Theoretical Football

“Theoretical football is the notion that American football is an exceedingly complex sport that requires a branch of learning. Its goal is to accentuate the cerebral, academic, and quantifiable

aspects of American football.” - Denauld William Brown

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Mechanics Of The West Coast Offense

By J.A. Polk

Topic: Bill Walsh

1983 49ers Offense

January 10, 1982, The NFC Championship Game: Down 21-27 with 58 Seconds left in the Fourth Quarter, San Francisco faces a 3rd and 3 on the Dallas

6th yard line. Joe Montana enters the huddle and gives the play call; Red Right Tight, Sprint Option Right. The huddle breaks, the men line up, and the

Catch becomes part of football history.

The West Coast offense (WCO) is a difficult philosophy for any defense to contend against. Over time this offensive system, and it’s

creator, has become part of football lore. Innovation has built upon Walsh’s most basic principles of the WCO. The system ran today,

only reflects the 49er’s of yesteryear in base applications. No matter how different today’s formations may be in this system (i.e.

Jon Gruden’s I-Formation based WCO or Andy Reid’s Spread based WCO), the principles of the WCO stay the same. Defending the

WCO can be challenging for someone that does not know or understand what the WCO sets out to accomplish. This guide is meant

to present those basic philosophies and how to best defend against them.

Next Topic: Steve Mariucci

1997 Cal Offense

X

How do you defend an offense that

holds the ball, throws it around, and

pulls tricks out of it’s sleeve? That was

the question many defensive

coordinators were faced with in the

early 1980’s. Bill Walsh was the

brainchild of such a system. One that

attacked, for the times, in such an

unconventional way.

The WCO set out to accomplish a great

feat in football; controlling possession

and scoring the ball through the air.

Today, the principles of the WCO are

time honored, and have been

incorporated into other offensive

systems, but way back then it was a

beast of it’s own.

In principle, the WCO attacked

defenses in many new ways. These

included:

• Spreading the defense horizontally

and vertically.

• Creating mismatches between

receivers and defenders.

• Passing the ball, instead of running

it to maintain possession.

• While using all 5 receivers.

Other principles, contributed to why

defending the WCO was/is difficult.

Quick, timed passes caught defenses

off guard, while sound pass

protections and formations warded off

blitzing defenders. Receiver

mismatches wrecked havoc on M2M,

as great QB’s picked apart zones.

Defending the WCO is just like

defending any other offensive system;

by knowing and defending the

principles. How can a team use it’s

bread and butter, after the defense

slammed the bread box closed?

That is what the essentials of WCO

defense comes to, taking those

principles away. While saying that is a

lot easier then doing it, it is possible; if

planned for correctly. Remember,

football requires proper planning

today, for accurate execution

tomorrow.

1

X

The play below emphasizes many of

the WCO’s most basic principles.

Before reading further, can you spot

them?

Walsh wanted to attack defenses by

stretching them. Forcing Defenders to

cover more of the field helped create

space. This formed open pockets in the

defensive field, that Walsh attacked

using timed pass routes. Most of

Walsh’s quarterbacks worked for a 3

or 5 step drop, allowing the pass to

leave the QB’s pocket

quicker.

These two principles can be seen in

the play below.

X,Z, and R executes, what Walsh

referred to as, a takeoff route. By

design, these routes stretch the

secondary deeper down the field. As

the secondary stretches back, F’s route

(a swing route) is used to stretch the

intermediate defensive personnel

towards the sideline. This executes

Walsh’s first concept, space. The prior

four routes helped to create space,

while the route ran by Y is designed to

take advantage of that space, using

Walsh’s second concept ; Timed pass

routes.

Route combinations such as these

made defending the WCO difficult,

when using zone coverage. This play

can successfully beat a Cover 2 and

Cover 3 zone down the field.

Defending this type of play, was best

served using a mixture of man and

zone coverage. For instance, Cover 2

Man assigns a defender for each

receiver while making two deep

defenders each responsible for one

half of the field. This allowed for

tough defense on receivers with help

from over the top. Tighter defense and

route disruption helped to throw off

the timing of the pass.

Using this type of defense lead to

creating stops, but it was far from

perfect. Man Coverage allowed for

personnel mismatches . It was only a

matter of downs, before someone

would make a play.

2

X

When attacking with the pass in the

WCO, most plays utilized 5 receivers.

The invent of the Zone blitz helped to

defend areas of the field while

providing a pass rush. Most times, this

would create a M2M pass block;

allowing athletic pass rushers the

chance to make a play (with both sacks

and delivery sacks.) To combat this,

Walsh would often supply an extra

blocker, against pass rush happy

teams.

Designed plays that attacked with four

receivers could, at times, behave

differently. The play shown below is a

great example. Unlike most WCO

plays, that supply a number of

different reads for the QB, the play

below works off the basic high/low

read.

The play diagramed below is similar to

a Curl/Flat route combo. Can you see

why? The similarity is that the

quarterback is only reading one half of

the field. However, we can still see the

space concept at work. Instead of

having X run a Curl at 12 yards, the

player works downfield, taking the

defender(s) with them. As X works the

lane down the field, Z is used to fill the

alley, left in the flats. As stated, most

QBs will execute a traditional

High/Low read. In this play, that read

can be taken from the Strong Side

corner. If the corner plays a short

zone, X will become open in the

intermediate area, under the Safety. If

the corner played a soft zone, the flat

could open up for Z.

Press coverage proved to be effective

against types of plays. Using corners to

press X and Z off the LOS helped to

disrupt the timing of the pass . After

all, route disruption is one of the most

important aspects of WCO defense.

Man Cover 2 Press is a pretty good

option to defend this play with. Both

Z and X are covered by corners, while

the SC has ‘over the top’ help from the

deep Safety. Although M2M coverage

could create mismatches between the

running backs and linebackers, the

play’s # 1 and #2 receiving options are

well defended.

3

X

Bill Walsh’s idea was to throw now and

run later. Walsh’s objective was to pass

for points early in the game, while

running on a tired defense later in the

game. BUT WAIT! If Roger Craig was

your back, would you wait till the third

quarter to hand him the ball?

Other coaches didn’t think so either.

Walsh would incorporate split back

running plays to add some ground

game to the WCO. But, sometimes the

presence of a great runner is threat

enough. Walsh proved to be a master

of trickery, showing a defense one

thing, while delivering another. Play

Action passing, in all it’s various forms,

was not a new topic at the time. It was

ran by many different teams for

decades.

What was different is how Walsh used

his play action. Any coach will tell

you to run the ball, until the

linebackers crept up. When this

occurred you hit them with the play

action pass down field. What set Walsh

apart was his belief that establishing

the run was not needed to perform a

successful play action pass, the threat

was good enough.

This is how the WCO (or Walsh’s style

of the WCO) would trick defenders and

frustrate DCs. To understand how this

play executed, you had to know how a

defense thought. At the time, ground

oriented offenses ruled the NFL.

Running teams like the Redskins

dominated the league. (with a few

exceptions)

Most interior defensive personnel were

taught different keys to read the

offense with. One important key then

(and now) were the offensive guards.

Walsh knew that when defenders saw

the guards clearing to one side, that

linebackers typically followed,

expecting a running play.

Walsh relied on these tendencies to

form his theory of play action passing.

When teams did not fall for this ‘trick’

he simply ran the ball in the space they

gave up.

Defending Walsh’s play action plays

were just like defending anybody

else’s. They were just harder to predict.

4

Closing Notes

Walsh was indeed an offensive genius. The amount of time the WCO has lived is a testament to that. However, defending this great coach was not about defending his x’s and o’s alone. Walsh originated many other techniques that helped him get ahead in the game. Predictability- Because Walsh was open to throwing the ball in any situation, this made predicting his plays harder. Defensive Coordinators would scramble to find systems that covered both run and pass defense, especially on 3rd and short. Play scripting- Walsh was a master scripter. Where most teams scripted their first 15 offensive plays, Walsh scripted 25. Every Week the script was practiced and executed, in order. This lead to a higher level of comprehension and execution for his players. Walsh was also one of the greatest talent assessors in football. I could easily see him and John Camp standing on a sideline and discussing this topic. Walsh knew the secret, make the offense work for the players, not the other way around. The WCO oozes this belief. Montana was no Marino, but finished on top. Craig didn’t look like Sweetness, but they both averaged 4 yards a carry. Walsh knew what his players could do well, and adjusted his offense to fit their talents. Although he was not part of the 1982-83 team, I am always reminded of a quote from a Dallas Defensive coach. “It’s frustrating, you plan and practice all week to defend this thing called the West Coast Offense. You believe you dotted all the I’s and crossed all the t’s, and you say to yourself we got a real shot at beating these guys. Then come Sunday afternoon, the sun is on your back, the crowd is cheering and Jerry Rice is running away.