Measuring Social Capital: Implications for Conflict Prevention

Measuring Social CapitalMichael J. Gilligan, New York University

+1Social Capital: Definitionsinstitutions, relationships, attitudes, and values that govern interactions among people and contribute to economic and social development (Grootvaert and Bastelaer, 2002).They divide social capital into three categories:Structural membership in associations and networksCognitive trust and adherence to normsCollective actionWe are mainly interested in three behaviors/attitudes:TrustTrustworthinessObligation, i.e. willingness to contribute to joint community endeavors+Implications for Conflict Prevention and DevelopmentTrust: crucial for cost-effective self enforcement of contracts and peace agreementsObligation: Compliance with social norms: non-violence, compromise, fairnessObligation: contributions to public goodsObligation: Respect for legitimate sources of authority+A Few Findings (among many)Putnam (1993) shows that local governments in Italy are more efficient where there is greater civic engagement. Knack and Keefer (1997) demonstrate that increases in country-level trust lead to large increases in the countrys economic growth. La Porta et. al. (1997) establish a strong positive link between trust and judicial efficiency and a strong negative link between trust and corruption. +ImplicationsBecause social capital is linked to development and post conflict peace the World Bank and other international actors have many programs to foster the growth of social capitalCommunity-based DDRCommunity-driven development programsA focus on local capacity in peacekeeping effortsLocal ownership of development and peacebuilding programs

+Measuring Social CapitalThese are very difficult concepts to measureIn many cases they are not observed directlyIndicators differ greatly across different culturesThree sorts of measures can be employedObservationalSurveyBehavioral

+FamiliarizationCommunity ToursInterviews with local leadersFocus groupsIncluding locals on the team is crucial

+Community ObservationFocus group discussionCrime reportsSchool attendanceUpkeep of public spacesUse of public spaceParticipation at public eventsvery context dependent, so be careful!

+SurveysCollective ActionCommunity clean-ups, road building, church raising etc.Cooperatives: financial, child care, agricultural, fishing, etc.Peaceful political activities, for example lobbying of central government+SurveysCommunity associationsList of those that are activeActivitiesMembership: both individual level and total

+SurveysAttitudinal questionsIs this a good place to raise children?I am proud of my communityLocal community leaders are honest/indifferent/corruptAnd many others

+Behavioral activitiesCommunity observation and surveys can fail to uncover true individual social attitudes.Behavioral group activities can be better measures because they isolate and incentivize the precise attitudes and behavior we need to measure.These are referred to as games in the academic literature, but that name understates their seriousness as an effective tool for measuring social capital

+Behavioral gamesFour important games are:Risk gameAltruism game Trust game Public goods gameOur main interest is in trust and public goods games, but we also need to conduct risk and altruism games to control for risk attitudes and altruism

+Game Instruction

+Physical Set up

+LotteryMeasures subjects attitudes toward riskIt is important to control for this attitude because behavior that appears to be trust may really be risk acceptance

+Example from NepalLotteryHeadsTails140402305032060410705080+Nepal Lottery ChoicesLottery Freq. Percent Cum.------------+----------------------------------- 1 | 50 39.06 39.06 2 | 28 21.88 60.94 3 | 21 16.41 77.34 4 | 12 9.38 86.72 5 | 17 13.28 100.00------------+----------------------------------- Total | 128 100.00

+Altruism GameSubjects were given a sum of money In Nepal 40 NPR in 5 NPR notesSubjects are asked how much they wanted to contribute to a local needy familyThe identity of the family is not revealed+

+Altruism Game: Amount SentExample from Nepal Sent Freq. Percent Cum.0166.356.3555220.6326.98107529.7656.7515155.9562.7205923.4186.112531.1987.33031.1988.493562.3890.8740239.13100Total252100+Trust GameSubjects are randomly assigned to one of two roles: sender or receiverBoth types are given initial endowment of moneySenders decide how much of their endowment to send to the receiverWe triple that amount and give it to the receiverThe receiver decides how much of this total to return to the senderAll players and types are anonymousNash: send zero, return zeroSocial optimum: send full endowment, return whatever+TrustDifferent than trustworthiness (Glaeser et. al)Confounded with risk aversion (Schechter 2006)Confounded by feelings of altruism and fairness (Cox 2002)Confounded with patience (de Oliviera et. al 2010)+23Public Goods GameAll subjects play simultaneouslyEach player is given two cards, one with an X and one blankFor each X card turned in in the first round all players receive an amount of money, say 4NPRTurning in an X card in the second round earns the player that turned it in a larger amount, say 20 NPRNash: keep X cardSocial optimum: everyone turns in X card+Example from Nepal:Does exposure to Conflict Affect Social Capital?Victimization may lead to lack of trustDifficult circumstances may force communities to work togetherIf the former a vicious cycle could result An answer is important for transitional programming.Blattman (2009) and Voors et. al. (2009) using different measures have found a positive link between conflict exposure and social capital

+Trust: Amount sent

+Trust: Percent returned

+Effect of Conflict on Trust Variable | Coef. Std. Err. T-stat----------------------------------------------------------------------Dictator sent .1457.0295.09Log income -.532.213 -2.49Log Family Mem. .619 .465 1.33 Conflict area1.257 .722 1.74Constant7.297 2.738 2.67

N = 93Standard error are clustered on village+Effect of Conflict on TrustworthinessVariable Coef. Std. Err. T-stat----------------------------------------------------------------------Sender sent1.053 .246 4.28Log income -.0187 .213 -0.09Log Family Mem.1.6741.979 0.85Dictator sent.254 .0749 3.39Conflict Area1.172 1.095 1.07Constant-5.216 3.863 -1.35

N = 88Standard errors clustered on village+Public goods and ConflictVariableCoef. Std. Err. Z-stat--------------------------------------------------------------------------Log income 0.1850.1021.82Log Family Mem.-0.4710.186-2.53Conflict Area -0.5270.270-1.95Constant -1.6731.125-1.49

N = 178Standard errors clustered on village+Summary of findingsConflict is associated with(1) A greater willingness to provide public goods (2) Higher levels of trust (3) But not higher levels of trustworthiness.+31ConclusionSocial capital is an important component of post-conflict stability and economic developmentMany development programs are designed to foster the growth social capitalThe extent to which these programs accomplish this goal is an important evaluative criterion of these programsSocial capital is measurable by observational survey and behavioral measures+