ISO Public

ISO Public

Maximum Import Capability

Stabilization and Multi-Year Allocation

Draft Final Proposal

Catalin Micsa

Senior Advisor Regional Transmission Engineer

Stakeholder Call

July 21, 2020

ISO Public

CAISO Policy Initiative Stakeholder Process

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POLICY AND PLAN DEVELOPMENT

Issue

Paper Straw

Proposal Revised

Proposal

Draft Final

Proposal

We are here

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Agenda

• Purpose of stakeholder initiative

• Short-term - proposed stabilization of Maximum Import Capability

• Long-term - proposed multi-year allocation process

• Open discussion

• Initiative schedule

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Purpose of stakeholder initiative

• Short-term - update the methodology used in the calculation of the

simultaneous Maximum Import Capability (MIC) including its

description in the CAISO Reliability Requirements Business Practice

Manual (BPM) in order to achieve a greater stability of MIC overall

allocations

• Long-term - update the annual nature of the MIC allocation process,

as described in Tariff section 40.4.6.2 Deliverability of Imports, into a

multi-year allocation process to accomplish numerous important

objectives, the primary of which is the facilitation of long-term

procurement of import resources and multi-year system Resource

Adequacy (RA) requirements

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Maximum Import Capability Stabilization

• Have a more stable MIC values from one year to the next

• Protect import deliverability values comparatively equal with internal

resources that get protection for 3 years.

• Continue MIC protection for interties that are actually used by LSEs

and allows MIC to decrease if not used for excessively long periods.

• No Tariff changes are required

• BPM changes have been effective since 6/1/2020.

• CAISO has implement new method for RA Year 2021.

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New MIC calculation

Use the average of four hours, with no more than one hour per

day, two in each one of the two years with the highest actual

imports (when load is at or above 90% of that year’s peak) among

the past five years as baseline calculation.

In order to come up with the actual MIC for the applicable (future)

RA year, the base line calculation above is augmented by the

future year available ETC, TOR and Pre-RA Import Commitments

as well as TPP portfolio (in order to assure that state and federal

policy goals are accomplished).

Increased values must pass a simultaneous deliverability test.

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Stakeholder input

• A majority of stakeholders agree that the new methodology is an

improvement to the old methodology.

• To date the CAISO and stakeholder have not found a viable

alternatives to replace the current method for calculating the

Maximum Import Capability.

• Enhancement or changes to the calculation method (for

example centered around actual new RA contracts) may be

explored in the future through an open stakeholder process.

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Multi-Year Allocation Process

• CAISO intends to move forward with multi-year available import

capability allocation process that could facilitate long-term

contracting (minimum 3-years) and facilitates multi-year contracts for

resources dedicated to LSEs that serve load inside the CAISO BAA,

without unduly restricting entry of new LSEs in the future.

• In order to be implemented in the 2022 RA year it requires FERC

approval of new Tariff along with BPM changes by mid June 2021.

• Import capability is allocated to CAISO LSEs because those LSEs

and their customers pay for the transmission system and should

receive the benefits from it and therefore have the ability to select

which external resources are procured and relied upon as part of RA

capacity portfolios.

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Positive stakeholder input

• A majority of stakeholders agree with two items in current CAISO

proposal therefore we are moving forward with them:

– Transparency - make public for each branch group (scheduling

point) at least: LSE holder, locked up amounts, lock start date,

lock expiration date

– Change to the Remaining Import Capability allocation

methodology – introduce a intermediate calculation in order to

assure that the LSE that are below their load share ratio,

effectively carry the same burden imposed by LSE above their

load share ratio due to existing ETC, TOR and Pre-RA Import

Commitments.

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Transparency

CAISO intends to make public for each branch group

(scheduling point):

– LSE holder

– Locked up amounts

– Lock start date

– Lock expiration date

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Changes to the Remaining Import Capability

allocation methodology

Current methodology results in an uneven effective allocation among

LSEs. Example:

TIC =

500

Load

share

ratio

Steps

3 & 4

Load share

quantity

Load Share

after step 4

RIC

allocation

Actual

allocation

MW

Effective allocation

LSE 1 53 15 500*.53=265 .53/.98=.54 300*.54=162 177 177/265=.67

LSE 2 40 75 500*.40=200 .40/.98=.41 300*.41=123 198 198/200=.99

LSE 3 5 10 500*.05=25 .05/.98=.05 300*.05=15 25 25/25=1

LSE 4 2 100 500*.02=10 - - 100 100/10=10

ISO Public 12

New proposed methodology for RIC allocation

Follows steps 1-4 as done today.

Under step 5 calculate Gross Remaining Import Capability as:

GRIC = TIC - ∑(MWs allocated to non-eligible LSEs)

- then calculate the load share ration share of GRIC to eligible LSEs.

- any LSE with Step 3 & 4 allocations > then their share of GRIC will

also be excluded from further allocation

- Each remaining eligible LSE will have its RIC calculated as:

RIC = LSE share of GRIC - ∑(MIC allocations in previous steps)

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New proposed methodology for RIC allocation

Example:

TIC =

500

Load

share

ratio

Steps

3 & 4

Load share

quantity

Load Share

after step 4GRIC share RIC allocation

Actual

allocation

MW

Effective

allocation

LSE 1 53 15 500*.53=265 .53/.98=.54 400*.54=216.3 216-15=201.3 216.3 216.3/265=.82

LSE 2 40 75 500*.40=200 .40/.98=.41 400*.41=163.3 163.3-75=88.3 163.3 163.3/200=.82

LSE 3 5 10 500*.05=25 .05/.98=.05 400*.05=20.4 20.4-10=10.4 20.4 20.4/25=.82

LSE 4 2 100 500*.02=10 - - - 100 100/10=10

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Simplified Alternative 2 - positive stakeholder input

• Support – PG&E

• Support with caveats - CDWR, SWPG, NCPA, VEA, CPUC,

Brookfield Renewable, Direct Energy Business

• Neutral - PowerEx

• Opposed with caveats - SCE (lack of multi-year system rules);

Six Cities, CMUA, SMUD (eliminate)

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CAISO will not move forward with

• Eliminating the allocation process, because technically it is very

useful - the total of physical capability of each intertie totals about

44,400 MW and the highest net import the CAISO has ever seen

is around 12,500 MW – whereas MIC is at around 15,800 MW.

• Moving deliverability testing until after the showings are in. That

could leave LSEs with stranded assets, it will required far more

time for showings validation and it could have high ramification of

CPM back-stop costs for system RA.

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Move forward with a simplified Alternative 2

One year allocation with possibility to lock MIC

• Follow current LSE by LSE one year out MIC allocation at the

branch group level as available today. (Done mid-late August).

• LSEs may lock their yearly allocations at the branch group level

through RA contracts for an undetermined length of time, however

if the individual LSEs total year ahead allocation falls below the

previous year(s) total lock up amount, then the LSE will be limited

to the current total year ahead allocation

– LSEs to provide CAISO with contract priority curtailment order

• Up to 75% of an LSEs MIC allocation can be locked up at the

branch group level by multi-year applicable contracts signed by

May 15th of the next RA year (coincides with July RA showings)

AND they must be communicated to the CAISO by submitting the

completed template by deadline included in the BPM.

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Why move forwards with simplified Alternative 2?

• It is closest to current approved allocation method (limited to one

year load share ratio for all new contracts)

• It solves the biggest part of the load migration (formation of new

LSEs and year ahead load migration).

• Provides a way to get up to 75% of ones MIC allocation locked up

at a branch group level for long-term contracting

• LSEs will need to manage the risk on their own by either:

Staying further back from the 75% limit

Selling the extra contracts with load share ratio decrease

Buying extra MIC allocations from other LSEs (if available)

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Why simplify Alternative 2?

• Most stakeholders prefer a simpler implementation

• Currently there is no LSE by LSE load forecast provided by the

CEC that goes beyond one year.

• Even if the CEC makes one, it will not include “unknown” new

LSEs that will contribute to load migration in the future (beyond

one year)

• Majority of LSEs would like to be able to lock MIC at the branch

group level for multi-year contracts

• Efficiency of the process and reduces upgrades required to CIRA.

ISO Public 19

Tariff changes required for implementation:

• Step 5 needs to be modified to allow assignment of Remaining

Import Capability on a specific intertie and to specify how this

assignment will be done (potentially adding a new step)

• Step 6 (public posting) needs to be modified to increase

transparency for Pre-RA Import Commitments and to add

transparency and data for the new contracts that lock Remaining

Import Capability

• Step 7 (communication to the SC for the LSE) needs to be

modified to include the amount of, and Intertie on which, the Load

Serving Entity’s new lock amounts of Remaining Import

Capability, as applicable, have been assigned; and any additional

amount of Remaining Import Capability that the LSE can lock by

May 15th of the next RA year.

• New definition for the locked part of Remaining Import Capability.

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Applicable contracts used to lock MIC allocation

• CAISO agrees with stakeholder comments that the CAISO should

develop mechanisms that will ensure capacity built outside

California to support CAISO load will be available and accessible

to California on the same basis as RA capacity in the CAISO

balancing area is available to the CAISO

• Therefore the CAISO is proposing that new contracts used to lock

MIC allocations to branch group should be associated with source

specified import resources (either resource specific or an

aggregation of specific resources). This design is consistent with

the proposed import RA rules and maintains alignment with RAE

must offer obligation rules.

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RA contractual requirements to qualify for MIC lock

• In order to qualify for any one year lock the RA contract has to

span a minimum of 3 summer months (between June-September).

For years when the contract drops below the minimum summer

months requirement the RA import allocations can still be received

through the annual allocation process, however the LSE will not

have a lock or pre-assignment at the respective branch group.

• In order to maintain the lock on the branch group, the RA contract

used for locking must be active in the next RA year and must be

included in the year ahead template submitted to the CAISO.

• Evergreen contracts are not allowed, the RA contract must have a

specific end date and must be communicated to the CAISO.

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RA contractual requirements to qualify for MIC lock

• In order to assure that each LSE has a chance of locking up MIC

at any given branch group and to also assure that an LSE does

not have a forever lock on a certain branch group; the LSEs

cannot change the contract used for locking MIC with a new

contract or an extension of the same contract without going

through the yearly MIC allocation first.

• An extension of an old contract (Pre-RA Import Commitment or

New Use) is treated as a new contract and must meet any new

(future) Tariff and BPM requirements in order to achieve a new

lock based on its own merits.

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Maximum value by branch group (scheduling point)

• If the specific resource or the aggregation of specific resources

have variable Qualifying Capacity values between months, then

the month with the highest total QC value by branch group will

represent the locked amount. These values must be given to the

CAISO in the template LSEs will have to fill in around mid-June

for the next RA year (similar to the Pre-RA Import Commitment

template).

• Example - LSE A has 3 contracts at the same branch group:

• MIC allocation lock for this branch group will be 35.68 MW for the

next RA Year.

Month Jan. Feb, Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept, Oct. Nov. Dec.

Res. 1 8.61 7.38 17.22 15.38 15.38 20.30 14.15 12.92 9.23 4.92 7.38 8.00

Res. 2 0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 6.00 6.00 5.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.00

Res. 3 8.30 10.30 10.50 15.3 15.3 8.50 8.50 7.50 6.50 5.00 4.00 2.00

Total 16.91 18.68 29.72 33.68 35.68 34.80 28.65 25.42 18.73 11.92 12.38 10.0

ISO Public 24

Maximum value by branch group (scheduling point)

New:

• In order to avoid excessively high off-peak contracts that would

lock MIC allocations over the entire year; and

• In order to allow for resource specific contracts that may have

slightly higher values in the off-peak period,

• Each LSEs locked amount per branch group (scheduling point) is

limited to 120% of the highest summer monthly value.

• Additional MWs may be obtained through the regular allocation

process, without lock or through trading.

ISO Public 25

LSE provided contract priority curtailment order

vs. cutting all contracts pro-rata

• Reminder – the year immediately after an LSE has a cut to its RA

contracts due to lower load share ratio, the LSEs can resubmit and

use the same contract, if is still active and meets all the current

requirements, to increase back its RA lock if the new load forecast

has increased again.

• Same process is true if the LSE load share ratio stayed the same

however the LSE sold one of its other RA contracts.

• Cutting all contracts pro-rata, will be more “painful” for the involved

LSE in the first year, however will not prevent the LSE for selling

any contract they want and most likely getting back the lock on the

branch groups of their choice the next RA year.

• Allowing the LSE to pick the curtailment order will allow the LSE to

sell the preferred contract immediately, avoiding one year lag and

the “pain” of having to go through the locking process again.

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Available Pseudo-ties and Dynamic scheduled resources

• Currently there are:

– Over 6450 MW of dynamic scheduled resources and

– Over 650 MW of pseudo-ties

• Geographically spread:

– Over 1150 MW in the north

– Almost 5000 MW in the south

• Contractual status:

– Estimated that over 2000 MW are existing Pre-RA Import

Commitments or scheduled over existing ETC and TOR

– About 5000 MW are already under new RA contracts or

immediately available for multi-year contracting

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Open discussion

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Initiative Schedule

– Post issue paper – December 3, 2019

– Stakeholder call – December 10 – comments by December 24

– Post straw proposal – January 22, 2020

– Stakeholder meeting – January 29 – comments by February 12

– Post revised straw proposal – March 12

– Stakeholder call – March 19 – comments by April 2

– Start BPM process for short-term MIC stabilization – March 26

– Post second revised straw proposal – May 21

– Stakeholder call – May 28 – comments by June 11

– Post draft final proposal – July 14

– Stakeholder call – July 21 – comments by – August 4

– Board of Governors Meeting – September 2020

– FERC filling after Board approval – Exact date TBD

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Next Steps

• Stakeholder comments due by end of day August 4,

2020

– Email comments to regionaltransmission@caiso.com

– Stakeholder comments are to be submitted within two weeks

after stakeholder meetings

– ISO will post comments and responses on website

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