mccormick the enduring ambiguity of machiavellian virtue

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Social Research: An International Quarterly, Volume 81, Number 1,Spring 2014, pp. 133-164 (Article)

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John P. McCormickThe Enduring Ambiguity of Machiavellian Virtue: Cruelty, Crime, and Christianity in The Prince

one of the puzzles still confronting readers of the prince concerns

Niccol Machiavellis evaluation of Agathocles the Sicilian.1 Why does

Machiavelli hesitate to deem the impressively intrepid and entrepre-

neurial Agathocles virtuous? Machiavelli calls Agathocles a criminal.

But, as even casual readers of the Florentines writings know, Machiavelli

seldom refrains from praising political actors simply because they have

committed crimes.

Indeed, his less than fulsome endorsement of Agathocles ap-

pears in a chapter immediately following one in which he favor-

ably recounts the infamously criminal career of Cesare Borgia or, as

Machiavelli prefers to call him, Duke Valentino. Machiavelli extols

the dukes virtue without any apparent qualification; moreover, he

professes to offer new princes no better example than that of Borgia

(P 7). Especially perplexing in this context is the fact that Agathocles

enjoyed a more successful political career than did Valentino: the duke

was deceived and unceremoniously stripped of his power by Pope Ju-

lius II, leaving his kingdom entirely in the air (P 7), while Agathocles

seized the Syracusan principality for himself and, after noteworthy

civic and military accomplishments, held it securely into an advanced

old age. On these grounds, ought not Machiavelli, the most notorious

purported consequentialist in the history of letters, expressly favor

Agathocles over Borgia?

social research Vol. 81 : No. 1 : Spring 2014133

134 social research

In what follows, I argue that Machiavelli, in fact, considers

Agathocles fully virtuous, and in certain respects esteems him more

highly than he does Borgia. A careful reading of The Prince reveals that

Machiavelli firmly establishes Agathocless credentials as a prince of

equal or superior worth to Duke Valentino. Furthermore, to fully un-

derstand what Machiavelli means by political virtue, I suggest that the

comparison of Agathocles and Borgia must be expanded to include a

too often neglected figure also discussed by Machiavelli in The Prince:

Liverotto of Fermo. The example of Liverotto permits Machiavelli to

demonstrate the extent to which Christianity has undermined the

ability of modern princes, like Borgia, to display the kind of virtue

exhibited by ancient princes, like Agathocles. Liverottos career ac-

centuates just how much Christianity diminishes the quality of politi-

cal virtue in contemporary Italy, and how much the Catholic Church

severely restricts the possibility of grand geopolitical success in the

Mediterranean world.

CRIMES AND THE VIRTUOUS PRINCEIn chapter 8 of The Prince, Machiavelli introduces Agathocles as the

primary exception to the illustrious virtue/fortune distinction that

governs the Florentines evaluation of new princes. As any reader of

the book knows very well, Machiavelli insists that successful princes

must rely on their own virtue rather than capricious fortune in order to

acquire and retain power. In the preceding chapters, 6 and 7, Machiavelli

suggests that new princes come to power either entirely through their

own arms and efforts, as did Romulus, Theseus, and Cyrus, or through

the arms and efforts of others, as did Cesare Borgia (who relied initially

on arms acquired for him by his father, Pope Alexander VI). To be sure,

even the first, entirely virtuous set of princes depend on the good

fortune of finding an enslaved people to liberate, while the ostensibly

merely fortunate ones, like Borgia, may eventually exhibit consider-

able virtue in making the arms of others their own. In fact, Machiavelli

goes so far as to call Borgia or Duke Valentino an individual of ferocity

and virtue; he refers to the duke as a prudent and virtuous prince,

The Enduring Ambiguity of Machiavellian Virtue 135

one whose actions should be imitated despite his initial reliance on

fortune and even despite his ultimate political demise (P 7).

But in the next chapter, Machiavelli suggests that Agathocles

rose to the principate of Syracuse neither through virtue nor fortune,

but rather through a life of crime pursued at every stage of his career

(P 8). As we know, crime is hardly absent from the repertoires of suc-

cessful princes whom, in previous chapters and elsewhere, Machiavelli

deems either virtuous or fortunate. As Machiavelli notes in the Dis-

courses, Romulus murdered his brother, Remus, and his co-regent, Titus

Tatius (D I.9, I.18); and, as he explains in The Prince, Borgia strangled

competing condottieri, and dismembered his problematically capable

henchman, Remirro dOrco (P 7). More intriguingly, Machiavelli insists

that without recourse to these crimes, Romulus would not have success-

fully laid the foundations for Romes free republic and glorious empire,

and Borgia would not have effectively established good government

in the Romagna and provided well-being for its inhabitants (P 7).

In light of his discussions of Romulus and Borgia, why does

Machiavelli refrain from wholeheartedly endorsing Agathocles as a

fully virtuous prince? On the one hand, Machiavelli declares that Ag-

athocless infinite crimes preclude him being called virtuous. Yet, on

the other, Machiavelli himself explicitly invokes the Sicilians virtue

twice: he refers to Agathocles virtue of spirit and of body (virt di

animo e di corpo), and more simply, the virtue of Agathocles (la virt di

Agatocle) (P 8). What accounts for Machiavellis hesitation and equivo-

cation in discussing Agathocless virtue when he exhibits little or

none concerning the respective virtues of Romulus, and, especially, of

Borgia?2

In his account of the Sicilians career, Machiavelli emphasizes

Agathocless poor and lowly origins (P 8). Yet he quickly demonstrates

how, through cruelty, criminality, and military prowess, Agathocles

rose from the son of a simple potter to become praetor, the chief

magistrate, of the Syracusan republic (cf. II.13). One might expect

someone like Agathocles to be satisfied with this astonishing rise from

abjectly poor origins to the height of political and military power. Is

136 social research

it not sufficiently satisfying for Agathocles, a base craftsmans son, to

have become the Syracusan equivalent of a Roman consul? It must be

noted that this potters son rose to command military forces that, not

long before, had defeated the Athenians at the height of their empire.

Nevertheless, legitimate civic and military authority proves

insufficient for Agathocles ambition. According to Machiavelli, Ag-

athocles decided to become prince and to maintain with violence and

without obligation to anyone else that which had been given to him

by consent (P 8). Indeed, even supreme magistrates like praetors and

consuls are bound by collegial obligations and are confined by finite

terms of office. Agathocles aspired to a kind of rule that is, by contrast,

completely or nearly unlimited.

At the time, a Carthaginian army occupied much of Sicily and

threatened Syracuses security and independence. Machiavelli tells us

that Agathocles informs the Carthaginian commander, Hamilcar, of

his plans, but he keeps readers in suspense by neglecting to tell us pre-

cisely what those plans are. Agathocles then calls a formal assembly of

the Syracusan Senate, and the people to decide important public mat-

terspresumably hostilities with Carthage. At this public gathering,

Agathocles orders his soldiers to kill all the senators and the richest

of the people (P 8). In other words, in full sight of the popolo, Agatho-

cles murders the wealthiest and most powerful citizens of his repub-

liccollectively, the social class that in the next chapter, Machiavelli

identifies as the great, the grandi (P 9). In so doing, Agathocles firmly

establishes his principality in Syracuse.

While Agathocles supposedly aspires to act in a manner un-

obliged or unbeholden to anyone else, he clearly depends on the con-

sent of a foreign power. We may now surmise that Agathocles had

asked Hamilcar to indulge his coup in Syracuse, for which Agathocles,

in return, would make Syracuse a client of Carthage. Furthermore,

Agathocles seems to assume the continued consent and even coopera-

tion of common citizens, the people: Machiavelli reports that after

perpetrating his crime against the Syracusan elite, Agathocles holds

the principality without any civil controversythat is, without any


popular protestation. Indeed, once Agathocles betrays Hamilcar and

refuses to surrender Syracuses independence to Carthage, he with-

stands serious initial defeats and sieges without incurring popular

revolts. Then, strikingly turning the besiegers into the besieged, Ag-

athocles invades Africa and harasses the Carthaginians into accepting

his peace terms; specifically, he imposes upon them a truce that grants

him hegemony over the entire island of Sicily (D II.12).

In his summary of Agathocles career, Machiavelli repeats the

fact that he gained independence from virtually all others: while ini-

tially depending upon the Senates consent in order to wield supreme

command, and upon Hamilcars complicity to execute his coup, Ag-

athocles audacity and military skill eventually free him of such en-

tanglements, domestic and foreign. Machiavelli attributes Agathocles

military success first and foremost to his favor with the Syracusan

soldiers, whom he gained for himself through many hardships and

dangers (P VIII). These words, disagi e periculi, hardships and dan-

gers, echo precisely those with which Machiavelli describes himself in

the Dedicatory Letter, that opens The Prince (P DL).

Machiavelli, after all, attempted to advance his own republics

security against foreign threats through diplomatic and military means:

he served as Florences emissary to the empires that threatened his re-

publicthose of France, Germany, and the Holy See; and, he sought to

recruit and train a Florentine civic military. However, the Florentine

aristocracy consistently scuttled Machiavellis efforts to better serve his

patria. Florences ottimati, the grandi, blocked Machiavellis appointment

as the republics ambassador, and they undermined his efforts to estab-

lish a large-scale citizen army within the city. Machiavelli often attrib-

uted to his own relatively humble origins the fact that he received so

little cooperation, recognition, and reward from his fellow citizens for

his difficult and dangerous service to the fatherland.3

Curiously, Borgia, or Duke Valentino, is the other figure with

whom Machiavelli directly affiliates himself textually in The Prince

each of them, Machiavelli claims, suffers a similar malignity of for-

tune (P DL, VII). Both Borgias and Machiavellis political careers

138 social research

were effectively terminated by machinations involving Pope Julius II,

while the latter attempted to consolidate and extend the Churchs ter-

ritorial holdings in central Italy. Upon becoming pope, Julius impris-

oned Borgia and deprived the duke of his troops and provinces. (Bor-

gia escaped to resume a military career in Spain, eventually dying in

battle fighting for the King of Navarre.) Pope Julius also participated in

the plot that overthrew the republic served by Machiavelli and headed

by his patron, Piero Soderini. Julius, Florences nobility, King Ferdi-

nand of Spain, and the Medici family conspired against the republic

to restore the Medici as princes within Florence. As a consequence,

Machiavelli was sacked, incarcerated, and tortured.

In stark contrast, then, to either Borgia or Machiavelli, Agatho-

cles remained secure in his state for the duration of his long life. Ob-

viously, the hardships and dangers that, in Machiavellis own words,

link him with Agathocles, produced greater results for the Sicilian:

after rising to power through Syracuses civic military and then per-

sonally removing any aristocratic obstruction to his plans, Agathocles

greatly expanded his armys ranks. Conversely, Machiavelli, the citi-

zen of an unarmed republic, acceded to the objections of his citys

nobles and settled for the establishment of a small militia comprised

of peasants from Florences countryside. Agathocles led the heavily

armed Syracusans against fearsome Carthage to secure his citys inde-

pendence on his own terms; the poorly armed Florentines sent emis-

saries like Machiavelli to effectively beg the great powers who besieged

them topretty pleaseleave them alone.

Agathocless military acumen is unimpeachable. Indeed, when

Machiavelli first invokes Agathocless virtue, it seems to pertain only

to his military skill, to his status as a most excellent captain (P 8). The

Florentine mentions Agathocles virtue in spirit and body in light of

his martial prowess; and he accentuates the virtue of Agathocles in

confronting and escaping dangers . . . [his] great spirit in sustaining

and overcoming adversities. Both the ancient sources and Machiavelli

himself underscore Agathocless remarkable improvisational skills in

conducting the arts of war.


Yet Machiavelli also provides the Sicilian with a considerable do-

mestic portfolio. Machiavelli notes that despite Agathocless infinite

betrayals and cruelties, he remained securely in power for the dura-

tion of his long lifemost astoundingly, even while he left Syracuse

to wage war on another continent. If Agathocles were not both an

excellent captain and prince, why would the Syracusans endure Ag-

athocless rule even while he was far away from the city? Why would

they not have rebelled against his imperium and blocked his return?

Machiavelli provides an answer. Agathocles was never con-

spired against by his citizens [da sua cittadini non li fu mai conspirato contro] because he employed cruelties well used: that is, cruelties that a prince initially performs at a stroke and that, when reverted to,

subsequently result only in as much utility for subjects as possible

(P 8). Agathocless rapidly and surgically applied cruelties, Machiavelli

avers, benefit rather than harm the majority of his people. Agathocles

may kill some citizens but he also earns the tacit consent and perhaps

even the overt support of very many others.

Machiavellis use of Agathocles as his chief exemplar of a prince

who practices cruelty well-used vis--vis his subjects suggests the fol-

lowing: the Sicilian possesses not only military virtue but also domes-

tic or even civil talents more generally indicative of princely virtue.

What else should we expect from a thinker like Machiavelli who de-

clares unequivocally: where there are good arms there will be good

laws (P 12)?

Indeed, in The Prince Machiavelli upholds Agathocles as the chief

example proving the following somewhat paradoxical rule: a truly in-

dependent prince cannot live securely with his people unless they live

in some security from him. Machiavelli insists, with Agathocles as his

exemplar, that one can never found oneself upon his subjects [sudditi]

if, as a result of new and continual injuries, they are not safe against

him (P 8). To be truly autonomous, Machiavelli declares, a prince may

not simply treat his subjects however he pleases; to avoid conspiracies

and insurrections, he must permit his subjects or citizens some tan-

gible autonomy from himself. Machiavelli here uses the words sub-

140 social research

jects and citizens interchangeably, just as he does elsewhere for

those who live under the rule of another so-called tyrant of Syracuse,

Hiero.

Depending on which classical sources were available to him,

Machiavelli may have been aware of the following remark attributed to

Agathocles: The Sicilian declared that he employed no bodyguards be-

cause the people themselves served as his bodyguard (see Diodorus 1957,

Books IXXI, here Book X, 315; on Machiavellis use of ancient sources,

generally, see Sasso 1987, and Benner 2010). Perhaps this is prominent

among the reasons why Agathocles, according to Machiavelli, lived

securely for a long time in his patria (P 8). If Agathocles was, as the

writers so often called him, a tyrant, then Machiavelli seems to suggest

that he is a peculiar kind of tyrant indeed. Rather than the title of ty-

rant bestowed upon Agathocles by history, Machiavelli writes as if the

Sicilian behaved like someone more akin to a constitutional monarch

(see Machiavelli on the French monarchy: P 19; D I.16, I.58). At the very

least, in addition to enjoying longer lasting political success than Borgia,

Agathocles seems to have provided the Syracusans as much good gov-

ernment and well-being as the duke bestowed upon the Romagnoli,

whom he ruled for a much shorter time.

Despite the fact that Agathocles is a remarkably effective captain

and good ruler, Machiavelli points to the objective fact that Agathocles

is not celebrated among the most excellent men (P 8). Machiavelli is

clearly cognizant of the fact that the writers of the pasthistorians,

essayists, and philosophershave tended to denounce or ignore Ag-

athocles, or at least they tried to minimize his achievements and sig-

nificance. The Florentine was certainly also aware that writers in his

own day vilified Borgia and would continue to do so (see, for instance,

Guicciardini 1984, 13940, 15057, 16176, 18289). Yet Machiavelli,

who never misses an opportunity to distinguish himself from other

writers, here seems to follow the example of ancient writers when he

compliments Agathocles less robustly than he does Valentinoeven

as he defies contemporary convention by bestowing fairly lofty praise

on the duke.


Recall that Borgia was Machiavellis prime example of a prince

who came to power through fortune but was sufficiently adept at force

and fraud to compensate for such initial dependence, so much so that

Machiavelli deems him virtuous with little or no hesitation. If the Flo-

rentine were still operating in chapter 8 with the evaluative opposi-

tion of virtue versus fortune that he employed in chapters 6 and 7,

he would certainly have been logically compelled to judge Agathocles

as virtuous without any qualification. After all, he demonstrates that

the Sicilian owed much less of his political success to fortune than did

Borgia. Agathocles did not, like the duke, inherit arms that his father

borrowed from a foreign king to establish his principality; the Sicilian

rose from the very bottom of Syracuses military to seize such arms for

himself and to establish his own principality with them, successfully

discarding any inhibiting relations of dependence that he incurred

along the way. Again, Agathocles retained his principality much more

successfully and with greater longevity than did the duke, whose king-

dom evaporated with his fathers death.4

Nevertheless, despite all of Agathocles remarkable self-earned

success, Machiavelli quite famously seems to hedge over Agathocles

status as a virtuous prince. In one of the most quoted sentences from

The Prince, Machiavelli declares, with respect to Agathocles, One can-

not call it virtue to kill ones fellow citizens, to betray ones friends, to

be without faith, without compassion, without religion (P 8).

In the effort to better understand the Florentines evaluation

of the respective virtues of Agathocles and Borgia, and therefore

the quality of Machiavellian virtue itself, we should now apply the

standard that Machiavelli invokes in this famous sentence more spe-

cifically and more directly to each of these figures. In subsequent sec-

tions, I will examine more closely Machiavellis apparently emphatic

attribution of virtue to Borgia and then I will reevaluate the respective

virtues of each figure.

142 social research

THE PRINCELY QUALITIES ASSOCIATED WITH VIRTUEWorking backward through the qualities quoted above, which

Machiavelli insists a virtuous prince should possess: Who is more directly

associated with religion, Agathocles or Valentino? The duke was the

natural son of a pope, and he acted as commander of the papal armies.

This certainly gives Borgia some directif, conventionally, rather

un-Christianaffiliation with religious institutions. However, Borgia

had previously served as a cardinal before renouncing churchly office

to pursue a military career. This implies some diminution of Borgias

religious association over the course of his life. Somewhat surprisingly,

Agathocles maintained greater ties to religious authority than did Borgia:

According to historical sources, the Sicilian held a high priesthood when

he seized control of Syracuse, and the only crown that he wore during

his tenure as prince was the ribbon signifying this civic-religious office

(see Diodorus 1959, Book X, 291). Perhaps Machiavelli has this in mind

when he claims, otherwise inexplicably, that Agathocles actions acquit-

ted him well with both God and with men (P 8).

Who was more compassionate? Almost as much as Agathocles,

Borgia serves as a prominent exemplar of the aforementioned Machia-

vellian principle of cruelty well-used. Both commit sudden acts of

violence against prominent elites that consequently result in a form of

kindness for the common people. Borgia eliminates the corrupt petty

lords who despoiled and misgoverned the residents of the Romagna,

and he vivisects his henchman, fellow Spaniard Remirro, who offend-

ed the people while instituting Borgias rule in that province. As we

know, Agathocles exterminates Syracuses ruling class and rescues the

people from the threat of Carthaginian domination. Both Valentino

and Agathocles, Machiavelli notes, resort to violence at a stroke while

gaining control of, respectively, Cesena and Syracuse; as a result, both

princes eschew the kind of persistent and intensifying violence that

necessarily harms the universality of the people (P 8). Both commit

instantaneous acts of cruelty toward the few in ways that exhibit long-

term compassion for the many.


What of faith? Machiavelli demonstrates that both princes are

accomplished liars. Borgia, whom Machiavelli claims knew so well

how to dissimulate, lures disloyal, subordinate condottieri to Siniga-

glia on the pretense of making peace with them, only to murder them

en masse; Agathocles calls the Syracusan grandi to a formal assem-

bly on the pretext of discussing public affairs, only to perpetrate a

similar crime upon on them. Which of the two is guiltier of betray-

ing friends? Borgia rewards Remirros effective service on his behalf

by eliminating him in a spectacularly bloody fashion. He also evades

his obligations to the French king, who had provided him with arms:

rather than enthusiastically aid the latter in his territorial designs on

Naples, Machiavelli favorably describes how the duke pursues his own

conquests in central Italyconquests that were, in fact, expressly pro-

scribed by the king (P 7). Agathocles, besides betraying the Syracusan

Senates trust by eliminating it, breaks whatever word he gave Hamil-

car by renewing hostilities with Carthage after the latter had allowed

him to seize the Syracusan principality.

In summation, Borgia, whom Machiavelli deems virtuous with-

out any apparent qualification, and Agathocles, whom Machiavelli

does not acknowledge as a fully virtuous prince, both more or less

equally exemplify (or contravene) the qualities of religion, compas-

sion, faith, and friendship that are supposedly decisive in Machiavellis

evaluation of a princes prospective virtue. Further complicating mat-

ters, Machiavelli arguably holds in higher regard than any of these

qualities, which Agathocles may or may not have possessed, the fol-

lowing two modes, mentioned above, that Machiavelli insists Agath-

ocles most certainly observed with great care: the exercise of cruelty

well used and the guarantee of personal security to most of his sub-

jects or citizens. These modes of action are more conducive to virtue

as Machiavelli expounds it throughout The Prince than are actions con-

forming to religion, compassion, faith, and friendship, about which he

expresses notorious ambivalence (see, for example, P 18).

But Agathocles rule most certainly did not guarantee the

security of all of his would-be citizen-subjects. Therefore, a serious

144 social research

impropriety that Agathocles commits, which Borgia does not, an act

that may indeed impeach the Sicilians credentials as a fully virtuous

prince, is the following crime: to kill ones fellow citizens (ammaz-

zare e sua cittadini) and in so doing, overthrow a republic. From the pen

of Machiavelli, who generally favors republics over principalities (D

I.58; II.2), this is potentially a very serious charge indeed.

After all, in the Discourses, Machiavelli, following well-worn re-

publican tropes, declares that individuals should wish to be praised,

as Scipio Africanus is, for defending and maintaining republics rather

than be denounced, as Julius Caesar iswhether overtly or subtlyfor

corrupting or usurping them (D I.10; see also Oppel, 1974, 221265;

and Jurdjevic 1999, 10025). History may forgive a founder like Ro-

mulus, who commits crimes in the process of laying the foundations

of a future republic, but crimes committed in the usurpation of a re-

public bring blame upon princes like Caesar. The former, Machiavelli

observes, win worldly glory for themselves while the latter suffer

enduring infamy (D I.10).

From this perspective Valentino looks more like Romulus and

Agathocles more like Caesar. The dukes crimes enable him to establish

the foundations of a principality in Urbino and the Romagna thatbut

for his ultimate ill fortunemight have eventually become a republic.

While Agathocles overthrows a republic and kills fellow citizens,

Valentino, by bringing peace and civic institutions to his conquests,

initiates the process of making citizens out of the formerly subjugated

peoples of the greater Romagna (P VII).5 Borgia cleaned up the corrupt,

petty lords of those provinces (cf. D I.29) while Agathocles usurped an

already existing Mediterranean republic.

This sharp contrast between the two figures may be mitigated

somewhat by the fact that both Valentino and Agathocles enhanced

the civic-military institutions of their dominions: the duke arms his

new subjects in the Romagna and the Sicilian expands the civilian

ranks of his militaryin fact, he even frees slaves to serve alongside

citizen-soldiers (see Justin 1994, 22:4). Moreover, Agathocles may have

inflicted less harm on the common people of Sicily while consolidating


his rule there than the duke imposed on the vulgaro of the Romag-

nawhy else were the latter so angry at Remirro (and possibly at the

duke himself) that Valentino needed to purge them of such ill spirit

by eliminating the former so spectacularly (P 7)?6

When founding a people, as opposed to simply establishing a

principality cum republic, a prince may be compelled to behave cruelly

toward the people as well as toward elites. Note, for instance, the infi-

nite numbers of his own people Machiavelli insists Moses needed to kill

in order to establish his laws (D III.30)many more, it seems, than did

Romulus. Of course, Machiavelli sets strict limits on how deeply into the

populace such cruelties should penetrate and for how long they ought

to persist (P 8)especially when such rigors pertain to subjects prop-

erty and women (P 16, 19). In short, the rule of no prince can long en-

dure pervasive and persistent abuse of the common people.7

Be that as it may, even if Borgias cruelties affected a larger

number of subjects than did those of Agathocles, the latters cruelties

harmed already established citizens, usurped civic institutions, and

overturned a republic. Such criticisms of Agathocles abound in the

works of scholars associated with Cambridge School interpretations

of Machiavelli, especially in the writings of Quentin Skinner (see Skin-

ner 1978, 119, 13738; 1981, 42; 2000, 47; see also Stacey 2007, 135,

147, 29697). I want to suggest that such criticisms are premised on a

widely held but potentially faulty assumption that Machiavelli main-

tained a rather strictly undifferentiated notion of both republics and

of citizens.

On the issue of republics: Machiavelli does not merely prefer

republics to principalities; he favors certain republics over others,

namely democratic republics like Athens and Rome and the German-

Swiss cities over oligarchic republics like Sparta and Venice (see Mc-

Cormick 2011a, 117, 2135, 4661). Furthermore, he may favor

certain kinds of principalities over these latter, oligarchic forms of re-

publicsespecially principalities that convert unarmed republics into

armed ones; and principalities that transform republics governed by

the few into those where the many enjoy more extensive and robust

146 social research

political power. All of the ancient sources, whatever their conflicting

accounts of Agathocless career, concur on at least this point: the Si-

cilian overthrew a republic where the Senate and richest citizens had

recently amassed more power for themselves at the Syracusan demoss

expense. In short, Agathocles overthrew an oligarchy that had former-

ly been a democracy (see M. I. Finley 1979, 101).

Relatedly, on the issue of citizens: Machiavelli begins to show

in chapter 8 of The Prince, and then confirms decisively in chapter 9,

that as far as he is concerned, there are in fact two kinds, not one kind

of citizen: in chapter 8 he introduces certain citizens who crave op-

pression versus those who strive to resist it; and, more specifically, in

chapter 9, he distinguishes between the grandi, or the nobles, who are

consumed by the appetite to oppress, and the popolo, the people, who

are motivated by the appetite not to be oppressed.

These distinctions among kinds of republics, between different

kinds of principalities, and between different kinds of citizens are es-

pecially relevant in our evaluation of Agathocles. After all, as both

Victoria Kahn and Leo Strauss point out quite astutely, Agathocles

reign in Syracuse, which Machiavelli describes with feigned ambiva-

lence in chapter 8, shares many characteristics with the civil prin-

cipality that he describes with more explicit favor in chapter 9: that

is, a principality in which an individual comes to supreme power with

the support of some citizens over othersmost preferably, with the

armed support of the common people against the nobles.

Indeed, Machiavellis exemplar of the successful civil prince in

chapter 9, Nabis the Spartan, behaves very much like Agathocles. Ac-

cording to Machiavelli, Nabis satisfied the Spartan people and avoided

being hated and despised by them; as a result, he withstood military

assaults and sieges by all of Greece, and even by the Roman Republic,

successfully defending his patria and his state against them (P 9, 19;

D I.10). Curiously, Machiavelli declares in these passages that he can-

not provide details of how a prince such as Nabis may gain the people

to himself since, supposedly, there are too many ways to do so for

which no fixed rules apply.


Or, perhaps, Machiavelli need not explicate such means in chap-

ter 9 because he has already provided precisely such details through

the example of Agathocles in the previous chapter. In fact, if we con-

sult the historical record, Nabis and Agathocles liberate their peoples

from both domestic and external oppression in similar ways, including

cruelty and criminality: like Agathocles, Nabis makes fighting subjects

out of former slaves to expand Spartas military forces; like Agatho-

cles, who manipulated his alliance with Carthage, Nabis betrays the

Macedonian monarchy to the diplomatic and military advantage of

his patria; and, if Nabis does not, as did Agathocles, murder his citys

nobles at a stroke, he intermittently kills, tortures, and exiles his

richest and most powerful subjects in order to distribute their wealth

to the people.

In short, both Agathocles and Nabis usurp oligarchic republics;

both kill rich, prominent citizens, and both successfully defend their

fatherlands from external domination (see Strauss 1958, 310, n. 53).

The only notable distinction between the two is the fact that Agath-

ocles attempts to restore a republic, in fact, a democracy, from his

deathbed; Nabis was prevented from doing so, had he been so inclined,

by an assassination plot hatched by foreign agents.8 By Machiavellis

standards, Agathocles enjoys credentials that entitle him, as much or

more so than Nabis, to the status of a civil prince: Agathocles initiates

and guides the transformation of an oligarchic republic into a more

democratic one. Both left their republics, by certain standards, in bet-

ter civic and military conditions than when they first usurped them.

If Machiavelli suggests that Agathocles shares with Nabis the

qualities of a successful civil prince, we should not be surprised to

note that Agathocles, like Nabis, avoids the mistakes that, in chapter

9, Machiavelli attributes to failed civil princes such as the Gracchi in

Rome and Giorgio Scali in Florence (P 9): Agathocles assumes supreme

command of a citizen army and mobilizes the people against the nobil-

ity. Founding on the people entails much more than mere popular

favor; one must be in a position to command the peoplewhich means

they must be armed and ordered under your charge. The Roman and

148 social research

Florentine grandi managed to overcome the Gracchi and Giorgio Scali

precisely because the latter had not formally and militarily enlisted

the people in their defense. Tribunes, like the Gracchi, who command-

ed the plebeians in assemblies but not in legions, were thoroughly

crushed by Romes senatorial order. Scali, who served as the patron of

poor Florentines during the Ciompi Revolt, was easily outmaneuvered

by the citys political and economic elites, and executedcursing the

purported faithlessness of the Florentine people (see Machiavelli 1962,

3:18).

Machiavellis examples of Nabis and Agathocles set against those

of Scali and the Gracchi suggest that civil princes who would reform

republics that have become increasingly and deleteriously oligarchic,

encounter kill-or-be-killed circumstances vis--vis the Senates and rich-

est citizens of their cities. Agathocles, I argue, must be evaluated in light

of this do-or-die dilemma, and also in light of Machiavellis distinctions

between democratic and oligarchic republics, between princes who fa-

vor the people and those that favor the nobles, and between the moti-

vations of noble versus common citizens. From this perspective, there

may be certain circumstances condoned by Machiavelli, such as those

confronted by Agathocles, where a prince might legitimately ammazza

e sua cittadini, or kill ones fellow citizens.9

All this notwithstanding, the fact remains: despite the virtue

that Machiavelli attributes to Borgia, the duke failed to achieve his

goal of creating a broad central Italian principality and of becoming

arbiter of Italy, while Agathocles secures all of Sicily for himself.

Moreover, it must be noted that Machiavelli is not exactly the full-

throated champion of Borgias virtue that he first appears to be. On

closer inspection, just as Machiavelli seems to qualify Agathocless vir-

tue, he also subtly indicates a certain lack of virtue on Borgias parta

lack of virtue not fully attributable to the fact that the duke began his

career with borrowed arms. On the one hand, Machiavelli explicitly

calls Valentino virtuous throughout his account of the dukes career,

and he seems to insist that the latters ultimate political failure was

not his fault (P 7). On the other, however, Machiavelli ultimately


attributes the dukes political demise not to any specific malignity

of fortune but rather to a fairly clear deficiency of virtue: Borgia, he

claims, errs in his choice of who would succeed his father as pope. Val-

entino could, Machiavelli claims, have prevented the election of a pon-

tiff who would have posed a grave threat to his nascent principality:

he could have permitted the accession of a French or Spanish cardinal

who would have more readily tolerated Borgias territorial gains than

did an Italian like Giuliano della Rovere, who became Julius II. Instead,

Borgia permits the election of della Rovere, a man his father had pre-

viously exiled and who, in retribution, would consequently strip the

duke of his state.

So, to offer a provisional summary of Machiavellis assessments

of these figures: on the one hand, Machiavelli denies Agathocles the

full praise that his actions, by Machiavellian standards, ought to en-

title the Sicilian; on the other, Machiavelli exaggerates his praise of

Borgia, whose actions, by those very same standards, ought to con-

demn him as a rather foolhardy failure. In the end, the Florentine

bestows upon Agathocles the virtue that he seemed to be withhold-

ing from him throughout his evaluation, and then withdraws from

Borgia the virtue that he initially granted him. Indeed, if one looks

more closely at Machiavellis evaluation of Agathocles, it is hard to

say whether the Florentine ever actually criticized the Sicilian at all:

Machiavelli employs indirect speech when he claims that one can-

not call Agathocles virtuous; but then, in his own voice, Machiavelli

emphatically calls him virtuous. Machiavellis rhetoric suggests that

it may, in fact, be a third party or third parties, and not Machiavelli

himself, who deny Agathocless virtue. The Florentine expresses his

own view when he directly attributes virtue to the Sicilian. In light of

these giveths and takeths on the part of Machiavelli, it proves exceed-

ingly difficult to provide a definitive answer to the simple question,

Who is more virtuous, Agathocles or Valentino? Clearly one is more

virtuous than Machiavelli first makes it seem, and the other less so.

But we do not know, conclusively, which one Machiavelli deems to be

more virtuous.10

150 social research

We cannot, I argue, venture a final word on this issueif such

a word is indeed possibleuntil we examine Machiavellis other ex-

ample of an individual whom, like Agathocles, he initially claims to

be neither strictly virtuous nor fortunate; another individual whom

Machiavelli deems to be a mere criminal: Liverotto da Fermo. Liverotto

shares notable attributes associated with both Borgia and Agathocles,11

and Machiavellis account of his career sheds light on two issues raised

above: first, the extent to which Machiavelli thinks that cittadini are

always worthy of the reverence bestowed on them by civic-humanists;

and, second, the issue I raised at the outset of my remarks: the ramifi-

cations of papal power for contemporary Italian politics. More specifi-

cally, the case of Liverotto highlights the extent to which Christianity

and the Catholic Church have foreclosed the possibility of princely

virtue emerging in the Italy of Machiavellis day.

LIVEROTTO, CORRUPT CITIZENS, AND THE PAPAL THREAT TO PRINCELY VIRTUE The mercenary captain Liverotto of Fermo (Oliverotto Euffreducci) is

Machiavellis modern example of a prince who, like his ancient counter-

part, Agathocles, rises to political authority through crimes. Liverotto,

ingenious, and hardy in body and spirit, returns to his native city after

excelling in the military service of condottieri, Paolo and Vitellozzo Vitelli

(P 8). Exploiting norms of patriotic duty and filial obligation, Liverotto is

permitted to enter the city in a parade of armed men and granted an elab-

orate homecoming dinner, a celebratory banquet that purportedly will

honor everyone involved: the returning hero, his family, and his beloved

hometown. However, at this solemn banquet, Liverotto deceives and

strangles Giovanni Foglianihis maternal uncle and adopted father

along with other first men of the republic. Machiavelli notes how

certain citizens (alcuni cittadini) of Fermo were complicit in Liverottos

coup; certain citizens who esteemed servitude more highly than

the liberty of their patria (P 8). In other words, at the same time that

Liverotto betrays his adopted father, Fogliani, these leading citizens,

Machiavelli suggests, betray their fatherland by conspiring to hand it


over to a mercenary usurper. To underscore this point, Machiavelli

declares the acts of Liverotto and his co-conspirators a parricide.

This emphasis on duplicitous, corrupt citizens potentially un-

dermines the exalted status to which the civic humanists of Machiavel-

lis day (and contemporary neorepublicans) might elevate, without

qualification, the notion of cittadini. Furthermore, it may problema-

tize the extent to which Agathocles should be rebuked for killing citi-

zens. Machiavelli introduces here, and in the next chapter further

explores, the idea, mentioned above, that there are in fact two kinds of

citizens in republics: those who crave oppression and those who strive

to resist it (P 9; cf. D I.5). The combination of evidence and arguments

from these two chapters may suggest that the former should be dealt

with more sternly than the latter.

Be that as it may, Liverotto proves an intriguing parallel for

Agathocles: an orphan, the usurper of Fermo compensates for a disad-

vantaged upbringing by excelling in military arts, albeit under merce-

nary rather than civic auspices (P 8). Machiavelli also notes that, like

Agathocles, Liverotto equates obedience and even collegiality with ser-

vility; moreover, like the Sicilian, Liverotto eliminates his citys ruling

classor at least that part of it which was not complicit in his coup. As Machiavelli shows elsewhere in The Prince, as well as in the Discourses

and the Istorie Fiorentine, while the nobilities of ancient Italian repub-

lics remained united by their shared antagonism toward armed popu-

laces, who constantly challenged their privilege and authority, papal

meddling into domestic politics splits the nobilities of modern Italian

cities into antagonistic parties, such as Guelfs and Ghibellines (P 11,

20). Whereas class conflict produced outcomes conducive to liberty

in ancient republics, sectarian strife continually undermines the civic

health of modern republics.

However, despite these general criticisms of modern republics

and those who exploit their civic deficiencies, Liverotto is not, in Ma-

chiavellis estimation, an entirely reprehensible individual. After forci-

bly compelling Fermos magistrates to grant him full power, Liverotto,

like Agathocles, reorders the republic with civic and military reforms.

152 social research

Also like Agathocles, Liverotto governs without insurrection and with

notable military success. He was poised to expand his principality be-

yond Fermo, Machiavelli informs us, only to be undone by the deceit

of none other than Cesare Borgia, who entraps and murders Liverotto

at another purportedly celebratory gathering a year later in Senigallia.

This outcome, Machiavelli intimates, would have been highly unlikely

absent the intrigues associated with mercenary warlord politics con-

tinually instigated by the papacy (cf., P 13, 24). (Of course, Liverotto

may never have enjoyed the opportunity to overthrow Fermos repub-

lic in the first place, without such intriguesat least not with the aid

of foreign arms.)

Machiavelli elaborates the full ramifications of this point with

considerable delicacy. Unlike Agathocles, who gains imperium over all

of Sicily, Liverottos own ability to secure a foothold within the Marche

region of Italy is constantly shadowed by papal authority in Machia-

vellis account: Machiavelli dates Liverottos political rise by citing the

reign of Pope Alexander VI; the Vitelli, mercenaries in the service of

Alexander, sponsor Liverottos coup in Fermo; and, finally, Liverotto

invokes the greatness of Pope Alexander and his son, Duke Valen-

tino, at the banquet where he deceives and murders leading citizens of

Fermo. Liverottos toast or blessing honoring Alexander and Valentino

prompts a conversation among the dinner participants over contem-

porary papal politics, which then gives Liverotto the pretext to move

such sensitive discussions to a more secret place (in loco piu secreto). In

this antechamber or upper room, Liverottos soldiers, who are lying in

wait, strangle his uncle and the other leading citizens in attendance.

Rather chillingly, Liverottos toast is a blessing that proves to be

a curse. It rings out as a death sentence for Fermos first citizens, who

are strangled that night; it foreshadows Liverottos own deception and

strangulation by Cesare Borgia, whose greatness it invokes. Moreover,

Liverottos blessing proves to be a curse for Duke Valentino as well. In

fairly short order, all of the above will have been deprived of either

their lives or their authority. After Liverottos assassination of the otti-

mati of Fermo, Pope Alexander and his son quickly snuff out Liverottos


nascent principality, just as Pope Julius will shortly do the same to Ce-

sare Borgias reign in the greater Romagna.

Machiavelli emphasizes the corrupt clientalism and servile

dependence rife within papal-mercenary politics by revealing Liv-

erotto, in the end, to be little more than an extension of Vitellozzo

Vitellis power and influence (P 8): at Senigallia, while both were being

strangled by Borgias men, Liverotto pleaded mercy; from his knees

and through his tears, Liverotto protested that he was only doing Vi-

tellozzos bidding in challenging the authority of the duke and the

Church (see Machiavelli [1989], 1: 16370). By his own words, Liverotto

confirms the fact that, all along, Vitellozzo had been, in Machiavel-

lis words, the master of both [Liverottos] virtues and his crimes.

Plainly, his insolent and insubordinate nature notwithstanding, Liv-

erotto never managed to fully extricate himself from dependence on

his mercenary patrons, the Vitelli, who themselves never successfully

freed themselves from dependence on the nefarious patronage of the

Churchwhich, through Valentinos actions, hastened their collective

demise.

Indeed, in the Discourses, Machiavelli similarly declares Cesare

Borgia to have been little more than the instrument of his not so Holy

Father, Alexander (P 11; D III.29). Within Machiavellis worldview, it

seems, until such time as one is truly a prince, until one attains full

autonomyas Agathocles enjoyed in Sicilyone is always merely the

tool of some other more powerfully situated political actor.

Despite his own revulsion toward servitude, Liverottos pros-

trate, tearful confession bears witness to the fact of his own lack of au-

tonomy, his own servility, at the very moment that others take his life

from him. By contrast, Agathocles lived securely for a long time in

his patria, his fatherland (P 8). Not only did Agathocles die in his bed,

an old man, he pronounced the restoration of the Syracusan republic,

which he left in better civic and military conditions than when he first

usurped it. Machiavelli never remotely accuses Agathocles, as he does

Liverotto, of committing parricide because the Sicilian leaves his pa-

tria better off than he found it. To put matters simply, Machiavellis

154 social research

contrast of the careers of Liverotto and Borgia against that of Agatho-

cles demonstrates that princely independence and longevityas well

as the civic benefits that these may confer upon republicsare much

more difficult to attain in Christian Italy than they were in the pagan

Mediterranean.

As both Liverotto and Valentino discover, to their considerable

dismay, a curious combination of power and weakness enables the pa-

pacy to prevent an Agathocles from emerging in modern Italy. Speak-

ing generally, Machiavelli observes how the Church was too strong

to permit another actor to unify Italy, but too weak to do so itself (D

I.12; see Brown 2011; Colish 1999, 597616; Cutinelli-Rndina 1998;

Tarcov 2014; and Viroli 2012). For our purposes, this means that it is

much more difficult for a modern usurper of Fermo, like Liverotto, or

a redeemer of the Romagna, like Borgia, to become lord of the entire

region; more difficult certainly than it was for the ancient usurper

of Syracuse to become master of all Sicily. Machiavellis contrast of

Agathocles and Liverottos careers highlights the thorough corrup-

tion and denigration of politics wrought by the papacy (P 1112).

Throughout his writings, Machiavelli observes how the Church again

sows seeds of disunity among the nobles of Italian republics, splitting

them into parties like Guelphs and Ghibellines; he also shows how

the papacy abetted the military disarming of modern peoples: even

when guildsmen managed to vanquish their cities nobles, they relied

increasingly on the arms of private, hired mercenaries to protect their

republics (P 1213).12 The Church may have religiously legitimated the

cause of the people in such conflicts, but in the service of that cause,

Machiavelli insists, it would not, and indeed could not, provide them

with arms or knowledge of how to use them.

Precisely because the Church divides modern nobles and dis-

arms modern peoples, new princes, like Liverotto, seldom enjoy the

opportunity to usurp republics in ways that actually improve them

long term, both civically and militarily. Modern usurpers cum reform-

ers rarely face the circumstances seized by Agathocles; that is, the op-

portunity to publiclyand hence with all the dignity that publicitas


confersoverthrow or correct their citys nobles. In Christian repub-

lics, supreme magistrates never wield robust civic-military author-

ity over armed citizens, and they never confront their citys nobles

formally collected in Senates in the full light of day.13 Instead, new

princes must, as Liverotto is compelled to do, dishonorably lure their

adversaries to banquets held in private chambers, secret rooms, where

they strangle them in the shadows of the night (P 8). In other words,

modern princes confront few opportunities to become genuine civil

princes, as defined by Machiavelli in the very next chapter.

Machiavellis Liverotto also intriguingly serves as a fruitful alle-

gory for Christian Italy, as a whole: orphaned by the collapse of pagan

Rome, Italy, like Liverotto, is put in the inconstant, treacherous, and

civically corrupting hands of mercenary commanders by an effemi-

nate father-figure, the pope. (Recall that Machiavelli carefully identi-

fies Liverottos adopted father, Fogliani, as his maternal uncle, his

zio materno.) Destined to remain the hopelessly hobbled instrument

of the Church, Liverotto is literally and figuratively both a strangler

and the strangled: as a mercenary he helps the Church undermine

functioning republics like Fermo by asphyxiating their leading citi-

zens; conversely, as a potential princely threat to the Churchs author-

ity he himself must be suffocated by the Churchs latest mercenary

tool, Cesare Borgia.

In short, whatever flowers of political virtue might be planted

or cultivated in central Italy by some ambitious individual pope must,

to preserve the authority of the Church, be cut down subsequently

by that very same pontiff or by a succeeding one. These Alexanders,

Juliuses, and Caesars prove, in the end, to be shallow, impotent

imitations of their ancient, pagan namesakes. International influ-

ence over papal elections and the short terms of a single popes reign,

Machiavelli indicates, serve to undermine any political actor, however

virtuous, who might threaten to supplant the Churchs self-anointed

role as imperfect but seemingly permanent arbiter of Italy. To empha-

size this fact, Machiavelli demonstrates how previous princely would-

be arbiters of Italy, such as Braccio da Montone or Francesco Sforza,

156 social research

fared no better in their day at seizing the peninsulas fate from the

hands of the Church than Liverotto or Valentino did in theirs (P 12).14

AGATHOCLES, BORGIA AND VIRTUE REVISITEDLet us reevaluate our principle comparison between Agathocles and

Borgia in light of the example of Liverotto. Agathocles is more virtuous

than Valentino in the strictest sense in which Machiavelli uses the term:

he winds up beholden to no other political actor except his own armed

people; he gains mastery over an impressively wide territorial expanse;

he is crueler to the few than to the many; no one conspires against or

overthrows his state during the span of his long life; and he leaves his

polity better off than he found it. However, Agathocles never encoun-

tered the kind of senatorial order that confronted both Liverotto and

Valentino. The court of Rome is a seat of collegial power that can neither

be navigated nor eliminated so easily as were the Senate of Syracuse,

or the Signoria of Fermo, or the petty lords of the Romagna. The papa-

cys influence, Machiavelli indicates, will continually serve to severely

constrict any civic or territorial gains a new prince might secure within

Italy. Moreover, it will continue to empower mercenaries or foreigners

to ensure that the Church retains its dominant if limited geopolitical

position on the peninsula. Invariably, the papacy will either literally or

figuratively strangle such a new principality in its cradle.

From this perspective, Cesare Borgias genuine virtue is dis-

played afresh: he accomplished so much despite the presence of ob-

stacles that never stood in the way of ancient princes, reformers, and

founders (see McCormick 2011b). In this light, Valentino is somewhat

absolved for his flawed judgment in permitting an Italian rather than

a Frenchman or Spaniard to become pope. Perhaps, as Machiavelli sug-

gests, the latter would not have seized the dukes provinces in the Ro-

magna; Borgia did in fact enjoy diplomatic ties with the French throne

and filial ties with the Spanish one. However, even if we bracket the

doubts that Machiavelli raises about the durability of diplomatic and

filial ties throughout the episodes discussed above, neither the French

nor the Spanish monarch were likely to allow their own pope to watch


idly while Valentino expanded his holdings in ways that threatened

French or Spanish interests on the peninsula. Again, the Church is too

strong relative to Italian political actors and too weak relative to for-

eign ones to serve as a reliable vehicle for uniting Italy.

Notwithstanding the political constraints imposed by the

Churchor precisely because of themCesare Borgia, Duke Valen-

tino, rather than Agathocles the Sicilian, must be Machiavellis exem-

plar for political success in the Italy of the Florentines day. This may

account for Machiavellis rhetorical accentuation and perhaps even

exaggeration of Valentinos virtue, even though, in otherwise objec-

tive terms, it falls far short of the virtue exhibited by Agathocles. Ma-

chiavellis Duke Valentino shows how far one can ride papal authority

toward becoming arbiter of Italy, but he simultaneously serves as a

cautionary tale for how much further one must go than did the duke

to actually realize such a goal.

Ultimately, Machiavellis narrative in chapters 7 and 8 of The

Prince intimates that the Church is a more intractable opponent than

one of the fiercest, most successful military powers of all time, the

Carthaginian Republic. Recall that Agathocles managed to impose his

will on Carthage, perhaps the second most formidable military re-

public, after Rome, in ancient history. Yet individuals like Borgia and

Liverotto, princes who possess virtue and spirit of mind and body

comparable to those of Agathocles, stand nary a punchers chance in

combat with the Holy See.

ACkNOWLEDGMENTThis essay is part of a book project titled The Peoples Princes:

Machiavelli, Leadership, and Liberty.

NOTES

1. The Machiavelli texts cited in this paper are Il Principe (De Principatibus),

composed circa 1513 and published in 1532 (ed. G. Inglese, 1995),

which is abbreviated as P and cited with chapter numbers within the

text; and Discorsi (ed. C. Vivanti, 1997), hereafter D within the text.

158 social research

2. Kahn offers a clever and remarkably convincing resolution to the

Borgia-Agathocles puzzle: Machiavelli, in her estimation, criticizes

Agathocless crimes immediately after praising those of Borgia so as

to absolve himself, rhetorically, for actually endorsing the evil means

employed by both political actors. In so doing, Machiavelli, in chapter 8,

mimics Borgias own theatrical act of disavowal that the Florentine

describes in chapter 7: by spectacularly murdering his henchman,

Remirro dOrco, Borgia exonerates himself of responsibility for the

crimes that Remirro committed at Borgias behest. Machiavelli does

the same vis--vis Borgia through his ostensibly severe but actually

barely feigned criticisms of Agathocles. See Kahn, Virt and the

Example of Agathocles (1993) as well as Kahn, Machiavellian Rhetoric:

From the Counter-Reformation to Milton (1994, 2639); and her reconsid-

eration of Machiavellis Agathocles in Revisiting Agathocles (2013).

3. See, e.g., de Grazia (1989, 251). Some interpreters consider Agathocless

poor and abject origin to be the very reason that he has not been more

celebrated historically (e.g., P XIV, D I.10). Lefort and Coby suggest that

Agathocless low birth is what ultimately separates him from figures

who act in a similar manner and yet nevertheless attain glory, such

as Scipio, Moses, Romulus, and Borgia (see Lefort 1972, 380 and Coby

1999, 23435).

4. It must be noted, of course, that Machiavelli does not necessarily

equate either virtue or glory with success, as such: Hannibal is an

individual who, in Machiavellis estimation, deservedly achieved both

despite his ultimate military and political defeats (D III.10).

5. Machiavelli notes how, in a manner quite unusual for the times,

Valentino rapidly and extensively began arming his subjects (see

Machiavelli 1964, 419, 455; Skinner 2000, 2021).

6. Perhaps most important, one characteristic in particular sepa-

rates Agathocles from Borgia: Kahn successfully demonstrates that

Machiavelli condemns the Syracusan far less substantially than inter-

preters conventionally suppose. Indeed, she understands Machiavelli

to be more favorably disposed to Agathocles than to Borgia, suggesting

that he presents the former to be more popularly representative than


Borgia, more robustly proto-republican than the duke, and indeed a

better approximation of the civil prince, whom Machiavelli favorably

describes in chapter 9. See Kahn (1994, 3539). I am generally amena-

ble to this position, as what follows makes clear; but several counter-

arguments are worth considering: Machiavelli explicitly identifies the

people more closely with Borgia, via the title Duke Valentino, than

with any other figure in The Prince; Borgia betrays friends and allies

after they have exhibited bad faith or caused him harm (cf., P 7) while

Agathocles apparently does so without provocation; Borgia establishes

civic institutions whereas Agathocles, from a certain perspective, can

be said to have undermined or destroyed them; and if Agathocles

reigned longer than Borgia, it could be argued that this is due as much

to the foundations provided by the respectively corrupt and thriving

regimes that preceded their rule as to their own individual talents and

efforts (see McCormick 2011b).

7. Machiavelli notes the checkered record of the Roman emperors who

confronted circumstances where the soldiers were not identical to the

people (as they had been in the republic): such emperors were forced

either to indulge the soldiers abuse of the people or protect the latter

from the former; in either case, deposition or assassination were the

usual outcomes (19).

8. Strauss suggests that Machiavelli deliberately fails to mention

Agathocless pitiable end and the fact that Nabis perished through

a conspiracy (see Strauss 1958, 26). However, the classical sources

conf lict over the circumstances of Agathocless death: Diodorus

reports that he was poisoned; Justin that he contracted a fatal disease.

Even if the former is the case, Agathocless end is no more pitiable

than those of, say, Moses or Romulus. Nabis did in fact succumb to

an externally hatched conspiracy: former military allies assassinated

Nabis but failed to install an alternative government in Sparta, due

to vigorous resistance on the part of Nabiss subjects. In any case,

Nabis was ambushed exactly where Machiavelli suggests a good prince

always ought to be: exercising his troops (14).

160 social research

9. I say more elsewhere about Machiavellis discussion of Scipio, Caesar,

Agathocles, and the praise and blame that ought to accompany the

maintenance or usurpation of republics; more specifically, I question

how far the republican standard may be used within a Machiavellian

framework to rebuke Agathocles (see McCormick 2014). I suggest that,

in Machiavellis estimation, Agathocles actually proves to be a supe-

rior civil prince to both Scipio and Caesar, each of whom permitted

themselves to be undermined or eliminated by the senatorial orders of

their republics when they should have taken bolder measures to effec-

tively crush the latter so that each civil prince, acting as a reformer or

refounder, might have initiated or completed necessary civic-military

reforms. In the case of Rome, these reforms would have stemmed the

trends of oligarchic corruption that were heading the republic toward

collapse. For more on the idea that eliminating an entire republics

elite is not necessarily a bad thing as far as Machiavelli is concerned,

see McCormick (2012, 71738).

10. Many commentators seek to resolve this issue by invoking the theme

of glory; they attempt to diminish whatever virtue Machiavelli

attributes to Agathocles by citing the Florentines remark that

Agathocless methods may be employed to acquire rule but not glory

(8). However, within The Prince, Machiavelli does not discuss glory as if

it is something that he himself is capable of bestowing upon an indi-

vidual prince. The historians, the writers, have already decided who

is counted among the most excellent men and who is worthy of

glory. If one examines carefully the individuals in The Prince whom

Machiavelli concedes have attained glory, these figures do not neces-

sarily meet with the Florentines approvalmost notably Ferdinand

of Aragon (12, 13, 21) and Scipio Africanus (14, 17). The writers, whom

Machiavelli argues do not properly apprehend the effectual truth

of politics, bestow glory upon such individuals, whom Machiavelli

himself considers to be less than fully virtuous (see McCormick 2014).

To make a rather long story short, I argue that Machiavellis treatment

of glory in The Prince suggests that Scipio is glorious but not virtuous,

while Agathocles is virtuous but not glorious. In contemporary social


science jargon: excellence and glory are descriptive categories for

Machiavelli, while virtue is a normative category.

11. Noteworthy comparisons/contrasts that are operative here: Agathocles

rises from low, impoverished origins to command a civic military

while Liverotto and Cesare are displaced and wayward, orphaned, or

illegitimate aristocrats who are provided mercenary and foreign arms

by the Church and its clients.

12. This is, of course, one of the prevailing narratives of Machiavelli (1962,

especially, I.23); see also Lynch 2012, 126).

13. There is some tension on this point when Machiavelli discusses

Agathocles in the Discourses: on the one hand, he cites the Sicilian as

one who rose to power from obscure or base fortune more through

fraud than through force (D II.13); on the other, he uses Agathocles

as an example of a prince of an army . . . who seized his fatherland

at a stroke and through his forces (D III.16). In the latter chapter

Machiavelli presents Agathocles as one who became prince more

through force than with deceit and art or with foreign forces.

14. Machiavelli notes that Valentinos high intentions and spirit inclined

him to do no other (7) than prove excessively deferential to the

papacy. In this light, note how Machiavelli declares that subjects of

ecclesiastical principalities cannot think otherwise than to continue

living under religious rule (11). Moreover, these words, high inten-

tions and spirit, when applied to Christian princes, are not necessar-

ily in themselves compliments: see Machiavellis assessment of Giano

della Bella, about whom, in seeming praise, he says, nothing bad ever

crossed his mind (Machiavelli 1962, II.13). Giano, and, one might add,

Cola di Rienzo, are, in this respect, the direct opposites of Agathocles

and Liverotto, whose audacity and, especially, risk taking, Machiavelli

accentuates: Giano and Cola are excessively risk averse regarding their

lives, their property, and perhaps their souls.

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mccormick the enduring ambiguity of machiavellian virtue

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