MAINESUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2018ME72Docket: Som-17-240Argued: December13,2017Decided: May24,2018Panel: SAUFLEY,C.J.,andALEXANDER,MEAD,HJELM,andHUMPHREY,JJ.

MAUREEND.DAVISv.

BENNIEC.MCGUIREIIIHJELM,J.

[¶1] MaureenD.Davis appeals from a judgment of theDistrict Court

(Skowhegan,1Stanfill,J.)dismissing,forlackofstanding,hercomplaintseeking

tobedeterminedadefactoparentofhergrandson.See19-AM.R.S.§1891(2)

(2017). Davis argues that the court erred by concluding after a contested

hearingthatshefailedtoestablishthatshehasstandingtoproceedtoaplenary

hearingandthatthecourtimproperlyheldhertoagreaterstandardthanthat

towhichanunrelatedthirdpartywouldbeheld.Weaffirmthejudgment.

1Inthecaptionsofseveralordersissuedinthismatter,includingthejudgment,thecourtlocation

isdesignatedasWatervilleratherthanSkowhegan.Thecase,however,wasfiledas,andremained,aSkowheganproceeding.

2

I.BACKGROUND

[¶2]Thefollowingfactsareeitherundisputedordrawnfromthecourt’s

findingsoffact,allofwhicharesupportedbytherecord.2SeeThorndikev.Lisio,

2017ME14,¶2,154A.3d624.

[¶3]Davis’sdaughter,Danielle,gavebirthtoaboyinDecemberof2007.

BennieC.McGuireIIIisthechild’sfather.In2008,Daniellefiledacomplaintto

determineparentalrightsandresponsibilitiesandchildsupport.In2009,by

agreementofDanielleandMcGuire,theDistrictCourt(Skowhegan,Carlson,M.)

enteredajudgmentawardingDaniellesoleparentalrightsandresponsibilities,

withnorightsofcontacttoMcGuire,andorderingMcGuiretopayDaniellechild

support.DaniellediedinearlyAugustof2016.

[¶4]Davishasconsistentlybeeninvolvedinthechild’slife.Forexample,

thechildfrequentlystayedovernightatDavis’shome,whereDavisprovided

thechildwithhisownspaceandallowedhimtokeepbelongings.Thechild’s

address for purposes of school and extracurricular activities, however, was

Danielle’s,andhereferstoDavisashisgrandmother.Further,beforeDanielle’s

2 After the court issued its judgment,which contained findingsof fact,Davis filedaproperly

formulatedmotionforfurtherfindingsandconclusionsoflaw,seeM.R.Civ.P.52(b),whichthecourtdenied.Withrespecttofactsindispute,wethereforedonotattributefindingstothecourtbeyondthosearticulatedinitsjudgment.SeeEhretv.Ehret,2016ME43,¶9,135A.3d101.

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death Davis did not seek formal recognition as a parent to the child, and

Danielle did not indicate informally that she regarded Davis as the child’s

parent.

[¶5] Less than one week after Danielle died, Davis filed an ex parte

petitionintheSomersetCountyProbateCourtseekingtemporaryguardianship

ofthechild.Inherpetition,Davisallegedthatthechildhadresidedbothwith

herandwithDaniellesincehisbirthandthatMcGuirehadnotparticipatedin

thechild’slifeduringthepasteightyearsotherthanahandfulofvisitswiththe

childinMaine.Thecourt(Washburn,J.)grantedDavisasix-monthtemporary

guardianshipofthechild.

[¶6]Uponlearningoftheorderoftemporaryguardianshipseveraldays

afteritwasissued,McGuirefiledapetitiontoterminatetheguardianship.The

Probate Court commenced a hearing on McGuire’s petition, but before the

hearing could be completed, Davis filed a complaint in the District Court in

Skowheganseekinganadjudicationthatsheisadefactoparentofthechildand

an order establishing parental rights and responsibilities and child support.

McGuirefiledananswertoDavis’scomplaintandamotiontodismissforlack

ofstanding.BothDavis’scomplaintandMcGuire’sanswerwereaccompanied

byaffidavits.See19-AM.R.S.§§1891(2)(A),(B).

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[¶7]PursuanttotheHomeCourtAct,see4M.R.S.§152(5-A)(2017),the

ProbateCourtcasewastransferredtotheDistrictCourtinSkowhegan,which

conducted a consolidatedhearing (Kelly, J.) onDavis’s guardianship petition

andMcGuire’s petition to terminate the temporaryguardianship. While the

hearing was ongoing, the parties reached an agreement for a temporary

co-guardianship,whichthecourtacceptedandenteredasanorderthatmade

Davis and McGuire the child’s co-guardians until February of 2017 and

provided that the childwouldmove toOhiowithMcGuire in lateDecember

of2016. Theorderstayedalldeadlines in thede factoparenthoodcase and

continued the case to February for either an uncontested hearing or a case

management conference, specifically reserving the issue of standing. The

parties’ agreement subsequently faltered, however, aswas demonstrated in

earlyDecemberof2016whenMcGuirefiledamotionforcontempt,whichthe

courtultimatelydeniedafterholdingahearingthefollowingmonth.

[¶8]WiththeresumptionofproceedingsonDavis’sdefactoparenthood

complaint, the court (Stanfill, J.) issued awritten order on standing. In the

order,thecourtstatedthatbasedonitsreviewoftheparties’affidavitsfiled

with the complaint and the answer, it “has serious concerns whether

Ms.Davis’srolehashistoricallybeenasalovingandinvolvedgrandparentor

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asadefactoparent.”Forthatreason,thecourtscheduledahearingpursuant

to section 1891(2)(C) for the court “to determine” whether Davis satisfied

specifiedaspectsofthestandingframework.

[¶9] At the resulting hearing, held in March of 2017, both parties

testified,and,byagreement, therecord included transcripts fromtheearlier

proceedingsheldinboththeProbateCourtandtheDistrictCourt.3Laterthat

month,thecourtentereda judgmentdismissingDavis’sdefactoparenthood

complaintforlackofstanding.Theordercontainedanumberoffindingsoffact

andreiteratedthatthepurposeofthehearingwasforthecourt“todetermine

thosefacts”thatwerecontroverted.

[¶10]Initsjudgment,thecourtaddressedtheseparatestatutorycriteria

thatmustbemetforapartytoestablishdefactoparenthood.See19-AM.R.S.

§1891(3)(2017).Butseeinfran.7.ThecourtfoundthatDavishadpresented

primafacieevidence

that shehas engaged in consistent caretakingof [the child]; thatthereisabondedanddependentrelationshipbetweenMs.Davisand[thechild]thatwasfosteredby[thechild’s]motherDanielle;that[Davis]acceptsfullandpermanentresponsibilityofthechildwithout expectation of financial compensation; and that the

3Thecourt’sconsiderationofevidencepresentedinaseparateproceedingispermissiblewhere

the parties agree to that enhanced record. See Cabral v. L’Heureux, 2017ME 50, ¶¶11n.4, 12,157A.3d795.

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continuingrelationshipbetweenMs.Davisand[thechild]isinhisbestinterest.

Thecourtalsofound,however,thatDavisdidnotpresent“primafacieevidence

that[thechild]residedwithherforasignificantperiodoftime”or

that Danielle understood, acknowledged or accepted that orbehavedasthoughMs.Daviswas[thechild’s]parentasopposedtoa loving, involved and supportive grandparent. . . . [A]lthough itappearsthatDaniellereliedheavilyonMs.Davisforhelpwith[thechild],takingcareofhimafterschool,gettinghimtoevents,andthelike,thereislittleevidencethatDaniellesawMs.Davisasaparent,withrightsequaltohers,asopposedtoawonderfulandimportantgrandmotherwhoprovidedconsistentsupportandassistance.

The court further found that, given the child’s bond with Davis, the child’s

separationfromherwouldcausehim“despair.”Followingfromitsfindingthat

McGuireisafitandcompetentparent,thecourtconcludedthatthebestinterest

ofthechildbyitselfisnonethelessinsufficienttoconferstandingonDavis.

[¶11] Because the court concluded thatDavis failed to prove several

elements necessary to establish her standing to proceed with the de facto

parenthood claim, the court dismissed the complaint. Davis moved for

additional findings and to amend the judgment. SeeM.R.Civ.P.52,59. The

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courtdeniedthemotion,seesupran.2,andDavistimelyappealedtous.M.R.

App.P.2(b)(3)(Tower2016).4

II.DISCUSSION

[¶12]Inthiscase,weconsiderforthefirsttimetheprocessrequiredby

theMaineParentageAct(MPA),see19-AM.R.S.§§1831-1939(2017),5whena

partyseeksacourtadjudicationthatheorsheisadefactoparent.Theaspect

of the judicial process at issue here is the determination of standing. To

consider Davis’s challenges to the court’s conclusion that she did not

demonstrateherstandingtoproceedwiththedefactoparenthoodcomplaint,

wemustfirstexaminethestandardsofproofcreatedbytheMPAprescribing

whatDaviswas required to show to establish standing. Against those legal

standardsthatwedrawfromthestatute,wewillthenconsiderDavis’sspecific

challenges.

A. StandardofProoftoEstablishStanding

[¶13] Pursuant to the framework described both in our de facto

parenthooddecisionsthatpredatedtheenactmentoftheMPAandnowinthe

4 TherestyledMaineRulesofAppellateProceduredonotapplybecausethisappealwasfiled

beforeSeptember1,2017.SeeM.R.App.P.1(restyledRules).

5TheMaineParentageAct(MPA)becameeffectiveJuly1,2016.SeeP.L.2015,ch.296,§§A-1,D-1.

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MPAitself,apartywhofilesacomplainttobeadjudicatedadefactoparentof

achildmustmakeaninitialshowingofstandingthatwilldeterminewhether

thecourtwillholdaplenaryhearingontheultimatequestionofwhetherthat

personisadefactoparent.See19-AM.R.S.§1891;e.g.,Pittsv.Moore,2014ME

59,¶35,90A.3d1169(pluralityopinion);6Philbrookv.Theriault,2008ME152,

¶¶19-22,957A.2d74.Therequirementofapreliminaryshowingofstanding

isafunctionoftheprinciplethataparenthasafundamentalrighttoraisehis

or her child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality opinion);

Rideoutv.Riendeau,2000ME198,¶18,761A.2d291(“[T]herighttodirectand

controlachild’supbringingisa‘fundamental’libertyinterestprotectedbythe

DueProcessClause.”).

[¶14] By itself, a thirdparty’s assertionofde factoparenthood rights

results in a disruptionof theparent-child relationshipbecause it “forc[es] a

parenttoexpendtimeandresourcesdefendingagainstathird-partyclaimtoa

child[and]isitselfaninfringementonthefundamentalrighttoparent.”Pitts,

2014ME59,¶35,90A.3d1169;seealsoRideout,2000ME198,¶30,761A.2d

6Thenatureoftheshowingnecessaryforajudicialdeterminationofdefactoparenthoodwas

articulatedinapluralityopinioninPittsv.Moore,2014ME59,90A.3d1196.AmajorityoftheCourt,comprisingthosewhojoinedthepluralityandconcurringopinions,id.¶¶35,42,tooktheviewthatstandingmustbeestablishedpreliminarilytoanyadjudicationofthedefactoparenthoodclaimitself.ThataspectofouropinioninPittsisthereforeauthoritative.

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291(addressingthesameeffectofathird-partyclaimbroughtpursuanttothe

GrandparentsVisitationAct,19-AM.R.S.§§1801-1805(2017)). Accordingly,

to protect “against unwarranted intrusions into an intact family’s life,” see

Rideout,2000ME198,¶30,761A.2d291,wedevelopedtherequirementof

standingthatrequiresthepetitionertodemonstrateanentitlementtoproceed

with the claim itself. That requirement is now codified in the MPA. See

19-AM.R.S.§1891(2);L.D.1017,EnactedLawSummary(127thLegis.2015)

(stating that the MPA “codifies the de facto parent doctrine, now firmly

establishedbycaselaw,torequireanexplicitdeterminationofstandingasa

prerequisiteformaintaininganaction”);seealsoinfran.8.

[¶15] Pursuant to section 1891(2)(C) of the MPA, to demonstrate

standing, the party claiming de facto parenthoodmust present “prima facie

evidence”ofthestatutoryelementsthatarenecessarytoultimatelyestablish

the existence of a de facto parent relationshipwith the child.7 That statute

7 Inourcaselawthatprecededthe2017enactmentoftheMPA,whichcontainsthestatutory

authoritygoverningdefactoparenthood,wediscussedwhatapetitionerisrequiredtoprovetobeadjudicatedasadefactoparentsothatthestatedoesnotunconstitutionallyintrudeintotheparent’sfundamentalrelationshipwithhisorherchild.Inthosecases,weheldthat,inordertoestablishthecompelling state interest needed to justify governmental interference with a parent-childrelationship, the petitioner must prove the existence of “exceptional circumstances.” See, e.g.,Thorndikev.Lisio,2017ME14,¶¶17,19,154A.3d624;Kilbornv.Carey,2016ME78,¶¶17,22,140A.3d461.Inanothercase,apluralityopinionandadissentingopinioneachexpressedtheviewthat,foradefactoparenthoodadjudicationtobeconstitutional,theexceptionalcircumstancemustbeharmtothechildintheabsenceofsuchanadjudication. Pitts,2014ME59,¶¶14-17,29,36,61-65,90A.3d1169.

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prescribesamulti-stepprocessforthedeterminationofstanding.19-AM.R.S.

§ 1891. First, the claimant is required to file an affidavit along with the

complaint, stating “specific facts” that track the elements of a de facto

parenthood claim. Id. § 1891(2)(A). Next, the adverse party may file a

responsiveaffidavitalongwitharesponsivepleading.Id.§1891(2)(B).Finally,

thecourtistoreviewtheparties’submissionsandeithermakeadetermination

based on the parties’ submissions whether the claimant has demonstrated

standing,or,“initssolediscretion,ifnecessaryandonanexpeditedbasis,hold

ahearing todeterminedisputed facts thatarenecessaryandmaterial to the

issueofstanding.”Id.§1891(2)(C).

Thestatutoryelementsofproofofdefactoparenthoodfoundin19-AM.R.S.§1891(3)(2017),

however, donot explicitly include these factors. See, e.g., Kilborn, 2016ME78,¶¶1n.1,25n.7,140A.3d461(pointingoutthattheMPA’sformulationofdefactoparenthooddoesnotrequireashowingofharmtothechild). Ourcaselawexplainedthatanexceptionalcircumstancerequiresproof “that the child’s life would be substantially and negatively affected if the personwho hasundertakenapermanent,unequivocal,committed,andresponsibleparentalroleinthatchild’slifeisremoved from that role.” Id. ¶ 22 (quotation marks omitted). Section 1891(3) describes therelationship between the putative de facto parent and the child in the sameway, but omits anyreferencetotheeffectthattheremovalofthatpersonfromthechild’slifewouldhaveonthechild.

This leaves thequestionofwhetherproofof thestatutoryelementsalone isaconstitutionallyadequatefoundationforadefactoparenthooddetermination,orwhetherapetitionermustprovesomethingmorethanthosestatutoryelementstomakethestatuteconstitutionalasapplied.Wedonotreachthisquestionbecause,asthecourtcorrectlydetermined,Davis’ssubmissionsdonotsatisfyeventhestatutorycriteriaforstanding,andsothiscaseisnotanoccasiontoconsiderwhether,tobeconstitutionally applied, a petitioner for de facto parenthood must prove factors beyond thosearticulatedinthestatute.

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[¶16] To consider themeritsofDavis’s contentiononappeal that the

courterredbyconcludingthatshehadnotmetherburdenofprooftoshow

standing,wemust examine the standards ofproofbywhichher evidenceof

standingmustbeassessedpursuanttotheMPA.Theissuearisesbecauseof

the language insection1891(2) thatbearson thestandardofproof that the

claimant must satisfy in the standing analysis. As is noted above, section

1891(2)(C)provides that inmaking itsstandingdeterminationbasedon the

parties’affidavitsandpleadings, thecourtdecideswhether theclaimanthas

presented“primafacieevidence”ofadefactoparenthoodrelationshipwiththe

child. If,however,thecourtexercisesitsdiscretiontoholdahearingonthe

questionofstanding,thecourtwill“determinedisputedfacts.”Id.§1891(2)(C)

(emphasis added). Because the Legislature has described the standards of

proofintwodifferentwaysdependingontheformoftheevidencepresented

tothecourt,wemustconstruethisaspectofthestatutetodetermineifthose

standardsaredifferentinsubstance.

[¶17]Thegoalofstatutoryinterpretationistodetermineandgiveeffect

totheLegislature’s intent. SeeDickauv.Vt.Mut.Ins.Co.,2014ME158,¶19,

107A.3d621. “Among themany sourceswemay consult todetermine that

legislativeintent,wefirstdetermineifthelanguageofthestatute. . .isplain

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andunambiguous.” Id. Whenexamining theplain languageofastatute,we

“tak[e] into account the subjectmatter and purposes of the statute, and the

consequences of a particular interpretation,” id.¶ 21, with the objective to

“avoidabsurd, illogicalor inconsistentresults,”Wongv.Hawk,2012ME125,

¶8, 55 A.3d 425 (quotation marks omitted). “If the statutory language is

ambiguous, meaning that it is reasonably susceptible to multiple

interpretations,or issilentonaparticularpoint,wewillthenconsiderother

indicia of legislative intent including the purpose of the statute.” Griffin v.

Griffin,2014ME70,¶18,92A.3d1144(quotationmarksomitted).

[¶18] Takenby itself, theLegislature’sdesignationof the standardof

proof that the court must apply at a contested evidentiary hearing is not

ambiguous:theplainlanguageofthestatute’sdescriptionofthatstandardis

oneofpersuasionbecausethestatutecallsforthecourtto“determine”—i.e.,

find—thefacts.19-AM.R.S.§1891(2)(C).Theremaybealatentambiguityin

thisprovision,however,becausethestandardofproofapplicabletoastanding

determination conducted solely on the parties’ written submissions is the

presentation of “prima facie evidence.” Id. In some contexts, this means

meetingmerelyaburdenofproducingevidencethat,ifbelieved,wouldsatisfy

thegreaterburdenofpersuasion. See,e.g.,CamdenNat’lBankv.Weintraub,

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2016ME101,¶11,143A.3d788(statingthattomakea“primafaciecase”as

requiredby theanti-SLAPPstatute,see14M.R.S. §556(2017), theclaimant

must present “only some evidence on every element of proof necessary to

obtainthedesiredremedy,”withoutregardtothereliabilityorcredibilityof

theevidence(quotationmarksomitted));LougeeConservancyv.CitiMortgage,

Inc., 2012 ME 103, ¶ 12, 48 A.3d 774 (stating that to defeat a motion for

summaryjudgment,aplaintiffmustsatisfythe“primafacieevidencestandard

[that]...requiresproofonlyofenoughevidencetoallowthefact-triertoinfer

the fact at issue and rule in the party's favor”). The resulting question is

whether in the MPA the Legislature intended to impose two different

evidentiarystandardswhenthecourtmakesadeterminationofstanding:the

lesserstandardofproductionwhenthecourtmakesthatdeterminationbased

on the parties’written submissions, and the greater standard of persuasion

whenthecourtchoosestoholdacontestedhearingonthatissue.

[¶19]Forthreereasons,weconcludethatthesinglestandardofproof

that governs the court’s determination of standing is that of persuasion,

irrespectiveofwhetherthecourtadjudicatestheissuebasedonthepapersor

onevidencepresentedatahearing.

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[¶20] First, thestatutorystandardofa“primafacie”demonstrationof

standingechoesthelanguagewearticulatedindefactoparenthoodcasesthat

predatedtheenactmentoftheMPA.See,e.g.,Curtisv.Medeiros,2016ME180,

¶18,152A.3d605;Eatonv.Paradis,2014ME61,¶8,91A.3d590(quoting

Philbrook,2008ME152,957A.2d74);Pitts,2014ME59,¶35,90A.3d1169;

Philbrook,2008ME152,¶¶17,19-22,957A.2d74.Giventhelegislativehistory

oftheMPA,8weusethecommonlawthattheMPAlaterattemptedtocodifyas

onewaytounderstandtheLegislature’sintentions.Innoneofthosecaseshave

we equated the standard of prima facie evidence with the mere burden of

production. Infact,wesuggestedthecontrary. Forexample,westatedthat,

when addressing a claim of standing, “the court must make a preliminary

determinationthat[adefactoparenthood]relationshipdoesinfactexistbefore

aparentcanberequiredtolitigatetheissue.”Philbrook,2008ME152,¶19,

957A.2d74(emphasisadded).Provingthatafactexistsrequiresmorethan

8 AlthoughthosecasespredatedandthereforewerenotgovernedbytheMPA,whichbecame

effectiveonJuly1,2016,see19-AM.R.S.§1891(2017),enactedbyP.L.2015,ch.296,§§A-1,D-1,ourdiscussion in these cases regarding the procedure at the standing and plenary hearing stages isrelevanttoandalignedwith19-AM.R.S.§1891.Further,thelegislativehistoryoftheMPAindicatesthat the de facto parentage section of the MPA is intended to codify the existing common lawdoctrinesthat “requireanexplicitdeterminationofstandingasaprerequisite formaintaininganaction,[and]recognizetheelevatedburdenofproofthatapersonclaimingsuchstatusmustsatisfy.. . .” See L.D.1017, Enacted Law Summary (127th Legis. 2015); see also Family Law AdvisoryCommission,ReporttoMaineLegislatureJointStandingCommitteeonJudiciaryPursuanttoResolve2014,c.83OnProposed“MaineParentageAct”4-5(Dec.2014).

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simply proffering evidence that, if believed, would prove the point. Rather,

proofoftheexistenceofafactrequiressatisfyingtheburdenofpersuasion.

[¶21] We have also explained that even when the court determines

standingbasedonareviewofaffidavits,thequestiontobeaddressedbythe

court iswhethertheclaimants“canmeettheirburdenofproof.” SeeDavisv.

Anderson,2008ME125,¶17,953A.2d1166(emphasisadded).The“burden

ofproof”ordinarilymeanstheburdenofpersuasion.SeeDir.,OfficeofWorkers’

Comp.Programsv.GreenwichCollieries,512U.S.267,272-76(1994).And,in

the analogous procedural context of the Grandparents Visitation Act, a

petitioning grandparent must prove that “it is more likely than not”—i.e.,

shownbyapreponderanceoftheevidence—thatheorshehasstandingandis

therefore entitled to proceed to themerits of a claim to establish visitation

rightswithagrandchild.19-AM.R.S.§1803(2)(C);seealsoRideout,2000ME

198, ¶ 30, 761 A.2d 291 (explaining that “grandparents must demonstrate

standingbeforetheymaylitigatetheir[GVA]claim”by“convinc[ing]thecourt

that they are among those grandparents who may pursue visits under the

[GVA]”(emphasisadded)).Thelevelofproofthatrequiresapartytoconvince

thecourtofstandingclearlyexceedsmerelypresentingevidenceofstanding.

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[¶22] In light of these statements describing the quantum of proof

necessarytodemonstratestandingandtheproceduralphasewherethecourt

makesthatdetermination,itisevidentthat“primafacie”asusedinthisstatute

isnot a reference to thequantumofnecessaryproofbut rather ismerely a

temporal indicator that the standing requirement is to be determined

preliminarilytoanyultimateadjudicationofdefactoparenthood.

[¶23]Second,comparedtoamereburdenofproduction,theburdenof

persuasion is more consistent with the constitutional aspect of a de facto

parenthoodproceeding.Asisdiscussedabove,acentralpurposeofrequiring

adefactoparenthoodclaimanttoprovestandingistoprotectaparentfrom

undueinterferencewithhisorherconstitutionallibertyinterestsarisingfrom

theparent-childrelationship.See,e.g.,Troxel,530U.S.at66;Rideout,2000ME

198,¶18,761A.2d291.Ifapartyclaimingtobeadefactoparentwereentitled

toaplenaryhearingbymerelyprofferinginformation,albeitinaffidavitform,

that correlated with the elements of a de facto parenthood claim, the legal

parents could face excessive exposure to unwarranted and ultimately

unsubstantiated interferencewith their constitutionally protected parenting

interest.Holdingapartyseekingdefactoparenthoodstatustotheburdenof

persuasion,regardlessofthesettingwherethecourtdeterminesstanding,best

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achievesthedesiredbalancebetweenthe“parents’ fundamentalrights[and]

the legitimate interestsof third parties . . . asserting their status asde facto

parents.”Eaton,2014ME61,¶8,91A.3d590.

[¶24] Third and finally, there is no principled reasonwhy a standing

determinationshouldbesubject toonestandardofproof if thecourtmakes

that determination based on the pleadings and affidavits, and a greater

standardofproofiftheevidenceispresentedinadifferentway,namely,ata

contested hearing. In either procedural setting, the question of standing

presentedtothecourtis,intheend,identical.Aswehavenoted,pursuantto

the plain terms of section 1891(2)(C), the standard of proof requires the

claimant topresentpersuasive evidenceof standing. Given that evidentiary

standardapplicableinacontestedhearingheldbythecourtinitsdiscretion,

thestandardforanadjudicationofstandingwithoutacourthearingshouldnot

belower.

[¶25]Forthesereasons,apartyseekingtobeadjudicatedasadefacto

parentissubjecttoapreliminaryburdentopersuadethecourtoftheparty’s

standing,andnotmerelytoproduceevidenceofstanding.

[¶26]Inthiscontext,wenotethatwehavenotexplicitlyarticulatedthe

standard of proof applicable to the question of standing, although we have

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mademoregeneralcharacterizationsofthatstandard,asdiscussedabove.See

supra¶19.Forthereasonsexplainedabove,theclaimant’sevidencemustbe

persuasive,meaning that the proofmust be at least a preponderance.9 See

Jacobsv.Jacobs,507A.2d596,599(Me.1986)(“Thestandardofproofinacivil

casebetweentwoprivatepartiesisordinarilypreponderanceoftheevidence,

arulethat isdepartedfromonlyinthoserarecircumstanceswhereahigher

standardofproofisclearlyjustifiedforconstitutionalorothersignificantpolicy

reasons.”). The standard governing a standing determination need not be

greater than that, however, becauseat theplenaryhearing apetitionerwho

alreadyestablishedstandingmustproveadefactoparentrelationshipbyclear

andconvincingevidence—thatis,toahighlevelofprobability.See19-AM.R.S.

§1891(3);InreG.T.,2016ME2,¶10,130A.3d389;Eaton,2014ME61,¶9,

91A.3d590;Pitts,2014ME59,¶27,90A.3d1169.Torequireapetitionerto

proveatapreliminaryhearingthesameelementsandtothesamestandardof

proofthatgoverntheplenaryhearingwouldrenderthelatterduplicative.

9Ofcourse,whenthecourtinitiallyexaminestheparties’standingsubmissionsonthepapersand

determinesthattherearecontestedfacts,itneednotholdahearingonstandingif,evenassumingthepetitioner’sassertionsaretrue,theycouldnotordonotmeetthepreponderancestandard.

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[¶27]Havingidentifiedthestatutoryrequirementsgoverningstanding,

wenowconsiderDavis’sassertionthatthecourterredbydeterminingthatshe

doesnothavestandingtopursuehercomplaintfordefactoparenthood.

B. Davis’sStanding

[¶28] Toestablish standingpursuant to theMPA,but see supran.7, a

petitionermustprove eachof theelementsofade factoparentrelationship

with the childby—aswe nowhold—apreponderanceof the evidence. The

elementsareasfollows:

A. Thepersonhasresidedwiththechildforasignificantperiodoftime;

B. Thepersonhasengagedinconsistentcaretakingofthechild;

C. A bonded and dependent relationship has been establishedbetweenthechildandtheperson,therelationshipwasfosteredorsupportedbyanotherparentofthechildandthepersonandtheotherparenthaveunderstood, acknowledgedor acceptedthatorbehavedasthoughthepersonisaparentofthechild;

D. Thepersonhasacceptedfullandpermanentresponsibilitiesasa parent of the child without expectation of financialcompensation;and

E. Thecontinuingrelationshipbetweenthepersonandthechildisinthebestinterestofthechild.

19-AM.R.S.§1891(3)(A)-(E). BecauseDavishad theburdenofproofat the

hearingonstanding,see id. §1891(2),shemustestablishonappeal that the

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evidencecompelledthecourttofindeachofthosefiveelementsinherfavor.

See id. § 1891(3)(A)-(E); Baillargeon v.Estate of Daigle, 2010ME127, ¶20,

8A.3d709.

[¶29]AfterreviewingtheaffidavitspresentedbyDavisandMcGuire,the

court found that Davis had not presented prima facie evidence on several

necessarystatutoryelementsofadefactoparenthoodcase—thatthechildhad

resided with her for a significant period of time as required by section

1891(3)(A), and that Danielle understood, acknowledged or accepted that

DavishadaparentalrelationshipwiththechildorbehavedasthoughtheDavis

wasaparentofthechild,asrequiredinpartofsection1891(3)(C).Thecourt

then held a hearing on those criteria so that, on the basis of the parties’

evidence,itcould“determine”thefactsindispute.

[¶30] The court issued its dispositive order on standing after the

hearing.10 Thecourt foundthat thechildhadneverresidedatDavis’shome

eventhoughhestayedtherefrequentlyandhadaspaceofhisownandkept

10Althoughthejudgmentmadereferenceto“primafacieevidence,”itisapparentthatthecourt

heldDavistotheburdenofpersuasion,which,asweholdtoday,wascorrect.Intheorderstatingthatahearingwouldbeheld,thecourtexplainedthatthepurposeofthehearingwastoallowthecourt“todetermine”factsbearingoncertainelementsofadefactoparenthoodcase.Atthehearingitself,thecourtstated that itsintentwas to “make thedeterminationastostanding.” Andinthejudgmentissuedfollowingthehearing,thecourtmadereferencetothestatutoryprovisionthat,atahearing on standing, the court was to “determine” facts that bear on standing, see 19-A M.R.S.§1891(2)(C).

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some of his belongings there. Rather, the child resided at Danielle’s home,

whichwas separate fromDavis’s, and itwas this address thatwas used for

school purposes and extracurricular activities. The court also found that

DanielledidnotregardDavis as thechild’sparentwithrightsequal tohers.

AlthoughDavisconsistentlysupportedandassistedDaniellewithraisingthe

child,andDavis’s relationshipwith thischilddiffered fromtherelationships

she has with her other grandchildren, the court did not err in its ultimate

conclusion that Davis’s relationship with the child was a

grandparent-grandchildrelationshipandnotthatofadefactoparent.

[¶31]Wehavepreviouslyaddressedtheissuepresentedhere—whether

thecourterredbydismissingagrandparent’sdefactoparenthoodcomplaint

forwantofstanding.Philbrook,2008ME152,957A.2d74.Inthatcase,the

petitioners, who were the children’s maternal grandparents, had provided

substantial care to the children when the children’s mother lived in the

grandparents’ homewith the children on and off for a period of years. Id.

¶¶2-13.Inaffirmingthejudgmentdismissingthepetition,westated:

We have never extended the de facto parent concept toincludeanindividualwhohasnotbeenunderstoodtobethechild’sparentbutwhointermittentlyassumesparentaldutiesatcertainpointsoftimeinachild’slife.Rather,whenwehaverecognizedapersonasadefactoparent,wehavedonesoincircumstanceswhen

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theindividualwasunderstoodandacknowledgedtobethechild’sparentbothbythechildandbythechild’sotherparent.11

Id.¶23.Itisnotenoughthatthegrandparentshad“providedneededcarefor

the [children],” because “they were never thought to be the [children’s]

parents.”Id.¶26.

[¶32] Here, the court found that Davis had a bonded and dependent

relationshipwith the child and thatDanielle fostered that relationship. The

courtfound,however,thatDanielledidnotunderstand,acknowledge,oraccept

DavisasaparenteventhoughDanielleacceptedDavis’scareforherson.The

courtcorrectlydrewtheproperdistinction,whichcanbenuancedandsubtle,

betweentheroleofanurturingandinvolvedcaregiverandonewhoactswith

and is recognized as being fully equivalent to a parent. Cf. Kilborn v. Carey,

2016ME78,¶¶4-7,19,140A.3d461(describingevidencethatdemonstrated

themother’sintentthattheputativedefactoparentassumeaparentalrolefor

thechild). Here, theevidencedidnotcompel thecourt to find thatDanielle

regardedDavisasaparenttothechild.12Asaresultofthisdetermination,the

11TheMPAdoesnotrequirethechildtoacknowledgetheputativedefactoparentasaparent.

See generally 19-AM.R.S. § 1891(3). However, subsection 3 appears to be a codification of theprinciplethatthechild’sparentmustrecognizetheputativedefactoparentasaparent.

12Davisarguesthat“[w]hileassumingaparentalrolecompletelycertainlystrengthensaclaimfordefactoparentage,thewordingofthestatutedoesnotrequirethis.”Infact,section1891(3)(C),thecommonlawthatitcodifies,andtheveryterm“defactoparent”requirejustthat.See19-AM.R.S.§1891(3).

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courtwasrequiredtodismissthecomplaint—asitdid—becauseDavisdidnot

havestandingtoproceedwithherdefactoparenthoodclaim.13

[¶33]Finally,contrarytoDavis’scontention,dismissalofhercomplaint

for lack of standing does not mean that a grandparent is held to a higher

standard than the standard that applies to someone who is not a family

member.Properapplicationoftheconstitutionallybasedprinciplesregulating

de facto parenthood proceedings will require any person—regardless of

whether there is a biological relationship to the child—to present exacting

proof to be adjudicated a de facto parent and awarded parental rights to

someoneelse’schild. See19-AM.R.S.§1891. Here,Daviswasfoundto lack

standingnotbecauseshewasheldtoastandardthatisgreaterthanwouldhave

beenapplied if shewerenot thechild’sgrandparent,butratherbecauseshe

failedtopersuadethecourtthatthechild’smotheracknowledged,accepted,or

understoodherasaparenttothechild.

Theentryis:

Judgmentaffirmed.

13Becauseapetitioner’sfailuretosatisfyanyoftheelementsofstandingisfataltothepetition

itself,weneednotanddonotaddressthecourt’salternativeconclusionthatthechildhadnotresidedwith Davis for a significant period. See 19-AM.R.S. § 1891(2), (3) (setting out the elements toestablishstandingintheconjunctive).

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Elissa J.Roberts,Esq. (orally), Schneider&Brewer,Waterville, for appellantMaureenD.DavisTiffany Bond, Esq. (orally), BondLaw, Portland, for appellee Bennie C.McGuireIIISkowheganDistrictCourtdocketnumberFM-2016-235FORCLERKREFERENCEONLY