smuggle weapons, conduct kidnappings, and act as lookouts and enforcers. This arrangement helps to insulate Mexican DTO members from U .S . law enforcement .

• (U) Since 2007, Mexican DTOs have increased potential marijuana production in Mexico 36 percent even as they maintain high levels of marijuana production in the United States .

a- (LES) A DTO is reported to have a presence (operate) in a location if at least one DTO member is identified as engag-ing in drug trafficking (producing, smuggling, transporting, warehousing, protecting, or distributing) or handling illicit drug proceeds.





This document must be protected and not released to unauthorized individuals. It is to be used by persons in your agency who have a “need to know” the sensitive information contained in this document in order to perform an identifiable and authorized government function. It may not be released beyond your agency without the permission of NDIC. It must be stored in a limited access area or in a locked container when unattended. It must be destroyed by shredding or burning.


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• (LES) Mexican DTOs have become the leading suppliers of heroin in U .S . drug markets, fueled by a 342 percent increase in heroin production in Mexico since 2004 .

• (U) Mexican DTOs adapted their chemical diversion and methamphetamine produc-tion operations in Mexico, which led to a sharp increase in methamphetamine pro-duction in 2009 .

• (LES) The Guzmán-Loera Organization, part of the Sinaloa Cartel, is transporting large amounts of marijuana and other drugs from Mexico into the United States through the Tohono O’odham Reservation in Ari-zona. Law enforcement officials estimate that as much as 27 metric tons of marijuana is transported through the Tohono O’odham Reservation a week.

• (U) When necessary or convenient, Mexi-can DTOs use alternative routes to smuggle drugs into the United States including the use of tunnels running under the U .S .–Mexico border . U .S . Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers along the U.S.–Mexico border discovered 16 tunnels in fiscal year (FY) 2008 and 26 tunnels in FY2009; mostly in Arizona .

• (U) Although not comparable to cartel- and DTO-related crime and violence in Mexico, some Mexican DTOs operating in the Southwest Border Region are committing crimes such as automobile theft, firearms trafficking, home invasions, murder, ran-som kidnapping, and robbery.

• (U) U.S. law enforcement officers along the U .S .–Mexico border are assaulted more than 1,000 times each year, often by members of Mexican DTOs . The U .S . Border Patrol reported 1,056 assaults in FY2009 against its agents along the U .S .–Mexico border .

• (U) Mexican DTOs are illegally obtain-ing weapons from sources in the United States, often with assistance from U .S . street gang members, primarily from cities

in Texas (Austin, Brownsville, Corpus Christi, Dallas, El Paso, Fort Worth, Har-lingen, Houston, Laredo, McAllen, Pharr, and San Antonio) and Arizona (Glendale, Phoenix, and Tucson) .

• (LES) Mexican DTOs are increasingly us-ing grenades, acquired in Central American and other countries . Grenades were used in Mexico against police headquarters, city halls, a U .S . consulate, television stations, and senior Mexican officials between Sep-tember 2008 and March 2009 .

• (LES) Mexican DTOs also actively seek to corrupt law enforcement officers in the United States and Mexico, particularly officers who work along the Southwest Border. For example, a CBP inspector was convicted in April 2009 of drug traffick-ing, alien smuggling, and bribery from July 2008 to January 2009 .

• (LES) Mexican DTOs use bulk cash smug-gling as their principal method to move tens of billions of dollars in drug proceeds annually from the United States into Mex-ico. Mexican DTOs have established bulk cash operations in a handful of U .S . cities where drug proceeds are consolidated for shipment to the border . The largest of these bulk cash consolidation centers are Atlanta, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York City, and various locations in North Carolina .

• (LES) NDIC assesses that since the violent Los Zetas now operate independently of the Gulf Cartel, the potential for spillover crime and attacks against law enforcement officers in the United States has increased. The threat increase is attributed to the fact that many younger Los Zetas recruits lack the discipline of senior members and are more likely to be compulsive in their use of violence to prove themselves and earn respect within the organization . Los Zetas has established numerous enforcement cells within the United States, primarily in Texas,






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that support criminal operations and consti-tute a significant public safety threat particu-larly to the Southwest Border Region of the United States. Further, Los Zetas is arming and training its transporters to defend their drug shipments and to violently engage U .S . law enforcement if challenged .

(U) Currently, there are no DTOs positioned to challenge the dominance of Mexican DTOs in wholesale cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine distribution in the United States. In fact, NDIC assesses with high confi-dence that Mexican DTOs will further expand their drug trafficking activities in the New England, New York/New Jersey, Mid-Atlantic, and Florida/Caribbean Regions primarily at the expense of Colombian DTOs . In addition, NDIC believes that the relationships between Mexican DTOs and U .S .-based gangs will strengthen in the near term, particularly in the Southwest Region but also in other regions,

further aiding the expansion of Mexican DTO influence. Lastly, drug-related crime and vio-lence by Mexican DTOs in the United States will continue; however, it is very unlikely that large-scale, inter-cartel violence, will occur in the United States . The conditions and moti-vations that foster massive and long-running cartel violence in Mexico are largely absent in the United States .

The Growing Strength of Mexican DTOs in the United States

(LES) Mexican DTOs are more deeply entrenched in drug trafficking activities in the United States than any other DTOs . They are the only DTOs that are operating in all nine OCDETF regions (See Map 1 in Appendix B.) and all 32 High Intensity Drug Traffick-ing Areas (HIDTAs) and operate in at least 1,286 cities throughout the United States

Figure 1. (U) U.S. Cities With Mexican DTO Activity as Reported by Federal, State, and Local Enforcement in 2009

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Source: National Drug Intelligence Center Field Intelligence Officer interviews of local law enforcement agenciesand Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force reporting from August 2008 through December 2009.

Reporting Agency

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE






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(See Figure 1 on page 3.)b Law enforcement officials in at least 143 cities and 36 states report drug trafficking activity linked to at least one of the major Mexican organizations that supply illicit drugs to U.S. markets. Law enforcement reporting and case initiation data show that Mexican DTOs control most of the wholesale cocaine, heroin, and methamphet-amine distribution in the United States as well as much of the marijuana distribution .

(U) The influence of Mexican DTOs over wholesale drug distribution is expanding, primarily in areas where the direct influ-ence of Colombian DTOs is diminishing.

(U) In the past few years, Mexican DTOs expanded their operations in the Florida/Caribbean, Mid-Atlantic, New York/New Jersey, and New England Regions, where, in the past, Colombian DTOs were the leading suppliers of cocaine and heroin . As a result, the direct influence of Colombian DTOs has diminished further, although they remain a source for wholesale quantities of cocaine and heroin in many eastern states, especially New York and New Jersey. Mexican DTOs have expanded their presence by increasing their transportation and distribution networks, directly supplying Dominican drug distribu-tors that had previously distributed cocaine and heroin supplied by Colombian DTOs . The switch by Dominican DTOs from Colombian to Mexican suppliers is most evident in the Mid-Atlantic Region, specifically in the Philadelphia/Camden and Washington/Baltimore areas . In these locations, some Dominican DTOs bypass Colombian sources of supply in New York City and Miami and obtain cocaine and heroin directly from Mexican sources or from sources in the Caribbean or in South America .

b- (U) A DTO is reported to have a presence (operate) in a location if at least one DTO member is identified as engag-ing in drug trafficking (producing, smuggling, transporting, warehousing, protecting, or distributing) or handling illicit drug proceeds.

(LES) To help expand their operations in the United States, Mexican DTOs are in-creasingly working with U.S.-based prison and street gangs, an arrangement that insulates Mexican DTO members from U.S. law enforcement.

(LES) According to law enforcement re-porting, Mexican DTOs are increasingly using U .S .-based gangs to smuggle and distribute drugs, collect drug proceeds, smuggle weap-ons, conduct kidnappings, and act as lookouts and enforcers . Mexican DTOs primarily are working with gang members—particularly U.S. citizens—along the Southwest Border. Gang members who are U .S . citizens are valued by Mexican DTOs because they can cross the U .S .–Mexico border with less scru-tiny by law enforcement .1 The following are examples of the cooperative associations between Mexican DTOs and U .S . gangs .

• (LES) The Juárez Cartel supplies whole-sale-level quantities of cocaine and mari-juana to members of the El Paso, Texas-based, Barrio Azteca (BA) prison gang . This enables BA to exert control over drug distribution in El Paso and to ex-pand its wholesale-level drug trafficking operations to other U .S . cities, including Denver, Colorado; Indianapolis, Indiana; and Memphis, Tennessee . In exchange, BA members assist the Juárez Cartel in smuggling drugs across the Southwest Border . The BA prison gang also pro-vides protection for Juárez Cartel or other DTO members associated with the Juárez Cartel who are incarcerated in U .S . and Mexico prisons .2

• (LES) The Latin Kings gang purchases multikilogram quantities of cocaine and multithousand-kilogram quantities of marijuana from DTOs associated with the Sinaloa Cartel . Latin Kings members then transport these drugs from South Texas to Chicago, Illinois; Detroit, Michigan;






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Houston, Texas; and New York City for further distribution by the gang .3

• (LES) Members of the Mexican Mafia (La Eme) prison gang based in Los Angeles, California, work with Mexico-based DTOs affiliated with the Tijuana and Sinaloa Car-telsc to smuggle wholesale-level quantities of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and meth-amphetamine from Mexico into the United States through California ports of entry (POEs) on the U.S.–Mexico Border. Feder-al law enforcement authorities estimate that the La Eme is responsible for smuggling more than 200 kilograms of cocaine a week from Mexico into California .4

• (LES) Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) members in Reynosa, Mexico, work closely with MS-13 members in Rio Grande Valley, Texas, to provide protection for Los Zetas drug shipments smuggled from Mexico into the United States .5

• (LES) Hermanos de Pisoleros Latinos (HPL), Latin Kings, and Tango Blast gang members smuggle weapons from the United States to Mexico, where they are exchanged for drugs or sold to Mexican DTOs affiliated with the Gulf, Juárez, and Sinaloa Cartels .6

• (LES) The Tijuana Cartel pays the Calle Treinta (30th Street) gang members from the Logan Heights area of San Diego, California, to carry out various enforce-ment activities, particularly kidnappings, on behalf of the cartel .

c- (LES) Law enforcement reporting indicates that there are independent Mexico-based DTOs that participate with ma-jor DTOs in joint smuggling operations or other endeavors.

Drug Production by Mexican DTOsMarijuana

(LES) Since 2007, Mexican DTOs have significantly increased the production of marijuana in Mexico even as they maintain high levels of marijuana production in the United States.

(LES) The most recent data show that the amount of marijuana potentially produced in Mexico increased 36 percent from 15,800 metric tons in 2007 to 21,500 metric tons in 2008; much of this marijuana is destined for the United States. (See Figure 2 on page 6.) This increase in cultivation is partially attributed to a decrease in cannabis eradication in Mexico, which has declined since 2005 . The decrease in eradication is a result of (1) the realignment of responsibilities for aerial eradication within the government of Mexico (GOM) from the Attorney General’s Office to the Secretary for Public Security and (2) the shifting of overall counternarcotics priorities to interdiction and the targeting of DTO leadership .7

(LES) In addition to cannabis cultivation in Mexico, some Mexican DTOs maintain large outdoor cannabis grow operations—typi-cally in excess of 500 plants per site—in the western United States, principally on public lands . Data estimating the amount of canna-bis cultivated and marijuana produced in the United States by these DTOs are not avail-able . However, these grow operations present heightened danger to the public and law en-forcement because of the presence of tenders who live on site throughout the cultivation season and are typically armed to protect the crop from theft or detection. For example, in March 2009, federal, state, and local law en-forcement officials seized an outdoor cultiva-tion operation in Siskiyou County, California, that yielded 114,730 plants. Officials reported that five armed Mexican nationals tended the site and had been camping there for at least a couple of months .8 NDIC research indicates






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Figure 2. (LES) Cannabis Cultivation (in Hectares), Eradication (in Hectares), and Potential Marijuana Production (in Metric Tons) in Mexico, 2004-2008

5,800 5,6

00

8,600

8,900

12,00

0

30,85

1

30,84

2

30,16

2

23,19

2

18,56

2

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0

10,10

0

15,50

0

15,80

0

21,50

0

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Tota

l in

Hec

tare

s or

Met

ric T

ons

Year

Net Cultivation (ha)

Eradication (ha)

Potential Marijuana Production (MT)

Source: Crime and Narcotics Center .

that although there have been no confirmed connections to LFM, Mexican DTOs based in Michoacán, Mexico, are increasingly involved in outdoor cannabis cultivation in the western United States . These DTOs controlled nearly all the outdoor cannabis cultivation sites seized in Oregon and Washington and a majority of those seized in California in 2008 . Law enforcement reporting also indicates that individuals from Michoacán tended sites in Idaho and Utah .9

Heroin

(LES) Mexican DTOs have become the leading suppliers of heroin in U.S. drug markets fueled by a massive increase in heroin production in Mexico since 2005.

(LES) From 2004 through 2008, estimated heroin production in Mexico increased 342 percent from 8,600 kilograms (8.6 metric tons) to 38,000 kilograms (38 metric tons).(See Figure 3 on page 7.) In fact, from 2007 to 2008 potential heroin production more than doubled from 18,000 kilograms (18.0 metric

tons) to 38,000 kilograms (38.0 metric tons). The sharp increase in heroin production in 2008 largely was the result of decreased ef-forts to eradicate opium poppies in Mexico . The amount of opium poppies available for conversion to heroin in Mexico increased from 6,900 hectares in 2007 to 15,000 hectares in 2008 . The 2008 opium crop in Mexico could produce an estimated 38,000 kilograms (38 metric tons) of pure heroin, or about 105,000 kilograms (105 metric tons)d of export-quality (far less than pure) black-tar heroin .10 In addition to decreased eradi-cation, increased opium poppy cultivation may reflect an attempt by the Sinaloa Cartel and perhaps the BLO to increase heroin pro-duction and distribution to compensate for revenue lost by a drop since 2007 in cocaine supplied by South American traffickers.11

d. (U//FOUO) The equivalence in black tar heroin is calcu-lated based on the purity levels of Mexican heroin seized in 2007, the last year for which the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has purity data.






7

Figure 3. (LES) Opium Poppy Cultivation (in Hectares), Eradication (in Hectares), and Potential Pure Heroin Production (in Kilograms) in Mexico, 2004-2008

3,500

3,300 5,1

00 6,900

15,00

0

15,92

5

21,60

9

16,88

9

11,10

2 14,71

8

8,600

8,000

13,00

0

18,00

0

38,00

0

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

40,000

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Tota

l in

Hec

tare

s or

Met

ric T

ons

Year

Cultivation (ha)

Eradication (ha)

Potential Pure Heroin (kg)

Source: Crime and Narcotics Center .

Methamphetamine

(U) Following a decrease in methamphet-amine production in 2007 and early 2008, Mexican DTOs adapted their chemical diver-sion and methamphetamine production op-erations in Mexico, which led to an increase in methamphetamine production in 2009.

(U) Methamphetamine production in-creased in 2009 after declining in Mexico in 2007 and early 2008 as a result of pre-cursor chemical restrictions (see text box) . According to the U .S . Department of State, the amount of methamphetamine seized in Mexico drastically increased from 232 kilo-grams in 2008 to 5,400 kilograms in 2009. Additionally, methamphetamine laboratory seizures in Mexico increased from 47 in 2008 to 165 in 2009 .12

(U) By late 2008, Mexican DTOs had adapt-ed their operations in several ways, including the smuggling of restricted chemicals via

(U) Methamphetamine Chemical Restrictions in Mexico

Ephedrine and pseudoephedrine import restrictions in Mexico resulted in decreased Mexican methamphetamine production in 2007 and 2008. In 2005, the GOM began implementing progressively increasing restrictions on the import of ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, and other chemicals used for methamphetamine production. In 2007, the GOM announced a prohibition on ephedrine and pseudoephedrine imports into Mexico for 2008 and a ban on the use of both chemicals in Mexico by 2009.

Source: United Nations .

new routes, importing nonrestricted chemical derivatives instead of precursor chemicals, and using alternative production methods. For ex-ample, Mexican DTOs smuggle ephedrine and pseudoephedrine from source areas in China and India. Additionally, packages containing ephedrine and pseudoephedrine are commonly






8

mislabeled as other items during transit to avoid law enforcement inspection at air- and seaports in Mexico .

(U) To circumvent the chemical restrictions, Mexican DTOs also began importing chemi-cal derivatives such as n-acetyl ephedrine and methylamine that are not regulated in Mexico, but can be used to produce methamphetamine precursor chemicals and subsequently meth-amphetamine . Limited access to ephedrine and pseudoephedrine has also spurred methamphetamine producers in Mexico to increasingly use nonephedrine-based pro-duction methods . According to Drug En-forcement Administration (DEA) reporting, Mexican DTOs conduct large-scale non-ephedrine-based methamphetamine produc-tion operations in Mexico, particularly using the phenyl-2-propanone (P2P) method .

(LES) Mexican methamphetamine pro-duction increased in 2009 as indicated by unprecedented seizure amounts at the South-west Border . According to CBP data, the amount of methamphetamine seized at or between POEs along the Southwest Border in 2009 (3,154 kg) surpassed all annual totals since 2005—specifically, 2008 (1,362 kg), 2007 (1,132 kg), 2006 (2,286 kg), and 2005 (2,391 kg). Most methamphetamine seized at POEs in 2009 was seized at California POEs in the San Diego and El Centro Areas .

Drug Smuggling into the United States by Mexican DTOsOverland Smuggling

(U) The preference of Mexican DTOs to smuggle drugs using overland routes and their methods of concealment have not changed appreciably in recent years . Mexi-can DTOs exploit the combination of vast stretches of remote, sparsely populated land, extensive cross-border economic activity at POEs . The DTOs continue to conceal drug

shipments among the high volume of le-gitimate cross-border traffic through POEs primarily using private vehicles, commercial tractor-trailers, buses, and pedestrians that cross the U .S .–Mexico border daily .

(U) Although their methods of concealment and transportation have not changed sig-nificantly, Mexican DTOs have shifted their overland smuggling routes for cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana, in part because of heightened law enforce-ment pressure, changes in drug production trends, and evolving market dynamics.

(U) There have been significant and pro-longed shifts in cocaine smuggling routes that most likely have been caused by a com-bination of factors, particularly decreased cocaine production in Colombia, enhanced counterdrug efforts in Mexico, high levels of cartel violence, sustained interdiction pres-sure, and cocaine flow to non-U.S. markets. In 2007, a decline in the amount of cocaine seized along the Southwest Border in the South Texas region—the predominant co-caine smuggling route at the time—resulted in a sharp decline in the amount of cocaine seized overall . As seizure totals for South Texas declined, seizure totals for California POEs began trending upward . Since 2007, cocaine seizures at California POEs have equaled or exceeded seizure totals at South Texas POEs; nonetheless, overall seizure totals remain lower than the seizure totals recorded before the significant decline was noted . Although no single cause for the decline in overall seizures can be identified, multiple factors—including a sharp decline in cocaine production in 2008 and enhanced GOM counterdrug efforts—likely contributed to the decrease in amounts being transported from South America to Mexico and ultimate-ly to the Southwest Border .






9

Table 1. (LES) Major DTOs Operating in Drug Smuggling Corridors Along the Southwest Border

State Corridor POEsU.S. Border Patrol

SectorsDTOs

Arizona

Douglas/Agua Prieta Douglas TucsonCarrillo-FuentesGuzmán-LoeraZambada-García

Naco Naco Tucson Guzmán-Loera

Nogales Nogales TucsonGuzmán-LoeraZambada-García

Sasabe Lukeville

LukevilleSasabe

TucsonBeltrán-LeyvaGuzmán-Loera

Yuma/San Luis RioColorado

San Luis Yuma Zambada-García

California Tijuana/San DiegoLos Angeles

AndradeCalexicoCalexico EastOtay MesaSan YsidroTecate

El CentroSan DiegoYuma

Arellano-Félix,Beltrán-LeyvaEsparragosa-MorenoGuzmán-LoeraZambada-García

New Mexico Palomas/Columbus Columbus El PasoCarrillo-FuentesGuzmán-Loera

Texas

Juárez/El Paso

El PasoFabensPresidioSanta Teresa

El PasoMarfa

Carrillo-FuentesGuzmán-Loera

Matamoros/Brownsville Brownsville McAllenCárdenas-GuillénCostilla-SánchezLazcano-Lazcano

Nuevo Laredo/Laredo Laredo Laredo

Beltrán-LeyvaCárdenas-GuillénCostilla-SánchezGuzmán-LoeraLazcano-Lazcano

Piedras Negras/Eagle Pass Ciudad Acuna/Del Rio

Eagle PassDel Rio

Del Rio

Cárdenas-GuillénCarrillo-FuentesCostilla-SánchezLazcano-Lazcano

Reynosa/McAllenStarr County

HidalgoProgressoRio Grande CityRoma

McAllenCárdenas-GuillénCostilla-SánchezLazcano-Lazcano

Source: Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force Southwest Region; U.S. Customs and Border Protection.






10

(U) Conversely, heroin seizures along the Southwest Border have been increasing, most likely as a result of the growing Mexican influence in heroin production and transporta-tion . This increase in Southwest Border heroin seizures coincides with a decrease in heroin seizures from commercial airlines . In 2008, National Seizure System data indicate that the total amount of heroin seized along the Southwest Border (556 kg) exceeded the total amount of heroin seized from commercial airlines (398 kg) for the first time. This shift appears to be directly related to production trends and the changing roles of DTOs. For the past several years, production estimates for Mexican heroin, which is transported primarily overland across the Southwest Border, steadily increased to record levels in 2009. Furthermore, Mexican DTOs have become increasingly in-volved in the transportation of South American heroin . This increased availability of Mexican heroin, coupled with increased involvement of Mexican DTOs in trafficking South American heroin, likely have resulted in significantly greater quantities of heroin being transported across the Southwest Border .

(LES) Methamphetamine and marijuana sei-zures have also increased along the Southwest Border, partly because of increased produc-tion . Methamphetamine production in Mexico appears to be increasing again after a sustained period of limited production resulting from laws that eventually banned pseudoephedrine in Mexico . Methamphetamine seizure totals along the Southwest Border in 2009 surpassed all annual totals since 2005 and were 32 percent higher than the previous high annual seizure total in 2005 . Multiple factors may be contrib-uting to an increase in marijuana smuggling, particularly decreased GOM cannabis eradica-tion efforts, which have resulted in elevated production levels . Marijuana seizure totals in 2009 exceeded all annual totals since 2005 and were 40 percent higher than the 2007 total, the previous high annual seizure total .

(LES) Currently, the most prominent cor-ridors and the primary drugs transported into the United States through these corridors are Juárez/El Paso (marijuana), Matamoros/Brownsville (cocaine and marijuana), Nogales/Nogales (heroin, marijuana, and metham-phetamine), Nuevo Laredo/Laredo (cocaine), Reynosa/McAllen/Starr County (cocaine, mari-juana, and methamphetamine), and Tijuana/San Diego/Los Angeles (cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine) . Various Mexican DTOs operate with varying degrees of influence in these corridors . (See Table 1 on page 9 .) Co-caine, methamphetamine, and heroin are pre-dominantly transported into the United States from Mexico through overland POEs, whereas marijuana is generally transported overland between POEs . Once in the United States, the drugs are often consolidated and stored at stash sites in the Southwest Border Region prior to transportation to drug markets throughout the United States .13

Cross-Border Drug Smuggling Through Indian Country by Mexican DTOs

(LES) The Guzmán-Loera Organization, part of the Sinaloa Cartel, transports signifi-cant quantities of drugs, particularly marijuana, from Mexico into the United States through the Tohono O’odham Reservation in Arizona . Law enforcement officials estimate that as much as 27 metric tons of marijuana is transported through the Tohono O’odham Reservation per week; traf-fickers also transport lesser amounts of cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine. Drug traffickers exploit the vast stretches of remote, sparsely populated desert, the 75 miles of largely under-protected border with Mexico, and the highways that connect the Tohono O’odham Reservation to major metropolitan areas to distribute drugs in markets throughout the United States. The Guzmán-Loera Organization supplies Mexican DTOs that operate within the reservation . Mem-bers of these DTOs typically use sport utility vehicles and pickup trucks to transport 1,500 to 2,000 pounds of marijuana per smuggling event






11

into the United States through the reservation .14 Each DTO compartmentalizes its operations to help protect it from law enforcement activities .

Alternative Smuggling Methods: Tunnels, Trains, Airplanes, and Maritime Vessels(U) Although most drugs smuggled by Mexican DTOs are transported overland through or between POEs, these DTOs also use tunnels, trains, and maritime vessels to move drugs, primarily marijuana, into the United States.

(LES) Mexican DTOs smuggle up to hun-dreds of pounds of marijuana and occasionally other illicit drugs through subterranean tun-nels along the Southwest Border. CBP officers along the U .S .–Mexico border discovered 16 tunnels in FY2008 and 26 tunnels in FY2009, mostly in Arizona . NDIC assesses with mod-erate confidence that Sinaloa Cartel members or associates used these tunnels, based on this cartel’s dominance along the Arizona–Mexico border. In FY2008 and FY2009, authorities discovered two and five tunnels, respectively, beneath the California–Mexico border—indi-cating that these tunnels were used by mem-bers or associates of the Sinaloa or Tijuana Cartel, based on their area of influence in the California border region .15

(LES) Mexican DTOs smuggle drugs into the United States on trains, evidenced by oc-casional seizures; however, the full extent of their use of trains is largely unknown. Al-though employment of the Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (VACIS)e limits the feasi-bility of smuggling drugs by rail from Mexico into the United States, Mexican DTOs use rail

e- (LES) CBP has placed sophisticated gamma ray systems called VACIS at key border inspection points to assist in the detection of drugs and stowaways on railcars. A VACIS scan is performed on every railcar that arrives from Mexico as it moves across the border into the United States.

lines in South Texas to cross shipments into the border region . At least 33 seizures have occurred at or near the border from January 2005 through June 2009 . Most of those sei-zures (21) occurred from 2007 through 2009 .16 The areas where the seizures have occurred since 2005 are El Paso (14), Harlingen (9), Eagle Pass (5), and Brownsville (5). Further-more, the expansion of several Mexican mari-time ports and the development and expansion of intermodal transportation networks, includ-ing rail transportation infrastructure, connect-ing these ports to POEs along the Southwest Border is expected to result in Mexican DTOs’ increased use of rail traffic.

(LES) Maritime smuggling by Mexican DTOs is far less common than smuggling overland . However, some DTOs use vessels to smuggle drugs into the United States, viewing this method as less risky because of limited U .S . maritime law enforcement resources . DTOs quickly reduce maritime smuggling attempts when law enforcement operations are initiated .17 Mexican DTOs use commercial and private watercraft to smuggle drugs, primarily marijuana, into Southern California . Accord-ing to the San Diego Air and Maritime Task Force, Mexican DTOs load illicit drugs onto go-fast boats and rendezvous with smaller, less conspicuous fishing vessels in internation-al waters to transfer drugs. The fishing vessels then enter U .S . waters with the drugs hidden aboard and destined for marinas along the Cal-ifornia coast . In fact, in 2009, more than 3 .1 metric tons of marijuana were reported to have been seized from private vessels arriving in southern California, primarily the San Diego area . The Gulf Coast of Texas is also a com-mon destination for maritime drug smuggling operations originating in Mexico . Mexican drug traffickers often initiate maritime smug-gling operations from Tamaulipas, Mexico, using fishing vessels, shrimp boats, and shark boats (lanchas, a small, passenger motorboat) to transport illicit drug shipments, primar-






12

ily marijuana and cocaine, to coastal areas of South Texas, including the Intracoastal Wa-terway, Padre Island National Seashore, and South Padre Island . Additionally, law enforce-ment officials periodically encounter mari-juana and cocaine bundles that have washed ashore from maritime smuggling operations in the Gulf of Mexico . In 2009, more than 114 kilograms of cocaine were recovered in the region compared to only 1 kilogram in 2008.

(U) Authorities Identify the Use of Ultralight Aircraft by Mexican Traffickers (LES) Law enforcement authorities along the Southwest Border have determined that Mexican DTOs are using ultralight aircraft to transport drugs across the border into the United States in an effort to circumvent increased overland security measures along the border region. This is not a new method of smuggling; however, law enforcement officials are noting a resurgence of incidents involving ultralights since 2008. These aircraft can fly below conventional radar to avoid law enforcement detection. Most ultralight aircraft are equipped to carry 3 to 4 gallons of fuel, which allows them to travel approximately 250-300 miles, and have a relatively low carrying capacity, typically less than 500 pounds.

Source: McAllen Intelligence Center, The MIC Out-look, Bulletin No . 2, September 2009 .

Domestic Drug Distribution by Mexican DTOs(U) Mexican DTOs are the primary whole-sale drug distributors in the United States and are increasing their influence in sev-eral regions of the country.

(U) Mexican DTOs dominate wholesale drug distribution in the Southwest, South-east, Great Lakes, West Central, and Pacific Regions and are expanding their distribution operations in the Florida/Caribbean, Mid-

Atlantic, New York/New Jersey, and New England Regions . Mexican DTOs maintain a vast U.S.-based distribution network that makes significant use of commercial trucks and private vehicles that cross the Southwest Border to smuggle multihundred kilogram to multiton quantities of drugs from Mexico to U .S .-based warehouse sites along the South-west Border for further distribution throughout the United States . Most of the region’s prin-cipal metropolitan areas, including Dallas, El Paso, Houston, Los Angeles, Phoenix, San Antonio, San Diego, and Tucson are signifi-cant storage locations as well as regional and national distribution centers . Smaller border communities, particularly in South Texas, such as Brownsville, McAllen, and Laredo, are also significant storage locations. Mexican DTOs have developed sophisticated and expansive drug transportation networks to transport drug shipments from these locations to destinations throughout the country. For specific informa-tion on each DTO’s distribution activities, see Organizational Overviews of Major Mexican DTOs in Appendices A and B .

National Security Threats Posed by Mexican DTOs Operating in the United StatesDrug-Related Crime and Violence

(U) In addition to drug trafficking, Mexican DTOs operating in the Southwest Border Region engage in many other criminal op-erations, including violent crimes.

(U) Drug-related violence and other crimes committed in the United States by Mexican DTOs increases the overall threat posed by these organizations . However, direct violence similar to the conflicts occurring among major DTOs in Mexico is rare in the United States . Incidents of direct intercartel or intracartel violence have not materialized in the United States on a scale that in any way resembles






13

(U) Increased Drug-Related Murders in Northern Mexico(LES) According to Mexican press reports, there were 6,587 drug-related murders committed in Mexico in 2009, a 28 percent increase from the 5,153 such murders in 2008. Mexican of-ficials attribute this increase to hostilities between criminal organizations, competition among these organizations for control of lucrative smuggling corridors, and retaliation by drug traffick-ers against Mexican law enforcement and military personnel engaged in Mexico’s counterdrug initiative. Most of these murders occurred in Mexican states along the U.S.–Mexico border.

Source: Agencia Reforma; University of San Diego, Trans-Border Institute.

(U) DTO Member Targeted in El PasoIn August 2009, the El Paso Police Department arrested three individuals in the shooting death of José Daniel González-Galeana, a midlevel Juárez Cartel member. The victim was shot multiple times outside his home in an upscale East El Paso neighborhood. Among those arrested was the group’s leader, Ruben Rodríguez-Dorado, who was also a member of the Juárez Cartel. Rodríguez-Dorado is believed to have orchestrated the killing. Also arrested was the alleged shooter, an 18-year-old U.S. Army soldier stationed at Fort Bliss, Texas. The three individuals were subsequently indicted in October 2009 on capital-murder charges.

Source: STRATFOR (Strategic Forecasting, Inc.).

the widespread cartel violence in Mexico . Nevertheless, some reports of DTO or cartel violence occasionally emerge, including some incidents in 2009 . More typical, however, is indirect violence within DTOs or cartels . Indirect violence takes many forms: drug cus-tomers who owe money are kidnapped until payment is made and cartel employees who fail to deliver the contraband or the expected proceeds are disciplined through beatings, kidnappings, torture, or death.

(LES) Although not comparable to cartel- and DTO-related crime and violence levels in Mexico, some Mexican DTOs operating in the Southwest Border Region are committing crimes such as automobile theft, firearms trafficking, home invasions, murder, ransom kidnapping, and robbery. For example, in November 2009, federal, state, and local law enforcement officials arrested 13 people involved in a stolen automobile operation in El Paso. Officials recovered more than $500,000 in stolen vehicles and parts . An official involved in the operation reported that during the course of the investigation, law

enforcement discovered ties between this group and the Juárez Cartel; however, further infor-mation on those ties is unavailable .18 In August 2009, Mexican authorities reported that Los Zetas used fraudulent importation documents to smuggle at least $2 .4 million worth of stolen crude oil from Mexico into Texas that was subsequently sold to U.S. refineries .19 Ransom kidnappings—some of which occur in the United States—are now a significant source of income for the Tijuana Cartel . Ransom amounts charged by the DTO range from $50,000 to $1 million, providing an additional source of income to illicit drug sales .20

(LES) The violence associated with DTO op-erations in Mexico have caused DTO members and their families to seek safety in Southwest cities such as Phoenix, Arizona; El Paso and Laredo, Texas; and San Diego.21 (See text box-es above.) Consequently, rival DTO conflicts in Mexico have occurred in U .S . border cities, resulting in kidnappings, home invasion robber-ies, and homicides directed at DTO members and their families .22 For example, the Phoenix Police Department reports that there were 260






14

reported kidnappings in 2007, 299 in 2008, and 267 in 2009; many of these are believed to have been drug-related .23 Additionally, the number of kidnappings in San Diego increased from 12 in 2006 to 23 in 2008, according to the Fed-eral Bureau of Investigation, San Diego Field Division .24 San Diego law enforcement officials believe that many of the kidnappings in their jurisdiction are drug-related .25

Violence Against U.S. Law Enforcement Officials From Mexican DTOs(U) U.S. law enforcement officers along the U.S.–Mexico border are assaulted more than 1,000 times each year, often by mem-bers of Mexican DTOs.

(U) U.S. law enforcement officers working along the U .S .-Mexico border are being as-saulted by members of Mexican DTOs and alien smugglers that have become frustrated by enhanced border security . The total number of assaults against U .S . Border Patrol (USBP) agents along the U .S .–Mexico border remained relatively stable from FY2008 (1,085 assaults) to FY2009 (1,056) assaults. However, in the Lar-edo Sector assaults increased 168 percent from 44 in FY2008 to 118 in FY2009. Conversely, assaults against law enforcement officials in the El Paso Sector decreased 43 percent from 88 in FY2008 to 50 in FY2009. The Tucson Sector ac-counted for the highest number of assaults (261) . While many of the assaults were intended only to deter agents from seizing drugs and detaining illegal aliens, they occasionally resulted in seri-ous injury or death of law enforcement officers. For example, in February 2009, USBP agents from Santa Teresa, New Mexico, attempted to stop a suspicious pickup truck. The truck ac-celerated, striking and critically injuring a USBP agent . The driver was subsequently shot by other agents. Inside the truck, agents found 1,500 pounds of marijuana .26

Weapons Trafficking

(U) Mexican DTOs control most of the firearms trafficking along the U.S.–Mexico border, typically obtaining the weapons illegally.

(U) Mexican DTOs, including the Gulf, Juárez, Sinaloa, and Tijuana Cartels, and their associates are the chief organizations that smug-gle thousands of firearms from the United States to Mexico. Law enforcement officials at the U .S .–Mexico border report that Mexican DTOs obtain weapons from sources in the United States, primarily from cities in Texas (Dallas, El Paso, Houston, and San Antonio) and Arizona (Phoenix and Tucson). To obtain these firearms, Mexican DTOs and their surrogate enforcement groups and gangs purchase them from firearms dealers at gun stores, gun shows, and pawn shops, often using straw purchasers to insulate them from the transactions . They also purchase firearms from private sellers.27 The firearms are transported from the United States to Mexico us-ing the same routes, corridors, and conveyances traffickers use to smuggle drugs and currency across the border. (See Figure 4 on page 15.)

(LES) Mexican DTOs are using grenades, acquired in Central American and other countries, escalating the hostilities in Mexico and increasing the potential for violence in the United States.

(LES) In 2008 and 2009 Mexican DTOs increased their use of grenades, a direct result of the increased pressure placed on DTOs by the GOM . DTOs are expanding their bases of operation farther into Guatemala and other parts of Central America, where most of the grenades are acquired . This expansion is gen-erally accomplished by Los Zetas, who have a strong military background. Grenades were used in Mexico against police headquarters, city halls, a U .S . consulate, television stations, and senior Mexican officials from September 2008 through March 2009 .






15

Figure 4. (LES) Southbound Firearms Smuggling Routes From the United States Into and Throughout Mexico

PAC I F I CO C E A N

G u l fo f

M e x i c o

Smuggling Routes and the Mexican DTOs Operating Along Each Route

Source: Mexican Chamber of Deputies Security Commission 2007; “Mexican Authorities Explain Cartel’s Drug, Arms Trafficking Routes,” Open Source Center, April 1, 2008.

Route 1 – Phoenix: Juárez, Tijuana, and Sinaloa Cartels

Route 2 – San Ysidro: Juárez and Sinaloa Cartels

Route 3 – Las Cruces: (to Culiacán) Juárez, Sinaloa, and Tijuana Cartels (to Chihuahua) Gulf Cartel

Route 4 – El Paso: Juárez Cartel

Route 5 – Dallas: All large-scale Mexican DTOs

Route 6 – Houston: (to Chilpancingo) Juárez Cartel (to Oaxaca) Juárez and Tijuana Cartels (to Villahermosa) Juárez and Gulf Cartels

Mexicali

Hermosillo

Chihuahua

Culiacán

San Luis Potosí

Guadalajara

ColimaMorelia

Querétaro

Mexico CityPuebla

Villahermosa

TuxtlaGutiérrezOaxaca

Chilpancingo

Las Cruces

El PasoCiudad Juárez

Nogales

Phoenix

Tucson

San YsidroSanDiego

Tijuana

Los Mochis

Mazatlán

Dallas

San AntonioHouston

PiedrasNegros

NuevoLaredo

Reynosa

Matamoros

Source: Mexican Chamber of Deputies Security Commission, “Mexican Authorities Explain Cartel’s Drug, Arms Trafficking Routes.”

(LES) In Guerrero, Mexico, the entire police force of Zihuatanejo, totaling more than 300 municipal officers, went on strike for more pay following a grenade attack on their offices in February 2009. In January 2009, an unknown individual threw a fragmentation hand grenade into a crowd at a nightclub in Pharr, Texas . The grenade did not detonate . Explosives experts with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives identified the grenade as a South Korean model K75 fragmentation hand grenade with a lot number stenciled on it that was linked to a Mexican warehouse . Other grenades recovered at the same warehouse were similar to those used in an attempted attack on the U.S. Consulate in Monterrey, Mexico, and an attack on a Monterrey television station . The grenade thrown at the U .S . consulate in Monterrey did

not explode . Grenades have also been seized in the Southwest Region, apparently destined for Mexico . In April 2009, law enforcement authori-ties seized 10 grenades along with gun parts and more than $120,000 in cash from a car headed south on Interstate 35 near Pearsall, Texas .

Public Corruption

(LES) Mexican DTOs actively seek to cor-rupt U.S. law enforcement officers who work along the Southwest Border.

(LES) Traffickers sometimes bribe officers to provide information about drug seizures and arrests, ensure safe passage of drugs or illegal aliens through POEs and interior checkpoints, and transport drug shipments or illegal aliens into the United States .28 From 2008 through






16

2009, there were 400 public corruption cases involving federal, state, and local law enforce-ment agents initiated in the Southwest Region, according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In one case, an individual gained employ-ment as a border inspector for the purpose of assisting drug traffickers, and she received more than $5 million in bribes . 29 This former official pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to import more than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana into the United States, along with public corruption charges. Additionally, the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Southern District of Texas reports that a CBP inspector was convicted in April 2009 of drug trafficking, alien smuggling, and bribery that took place from July 2008 to January 2009. The inspector admitted to conspiring to transport illegal aliens across the U .S .–Mexico border, accepting bribes, and conspiring to possess with intent to distribute approximately 15 kilograms of cocaine .30

Illicit Finance Operations of Mexican DTOs(LES) Mexican DTOs use bulk cash smug-gling as their principal method to move tens of billions of dollars in drug proceeds annu-ally from the United States into Mexico.

(LES) Mexican DTOs have established bulk cash operations in a handful of U .S . cities where drug proceeds are consolidated for ship-ment to the border. The largest of these bulk cash consolidation centers are Atlanta, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York City, and various loca-tions in North Carolina . Atlanta is the leading consolidation area for Mexican DTOs operating in eastern drug markets; however, bulk cash operations in North Carolina have increased sharply, likely a result of increased enforce-ment activity in the Atlanta area . Los Angeles is the principal consolidation area for Mexican DTO operations in the western United States . Mexican DTOs—or independent bulk cash or-ganizations contracted by the DTOs—typically

maintain multiple bulk cash stash houses in a consolidation area . Usually, numerous small shipments of currency (less than $1 million) are quickly transshipped through these stash houses in an effort to reduce the risk of detection and seizure by law enforcement. Once the bulk cash reaches the Southwest Border, it is often transferred to other couriers for transshipment into Mexico . Larger shipments are frequently broken into smaller increments to further reduce the risk of loss before being smuggled across the border .31

(LES) These proceeds are transported in private, rental, and commercial vehicles, many of which have natural voids or aftermarket trap compartments that are used to conceal contraband. Pedestrian traffic is also used to smuggle bulk cash across the Southwest Border into Mexico. The movement of bulk cash generally follows the same routes as drug shipments, but in reverse; money is transport-ed from regional drug markets to national-lev-el distribution hubs, such as Los Angeles . The hub cities serve as both consolidation points for drug proceeds generated in other regional drug markets and origination points for drug proceeds destined for Mexico .32

(LES) High-ranking Mexican cartel members based in Mexico typically control the cross-border movement of bulk cash. These members coordinate bulk cash smuggling operations through U .S .-based managers and cell leaders, who are either Mexican or U .S . citizens . Law enforcement reporting indicates that high-ranking Mexican cartel members periodically fly from areas along the Southwest Border to consolidation points to oversee the count-ing and packaging of particularly large bulk cash shipments . The managers and cell leaders generally facilitate the flow of bulk cash into Mexico, using couriers who either are associ-ated with the cartel or are trusted contractors who specialize in cross-border smuggling from the United States into Mexico .33






17

(LES) Once the bulk cash is in Mexico, DTOs use various means and methods to laun-der drug proceeds, including both bank and nonbank financial institutions (such as money services businesses, which include U .S .-based casas de cambio), commingling illicit funds in legitimate business accounts, front businesses, and real estate fraud .34

Vulnerabilities(U) DTOs employ spotters to monitor the

flow of traffic through POEs. These spotters direct load vehicles to specific lanes that they believe will have the highest chance for suc-cessful entry into the United States without inspection . Denying spotters clear visibility of the POE lanes through the use of lights or visual barriers would reduce the success of smugglers . Alternatively, implementing a process that would direct vehicles to specific lanes in a random process also would deny spotters any advantage .

(U) Drug traffickers are vulnerable to law enforcement detection at stash sites in the Southwest Border Region . Seizures of illicit drugs from these locations often result in a much greater loss to Mexican DTOs than seizures that take place after the drugs have been broken down into smaller shipments for distribution in retail drug markets. Identifying load vehicles at POEs and then conducting controlled deliveries or simply tracking them to Southwest Border stash sites would be an effective method of detecting such sites and increasing drug seizures .

(U) Domestic drug transportation in com-mercial tractor-trailers is vulnerable to high-way interdiction . Because tractor-trailers typi-cally travel interstates or larger U .S . highways to transport large drug shipments to domestic drug markets, nationally coordinated domestic surge operations to bring about intense and sustained interdiction efforts would increase the amount of drugs seized domestically .

(U) The activities of Mexican DTOs are particularly vulnerable to detection when they attempt to expand drug distribution into new markets. When DTOs expand into new drug markets, they often lack a reliable network of distributors and security personnel in the new markets. As a result, they are more likely to deal with new, unproved local dealers, render-ing the organization vulnerable to undercover law enforcement operations .

(U) Mexican DTO bulk cash shipments of illicit drug proceeds are at risk of seizure at stash houses in consolidation cities and in transit to and across the Southwest Border . DTOs have developed elaborate countermea-sures to minimize this risk, such as choosing unassuming locations, limiting the number of individuals who have knowledge of the stash house sites, and moving bulk cash quickly through stash houses . However, a dedicated investigative team capable of developing and exploiting organizational intelligence in each of the leading bulk cash consolidation cities could result in significant seizures in those cities . Moreover, enhanced interdiction efforts and rigorous outbound inspections of vehicles leaving the United States would result in an increase in bulk cash seizures.

Intelligence Gaps(U) There are no current or reliable estimates

of the quantity of drugs available in the United States and, likewise, there are no estimates of the amount of drugs smuggled into the United States specifically by Mexican DTOs. As a re-sult, precisely measuring the rise and fall of the flow of drugs into the United States by Mexi-can DTOs is not possible .

(U) The total number of Mexican DTO mem-bers operating in the United States is unknown. As a result, precisely measuring the growth or contraction of specific Mexican DTOs operat-ing in the United States is not possible .






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(LES) Information regarding the nature and extent of alliances between Mexican DTOs is limited. The available information indicates that these alliances change frequently, often as a result of personal disputes between DTO members or law enforcement counterdrug operations. Because such information is lim-ited, it is very difficult to accurately assess the relative strength of the various Mexican DTOs operating within the United States.

(LES) The extent to which Mexican DTOs use rail lines to transport illicit drug shipments into the United States is largely unknown. Relatively few rail seizures are reported, sug-gesting that use of this smuggling method is very limited. However, it is possible that the few seizures only reflect low rates of success in detecting such shipments.

(LES) Specific estimates regarding the amount of drug money laundered domesti-cally or in Mexico, or of bulk cash smuggled from the United States into Mexico by Mexi-can DTOs each year is unknown. As a result, precisely measuring, or even generally esti-mating, the annual profits of Mexican DTOs is very difficult, infrequently performed (most recently estimated in 2002), and not accurate (reported as a potential profit range spanning tens of billions of dollars).

(LES) Data estimating the amount of can-nabis cultivated and marijuana produced in the United States by Mexican DTOs are not available. In addition, the extent of indoor cannabis cultivation by these groups in the United States is largely unknown and likely is underreported because of the challenges posed to law enforcement entities in locating indoor grow sites.

Outlook(U) NDIC assesses with high confidence

that no DTOs will challenge the dominance of Mexican DTOs in wholesale cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine distribution in the United States, particularly in the South-west, Southeast, Great Lakes, West Central, and Pacific Regions.

(LES) The Sinaloa Cartel is operating in more areas of the United States than any other Mexi-can Cartel or DTO and NDIC assesses that no other single cartel will be able to challenge its geographic range of operations and influence within the United States in the near term.

(LES) NDIC assesses with high confidence that Mexican DTOs will further expand their drug trafficking activities in the New England, New York/New Jersey, Mid-Atlantic, and Florida/Caribbean Regions primarily at the ex-pense of Colombian DTOs. Dominican DTOs in eastern drug markets that previously were supplied entirely by Colombian DTOs are in-creasingly being supplied by Mexican DTOs. There is no indication that Colombian DTOs are acting to recover or retain the Dominican distribution networks through which they have distributed many tons of cocaine and South American heroin annually.

(LES) Because Mexican DTOs frequently alter their drug smuggling methods and routes in response to U.S. and Mexican law enforce-ment pressure, NDIC assesses with moderate confidence that Mexican DTOs that smuggle drugs through the El Paso/Juárez Plaza, particularly the Juárez and Sinaloa cartels, will seek alternative routes for some of their shipments to avoid GOM counterdrug forces and rival DTOs. However, the El Paso/Juárez Plaza will continue to be a significant entry point for drug shipments entering the United States from Mexico.

(LES) NDIC assesses with high confidence that relationships between Mexican DTOs






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and U .S .-based gangs will strengthen in the near term, particularly in the Southwest Region, but also in other areas, such as the Great Lakes and West Central Regions. As these relationships mature, some gangs will assume greater responsibility for wholesale-level drug trafficking, enabling Mexican DTO members to become increasingly insu-lated from U .S . law enforcement .

(U) Drug-related crime and violence by Mexican DTOs in the United States will continue and in some instances violence will be extreme . However, NDIC assesses with high confidence that large-scale, intercartel violence will not occur in the United States in the same manner that it exists in Mexico . The conditions and motivations that foster massive and long-running cartel violence in Mexico are largely absent in the United States .

(LES) The ongoing inter-cartel violence among Mexican cartels and DTOs fuels a strong demand for weapons and ammunition . As a result, NDIC assesses with moderate confidence that weapons trafficking, predomi-nantly from the Southwest Region to Mexico, will continue in the near term . However, reso-lution of these conflicts would immediately result in a reduced flow of weapons from the United States into Mexico .

(LES) The success that Mexican DTOs have in smuggling bulk cash from U.S. drug markets to Mexico, as well as the relative difficulty in laundering drug money in the United States, ensures that bulk cash opera-tions will continue in the near term . In fact, NDIC assesses with moderate confidence that bulk cash smuggling by Mexican DTOs will increase because Mexican DTOs are still ex-panding their drug trafficking operations in the United States, resulting in more drug profits.






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Appendix A. Overviews of Major Mexican DTOs (U) This section provides overviews of the principal Mexican DTOs, including their areas of

operation, drugs trafficked, leadership, affiliates, and rivals.

Sinaloa Cartel(LES) The Sinaloa Cartel is the most prolific DTO in Mexico and represents the greatest organizational drug trafficking threat from that country.

(LES) Members and associates of the Sinaloa Cartel smuggle multiton quantities of cocaine and marijuana, as well as significant quantities of heroin and methamphetamine, monthly into the United States . DTOs aligned with the Sinaloa Cartel supply these drugs to distributors in at least 75 U .S . cities in 30 states .35 (See Map 2 in Appendix B .) The cartel is based in Sinaloa, Mexico, and operates in other Mexican states as well . Additionally, the cartel operates in drug smuggling corri-dors in Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas . 36

(LES) The Sinaloa Cartel, which is sometimes referred to as the Mexican Federation or The Alli-ance, is composed of Mexican DTOs led by Joaquín Guzmán-Loera, a Consolidated Priority Organi-zation Target (CPOT), as well as CPOTs Ignacio Coronel-Villareal, Juan José Esparragosa-Moreno, and Ismael Zambada-García .37 This alliance maintains cooperative arrangements and close coordina-tion with South American cocaine sources .38 Shifting loyalties among DTO members has been the im-petus behind the increased violent conflicts with its rivals in recent years.39 In 2008, CPOT Arturo Bel-trán-Leyva (now deceased), head of the BLO, split from the Sinaloa Cartel . Since 2008, the Sinaloa Cartel has been involved in a violent conflict with the Juárez Cartel for control of the Juárez Plaza (across the border from El Paso) and with the Tijuana Cartel for control of the Tijuana Plaza (across the border from San Diego) .40 The Sinaloa Cartel has been trying to marginalize the Juárez Cartel by co-opting or intimidating its members or associates (often through the use of violence), including BA gang members who smuggle drugs and act as enforcers, and members serving as gatekeepers and smugglers who assist in drug transportation .41 The Sinaloa Cartel controls most smuggling plazas in southern Arizona .42 NDIC analysis indicates that if the Sinaloa Cartel were able to control the Tijuana and Juárez smuggling plazas, it would effectively dominate border smuggling activities from San Diego to El Paso. Additionally, LFM is now reportedly aligned with the Sinaloa Cartel to gain access to significant drug corridors in Southern California and West Texas.

(U) U.S. Government Targets Mexican DTOsOn August 20, 2009, 43 defendants in the United States and Mexico, including 10 alleged Mexican DTO leaders, were charged in 12 indictments in U.S. federal courts in Brooklyn, New York, and Chicago. The alleged leaders and other high-ranking members of several of Mexico’s most powerful DTOs—including the Sinaloa and Juárez Cartels, and the BLO—were charged with operating continuing criminal enterprises or participating in international drug trafficking conspiracies. The indictments collectively seek forfeiture of more than $5.8 billion in drug proceeds. Nearly 36 tons of drugs and $23 million were seized during the investigation. Law enforcement officials reported that these actions are a significant step in breaking down the infrastructure of these criminal organizations.

Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs.






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(LES) According to law enforcement reporting, the following Mexican DTOs are affiliated with the Sinaloa Cartel .f

• (LES) The Aguirre-Aguirre DTO, led by Regional Priority Organization Target (RPOT) Julian Aguirre-Aguirre (the nephew of Joaquín Guzmán-Loera of the Sinaloa Cartel), is based in Nogales, Sonora, Mexico. This DTO smuggles approximately 1,000 kilograms of cocaine and 10,000 pounds of marijuana monthly primarily through the Nogales POE to stash locations in the Tucson and Phoenix areas . The DTO is responsible for subsequent drug transportation to Atlanta; Charlotte, North Carolina; Chicago; Dallas; Los Angeles; New York City; and Orlando, Florida. The Aguirre-Aguirre DTO uses concealed compartments in both passenger vehicles and tractor trailers to smuggle drugs into the United States and to transport bulk cur-rency from the United States to Mexico .43

• (LES) The Andrade-Parra DTO, led by RPOT Alfredo Andrade-Parra, is based in Acuna, Coahuila, Mexico. This DTO smuggles approximately 2,500 kilograms of marijuana and 50 kilograms of cocaine monthly from Mexico through the Del Rio POE to stash locations in Texas . The DTO subsequently transports those drugs to Chicago, Dallas, and Houston . The Andrade-Parra DTO smuggles drugs for the Sinaloa Cartel and Alfredo Andrade-Parra reports directly to Joaquín Guzmán-Loera .44

• (LES) The Bercovich-Díaz DTO, led by RPOT Manuel Bercovich-Díaz, is based in Sonora, Mexico. This DTO is responsible for smuggling approximately 300 kilograms of cocaine and tons of marijuana monthly, primarily through the Lukeville, Arizona, POE to stash locations in the Phoenix area. The DTO then transports the drugs to Boston, Massachusetts; Chicago; Detroit; New York City; Newark, New Jersey; and St. Louis, Missouri. The DTO also trans-ports bulk currency from the United States into Mexico using motor homes and camping trail-ers . The Bercovich-Diaz DTO pays a fee to the Sinaloa Cartel’s Joaquín Guzmán-Loera DTO for the privilege of transporting drugs through Northern Sonora, Mexico .45

• (LES) The Fierro-Ramírez DTO, led by RPOT Jesus Fierro-Ramírez, is based in Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, Mexico. This DTO smuggles multikilogram shipments of cocaine through the El Paso POE to stash locations in the El Paso area . The cocaine typically is concealed within hidden compartments of sport utility vehicles and tractor trailers . The DTO then trans-ports the drugs to Arkansas, California, Florida, Illinois, Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin. The Fierro-Ramírez DTO is subordinate to the Guzmán-Loera and Zambada-García DTOs of the Sinaloa Cartel. Law enforcement officials also report that the Fierro-Ramírez DTO smuggles weapons from the United States into Mexico for the Sinaloa Cartel .46

• (LES) The Guzmán-Dennis DTO, led by RPOT Christian Ivan Guzmán-Dennis, is based in Sonora, Mexico. This DTO smuggles approximately 300 kilograms of cocaine and 10,000 pounds of marijuana each month into the United States, primarily through the Nogales POE . The Guzmán-Dennis DTO uses passenger vehicles and tractor trailers with concealed com-partments to smuggle drugs into the United States and to smuggle bulk currency from the United States into Mexico . The Guzmán-Loera DTO of the Sinaloa Cartel supplies drugs to the Guzmán-Dennis DTO . Additionally, the Guzmán-Dennis DTO supplies an undetermined number of independent DTOs operating in the United States, such as the Javier Munoz DTO, based in Phoenix . The Munoz DTO distributes drugs to Atlanta, Chicago, and Los Angeles .47

f- (U) These DTOs are examples of organizations whose operations are linked to the Sinaloa Cartel and are not a comprehensive representation of all affiliated DTOs.






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• (LES) The Peña-Rivas DTO, led by RPOT Jorge Peña-Rivas, is based in Sinaloa, Mexico . This DTO smuggles multikilogram quantities of cocaine and multipound quantities of meth-amphetamine each week, primarily through the Calexico, Otay Mesa, San Ysidro, California, and San Luis, Arizona, POEs into the United States . The DTO uses concealed compartments in vehicles and commercial trucks to smuggle drugs into the United States. The DTO then transports the drugs to Las Vegas, Nevada; Los Angeles; and Phoenix. Law enforcement re-porting indicates that the Peña-Rivas DTO is a cell of the Sinaloa Cartel .48

• (LES) The Quintero-Soto DTO, led by RPOT Abelardo Quintero-Soto, is based in Sinaloa, Mexico. This DTO smuggles hundreds of kilograms of cocaine and hundreds of pounds of methamphetamine monthly through various Arizona POEs to stash locations in the Phoenix area . The DTO transports the drugs to Denver, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, and Seattle, Washing-ton . According to law enforcement reporting, the Ismael Zambada-García DTO of the Sinaloa Cartel supplies drugs to the Quintero-Soto DTO. The Quintero-Soto DTO also smuggles bulk cash drug proceeds from the United States to Mexico .49

Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas(LES) The Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas are major drug distributors to the United States, and the splintering of these two groups is expected to lead to increased drug distribution and violence in the United States.

(LES) The Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas smuggle multiton quantities of cocaine and marijuana, multihundred pounds of methamphetamine, and significant quantities of heroin monthly into the United States . DTOs aligned with the Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas supply these drugs to distribu-tors in at least 37 U .S . cities in 15 states .50 (See Map 3 and Map 4 in Appendix B .) The Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas operate primarily in Coahuila and Tamaulipas, Mexico, as well as in other Mexican states . Additionally, the organizations operate in drug smuggling corridors in Texas .51

(LES) The leadership of the Gulf Cartel consists of affiliated DTOs headed by CPOTs Antonio Ezequiel Cárdenas-Guillén, Heriberto Lazcano-Lazcano, and Jorge Eduardo Costilla-Sánchez . Numerous individuals have led the organization over the years, but Osiel Cárdenas-Guillén has had the most impact . Cárdenas-Guillén hired Los Zetas as his personal security force to ensure his leadership position . Los Zetas evolved into a violent security enforcement arm for the Gulf Cartel responsible for the safe passage of drug shipments through Nuevo León and Tamaulipas, Mexico, into the United States .52 Since Cardenas Guillen’s extradition to the United States in 2007, these DTOs have become splintered—Antonio Ezequiel Cárdenas-Guillén and Costilla-Sánchez have taken charge of the Gulf Cartel, and Lazcano-Lazcano now leads Los Zetas.53

(LES) The Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas consolidated control of drug trafficking plazas in Browns-ville, Del Rio, Eagle Pass, Laredo, and McAllen—the major transportation and distribution centers in South Texas. This area includes several high-traffic POEs along the Southwest Border with interstate access to major drug markets within the United States, making control of this area conducive to large-scale drug smuggling .54

(LES) In January and February 2010, members and associates of the Gulf Cartel were killed by Los Zetas and vice versa. These actions sparked a violent conflict between the two organiza-tions in Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas . The Gulf Cartel has reportedly aligned with






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the Sinaloa Cartel and LFM while Los Zetas has aligned with the Juárez Cartel and possibly the BLO in this conflict.55

(LES) NDIC assesses that since the violent Los Zetas, now operate independently of the Gulf Cartel, the potential for spillover crime and attacks against law enforcement officers in the United States has increased . The threat increase is attributed to the fact that many younger Los Zetas recruits lack the discipline of senior members and are more likely to be compulsive in their use of violence to prove themselves and earn respect within the organization . Los Zetas has established numerous enforcement cells within the United States, primarily in Texas, that support criminal operations and constitute a significant public safety threat particularly to the Southwest Border Region of the United States .56 Law enforcement reporting indicates that Los Zetas is arm-ing and training its transporters to defend their drug shipments and to violently engage U .S . law enforcement if challenged .57

(U) U.S. Government Targets Gulf Cartel and Los ZetasOn July 20, 2009, the U.S. Departments of Justice, State, and Treasury announced the indict-ments of four high-level leaders, three of whom are CPOTs affiliated with the Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas. The indictments allege that the DTOs had been operating along the U.S.–Mexico border and smuggling drugs into Texas cities for further distribution to other U.S. cities. The Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas allegedly used sophisticated recordkeeping programs to track shipping, employment, payroll, and payments made to corrupt law enforcement officials, as well as pay-ments received and owed. The indictment further alleges that the defendants discussed supply issues, debt collection, pricing for drugs in specific areas, bonus structures for individuals work-ing at the plazas, transportation concealment methods of drugs, and methods of shipment from Mexico to Texas.


(LES) According to law enforcement reporting, the following Mexican DTOs are affiliated with the Gulf Cartel/Los Zetas.

• (LES) The Alaniz DTO, led by RPOT Mauro Sandoval Alaniz, is based in Brownsville . This DTO smuggles approximately 200 kilograms of cocaine and multiton quantities of marijuana monthly in both private vehicles and tractor-trailers through the Brownsville POE to stash locations in South Texas. The Alaniz DTO then transports multikilogram quantities of cocaine and multiton quantities of marijuana to Atlanta; Chicago; Cincinnati, Ohio; Houston; and Orlando. According to law enforcement reporting, the Alaniz DTO also transports bulk cash in million-dollar amounts to Mexico at the direction of Antonio Ezequiel Cárdenas-Guillén, a Gulf Cartel leader . The transportation of drug proceeds to South Texas and subsequently into Mexico is coordinated by attorneys employed by the Gulf Cartel .58

• (LES) The Pérez-Martinez DTO, led by RPOT Celso Pérez-Martinez, is based in Piedras Negras, Coahuila, Mexico . This DTO smuggles approximately two tons of marijuana and 50 kilograms of cocaine each month, primarily through the Eagle Pass POE into South Texas. The drugs typically are stored at stash locations in Eagle Pass, Dallas, and San Antonio before being transported to other distribution locations, including North Carolina . The DTO uses pas-senger vehicles and tractor-trailers to smuggle drugs into the United States . According to law






25

enforcement reporting, Miguel Trevino-Morales, a high-ranking member of Los Zetas, sup-plies the Pérez-Martinez DTO with the drugs that organization distributes .59

• (LES) The Coronado DTO, led by RPOT Miguel Angel Coronado, is based in Piedras Ne-gras, Coahuila, Mexico. This DTO smuggles approximately 500 kilograms of cocaine and 3,000 pounds of marijuana monthly, primarily through the Eagle Pass POE to stash locations in South Texas . The drugs are subsequently transported to Dallas and Houston, as well as to cities in other states. The Coronado DTO also smuggles weapons and bulk currency from the United States into Mexico . Miguel Angel Coronado reports directly to Gulf Cartel leaders Ezequiel Cárdenas-Guillén and Jorge Eduardo Costilla-Sánchez .60

• (LES) According to law enforcement reporting, the Lemus-Godina DTO controls as much as 30 percent of the drugs trafficked by the Gulf Cartel and is directly affiliated with Miguel Trevino-Morales . The DTO uses ranches in northern Mexico as stash locations then smuggles large quantities of cocaine and marijuana through the Laredo POE to U .S . distribution loca-tions including Atlanta, Dallas, and Houston . The DTO uses tractor-trailers and private ve-hicles with hidden compartments to smuggle narcotics into the United States and return bulk cash drug proceeds to Mexico . The DTO is also paid by organizations smuggling aliens into the United States through the Laredo POE .61

Juárez Cartel(LES) The Juárez Cartel’s control of smuggling through the Juárez/El Paso corridor is be-ing challenged by the Sinaloa Cartel.

(LES) The Juárez Cartel smuggles multihundred-pound quantities of cocaine and multiton quantities of marijuana, as well as lesser quantities of heroin and methamphetamine, from Mexi-co into the United States through the Juárez/El Paso corridor on a monthly basis.62 DTOs affiliat-ed with the cartel supply distributors with significant quantities of these drugs in at least 33 U.S. cities in 16 states .63 (See Map 5 in Appendix B .) The cartel is based in Chihuahua, Mexico, and operates in other Mexican states as well . Additionally, the Juárez Cartel operates in drug smug-gling corridors in Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas .64

(LES) The cartel, led by Vicente Carrillo-Fuentes, has controlled drug trafficking operations in the El Paso/Juárez Plaza since the early 1990s.65 Since 2008, the Juárez Cartel has been in an increasingly violent conflict with the Sinaloa Cartel to control the lucrative Juárez Plaza.66 The conflict has resulted in a dramatic increase in drug-related murders in Chihuahua, from 148 mur-ders in 2007 to 1,649 in 2008 and to 2,082 in 2009 .67 The increasingly violent struggle for control of drug smuggling into West Texas demonstrates the plaza’s importance to Mexican cartels that exploit the robust, legitimate, cross-border economic activity and social interaction between El Paso and Juárez .68 Juárez Cartel trafficking operations would be negatively impacted if the Sinaloa Cartel gains control of the Juárez Plaza and denies the Juárez Cartel access to this pri-mary smuggling corridor, according to NDIC analysis . The Juárez Cartel is aligned with the BLO and Los Zetas in the conflict with the Sinaloa Cartel.69






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(LES) According to law enforcement reporting, the following Mexican DTOs are affiliated with the Juárez Cartel .

• (LES) The Vasquez DTO, led by RPOT Luis Carlos Vasquez, is based in Palomas, Chihuahua, Mexico . This DTO smuggles tons of marijuana each month, primarily between and through New Mexico POEs to stash locations in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and Phoenix . The drugs are subsequently transported to other distribution locations including Chicago, Denver, and New York City. The DTO uses an array of methods and conveyances to smuggle drugs into the United States, including backpackers and stolen vehicles. According to law enforcement reporting, Luis Carlos Vasquez is closely associated with Vicente Carrillo-Fuentes, leader of the Juárez Cartel .70

• (LES) The Borunda-Cardenas DTO, led by RPOT José Esparragosa-Moreno Borunda-Cardenas, is based in Ojinaga, Chihuahua, Mexico . This DTO smuggles multiton shipments of marijuana, primarily through West Texas to stash locations in West Texas and then to other locations, including distribution sites in Kansas and Oklahoma. Law enforcement reporting indicates that the Borunda-Cardenas DTO operates as a cell of the Vicente Carrillo-Fuentes DTO of the Juárez Cartel .71

• (LES) The Rigoberto Aguirre DTO smuggles approximately 200 kilograms of cocaine each month from Mexico, primarily through the El Paso area into West Texas . This DTO distrib-utes multikilogram quantities of cocaine to multiple cell heads in El Paso and to several cities throughout the United States . According to law enforcement reporting, Rigoberto Aguirre is closely associated with the Vicente Carrillo-Fuentes DTO. The Rigoberto Aguirre DTO uses commercial trucks to transport large shipments of cocaine to distribution locations including Chicago, Denver, Memphis, New York City, Phoenix, and Raleigh, North Carolina.72

• (LES) The Miguel Dávila Jr . DTO smuggles large amounts of marijuana and cocaine from Mexico into West Texas . The DTO subsequently transports the drugs to Atlanta, Chicago, De-troit, and Memphis . Its members use tractor-trailers to transport drugs into the United States and drug proceeds to Mexico. This DTO also transports bulk currency from drug sales from the United States into Mexico. The Miguel Dávila Jr. DTO is directly linked to a high-level but unidentified member of the Vicente Carrillo-Fuentes DTO.73

Beltrán-Leyva Organization (BLO)(LES) The BLO’s recent alignment with the Juárez Cartel will provide BLO with new drug smuggling corridors.

(LES) The BLO smuggles multihundred-pound quantities of cocaine and marijuana and lesser quantities of heroin and methamphetamine monthly into the United States . Organizations asso-ciated with the BLO supply distributors with these drugs in at least 30 U .S . cities in 11 states .74 (See Map 6 in Appendix B .) The BLO is based in Guerrero, Mexico and operates in other Mexi-can states as well . Additionally, the organization operates in drug smuggling corridors in Arizona, California, and Texas .75

(LES) The BLO was led by former CPOT Arturo Beltrán-Leyva until his death in December 2009. (See text box on 27.) Formerly a part of the Sinaloa Cartel, the BLO forged a new alliance with the Juárez Cartel in 2008, which, according to NDIC analysis, will mutually benefit the






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organizations to gain greater access to U.S. drug markets. This alliance enables the BLO to share access with the Juárez Cartel to important smuggling corridors leading into West Texas, eastern Arizona, and New Mexico .76

(LES) BLO members use violence to maintain and expand their access to drug transportation routes . They have used violence against their former alliance partner, the Sinaloa Cartel, have ordered targeted assassinations of high-ranking Mexican Government officials, and are also rivals of LFM.77

(U) BLO Leader Killed in Government of Mexico OperationArturo Beltrán-Leyva was killed during a Mexican Navy Special Forces raid on an apartment complex in Cuernavaca, Morelos, Mexico, December 16, 2009. Additionally, one member of the Mexican Navy and several of Arturo’s bodyguards were killed in the raid. The successful operation is a significant victory for the Mexican government; however, the death of Arturo Beltrán-Leyva should lead to increased violence as the BLO has a history of extremely violent retaliation against the Mexican government and rival cartels when its leaders have been cap-tured or even threatened.

Source: STRATFOR (Strategic Forecasting, Inc.), “Mexico: A Cartel Leader’s Death and Violence Ahead.”

(LES) According to law enforcement reporting, the following Mexican DTOs are affiliated with the BLO .

• (LES) The Lealde León DTO, led by RPOT Arsenio Lealde León, smuggles hundreds of kilo-grams of cocaine each month primarily through South Texas POEs to the Houston area using commercial trucks from several transportation companies owned by Arsenio Lealde León. The drugs are then transported to U .S . distribution cities including Atlanta, Chicago, and New York City. Law enforcement reporting indicates that the Lealde León DTO is closely associ-ated with the BLO as well as the Gulf Cartel .78

• (LES) The Vasquez-Villagrana DTO, led by RPOT Ambrosia Vasquez-Villagrana, is based in Santa Ana, Sonora, Mexico. This DTO smuggles significant quantities of cocaine and mari-juana primarily through the Nogales POE to stash locations in the Phoenix and Tucson areas . The Vasquez-Villagrana DTO smuggles drugs into the United States primarily in vehicles with hidden compartments . The drugs are subsequently transported to California, Maryland, New York, Nevada, and Washington. This DTO also smuggles weapons and ammunition, as well as bulk currency, from the United States into Mexico. According to law enforcement reporting, the Vasquez-Villagrana DTO is closely associated with the BLO .79

• (LES) The Juan Socorro-Garza DTO, based in Houston and McAllen, smuggles multikilo-gram shipments of cocaine from Mexico into the United States through South Texas . Accord-ing to law enforcement reporting, this DTO is associated with the Beltrán-Leyva DTO . The Socorro-Garza DTO uses the Fine Line Transportation trucking company to transport cocaine and bulk currency throughout the United States.80






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La Familia Michoacána (LFM)(LES) LFM is a leading supplier of methamphetamine smuggled from Mexico into the United States and has emerged in recent years as a significant DTO.

(LES) Over the past several years, LFM has become a strong Mexican DTO, primarily by smuggling methamphetamine into the United States. In addition to methamphetamine, LFM smuggles multithousand pound quantities of cocaine as well as significant quantities of mari-juana monthly into the United States. DTOs affiliated with LFM supply these drugs to distribu-tors in at least 27 U .S . cities in 16 states .81 (See Map 7 in Appendix B.) LFM has become a significant wholesale drug supplier in the Atlanta and Dallas areas.82 LFM is based in Michoacán, Mexico, and operates in other Mexican states as well .

(LES) LFM, led by CPOT Jesus Mendez-Vargas, was organized in 2004 as a vigilante group opposed to drug gangs and kidnappers. Its members soon became involved in the drug trade and in extremely violent acts in Mexico, such as beheading rivals . Mendez-Vargas was a cell head of the Gulf Cartel prior to the formation of LFM. Consequently, LFM allied with Los Zetas in 2006 and 2007 before severing ties .83 LFM is now a rival of Los Zetas, as well as the BLO and Tijuana Cartel .84 LFM is reportedly aligned with the Sinaloa Cartel to gain access to significant drug corridors in southern California and west Texas, NDIC concludes that such an arrangement has enabled LFM to establish an expanded drug trafficking presence in U.S. markets.85

(U) Project Coronado Targets LFMOn October 22, 2009, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder announced the arrest of more than 300 alleged members of LFM. The arrests marked the culmination of a 44-month multiagency law enforcement investigation known as Project Coronado that included the arrests of nearly 1,200 individuals on narcotics-related charges and the seizure of more than 11.7 tons of nar-cotics and $32.8 million in U.S. currency. LFM is directly responsible for a vast majority of the methamphetamine smuggled from Mexico into the United States. It is unknown what effects Project Coronado will have on methamphetamine trafficking in the United States.


(LES) According to law enforcement reporting, the following Mexican DTOs are affiliated with LFM.

• (LES) The Renteria-Andrade DTO, led by RPOT Rigoberto Renteria-Andrade is based in Tijuana, Baja California Norte, Mexico. This DTO smuggles hundreds of kilograms of co-caine and hundreds of pounds of methamphetamine monthly through the Otay Mesa, San Ysidro, and Tecate, California, POEs to stash locations in the San Diego area . The DTO con-ceals drugs in hidden compartments of various types of vehicles . The Renteria-Andrade DTO also transports the drugs to Atlanta, Chicago, and Dallas for further distribution . The Renteria-Andrade DTO is closely aligned with LFM and also coordinates the transportation of illicit drug proceeds to Mexico .86

• (LES) The Vasquez-Valencia DTO, led by RPOT José Esparragosa-Moreno Luis Vasquez-Valencia, smuggles hundreds of kilograms of cocaine and hundreds of pounds of metham-phetamine each month primarily through California POEs to Los Angeles for subsequent






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distribution to locations in Colorado, Georgia, Kansas, Missouri, and Texas . The DTO uses tractor-trailers to smuggle and transport drugs into and throughout the United States . The Vasquez-Valencia DTO is closely associated with Jesus Mendez-Vargas, the leader of LFM.87

Tijuana Cartel (LES) The Tijuana Cartel’s strength and operations have been diminished by infighting and a violent conflict with the Sinaloa Cartel.

(LES) The Tijuana Cartel smuggles multiton quantities of cocaine and marijuana, as well as significant quantities of heroin and methamphetamine, into the United States. DTOs affiliated with the cartel supply wholesale quantities of drugs to cells and dealers in at least 21 U .S . cities in 11 states .88 (See Map 8 in Appendix B .) The cartel is based in Baja California, Mexico, and conducts drug smuggling primarily through corridors in California .

(FOUO) The Tijuana Cartel, led by CPOT Fernando Sánchez-Arellano, was once one of the most powerful cartels in Mexico .89 The arrests or deaths of key cartel members since 2002, including the five Arellano-Félix brothers, have contributed to the decline of the cartel.90 Since the arrest of former CPOT Eduardo Arellano-Félix in October 2008, an internal power struggle between Fernando Sánchez-Arellano and recently apprehended Eduardo García-Simental (see text box), a former cartel lieutenant, has led to increased violence in Tijuana .91 Further, attempts by the Sinaloa Cartel to expand into Tijuana during 2008 also contributed to an escalation of violence in Baja California, where drug-related murders increased from 154 in 2007 to 604 in 2008—a 292 percent increase.92 However, drug-related murders decreased to 320 in 2009 .93 LFM is another rival of the Tijuana Cartel .94 Tijuana Cartel trafficking operations would be negatively impacted if the Sinaloa Cartel gains control of the Tijuana Plaza and denies the Tijuana Cartel access to this primary smuggling corridor, according to NDIC analysis .

(U) Tijuana Cartel Figure ArrestedEduardo Teodoro “El Teo” García-Simental was arrested at a residence in La Paz, Baja Cali-fornia Sur, Mexico, on January 12, 2010, subsequent to a Mexican federal police raid. The operation was reportedly the culmination of a three-month intelligence operation that tracked the movements of the cartel leader. García-Simental has been a catalyst for much of the violence in the Tijuana area over the past 2 years, including the majority of kidnapping and extortion operations.

Source: STRATFOR (Strategic Forecasting, Inc.).

(LES) The Tijuana Cartel uses corrupt law enforcement officials in Mexico to protect drug shipments and to conduct kidnappings.95 For example, in March 2009, 23 Tijuana police officers were arrested under the GOM’s Federal Law Against Organized Crime for their involvement in the cartel battle for power between Fernando Sánchez Arellano and Eduardo García-Simental.96






30






31

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32

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39

Endnotes1 . (U) Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF), Southwest OCDETF Region Strategic Plan

2010, September 2009 .2 . (U) U .S . Department of Justice (DOJ), Justice Intelligence Coordinating Council, Barrio Azteca Prison Gang

Joint Intelligence Project, May 2007 . West Texas HIDTA Report on Violence and Cartel Operations in Ciudad Juárez, Juárez, Mexico .

3 . (U) DOJ, OCDETF Southwest Texas South (SWTXS) Investigation Initiative Forms (IIF) 714 November 2008. SWTXS IIF 695 Interim Report August 2008.

4 . (U) E-mail from Supervisory Special Agent (SSA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Safe Streets, Septem-ber, 25, 2008 . E-mail from DEA Los Angeles, September 10, 2008 . FBI Mexican Mafia Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT) Nomination.

5 . (U) National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC), National Gang Threat Assessment 2009, Product No . 2008-M0335-001 .

6 . (U) NGIC, National Gang Threat Assessment 2009, Product No . 2008-M0335-001 .7 . (U) 2009 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR): Mexico .8 . (U) E-mail from Central Valley HIDTA, April 2, 2009 .9 . (U) Washington State Police July 2008 .

Oregon State Police July 2008 . Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Domestic Cannabis Eradication /Suppression Program (DCE/SP) Year-End Totals 2008 . California Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement (BNE) June 2008 . California Fusion Center, July 2008. Central Valley Marijuana Investigative Team–Fresno BNE July 2008.

10 . (U) Major Illicit-Drug-Producing Nations: Cultivation and Production Estimates, 2003–07, November 2008 .U and U//FOUO information taken from SECRET//NOFORN document, CNC SF 2009-30030, October 13, 2009.

11 . (U) U and U//FOUO information taken from SECRET//NOFORN document, CNC SF 2009-30030, October 13, 2009 .

12 . (U) U .S . Department of State, 2010 INCSR.13 . (U) OCDETF.14 . (U) U.S. Border Patrol (USBP), Pinal County Sheriff’s Office, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),

DEA, and Phoenix Police Department (PD) interviews, February and March 2009.15 . (U) El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), Tunnelvision . 16 . (U) Houston HIDTA, 2009 Houston HIDTA Threat Assessment, July 2009 .

Interviews with law enforcement personnel from FBI McAllen, South Texas HIDTA, McAllen Intelligence Center in 2009 .

17 . (U) U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), Southwest (SD/MX) Maritime Border Smuggling Trends. Interviews with California Border Alliance Group (CBAG), South Texas HIDTA analysts, National Park Ranger, Padre Island National Seashore .

18 . (U) El Paso Times, “Authorities Bust Local Auto Theft Operation,” <www.elpasotimes.com>, November 7, 2009 .19 . (U) Open Source Center, Highlights: Mexico Economic Issues, August 11, 2009 .20 . (U) San Diego PD .21 . (U) ICE, El Paso Field Office.22 . (U) ICE, El Paso Field Office.





http://www.elpasotimes.com


40

23 . (U) Phoenix Planning and Research Bureau, Crime and Analysis Research Unit, December 17, 2008 .24 . (U) FBI, San Diego, E-mail July 18, 2008.25 . (U) FBI, San Diego, E-mail July 18, 2008.26 . (U) Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Press Release .27 . (U) James Vertini, Arming the Drug Wars, Examining the U.S.–Mexico Gun Trade, <www.portfolio.com>, July 2008 .

Statement of William Hoover, Assistant Director for Field Operations, before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, ATF, February 7, 2008. International Regulations and Security Network Security Watch–Guns: The Bloody U.S.–Mexico Market, August 2008 .Mexico: Dynamics of the Gun Trade, STRATFOR (Strategic Forecasting, Inc.) Intelligence Report, October 24, 2007.“U.S. Steadies its Aim at Gun Trafficking into Mexico,” Christian Science Monitor, July 20, 2007 .“U.S. Steadies its Aim at Gun Trafficking into Mexico,” Christian Science Monitor, July 20, 2007 .“Mexican Blackwater and the NY Connection,” <www.att-tactical.com>, October 27, 2008 .

28 . (U) U.S. DOJ review of 2008 and 2009 OCDETF case files.29 . (U) FBI, Criminal Investigative Division, Assistant Director Kevin L. Perkins’ statement before the ad hoc

subcommittee on state, local, and private sector preparedness and integration of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, titled, “New Border War: Corruption of U.S. Officials by Drug Cartels,” presented March 11, 2010 .

30 . (U) U.S. Attorney’s Office of the Southern District of Texas.31 . (U) Office of Queen’s County District Attorney (DA), September 2008.

New York/New Jersey High Intensity Financial Crime Area, September 2008. Chicago PD, October 2008 . Cook County DA’s Office, October 2008. Cook County Sheriff’s Department, October 2008. DEA, Chicago, October 2008 . Illinois State Police, October 2008 . ICE Chicago, October 2008 . ICE New York, October 2008. United States Attorney’s Office (USAO) Northern District Illinois, October 2008. California BNE, November 2008 . ICE Los Angeles, November 2008 . DEA, Atlanta, December 2008 . ICE, Atlanta, December 2008 . Internal Revenue Service–Criminal Investigations Atlanta, December 2008 . Southeast Region, December 2008 . USAO Northern District Georgia, December 2008 . National Seizure System, 2006 through June 2009 .

32 . (U) OCDETF, Southwest OCDETF Region Strategic Plan 2010, September 2009.33 . (U) OCDETF, Southwest OCDETF Region Strategic Plan 2010, September 2009 .34 . (U) OCDETF, Southwest OCDETF Region Strategic Plan 2010, September 2009.35 . (U) DOJ, OCDETF, Information derived from IIFs, CPOT List, and Regional Priority Organizational Targets

(RPOT) List, 2009 .36 . (U) OCDETF, Southwest Region, and CBP .37 . (U) OCDETF, CPOTs,October 2009.38 . (U) OCDETF, CPOTs,October 2009.39 . (U) OCDETF, CPOTs,October 2009.40 . (U) OCDETF, Southwest OCDETF Region Strategic Plan 2010, September 2009.





http://www.portfolio.com

http://www.att-tactical.com


41

41 . (U) West Texas HIDTA .42 . (U) OCDETF, Southwest OCDETF Region Strategic Plan 2010, September 2009.43 . (U) DOJ, OCDETF, FY2010 RPOT Profiles.44 . (U) DOJ, OCDETF, FY2010 RPOT Profiles.45 . (U) DOJ, OCDETF, FY2010 RPOT Profiles.46 . (U) DOJ, OCDETF, FY2010 RPOT Profiles.47 . (U) DOJ, OCDETF, FY2010 RPOT Profiles.48 . (U) DOJ, OCDETF, FY2010 RPOT Profiles.49 . (U) DOJ, OCDETF, FY2010 RPOT Profiles.50 . (U) DOJ, OCDETF, Information derived from IIFs, CPOTs List, and RPOTs List, 2009.51 . (U) OCDETF, Southwest Region and CBP.52 . (U) OCDETF CPOTs, October 2009.53 . (U) OCDETF CPOT, October 2009.54 . (U) South Texas HIDTA .55 . (U) DHS, HIR/ICE-0196-10, March 12, 2010.

FBI, Situational Information Report, Criminal Activity Alert, San Antonio Division, February 26, 2010.56 . (U//FOUO-LES) NGIC, (U//FOUO-LES) “Los Zetas Enforcement Cells Operating in the United States,” May 2009.57 . (U//FOUO-LES) DOJ, FBI McAllen, (U//FOUO-LES) JAB Alert #48, October 2008.58 . (U) DOJ, OCDETF, FY2010 RPOT Profiles.59 . (U) DOJ, OCDETF, FY2010 RPOT Profiles.60 . (U) DOJ, OCDETF, FY2010 RPOT Profiles.61 . (U) DOJ, OCDETF, IIF SW TXS 0725, March 2009.62 . (U) OCDETF CPOTS, October 2009.63 . (U) DOJ, OCDETF, Information derived from IIFs, CPOTs List, and RPOTs List, 2009.64 . (U) OCDETF, Southwest Region, and CBP.65 . (U) OCDETF CPOTs, October 2009.66 . (U) West Texas HIDTA .67 . (U) Agencia Reforma .

University of San Diego, Trans-Border Institute .68 . (U) West Texas HIDTA .69 . (U) Southwest OCDETF Region, Strategic Plan FY2010.70 . (U) DOJ, OCDETF, FY2010 RPOT Profiles.71 . (U) DOJ, OCDETF, FY2010 RPOT Profiles.72 . (U) DOJ, OCDETF, IIF SW TXW 0456.73 . (U) DOJ, OCDETF, IIF SW TXW 0469.74 . (U) DOJ, OCDETF, Information derived from IIFs, CPOTs List, and RPOTs List, 2009 .75 . (U) OCDETF, Southwest Region, and CBP .76 . (U) OCDETF CPOT Book, October 2008.

STRATFOR, Mexican Drug Cartels: Government Progress and Growing Violence, December 11, 2008 .CBP Tucson and Yuma Sectors, Santa Cruz County, Arizona, Task Force, June 24, 2009.

77 . (U) STRATFOR. CPOTs Quarterly Activities Report (QAR), 1st Quarter 2009 .

78 . (U) DOJ, OCDETF, FY2010 RPOT Profiles.






42

79 . (U) DOJ, OCDETF, FY2010 RPOT Profiles.80 . (U) DOJ-OCDETF, IIF SW TXS 0744.81 . (U) DOJ, OCDETF, Information derived from IIFs, CPOTs, and RPOTs Lists, 2009 .

Durham, North Carolina, PD, June 24, 2009 . Greensboro, North Carolina, PD, June 23, 2009 .

82 . (U) DEA Atlanta Field Division, October 9, 2009. Texas Department of Public Safety, July 1, 2009 .

83 . (U) OCDETF, CPOTs, October 2009. 84 . (U) CPOTs QAR, 1st Quarter 2009 .85 . (U) Foreign Military Studies Office, Latin America Military and Security Watch, August 06, 2009, “Alliances

revealed between La Familia Michoacána and the Sinaloa Cartel.” Available online .86 . (U) DOJ, OCDETF, FY2010 RPOT Profiles.87 . (U) DOJ, OCDETF, FY2010 RPOT Profiles.88 . (U) DOJ, OCDETF, FY2010 RPOT Profiles.89 . (U) OCDETF), CPOT, October 2009.90 . (U) OCDETF, CPOTs, October 2009.91 . (U) OCDETF, CPOTs, October 2009.92 . (U//FOUO) DHS, Office of International Affairs Note, (U//FOUO) “Mexico: Drug Violence in Tijuana Likely to

Worsen,” March 19, 2009 .93 . (U) Agencia Reforma .94 . (U) CPOT, QAR .95 . (U) California Department of Justice, June 17, 2009 .96 . (U) Latina online, March 3, 2009, “23 Mexican Police Officers Arrested for Corruption,”

<http://en.terra.com/lifestyle/articles/html/hof5058.htm> .





http://en.terra.com/lifestyle/articles/html/hof5058.htm


43

SourcesNationalCentral Intelligence AgencyExecutive Office of the President

Office of National Drug Control PolicyHigh Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas

Central Valley CaliforniaChicagoGulf CoastHoustonLake CountyLos AngelesMilwaukeeNevadaNorth TexasOhioPhiladelphia/CamdenRocky MountainSouth FloridaSouthwest Border

ArizonaCalifornia Border Alliance Group

San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination CenterNew MexicoSouth TexasWest Texas

Open Source CenterU.S. Department of Defense

Army National GuardDepartment of the Army

Foreign Military Studies OfficeJoint Reserve Intelligence Center

United States Northern CommandJoint Task Force-North

U.S. Department of Homeland SecurityU.S. Coast GuardU.S. Customs and Border Protection

Office of Border PatrolBorder Patrol Intelligence Center

Office of Field OperationsU.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

Atlanta Field OfficeChicago Field Office






44

Dallas Field OfficeEl Paso Field OfficeLos Angeles Field Office New York Field OfficeAlbuquerque Resident Office

U.S. Department of JusticeBureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and ExplosivesAtlanta Field OfficeCharlotte Field OfficeDallas Field OfficeHouston Field OfficeMcAllen Field OfficeSan Antonio Field OfficeU.S. Bomb Data Center

Criminal DivisionOrganized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force

Drug Enforcement AdministrationAtlanta DivisionCharlotte DivisionDallas DivisionDenver DivisionEl Paso DivisionEl Paso Intelligence Center

National Seizure SystemFederal-Wide Drug Seizure SystemHouston Field DivisionLittle RockLos Angeles DivisionPhoenix DivisionSan Diego Division

Enforcement Group 1Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys

U.S. Attorneys OfficesArizonaCalifornia

Central DistrictSouthern DistrictNew MexicoOklahoma

Eastern DistrictNorthern DistrictWestern District






45

TexasEastern DistrictSouthern DistrictWestern District

Federal Bureau of InvestigationAtlanta Field DivisionMcAllen Intelligence CenterNational Gang Intelligence CenterSan Diego Field Division

Violent Crime SquadU.S. Department of State

Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement AffairsU.S. Department of the Interior

Bureau of Indian AffairsBureau of Land ManagementU.S. Fish and Wildlife ServiceNational Park Service

Padre Island National SeashoreU.S. Department of the Treasury

Financial Crimes Enforcement NetworkInternal Revenue Service

U.S. Government Accountability OfficeU.S. House of Representatives

House Committee on Homeland SecuritySubcommittee on Investigations

Local, State, and Regional

ArizonaArizona Counter Narcotics AllianceGlendale Police DepartmentMaricopa County Sheriff’s OfficeMesa Police DepartmentNogales Police DepartmentNorthern Arizona Metro Task ForcePhoenix Police Department

Drug Enforcement BureauPima County Sheriff’s DepartmentSanta Cruz County Sheriff’s Office

Metro Task ForceScottsdale Police DepartmentState of Arizona

Department of Public Safety






46

Tucson Police DepartmentYuma County Sheriff’s OfficeYuma Police Department

ArkansasLittle Rock Police DepartmentState of Arkansas

Arkansas State Police

CaliforniaLos Angeles County Sheriff’s DepartmentLos Angeles Police Department

LA IMPACT Task ForceOrange County Sheriff’s DepartmentSan Diego County Sheriff’s DepartmentSan Diego Law Enforcement Coordination CenterSan Diego Police DepartmentState of CaliforniaCalifornia Highway PatrolDepartment of JusticeBureau of Narcotic EnforcementCriminal Intelligence BureauOffice of the Attorney GeneralUniversity of San Diego

Trans-Border Institute

ColoradoAurora Police DepartmentColorado Springs Police DepartmentDenver Police DepartmentState of Colorado

Colorado Department of Corrections

FloridaJacksonville Sheriff’s OfficeOrange County Sheriff’s Office

IllinoisChicago Police DepartmentCook County District Attorney’s OfficeCook County Sheriff’s DepartmentState of Illinois

Illinois State Police






47

KansasWichita Police Department

MissouriKansas City Police DepartmentSt. Louis Metropolitan Police Department

NebraskaGrand Island Tri-County Drug Task ForceOmaha Police Department

New MexicoLas Cruces Police Department

Regional Interagency Drug Task ForceNew Mexico All Source Intelligence Center

New YorkNew York Police DepartmentQueen’s County District Attorney’s Office

North CarolinaCharlotte Mecklenburg Police DepartmentDurham Police DepartmentGreensboro Police DepartmentGuilford County Sheriff’s OfficeRaleigh Police Department

OhioWarren County Drug Task Force

OklahomaOklahoma City Police DepartmentState of Oklahoma

Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous DrugsTulsa Police Department

TennesseeState of Tennessee

Tennessee Bureau of InvestigationShelby County Sheriff’s Office






48

TexasBrownsville Police DepartmentCity of HoustonHouston Police DepartmentCorpus Christi Police DepartmentDallas Police DepartmentGang UnitNarcotics DivisionEagle Pass Police DepartmentEl Paso County Sheriff’s DepartmentEl Paso Metro Task ForceEl Paso Police DepartmentFort Worth Police DepartmentHarris County Sheriff’s OfficeHidalgo County Sheriff’s DepartmentHidalgo Police DepartmentIrving Police DepartmentLaredo Police DepartmentMcAllen Police DepartmentState of Texas

Texas Department of Criminal JusticeTexas Department of Public Safety

Webb County District Attorney’s OfficeWebb County Sheriff’s Department

UtahSalt Lake City Police DepartmentState of Utah

Utah Metro Drug Task Force

OtherEl Paso TimesHouston ChronicleReforma.comReutersSTRATFOR (Strategic Forecasting, Inc.)The Washington Post





Questions and comments may be directed to Canada/Eurasia/Africa/Latin America Unit, National Threat Analysis Branch

National Drug Intelligence Center

319 Washington Street 5th Floor, Johnstown, PA 15901-1622 • (814) 532-4601NDIC publications are available on the following web sites:

INTERNET www.justice.gov/ndic ADNET http://ndicosa.adnet.sgov.gov RISS ndic.riss.net LEO https://www.leo.gov/http://leowcs.leopriv.gov/lesig/ndic/index.htm

052010

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

NATIONAL DRUG INTELLIGENCE CENTER

May 2010

Mexican Drug Trafficking OrganizaTiOns:

DevelOpMenTs iMpacTing The uniTeD sTaTes

mexican drug trafficking organizations mx... · 2014-01-13 · mexican drug trafficking...

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