metaphor and metonymy in language and thought: a cognitive

ReviewpaperUDCdoi:10.21464/sp32202Received:May31,2017

Klaus-Uwe Panther,1 Linda L. Thornburg1UniversityofHamburg,InstituteofEnglishandAmericanStudies,Von-Melle-Park6,D–20146Hamburg

[email protected]

Metaphor and Metonymy in Language and Thought: A Cognitive Linguistic Approach

AbstractCognitiveLinguistics (CL) is a cover term for some functionalist and cognitivist approach-es to the study of language that emerged in the 1970s and share basic theoretical and meth-odological tenets, most of which are incompatible with Noam Chomsky’s theory of Genera-tive Grammar and its more recent offshoots. CL diverges from generative grammar among other things (i) in rejecting the Chomskyan claim that the language faculty is innate, (ii) in emphasizing the semiotic character not only of words but also of grammatical constructions as meaningful units of language, (iii) in attributing an important cognitive and linguistic role to metaphor and metonymy, and (iv) in contending that language structure and use are (relatively) motivated by conceptual and pragmatic factors. The article focuses on points (ii), (iii), and (iv), which are supported empirically by authentic English language data.

Keywordscognitivelinguistics,generativegrammar,grammaticalconstructions,languageandthought,metaphor,metonymy,motivation

1. Introduction

CognitiveLinguisticsisaparadigmthatoriginatedintheUnitedStatesinthe1970sandspreadtomanycountriesinEuropeandtoAsiancountriessuchasJapan,SouthKorea,andChina.Itdevelopedintoaseriouscompetitortothehithertodominanttheoreticalframeworkinlinguistics,GenerativeGrammar.Uptothe1950s,thescienceoflanguageintheUnitedStateshadhadamainlystructuralistorientation,whichisknownasDescriptivism.Descriptivismisanon-mentalistorevenanti-mentalistapproachtothestudyoflanguage,epito-mizede.g.inLeonardBloomfield’sinfluentialmonographLanguage(1933).Bloomfieldwasbeholdentothethenprevalentpsychologicaldoctrineofbe-haviorism:Thehumanmindisablackbox,onlybehavior,i.e.stimulus-re-sponsepatterns,isobservable,andhencestatementsaboutthenatureofthehumanmindanditsrelationtolanguagearespeculativeandunscientific.Thebehavioristapproachto languagewasseriouslychallengedin1959byNoamChomsky,ayounglinguistattheMassachusettsInstituteofTechnol-ogy,whowroteascathingcritiqueofthebehavioristB.F.Skinner’smono-graphVerbal Behavior (1957),areviewarticlethatappearedintheleadingAmericanlinguisticjournalLanguage.Chomskyarguedthatthehumanlan-guagefacultyisa“mentalorgan”,asheputitmetaphorically,andthathencelinguisticscruciallyinvolvesthestudyofanimportantaspectofthehumanmind.

https://doi.org/10.21464/sp32202

SYNTHESISPHILOSOPHICA64(2/2017)pp.(271–294)

K.-U.Panther,L.L.Thornburg,MetaphorandMetonymyinLanguageandThought:…272

Inhiswritings,Chomskydistinguishesbetweentwodimensionsoflanguage:languageasaknowledgesystem,whichhecallslinguistic competence, andtheapplicationofthissysteminactuallanguageuse,whichhedubslinguistic performance.AccordingtoChomsky,thecentralobjectofthescienceoflan-guageshouldbecompetence,i.e.the(mostly)subconsciousknowledgethatnativespeakershaveoftheirmothertongue.Becauseoftheparadigmshiftheinitiated–fromlanguageasakindofbehaviororhabitformationtolanguageasanautonomousmoduleofthehumanmind–Chomskycanbecalleda“cognitivelinguist”avant la lettre,anditisnotacci-dentalthatleadingcognitivelinguistsintheUnitedStates,suchase.g.GeorgeLakoffandRonaldLangacker,originallyadheredtotheChomskyandoctrinebeforedevelopingtheoreticalframeworksthatare,inmanyways,incompatiblewithChomsky’sconceptionoflanguageanditsacquisition(seesection2).Chomsky (1988: 4–5) claims that a purely behaviorist, i.e. empiricist ap-proach to language, faces a conceptual paradox.The paradox is known asPlato’s problem, which was already formulated by the British philosopherBertrandRussellinthefollowingway:

“Howcomesitthathumanbeings,whosecontactswiththeworldarebriefandpersonalandlimited,areabletoknowasmuchastheydo?”(quotedinChomsky1988:4)

Chomsky’sanswertoPlato’sproblemwithregardtotheacquisitionoflin-guisticcompetenceisasfollows:

i. Humans learn theirmother tonguerelativelyeffortlesslybecause thelanguagefacultyisinnate,i.e.aspecializedmoduleofthehumanmind.Inotherwords,humansarebornwitha“universalgrammar”,asetofuniversalgrammaticalrules,principles,andconstraints.Beforeevenstartingtolearntheirnativelanguage,infantsalready“know”atleastsomeoftheuniversalpropertiesthatallhumanlanguagesshare.

ii. Thelanguagefacultyisnotderivablefromothergeneralhumancogni-tiveabilities,e.g.intelligenceandthecognitiveprocessingofpercep-tualandexperientialevents.

What Chomsky’s mentalist framework and Cognitive Linguistics have incommonistheiranti-behavioriststance.However,CognitiveLinguisticsdif-ferssubstantiallyfromChomskyanGenerativeGrammarinatleastthefol-lowingrespects:

i. thenatureofthelinguisticsign,ii.thenatureofthelanguagefaculty,iii.thecognitivemechanismsatworkintheacquisitionoflanguage,iv.theoverallarchitectureofgrammar, includingitsrelationtophonol-

ogy,semantics,andpragmatics,andv. the theoretical status of linguistic performance (i.e. actual language

use).

Section2ofthisarticleprovidesabriefintroductiontothevarietyofpara-digmsthataredesignatedbythecoverterm‘CognitiveLinguistics’.Section3focusesonmetaphorandmetonymy,twotropesthatinCognitiveLinguisticsareregardednotonlyasfiguresoflanguage but,importantly,alsoofthought. Some cognitive linguists, including the present authors, maintain that me-tonymyisanevenmorebasicfigurativedevicethanmetaphor,andinsec-tions4and5theconceptualandpragmaticfunctionofmetonymyisanalyzedinmoredetail. Insection4, thecrucialroleofmetonymyintheresolution



ofconceptualconflictsbetweenconstructionmeaningand lexicalmeaningisillustratedwithsomeexamples.Section5considerstheworkingsofme-tonymyinsemioticmodesotherthannaturallanguage;bywayofexample,it is shownwithoneexample that the interpretationofvisualartmay relyonmetonymicthinking.Finally,section6concludesthiscontributionwithabriefanswertothequestionwhethermetonymyisa“dedicatedcomprehen-sionmechanism”.

2. Some basic theoretical and methodological assumptions of Cognitive Linguistics

Insection1,wehavepointedoutthatinthe1960scognitivelinguistssuchasRonaldLangackerandGeorgeLakoffwereinfluencedbytheChomskyanparadigm,butespeciallyLakoffsoonbegantocriticizetheconceptionoflan-guageandthearchitectureofgrammardevelopedinChomsky(1965).Inac-cordancewithlinguistssuchasJohnRobertRoss,JamesD.McCawley,andPaulPostal,Lakoff rejected,amongother things, theconceptsof syntacticdeepstructureandinterpretativesemantics,wherethelatterissupposedtobebasedonsyntacticdeepstructureorsurfacestructureasadvocatedbyChom-sky (1965) and Jackendoff (1974), respectively. In contrast, Lakoff, Ross,McCawley, and Postal argued for a semantically-based grammar, a modelknownasgenerative semantics.ThedissensionregardingthearchitectureofgrammarbetweenChomskyans andgenerative semanticistshas aptlybeencharacterizedmetaphoricallyas“linguisticswars”byRandyA.Harris(1993)(forfurtherdetailsaboutthesetheoreticalcontroversies,seealsoGutknechtandPanther1973).Although,insomerespects,generativesemanticswasstillcommittedtotheChomskyanparadigm,thefocusonmeaningandpragmaticuseconstitutedanimportantstepforwardtoacognitivelinguisticapproachtolanguage.GeorgeLakoff(1987:82)regards“cognitivegrammarasanup-datedversionofgenerativesemantics”.AsaconvenientpointofdepartureforabriefdescriptionofsomeimportantfeaturesofCognitiveLinguistics,itmightbehelpfulforthereadertoconsiderhumancognitionanditsrelationtoother“peripheralsystems”asdiagrammedinFigure1.

Figure1.Cognitionanditsinteractionswithotherhumansystems(adaptedfromPantherandRadden2011:2)



FollowingPantherandRadden(2011),weregardcognitioninthenarrowsenseasconsisting,amongotherthings,ofthehighermentalfacultiesofhumanstoreasonandtoinfer,tocategorize,toconstructcognitivemodels(framing),toblendtwoormoreconceptsintoanewconcept(seeFauconnierandTurner2002),andtoperspectivize.Inthiscontribution,forreasonsofspace,wefo-cusonthementalskillsofanalogicalthinking(conceptualmetaphor)and,inparticular,offormingassociationsamongconcepts(conceptualmetonymy),withoccasional references tosomeadditional importantcognitivefacultieslistedinFigure1.Thesecognitiveabilitiesinteractwith(asindicatedbythedouble-headedarrows),i.e.feedintoandreceivefeedbackfrom,peripheralsystemssuchasbodilyexperience,perception,emotion,action(includingso-cialandcommunicativeinteraction),culture,and,importantly,language.WeclaimthatanadequatecognitivetheoryoflanguagehastotaketheparametersdiagrammedinFigure1intoaccount.CognitiveLinguistics,at itspresent stage, isnotahomogeneous theoryoflanguage.However,therearebasicassumptionsandcommitmentssharedbydifferentvariantsofthegeneralparadigm.Amongthesearethefollowing:

i. Humanlanguagesaresemioticsystemsthatpairforms,i.e.morphemes,words,andconstructionswithconventionalmeaningsandcommuni-cativefunctions.Furthermoreandimportantly,inactuallanguageusemeaningsandcommunicativefunctionsareoftennotexplicitlycodedbutspeakersimplyandhearersinferadditionalmeaningsandfunctions(e.g.implicaturesinthesenseofGrice1975).

ii. Generalcognitivefacultiesand learningskills (incontrast toChom-sky’s innatenesshypothesis)suffice toaccountdescriptivelyandex-planatorilyforthemechanismsoflanguageacquisition.

iii.Cognitive linguists reject the common methodological practice ofChomskyanlinguiststorelyonintrospectivelygainedlinguisticdata.The introspective method is based on the (problematic) assumptionthatthenativespeakerofalanguage(intuitively)“knowsbest”whatisagrammaticallywell-formedand/oracceptableexpression,e.g.sen-tence,inthemothertongue.

iv. In contrast to the Chomskyan introspective method, Cognitive Lin-guisticsfavorsausage-based approachtothestudyoflanguage(seee.g.Langacker2008,2013).Theusage-basedapproachpresumesthattheempiricalbasisoflinguisticanalysisshouldbeauthenticlanguagedata,whichatpresentare increasinglyavailableas largeonlinecor-pora.Theexistenceofelectroniccorporahasalsogivenrisetowhatsomecognitivelinguistscallthe“quantitativeturn”inlinguistics(seeJanda2013), i.e. the analysisof largenumbersof linguisticdatabymeansofadvancedstatisticalmethods(forsomechallengesfacedbyusage-basedanalyses,seeDivjak2015).

v. Regardinglinguisticmeaning,aground-breakingapproachinspiredbydevelopments incognitivepsychologyandcognitivesciencehas ledto,amongotherthings,arejectionofstructuralistsemanticsintermsofatomicsemanticfeatures(componentialanalysis)and logic-basedtruthconditionalsemantics,astheyaretakenmoreorlessforgrantedin the Chomskyan paradigm. Cognitive Linguistics adopts Wittgen-stein’s (2009: 36) concept of family resemblances (German Fami-lienähnlichkeiten), as illustrated in his Philosophical Investigations with the“activities thatwecall ‘games’”(GermanSpiele). Wittgen-steinarguesthatitisimpossibletodefinewhatagameisintermsof



necessary and jointly sufficient properties or features.A related ap-proachtocategorization,whichhasalsohadaprofoundinfluenceonCognitiveLinguistics,goesbacktothecognitivepsychologistEleanorRosch(e.g.1975).ShehasshownexperimentallythatcategoriessuchasFUrNITUrEhaveaprototypical structure,i.e.,FUrNITUrEisnotacate-gorythatcanbedefinedintermsofnecessaryandsufficientproperties,butindividualmembersofthecategoryarerankedona“goodness-of-example”scale(seeTaylor1995:44).Forexample,subjectsconsiderCHAIr,SOFAorTABLEasgoodexemplarsofthecategoryFUrNITUrE;incontrasttorEFrIGErATOrorTELEPHONEthatarerankedverylowonthegoodnessscale,andarethusnotregardedasrepresentativemembersofthecategoryFUrNITUrE.SuchempiricallysupportedworkoncategorystructurechallengeswhatisgenerallycalledtheAristotelian approachto categorization. Finally, another promising approach to conceptu-alizationiswhatisknownastheembodiment hypothesis.InVyvyanEvans’(2007:66)formulation,thebasicinsightoftheembodiedcog-nitionhypothesisisthat“thehumanmindandconceptualorganisationareafunctionofthewayinwhichourspecies-specificbodiesinteractwiththeenvironmentweinhabit”.Figure1representsthishypothesisas “peripheral” systems that interact with cognition; e.g. bodily ex-perience,perception,andaction.Theconceptofembodiedcognitionishighlyrelevanttothesemanticsofhumanlanguages,inparticular,toanadequateunderstandingofmetaphor andmetonymy, twobasictropesofthoughtandlanguage,whicharepresentedandexemplifiedinthefollowingsections.

3. Figurative thought and language: metaphor and metonymy

3.1. Primary and complex metaphor

In Cognitive Linguistics, metaphor is seen as a prime example of embod-iedmeaning.Twomajormetaphortheorists,thelinguistGeorgeLakoffandthephilosopherMarkJohnson(LakoffandJohnson1980,1999),followingJosephGrady(1997),distinguishbetweenprimary andcomplex metaphors.Primary metaphors are directly related to experience, often bodily experi-ence,and,accordingtoLakoffandJohnson(1999:50),theyconstitutebasicconceptualcorrelationsfromwhichcomplexmetaphorsarebuiltup.Inwhatfollows,thesubscriptS standsforthemetaphoricalsourceandT forthemeta-phoricaltarget;thedouble-linedarrow‘’symbolizesthemetaphoricalrela-tionbetweenthesourceandthetargetmeaning.InstancesofprimarymetaphorspostulatedbyLakoffandJohnsonare:

(1) a.CLOSENESSSINTIMACY

T

b.DESTINATIONSSPUrPOSES

T

c.WArMTHSAFFECTION

T

Forexample,(1a)istobeinterpretedasmeaning‘emotionalintimacy(targetmeaning)isconceptualizedintermsofspatialcloseness(sourcemeaning)’.ThusinEnglishwefindexpressionssuchas

(2) a. MaryandPamwereclosefriends.b. Heexperiencedalackofclosenesstohisparentsduringchildhood. [https://www.thefreedictionary.com]



Lakoff (2008:27)describes theexperientialbasisof theprimarymetaphor(1a)asfollows:

“…thepeopleyouaremostintimatewitharetypicallythepeopleyouhavespenttimephysi-callycloseto:yourfamily,lover,andsoon.”

Complexmetaphors canbe seen as (at least partially) iconic relations, i.e.structure-preservingmappings fromoneconceptualframe(source)intoan-other(fordiscussion,seePanther2006).TheschematicstructureofcomplexlinguisticmetaphorsisdiagrammedinFigure2.

Figure2.Complexmetaphor

A metaphor is produced in a certain (extralinguistic) situation and a (lin-guistic)context.Thewordorexpressionthattriggersthemetaphoriscalledthe linguistic vehicle, which conveys a conventional (“literal”) meaning,thesourcemeaning.Thismeaningisrepresentedbymeansofaconceptual frame,amentalrepresentationintermsofmeaningcomponentsthatenter-tain various conceptual and encyclopedic relations with one another (seeZiem2014foranin-depthintroductiontoanddiscussionofframeseman-tics).Componentsofthesourceframeareiconicallymappedontoanotherdistinct conceptual frame, the target.The target frame is thus structurallyisomorphictothesourceframe,i.e.,itisakindofanalogicalreplicaofthesourceframe(seethecharacterizationofmetaphorasanalogicalthinkinginFigure1).ThenotionofcomplexmetaphorcanbeillustratedwithsomelinesfromWil-liamShakespeare’scomedy As You Like It,ActII,SceneVII:

(3) Alltheworld’sastage, Andallthemenandwomenmerelyplayers; Theyhavetheirexitsandtheirentrances, Andonemaninhistimeplaysmanyparts, Hisactsbeingsevenages.

Atthemostschematic level theunderlyingmetaphor in(3)canbenotatedasSTAGE

SWOrLD

T(printedinboldinFigure3),whichimpliesanumberof

submetaphors(innormalprint):



Figure3.ThecomplexShakespeareanmetaphorSTAGES WOrLD

T

Asanothernon-literaryordinarylanguagemetaphorthathasbeendiscussedin some detail in the cognitive linguistic literature, consider the conceptu-alizationofhumanlifeasa journey: JOUrNEY

SLIFE

T.LakoffandJohnson

(1999:60–62)suggestthatthismetaphorisbasedonacultural modelsuchas(4)thatinvolvesprimarymetaphorsasin(5):

(4) “Peoplearesupposed tohavepurposes in life,and theyaresup-posedtoactsoastoachievethosepurposes.”(LakoffandJohnson1999:61)

(5) a.DESTINATIONSSPUrPOSES

T

b.MOTIONSSACTIONS

T

ThemappingsoperativeinthecomplexmetaphorJOUrNEYSLIFE

Tcanthen

berepresentedasinFigure4:

Figure4.JOUrNEYSLIFE

T



3.2. Metaphorical framing

InFigure1,thedouble-headedarrowsthatconnectcognitiontovariouspe-ripheralsystems,oneofwhichis language, indicatethepossibilitythat thelinkedcomponentsmutually influenceeachother(seePantherandRadden2011 for detailed discussion). With regard to metaphor, the notation sug-geststhatthistropeisnotmerelyafaçon de parler butthatitmayreflectthewayslanguageusersthinkabouttheworld,i.e.metaphorsmay“frame”peo-ple’sthinking.Inwhatfollows,bywayofexample,wereportanexperimentconductedbycognitivepsychologistsPaulThibodeauandLeraBoroditsky(2011)thatsupportstheLakoffianclaimthatmetaphordoesindeedhaveanimpactoncognition.InThibodeauandBoroditsky’sexperiments,participants,whoweredividedintotwogroups,weregivenatextaboutthecrimerateinafictitioustownnamed‘Addison’.Thefirstgroupreadatextthatsystematicallyconceptual-izedcrimeasavirus(see(6))whereasthesecondgroupreceivedatextthatconveyedthesamecontentbutmetaphorizedcrimeasawildbeast(see(7))(ThibodeauandBoroditsky2011:3):

(6) Group1:VIrUSSCrIME

T

“CrimeisavirusinfectingthecityofAddison.Thecrimerateintheonce,peacefulcityhassteadilyincreasedoverthepastthreeyears.Infact,thesedaysitseemsthatcrimeisplaguingeveryneighborhood(…).”

(7) Group2:WILDBEASTSCrIME

T

“CrimeisawildbeastpreyingonthecityofAddison.Thecrimerateintheoncepeacefulcityhassteadilyincreasedoverthepastthreeyears.Infact,thesedaysitseemsthatcrimeislurkingineveryneighborhood(…).”

Aftertheparticipantshadreadtheirrespectivetexts,theywereasked,amongother things, the followingquestion: “Inyouropinion,what doesAddisonneedtodotoreducecrime?”ThibodeauandBoroditskyfound(ibid.:4)that“[p]articipants given the crime-as-beast metaphorical framing were morelikely to propose enforcement (74%) than participants given the crime-as-virusframing(56%)”. Ingeneral,Group1participants,whowereexposedto themetaphorVIrUS

SCrIME

T, recommendedbettereducation, reduction

ofpoverty,andsocialreformaseffectivemeasurestoreducethecrimerate,whereasGroup2participants,whohadbeensubjectedtothemetaphorWILDBEAST

SCrIME

T,wereinfavoroflawenforcement,policeforce,andprison

sentencestoachievethesameobjective.Inconclusion, there issomeevidence thatmetaphorshavean influenceonhowpeoplethinkandbehave(fortheroleofmetaphoricalframinginpoliticaldiscourse,seee.g.Lakoff2016andWehling2016).

3.3. Metonymy

Likemetaphor,metonymyisaubiquitousphenomenoninordinarylanguage.Tobeginwith,consideraninscriptionfoundonmanyATMs(anabbreviationfor‘AutomatedTellerMachine’)inEngland:

(8) Freecashmachine.

Onlyverynaivepeoplewouldtakemessage(8)asmeaningthattheATMinquestiondispensesfreemoney.Amoreplausibleinterpretation,inlinewithlanguage users’ world knowledge and social experience, is that customers



canwithdrawmoneyfromtheirownbankaccountswithoutbeingchargedaservicefee.Asafurtherexample,considertheadvertisement

(9) Greathair doesn’thappenbychance…ithappensbyappointment.

Greathairisasubstance(nicetolookat),butsinceitisnotanevent,itcannothappen.Nevertheless,itispossibletoreinterpretgreat hairmetonymicallyasanevent;moreprecisely,asetofactionsperformedbyahairdresserthatresultsingood-lookinghair.Thisinterpretationisreinforcedbythepreposi-tionalphraseby appointment,whichmarksthebeginningofaseriesofac-tionsthatleadtothedesiredresultgreat hair.Examples (8) and (9) illustrate the pervasive phenomenon of metonymy.Some cognitive linguists, including the present authors, regard conceptualmetonymyasanevenmorebasicfigureofthoughtandlanguagethanmeta-phor.ThebasicmetonymicrelationisdiagrammedinFigure5.

Figure5.Metonymy

Inwhatfollows,somecharacteristicsofmetonymyarelisted:i. Metonymyisanassociativeor,fromasemioticperspective,indexical

relationbetweenmeaningcomponentswithinoneconceptualframe(incontrasttometaphor,whichisaniconicrelationbetweentwoconcep-tualframes).

ii. Metonymy is not specific to language but exists in other semioticmodes,suchase.g.thevisualarts(seePanther2005).1

iii.Metonymyinvolvesalinguisticvehiclethatdenotesasemanticcompo-nentinaconceptualframe,thesourcemeaning,which,inturn,servesasaconceptualvehicletoaccessatargetmeaning(seeKövecsesandRadden 1998;Radden andKövecses 1999). The source meaning isconceptuallyintegratedintothetargetmeaningasaresultofthemeto-nymicoperation.

1

This isa feature thatmetonymyshareswithmetaphor.



iv. Therelationbetweensourceandtargetisconceptually tight(cf.Pan-therandThornburg1998;seealsoFauconnierandTurner’s2002no-tionofconceptualcompression).

v. Therelationbetweensourceandtargetistypicallycontingent,i.e.con-ceptuallynon-necessary.

vi.Languages maydiffer as to the conceptual relations theymetonym-ically exploit.

UsingthesubscriptsS andT for‘sourcemeaning’and‘targetmeaning’,re-spectively(asbeforeformetaphor),andthesingle-linedarrow‘→’for themetonymicrelation,werepresentthelinkbetweenthesourceandthetargetmeaningasin(10),exemplifiedby(11):

(10) [x]S→[Y[x]S]T(11) [MOZArT]S→[MUSICCOMPOSEDBY[MOZArT]S]T

SometypicalmetonymicrelationsexploitedinEnglishandotherlanguagesare:

Locations andevents that happen there

(12) Rio wasasuccess→‘TheeventsthatoccurredinRiowereasuccess’

Causes and their effects

(13) ahealthydiet→‘adietthatcauseshealth’

People and their salient attributes

(14) Theblonde walkedintotheroom→‘Thewomanwithblondhairwalkedintotheroom’

The virtual and the actual

(15) Hewas able to doit→‘Hemanagedtodoit’

Thefollowingpragmatictypesofmetonymycanbedistinguished(seePantherandThornburg1998):(i)propositional metonymies,whichcanbereferential and/orpredicational,and(ii)illocutionary metonymies (seeSearle1969forthedistinctionbetweenpropositions(reference,predication)andillocution).

3.3.1. Referential metonymies

Referentialmetonymiesoperateonnominalexpressions,e.g.nounphrasesandpropernouns.ThefollowingexampleshavebeenextractedfromtheCor-pus of Contemporary American English (COCA),withtheyearofattestationgiveninparentheses(italicsadded):

(16) ImeanthefactthatyoulikeBrahms,forinstance,doesn’tmeanthatyouarenotgoingtolikeLittle Richard.(COCA1997)

(17) I’mnotgoingtonamenames.EverybodyknowswhoI’mtalkingabout.(COCA2015)

(18) Wehaven’tbeenbombing.Wehaven’tevenjustsentinboots ontheground.(COCA2015)

In(16)aubiquitousmetonymicrelationisexploitedinwhicha19thcenturycomposer(Brahms)standsforthemusichecomposedandaRockandRoll



singer(Little Richard)forhismusic(composedand/orperformed).Thisme-tonymycanbenotatedas:

(19) [COMPOSEr]S→[MUSICCOMPOSEDBY[COMPOSEr]S]T(19)isaninstanceofthehigh-levelmetonymy(20):

(20) [PrODUCEr]S→[PrODUCTPrODUCEDBY[PrODUCEr]S]T

In(17),itisthesignrelationshipbetweensignifier(form)andsignified(con-tent)thatismetonymicallyexploited:

(21) [NAME]S→[PErSONBEArING[NAME]S]T

Notethatin(17)themetonymictargetinterpretationPErSONissupportedbythe second clause Everybody knows who I’m talking about. The exampledemonstrates that in actual communication contextual clues may facilitatementalaccesstothetargetmeaning.In(18),referenceismadetoboots on the ground,andthisnominalexpressionisaconventionalmetonymyfor‘troops/soldiersontheground’.Themetonymicre-lationshipbetweenthesourceandthetargetmeaningcanbenotatedasin(22):

(22) [BOOTS]S→[MILITArYPErSONWEArING[BOOTS]S]T

Metonymy(22)isasubcaseoftheubiquitousgenericmetonymy(23):

(23) [ATTrIBUTE]S→[PErSONPOSSESSING[ATTrIBUTE]S]T

3.3.2. Predicational metonymies

Predicationalmetonymiesoperateontheverbphraseofsentences.Someex-amplesare:

(24) Ihad to take up residencyinLosAngeles.(25) Kylecould hear thecrashingofglassandmetal.(26) Soonhewasallowed to fly totheUnitedStates,whereheisinexile.

In(24)–(26),someeventoractionthat,literally,ismerelycodedaspotentialisinterpretedasreallyoccurring.Themetonymiesatworkintheseexamplesaregivenin(27),(28),and(29),respectively:

(27) [OBLIGATIONTOACT]S→[[OBLIGATIONTOACT]S&[ACTUALACTION]]T(28) [ABILITYTOHEAr]S→[[ABILITYTOHEAr]S&[ACTUALPErCEPTUALEVENT

OFHEArING]]T(29) [PErMISSIONTOACT]S→[[PErMISSIONTOACT]S&[ACTUALACTION]]T

Metonymies(28)–(29)areinstancesofthehigher-ordermetonymygivenin(30):

(30) [POTENTIALEVENT]S→[[POTENTIALEVENT]S&[ACTUALEVENT]]T

Thismetonymyisextremelyproductiveine.g.EnglishandGerman,butPan-therandThornburg(1999a),whocallthismetonymyPOTENTIALITYFOrACTU-ALITY,showthatitsuseismorerestrictedinHungarian.

3.3.3. Illocutionary metonymies

The third metonymy type can be called ‘illocutionary metonymy’ becauseitoperatesonthespeechactlevel.Theconceptual-pragmaticstructureofil-locutionaryactscanbedescribedintermsofillocutionary frames or,equiva-



lently, speech act scenarios (the latter term was coined byThornburg andPanther1997).Toillustratetheworkingsofillocutionarymetonymy,considerasimplifiedspeechactscenariofordirectivespeechactssuchasrequests(cf.theanalysisofrequestsproposedbySearle1969:67,which,insomerespects,differsfromtheoneproposedhere).

Figure6.Illocutionaryframeofarequest

TheillocutionaryframeinFigure6isorganizedinthefollowingway.TherearephasesorstagesthatareorderedalongthetimeaxisT,witht0designatingthetimeoftheperformanceoftheillocutionaryact,viz.whatisreferredtoastheCOrEinFigure6.TheCOrEisprecededbytheBEFOrE,i.e.conditionsthatshouldbefulfilledforafelicitousperformanceoftheillocutionaryact,e.g.thecondi-tionthatthehearerisabletoperformtheactionrequested,andthementalatti-tudecondition(called‘sinceritycondition’inspeechacttheory)thatthespeakerwantsthehearertoperformtheaction.Theactualperformanceoftheillocution-aryacthastheimmediateeffectthattheheareris(moreorlessstrongly)underanobligationtoperformtheaction(rESULTANTOBLIGATION);andiftheobligationisaccepted,thehearershouldbewillingtoperformtheaction(rESULTANTWILL-INGNESS).Finally,thereisthephaseofsatisfactionoftherequest,i.e.thehearer’sactualimplementationoftheaction,whichisnamedtheAFTErinFigure6.What is thedescriptiveor even explanatoryvalue of assuming a frame orscenarioapproachtospeechacts?Inanutshell,itsstrengthisthatitallowsacognitivelinguisticaccountofwhatSearle(1975)callsindirect speech acts intermsofconceptualmetonymy.Whenperforminganindirectspeechact,thespeakerselectsoneelementfromthecomponentsBEFOrE,rESULTANTOBLIGA-TION,rESULTANTWILLINGNESS,orAFTErasthemetonymicsourceandindoingsoprovidesthehearerwithcuestomentallyaccesstheintendedtargetmean-ing,i.e.theCOrEoftheillocutionaryframe.Thefollowingexamplesillustratethisapproachtoindirectspeechacts:2

BEFOrES→COrET(31) Can/couldyouturnofthelight?(32) Youcanturnoffthelight.



(33) Iwant/wouldlikeyoutoturnoffthelight.

rESULTANTOBLIGATIONS→COrET(34) Youmust/shouldturnoffthelight.

rESULTANTWILLINGNESSS→COrET(35) Wouldyoumindturningoffthelight?

AFTErS→COrET(36) Youwillturnoffthelight.(37) Willyouturnoffthelight?

4. The role of metonymy in semantic-pragmatic conflicts

Inthissection,theimportanceofmetonymyinlanguageisfurtherevidencedby the role itplays in the resolutionof conceptual conflictsbetweenword meaningandconstruction meaning.Whiletheconcept‘word’canbetakenforgranted,itisnecessarytoprovideaworkingdefinitionofthenotionofconstruction.AgoodstartingpointisthebynowclassicaldefinitionproposedbyAdeleGoldberg(1995:4):“CisaCONSTrUCTIONiffdefCisaform-meaningpair<Fi,Si>suchthatsomeaspectofFiorsomeaspectofSiisnotstrictlypredictablefromC’scomponentpartsorfromsomeotherpreviouslyestablishedconstructions.”

In amore recentmonograph,Goldberg (2006: 5) abandons the unpredict-abilityconstraintontheformand/ormeaningofconstructions,butnowtreatsmeaningfulmorphosyntacticpatternsasconstructionsaslongastheyoccurwith “sufficient frequency”. Nevertheless, constructions, i.e. frequently re-curringpatterns, often exhibit idiomatic, i.e. not completely compositional(predictable)meanings,andthisfactisagoodreasonforregardingconstruc-tionsassemioticunitsintheirownright.WeillustratetheconflictbetweenwordmeaningandconstructionmeaningwithwhatPantherandThornburg (1999b,2000)callAction constructions,i.e.constructionsthat,inthedefaultcase,requirereferencetoanactionper-formedbythespeaker,thehearer,orathirdparty.Hereisa(non-exhaustive)listofsuchActionconstructionswithillustrativeexamples(seealsoPantherandThornburg1999b:38–39)(theactionverbisitalicized):

Imperatives(38) Cleanyourdesk.(39) Give meacall.(COCA2014)

What about VING[…]?(40) Whataboutgiving tomycollege?(COCA2014)(41) Whataboutworking fourdaysaweek[…]?(COCA1993)

Infinitive complement clauses requiring action verbs(42) The Conservatives promised to increase NHS funding […].

(COCA2015)(43) Heaskedmetowork forhimattheendof2004.(COCA2015)

2

Obviously,therearesocioculturalfactors,e.g.politeness,thatinfluencehowarequestisco-dedbythespeaker,butadiscussionofsuch

factors isbeyondthescopeof thiscontribu-tion (seee.g.BrownandLevinson1987 forin-depthtreatmentofpoliteness).



Why not VINF […]?(44) Whynottry foranEnglishmajor?(GloWbE)3

(45) Whynotsend robotstoanasteroid?(COCA2011)How to VINF […]

(46) Howtohandletheslopes(COCA2015)[fromagolfmagazine](47) Howtodo thingswithwords.

Somebriefcommentsontheabove-mentionedconstructionsareinorder.Thecommunicativefunctionoftheimperatives(38)–(39)isdirective;thehearerisaskedtoperformafutureaction.AstotheconstructionalschemaWhat about VING […]?,exemplifiedbyutterances(40)and(41),it functionspragmaticallyasasuggestionaboutwhatthehearercoulddooroughttodointhefuture.Infini-tivecomplementclausesheadedbydirectiveverbslikeask (to) orcommissiveverbslikepromise,asin(42)–(43),usuallylicenseanactionverbinthecomple-mentclause.ApotentialfutureactionisalsoreferredtobytheinfinitivalverbintheconstructionWhy not VINF […]?,whichin(44)–(45)hastheillocutionarypo-tentialofastrongsuggestionwiththemeaning‘Thereisno(good)reasonwhytheactiondenotedbyV shouldnotbecarriedout’.Finally, theconstructionHow to VINF […], instantiatedby (46)–(47),expressesanopenproposition,whosevariablepronounhow isspecifiedinthesubsequentdiscourse.Thisconstructionoftenappearsinbooktitlesorheadlinesofmagazinearticles,andthelike.Oncloserinspection,thegeneralizationthattheconstructionsinstantiatedbyexamples (38)–(47) requireverbsdenotingactions, ishowever falsifiedbyauthenticdatasuchas(48)–(69),wheretheverbslotisfilledwithnon-actionverbs:e.g.stativeverbs,suchasbe, have, know,etc.orverbsofchange-of-state,suchasbecome:Imperatives withnon-actionverbs

(48) Knowthyself.(49) Knowwhatisrightandwrong.(COCA2015)(50) Comeon.Doit.Beabiggirl.(COCA2015)(51) Beasweetheartandaskhimtocallme.(COCA2012)(52) Becomeamorevaluedcontributortoyournewteamandthecom-

pany.(COCA2014)(53) BecomearegularTwitteruser.(COCA2013)

What about VING […]?withnon-actionverbs(54) WhataboutlivinginNewYork?(55) What about being pain-free?Able to walk unassisted? (COCA

2007)(56) Whataboutbeing anoceanographer?(COCA1999)(57) ANNOUNCER:Questionsabouthercareerandherfutureplans

WALTERS:Whataboutbeinganambassador?Mrs.THATCHER:Well,I’mnottrainedtobeanambassador.(COCA1991)

(58) Whatabouthaving thepotatointhesteak,insteadofFrenchfriesontheside?(COCA2015)

(59) Whataboutbecomingapoet?(COCA2012)(60) What about becoming more aware of societies’ perceptions of

women?(COCA1991)Infinitive complement clauses withnon-actionverbs

(61) Wherewashe?Hehadpromisedtobehomefordinnertonight.(COCA2015)



(62) [T]hepresidententeredtheSenateandaskedtoknow thereasonsforrejectinghisnomination.(COCA2009)

Why not VINF […] withnon-actionverbs(63) Whynotbe goodcorporatecitizens?(COCA2011)(64) Whynotbe idealistic?(COCA2000)(65) Whynotbelieve them?Theyarethetrafficexperts[…].(COCA

2000)(66) Whynotbecome alifetimesupportingmemberofthesitewitha

one-timedonationofanyamount?(GloWbE)

How to VINF […] withnon-actionverbs(67) Howtobehappy.(COCA2015)(68) Howtobe good.(COCA2001)(69) Howtoknow howmuchtoeat?(COCA2002)

For reasonsof space,we limitouranalysis to twoexamplesofnon-actionverbsinActionconstructions.Considerfirst thewell-knownancientGreekaphorismγνῶθισεαυτόν(gnōthi seauton),whoseEnglishtranslationin(48)isrepeatedin(70):

(70) Knowthyself.

Know is amental-stateverband,given thedirective illocutionary forceofimperatives, a conceptual conflict arisesbetween thepropositional contentof the imperative,which expresses a futureaction to beperformedby theaddresseeofthespeechact,andthestativemeaningoftheverb.Despitethisconceptualdiscrepancy,know canbeusedinimperativesinEnglish;andthisusage isbynomeansexceptional– therearehundredsofexamples in theAmericanEnglishonline corpusCOCA.Howcan these conflictingmean-ings,i.e.theconstructionmeaningandthelexicalmeaningbereconciled?Asimplebutappealingsolutiontothisproblemistointerpretknow asthere-sultantmentalstateofacognitiveaction.Whatisovertlycodedlinguisticallyismerelytheeffectof thismentalaction,viz.know;theactionthatleadstothisresultremainsimplicit.Moregenerally,thereexistsahighlyproductivemetonymicprincipleinEnglishthatcanbenotatedas:

(71) [STATE]S→[ACTIONrESULTINGIN[STATE]S]T

ItisinterestingtocomparetheEnglishtranslationoftheGreekaphorismwithitsrenditioninGerman:

(72) a. Erkennedichselbst.(literally:‘Gettoknowyourself’)b. *Wissedichselbst.(‘literally:‘Knowyourself’)

InGerman,theliteralequivalentofEnglishKnow yourself/thyself asin(72b)isnotpossible(theasteriskmarksunacceptability);insteadamoredynamicpredicatesuchassich selbst erkennen ‘gettoknowoneself’,anACCOMPLISH-MENT(intheterminologyofthelinguisticphilosopherZenoVendler1957)isused,whichexpressesamentalorperceptualaction.Toputitnegatively,themetonymy(71) isnotexploitable,at leastas faras thestativeverbwissen ‘know’ is concerned. The contrast between English and German observedhereisindicativeofthemoregeneralphenomenonofcross-linguisticdiffer-

3

TheabbreviationGloWbE standsforCorpus of Global Web-Based English (1.9 billion

words), a corpus that covers 24 varieties ofEnglish(http://corpus.byu.edu/dialects.asp).



encesintheexploitation ofmetonymy(seee.g.Panther2015andtherefer-encestherein).Asasecondexampleofconceptualconflictbetweenconstructionalmeaningandlexicalmeaning,consider(67), thetitleofabookbyL.Hoggardpub-lishedin2005,whichisrepeatedin(73):

(73) Howtobehappy.

Themeaningof(73)canbeparaphrasedroughlyas‘Theauthoroffershisread-ershipinformationabouthowtheycanachievehappiness’.Figure7diagramstheconceptualclashbetweenthemeaningoftheconstruction,whichdesig-natesanACTIONrtobeperformedbythereaderR,andthemeaningofhappy,i.e.thereader’sprospectivementalstateSTATEr.Theresolutionofthisseman-ticconflictisachievedbyaprocessofaspectualcoercion(seee.g.Michaelis2004);i.e.,theactionalconstructionmeaningcoerces thestativemeaningofhappy intoanACTIONsense.Thefirst step towards this targetmeaning isa(metonymicallyinduced)reinterpretationofhappy asarESULTANTSTATEr.Inthesecondandfinalstep,thisrESULTANTSTATEisinterpretedastheeffectofthereader’sACTIONr(oraseriesofactions).ThistargetmeaningisperfectlycongruentwiththemeaningoftheACTIONsenseoftheconstruction.

Figure7.Metonymiccoercion

Inconclusion,itisimportanttonotethatthepossibilityofharmonizingcon-structionalmeaningandlexicalmeaningisnotjustamatteroflanguage,butrathercruciallydependson the languageusers’ folkorculturalmodels.Asfor happiness, peoplehavedivergent viewsonwhether it canbe achievedintentionallybyaseriesofactionsorwhetherhappiness is“in thegenes”,i.e.astateofmindthatcannotbebroughtaboutdeliberately(seePantherandThornburg2000onthistopic).

5. Metonymy outside language

Inthissection,acaseismadefortheexistenceofcross-modalmetonymies,i.e.metonymiesthatoperatenotonlyinnaturallanguagebutalsoinothersignsystems,suchasthevisualarts(seealsoPanther2005:24–30).Insupportofthisclaim,wepresentaconceptualmetonymythatisatworkinbothlanguage



andthevisualarts.Thismetonymyrelatesthesourcemeaning(PErCEPTUAL)APPEArANCEtothetargetmeaningrEALITY.Itsgroundinginafolkmodelofreasoningishumorouslyexpressedinthefollowingpieceofabductiverea-soning(the“ducktest”(italicsadded):4

(74) Ifitlookslikeaduck,swimslikeaduck,andquackslikeaduck,thenitprobablyisaduck.(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duck_test)

InEnglish,thereexistsaconstructionthatroutinelytriggersthemetonymyAPPEArANCE→rEALITY.TheconstructioniscalledthePercept Subject con-structioninPantherandThornburg(2009:27–28)andisexemplifiedin(75)byapieceofspokendiscoursefromanAmericantelevisionchannel(instanc-esoftheconstructionareitalicized):

(75) Then you can see Kevin’s eyes. He looked worried. He neverlooked scared to me.He looked strong,youknow?He–looked strong to me.(COCA2008)

ThePerceptSubjectconstructionisdiagrammaticallyrepresentedinFigure8.

Figure8.ThePercept Subject constructionanditsmetonymicextension

ThefirstlineoftheupperrectangleofFigure8representsthesyntacticstructure(FOrM)oftheconstruction.Thesecondlineoftheupperrectanglerepresentsthe(literal)meaningoftheconstruction(SOUrCEMEANING),whichisnotatedinasimplifiedpredicatecalculusformat.Linesconnectthesyntacticconstituentstotheirrespectivemeaningcomponents:NP1toPErCEPT,VcoptoPErCEIVE,Adj toPrOPErTY,andtheoptionalprepositionalphraseto NP2toExPErIENCEr.Intheitalicizedpartsof(75),thePErCEPTisthereferentofthepronounhe(=Kevin).Thepredicateconsistsofacopularverbofperception(looks) andanadjective denoting a psychological property (worried, scared, and strong).TheoptionalargumentofthePerceptSubjectconstructionistheExPErIENCErargument,whichiscodedsyntacticallyasto me intwosentences.Ingeneralterms,thesourcemeaninginFigure8expressessomestate-of-af-fairsthatappears tobethecase,i.e.whosefactualityhasnotbeenestablished.Yet,giventhatsensoryexperience,especiallyvisualperception,isanimpor-tantsourceofknowledge,astrongexpectationistriggeredbytheconstructionmeaningthatthePrOPErTYpredicatedofthePErCEPTactuallyholdsinreality,i.e.exists.ThistargetinterpretationisnotatedinthelowerrectangleofFigure

4

Heim(2007:68)attributes this reasoning totheAmerican poet JamesWhitcombe Riley(1849–1916),who issupposed tohavesaid:

“WhenIseeabirdthatwalkslikeaduckandswimslikeaduckandquackslikeaduck,Icallthatbirdaduck.”



8;itisinducedbythemetonymicinferenceAPPEArANCE→rEALITY.Thus,thefollowingmetonymicinferencesholdforsentences(75):5

(76) a. Helooked worried→Heis worriedb. Heneverlooked scared(tome)→Hewas neverscared(inmy

opinion)c. He looked strong→Hewas (mentally)strongd. He–looked strongtome→Hewas (mentally)strong(inmy

opinion)

ThemetonymyAPPEArANCE→rEALITY isalsoexploited in languagesotherthanEnglish.Forexample,thesentenceYou look tired translatesintoGermanasDu siehst müde auswiththevisualperceptionverbaussehen ‘look(like)’, andintoFrenchasTu as l’air fatigué wherethenounair hasthedenotatum‘appearence’.Finally,themetonymyAPPEArANCE→rEALITYalsoplaysanon-negligibleroleoutsidelanguage,e.g.inthevisualarts,asarguedinPanther(2005).Asanexample,considerFigure9,aportraitofa15thcenturyaristocraticwoman,Ginevrade’Benci,paintedbyLeonardodaVinci.

Figure9.LeonardodaVinci:Ginevra de’ Benci (c. 1474/1478) [NationalGallery of Art, Washington, D.C.,NGAImages]

OneInternetsitecharacterizesthepaintingasfollows(italicsadded):

(77) UnlikeLeonardo’sotherportraitsofwomenthisladylookssulky,unforgiving andhaughty;thisisemphasisedbytheslightlysmallercastofoneeye,makingherlookwithdrawn. Herlefteyeseemstogazedirectlyatuswhiletherightlooksbeyondtosomeinvisiblepoint. (…) Maybeherexpression indicates shewasnotentirelyhappy regarding her forthcoming marriage. (http://www.leonar-dodavinci.net/portrait-of-ginevra-de-benci.jsp)

Itisclearthatthewriterregardsthesulky,unforgiving,haughty,andwith-drawn look of the portrayed lady’s face as strong indices that she is actu-allysulky,unforgiving,haughty,andwithdrawn.Furthermore,thesementalstatesandcharactertraitsareassumedtobeindicationsofanotheremotionalstate,viz.thatGinevrais“notentirelyhappyregardingherforthcomingmar-riage”.6

Fromanotheranalyticalperspective, theperceptualattributes listed in (77)canalsobeseenaslinksinacausalchain(seeFigure10).Theauthoroftheportrait observes certain features of Ginevra’s face: for example, she doesnotsmile,herlefteyeisslightlysmallerthanherrighteye,thelatterlooking“beyond [theviewer] to some invisiblepoint”.Thesephysical featuresareperceivedassymptomsofspecificmentalandemotionalstatessuchastheonesdescribedin(77)(sulky,unforgiving,haughty,withdrawn).Fromthereit isonlyone inferentialstep to theconclusion that thesementalstatesare



notjustperceived–theyarereal.Inotherwords,thefacialfeaturesobservedbytheviewerarecaused byunderlyingexistingmentalandemotionalstatesof theportrayed lady.What is atworkhere–both in the interpretationofnaturallanguageconstructionsandofapieceofvisualart–isthehigh-levelmetonymyEFFECT→CAUSE.Whatisperceivableistheeffect;thecausemustbe inferred.Fromthevantagepointof themetonymyEFFECT→CAUSE, thetargetofthemetonymyAPPEArANCE→rEALITYcanbeinterpretedasCAUSE;intheunderlyingfolkmodel,whichisreflectedinbothnaturallanguageandthesemioticsofvisualart interpretation,APPEArANCE isconceivedofascausedbyrEALITY.

Figure10.Fromsymptomstounderlyingcauses:themetonymyEFFECT→CAUSE

6. In lieu of a conclusion

Thefocusofthiscontributionhasbeenonthetwotropesofmetaphorandme-tonymy,which,inCognitiveLinguistics,areregardednotsolelyasfiguresoflanguage,but,equallyimportant,asfiguresofthought.Alongwithothercog-nitivelinguists(e.g.Barcelona2000;Radden2002;PantherandThornburg2007), the present authors consider conceptual metonymy, i.e. associativethinking,asevenmorefundamentalthanmetaphor.Metonymicreasoningisubiquitous innatural language,but,ashasbeenarguedinsection5of thiscontribution,metonymicthinkingisalsooperativeinothersemioticmodes,e.g.intheinterpretationofvisualart.Prima facie, theinterpretationofmetonymiescouldberegardedasakindof“mind-reading”,asunderstoodincognitivepsychology,sincethetargetsenseofametonymyisnotovertlycodedbutisimplied bythespeakerandhasto

5

Notethatforreasonsofsimplicitythesourcemeaning,which,aspointedoutinsection3.3,is a conceptual part of the source meaning(see(10)),hasnotbeenincorporatedintothetargetmeaningofFigure8.

6

Ananonymousreviewerappearstoattributetous the idea thatmetonymyis theonly re-

levant cognitive tool in the interpretationofvisual art.Wedonot claim this, butmerelywanttodemonstrate,bywayofexample,thatmetonymyisoperativeinothersemioticmo-desthanlanguage.Wecompletelyagreewiththe reviewer that the metonymic approachwillnotnecessarilyyieldsatisfactoryresultswithworks fromotherperiodsand/or stylesinthehistoryofthevisualarts.



beinferredbythehearer.AccordingtoDeirdreWilson(2005:386)(seealsoSperberandWilson2002):

“…mind-readingisnotasinglehomogeneousmodulebutasetofspecial-purposemechanismsorsubmodules(…)thesemayincludeadedicatedcomprehensionmechanism,anevolvedmen-tal organ withitsownspecialpurposeprinciplesorprocedures.”

Wehopetohavepresentedsomeevidenceinthiscontributionthatmetonymicreasoningisnota“dedicatedcomprehensionmechanism”,butratheracog-nitive tool, which provides all-purpose inference schemas that are appliedinsideandoutsidelanguage.

Acknowledgments

Thefirstversionofthiscontributionwaspresentedattheinternationalcon-ference25th Days of Frane Petrić onthebeautiful islandofCres(Septem-ber25–28,2016),asymposiumthatthematicallyfocusedonLanguage and Cognition. We would like to thank the Croatian Philosophical Society forgivingustheopportunitytopresentourviewsonCognitiveLinguistics–inparticular,ProfessorMilenaŽicFuchs,whosuggestedusaspresenters,Pro-fessorIgorMikecin,whoinvitedusonbehalfofthePhilosophicalSociety,ProfessorMislavJežić,withwhomwehadstimulatingdiscussionsabouttheroleofmetaphorinVedictextsandwhogaveusgoodadviceonourplannedtriptoIndia,andDr.LjudevitFranJežić,whotookgoodcareofusduringourstayandwasourcontactpersonduringthepublicationprocess.Finally,wearegratefultotwoanonymousreviewersfortheirconstructivecriticismofthefirstdraftofthisarticle,whichwehopehasledtoabetterproduct.Remainingerrorsareofcourseourresponsibility.

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Klaus-Uwe Panther, Linda L. Thornburg

Metafora i metonimija u jeziku i mišljenju: kognitivnolingvistički pristup

SažetakKognitivna lingvistika naziv je koji pokriva raznolike funkcionalističke pristupe istraživanju jezika koji su se pojavili 1970-ih godina i koji dijele stanovite temeljne teorijske i metodolo-ške zasade, od kojih većina nije kompatibilna s teorijom Noama Chomskoga i njenim novijim ograncima. Kognitivna lingvistika razlikuje se od generativne gramatike u tome što: 1) odbacu-je Chomskijevu tvrdnju da je jezična moć urođena, 2) naglašuje semiotički značaj ne samo riječi nego i gramatičkih konstrukcija kao značenjskih jedinica u jeziku, 3) pripisuje važnu kognitivnu i jezičnu ulogu metafori i metonimiji, i 4) tvrdi da su jezične strukture i uporaba (relativno) mo-tivirani pojmovnim i pragmatičkim čimbenicima. Rad se usredotočuje na točke 2), 3) i 4), koje se empirijski potkrjepljuju jezičnim primjerima iz engleskoga.

Ključne riječikognitivna lingvistika,generativnagramatika,gramatičkekonstrukcije, jezik imišljenje,metafora,metonimija,motivacija


Metapher und Metonymie in Sprache und Denken: ein kognitiv-linguistischer Ansatz

ZusammenfassungDer Terminus Kognitive Linguistik (KL) ist ein Sammelbegriff für funktionalistische und kogni-tivistische Sprachtheorien, die in den 1970er-Jahren entstanden und mit der generativen Gram-matik Chomskys und ihrer Weiterentwicklung vielfach unvereinbar sind. Grundannahmen der KL sind u. a.: (i) Die menschliche Sprachfähigkeit ist nicht angeboren, sondern durch das Wir-ken genereller kognitiver Lernmechanismen erklärbar. (ii) Sprachliche Einheiten – einschließ-lich morphosyntaktischer Konstruktionen – sind Zeichen. (iii) Die Metapher und die Metonymie spielen eine zentrale Rolle im Prozess der sprachlichen und kognitiven Bedeutungskonstitution. (iv) Sprachstruktur und Sprachgebrauch sind zumindest partiell motiviert. Der Artikel diskutiert die Punkte (ii), (iii) und (iv), die durch authentische englischsprachige Sprachdaten erläutert und empirisch gestützt werden.

SchlüsselwörterKognitive Linguistik, Generative Grammatik, morphosyntaktische Konstruktionen, Sprache undDenken,Metapher,Metonymie,Motivation

https://doi.org/10.1075/hcp.48




La métaphore et la métonymie dans le langage et la pensée : une approche cognitive

RésuméLa linguistique cognitive (LC) est un ensemble de théories fonctionnalistes et cognitivistes qui ont émergé dans les années 1970 et qui, à de nombreux égards, sont incompatibles avec la grammaire générative. Les hypothèses de base de LC sont, entre autres : (i) LC réfute l’hypo-thèse de Chomsky selon laquelle la faculté du langage est innée. (ii) LC souligne le caractère sémiotique des unités grammaticales, y compris des signes complexes tels que des constructions morphosyntaxiques. (iii) LC considère la métaphore et la métonymie non seulement comme des façons de parler, mais, en outre, comme des figures de pensée. (iv) LC soutient que les structures grammaticales d’une langue sont motivées en grande partie par des facteurs conceptuels et pragmatiques. L’article porte surtout sur les points (ii), (iii) et (iv), qui sont élaborés et illustrés avec des données de langue anglaise.

Mots-cléslinguistiquecognitive,grammairegénérative,constructionsmorphosyntaxiques, langageetpensée,métaphore,métonymie,motivation

metaphor and metonymy in language and thought: a cognitive

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