memory and democracy misztal

8/22/2019 Memory and Democracy Misztal

1/20

http://abs.sagepub.com/American Behavioral Scientist

http://abs.sagepub.com/content/48/10/1320The online version of this article can be found at:

DOI: 10.1177/00027642052770112005 48: 1320American Behavioral Scientist

Barbara A. MisztalMemory and Democracy

Published by:

http://www.sagepublications.com

can be found at:American Behavioral ScientistAdditional services and information for

http://abs.sagepub.com/cgi/alertsEmail Alerts:

http://abs.sagepub.com/subscriptionsSubscriptions:

http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navReprints:

http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navPermissions:

http://abs.sagepub.com/content/48/10/1320.refs.htmlCitations:

at LUND UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES on March 5, 2011abs.sagepub.comDownloaded from
http://abs.sagepub.com/http://abs.sagepub.com/http://abs.sagepub.com/http://abs.sagepub.com/content/48/10/1320http://abs.sagepub.com/content/48/10/1320http://www.sagepublications.com/http://abs.sagepub.com/cgi/alertshttp://abs.sagepub.com/cgi/alertshttp://abs.sagepub.com/subscriptionshttp://abs.sagepub.com/subscriptionshttp://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navhttp://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navhttp://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navhttp://abs.sagepub.com/content/48/10/1320.refs.htmlhttp://abs.sagepub.com/content/48/10/1320.refs.htmlhttp://abs.sagepub.com/content/48/10/1320.refs.htmlhttp://abs.sagepub.com/http://abs.sagepub.com/http://abs.sagepub.com/http://abs.sagepub.com/http://abs.sagepub.com/content/48/10/1320.refs.htmlhttp://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navhttp://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navhttp://abs.sagepub.com/subscriptionshttp://abs.sagepub.com/cgi/alertshttp://www.sagepublications.com/http://abs.sagepub.com/content/48/10/1320http://abs.sagepub.com/


2/20

Memory and Democracy

BARBARA A. MISZTAL

University of Leicester, United Kingdom

This article reconstructs and evaluates prevalent assumptions in the li terature about links

betweencollectivememory anddemocracy. There arewidespread assertionsthat memory is

important for democratic community to achieve its potential, avoid dangers of past crimes,

and secure its continuation. These assertions assume collective memory as a condition for

freedom, justice, and the stability of democratic order. This article considers these assump-

tions with equally popular counterpropositions, arguing that memory presents a threat to

democratic community because it can undermine cohesion, increase the costs of coopera-

tion, and cause moral damage to civil society by conflating political and ethnic or cultural

boundaries. The relationship between memory and democracy is discussed, along with the

intermediatenotions of identity, trauma, andritual. Thearticle concludesthat what matters

for democracys health is not social remembering per se but the way in which the past is

called up and made present.

Keywords: memory; democracy; past wrongdoings; forgetting

This article reconstructs and evaluates some prevalent assumptions about

links between collective memory and democracy. Looking at various theories

about the role of collective memory in the functioning of democratic systems, it

appears there are widespread assertions that memory is important for demo-

craticcommunity for three reasons: to guarantee justice, to achieve itspotential,

and to secure its continuation. Equally popular are counterpropositions arguing

that memory presents a threat to democratic community because it can under-

mine cohesion, increase the costs of cooperation, and cause moral damage to

civil society by conflating political and ethnic or cultural boundaries. Social

analysis is challenging,even more so when using slippery labelssuch as democ-

racy and collective memory. Such indeterminism entails a fundamental plural-

ism of meanings as captured by Gallies (1955) notion of essential contest -

ability. Freeden (1997) observed that the intension of any political concept

contains more components than anyparticular instancecanhold at a giventime

(p. 749). Collective memory is also a concept defined and interpreted in many

different ways, so memory and democracy in onesentence mayseem confusing,

particularly when combined with discussions about identity, solidarity, guilt,trauma, freedom, justice, and stability.

1320

AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Vol. 48 No. 10, June 2005 1320-1338

DOI: 10.1177/0002764205277011

2005 Sage Publications

http://abs.sagepub.com/http://abs.sagepub.com/http://abs.sagepub.com/http://abs.sagepub.com/


3/20

The proliferation of the debate about the relationships between memory and

democracy reflects thegrowing popularity of thenotionof memoryin academicdiscourse. The significance of memories for historical and social inquiries has

increased due in part to the cultural turns proposition that history, as another

form of narration, does not have any particular claims to truth and by the

interactionist approachs use of biography in understanding our lives. Conse-

quently, from the end of the 1980s, we have witnessed the spread of studies of

collective memory, seen as part of cultures meaning-making apparatus

(Schwartz, 2000, p. 17). This extraordinary increase in theinterestin memoryas

a subject for study in the humanities and social sciences has been fuelled by

developments such as therevival of fierce debates concerning theHolocaust and

the Vichy regime and the impressive number of civic anniversariesfrom the

U.S. bicentennial to the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II (Ashplant,

Dawson, & Roper, 2001; Kammen, 1995).

Defining collective memory as a social fact has been challenging for social

scientists not only because conceptualizations of collective memory have com-

plex relations with myth and history but also because collective memory is seen

as performing many functions, operating on many different levels, and is

assigned multiple meanings. The difficulty of defining collective memory, or

memory in other forms, is magnified further by the fact that things that we

remember individually are of many different kinds and we remember them for

different, individual, reasons. For example, we can talk about autobiographical

memory, cognitive memory, habitual memory, and collective or social memory,

which is our main concern here. Collectivememory is social in originand influ-

enced by dominant discourses, but memory is also the faculty of individual

minds. Although it is the individual who remembers, remembering is more than

a personal act, as even themost personal memories areembedded in social con-

text andshapedby socialfactorsthat make socialrememberingpossible, such as

language, rituals, andcommemoration practices. This is themain assumption of

the intersubjective sociology of memory, which sees the individual as the agent

of remembering and argues the nature of what is remembered is profoundly

shaped by a what has been shared with others so that what is remembered is

always a memory of an intersubjective past of past time lived in relation to

other people (Misztal, 2003, p. 6). So, although the act of remembering feels

like a highly personal act, collective memory is a kind of socially accepted

currency, which we have all learnt.

In themid-1990s, the focus on collective memory shifted; not just anymem-

ory but traumatic memory attracted the attentionof a growing number of schol-

ars. Assigningnew value to traumaticmemory, in a society without living mem-

ory (Nora, 1996) and in a society that encourages people to search for theirauthentic identities, resulted in an enhancement of the sacred status of memory

or the sacralization of memory (Misztal, 2004). This shift raised concerns such

as, Did the ethical burden prompted by viewing memory as the surrogate of the

soul and the possible overrating of the role of identity politics result in the

Misztal / MEMORY AND DEMOCRACY 1321



4/20

displacementof publicconcernswith privateones?Andwhat kind of memoryis

compatible with just, pluralist, and cohesive democracies?The issue of the nature of relationships between memory and democracy

entered public debates partly because of political apologies for past

wrongdoings, for example, the Popes apologies to Jews and to Aboriginals;

Japans prime minister apologizing for his countrys World War II crimes; an

apology from the Canadian prime minister to Canadas indigenous population;

an apology from thePolish prime ministerto Ukrainians; theU.S. governments

apology and compensation to American citizens of Japanese descent for their

internment during World War II; and notably, Australian Prime Minister John

Howards refusal to apologize to Australian Aboriginals, resulting in Austra-

lians establishing an annual Sorry Day. Hence, we witness the emergence of

new political rituals, which are concerned with the stains of the past, with self-

disclosure, and with ways of re-remembering once taboo and traumatic events.

Warner (2003) viewed apology as a secularized ritual and argued it grows out

of identity politics and its particular aspect of victimhood (p. 11). Warner

argued that apology hasbecomea very powerful instrument of recognition and

retention or refusal to give one withholds that recognition with new sharpness

(p. 13). But is political apology a remedy, and do ritual and the confessional

process enhance democratic values and institutions?

Links between democracy and memory are not solely a theoretical problem.

The end of the cold war brought many new democracies and new issues about

how to define national past or how to define the role of collectivememory in the

institutionalization of democracy. The third wave of democratization as con-

ceivedby Huntington (1991) hasbrought an explosion of previously suppressed

collective memories and adjoining dilemmas of how to address past wrong-

doings. In postcommunist Eastern Europe, South Africa, and some newly

democratized Latin American countries, debates about links between mem-

ory and democracy have been more than rhetorical battles because the debates

have influenced what political policies are adopted (such as adopting de-

communizationpolicies). Politicalcontroversies concerningtheuseand signifi-

cance of memory can resemble or reflect incoherencies in sociological and

political theories.

In what follows, I present arguments and counterarguments in the debate

about the valueof memory for democracy. While summarizing each exposition

of thenegative andpositiveconsequencesof theuse of memory, I show thediffi-

culties and complexities of the process of judging the act of putting the past in

the service of the present.

REMEMBERING AS A CONDITION OF JUSTICE

Theargumentthat collectivememoryis a conditionforjustice is based on the

idea that healthy democratic nations do acknowledge and reconcile their past

1322 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST



5/20

pathologies andcrimes soasnotto repeatthem,censor history, or forgetvictims.

According to Avishai Margalit (2002), the ideal answer to Hitlers questionWho today remembersthe Armenians? is We alldo (p.78). Acknowledging

past crimes is an essential element in the process of a countrys transition to

democracy because if democracy means the revival of the legal impulse in

men, addressing wrongdoings is the first essential step in this direction

(Weschler, 1990, p. 242). According to this perspective,truth about thepast is

a human right, underscored by the need for recognition of a countrys or corpo-

rations responsibility for injustices done in the past.

Adorno (1986) argued that a culture of forgetting threatens democracy

because real democracy requires a self-critical working through of the past.

While analyzingNazi history, Adornoobserved, The effacement of memory is

more theachievementof an all-too-wakefulconsciousness than it is theresultof

its weakness in the face of the superiority of unconscious processes (p. 1117).

Ricoeur (1999, pp. 9-12) argued that both memory and forgetting contribute in

their respective ways to the continuation of societies. But there is no symmetry

between a duty to remember anda duty to forgetbecause it isonly by remember-

ing that we can construct the future, transmit the meaning of past events to the

next generation, and become heirs of the past. The duty to forget is a duty to go

beyond anger and hatred, whereas the duty to remember keeps alive the mem-

oryof sufferingoveragainst thegeneral tendencyof history tocelebratevictors

(Ricoeur, 1999, p. 9).Habermas (1997), awareof limitsto what anethics of for-

getting can achieve, also emphasized community responsibility for a shared

history and its moral accountability, although within the limitsof thepast of the

constitutional order. According to Habermas, we must accept the presence of

thepast as a burdenon moral accountability;the Holocaustmust never be for-

gotten or normalized. He expressed his opposition to the process of normal-

ization in a very direct way when he criticized Reagans participation in a

wreath-laying ceremony at a Germanmilitarycemeteryat Bitburg in 1985. This

action was interpreted by some as a proclamation that fallen German soldiers

and murdered Jews were equal victims of Nazi oppression. Public exchanges

between prominent German scholars arguing for and against normalizing the

Nazi past, coined the Historians Debate, brought public attention to hidden

meanings of Holocaust history and the relationship between memory and jus-

tice. As one of the main protagonists in this debate, Habermas opposed ques-

tioning the uniqueness of the Holocaust and forgetting it by advocating the

importance of the relationship between the public role of memory and national

responsibility or the obligation that we in Germany haveeven if no one else

longer assumes ittokeep alive the memory of suffering of those murdered by

Germans hand and to keep it alive quite openly and not just in our mind(Habermas as quoted in LaCapra, 1997, p. 97). After the collapse of the Berlin

Wall, Habermas continued to argue that the issues of fairness and balance

require wide, public debates on how to interpret a countrys past.




6/20

Regardless of shortcomings and an unfavorable political climate for interna-

tionalcooperation, theNuremberg Trials of 1945 to 1946 (Luban, 1987; Taylor,1971) brought the issue of collective memory and justice to the attention of the

world. But it had no imitators for almost 50 years; only since the 1980s, and

especially after theendof thecold war, have nations and international organiza-

tions increasingly begun to seek justice for past violations. More than 15 truth

commissions have investigatedaspects of humanrights violations underauthor-

itarian rule, including the Guatemalan Historical ClarificationCommission and

the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. It is important that

criminal law generates the by-product of new interpretations of global history,

as illustrated by trials of the Nazi collaborators Laval, Touvier, Bousquet,

Barbie, and Fauvisson in France and by the arrest of former U.S.-backed Chil-

eandictator Pinochet. The Hague International Tribunal, the Tribunal on Geno-

cidal Civil War in Rwanda, and the permanent International Criminal Court,

with its worldwide jurisdiction concerning atrocities and genocide, are also

evidence of the growing power of international assemblages to address specific

injustices.

How to reconcile with a Communist past is part of the public agenda of

almost all newly democratized Eastern European countries. These countries

have implemented polices such as lustration (screening the pasts of candidates

to determine if they worked for, or collaborated with, Communist security

forces), de-communization (the policy of excluding former Communist party

officials from high public positions), and restitution of property (recompen-

sation and rehabilitation of victims).

Retroactive justice refers to how and why democratic regimes settle wrongs

committed during an authoritarian era by the state and its agents (Elster, 1998).

Elster (1998) suggested that coming to terms with thepast is thegrand narrative

of the present. A new relationship between memory and justice is emerging in

the aftermath of the postcold war expansion of human rights language and the

increased search for identities and authentic cultures. The new status of the

remembrance of past injustices ispartlydue toa globalspread of thelanguageof

human rights and valorization of memories of injustice as essential to healthy

democratic justice.

FORGETTING AS A CONDITION FOR JUSTICE

The argument that justice provides a strong link between memory and

democracy is also widely opposed. The linguisticaffinitybetween amnesty and

amnesia raises many issues connected to dealing with past wrongdoings on theway to democracy. An historical example is called forth: While restoring Athe-

nian democracy after the oligarchic coup and civil war of 404 B.C., democrats

ruled that to live together again as a political community and ensure reconcilia-

tion, individual citizens were forbidden to recall the past (Cohen, 2001; Elster,




7/20

1998; Ricoeur, 1999). Hence, selective amnesia was law; remembering past

injustice was seen as bridging that rule and was a punishable offence. Cohen(2001) analyzedthisfirst caseof transitional justiceandconcludedthatalthough

it perhaps was not the example of total amnesia or complete social harmony,

supporters of the oligarchy remained immune from prosecution. Consequently,

social efforts to reconstruct and restore Athenian democracy enjoyed a long

period of political stability.

For liberals such as Hobbes (1967) or Rawls (1993), social amnesia is con-

sidered a foundation of society because it allows society to start afresh without

inherited resentments. To achieve political and legal equality, through contract

or covenant, the individual has to forgetpast injustices andsocialcategories that

were formerlymarks of inequality (Wolin, 1989, p. 38). Liberalism buildson the

tacit assumption that nations aregiven andthat emotional solidarity andcultural

identity are essential (Freeden, 1997), therefore, forgetting a not-so-glorious

past rather than dwelling on it is a productive option. Ernst Renan (1882/1990)

argued that forgetting is an essentialelement in thecreation andreproductionof

a nation, because to remember everything could bring a threat to national cohe-

sion and self-image. According to Renan, forgetting is a necessary component

in the construction of memory just as the writing of a historical narrative neces-

sarily involves the elimination of certain elements. He pointed out that to

remember everything could bring a threat to national cohesion and self-image

and, therefore, insisted that the creation of a nation requires creative use of past

events. Although nations could be characterized by the possession in common

of a rich legacy of memories, theessenceof a nationis notonly that itsmembers

have many things in common but also that they have forgotten some things

(Renan, 1882/1990, p. 11). To ensure national cohesion, there is the need to

forget about violence and unity-threatening events and to remember heroes and

glory days.

After World War II, a need to reintegrate societies restricted nationsdesires

to expose their pasts. Thepoliticalclimate of thepostwar period favored forgiv-

ingandforgetting. In many countries, after theinitial punishment of leading fig-

ures, there wasa long periodof silence. In FranceandItaly, after initial attempts

to account for past wrongdoings and the initial stigmatization of collaborators,

myths were constructed to gloss over the extent and depth of collaboration with

theNazi regimes. In postwar France, complex readjustments designed to defuse

political discord by denying ideological reasons for the Nazi collaboration

ensured that for many years, the truth was censored for national security. After

World War II, both Gaullistsand Communists offered a heroic reworking of the

warin which Vichy waspresented as an aberration involving only a few French-

men. The myth of resistance and the need for reconciliation dictated the visionof this official remembered past (Bernstein, 1992; J. Gross, 2000; Rousso,

1991). Italian politicians in theimmediate postwar decades were quick to define

themselves against a defeated enemy against whom all Italians could unite.

Annual national celebrations of the end of the war focus on the German




8/20

atrocities and the unity of the Italian nation in the struggle leading to postwar

democracy.According to Herf (1997), early postwar era West Germany did not foster

either memory and justice or democracy (pp. 7-9). It was characterized by

social amnesia and weakening of memory, as the Holocaust was a source of

taboos and prohibition in its politics. The West German government was reluc-

tant to embrace theexampleof theallied tribunalsat Nuremberg. Thepolicy and

practice of defusing the past and putting the past behind was based on the

assumption that for the transition of WestGermany to a stabledemocracy, it was

politically necessary to adopt silence about the crimes of the period. Memory

and justice might produce, it was argued, a right-wing revolt that would under-

mine a still fragile democracy (Herf, 1997, p. 7).

The argument that too much remembering of the past can undermine inter-

group solidarity resurfaced in the 1990s. Preoccupation with memory of past

injustices couldeasily leadto social conflictsbecause it enhances thecollective

narcissism of minor differences that forms the basis of feelings of strangers

andhostilitybetween people(Blok, 1998, p. 33). As therecent bloodyconflicts

between different groups across Europe attest, the use of memories to close

boundaries of ethnic, national, or other identities, and which accepts some ver-

sions of the past to be the true version, could aggravate conflicts. Groups that

turn toward their past to glorify specific aspects of it and demand a recognition

of suffering risk allowingcollective memory to be used as a politicalinstrument

that legitimizes myths and nationalist propaganda. Such fascination with a par-

ticular collective memory might become an obstacle to democracy because

groups compete for recognition of suffering, undermining the democratic spirit

of cooperation. Ironically, coming to terms with thepast cansometimesawaken

stubborn resistance and bring about the exact opposite of what is intended.

Dwelling on injustices may tragically lead to banalization of the memory of the

injustice (consider the repeated television coverage of the Los Angeles Police

Departments beating of Rodney King). Shared memory can also be an expres-

sion of nostalgia, which tends to distort thepast by idealizing it (Margalit, 2002,

p.62); such idealizationcan diminish thecollectivememory asa sourceof truth.

MEMORY AND A NEED FOR BOTH

SOLIDARITY AND COHESION

Thelink between memoryof thepast injusticeand democracy is notstraight-

forward. There are limits to what an ethics of forgetting can achieve because it

can be divisive, costly, prolonging, and not satisfying to everybody. If democ-racy means cooperative relations, peaceful coexistence, and stability, the

politicization of memory and danger of intergroup conflict can be too high a

price to pay for addressing injustices. But we cannot escape the truth about past

injustices by simplyusing censorship; attempts to silence oppositional memory




9/20

often have the opposite effect (as, for example, the reoccurrence of the Vichy

syndrome illustrates). People tend to reject thevision of the past that is not con-gruentwith their own recollectionand sense of truth.Some past events canbe of

such importance topeople that they feel compelledto give their own accounts of

events that may undermine more official or media-generated accounts

(Schudson, 1997, p. 5). Osiel (1997, p. 113) noted that if a central power denies

thereality of any groups memoryandexperience, it runs therisk of discrediting

itself. Obviously, retrospective justice cannot rely solely on memory to render

perfect justice anymore than judicial outcomes can capture the complexity of

history.

Addressing the problematic nature of coming to terms with the past, Sebald

(2002) described Germans denial about their countrys devastation after the

war. Sebald argued that the Germans tried to destroy their memory not only of

what they had done but also of what was done to them. Although Sebald called

for truthfulness about the past, he warned us that a longing for truthfulness

redeems nothing. In his recent bookCrabwalk, Gunter Grass (2002) made a

case for a more inclusive past. The book, part documentary, part fiction, recalls

the Soviet torpedoing of a cruise ship (the Wilhelm Gustloff) ferrying refugees

near the Bay of Danzing in the Baltic in 1945. Crabwalkspotlights this tragedy

in a duty to remember the suffering of Germans in the war. Similarly, Ingmar

Bergmans 1977 film The Serpents Egg (staring David Carradine and Liv

Ulmann) presents a chilling, fairly historically accurate and horrifyingly

overlooked view of what life was like for the German people (and some non-

Germans) caught in postWorld War I, pre-Nazi Germany during the time of

massive inflation and crushing ostracism of Germany by the world, which lead

ultimatelyand perhaps understandablyto the desperate, popular adoption

of Nazism. In understanding (but not condoning) the wounds suffered by abus-

ers (or those they lead), one can sometimes gain a perspective or sense of mean-

ing about the cruel actions of abusers, sadists, tyrants, and despots.

Margalit (2002) argued that remembering is our moral duty to others simply

because we are all humans. It is our responsibility to make sure that the Holo-

caust, the Gulags, and Hiroshima are remembered as warning signposts in

human moralhistory. Margalitargued for adopting a policy of forgivenessbased

on disregarding the sin rather than forgetting it (p. 197) because what is

needed for successful forgiveness is not forgetting the wrong done but rather

overcoming the resentment that accompanies it (p. 208). Remembering crimes

against humanity is essential for sustaining solidarity and nourishing mutual

care.

Returning to Adorno (1986), he stated, Essentially, it is a matter of the way

in which the past is called up and made present; whether one stops at sheerreproach,or whether oneendures thehorror through a certain strength that com-

prehends even the incomprehensible (p. 126). Healthy democracy welcomes

collective memory from narrators whose credibility always can be questioned,

balanced with the critical, scientific, and objective distance achieved by check-




10/20

ing documents and archives, which inform us of the facts of what happened

(Ricoeur, 1999).We dependona pluralityof contending narratives andthe civil-ity of rules in the management of social strains. What happened can be discov-

ered under conditions of diversity anddiscourseby relying not on a singlenar-

rator, but rather on a plurality of contending voices speaking to one another

(Sennett, 1998, p. 14). This means simultaneously providing space for the truth

of groups painful memories and facilitating intergroup cooperation. Under-

standing the development of cooperative perspective on the present depends on

criticism that breaks up habitual ways of thinking and closurethinking in

terms of openness and relevance of memory for the restoration and/or the con-

tinuationof intergroup cohesion and solidarity. Hence, balancing solidarity and

cohesion sometimes requires the generosity of forgetfulness and sometimes

demands the honesty of remembrance.

REMEMBERING: ESSENTIAL TO REACH

DEMOCRATIC POTENTIALS

Is collective memory an essential condition for democratic community to

achieve its potential? Karl Deutsch (as quoted in Hosking, 1989, p. 119) argued

that social remembering is essential for any extended functioning of auton-

omy, and emphasized the role of memory in mastering democratic institutions

and improving the conditions of freedom. Memory, understood as a set of com-

plex practices, contributes to our self-awareness and allows us to assess our

potentialities and limits. Without reflection on memoryand thechecking of past

records of institutions and public activities, we would have no warnings against

potential dangers to democratic structures and less awareness of the repertoire

of remedies. Without memory, observed Deutsch, would-be self-steering

organizations are apt to drift with their environment because they are unable to

reassess and reformulate their rules and aims in the light of experience (as

quoted in Hosking, 1989, p. 119). This observation is supported by empirical

studies that show lack of interest inandknowledge of thepast tends tobeaccom-

panied by authoritarianism and utopian thinking; or as Gunn Allen (1999)

stated, The root of oppression is loss of memory (p. 589).

If publics in totalitarianregimesare presentedas being robbedof their collec-

tive memories and identities, is it assumed that in democratic systems collective

memory is the essential condition of reflexive judgment? Is democracy seen as

thecore case for theestablishment of conscience, which consists in the recogni-

tion of moral dutiesandconstraints?Without memory, reflexivity is diminished

because our ability to make sense of our present circumstances is connectedwith what we have learned from prior experiences, which we retain in our mem-

ory. Memory is tied to what it is to be a persona critical medium through

which identities are constituted. Hence, it can be seen as the guardian of




11/20

difference, as it allows for recollection and preservation of our different selves,

whichwe acquire andaccumulate through ourunique lives (Wolin, 1989, p. 40).Todays society is sometimes conceptualized as being terminally ill with

amnesia (Huyssen,1995, p. 1);and yetthe recent passion formemory (Nora,

1996, p. 3) has established the topic of memory as a main discourse to explain

the past and transform it into a reliable identity source for the group present.

Thus, the need for identities is absorbed by groupsmemories. When the past is

used asa base fora groups identity, collectivememories assumea crucial role in

thegroupself- formation, itsmobilization andparticipation in thepublic sphere.

Collective memory in civil society provides a source of categories through

which a group constructs its identity; a necessarystep in thedevelopment of the

groups ability to speak in one voice or be a political actor in the process of its

mobilization. Because a society draws a coherent identity from its communal

memory, communal memory is the essential element in the process of activiz-

ation of civil society, without which a democratic system cannot achieve its full

potential.

Collective memory may be a source of alternative solutions to emerging

problems and, therefore, enhance democracys ability to change and improve.

Society does not proceed from one organizational structure to another by aban-

doning all of its old institutions and traditions, as Halbwachs (1941/1992) con-

vincingly argued. Halbwachs wrote,

Whensociety becomes toodifferent from what it had been in thepastand from theconditions in which these traditions had arisen, it will no longer find within itselfthe elements necessary to reconstruct, consolidate, and repair these traditions.(p. 160)

Shared memories of democratic past are useful for evaluating whether newdevelopments fitpast occurrences in a confirming way. When the fit is imper-

fect, the past is at once an idealization and critique of the present world

(Schwartz, 2000, p. 253). Collective memorymay inspire and mobilize if the fit

is imperfect, leavingenough discrepancy to allow forevaluations of thepresent.

Collective memory can enhance creativity and enrich democratic systems.

Cultivating memory may help expand imaginative thinking and creative poten-

tials. Memory can provide democracy with the magic of emotions, affective

ties, and meaningful identities. Heller (2001) suggested that the need for cul-

tural memory is very strong and a Weberian slogan about the disenchantment

of the world could be one of many failed predictions (p. 112). Memory, emo-

tions,and magiccanenchant theworld, inWebers senseof theterm.Puresoci-

ety (based only on market relations) can not deliver all good that are still kept in

store by communities (Heller, 2001, p. 112). Margalit (2002) argued we live

in an animated world where mythmakers and poets provide legitimacy for

regimes whose entitlement to govern is anchored in events of the past (p. 11)




12/20

Similarly, Ortega y Gasset (1960) claimed modern people are empty because

they do not remember, which means they cannot understand the present andlack imagination and inner desire to excel. Research confirms the connection

between national remembering, emotions, and values such as patriotism, devo-

tion, and group allegiance, which areallperceivedas contributing to thequality

of the political life (Misztal, 2003).

IRRELEVANCE OF REMEMBERING

IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

The claims just discussed are undermined by the argument that collective

memory can be molded into an ideological weapon that may threaten demo-

craticways of thinking. Since the19th century, memory has seemed themech-

anism by which ideology materializes itself (Terdiman, 1993, p. 33). Ideolo-

gies provide an interpretation of the present and a view of a desired future.

Memory, employed as official ideology, can be seen as a broad and to some

degree, invented traditionthat explainsand justifies theends andmeans of orga-

nized social action, supplying ways of understanding the world and providing

people with beliefs and opinions that guide their action. Ideology acts as a form

of social cement, providing social groups or societies with a set of unifying

beliefs and values from which objectives are derived for political programs and

actions.

According to the invention of tradition paradigm, the connection between

hegemonic order and official remembering is challenged by the need for new

methods of establishingbonds of loyalty in theprocess of democratization. Due

to theexpansion of theelectorateandbecausepeopleare notpredictable, there is

a perceived need for official management of the past and present through the

invention of tradition to ensure the continuity of popular loyalty. Creating new

monuments, the invention of new symbols, and the rewriting of history books

are ways that the state reorients democratic measures to new insecurities

(Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983). According to this standpoint, the connection

between memory and democracy manifests itself in a deliberately established

connection in which collective memory is used to legitimatize government or

corporate agendas.

Butit is also argued that democratic regimes do notneed to recruit memoryto

secure their legitimacy, because a democracy anchors its legitimacy in the elec-

tion. Habermas (1997) even argued that democracy does not need the organic

unity of nationalism. He rejected the principle of the popular sovereignty as the

expression of a Volk. Habermas hoped that the Berlin Republic offered thechance of a different normality from the normalization he feared conservatives

were after. He thought that referendum, not a call to the common past, should

provide legitimization to the republic. Habermas rejected thepast as a sourceof

legitimization of government or corporate agendas while calling for moral




13/20

accountability for the national past. This demonstrates the tension between the

liberal/constitutional construction of identity and the role of collective memory(Booth, 1999).

Regarding negative aspects of particularisticmemories, it is useful to rethink

memory in terms of whether people employ collective memory in an open or

closed way. An open-ended, nonfixed, nonpoliticized collective memory is

good for cooperative relationships. As debates concerning the Polish and Ger-

man past illustrate, countries that successfully separate theirhistory from myths

and distance it from national propaganda are capable of constructing new trust

relationships and building more collaborative relations (Misztal, 1996). When

memorynarrative is characterized by closure andpermanent inscription, it does

not easily accommodate viewpoints of others (Josipovici, 1998). The difference

between open-ended and fixed memory positions is especially visible when

memories about traumatic events enter into dialog about establishing collective

rights and voicing collective demands. If fabricated or contrived collective

memories are imposed on groups, members may, or may not, feel deprived of

their own authenticvoice. In thecase of politicization of group identities, group

members may suffer from lack of equal opportunities and discrimination

because of systematic neglect of alternative causes of group disadvantage

other than theirdistinctivememory(Barry, 2001, p. 305). Although identitypol-

itics cannot fairly be said to undermine a political distribution (Gutmann,

2003, p. 23), groups that appear to elevate their identities above democratic

standards of equal freedom and opportunity for all may arise suspicion.

The idea that collective memory enhances democratic potentials is chal-

lenged by the observation that civil society can function without collective

memory. Both Heller (2001) and Markus (2001) asserted that civil society can

perform its role guided only by utilitarian consideration. Heller claimed civil

society canworkwithout cultural memory: Itcan operate smoothly through the

clashes of interestand cooperation, to limitedand future-oriented activities, and

to itsown short-term memories, without archivesandwithout utopiabutguided

simply by utilitarian consideration (p. 1034). Civil society, like the market,

does not require memory, as it is future oriented and seeks purposively oriented

cooperation and does not seek cohesion. According to Markus, democratic

imperatives, such as toleration and openness, can be achieved through the dis-

cursive mechanism of civil society. But the concept of civility (based in the rec-

ognition of the other as a bearer of basic and inalienable rights) does not

theoretically encompass a role for collective memory.

DEMOCRACY AND A CRITICAL APPROACH TO THE PAST

Collective memory can enhance or reduce the democratic potential, depend-

ing on the extent towhich the community adopts a critical and open approach to

itspast. Whether socialmemory enhances conflict or cooperation depends on its




14/20

content anditsopenness or closedness. Josipovici (1998) elaborated on this

theme in describing memory as the mastering of reality and memory as thecompulsive repetition of gestures and clichs, memory as the mastering of that

which is painful, and memory as the masochistic turning of the screw of pain

(p. 2). Cooperative and tolerant behavior is more likely if people can critically

evaluate their past in a safe, open, critical, and reflective environment. The

importanceof openness of memoryis illustratedby Lyn Spillmans (1997)com-

parative study of the celebrations of national centennials and bicentennials in

Australiaand theUnited States, which shows howtheUnited Statesand Austra-

lia adapted to changes in their political situations. Spillmans analysis reveals

that the American founding moment remained a robust element of national col-

lective memory because it offered multiple interpretive possibilities in a variety

of contexts. Showing that there are many possible alternatives for a version of

thepast,Spillman demonstrated that theopenness of thepast in collectivemem-

ory to oppositional politics results in the persistence of memory and its rele-

vance for the future. In short, when memories were open, they persisted and

provided peoplewith a visionof thefuture, which represented thenationand its

unity.

A closed or fixedmemory of events locks in an official authorized version of

the memory and as such, can hinder cooperation between groups that may or

may not agree with the authorized collective memory. For example, Serbscen-

tral memory of the lost Battle of Kosovo in 1389 symbolizes the permanent

Muslim intention to colonize them and, therefore, it is an obstacle to mutual

relations. In summary, collectivememorythat is used toclose boundaries of eth-

nic, national, or other identities and accepts particular versions of the past as

truecanaggravate conflict,whereas collectivememorythat is open ended can

be a lubricant for social cooperation.

COLLECTIVE REMEMBERING AND

THE STABILITY OF DEMOCRACY

A third assumption about democracy and memory is that people who have

experienced democracy and remember that experience help sustain the stability

of this political system. This is not so much a theoretical as an historical argu-

ment, because historical examples support claims that collective memory of the

democratic experience helps continue the legitimization of democracy and

respect for its institutions and cultivates values of moderation. It appears that

collective memory of a lived democratic past experience enhances the stability

of a democracy.It is also argued that collective memory of a lived democratic past actually

functionsas orchestrated culturalpracticesto guaranteereproduction of a politi-

cal order (which may call itself democratic). Institutional memory is made




15/20

formal in documents such as a constitution and acquires renewed legitimacy in

regular elections (Margalit, 2002, p. 12). Conflicts and their legacies and prob-lems and their solution experiences, even if not experienced in an individual

sense, ultimately shape the functioning of institutions and national culture. In

examiningWatergate,Schudson (1997) found that although Watergatedoes not

play an important role in popular American memory, its legacy influences the

functioning of American democracy. His study illustrates how the memory of

theWatergateexperience imposeditself on Americansperceptionand under-

standing of other political scandals, such as Iran/Contra-gate. The media cover-

age of Watergate was so successful that it generated government and corporate

constraints on coverage of later scandals; so information about undemocratic

actions by theU.S.government, and their aftermath, enters into American lives,

laws, and language in ways that people and politicalelites only marginally con-

trol. Schudson commented, The past seeps into the present whether or not its

commemoration is institutionalized (p. 15).

The nation-state can function as a mnemonic community that socializes its

citizens to what should be remembered and what should be forgotten. Govern-

ments and corporations can influence the depth of collective memory and

even regulate how much people remember, and which part of thepast should be

remembered. That is why peoplewho have experienced healthy democracyand

valueit canuse their collectivememoryof that experience to generateprodemo-

cratic values and dispositions.

Mnemonic communities (democratic or otherwise) ensure that new mem-

bers attaina required social identity and a particular cognitive bias by introduc-

ing and familiarizing members with the groupspast. A communitys traditions

express itsessential values andequip thecommunity with anemotionaltone and

style of its remembering. Memory of past democratic experience is one option

for making sense of the world and a feeling of belonging, as well as a way of

rethinking thepresent andthepast, forit is not true that theonly emotions that fit

the democratic spirit are those directed toward the future, such as manifest des-

tiny. Democrats or so-called democrats can and should include backward-

looking emotions and attitudes as well, such as forgiveness and gratitude

(Margalit, 2002, p. 12). Arguments like these contain historical evidence that

new democracies are fragile. Latin American democracies sometimes relapse

into authoritarian regimes duein part toa lack of democratic experience andcol-

lective memory of thatexperience (Misztal,1992). Conversely, previousexperi-

ence of democracyhelpssetthe stage for further democratization, forbothpol-

iticians and citizens learn from the successful resolution of some issues

(Rustow, 1970, p. 360). In Europe, Czechoslovakia was the only Eastern Euro-

pean country with a preWorld War II democratic experience, so it wasperceived as havinga chance to becomea stabledemocracyafter thecollapse of

communism.




16/20

IRRELEVANCE OF MEMORIES IN STABILITY

OF DEMOCRACIES

Opponents of the argument that the stability of democracy rests on the exis-

tenceof memories of thedemocraticpast, although agreeing that nations need to

establish their representation in thepast, have asserted that what shapes societal

aspiration for a stable, shared democratic future is the rediscovery of memories

of the golden age and a heroic past (Smith, 1986). Not memories of recent

years but appeals to the good old days, to the song, sights and smellsand

link[s] . . . to the idea of the historical continuity of people, its culture and land

(Wrong, 1994, p. 237), allcontribute significantly tonational stabilityand cohe-

sion. Creation of such a past is the task of nationalist movements, which propa-

gate ideology-affirming identification with the nation-state by invoking shared

memories (Gellner, 1993) that are based more in myth rather than the shared

experience and memory of healthy democracy.

Another challenge to the idea that there is a relationship between memories

of thedemocratic past and healthy democracy comes from a different direction.

Today, societies have such a diversity of cultures, ethnicities, religions, and tra-

ditions that they may witness a cosmopolitization of their national collective

memory. If the significance of national memories are diluted or fragmented,

they lose their significance, then democratic memories are also less important.

Theprocessesof globalizationand the increasingdiversificationandfragmenta-

tion of social interests enhance the transformation of collective memory from

the master narratives of a nation to the episodic narratives of various groups

(Levy & Sznaider, 2002).Collectivememories of a democratic past becomeless

significant because there is a lack of democratically (as opposed to authoritar-

ian) oriented unity among a population with so much sociopolitical diversity.

Nora (1996)observedthathistory washolybecause thenation washoly(p.

5) and that historians provide legitimacy to the national history. But once the

state is divorced from a nation, the collective of that past nation-state memory

vanishes and history gives way to the legitimization of a new society. In other

words, today, scholars may live with the subject of memory constantly on their

lips, whereas ironically, the collective (or fragmented) memories of refugees of

no-longer-existing nation-states seem useless.

Decoupling collective memory from national history exposes the process of

fragmentationof collectivememory.Emergingethnic groups areunifiedby col-

lective cultural memories that provide a sense of unity. Battles between groups

mayensue, forminorities rights are increasingly organized around questionsof

cultural memory, its exclusions and taboo zones (Huyssen, 1995, p. 5). In the

context of an absence of a comprehensive nation-state memory, it is difficult tosustain argument about the role of shared memory of the democratic or other

politicalsystems past. And thepoliticization of mnemonic groups could under-

mine the stability of an existing democracy.




17/20

Some scholars have maintained that each generation has autonomy to

remakehistory andthat each new generation takes itsinheritancefrom itsprede-cessor and can react against it, creating a new environment that again is the

object of reaction (Davis, 1989). Democratic developments could be results of

inversions and rejections of thepast rather than theextension of existingimages

of thepast.Perhaps recentEuropeanintegrationmay be rootedin a unifiedeffort

to forget this continents divisive past?

Often, democracy prevails not because of peoples collective memories but

because of the capitalist economic and political conditions that are tied to and

can strangle American democracy. The economic crises in pre-1939 Europe (in

Germany and Austria) and more recently in Latin American show the connec-

tion between political and economic instability. In contrast to the previous

assumption, democracy in postcommunist Eastern European countries, regard-

less of their lack of democratic tradition, may be stable due to a growing econ-

omy (a helpful condition for democracy). The stabilization of democracy in

these countries is enhanced by external reinforcement of the legitimacy of

democracy, their negative experience of undemocratic politics in the past, and

the seductive potential of consumerism, future capital accumulation, and free

enterprise.

DEMOCRACY AND WAYS OF INVOKING THE PAST

Social memory is crucial for change and stability. It can be a source of mobi-

lization for thereproduction andthemodification of a politicalsystem. Memory

ispartof telling the storyof the past and willbecomea condition of socialhar-

monious coexistence, if social trust is not undermined. The extension of trust

depends on the actors reinterpreting their collective past in such a way that

trusting cooperation comes to seem a natural feature of their common heritage

(Sabel, 1993, p. 107). To ensure trust and to avoid conflicts, there is a need for a

critical evaluation of social memory, which can be achieved only if we under-

stand the contested nature of the past. The present can be seen from an entirely

newperspectiveby juxtaposing rather thanintegrating thepastand thepresent

(D.Gross,1993-1994, p. 6).A self-conscious wayof invokingthepast andturn-

ingmemory into a sourceof mobilizationcan becontrasted with sharedmemory

as expressed in legacythat is, a memory of abstract things such as attitudes

andprinciples (Margalit, 2002, p. 60). Socialmemory, as a stabilizing factor in

socialsystems, is notsomething that brings back past events butrather,a control

mechanism that we use to sort relevant from irrelevant information.

According to Luhmann (2002), memorys true function consists not inremembering but forgetting. Only by forgetting can a people reorient itself

toward the future. Collective memories of a political system may serve either to

reject or to consolidate a sociopolitical structure.




18/20

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this article discusses controversies, confusions, and the com-

plexityof the relationship between memory and democracy. Collective memory

canenhance or reducedemocracydepending on theextent to which thecommu-

nity adopts a critical and open approach to its past. It appears that what matters

fordemocracys healthis notsocial remembering perse butthe wayin which the

past is calledup andused.Remembering is nota remedyfor allproblems, as cer-

tainmatters require the generosity of forgetfulness; but open and reflexive pub-

lic recollection can help make social life less alienated, autocratic, or dogmatic

and more meaningful, decent, and creative. In short, memory is of value for

democracy when it is conducive to democratic justice.

REFERENCES

Adorno, T. W. (1986). What does coming to terms with the past mean? (T. Bahti & G. Hartman,

Trans.). In G. Hartman (Ed.), Bitburg in moral and political perspective (pp. 114-129).

Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Ashplant,T.G., Dawson,G.,& Roper, M.(Eds.).(2001).Thepoliticsof warmemory andcommemo-

ration. London: Routledge.

Barry, B. (2001).Culture andequality:An egalitarian critique of multiculturalism. Cambridge, MA:

Harvard University Press.

Bernstein, R. (1992, June25). French collaborators:The newdebate.TheNew YorkReview ofBooks,

pp. 12-15.

Blok, A. (1998). The narcissism of minor differences. European Journal of Social Theory, 1(1),

33-56.

Booth, W. J. (1999). Communities of memory: On identity, memory, and debt. American Political

Science Review, 93(2), 249-268.

Cohen, D. (2001). The rhetoric of justice: Strategies of reconciliation and revenge in the restoration

of Athenian democracy in 403 BC. European Journal of Sociology, XLII(2), 335-356.

Davis, J. (1989). Thesocial relationsof theproductionof history. In E. Tonkin,M. McDonald,& M.

Chapman (Eds.), History and ethnicity (pp. 104-120). London: Routledge.

Elster, J. (1998). Coming to terms with the past.European Journal of Sociology, XXXIX(1), 7-48.

Freeden, M. (1997). Is nationalism a distinct ideology?Political Studies, XLV, 748-765.

Gallie, W. G. (1955). Essentially contested concepts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 56,

167-198.

Gellner, E. (1993). Nations and nationalism. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell.

Grass, G. (2002). Crabwalk(K. Winston, Trans.). London: Faber & Faber.

Gross, D. (1993-1994). Rethinking tradition. Telos, (98/99), 5-10.

Gross, J. T. (2000).Themes for a social history of war experience. In I. Deak, J. T. Gross, & T. Judt

(Eds.), The politics of retribution in Europe (pp. 15-37). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University

Press.

Gunn Allen,P. (1999). Whois your mother? Redroots ofWhite feminism. InC. Lemert(Ed.),Social

theory: The multicultural and classic readings (pp. 15-37). Boulder, CO: Westview.

Gutmann, A. (2003). Identity in democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Habermas, J. (1997).A Berlin Republic: Writing on Germany (S. Rendall, Trans.)Lincoln: Univer-

sity of Nebraska Press.




19/20

Halbwachs, M. (1992). On collective memory (L. A. Coser, Ed. & Trans.). Chicago: University of

Chicago Press. (Original work published 1941)Heller, A. (2001). A tentative answer to the question: Has civil society cultural memory? Social

Research, 68(4), 1031-1042.

Herf,J. (1997).Divided memory:The Nazi past in the two Germanys. Cambridge, MA:HarvardUni-

versity Press.

Hobbes, T. (1967). Body man and citizen (R. S. Peters, Ed.). New York: Collier.

Hobsbawm, E., & Ranger, T. (Eds.). (1983). The invention of tradition. New York: Cambridge Uni-

versity Press.

Hosking, G. A. (1989). Memoryin a totalitarian society. In T. Butler(Ed.),Memory,history, culture

and the mind(pp. 97-114). Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell.

Huntington, S. (1991). The third wave. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Huyssen, A. (1995). Twilight memories. London: Routledge.

Josipovici, G. (1998). Rethinking memory: Too much/too little. Judaism: A Quarterly Journal of

Jewish Life and Thought, 47(2), 232-240.

Kammen, M. (1995). Review of Frames of remembrance. History and Theory, 34(3), 245-266.

LaCapra, D. (1997). Revisiting the historians debate. History and Memory, l9(1/2), 80-112.

Levy, D., & Sznaider, N. (2002).Memory unbound:The Holocaustand theformationof cosmopoli-

tan memory. European Journal of Social Theory, 53(1), 87-106.

Luban, D. (1987). The legacies of Nuremberg. Social Research, 54(4), 62-87.

Luhmann, N. (2002). Limits of steering. In C. Calhoun, J. Gerteis, J. Moody, S. Pfaff, & I. Virk

(Eds.), Contemporary sociological theory (pp. 139-153). Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell.

Margalit, A. (2002). The ethics of memory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Markus, M. (2001). Decent society and/or civil society? Social Research, 68(4), 1011-1032.

Misztal, B. A. (1992). Must Eastern Europefollowthe Latin American way?Archives Europeennes

de Sociologie, XXIII, 151-179.

Misztal, B. A. (1996). Trust in modern society. Cambridge, UK: Polity.

Misztal, B. A. (2003). Social theories of remembering. Milton Keynes, UK: Open University.

Misztal,B. A. (2004).The sacralizationofmemory.EuropeanJournal of SocialTheory, 7(1),67-84.

Nora,P.(Ed.). (1996).Realms of memory (Vols.1-3, A. Goldhammer,Trans.). NewYork: Columbia

University Press.

Ortega y Gasset, J. (1960). The revolt of the masses. New York: Norton. (Original work published

1926)Osiel, M. (1997). Mass atrocity, collective memory and the law. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction

Publishers.

Rawls, J. (1993). Political liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.

Renan,E. (1990). What isa nation? InH. K.Bhabha (Ed.),Nation andnarration (pp.7-19).London:

Routledge. (Original work published 1882)

Ricoeur, P. (1999). Memory and forgetting. In R. Kearney & M. Dooley (Eds.), Questioning ethics

(pp. 5-12). London: Routledge.

Rousso, H. (1991). The Vichy syndrome. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Rustow, D. A. (1970). Transition to democracy. Comparative Politics, 2, 337-343.

Sabel, C. F. (1993). Studied trust: Building new forms. In R. Swedberg (Ed.), Explorations in eco-

nomic sociology (pp. 7-19). New York: Russell Sage.

Schudson,M. (1997).Lives,lawsandlanguage: Commemorative versusnon-commemorative forms

of effective public memory. The Communication Review, 2(1), 3-17.

Schwartz, B. (2000). Abraham Lincoln and the forge of national memory. Chicago: University of

Chicago Press.Sebald, W. G. (2002). On the natural history of destruction. London: Hamish Hamilton

Sennett, R. (1998). Disturbing memories. In P. Fara & K. Patterson (Eds.), Memory (pp. 10-46).

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, A. D. (1986). The ethnic origins of nations. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell.




20/20

Spillman, L. (1997) Nation and commemoration. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Taylor, T. (1971). Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American tragedy. New York: Bantam.Terdiman, R. (1993).Presentpast:Modernityand the memory crisis. Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity

Press.

Warner, M. (2003). Whos sorry now? Times Literary Supplement 1(August), 10-13.

Weschler, L (1990). A miracle, a universe. New York: Pantheon.

Wolin, S. S. (1989). The presence of the past. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Wrong, D. (1994). The problem of order. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

BARBARAA.MISZTALis a professor of sociologyat Universityof Leicester, UnitedKing-

dom. She worked at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sci-

ences (Warsaw) and Griffith University, Australia. She is the author ofTheories of Social

Remembering (Open University Press, 2003), Informality: Social Theory and Contempo-

raryPractice (Routledge, 2000),andTrust in Modern Society (Polity, 1996), as well coeditor

ofAction on AIDS (Greenwood, 1990).


memory and democracy misztal

Documents