mental conflict. descartes

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Mental Conict: Descartes

Andr Gombay

Philosophy / Volume 54 / Issue 210 / October 1979, pp 485 - 500

DOI: 10.1017/S0031819100063518, Published online: 30 January 2009

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/

abstract_S0031819100063518

How to cite this article:Andr Gombay (1979). Mental Conict: Descartes. Philosophy, 54, pp 485-500doi:10.1017/S0031819100063518

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Mental Conflict: DescartesANDR GOMBAY

In a famous text Descartes has written this:Whenever the thought of God's supreme power occurs to me, I cannothelp feeling that he might easily, if he so wished, make me go wrongeven in what I think I see most clearly with my mind's eye. On theother hand, whenever I turn to the matters themselves which I thinkI perceive very clearly, I am so convinced by them that I burst out: 'letwho will deceive me, he can never bring it about tha t I should be nothingat the time of thinking that I am something, nor that it be true thatI never existed if it is true that I exist now; nor even that two and threetogether make more or less than five, or any such thing in which I seemanifest contradiction' (AT VII, 36; HR I, 158-159).1

Descartes is reporting in himself incompatible beliefs. Whenever heentertains the thought of God's power, he believes that this God coulddeceive him about any proposition, however obvious; but whenever heactually contemplates one such proposition (e.g. '2 +3= 5'), n e fees s u r ethat he could not be deceived by any God, however powerful. So on thoseoccasions where Descartes entertains one thought, he cannot help believingthatP(whereP= 'a powerful God could deceive me about anything'); andon the occasions where he entertains another thought, he cannot helpbelieving that not-P, or at least believing something that entails not-P, viz.'about thisnobody could deceive m e'. L et me call this an inner conflict, orat least one type of inner conflict: what we have is not one person at onetime divided between two opposite views, but a person at different, andspecifiable-by-himself, times fully committed to each oftwoopposite views.

Such a predicament is not extraordinary, and need not even cause alarmin the person whom it befalls. For instance, we accept inner conflict readilyenough in the field of aesthetic appreciation. If you ask me who, in myopinion, has expressed in music feelings that lie deepest in the human1 References to Descartes' texts are as follows: (a) throughout: Descartes,Oeuvres, C. Adam and P. Tannery (eds), I2vols. (Paris: Vrin, 1897-1911);referredto asAT,followedbyvolume-, andpage-,numeral;(b) whereapplicable:(i) Descartes,PhilosophicalW orks,E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (eds),2vols.(London: Cambridge University Press, 1911); referred to as HR; (ii) Descartes,PhilosophicalLetters,A. Kenny (ed.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970); referredto as K; (iii) Descartes,Conversation withBurtnan,J. Cottingham (ed.) (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1976); referred to as C.

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heart, I might reply that whenever I listen to his Clarinet Quintet I amconvinced that it is Mozart, and whenever I hear the Agnus Dei of theB-Minor Mass, I am persuaded that it is Bach. A person can adopt towardsuch a conflict a detached, spectatorial, attitude and make no attempt toresolve it one way or the other; but this spectatorial attitude essentiallygoes, I think, with his being able, prospectively or retrospectively, to viewhis own conflicting beliefs as mental affections or afflictions that is to sayview them as ways in which his mind is affected according to circumstance,and so not regard them as beliefs to be assessed for their intellectualpedigree.

Of course Descartes conflict is more serious, or at least he takes it moreseriously. non-philosophical parallel ofhissituation occurs in Strindberg splay The Father.Adolf the hero, believes that women, all women, areinfinitely deceitful, and can feign love for a man when in fact they feel none.Given this, and given well-known facts of human physiology, it follows thatno man can ever know for certain that the child whom he takes to be hisnatural daughter, really is his daughter. Now true enough, Adolf acknowl-edges that at various moments in his conjugal life he has been unable toresist the conviction that his wife loved him; and for all he knows, in thefuture he may again at times be unable to resist; but Adolf reflects that hisinability to doubt his wife on such occasions can be taken as yet one furtherproof of wom en s imm ense ability to deceive. So in the end Adolf comm itssuicide (and here, of course, the parallel with Descartes comes to an endsince, as we all know, Descartes attempt had a happier outcom e). I shallnone the less remain for a while with my Strindbergian analogue, becauseI think it will enable me to set out vividly what is involved in a mentalconflict of this kind and in its solution, if indeed it can be resolved.First of all, in order to describe the predicament properly, we mustindividuate the thoughts of a man according to their temporaloccurrence.In this situation we have three episodes, or series of episodes: (i) the time,or times, of passion when Adolf is unable to distrust his wife; (2) the time,or times, of doubt when Adolf has the conviction of infinite feminine guile;and finally (3) the time, or times, when there is neither passion nor despair,and when Adolf simply reports the conflict and a ttempts to resolve it. Nowif you turn to the text of Descartes which I quote at the beginning, you willnotice that these temporal discriminations are very accurately marked.

Descartes begins: whenever quoties] the thought of God s supreme poweroccurs to me . . . etc. ; he goes on : on the other hand, w henever quotiesvero] I tu rn to the m atters themselves . . . etc. ; finally, Descartes reportof the conflict occurs itself at a definite, more detached, moment, namelythe beginning ofMeditationThree and Descartes marks this by saying: Imust at the first opportunity quamprimum occurret occasio] examine if thereis a God and, ifso, if he can be a deceiver; for w ithout knowing this, it doesnot seem to me th at I can be certain of anything else .486


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So: to describe Adolf's (and Descartes') mental conflict, different timesmust be assigned to different thoughts. But now there arises a question. Itis unnatural to suppose that men have no memory of their past thoughtsand convictions even when they are in the grip of a contrary conviction. Soat the very moment when Adolf believes that no man can ever be certain ofbeing loved by his wife, he is likely to remember moments when he nonethe less did feel certain of her. Of course we could suppose that the intensity

amtheard:toillyewsayce, of the present despair erases in Adolf all memory of the past, but that seemsual unrealistic. What is the present Adolf, who is racked by doubts, to say of

his past feelings of confidence, which he still remembers? It seems to me)re that he has basically three options, (a) He may choose to distrust hisg's recollection: true, he now thinks that at earlier times he was sure, but hisire memory may be playing him tricks. Or (b) he may choose to doubt not hisie. memory, but the constancy of human affections: wives may love you at onelat instant, and yet betray you the next; so you can never trust them. Oriis finally (c) Adolf may choose to doubt neither memory nor constancy, butA- simply hold that his earlier trust in his wife was misplaced when it occurred:to yes, he was certain of his wife but that certainty was even then misguided,he Let me call these three doubts respectively the doubt of one's memory, theiis doubt of the constancy of truth, and the doubt of one's certainty; and leter me transpose my earlier question from Adolf to Descartes: which, amongts these, is Descartes' scepticism when he entertains the thought of a deceitfulid God yet presumably also remembers having held about certain propositionsill that they were true, no matter what? Does he doubt his memory, these constancy of truth, or the worth of his certainty? Of course he might doubtal on all three counts; still, I ask, which is the primary and most important

doubt? This is an exegetical problem, with whose intricacies I do not intendst to detain the reader. I align myself with those commentators (notablye. Anthony Kenny2 and Harry Frankfurt3) who have argued that Descartes'2, doubt is not of the first kind: what he doubts is not his memory. Does he5, then believe, when he doubts, that perhaps truth does not stay put?

Granted, he did intuit yesterday that in a right-angled triangle the squarer, on the base was equal to the squares on the sides; but this is perhaps no

longer true today. The ascription of this doubt to Descartes rests onII evid ence th at isent i re ly indirec t , an d hast o dowi th th e doc t r in eofth e free

creat ion by Go d of th e e te rna l t ru ths . Notor i ous ly , D escar te s he ld t ha tr necessary t r ut hs we re f reely create d by Go d, hen ce no t necessar i ly necessary.s 'Even ifG od has wi l led tha t som e t ru th s should benecessary, th is do esnott mea n tha t hewi l led th em necessar i ly ; for it isone t h in g towil l that t heybef necessary, andqui te an o the r towil l th em necessar i ly , or to be necessi ta ted

2 A. Kenny, Descartes (New York: Random House, 1967), 187-189.3 H. G. Frankfurt , Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), 160-162.487


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to will them' (Letterto M esland, 2 May 1644, A T IV , 115, K 151). What conis more, necessary tru ths are e ternal only because God wills them to be of1such. Sothe argument goessomeone ignorant of the existence of God, attihence ignorant of the free creation by God of the necessary truths , is also stabereft of the comfort of knowing that these tru ths endure . Now this view inaof the doubt has been championed by a number of scholars, following ev


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at confident that his wife loves him. He now attempts to relieve himself of one>e of these beliefs, the belief in the boundless guile of women. I hold that thisi, attempt must proceed from one oftwoopposite hypotheses. The man m ightio start from the position of Strindberg 's Adolf, who regards his occasionalw inability to &tr us t his wife as simply a sign of hum an weakness, or perhapsg even as a further sign of women's immense ability to deceive. Here thew intellectually reputable belief is the belief of constant deception, and theo man seeks disconfirmation of the belief. On the other hand, we mighth conceive the opposite starting poin t: the man might be in the position ofg the husband who goes to his psychoanalyst and complains that even thougha heknows full well that his wife loves him, he periodically becomes convincede that she is putting arsenic into his coffee. Here it is the inability to prevent>t oneself from having these thoughts of uxorial treachery which is taken to bethe mental affliction. In one case, the weakness is the inability to retainsteady in one's mind the conviction that women cannot be trusted, in theother, it is the inability to retain steady the conviction of one's wife's love.Let me put my thesis a little more abstractly. I can offer noproof, butcontend that a man who attempts to resolve a mental conflict of the kind

experienced by Descartes must, as he sets out, make some estimate of therationality of his conflicting beliefs. Which does he regard as a mental3 affection (or affliction), that is to say as a way in which he cannot helpt feeling in certain circumstances; and which does he view as rational (arrivedat, or buttressable, by reasons), and in that sense as intellectually respect-able?There is one feature of this distinction which I am keen to stress. Toview, prospectively or retrospectively, a belief of oneself as a mentalaffection, is not the same as to hold that this belief is false, and converselyto view it as intellectually respectable is not the same as to hold it true.When I hear Bach'sAgnus Dei,I can no more help being overcome by theconviction that here indeed is the most sublime music than I can help theshivers running down my spine; yet the conviction may be correct all thesame. Adolf may take his despair to be rational yet hope it mistaken.

So we should ask: what is Descartes ' assessment of his conflicting beliefsas he sets out to resolve the conflict between them? Which does he view asa mental affliction, and which as the offspring of rationality? Is his inability,once he has become convinced of a mathematical truth, to remain steadyin that conviction the human weakness to be remedied by a proof of God'sveracity, or on the contrary is the weakness his inability to go on doubtingonce the thought of a mathematical proposition comes clearly before hismind? In my conjugal examples the assessments were clear: Strindberg'sAdolf does not go to the psychoanalyst, and my candidate for analysis doesnot go to the detective agency. My question is this: at the beginning ofMeditation Threeis Descartes in the position of Adolf, or in that of thepatient of the psychoanalyst? Does he view as intellectually respectable hisdoubt, or his certainty?489


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The question is important because its answer affects the objection which ingone wishes to level at Descartes' resolution. To resolve his quandaryheautlwishes to prove the existence ofatruthful God . But now suppose thatwhatis removed by thisproof, the fear that a supreme deceiver might exist,issomething which was viewed by Descartes as a mental affliction, thenonewill object that Descartes should not attach great intellectual value to theachievement. To put it crudely, all that he will have removed is a certainneurosis in himself; intellectually, the atheist (= the man who does notbelieve in any God, let alone non-deceiving) is in no worse position thanthe believer. This is the objection, often made to Descartes, that an atheistmay have knowledge of m athem atics; it proceeds from attributing to himoneassessment ofhismental conflict, namely the view that the intellectuallyreputable state is the inability to doubt a clearly perceived mathematicalproposition. Suppose on the other hand tha t we ascribe to Descartes theopposite starting point. Suppose we ascribe to him the view that thesecertainties, which he cannot help feeling, are none the less not intellectuallyreputable; then one will object that for Descartes the proof of God'sexistence cannot succeed. For its steps will be, at best, propositions whichhe cannot doubt while conducting theproof;hence propositions whichhemust prospectively find unacceptable since he prospectively knows thathewill be able later on to suppose that he might have been deceived abouttheir truth by a malignant God. For the proof to succeed Descartes mustview its future steps as intellectually reputable ; and for himsoto view them,the proof must already have succeeded. This, as is well known, is a chargeof circularity.

Both charges were made to Descartes himself, and both have beenextensively studied by scholars, the second more than the firstas is under-standable, since it is more damaging. I t is worth pointing out, however, thatthey are so to speak the opposite faces of the same coin: they proceed fromattributing to Descartes opposite assessments of the mental conflict whichthe proof of the existence of God is designed to resolve. In this conflict atleast one belief must be taken by Descartes as pure mental affliction. Iftheaffliction is his inability to remain certain, there is no philosophical need toprove that God exists, though this may have a certain therapeutic value.On the other hand, if the affliction is the inability to go on doubting, thereis no possibility of proving that God exists, since any proof will proceedthrough the prover's accepting something that he is unable to doubt, hencedisqualified fromaccepting.Sothe proofiseither unnecessary or impossible.Differently: Descartes is in the position of either my analytic patient orStrindberg's Adolf. However, the patient requires not proof but therapy;and Adolf will accept nothing as aproof.Such are the objections, which I shall name respectively the objectionof the possibility of atheist science ('the proof is otiose'), and the objectionof the impossibility of theist science ('the proof is circular'). Itisan interest-

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ing fact that both objections were first made in print by the same person, theauthor of theSecond Set ofObjections:

hatSince you are not yet certain of the existence of God, and what is more,according to your own statement, cannot be certain of anything or knowanything clearly and distinctly unless you already know certainly andclearly that God exists, it follows that you cannot know clearly anddistinctly that you are a thinking thing, since according to you thatknowledge depends on the clear knowledge of God's existence, the proofof which you have not reached when you conclude that you clearly knowwhat you are.

Take this also that while an Atheist knows clearly and distinctly thatthe three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, yet he is farfrom believing in the existence of God; in fact he denies it (AT VII,124-125; HRII, 26).To which objection is the Descartes ofMeditationThreemore vulnerable ?

If he is like the analytic patient, he should parry the charge about theAtheist; if like Adolf, the charge about the Cogito. On reading the fineprint of our initial text, we might incline to the second alternative. WhenDescartes reflects on God's supreme power he 'can't help admitting'[non

: ssnetheainnotlan:istimillycal:he;selly schheheu t possum nonfateri] tha t this G o d might deceive h i minany th i ng : th i s soundsi s t like the r epo r t of a reasoned belief. On the o ther hand , when Descar tesn> turns hism i n d to th ema t te r s them se lves , he is 'soconvinced bythem tha tS e [he] burst[s] out [tam plane ab Mispersuadeor, ut sponte erumpam in has

voces] , let who will deceive me . . . etc. ' This sounds more like the; n report of an affliction. Still, it would be unwise to rest much weight on suchr slender evidence.a t Fortunately we need not do this, because in his Reply Descartes putm forward a doctrine which he took to be an answer to both objections. I hold; n thisReplyto be crucial because, as well as being Descartes' first answer, ita* is also his last: on all subsequent occasions where he is confronted withi e either objection, he either reiterates the doctrine presented here or refers0 his objector (as for instance Arnauld [AT VII, 245-246; HR II, 114-115])e- back to this text. Here it is, quoted at some length:

ed . . . as soon as we think that we rightly perceive something, we spon-:e taneously persuade ourselves that it is true. Now if this conviction is so

strong that we can never have a reason to doubt that of which we haveconvinced ourselves, there is nothing further to inquire: we have allthat can rationally be required. What does it matter to us if perchancesomeone should feign that that of whose truth we are so firmly convinced

a. appears false to God or to an Angel, and hence is, absolutely speaking,1 false? What heed would we pay to that absolute falsity, since we should

not believe it in any way, or even in the least entertain its existence? For491


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we have assumed a conviction so strong that nothing can remove it, andthat conviction is clearly the same as the most perfect certainty[perfectissima certitudo.].But it may be doubted whether there is any such certainty, whethersuch firm and immutable conviction ex is ts .. . If it does, it can resideonly in matters which are clearly perceived by the intellect.Among these, some are so clear and so simple that we cannot thinkof them without believing them to be true, e.g. that I while I think exist,that what is once done cannot be undone, and other similar truth s aboutwhich we clearly possess this certainty. For we cannot doubt them unlesswe think of them, but we cannot think of them without believing themto be true. Hence we cannot doubt them without at the same timebelieving them to be t ru e; hence we can never doubt t h e m . . . Again itdoes not matter if someone feigns th at these appear false to God or to anAngel, because the evidence of our perception will not permit us to hearaudiamus] such fictions.

There are other matters which are also perceived most clearly by ourintellect when we attend sufficiently closely to the reasons on which ourknowledge of them depends, and at that time we cannot doubt them ; b utsince we can forget those reasons and yet remember the conclusionsdeduced from them, the question arises whether we can entertain thesame firm and immutable certainty about these conclusions while werecollect tha t they were deduced from evident principles . . . I reply thatthose possess it who, thanks to their knowledge of God, realize that thefaculty of understanding which was given to them by God must tendtoward the tru th ; but that this certainty is not shared by others AT V II,144-146; HR II, 41-43).What is remarkable in this doctrine is not so much a) the thesis thatabout some propositions all men have perfect certainty, nor even b) thethesis that about some other propositions only believers can have perfectcertainty, bu t c) the notion ofperfectissima certitudowhich is invoked.Perfect certainty is certainty that is firm and immutable. I shall discussfirmness later; for the moment, consider only immutability. According toDescartes, a proposition is perfectly certain nowonly if I cannot doubt itnow, but more important, only if there will never be a moment at which

I can doubt it, or at least never a moment at which I cannot remove at onceany doubt that I might entertain aboutit If I can sustain a doubt tomorrow,then I am not perfectly certain today. M en have sometimes thought of lovein this way: Abelard loves truly now, because he will love Heloise all hislife.More dubiously, we might also think of health in this fashion. I mightsay: my heart is perfectly hale now, if that heart will remain hale as long asI live. It follows of course that a man is not the last judge of his perfectcertainties: he may be certain of something now and believe that he will9


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and never stop being certain, yet be mistaken in tha tbelief.It also seems proper:tis- to distinguish, as Descartes does in theReply,between two kinds of perfectcertainties, the immediate and the derived: the first are of propositionsher which can never be entertained without being believed (e.g. 'I while I thinkside exist'); the second, of propositions which through reasoning become certainat some point (e.g. Pythagoras's Theorem) and then never cease being such,ink Likewise, there is love at first sight, and love that is grown in to, and thenist, never relinquished.Jut Armed with this conception, Descartes can now answer on both fronts,ess To the charge that the atheist, too, can have knowledge of mathematics,sm Descartes replies that this knowledge will be very much more restricted inne scope than the believer's, because (a) perfect certainty (not jus t certainty)iit is required for true knowledge, or scientia, and (b) the atheist is by andan large confined to his immediate perfect certainties. The first part of this:ar reply, thatperfectissima certitudois required for scientia, is a thesis whichwith some variation in terminologyruns throughout Descartes' v/ork. Itur appears in theFifth M editation (At V II , 70 ; HR I, 184), in theReplyto theur SecondSet of Objections, a few paragraphs before the long text which I haveut just quoted (A T VII, 141 ; HR II , 39), and most clearly in a Letter tois Regius, 24 May 1640 (AT III , 64; K 73-7 4):

You say that the truth of axioms which are clearly and distinctly con-ceived is self evident. This, I agree, is true during the time they areclearly and distinctly conceived because our m ind is of such a nature that, it cannot help assenting to what it clearly conceives. But because we oftenremember conclusions that we have derived from such premisses withoutactually attending to the premisses, I say that in such a case if we lackknowledge of God, we can pretend that they are uncertain even thoughwe remember that they were deduced from clear principles; because per-haps our nature is such thatwe gowrong even in the most evident matters.Consequently, even at the moment when we deduced them from thoseprinciples we did not have scientific knowledge {scientia of them, butonly a conviction{persuasio of them. I distinguish the two as follows:There ispersuasio when there remains some reason which might lead usto doubt; butscientiaispersuasiobased on an argument so strong that itcan never be shaken by any stronger argument.

The important sentences are the last two. Descartes says: even at the timewhen the atheist deduced his theorem and was certain ofit,he did not havescientia, because there existed then an argument which might later (oncethe steps of the deduction were forgotten) overturn that certainty. It doesnot matter if that argument never strikes the atheist, it is enough that it bepossible that it should strike him. So atheistic science is by and largeconfined to the stock of immediate and unshakeable certainties owned byevery man. Of course, there might occur small individual variations: an49


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atheist geometer might become so fluent in the proof of Pythagoras sTheorem that he can never entertain the theorem without the proof. His |science will then extend to that But given human mental capacity, suchfluency cannot be pushed very far; to the atheist, the bulk of knowledgeis |a Sisyphean goal. The believer is in an altogether different position. Heknows tha t the faculty of understanding which was given to [him] by Godimust tend towards the tru th . So, to remain certain of Pythagoras sTheorem, he need only remember that he once understood how it wasproved.

Such is the doctrine ofperfectissima certitudo;such th e reply to theobjection that atheist science is possible. But the same doctrine will alsoenable Descartes to answer the opposite charge, that theist science isimpossible (or that his argument for God s existence is circular). Whereofa man is certain, thereof he cannot doubt; and whereof always certain,thereof never doubt. Suppose two things:Suppose that there is a proof that a truthful God exists, a proof such thateach step, while entertained, is certain. It does not m atter how many axiomsare required, how many steps, how long it takes the mind to run throughthem all; each step, while entertained, cannot help but be believed. If thereis such aproof a man can become certain that God exists and does notdeceive.

Well, there is such a proofin the Third Meditation On this point, the onversationwith Burman is instructive. Burman wondered whether a mancould continuetoattendtothe axioms, hence continuetobe certain, throug h-out the demonstration:Our mind can think of only one thing at a time, whereas the proof inquestion is a fairly long one involving several axioms. Then again, everythought occurs instantaneously, and there are many thoughts which cometo mind in theproof.So one will not be able to keep the attention on allthe axioms, since one thought will get in the way of another.

Descartes replied:First, it is just not true that the m ind can think of only one thing at a time.It is true it cannot think of large number of things at the same time, b utit can still think of more than one thing .... Secondly, it is false thatthought occurs instantaneously; for all my acts take up time, and I canbe said to be continuing and carrying on with the same thought duringa period of time .... Therefore, it is clear that we are able to behold[complecti] in its entirety the proof of God s existence. As long as we areengaged in this process, we are certain that we are not being deceived,and every difficulty is removed (AT V, 148-149; C 6-7).

So, a man can become certain that God exists and does not deceive. Still,you will object, this is only certainty, not knowledge: for the latter some-


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thing further is required, namely perfect (immutable) certainty. We canimagine Adolf conducting a proof in his wife s arms and reaching theconclusion th at she can, after all, be trus ted in everything. Alas, his certaintynever survives the cruel light of dawn. Similarly, will Th ursday s proveriKftViavea relapse, and say to himself on F riday : Yes, I was sure yesterdaythax* a truthful God existed, but how do I know tha t I was not being trickedyesterday by a deceiving God? ? If this relapse can occur, the believer has,not escaped Sisyphus fate. However:

Suppose that the certainty of G od s existence, once acquired throughdemonstration, is something which then can never belost It simply endures.In that event, perfect certainty is attainable, andscienti also.Well, such is precisely the caseaccording to Descartes. The convictionof God s existence and integrity, once achieved, rem ains, provided onlythat there remains a memory of its achievement. This crucial thesis isasserted in theFifth Meditation (AT V II, 7 0; HR I, 184), and most clearlyin theLetter to Regius, 24 May 1640 (A T I I I , 64, K 74), immediately afterthe sentences which I quoted two pages ago:

A man who has once understood the arguments which prove that Godexists and is not a deceiver, provided that he remembers the conclusionGod is no deceiver , whether or not he continues to attend to thearguments for it, will continue to possess not only the conviction, butrealscienti of this.

So God s integrity can be known, and the circle escaped.What do I think of these answers? First, I think, we should marvel atDescartes ingenuity. His very attempt to prove God s existence invites twocharges, and it looks as though he cannot answer them both. For theattempt proceeds from a quandary which compels him to give intellectualweight either to his certainties or to his doubts. If he does the former, theproof appears unnecessaryexcept perhaps as an exercise in auto-therapy;if the latter, the proof appears impossibleexcept perhaps as an achieve-ment in self-hypnosis. Yet in answer to the two charges Descartes offersa single doctrine which stands as Janus in his temple, facing both ways. Itenables him to claim tha t even if the doubt is given no intellectual weight,the proof of God s integrity is required; and that even if the certainties aregiven no weight, the proof is possible. Thi s is the doctrine ofperfectissimacertitudo. Descartes invites us to regard certainty as a condition stretchingout over time, as perhaps we view love or health. Where there is noimmutability, there is no genuine certainty. So D r Knock s d ictum : touthomme bienportant est un m l de qui s ignore applies very properly to theatheist. If it is argued, as by the Sixth Objectors, that an atheist is evenless likely to entertain the thought of a deceitful God, Descartes will reply: the more impotence he assigns to the author of his being, the more reason

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he will have to wonder whether he is not by nature such as to be deceivedin what seems most evident to him' (AT VII, 428; HR 245). So the proof|of God 's integrity is required by all. On the other hand , it is also accessible[to any. Once a man has become convinced that God is no deceiver, this


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ordinary derived kind, for this would generate a regress. Derived certaintiesdepend for their survival on the knowledge that God exists; so a man whohad proved God s existence could continue to be certain of this only if healready knew, hence was perfectly certain, that God existed; and for thatto be the case, he would already have to know, hence be perfectly certain,that God existed; and so on. So we have here an acquired certainty whichsurvives through the mere memory of its acquisition. Why should this beso? On Descartes own admission (vide onversation with Burmari theproof of G od s existence is long and unobvious; surely a man can rem emberits conclusion without recollecting all its steps. Normally this situationopens the door to doubts; here, it does not. Why should memory, in thisone instance, have the remarkable power of sustaining certainty? What ismore, the same kind of problemthough in an opposite direction attendsDescartes account of his initial predicam ent. Le t us retu rn toMeditationThree, and let us take seriously the thesis that some propositions cannot beentertained without being believed. When Descartes entertains 2 + 3 = 5 ,he cannot help assenting. Later, he thinks of an all-powerful God, andbelieves that this G od could deceive him about anything. We must supposethat at this later moment, either Descartes no longer remembers having hadthe earlier thought, or that remembering having had the thought does notinvolve having it again; for if it did, Descartes would again exclaim: Le twho will deceive me, he cannot bring it about tha t . . . e tc. So for theconflict to occur, Descartes must either forget, or remember without enter-taining. Both alternatives are unattractive. Why should he forget? Whyshould remembering that he had the thought that 2 + 3 was 5not be a caseof thinking that2 + 3 is 5 ? So it looks as though Descartes both expects toolittle and demands too much from human memory. For his conflicts toarise, the memory of having entertained the most simple truths mustsometimes fall short of actually entertaining these truths; for his conflictto be resolved, the mem ory of having once proved a complicated t ruth mustforever have the same impact as actually proving that truth.

Still, we might say: the problem here lies not with memory, but withwhatis supposed tobe remem bered. After all, the requirements of Descartesaccount are met well enough by my examples. Remember, two things areneeded for a Descartes-type conflict to arise: (a) that it be between twobeliefs each of whichsaturatesthe mind of the believer: each, when actuallyheld, blocks out the other (for otherwise they could coexist); (b) that con-versely mere mem ory ofoneof these beliefs does not have the same saturatingquality as the belief itself (for otherwise, that memory could not coexistwith the other belief). And for the conflict to disappear, something musteventually occur in the person so definitive that it prevents one of thewarring beliefs from ever taking hold again. Well, passionate love or musicalrapture can perhaps satisfy all these requirements. As I hear the clarinetsubside quietly at the close of M ozart s Quinte t, thoughts of Bachian

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supremacy simply cannot in tru de ; and Adolf in h is wife s arm s cannot beitouched by doubt. Love and musical enjoyment also display the requisitegap between actual experience and its recollection: I can remember enchant-ment at a performance of the Clarinet Quintet without feeling enchanted1now; and passion remembered is not passion relived. Finally, in the caseof love or m usic, we can also envisage a Cartesian resolution of the conflict.1I might hear a performance of the B-Minor Mass so sublime as to settleonce and for all the question of musical pre-eminence; Adolf m ight achieve*serenity not perhaps at one memorable instant of his life but gradually,through reaching an inner peace so profound tha t thoughts of uxorial deceit*can no longer impinge. The question is: can we recognize these features inthe certainties that make up Cartesian scientia for instance the certainty^that +3 is 5, or the certainty about the square on the hypotenuse, or thecertainty that the heavens are fluid (there is a good list of them at the endof thePrinciples AT IX, 324; HR I, 302)?

Without further discussion, let us accept Descartes claim aboutpotency of the proof tha t God exists, by viewing that proof on the modelofthe sublime m usical experience: perhaps mere remembrance is sufficient to

mental conflict. descartes

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