I

CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES

JAGIELLONIAN UNIVERSITY

KRAKOW, POLAND

FEDERALISM AS FUEL FOR ETHNIC CONFLICT: BELGIUM’S POLITICAL EVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

BY COREE BROWN

Indeks Number: 1016765

Thesis written under the supervision of dr. Hab. Marek Kucia.

submitted January 2008

II

TO MY NANA:

YOU ARE ALWAYS IN MY HEART AND MIND,

ENCOURAGING ME TO FOLLOW MY DREAMS

III

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I WOULD LIKE TO THANK

MY PARENTS FOR CONSTANT SUPPORT, ENCOURAGEMENT AND GROCERY

MONEY,

THE PEOPLE OF PEPINSTER, BELGIUM FOR SPARKING AN INTEREST,

RTBF FOR KEEPING IT INTERESTING,

THE DOCTORS AT DIETLA FOR KEEPING ME ALIVE SO I COULD FINISH,

&

GOSIA, BOBBIE AND HALINA FOR THEIR FRIENDSHIP, ENCOURAGEMENT

AND AN AMAZING YEAR!

IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION 2

HISTORICAL CONTEXT 5

RESEARCH QUESTIONS 7

STATEMENT OF THESIS 8

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE AND THEORY

INTRODUCTION 11

THE STATE OF THE SCIENCE 13

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND REGIONALIST DEMANDS 15

ETHNIC MOBILIZATION AND POLITICAL MANIFESTATIONS:

CAUSES & CONSEQUENCES 24

CONSOCIATIONALISM: FROM PILLARS TO PEOPLE 27

MULTIETHNIC-MULTINATIONAL FEDERALISM: IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE 32

WHEN THE SYSTEM FAILS: SECESSIONISM 42

CONCLUSION: ETHNIC CONFLICT IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE: THE CASE OF BELGIUM 46

CHAPTER THREE: HISTORY: THE FEDERALIZATION OF CONFLICT

INTRODUCTION 47

IDENTITY FORMATION UNDER OCCUPATION: 1750-1830 48

STATE FORMATION FROM ABOVE: BELGIAN INDEPENDENCE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF

THE STATE 53

THE RISE OF NATIONALISM AND REGIONAL DIFFERENTIATION 1840-1910 57

DEMOCRACY AND DISSENT: THE 1920S AND 1930S 62

WORLD WAR II: COLLABORATION AND RESISTANCE 68

CRISIS AND CHANGE: 1945 TO 1950S 69

ECONOMIC BOOM, ECONOMIC BUST: THE 1960S 72

THE FAILURE OF ACCOMODATION AND THE END OF THE UNITARY STATE: THE 1970S 74

TOWARDS A FEDERALIST BELGIUM: THE 1980S 75

BELGIUM 1993: THE END OR THE BEGINNING? 76

V

CONCLUSION 77

CHAPTER FOUR: ENTRENCHING ETHNIC CONFLICT: BELGIUM’S MOVE TOWARDS

FEDERALISM AND ITS IMPACT

INTRODUCTION 78

THE FEDERAL REFORM OF 1970: A RELUCTANT MOVE TOWARDS FEDERALISM 80

REFORM OF THE 1980S CONFLICT PREVENTION OR COOPERATION? 85

1989: REFORM UNDER DURESS 87

1993: THE “FINAL” REFORMS 89

2001 AND BEYOND 93

CONCLUSION 94

CHAPTER FIVE: ANALYZING THE EFFICACY OF BELGIAN FEDERALISM:

THE MITIGATION OF ETHNIC CONFLICT AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF

DIFFERENCE

INTRODUCTION 96

CAUSES AND NATURE OF ETHNIC CONFLICT IN BELGIUM 98

FROM CONSOCIATIONALISM TO FEDERALISM: WHAT REMAINS 103

BELGIAN FEDERALISM DEFINED 105

INSTITUTIONS, MECHANISMS AND FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 108

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PARTY SYSTEM 114

DOES A BELGIAN SOCIETY EXIST? 117

THE MOST EUROPEANS OF THE EUROPEANS: BELGIUM IN THE EU 123

THE PROBLEM OF BRUSSELS 128

CHAPTER SIX: THE FUTURE OF THE BELGIAN STATE:

BYE-BYE BELGIUM? DECEMBER 2007 129

WHAT COMES NEXT… 132

BIBLIOGRAPHY 135

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

EST-CE QU’ELLE EXISTE, LA BELGIQUE ?

No, Sire, there is no such thing as a Belgian soul. The fusion of Flemings and Walloons

is not so much to be desired and, if one were to desire it, one would have to admit that it

is not possible

Advisor to the King

The Belgians have a nationality which one can ignore only by repudiating the extensive

evidence of their history and by taking into account none of the numerous

characteristics they still display today

Essay on Belgian Public Opinion 1815-1830

Belgium is a rare nation that is defined by not being two of its neighbors. Within its

borders live, in grumpy co-existence, six million Dutch speakers who are not Dutch, and

four million Francophones who are not French

The Economist

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Introduction

On the thirteenth of December, 2006, the programming of RTBF, the state-

funded network in Francophone Belgium, was interrupted by a shocking special report.

Newscasters announced that the Flemish Parliament, in an overwhelming majority, had

voted to declare its unilateral independence, seceding from the Belgian state. King

Albert II, in protest of the decision, left the country in a “fit of pique,” accompanied by

his wife, Queen Paola. Although his destination was at the outset unknown, it was

eventually revealed that he was heading to the Democratic Republic of Congo, where

inhabitants of the former colony were gathering to welcome him. As the events

unfolded, responses from the multiple federal and regional bodies housed in the small

state and the public came pouring in.

A Flemish parliamentarian in an interview declared it to be a “fantastic day”

which would become a national holiday, a day of Flanders‟ deliverance. Belgium was

declared to be an artificial unit, an “invention of a Liegois journalist.” The secession

was to be followed by referendums on several issues, allowing the Flemish public to

weigh in on several; including approving the prepared constitution, the type of political

system to be adopted, and the selection of the Flemish capital. Political leaders assured

Francophones in Flanders that the Council of Europe‟s statutes on minority rights would

be signed and respected. A parliamentarian from the far-right Vlaams Belang argued,

with somewhat flawed logic considering Flemish nationalism, that the Francophones of

Brussels would support the act, as they are “not Walloons, they are Flemings, Flemings

who speak French” (Dutilleul, 2006).

The Walloon parliament was hastily assembled to formulate its response, while

the President, when interviewed, mentioned that rumors had been circulating for several

days. He attributed the move to radical elements and explained that the consociationalist

system had collapsed because the Francophones and Flemings had very different views

on Belgian federalism. While the Flemish community pushed for the division of the

social security system, Francophones were content with the status quo. They had no

demands, and therefore no bargaining power. The mayors of Brussels-based Front

Démocratique des Francophones argued that this unilateral action must be resisted.

The President of the Germanic community explained that the small region would

face several options for its future in the coming weeks. It could become an independent

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microstate, seek incorporation into Luxembourg or Germany or remain with Wallonia,

which at the point of secession oversaw its regional governance.

The traffic around Brussels was at a standstill as people rushed towards the

Belgian capital in confusion. A growing mass gathered around the Royal Palace,

holding the Belgian flag, shouting “Vive le roi” and singing La Brabançonne in both

Flemish and French. Manifestations in Anvers, the stronghold of Flemish nationalism,

erupted in celebration of the declaration, which would allow them to “make their own

choices in solidarity with his neighbors” and a gentleman burst into hastily improvised

song of the Basques, Catalans, Occitans and Alsatians who would follow in their

footsteps. Viewers were advised to stay home in order to avoid provoking violence.

Forty-five minutes into the broadcast, an announcement was made, explaining

this reportage was a farce, designed to spark debate over the nature and fate of the

Belgian state. The broadcast, featuring well-known politicians from across the political

and linguistic spectrum and familiar reporters, gave little cause for viewers to doubt its

veracity. The emission began with the statement “this is perhaps not fictional” and the

same ambiguous message appeared throughout the emission. After this announcement,

the broadcast continued; reporters, Belgian politicians and European officials weighed

in on the international and domestic ramifications and practicalities should such a

division occur.

The political and social debate that followed the broadcast indicated that all was

not well in the land of beer and chocolate. The so-called “docu-fiction” sparked outrage

amongst French and Flemish-speakers and was so convincing that some diplomats in

Brussels called their home states in confusion.

Inspired by Orson Welles‟ War of the Worlds and touted as an attempt to draw

attention to the state of Belgium, a multi-lingual, multi-ethnic federation, the

controversial programming succeeded in its objective. RTBF and the producer of the so-

called “mocumentary” Phillipe Dutilleul faced intense criticism from Walloons, the

King and the federal government. Flemish nationalists expressed their appreciation

citing it as evidence of the artificial nature and precarious position of the Belgian state.

Dutilleul defined the project as “science fiction derived from a probable reality”

(Dutilleul, 2006 p. 187). The fact that the belief in the veracity of the newscast was so

widespread calls attention to the fact that the future dissolution of the Belgian state is

not an absurd or unthinkable concept for Belgians.

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Belgium‟s delicate internal composition was exposed and debated in the

international press, an unfamiliar experience for the nation known primarily for its beer,

chocolate and commitment to European integration.

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Historical Context

Some have described Belgium as an artificial state, a result of the machinations

of the great powers in the 1830s. At its origins, Belgium was dominated by Francophone

elites who attempted to forge a common Belgian identity with a distinctly French flavor.

The power of Wallonia was bolstered by early industrialization, while Flanders

remained relatively underdeveloped and largely agrarian. Religious and ideological

cleavages combined with linguistic issues to prevent a strong sense of national identity

from taking root. As Flanders developed, an intellectual class worked to develop a

Flemish body of literature and standardize the language. Linguistic laws passed in the

late nineteenth century ranked Flemish on par with French, in theory if not in practice.

Ethnic conflict was exacerbated by the First World War over the treatment of

Flemish-speaking soldiers in the Francophone dominated corps and of instances of

collaboration by some Flemish nationalists with the German occupiers. While Flemings

were afforded some linguistic rights and enhanced participation in government as a

result of the crisis, the Second World War would divide the country further. Extremists

on both sides of the linguistic divide participated with the Nazi occupiers and following

the war, divisive battles about the role of the king, religion and the fate of

collaborationists were waged. The question of the king would become especially bitter,

resulting in the only violent ethnic conflict Belgium has ever seen, with three people

killed in protests and rioting.

The postwar period marked a dramatic shift in economic and demographic

power. Flanders began to welcome foreign investment, channeling it into developing

modern and lucrative enterprises, while Wallonia‟s traditional mining sector fell into

decay. At the same time, a new breed of Flemish elites, well-versed in Flemish language

and nationalism, came to the forefront of politics, giving the Flemish movement a voice.

Finally, in the 1960s, the country was partitioned along linguistic lines, which

were to be permanent, allowing politicians on both sides to mobilize territorially.

Ethnoregional parties emerged in Wallonia, Brussels and Flanders, challenging the

traditional parties and advocating Belgium‟s federalization. In order to cope with these

demands, Liberals, Catholics and Socialists split according to their linguistic affiliation

and adopted regionalist goals. In 1970, the first step towards federalization was made.

This process would continue for more than twenty years until Belgium was declared a

federal state in 1993. At present, many politicians continue to press for further

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devolution of competences, although their original demands have been fulfilled and

even exceeded, lending credence to the theory adopted here that federalism has

perpetuated and even stimulated centrifugal forces.

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Research Questions

Throughout the text, we will explore the theoretical framework, historical

context and political situation against which ethnic conflict in Belgium occurs. It is our

goal to answer the following questions:

What is the nature of Belgium‟s political system?

How does this system, with its consociationalist and federalist aspects, serve to

minimize or perpetuate conflict?

What is the role of parties and party elites within this system?

How does Belgian society as a whole act within this system?

What influence does the far right on both sides of the linguistic divide have on

political currents?

What is the role of the European Union in Belgian‟s experience with ethnic

conflict?

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Statement of Thesis

In 1993, Belgium formally became a federal state, essentially fulfilling demands

that originated in the interwar period by both Flemings and Walloons. Despite the

devolution of many competences to the regional and community level, issues continue

to plague the political scene and many more competences have been devolved, at very

high costs for the federalist apparatus.

This, I argue, is a result of the unique nature of the Belgian state. From its

origins, elites worked to build a Belgian society. While this was essential for ensuring

stability and cooperation from a society beset by severe social, religious and ideological

cleavages, the paritocracy has become entrenched, leading to charges of corruption and

disillusionment with the existing party system.

As regional conflict intensified in the 1970s, eventually leading to the adoption

of a federalist system, traditional parties adopted the demands once exclusive to the

regional parties in order to retain power. The parties split, and at present, only one small

party, the electorally minor Belgische Unie, Union Belge, competes across linguistic

boundaries. The country‟s parties were divided along linguistic lines in the 1970s and

now, little communication much less collaboration occurs, partly as a result of the

different ideological backgrounds. Flanders advocates free market policies but at the

same time is politically conservative, while Wallonia retains its socialistic leanings,

necessary to procure the funds to prop up failing, aging industries while adopting

socially liberal policies.

Research has shown that despite the predominance of demands for reforms on

the basis of a need for regional autonomy, citizens are becoming actually less attached

to the regions. They are, however, demanding changes in employment, economic and

social policy which political elites must satisfy. It is true that the federal government has

been essentially enfeebled by successive reforms and may lack the political and

economic resources to enact necessary reforms, but it is often not given a chance. The

politicians argue that all problems are better solved at a sub-national level, granting

themselves greater control over political power and resources.

However, regionalist parties persist, advocating further separation and taking on

rightist ideologies, especially in Flanders. As a result, it has become politically

profitable to advocate regional autonomy because of the manner in which the state

attempts to pacify demands and minimize ethnic conflict. This failure of the government

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to respond at any level has led to widespread disillusionment with traditional political

actors. As a result, rightist parties such as the ultranationalist Vlaam Belang have

achieved significant electoral success within Flanders, although it is unclear the

percentage of support generated by ideological agreement or protest votes.

The federalization of the Belgian state is not a unique phenomenon in a larger

European context. Throughout Europe, once centralized states are engaging in some

form of economic or political devolution to appease minorities, improve the

transparency and efficiency of government mechanisms and lend the political process

legitimacy. Belgium‟s move towards federalism actually mirrors the European Union‟s

expansion of competences and deepened integration. Belgium has always defined itself

as intensely pro-European, although some argue that the expansion of Union control

over fiscal and monetary policy, one of the few areas left in the domain of the federal

government, has essentially served to hollow the federal center from above and below.

The European Union, with its seat in Brussels, serves as the glue which holds it all

together, in the eyes of some. However, the European Union, with its attempts to

increase citizen involvement, has expanded operations at the regional level. Belgium,

already highly integrated by necessity into international markets, has pushed for further

integration. The division of Belgium into small states of Flanders and Wallonia seems

increasingly economically and politically feasible.

Belgium seems to be held together only by a few factors but even these provoke

disputes. The monarchy, represented by King Albert, has historically been a rallying

point for Belgians but has, since the postwar period, been a source of communitarian

strife. While Flanders once overwhelmingly supported the king in the controversy after

the First World War, many now criticize King Albert for his apparently pro-

Francophone views.

Brussels, an area of contention, is often ignored in order to prevent the total

failure of negotiations remaining a sticking point, with neither side willing to cede this

largely Francophone city in Flemish territory. Could Brussels become a UN protectorate

or a European city? Only the future will tell, but refusing to address the contentious

nature of Brussels may be the only way to hold the Belgian state together.

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CHAPTER TWO

ETHNIC CONFLICT, ETHNIC MOBILIZATION AND THE EUROPEAN UNION:

LITERATURE AND THEORY

Nobody can suppose that it is not more beneficial for a Breton or a Basque of French

Navarre to be a member of the French nationality than to sulk on his own rocks, the

half-savage relic of past times.

John Stuart Mill

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Introduction

The field of state-based ethnic conflict studies has remained relatively limited.

Scholars have resisted its study, believing it to be a transient phenomenon. Despite the

claims of scholars in the postwar world, ethnic conflict within multiethnic societies is

not an aberration, an unexpected bump in the road to modernity and post-nationalism.

The predicted homogenization of nation-states has yet to transpire.

As we have seen, the rapid changes spurred by globalization have perhaps

provoked more ethnic and national identification, as people naturally cling to what is

familiar, feeling lost in a world where nation, creed or village are supposed to be

meaningless. As Western Europe integrated, forming a new post-national entity which

successfully incorporated groups once divided by bitter hatred and centuries of conflict,

much of South-Eastern Europe crumbled into disorder and internal strife. It is for that

reason that state-based ethnic conflict is increasingly relevant and perhaps dangerously

neglected.

For our purposes, it is necessary to adopt a slightly more restrictive view towards

the causes and theories of ethnic conflict. We must focus on conflict which takes place

in the developed world, especially integrated Europe, which has eliminated or assuaged

ancient grievances between states while having a very limited role in internal affairs,

beyond assuring the accordance of minority rights. The resurgence of nationalism in

Europe may be particularly odd for social scientists in Europe, seeming "at odds with

the construction of a new and wider political order, often referred to a supranational,

which is seen as the culmination of the very trend to functional integration that is

credited with producing the nation-state" (Keating, 2004 p. 1).

It is interesting to note that state-based ethnic conflict, in the form of regional

autonomy movements and ethnic mobilization, has actually intensified as the grand

European project has progressed. This can perhaps be attributed to the fact that borders

dictated by the decisions of great powers and bloody wars throughout the centuries do

not always correspond with ethnic distributions and political realities. Some have also

argued that the nation-state is being weakened from above and below by the advent of

multi-level governance. We will examine the causes of this resurgence and the European

Union‟s role in its management.

Realizing the need to protect the rights of cultural minorities while sustaining the

central state, governments throughout the world and especially in Europe have adopted

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cultural protections. Some have done so on their own, others when mandated by larger

regional bodies, such as the Council of Europe and the European Union. In some cases,

the official recognition and protection of a distinct culture, language or religion has been

sufficient. However when it is not, power-sharing schemes, non-majoritarian in nature

have been designed to ensure representation and appease ethnic demands, especially

when these groups are politically mobilized or territorially based. Consociationalist

theories attracted attention in the 1960s when Dutch political scientists Arend Lijphart

proposed his theories of consociationalism as a means of mitigating conflict in

multiethnic societies.

Consociationalism relies on the existence of several pillars of society, whether

ethnic, religious or ideological. Federalism, typically identified with the German and

American systems, is another device for ethnic conflict management, useful only when

competing ethnic groups are territorially based. States often turn to federalism to

moderate these interests, as has India, Russia, Switzerland and Spain. This allows an

ethnic group some autonomous control over their territories. (Esman, 1994 p. 2). This

work will examine the causes and persistence of state-based ethnic conflict and

institutional strategies designed to manage it. It is important to remember that non-

majoritarian power-sharing strategies, including federalism or consociationalism, are not

designed to cure ethnic conflict or do away with ethnic identities, but to manage them in

a peaceful way, ensuring the survival of the state in question and the respect for rights of

its inhabitants. Both models rely on the presence of forward-thinking elites and both,

despite their merits and relative success in preventing violence in the Western countries

in which they are employed, have generated charges of elitism and democratic

deficiency, leading to political crises.

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The State of the Science

It was a common belief that economic development, urbanization and literacy

would create greater social and technological links between once feuding peoples,

serving to strengthen loyalties to the existing state and later to post-national bodies, such

as the European communities. (Gurr, 1994 p. 78). In Donald Horowitz's opinion, the

inattention of the social sciences to issues of ethnic conflict arose out a desire to relegate

this tribalism “to the dustbins of history.” He writes that this belief made it "easy to

perceive ethnic allegiances as purely vestigial affiliations, survivals of a traditionalism

whose lack of contemporary utility would be made apparent by the onslaught of modern

forces" (1985 p. 97). Despite these predictions, the postwar world has not seen a

decrease in nationalism and ethnic conflict. Very few societies (only 10% according to

Esman) possess the homogeneity required to ensure peace and in all societies, traditional

and modern ethnic groups have mobilized, at least at some level, politically. (1994 p. 2).

Neither the experience of prolonged prosperity, the decreasing salience of many

non-economic cleavages, the active intervention of the state, nor the irresistible

march of modernization significantly undermined traditional patterns of

majority-minority group conflict.

Fraga et al 1992 p. 5.

In fact, some scholars argue that the very process of modernization, which was viewed

as a antidote to primordialism, has in fact exacerbated existing problems as

“modernization is a threat to ethnic solidarities that prompts minorities to mobilize in

defense of their culture and way of life”(Gurr, 1994 p. 78).

The study of ethno nationalism evolved as the need to understand virulent ethnic

conflict became apparent in both European societies and abroad. In the 1950s and

1960s, models were developed to integrate multiethnic societies through peaceful and

non-majoritarian means, models which were intended to eventually lead to the

integration of ethnic groups. However, faced with nationalist success in Flanders,

Quebec and Scotland in the 1970s and 1980s, new fields addressing the political

mobilization of ethnic groups “ethno nationalism,” “minority nationalism” and “micro-

nationalism” emerged. As autonomists largely failed to achieve their stated goal of

independence, the studies sought to address their failure. The collapse of the Soviet

Union and Yugoslavia and the peaceful dissolution of Czechoslovakia allowed scholars

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to hone their skills. (Sorens, 2005 p. 304). Minahan identifies this as the third wave of

modern nationalism:

The nationalist revival, global in scope, has strengthened submerged national,

ethnic, and regional identities and has shattered the conviction that assimilation

would eventually homogenize the existing nation-states. The nationalist revival

is now feeding on itself, as the freedom won by many historically stateless

nations has emboldened other national groups to demand greater control of their

own destinies.

2002 p. xxii.

As ethnic conflict persists, both in the developing and developed world, more study is

necessary. Rather than focusing solely on the causes and manifestations of ethnic

conflict, scholars must look at successful techniques applied in countries with

territorially based ethnic groups which remain peaceful, such as Switzerland. The

European Union, which up until this point, has kept remarkably silent on cases of ethnic

conflict within its member states, may either foster or minimize ethnic conflict

depending on its approach.

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The European Union and Regionalist Demands

Hollowing from Above and Below

In a Europe where there is no majority, all nations are in a sense 'minorities', allowing

those who are minorities within their own states to project their concerns as part of a

wider issue'

Keating 2004 p. 137.

Introduction

Globalization and the regional integration that accompanies it have served to

undermine the nation-state.

The rapidly changing political and economic realities have swept aside the old

arguments that population size, geographic location, and economic viability are

deterrents to national self-determination. The revival of nationalism is

converging with the emergence of continental political and economic units

theoretically able to accommodate ever smaller national units within overarching

political, economic, and security frameworks

Minahan, 2002 p. xxi-xxii.

While the traditional state does remain the primary actor on the international stage, its

sovereignty is increasingly limited by its international obligations. International

organizations such as NATO have shown themselves willing to intervene in domestic

policy when it contravenes basic principles of human rights while regional bodies are

becoming increasingly influential in both economic and social affairs. Nowhere is this

more evident than in the European Union, which has become a significant source of

domestic policy and has expanded its competences far further than originally envisaged.

While many discount the role of the European Union in the rise of regional

autonomy (citing the minimal direct influence of Committee of the Regions on EU

policy and the persistence of the nation state as both the subject and the actor in of the

Union), the psychological impact of the Union which seems to make the nation state

superfluous in regards to its traditional functions (economic regulation, security) is

profound. The integration of a small region or a potential “microstate” into a larger

market independent of the traditional state is possible for the first time. To profit from

this certain regions have gone so far as to engage in international relations which were

once the exclusive and fiercely guarded domain of the nation-state. In addition, the

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Union, with its emphasis on rights for minorities and the peaceful mediation of conflict

is likely to be a moderating influence.

Regionalist Trends within the European Union

While globalization has weakened the nation-state, the predicted “death of

nationalism” has not occurred. Many European states are engaging in regional

decentralization to better cope with economic and social demands, although the extent

of this process depends on the nature of the regions themselves. Keating identifies

several characteristics of contemporary regionalism within Europe

• Regions become economic units in their own right;

• Regional identity strengthens;

• Regional institutions are established to deal with social, economic and political

issues;

• Regions seek investment from abroad;

• New development coalitions of public and private actors emerge at the regional

level;

• Inter-regional co-operation increases at international and European levels.

Keating, 2007 p. 19

While devolution seems to be a general trend in Europe, Keating et al explain that

contemporary moves towards decentralization are a result of different demands, often

reflecting the desire to manage economics while others, such as those in Spain, are

designed to protect local cultures and mitigate ethnic conflict. (2003 p. 21).

European states first engaged in decentralization after World War II, spurred by

the idea that regions rather than central governments could better deal with pressing

issues of economic development. The regions that resulted were not necessarily cultural

or linguistic entities. Some were determined according to their economic development,

designed to promote infrastructural development or investment, rather than a political

consciousness. (Keating, et al 2003 p. 7). Decentralization has occurred to a greater

extent in areas in which the territorial units are made up of national, linguistic or

religious communities, like in Belgium, than those which are units based on

administrative divisions or economic disparities, such as in Italy. (Kymlicka, 1998 p.

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130). Political nationalism was often unexpected, largely believed to be relegated to

Horowitz‟s dustbin of history.

As decentralization occurs, economic and ethnic regions have attempted to

project their interests on an international stage. Both Catalonia and Flanders engage in

what Keating terms “paradiplomacy”, promoting themselves as regions ripe for foreign

direct investment, with both the infrastructure and educated workforce to meet the needs

of foreign corporations. (Keating, 2004 p. 156). At the same time, they engage in

cultural nationalism, working to promote and preserve their language and culture.

Politically mobilized regions with the competences to do so set up missions to European

and international institutions to promote awareness and protect their interests. However,

international law rarely grants these missions standing in the institutions in which they

wish to take part.

The Regional Autonomists’ Vision of Europe

Europeanization is a popular theme among groups advocating regional autonomy

or outright independence. This is a reaction against prevailing political thought which

viewed regionalism as “backwards and regressive” and as a result, went incognito by

adopting “Europeanist” or “neo-Marxist internal colonialism ideologies” (Keating, et al

2001 p. 7). Despite the widespread pro-European sentiment, some have criticized the

Union for falling short of its goals. A specific vision of Europe is contained within

regionalist manifestos, including those of the Basques, Catalans and Flemish, who each

speak of a Europe of Regions. This vision is opposed to the present Europe of nation-

states, which they view as an artificial construct. While nationalists and autonomists

speak hopefully of a third level within European politics, the Convention on the Future

of Europe and the now defunct constitutional treaty proved a disappointment, doing

little to augment the powers of the Committee of Regions and focusing on the member

state as the primary political actor. (Keating, 2007 p. 17).

While this vision of Europe may be difficult to achieve, one must stress that

within an integrated Europe, ethnoregional mobilization has remained remarkably

peaceful and often manifests itself in political forms, less damaging and dramatic than

violence but no less telling or significant.

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Institutions and Representation

The growing importance of the regions was institutionalized in the Treaty of

Maastricht. Previously, Article 146 EEC restricted representation and voting within the

Council of Ministers to members of national governments. Due to intense lobbying by

both the Belgian regions and the German Lander during the intergovernmental

conference of 1991, the Treaty on the European Union reflected these concerns. (Laffan,

Stubb 2003 p. 78). Article 203 TEU allowed regional ministers to participate in Council

meetings, recognizing the devolution taking part in some countries which deprived the

central governments of competence in certain areas. However, the article stipulated that

each representative must present a unified voice, acting from “the policy position of the

member state as a whole and independent from the constitutional status the member

state representative enjoys domestically” (Beyers, Bursens 2006 p. 1064).

This emphasis on unanimity may in fact promote cooperation. “A domestic

compromise is needed if one wants to achieve anything at the EU level. Regions,

therefore, depend strongly on internal arrangements. (Beyers, Bursens 2006 p. 1064).

This is especially true in the case of Belgium which allows ministers from the relevant

policy area from both the communities and regions to participate in Council meetings

but requires consensus in order to cast a vote. In order to have a voice, the regions and

communities must find compromise. Policies regarding regional representation depend

on the competences vested in them by the nation-state and are not a result of European

Union decision-making. In Germany, one organization represents all Lander and they

are expected to come to a common decision. While the Belgian regions and

communities are expected to come to a consensus, each entity possesses its own

diplomatic corps. (Hooghe, 1995 p. 149).

The nation-state remains the primary actor at the EU-level, despite the principle

of subsidiarity. The states have, according to David Allen, retained control over access

through procedural requirements and may work to manage ethnic conflict and autonomy

through these policies.

It does seem that the effectiveness of sub-national access is determined more by

the nature of the constitutional arrangements in a particular member state than by

the Commission‟s partnership arrangements. In some cases central governments

have been able to strengthen their powers by using Commission procedures to

- 19 -

play one set of sub-national actors off against another, or by joining forces with

sub-national actors to do battle with the Commission

2000 p. 259-260.

Despite these restrictions in the main decision-making bodies, the regions and localities

have an institution in which they can act in an advisory capacity, although its

significance is debated.

With each treaty revision, the role of the Committee of the Regions has been

enhanced although it does not possess binding powers. The Commission and the

Council are obliged to consult the Committee on proposals which will have a regional

and local impact.

Maastricht Amsterdam

Culture Employment policy

Economic and social cohesion Environmental issues

Education Social policy

Health Transport

Trans-European Infrastructure Vocational training

As we will see in the following chapters, each of these policies now falls within the

competences of the regions and communities which together form the Belgian federalist

system.

While the committee is modeled after the powerful German Bundesrat, it is

described by some scholars as “internally divided” by a “debilitating diverse”

membership consisting of both of powerful regional authorities from Germany and

Belgium and representatives of small parishes in England. (Bomber, et al 2003 p. 63).

Because of this asymmetry, a group of stronger regions emerged which felt that the

Committee of Regions should be granted legislative powers, named “Regions with

Legislative Powers,” they

argued for a special status in the new treaty in recognition of their responsibility

in the transmission of European directives and application of European policies.

Neither the CoR nor the Convention, however, was prepared to allow this formal

asymmetry

- 20 -

Keating, 2007 p. 16.

Despite these weaknesses, the Committee may play an important role for socialization,

allowing representatives of politically mobilized regions to cooperate and exchange

ideas although its overall influence remains limited.

The Role of the European Union in Regionalist Conflict

The European Union, like the states which form its membership, has been forced

to divert more attention to the regions in recent years. The idea of regions as

international players in their own right was adopted by academics, governments and the

European Commission, becoming, by the 1990s, "the common currency of regional

political and administrative elites" (Keating, et al 2003 p. 18). According to scholars, the

Union served two important, although perhaps contradictory purposes in regards to

ethnic and nationalist conflict. Primarily, it has served to moderate national demands.

Even the most virulent nationalist seeks integration and acceptance into the larger

European body, although the regionalist conception of Europe may be very different

from the conception of a strong unitary state like France. Cooperation has increased

amongst the regions seeking autonomy or outright independence and the Basques,

Catalans, Flemish and Scots often speak of a Europe of Peoples or Regions rather than a

Europe of states. Keating describes this evolution as nationalism “tamed and

modernized” (2004 p. 137).

While independence within a highly integrated Europe seems for the first time

economically and politically viable, even for the smallest of states, these regions are

unlikely to engage in violence, considering the political consequences of such an action.

(Ghai, 2002 p. 157). "The Union has deeply redefined the notion of sovereignty and

autonomy, and has therefore given new (and less threatening) meanings to regionalism"

(Deshouwer, Van Assche 2005 p. 17). Even calls for independence have been

moderated as

nationalists in Wales and in Catalonia have explicitly renounced statehood as a

goal in favor of nation-building in a new form. The Flemish nationalists of the

Volksunie seem content to allow Belgium to continue as long as the region of

Flanders is also strengthened

Keating and McGarry, 2001 p. 9.

- 21 -

Despite this apparent downfall of the state, some minorities remain committed statehood

as the ultimate goal. "Paradoxically, the erosion of the ideology of state nationalism has

stimulated ethnic politics without diminishing the potency of self-determination as a

spur to ethnic activism" (Esman, 1994 p. 5). As the European Union has expanded its

competences, regionalist parties in Belgium, Spain and Scotland have looked at the

organization as a source of support for its ambitions. Majone explains

At a time when it becomes evident that the European state is too small for certain

essential tasks, such as military security and economic management, it also

becomes possible to argue that the nation-state is too large for other purposes.

Hence many regionalists view the movement toward greater European unity and

decentralization of state functions to the regional level as complementary trends

Majone, 1990 p. 72.

In the case of Belgium, European integration and regional devolution have followed a

remarkably similar course, serving as the ultimate example of multilevel governance.

As the EU asserts its influence over more aspects of life, it may undermine the

state which these regions rally against. In its quest for democratic legitimacy through

subsidiarity, the Union has augmented the role and influence of sub national bodies,

especially the regions. In fact, some would argue that the EU which grants regions a

voice (both through official representation and perhaps more significantly through the

distribution of structural funds on a local and regional basis), has served to empower

those regions, allowing them to gain political and economic expertise, which perhaps

strengthens their autonomist demands. “Especially regions with extensive competences

have a strong base from which they can mobilize. They are therefore more likely to shift

their political strategies to the European level" (Beyers, Bursens 2006 p. 1060-1). Stolz

describes a professionalization of a political class which has shifted its ambitions from

the national level to the regional and supranational level. (2003 p. 245). Regions which

share a common mission are able to mobilize support for their interests at the

supranational level, largely bypassing the nation-state and seek support in Brussels.

Within the European Parliament, the European Free Alliance represents regionalist and

nationalist movements from various member states.

The Union is hesitant to grant moral or political support, especially for outright

secessionist movements, as nation states do remain the primary actors. However,

through their inclusion in the political dialogue, Europe serves as another source of

legitimacy and recognition, both and moderating their demands in the process, with

- 22 -

potentially dramatic consequences. The distribution of structural funds may put multiple

levels within a state in direct competition.

Regionalism and Risks

While most argue that the representation of small ethnic groups at all levels of

EU decision-making enhance democratic representation and promote diversity, the

populist roots of many movements advocating multilevel governance have given some

scholars cause for concern. While policies which allow participation on multiple levels,

according to Logno, allows the “more effective protection of distinctive cultural features

and greater democracy through enhanced capacity of communities to choose the form of

government to represent them” (2003 p. 479), some scholars fear parochialism and

discrimination as regions attempt to prevent the dilution of their recently acquired

powers. These movements wish to promote cultural cohesion within their region and are

therefore often resistant to external immigration, and promote a “Europe of Regions”

that is of total European heritage, rather than a more inclusive entity. The policies which

promote cultural diversity raise, according to Longo, “the possibility of the emergence

of an inward-looking, competitive, xenophobic and culturally protectionist bloc” (2003

p. 480). This has been shown in the case of Flanders, as the Vlaams Belang has adopted

harsh anti-immigration policies. These risks must be anticipated as the European Union

strives to meet the needs of both the nation-state and the regions

Europe of Regions: A Vision of the Future?

Despite the trends towards devolution and federalization, the organization of a

Europe of Regions may prove difficult because of competing visions of Europe and

resistance on the part of the member states. The nation-state remains the primary focus

of the European Union and is likely to resist any attempt, on the part of its own

regionalist groups or in the groups of its neighbors, to reorient Union policy. (Beyers,

Bursens 2006 p. 1058). Centralized states which do have territorially-based ethnic

groups within its borders are likely to be wary of measures which may encourage

regionalization or ethnic mobilization at home. In addition, some nation-states do not

face ethnic conflict or regional autonomy movements, due to either homogeneity or the

lack of mobilization on the part of ethnic groups. Many “regions” are simple

- 23 -

administrative units, possessing no cohesive identity than the national one. The diverse

nature of European member states, consisting of both highly centralized and highly

devolved systems, is likely to hinder efforts to create a Europe of Regions.

- 24 -

Ethnic Mobilization and Political Manifestations

Causes and Consequences

Social scientists seeking to understand ethnic conflict are split into two camps

regarding the impetus to engage in political and ethnic mobilization. Primoridalists hold

that ethnicity is "deeply rooted in historical experience," some arguing that it can be

viewed as a biological phenomenon while still others maintain that it is a result of

socialization into an ethnic community which involves absorbing the language, customs

and norms of a people. Esman writes that primordialists "tend to attach high value to

historical continuity, group sanctions, and social solidarity as determinants of human

behavior." (1994 p. 10).

Instrumentalists argue the contrary, describing ethnicity as a "highly adaptive

and malleable phenomenon" with few firm boundaries. Some view ethnic identity as

motivated by the potential for gain, arguing that "ethnicity is primarily a practical

resource that individuals and groups deploy opportunistically to promote their more

fundamental security or economic interests and that they may even discard when

alternative affiliations promise better returns." (Esman, 1994 p. 10).

Wimmer explains that instrumentalism only occurs when a given ethnic group

has sufficiently mobile elites, often of the middle class. It often begins with cultural

issues; educated elites resist assimilation, and push for further academic opportunities in

their language and inclusion of minority history into programs of academic study.

They thus draw on the ideal of ethnic representativity, of equality before the law,

and of the state's responsiveness towards 'the people', in order to demand a 'just'

representation in government, a recognition of their cultural heritage as part of

the nation's treasures, a treatment as equally valuable and dignified parts of 'the

people'

Wimmer, 2002 p. 3.

They point out instances of cultural and legal exclusion, in the case of Belgium, the

traditional francophone dominance of government and the emphasis on French as the

language of social mobility. Within Western Europe, this historical situation was termed

“internal colonialism” and became a point of mobilization for Basques, Bretons,

Corsicans, Scots and the Welsh. (Gurr, 1994 p. 78-79). Lead by these “political

entrepreneurs” ethnic minorities began to form organizations and push for legal,

economic and cultural inclusion.

- 25 -

Despite these differences, Esman argues that rather than being contradictory,

primordialist and instrumentalist theories are instead interrelated and even

interdependent. He writes that: "ethnicity cannot be policiticized unless an underlying

core of memories, experience, or meaning moves people to collective action" These

include historical struggles, cultural markets (including language and religion). They are

also fluid, capable of being “oriented to fresh goals” and “infused with new content"

(1994 p. 14). This is true in many Western countries as ethnic groups focus on reviving

and preserving their unique cultural heritage in order to mobilize politically and improve

the status of the group as a whole, especially in economic terms, within a larger society.

Ethnic conflict is perhaps more virulent than other forms of state-based conflict

because of the ability to frame the conflict in black and white terms of us versus them. It

is often difficult, if not impossible, to identify the exact factors which lead groups to

mobilize politically in any given case. However, the manifestations of ethnic conflict

can be categorized.

Gurr identifies four politically important types of groups that exist within the

confines of the modern state which can be divided into two categories, those who seek

separation or autonomy and those who work to gain access and participation within the

existing state bodies.

Autonomists/Separatists

Ethnonationalists: previously independent ethnonationalists seek to

reestablish their own states or control their traditional territory. Examples are

found both in the developing world and the West, as the drawing of national

borders rarely creates homogenous societies. While the use of violent tactics

in the West is rare, wars for national independence are frequent in the

developing world and often carry dramatic international consequences as the

events do not occur in a vacuum. (1994 p. 19).

Indigenous peoples: seek to control and protect traditional lands, resources

and culture, examples include the native peoples of the Americas and Asia,

the Australian Aborigine, and the Scandinavian Saami. (1994 p. 19-21).

Equal participation

Communal contenders: one of a number of culturally distinct groups in

pluralist societies, compete for a share of political power. Communal

contenders can include previously secessionist ethnic groups have since been

integrated into the political system. Examples of this shift represent hope,

- 26 -

according to Gurr, for effective politics of power-sharing and integration.

(1994 p. 23). This category can also include politically active religious

minorities, which combined with nationality and class differences can prove

especially damaging.

Ethno classes: seek equal rights and opportunities to compensate for

discrimination experienced due to their status as an immigrant or cultural,

linguistic or religious minorities. Ethno classes may be repressed and

excluded and as a result, adopt autonomist policies. (1994 p. 22).

When these groups mobilize, the government may seek to control the process with

various methods, including consociationalism.

- 27 -

Consociationalism: From Pillars to People

Introduction

The idea of consociationalism was introduced by political scientist Arend

Lijphart in the 1960s as an explanation for political stability in plural societies.

Lijphart‟s first case was his native Netherlands, although he and his adherents

eventually expanded the theory to incorporate Switzerland. Lijphart and those who

developed his theories furthers attribute the apparent stability to elite behavior, arguing

that elites will act to combat disintegrating tendencies. The theory is distinctly anti-

majoritarian, and consociationalists are agreed on the need to a key "mitigate the

unfortunate effect of majority rule in ethnically divided societies" rather than eliminate

these societal cleavages completely. (Horowitz, 1985 p. 570). However, the

consociationalist model has come under intense criticism for its somewhat idealized

views of the roles and motivations of governing elites. Critics argue that elites are

unlikely to act against their own personal and professional interests to promote unity and

that a society dominated by elite bargaining is unlikely to be viewed as legitimate in the

eyes of the people.

Consociationalism Defined

Lijphart‟s original definition of consociationalist system was "government by

elite cartel to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable

democracy" (Lijphart, 1969 p. 216). This emphasis on stability is the most important

aspect, as the main characteristics of consociationalism focus on balance and

cooperation rather than majoritarian policy formation. Consociationalism is anti-

majoritarian, mandating near unanimous consent from all major political pillars,

including religious, ideologically, ethnic, socioeconomic, and territorial, which explains

its success in highly segmented societies like Switzerland and the Netherlands.

in deeply segmented democracies, federal as well as unitary, stability and some

slow progress have often been ensured over long spans of time by a grand

coalition of major parties and interest groups promoting their specific interests

but also seeking a general consensus on a give-and-take basis

Duchacek, 1986 p. 100.

- 28 -

There are several common characteristics of a consociationalist structure,

including the emphasis of autonomy or self-regulation in areas which concern each

specific group; these typically include language use, culture and education. At the

federal level, power is shared in several areas. Parties are formed to represent the

interests of each group and according proportional representation in the parliament. The

principle of parity is respected in key sectors, including the cabinet, the civil service, the

security forces and media.

The goal of consociationalism is to prevent majority rule, allowing each political

actor a voice in society and often a veto. There is an emphasis on consent, each segment

is vested with veto powers or accorded alarm bell devices, as in the case of Belgium.

(Hechter, 2000 p. 136). Traditional majoritarian democracies may be perfectly

acceptable in cases of homogenous societies, but may not be “suitable when elections

are decided on ethnic grounds, as this means a permanent majority for one side, and no

group trusts the other enough to allow it to govern on its own” (Keating, 2007 p. 6-7).

Consociationalism is best suited for societies in which cross-cutting cleavages

occur, groups driven into conflict by purely racial or religious reasons are more difficult.

Unlike federalism, consociationalism can work even when ethnic, religious or linguistic

groups do not have a territorial component.

Several primary conditions have been identified by Lijphart and other scholars.

1. The elite leaders of each group must have to resources to satisfy the demands set

forth by their group

2. Elites must be willing and able to cooperate with the representatives of rival

groups

3. The leadership as a whole must be dedicated to the larger state and be cognizant

of the consequences of ethnic conflict and disunity. There is no room for

autonomist demands in a society which is to function through the adoption of

consociationalist models.

Morris Hale, 1997 p. 8-9.

The emphasis on the role of leadership has proved to be the at once the model‟s greatest

strength and greatest weakness.

- 29 -

Strengths and Weaknesses of the Consociationalist System

Several examples of consociationalist success do exist, including Switzerland

which has remained remarkably unified despite a multitude of linguistic, political and

religious differences. Consociationalism has also been a characteristic of Canadian

governance, although less effective to a certain degree. While scholars often propose the

exportation of the Swiss model to diverse countries in the developing world, it is not

clear if a society which was once beset by bitter or violent ethnic conflict or minority

suppression is capable of achieving the level of trust and cooperation required for a

consociationalist system.

Consociationalist systems require extensive contacts and cooperation in order to

function effectively, which can “further the recognition of the other groups as equal

partners, improve the understanding of their standpoints, and, by creating positive trust

spirals, foster cooperative attitudes” (Bächtiger, et al 1998 p. 83). However, this

cooperation does not always occur and should elites refuse or be politically unable to

engage in a dialogue, crisis often occurs.

The primary criticism of the consociationalist system is derived from the core

principle set forth by Lijphart, that of elite dominance. Scholars such as Donald

Horowitz, arguably taking a more skeptical view of human nature, warning of

opportunism. Elites, representatives of the modern era, were expected to reject the

tribalism and parochialism of the past, promoting a new unity. In many cases, they did

the exact opposite, preying on ethnic divisions for votes and power. "The very elites

who were thought to be leading their peoples away from ethnic affiliations were

commonly found to be in the forefront of ethnic conflict" (Horowitz, 1985 p. 97). These

elites, in their effort to gain electoral support or political strength are likely to exploit

linguistic and ethnic differences to mobilize support. Others argue that

consociationalism which has been lauded as a solution for internal strife in the

developing world, is unlikely to work in societies with a history of violent or intense

interethnic conflict.

As popular democracy seems to be a given, at least in European societies, the

consociationalist emphasis on elite bargaining and secretive negotiations seems to be a

throwback to another era. (Hechter, 2000 p. 137). "Standard consociational practices are

vulnerable to charges that they are elitist and undemocratic, since decision making is

- 30 -

largely a matter of negotiation and compromise among established leaders of the

variable communities" (Esman, 1994 p. 43). The consociationalist system, with politics

taking place in the high levels of government with little popular participation, is unlikely

to be viable for the long-term as the societal differences and conflicts remain

entrenched. While the zero-sum approach to politics is minimized by these trade-offs,

groups are defined in opposition to one another and the development of a larger identity

or national sentiment is impaired. "By promoting group as against individual rights,

consociationalism tends to inhibit intergroup cooperation. It is at least as likely that

leaders will use consociational institutions to gain maximum resources for themselves

rather than to defuse intergroup conflict" (Hechter, 2000 p. 137).

The approach can also lead to the rise of more radical leadership who accuse

those taking part in the bargaining process of betrayal. The presence of “counter-elites”

has often been ignored in consociationalist theory and consociationalism in its present

incarnation has failed to explain the rise of radical groups seeking autonomy. Horowitz

writes

Consociational theory assumes the existence of 'group leaders', but, even when

groups begin with a single set of leaders, compromise across group lines is likely

to show those leaders to be merely party leaders opposed by leaders of other

parties seeking the support of the same group

2002 p. 21.

The public is often susceptible by these messages, disillusioned by the paritocracy that

dominates governance and the appearance of backroom deals and clientelism.

Consociationalist emphasis on legislative representation of the societal cleavages

also falls short of promoting greater cooperation. While consociationalist legislative

bodies often mirror the societal cleavages, there is no mechanism that encourages

cooperation between the groups in the parliamentary rather than elite sphere.

Centrapetalists argue that groups should be encouraged to look outside of their

linguistic, ethnic or religious group for electoral support. This, according to Reilly,

would "work to break down the salience of ethnicity rather than foster its representation

in parliament" (2001 p. 21). In addition to promoting democratic competition, it could

also serve to moderate elite demands. As we will see in the Belgian case, no multiethnic

competition takes place, essentially dividing the political sphere. As a result, the

political parties are free to espouse increasingly radical messages.

- 31 -

Conclusion

Consociationalism has proved to be relatively transient as it relies heavily on

informal agreements and the goodwill of elites, rather than constitutional guarantees. In

his study, Daniel Elazar showed that classic consociationalist systems have a lifespan of

about two generations before they enter into political flux. (1991 p. 24). The case of

Switzerland appears to be the exception rather than the rule, perhaps because the Swiss

system incorporates elements of federalism. Often the social cleavages have taken on

territorial characteristics, making the adoption of a federalist system an obvious choice.

In federalist systems, once informal relations are constitutionalized and mutual

guarantees are made. However, they often retain some traits of their former selves, as

trust has been established between the multiple pillars and elites often retain their

importance. Lijphart himself argued that consociationalism and federalism are not

mutually exclusive, explaining that “federalism offers an excellent opportunity for group

autonomy if the groups are geographically concentrated,” as in the case of India,

Switzerland and Belgium. (Lijphart, 2002 p. 51).

Consociationalism and federalism, according to Hooghe, both propose a

"systemic response to territorial conflict majority rule should be replaced by federalism

or by a consociational regime" (Hooghe, 2004 p. 18). However, they each possess

several weaknesses, including an undue reliance on the goodwill of elites which perhaps

explains their fragile nature “Because strategies based on outbidding are often easier to

instigate and maintain than those based on cooperation, politics can quickly come to be

characterized by centrifugal forces, in which the moderate political centre is

overwhelmed by extremist forces” (Reilly, 2001 p. 2).

- 32 -

Multiethnic-Multinational Federalism

In Theory and In Practice

Federalism has to do with the need of people and polities to unite for common purposes

yet remain separate to preserve their respective integrities. It is rather like wanting to

have one's cake and eat it too. Since that is the natural human condition, at least half

the work of politics, if not 90 percent of it, is directed to somehow accommodating that

logically insoluble problem

Daniel Elazar, 1991 p. 33.

Introduction

Federalism has been credited by many scholars as an institutional means of

containing ethnic conflict while ensuring adequate representation of minority rights. It

has become increasingly popular in Europe for both multiethnic and homogenous but

economically disparate regions. The case of the United States, a traditionally federalist

entity, is often cited as an example. However, one must remember that the federalist

States were not created to mitigate ethnic conflict. Multiethnic and multinational

federalism has been remarkably effective in calming tensions when implemented

properly. However, several sometimes elusive conditions have proved themselves

important. They include the existence of several territorial units, a commitment of

political elites to the central state and symmetry in federalist demands. The

implementation of a federalist system can have two drastically different results. It may

weaken ethnoregionalist sentiment as the demands of ethnic groups can be fulfilled

within the state context. Conversely, federalization provides regional and ethnic leaders

political experience, confidence and a territorial base from which to mobilize. This can

entrench nationalist sentiment and lead to further demands for devolution and even

secessionism, which although rarely successful, is incredibly divisive.

Whatever the effects, it is important to note that, like any tool for mitigating

ethnic conflict, federalism will not make these problems disappear. Several scholars

express reservations. Bauböck writes that

A well-ordered federation is not a final settlement of claims that could have been

be enshrined in a foundational contract, but an institutional framework for

building mutual trust in an ongoing negotiation of claims

- 33 -

2001 p. 380.

Kymlicka explains

Federalism can help to keep certain multination countries together, but the best

we can hope for in such circumstances is a looser and more provisional form of

'togetherness' which coexists with ongoing questioning of the value of

maintaining the federation

Kymlicka, 2001 p. 94.

Despite questions regarding longevity, it may ensure peace and prosperity within the

state.

Trends in Federalism

Federalism entered the political spotlight in the 1950s and 1960s, along with

consociationalism, which are both considered forms of non-majoritarian democracy.

(Elazar, 1991 p. 18). The federalist model has remained remarkably popular, especially

as political scientists struggle to come to terms with the fact that ethnic and national

identities have not been overtaken by modernist sentiment. Federalism‟s popularity is a

sign that a system of accommodation is increasingly necessary in countries in which

rights for minorities are guaranteed rather than suppressed. (Kymlicka, 2001 p. 96). "It

is now argued that the federal state format is the best conceivable one, given the strong

demand for democracy today, as well as the existence of many multicultural societies"

(Ersson, Lane 2000 p. 78).

Many former colonies, including India and Nigeria, have adopted federalist systems to

deal with suppressed ethnic identities and the inevitable conflict that results from

decolonization. In Europe, this federalist movement has been widespread, as both

multiethnic and homogenous ethnic states decentralize. Since the 1950s, Belgium, Italy

and Spain have adopted regionalist policies, France has granted certain powers to

Corsica, albeit reluctantly, and Austria, Germany and Switzerland, all possessing strong

federalist traditions, have remained committed and even intensified federalist aspects of

their society. (Elazar, 1991 p. 9). Despite this trend, Germany, Belgium and Switzerland

are each constitutionally federal states while Italy and the United Kingdom have

engaged in devolution or decentralization, in which the central state sets the goals or

principals while the regional units are responsible for implementation, a model not

unlike the European Union‟s principal of subsidarity. (Keating, 2007 p. 7).

- 34 -

Federalism Defined

A federalist system is defined as a political system "in which an overarching

government and regional government have joint sovereignty and governing authority,

with each holding final authority in some areas" (Brezinski, 1999 p. 46). Elazar explains

that while both the United States and Belgium are considered federal, the reasons and

processes of federalization are distinctive.

One of the characteristics of federalism is its aspiration and purpose

simultaneously to generate and maintain both unity and diversity. This

ambiguity is reflected in confusion over the very use of the term. People use the

terms "federalism," "federalist," and "federalize" to describe both the process of

political unification and the maintenance of the diffusion of political power

1991 p. 64.

In the United States, federalism was implemented from the beginning, designed to

promote a greater unity while preserving the rights of the states which made up the

union. In Belgium, federalism was a response to demands of ethnic groups which

threatened the unitary nature and very existence of the Belgian state. For our purposes,

we will focus on federalism as a means to retain unity while recognizing and ensuring

diversity. We will adopt Will Kymlicka‟s definition of federalism as applied to

heterogeneous democratic states

a political system which includes a constitutionally entrenched division of

powers between a central government and two or more subunits (provinces/

Länder/states/cantons), defined on a territorial basis, such that each level of

government has sovereign authority over certain issues

1998 p. 119.

This federalization is often a result of overwhelming or explosive ethnic conflict which

force states to adopt some sort of power-sharing to meet ethnic and economic demands

put forth by the regions. .

The goals of a federalist system are

• To balance power within a Constitution by providing a countervailing force to

the central government so as to preserve democracy and enhance liberty;

• To maximise allocative efficiency by locating government functions at the

most appropriate scale and to rationalise administration and policy-making;

- 35 -

• To manage nationally diverse and divided societies by giving groups a degree

of self-rule while maintaining the overall unity of the state.

Keating, 2007 p. 8.

While federalism may be a highly effective means of moderating ethnic conflict and

ensuring the effective functioning of the states, federalism is not suited for all

multiethnic states.

Conditions for Multiethnic Federalism

Scholars have noted that the most successful federalist systems encompass

multiple religious, ethnic, or linguistic pillars as none “can reasonably feed ambitions of

becoming the single dominant one" (Colomer, 2001 p. 188).This inhibits

majoritarianism and ensures that the center remains a forum for conflict mediation,

rather than being hollowed by demands for greater devolution. Horowitz attributes this

to the diversity of interests and opinions contained within the different federal units.

Territory can partition groups off from each other and direct their political

ambitions at one level of government rather than another. Federalism, and

especially the proliferation of federal units, or regional autonomy can act in

effect as an electoral reform and can preserve multipolar fluidity

Horowitz, 2002 p. 25.

In the case of Belgium and Canada, the demands of two ethnic groups are often

overwhelming and conflict is almost entirely framed along ethnic lines. Elazar presumes

that a federalist system in which demographic and economic equality is necessary to

prevent centralization. "The constituent polities in a federal system must be fairly equal

in population and wealth or at least balanced geographically or numerically in their

inequalities if noncentralization is to be maintained" (1991 p. 170). However, this is

difficult, if not impossible to maintain, if one is to give credence to instrumentalist

theory which states that ethnic groups will mobilize in favor of devolution when they

feel that their status is threatened. In both Belgium and Spain, the groups most in favor

of further autonomy are those who hold a position of economic superiority. This can

undermine the federalist cause and the state must develop mechanisms to cope with the

inevitable conflict that arises.

- 36 -

Elazar explains that there are no strict rules for federalism, emphasizing that, like

under a consociationalist system, relationships are more important than structures. "as

long as the proper relations are created, a wide variety of political structures can be

developed that are consistent with federal principles" (Elazar, 1991 p. 12). When faced

with continued ethnic conflict, federalized systems have several tools with which to

diffuse it and encourage greater integration. Bauböck outlines four of them

1. Concession granting greater autonomy to the contesting group and allowing

them special powers at the federal level. This can include vetoes over certain

issues or guaranteed representation.

2. Moderation undercutting support for extreme nationalists through free

elections.

3. Participation allowing minorities participation at the federal level, including

power-sharing schemes.

4. Multiple identities promoting geographic and marital mobility across

territorial boundaries and by promoting a greater federal citizenship.

Bauböck 2001 p. 381

The last, and probably the most important for the long-term viability of a federal

state, is often difficult to achieve, especially when dealing with deeply entrenched ethnic

identities. This has succeeded in the case of Switzerland, because according to Elazar,

people “think federal.” (1991 p. 78). However, in Belgium, where ethnic conflict seems,

at times, almost intractable, very few people cross ethnic and territorial boundaries for

marriage or for work and many French-speaking and Flemish citizens cannot

communicate with each other because of the decrease in multilingualism. (Billiet, et al.

2006 p. 915). However, the federal government has made progress in promoting a

greater Belgian identity as evidenced by recent polls, a phenomenon which we will

explore later.

Like in consociationalist societies, the role of elites is critical, as they can

mobilize in the interest or to the detriment of the federal state. Two crucial ingredients

for a successful federalism were identified by Thomas M. Franck “the transmission of

ideological commitment from charismatic leaders to the people (elite charisma) and/or

the transmission of broadly shared values (culminating in a federal value) from the

people to the leaders (popular charisma)” (Duchacek, 1986 p. 92). While federalist

principles may be enshrined in the constitution, a federalist system will not function

properly without the successful cooperation of governing parties.

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In severely divided societies, elites and parties may serve, at times, to undermine

the democratic legitimacy of the political process and also to gain political support

through populist and nationalistic policies. This reliance on elites is one of the

weaknesses of non-majoritarian power-sharing arrangements in which the general

population cannot make decisions through referenda.

An interesting characteristic of federalism, as noted by Erk and Gagnon, is the

presence of, and some might say, reliance on ambiguity. While federalism depends on

constitutionally guaranteed institutions and rights and the negotiation of all policies at

the federal level with input from relevant parties, some issues will remain unresolved.

constitutional ambiguity had become a sign of a broad consensus to eschew

polarization. When parties to the federal compact could not agree on the exact

terms of the union, they left the question about the nature of the political

community unclear. Compact between the provinces or compact between

peoples; in a way, they have been agreeing to avoid having to agree. At the same

time, the successful continuation of these arrangements was dependent on the

overall federal trust between the partners.

Erk, Gagnon 1998 p. 101.

This prevents either side from “winning” or “losing” and allows federal bodies to ignore

issues until they can be dealt with in a way satisfactory to all sides. However, this also

creates impetus for further reforms and is quickly seized by those unsatisfied by the

federal government. We will see this in the case of Belgium. Brussels, a Francophone

city in the heart of Flanders, has been disputed for decades with no clear resolution. It

has been compared to the child that preserves the union between feuding parents and it

is possible that should its status be irrevocably settled, it could increase calls for total

division on either side.

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Federalism and Mitigating Ethnic Conflict

Strengths and Weaknesses

Federalism has proved remarkably resilient, despite the presence of multiple

competing interests. In fact, Elazar notes that

No authentic federal system that has lasted for even fifteen years has ever been

abandoned except through revolutionary disruption (as in the case in Germany)

or foreign conquest (as in the case of Switzerland), and in most cases, including

the aforementioned two, federalism--showing remarkable resilience--has

ultimately been restored

1991 p. 156.

However, some would argue that this persistence is not necessarily a result of the

federalist system but due to a general feeling of trust and cooperation, something that is

nearly impossible to achieve in a political sphere recently beset by intense ethnic and

political conflict. Kymlicka asserts that

where federalism is needed to keep a country together, the odds that the country

will remain together over the long-term are not great. Federalism may be the best

available response to ethnocultural pluralism, but the best may not be good

enough

1998 p. 113.

The Federalization Process

Duchacek argues that "by timely concessions to, and constitutional recognition

of, territorial communities and their desire for self-rule, a formerly unitary nation-state

may be re-formed and its national unity saved" (1986 p. 92). However, this is more

relevant in theory rather than practice, as a unitary state is unlikely to divest itself of its

competences unless under extreme duress. "Because they start with a centralized

structure and because there is unease about the political implications of devolution,

national powers tend to be dominant, including, not infrequently, the power to suspend

regional governments" (Ghai, 2002 p. 157). This results in tensions between the

centralized government and ethnic groups, who sense this resistance.

As demands for federalization are likely to be precipitated by the mobilization of

ethnoregional parties rather than national governments, the national government may

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work to ensure its maintenance of power. "Indeed, federalism can and has been used by

majority groups as a tool for disempowering national minorities, by rigging federal units

so as to reduce the power of national minorities" (Kymlicka, 2001 p. 96). This may

occur by allowing some regional autonomy but limited representation, influence and

control at the federal level.

The Role of Elites

Consociationalist and federalist systems share several characteristics, the most

significant of those being the role of elites. Elites operating at the federal level may

promote trust through the construction of relationships. However, those elites may be

especially prone to mobilize on a territorial basis to ensure their electoral success.

"Federation may stimulate nationalist conflict because it provides potential nationalist

leaders with patronage and other resources that can be mobilized for nationalist ends"

(Hechter, 2000 p. 141). Horowitz rejects the assertion that the political elites that

advocate federalization will act in the interest of the larger state, rather than in the

interest of themselves or their ethnic group.

To the extent that the imputed motive is still statesmanship rather not to protect

cultural or than self-interest, the assumption that elites in divided societies are

likely to be more tolerant of other ethnic groups or less inclined to pursue

advantage for their own group is extremely dubious

2002 p. 21.

The Problem of Asymmetry

It has been shown that federal states with multiple units benefit from enhanced

stability, it is rare that various groups that comprise a multiethnic state makes similar

demands, especially since ethnic conflict often arises from the perception of economic

or political disparity. As a result, symmetry is often difficult to achieve, especially

when the adoption of a federalist system is a result of minority demands. (Kymlicka,

1998 p. 130). Majorities are often reluctant to relinquish control. In the case of Canada,

Quebec agitates for greater autonomy and even independence while the rest of the

country resents this federalization and wishes to restore the unitary system, essentially

- 40 -

rejecting “special privileges” for Quebec. Belgium‟s move towards federalism was

precipitated by Flemish demands and Wallonia resists further devolution.

Federalism and Society

Zbigniew Brzezinski argues that devolution to the regional levels can enhance

democratic participation by allowing greater competition on the lower levels, forcing the

parties to pay greater attention to the demands of the people. (1999 p. 50). This is true,

although perhaps to a limited extent. The territorialization of politics means that in some

cases, like in Belgium, no party competes on a national level. Parties must only be

responsive to their ethnic group and are thus unlikely to take into account the welfare

and desires of other groups, with whom they have now entered into competition. As

politics at the highest levels are negotiated by regional representatives rather than

subject to broad debate, this can limit political input.

While these issues of democratic participation are serious, perhaps one of the

most underrated effects of federalism is the social and cultural impact of the system.

This can be both positive and negative, undermining ethnic groups which may be

inclined to act in an oppressive and despotic manner while ensuring representation for

the minority by compartmentalizing conflict.

Federalism makes it more difficult for those who have a common motive to

invade the rights of other citizens to act in unison with each other. The influence

of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be

unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States

Kymlicka, 2001 p. 99.

However, within these ethnic regions, diversity is often viewed as a threat, immigration

from both other federal entities and from abroad, may undermine their influence. They

may work to prevent others from settling in the region or existing minorities from

engaging in public life. In the case of Belgium, the ethnoregionalist party Vlaams

Belang runs on an anti-immigration platform, advocating ethnic homogeneity as well as

independence.

“Multination federalism divides the people into separate 'peoples', each with its

own historic rights, territories, and powers of self-government; and each, therefore with

its own political community" (Kymlicka, 2001 p. 114). This political empowerment,

which is often vested with the powers and institutions of a state may be dangerous,

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according to Hechter, and may perhaps lead to further ethnic conflict and secessionism.

"When nations are given many of the accoutrements of real states, this also encourages

people to think and act according to national categories" (Hechter, 2000 p. 141).These

peoples, who are governed by political elites, are unlikely to either develop or retain a

common identity. In addition, each group is defined only by ethnicity, inhibiting

pluralism. Other identifications, such as class or religion, are likely to be ignored.

institutionalizing the federation along such lines is more likely to promote a

primordial nationalism, which in politically unstable polities increases the

likelihood of inter-ethnic violence and even civil war. Not only do such

arrangements tend to solidify and make permanent what might be temporary or

partial group identities, they also allow key policy areas to be hijacked by highly

partisan titular élites and thus increase the probability of tyranny by the minority,

which, it is contended, acts as an impediment to liberty for all

Smith, 2001 p. 345.

It is because of these characteristics that federalism does not pose a permanent solution.

However, its relevance and utility should not be dismissed because of the weaknesses

explored here. "In short, federalism is designed to prevent tyranny without preventing

governance. In this sense it seeks to provide a political remedy for political diseases"

(Elazar, 1991 p. 29). Federalism remains one of the most effective means moderating

conflict, preventing violence and allowing the effective operation of the state.

- 42 -

When the System Fails: Secessionism

Secessionism and Power-Sharing Arrangements

In the case of Belgium, federalism was touted as a panacea for ethnic conflict,

meant to appease ethnic groups and ensure the continued existence of the state. Despite

these ambitions, calls for the further devolution of competences and even the dissolution

of the Belgium state continue. This, according to scholars, should not be met with

surprise.

The more that federalism succeeds in meeting the desire for self-government, the

more it recognizes and affirms the sense of national identity amongst the

minority group, and strengthens their political confidence. Where national

minorities become politically mobilized in this way, secession becomes more

conceivable, and a more salient option, even with the best-designed federal

institutions

Kymlicka, 2001 p. 113.

As a result, national minorities may view themselves as part of a confederation, rather

than a federal state, possessing the right to govern and even declare their independence.

Secessionism is often cited as a reason for resistance to the adoption of a

federalist regime. Critics argue that once given power, the federal units, especially those

constructed on a regional or ethnic basis will often agitate for more power. This has

been proven true in some cases, with scholars arguing that power-sharing enhances the

confidence of regional elites, leading them to believe independence to be viable and

makes the idea more palatable for the general population.

While the implementation of consociationalist and federalist systems may be

necessary to ensure the protection of minorities, enhance democracy and minimize the

risk of violent ethnic conflict, these techniques can often further secessionist causes.

Regional autonomist groups, especially those possessing the goal of independence, are

unlikely to be appeased by the devolution of competences, no matter how significant.

(Horowitz, 1985 p. 624).Some political scientists argue that the state can inhibit

secessionist tendencies by involving all political actors, not just those amenable to the

status quo, at the national level, allowing them to “acquire a collective responsibility for

the common good of that state" (Bauböck, 2001 p. 379).

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Factors in Secessionism

The impact of economic differentiation is, according to many scholars, one of

the most influential political issues. Sorens explains the appeal of secessionist groups

from an instrumentalist perspective, noting the influence of socio-economic factors

rather than a larger identity.

Secessionist parties in advanced democracies succeed not because they appeal to

a primordial past but because they are able to present independence or

wideranging autonomy as beneficial in political and economic terms.

2005 p. 307.

In this context, ethnic identity may serve as a rallying point, a symbol of difference, but

is not the primary motivating factor.

According to Horowitz, secessionist regions, while not exclusively, are more

likely to be those which face a lower level of regional economic development and

prosperity. Those prosperous groups in prosperous regions (like the Flemings in

Flanders) which depart from the norm are likely to do so because they have a regional

economic grievance. He writes, "Advanced regions usually generate more income and

contribute more revenue to the treasury of the undivided state than they receive. They

believe that they are subsidizing poorer regions." He cites the Basques and Catalans,

which at the time of his writing had far greater per capita incomes than Spain as a

whole. The Basque protest song of the period somewhat graphically referred to Spain as

"a cow with its muzzle in the Basque country and its udder in Madrid," a slogan that

industrious Flemings might soon adopt. (1985 p. 249-50). In cases such as this,

Horowitz encourages states to do something that may seem counterproductive, devolve

further, allowing the region to tax and spend within its territory, thus taking

responsibility for its economic success or failure.

Secessionism as a Political Tool

Secessionism remains an important political issue, but in practice is rare as

citizens are reluctant to risk the possible political and economic consequences.

Kymlicka points out, that despite these demands and the democratic participation of

secessionist parties in the west, these parties have “never received a democratic mandate

for secession, and no referendum on secession has succeeded” (2001 p. 116).

- 44 -

This statistic may indicate the use of secessionism as a bargaining chip to push

for greater devolution. “While secession often leads to civil war, the threat of secession

may be an effective if risky strategy leading to increased autonomy” (Helms, McBeath

1983 p. 26). It may also be that calls originate from within radical groups, such as

Flanders Vlaam Belang, and while they are vocal, they do not necessarily represent the

wishes of the population, who is satisfied by the rights accorded by a federalist system.

Secessionism: European Trends and Influences

European integration has served to both inhibit and enable secessionist demands

in member states. Secessionist movements in advanced economies are often thwarted by

the fact that this prosperity may depend on integration within the greater economic

entity which supplies infrastructure, labor and consumers for its products. The argument

that the division of a state into independent parts would create economically and

politically untenable microstates have been undermined by several factors: the presence

of very small states within the Union, the reduced necessity for a nation within a united

Europe to maintain significant military forces, and economic integration which fosters

transborder trade. This would reduce the cost of independence for both parties, by

“preserving market access and factor mobility” and allowing “small states to externalize

costly items, such as negotiating common standards or support for declining sectors, or

maintaining a national currency" (Keating, 2001 p. 30-1).

However, secessionism is unlikely to be supported by neighbors, especially in an

integrated Europe within which borders are secure and a balance is maintained. In

Europe, autonomy movements and secessionism are rarely supported, morally or

fiscally. This tendency is derived from, I believe, from two primary factors: the delicacy

of international or in this case European politics, and fears over encouraging ethnic

conflict and autonomy movements in ones own state. Irredentism is virtually

unthinkable, the Netherlands would be unlikely to support a movement in the Flemish-

speaking part of Belgium which advocated reunification, and France, apart from some

extremists, has lent little support to the small Walloon reunionist group. France would

be equally reluctant to recognize a Basque or Catalan state for fear of antagonizing the

Corsicans or Bretons, who have finally been placated.

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Secessionism and Minority Rights

Theorists, while supporting self-determination in theory, often reject

secessionism as a viable alternative. "populist nationalism may take root, with its

targeting of ethnic and other social and political minorities as scapegoats for the

economic and social ills of the community" (Jenkins, Sofos 1996 p. 27). Regions are

rarely homogenous and the rights of minorities within the territory must be respected,

something that is especially worrisome as secessionist groups often thrive off of populist

demands, leaving immigrants and minority groups at risk.

The legitimacy of secession is almost always contested by some people within

the seceding territory, raising questions about the size of majorities required to

achieve it and the rights of minorities, who may themselves demand the right to

secede, or to remain within the host state

Keating, 2001 p. 28.

This could lead to potentially violent conflict and one that must be accounted for when

forming policy.

Conclusion

Secessionism, or at least the success of groups advocating independence, is a

very real risk for any multiethnic state. In states which employ power-sharing

techniques such as consociationalism and federalism, it is perhaps a greater risk. Some

states are reluctant to implement these means for fear of encouraging independence-

oriented groups. However, they may do so at their peril. Federalism and

consociationalism allows ethnic groups a voice, and may moderate their demands. A

unitary state in which no concessions are made may encourage desperation and violent

resistance among its minorities. Repression against these minorities is unlikely to be

tolerated within an integrated Europe.

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Conclusion:

Ethnic Conflict in Theory and In Practice: The Case of Belgium

Existing literature does not often anticipate the case of Belgium, focusing instead

on small, subordinate minority groups. However, because of the unique historical

transition of Flanders, these proofs can often be applied. Attempts to explain the actions

of the government (as a separate entity ruling from above) ignores the fact that Flemings

and Walloons make up the government while Catalans, Basques and Scottish, while

accorded greater standing in recent years are less influential.

Most theories deal with ethnic conflict arising from a disgruntled minority, like

that which occurs in the Basque, Catalan and Quebec cases. These groups often form a

small minority in the larger population although they are no less disruptive (they may be

prone to violence or terrorist acts in response to majoritarian principles which render

them voiceless), Belgium is distinctly different. Most claims for autonomy and

secession come from Flanders, although Wallonia has engaged in ethnic mobilization, it

is on a much smaller and more moderate scale. Flanders, while often studied in the

context of minority rights and autonomy, is in fact a demographic majority in the larger

Belgian state, forming 65% of the population. In addition, it is distinctly wealthier than

its southern counterpart.

Ethnic conflict in this case, arises not from minority status, but from several

distinct factors. Flanders, with its capitalist, market-oriented system has done very well

while the traditional industries of Wallonia have suffered. Flanders resents the Walloon

socialist system that props up ailing industries at the expense of the federal government,

whose coffers Flanders fills at a disproportionate amount. Historical memories of

Francophone dominance are also often invoked, especially by Flemish nationalists. The

issue of Brussels is probably the most symbolic, a francophone city, a European capital,

in the heart of Flanders, the Flemish parties have attempted to prevent its suburbs from

becoming increasingly francophone. Some scholars argue that Brussels, and the conflict

that it represents may be the glue holding the Belgian state together. We will examine

these centripetal and centrifugal forces in the following chapter.

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CHAPTER THREE

THE FEDERALIZATION OF CONFLICT

RELATIONS BETWEEN FLEMINGS AND WALLOONS FROM BELGIUM’S ORIGINS TO

PRESENT

Introduction

While both Flemish and Walloon nationalists attempt to frame the progression of

Belgian history as a story of oppression and opposition, power shifts have been frequent.

These shifts shaped all aspects of Belgian politics and social life, including education,

the role of the church in society and even foreign policy. Belgian nationhood has

coalesced only when under threat, first emerging in 1789 with the Brabant Revolution

against Habsburg rule. Despite the failure of the revolution, it planted the seeds for a

common identity, allowing Belgium to develop its unique nature during French and

subsequent Dutch rule. Even in the heady days of independence, the nation was beset by

both internal and external factors which threatened its unity. It was only through the

cooperation of the two principal political groups, Liberals and Catholics and the help of

powerful neighbors hoping to preserve the delicate continental balance that the Belgian

state survived.

However, this cooperation would not last long. Conflict and power struggles

between Liberals and Catholics would shape Belgian politics in the 19th century and

would eventually become imbued with ethnic and linguistic significance. The

emergence of the Flemish Movement, and the eventual Walloon response, would call

into question the very nature of the Belgian state. Faced by German invasion in both

World Wars, Belgium would be divided by charges of collaboration and irredentism. As

Flanders gained both economic and demographic strength, especially in relation to the

aging industry and populace of Wallonia, the continued dominance of political life by

Francophone elites seemed increasingly unwarranted. The economic disparities spurred

calls for federalism as both sides hoped that increased regional autonomy would allow

each to address its unique economic and social conditions as it saw fit. Despite the

adoption of a devolved system in 1970, calls for increased autonomy have continued,

reinforced by mainstream support for extremist movements such as the Front National

and Vlaams Blok. Both politicians and the public have a tendency to attribute economic

or political difficulties to the other side and the future of the Belgian state seems

increasingly uncertain.

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Identity Formation under Occupation:

1750-1830

Belgium was shaped by outside influences, rather than a common ethnic or

religious identity. In some ways it benefited from foreign rule, which provided both the

necessary economic resources to develop infrastructure and political structures and a

common threat against which to develop a national or regional identity.

Austrian Rule and the Development of Belgian Political Traditions

Because of the expense required to directly administer far-flung provinces, the

Austrian regime relied upon a highly devolved political structure. From 1750, the

Austrians administered their western territories through a sophisticated system of

administrative, judicial and religious bureaucracy, filling positions from the ranks of

local bourgeois and nobility. Like much of Europe, these bureaucratic elites were

educated in the French language. (Zolberg, 1974 p. 187). Mabille explains that this

experience created a tradition of regional and provincial autonomy; later attempts at

centralization by either foreign or domestic powers were resisted, especially by elites

eager to retain their influence. (1996 p. 20). In the public consciousness, provincial roots

took precedence over any identity imposed from above as

the scale of political authority in Belgium made it impossible to identify with a

nation (with the institutional and territorial framework of a state), in which the

principalities would belong. The principalities had their own institutions and

their delimited territories. In Belgium, the principalities‟ inhabitants saw their

identities as local (the town, the village) and regional (the principality) on one

hand and religious on the other

LeFebrve, 1997 p. 18-9.

This would later present an obstacle for the future unitary state which later arose.

The Brabant Revolution- The Development of Belgian National Consciousness

In December of 1789, Belgian conservatives formed a volunteer corps and

defeated their Austrian rulers at Turnhout. This victory led to a general uprising and the

localities, with the exception of Luxembourg, proclaimed their independence and

- 49 -

formed a Confederation of the United Belgian States. Vos describes two motivations for

the revolution, arguing that on the one hand, it was mainly encouraged by “the

traditional resistance to the centralization policies of the Emperor which encroached

upon the privileges of the favored classes, that is the nobility and clergy” but also that a

“minority of rebels sought justification for their revolt in the ideas of the

Enlightenment.” (1993 p. 131).

The leaders of the Brabant Revolution envisaged a highly decentralized Belgian

state in which the sovereignty of each province was guaranteed and the central

government had competences over only those aspects of life related to national interests,

allowing the fiercely independent provinces to cooperate and coexist while facilitating

some coalescence of national identities. (Manhés, 2005 p. 95). In fact, this fledgling

state had a system remarkably similar to that of today.

However, the movement was undermined by disputes amongst its leaders, the

ranks of whom included traditionalists and those admirers of the revolutionary French

system. (LeFebrve, 1997 p. 22-3). As each vied for political power and influence,

Belgium returned under Austrian control after just one year of independence. Perhaps

the most important aspect of this aborted independence was the developing Belgian

national identity, described by Vos as consisting of three elements, restoration, the

creation of national symbols, including a the flag, leadership and a uniquely Belgian

history, and the religious sentiment, predominantly Catholic, of the revolution.

The failure of the revolution drove some Belgian patriots towards France, the

government of which had originally adopted a policy oriented towards the creation of

independent but amicable republics on its frontiers. (Manhés, 2005, p. 96). While this

policy would quickly change from one of cooperation to one of occupation, the

language, culture and administration of France would have a profound impact on the

fledgling Belgian state.

Belgium under Revolutionary France

At first France advocated the incorporation of Belgium into the ideal Republic,

bound by common values and ideals. However, in 1795, the increasingly extremist

French regime voted to annex the Belgian territory and began imposing revolutionary

ideals upon the conservative Belgian society, including secularization and francification

of society. Despite these hardships, the annexation by France and improvement in

- 50 -

infrastructure gave Belgian merchants, who had benefited from the investment and

improved standard of living during Austrian rule, access to a greater market, actually

spurring Belgium‟s precocious industrial revolution. (LeFebrve, 1997 p. 24). Despite

France‟s rhetoric of self-determination, the country was treated as occupied territory,

rather than as an integral part of the Republic, burdened by high taxes and requisitions

(Bitsch, 2004 p. 64). They also advocated centralization, something completely contrary

to the provinces which had experienced a remarkable degree of autonomy under the

Austrian empire.

The repercussions of France‟s harsh assimilation policies are still present in

modern Belgium. The territory under Austrian rule had a linguistically heterogeneous

population, with the general population speaking Walloon or Flemish, while their rulers

spoke French. This led to a division of Belgian society by class lines, with elites,

anxious to retain their power, employing French while the rest of the population spoke

their regional dialects. (LeFebvre, 1997 p. 26). This spurred regional differentiation as

well, as the Walloon region, with its raw materials and developed infrastructure could

actually benefit from the French occupation, while the largely agrarian and inherently

traditional Flanders could not.

While the inhabitants of the Belgian provinces were legally equal citizens of the

French republic, the reality was often far different. (Bitsch, 2004 p. 65). The imposition

of secular policies “reinforced the Flemish community consciousness against the

French, already associated with centuries of wars and attempts at annexation”

(LeFebvre, 1997 p. 27). Linguistic policies also spurred a reaction by the Flemish-

speaking segments of the population, who perceived the imposition of the French

language by the Republic as “an attack on their cultural, linguistic and religious

identities” (LeFebvre, 1997 p. 26). In Wallonia, the transition was eased, owing to the

fact the fact that the upper and middle classes already spoke French. However, the

workers of Wallonia faced harsh conditions and were subject to draft into Napoleon‟s

army which in fact served as a form of francification, exposing them to the French

language and culture. (LeFebvre, 1997 p. 34).

Despite attempts at resistance, by 1814, when the Netherlands took control of

Belgian territory, French was the common language of Belgian elites, regardless of their

sphere of social activity and region of origin or of residence; it was also, therefore the

language of upward mobility. The French occupation had several important

consequences for the Belgian territory including the integration of Liege into the rest of

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the Southern Netherlands, the centralization of once fiercely independent provinces and

the birth of an assimilated Francophone bourgeoisie which took its place alongside the

traditionally French-speaking noble classes. (Vos, 1993 p. 132). The new occupiers

would have difficulty combating these trends.

Belgium under the Netherlands

In 1814 an agreement was signed in London detailing the amalgamation of the

Southern Netherland Territories with the Northern, affirming the principle of “one state,

two countries.” Fitzgerald describes the new state, undertaken with little consideration

of the views of Belgium‟s populace, as a “buffer between France and Prussia as part of

the 'reconstruction' of Europe undertaken by the Congress of Vienna” (1996 p. 21).

Belgium‟s status was vastly improved from its experience under French rule as the

region rivaled Holland in population, had increased visibility and saw Brussels regain its

status as a capital. Despite these advantages, Belgian nobles voted largely against the

union with Holland, reflecting the influence of the Catholic Church which feared the

rule of a Calvinist king. Notwithstanding these overwhelming objections, the agreement

went forward, a result of what satirists called “Dutch Arithmetic.” (Manhés, 2005 p.

102). Like under French rule, the approach towards the Dutch occupiers was dictated

more by social class and the desire to retain social standing than regional or ethnic

affiliations.

William the First adopted a policy designed to disengage Belgians from French

language and culture. In 1823, Dutch became the official language of administration and

justice in the Flemish region and Brussels and planned to apply this policy to Wallonia.

(Zolberg, 1974 p. 188).The Dutch were aware that this policy went against well-

established trends and would be met with considerable resistance. It was rejected by the

bourgeois of both regions who by now spoke almost exclusively French, the language

which was once and would be again connected with social mobility. William‟s policy

waged against the clergy also undermined further identification of the largely Catholic

Flemish with the Dutch. (Bitsch, 2004 p. 71).

The Dutch rule did serve an unintended purpose, increasing awareness of

Flemish culture, formed in contrast to Dutch and French traditions. Dutch rule led to a

greater acceptance of Flemish culture, revealing to the middle class a “hitherto almost

unsuspected, or actively repressed, existence of a modern literary and scientific culture

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in a standardized language almost identical to what was regarded as a mere “dialect” in

Belgium” (Zolberg, 1974 p. 191). This segment of society formed the core of the

Flemish intellectual class which would later be influential after independence.

Despite a shared history the incorporation of the Southern Netherlands into a

United Kingdom of the Netherlands failed. Fueled by revolutionary and romantic ideals

and deeply dissatisfied with the policies of King William I, both liberals and young

Catholics, especially from Flanders joined forces. The movement against Dutch rule

began in Liege and quickly spread to larger cities throughout Belgium, fomented anti-

Dutch sentiment and advocated greater liberties. Shortly before the revolution, the

Dutch administration began repressing dissidents. Bitsch writes that

Fourteen years of common life had actually enlarged the gulf that separated

Belgians from Dutch and the King William the First. This period permitted the

crystallization of a national Belgian sentiment which had been developing for

some time and which took a distinctly anti-Dutch tone

2004 p. 72.

These issues would culminate in the revolt of 1830 which would grant the Belgian state

its independence.

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State-Formation from Above

Belgian Independence and the Development of the State

Impetus for Revolution

The economic prosperity that Belgium experienced had no effect in calming

demands for autonomy and even independence. Periods of economic downturn would

naturally turn revolutionary. The failure of the Dutch administration to identify with the

people combined with an economic crisis that let to immigration and unemployment

would give the movement popular support. Many Francophones were also inspired by

news of France‟s July Revolution. A rapprochement that occurred in the 1820s between

liberals and increasingly progressive Catholics allowed the revolution to generate

popular support.

The Revolution

In Brussels on August 25th

1830, a theatre production ignited patriotic fervor

when it showed the fight of Napolitans against their Spanish oppressors. Demonstrations

followed during which the Branbacon flag was flown. A group of bourgeois, faced with

increasing disorder, formed a citizen‟s army which restored order to the streets. The

nobility advocated a dual administration under which Belgium would have a high

degree of autonomy. In the very beginning, the movement was led primarily by

Walloons, as the Church, highly influential in Flanders, distrusted a revolution inspired

in part by that of France, which it viewed as anticlerical and dangerous. However, anti-

Dutch activities eventually spread, with the Church seizing the chance to free itself from

the Protestant Netherlands and gain influence in the new Belgian state. Citizens,

deserters from the army and the French all joined in the effort to expel Dutch troops

from Belgian territory.

Militarily, Belgium did not have the strength to hold off Dutch troops

indefinitely; however, its timing was fortuitous. It benefited from a unique combination

of internal and external factors, including foreign support for Belgian independence and

the promise increased liberties and exercise of powers. LeFebrve describes the period in

which “Europe‟s smaller lands briefly profited from the failure of leadership once

vested in that continent‟s larger national units” (1997 p. 5). The fledgling Belgian state

- 54 -

benefited from the distractions of other European powers. While Prussia and Russia

were initially willing to intervene in favor of the House of Orange, Louis-Phillipe

abstained, as the French public supported Belgian independence. Prussia, faced with an

uprising in its Polish territories, also abstained. Belgium found support for its quest for

independence among the English who wanted to establish a state capable of defending

itself on France‟s northern frontiers. (Manhés, 2005 p. 101). England negotiated the

treaties which led to the recognition of Belgium by the great powers and helped defend

it against Dutch revanchisme. The nature of political leadership was also important, and

resulted in a union of the young generation from across the political spectrum, "the first

generation of Catholics who no longer wished for the restoration of the Ancien Regime

and the first generation of liberals who no longer feared this restoration" (Mabille, 1996

p. 23). The movement found its greatest support among the popular and middle classes

of Brussels, and in other Walloon towns, joined later by rural elements and the Flemish

provinces.

The Formation of the Belgian State and Language Policy

Belgium‟s first constitution was highly progressive, allowing freedom of

religion, education, association and the press. It also allowed, in Article 23, for the

freedom of linguistic usage. However, this was more relevant in theory than practice as

the political class believed that a cohesive Belgian state would not be possible unless

French was the only official language. (Zolberg, 1974 p. 191).

Although Belgium was linguistically heterogeneous, most of its inhabitants lived

in linguistically homogenous regions. A majority of those in the north of the country

spoke a dialect of Flemish. This formed a majority, about 60% of the Belgian

population, however these dialects had yet to be standardized. Those in the south spoke

Walloon or Picard while only a small, urban, industrial minority used standard French as

its primary means of communication. Francophones were not necessarily of Walloon

origin; a large segment consisted of Flemings who had adopted French as a means of

social mobility. Those who spoke French were the upper stratum of society, forming the

political class which shaped the Belgian state. (Zolberg, 1974 p. 182-3). However, the

status of French, Flemish and Walloon languages was not determined without debate,

and historians differ on the motivations for the choice of French.

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Vos attributes the adoption of French as the single national language to three

factors; including the belief that a one-language policy was critical for a stable state, the

conviction of the cultural superiority of the French language to that of the vernacular

Flemish or Walloon dialects, and the feeling that national identity could not form around

the language of the most recent overlord. (1993 p. 133). However, Alain Deickhoff

views the motivations in a slightly different light, arguing that Belgium was largely a

product of elite and bourgeois elements, with little input from the lower classes. He

explains the primary considerations as

the traditional usage of French as the language of central administration, its

cultural and ideological prestige as the language of freedom and progress, its

usage, in both Wallonia and Flanders, by the bourgeois

However, Dieckhoff also recognized the role of language in the formation of a national

consciousness. (1996 p. 10).

Resistance from Within:

Orangists and Reunionists

Although inhabitants of Belgian territory were generally in favor of

independence, there were some sources of dissent, advocating either union with the

French state or with the Low Countries. In Belgium, Orangists and Reunionists adopted

similar arguments in favor of reunion with the Netherlands and France respectively,

arguing that an independent Belgian state was not economically viable. (Bitsch, 2004 p.

86). Orangists, who promoted the maintenance of ties with the Low Countries were

present among the industrialists of both the north and the south largely abstained from

the election of national representatives, effectively eliminating themselves from the

political dialogue. Notably, the Orangists were not Flemish nationalists but were

Francophone who feared “the negative economic consequences of separation and the

dominant position which the Catholic Church was likely to achieve in an independent

Belgium” They disappeared completely with the international recognition of the Belgian

state in 1839. There was also a pro-French contingent, largely comprised of those who

had come of age during the French occupation. This group was more active than the

Orangists and the first acts of the national congress often reveal a pro-French bias.

(Mabille, 1996 p. 25-6).

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Choosing a King

Belgium‟s progressive political leadership seemed to make a strange choice

when it advocated the formation of a parliamentary monarchy to rule Belgium.

However, they believed that a king would enhance the fledgling state‟s status on the

international stage and would provide a figure around which Belgian identity could

coalesce. The choice of a king was a difficult one, as a member of the House of Orange

with which Belgium was engaged in conflict until 1838, could obviously not be

selected. The Belgian parliament was originally closely tied to France, with many

members advocating the Duke of Nemours, a choice others feared would merely be a

prelude to annexation by their powerful neighbor. Finally, Leopold de Saxe-Coburg-

Gotha was asked to become monarch. Linked through marriage with the British royal

family, Leopold I was a cunning statesman and competent to lead the military, a trait

which would serve him well as the Belgian state was attacked by the Netherlands

shortly after his inauguration. This foray was halted by Belgian and French troops and

the resulting stalemate forced an acceptance of the Belgian state, with some territorial

concessions on the part of Belgium in 1838. When independence was recognized by the

international order, the process of state-building could begin. Fitzgerald describes the

new state as coming into existence “both as a reaction against its arbitrary fate resulting

from historical accident and the machinations of the great powers, and at the same time

as the direct result of those very machinations” (1996 p. 6).

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The Rise of Nationalism and Regional Differentiation

The End of Unionism

Unionism, the alliance between liberals and Catholics through which Belgium

came into being, was necessary until the recognition of Belgian independence by the

Netherlands in 1839. (Bitsch, 2004 p. 108). However, this alliance would not survive

without the presence of a common external threat. Several scholars date the death of

unionism to 1847, although its decline was evident as early as 1840. (Fitzgerald, 1996 p.

26). Belgium, considered by some as an artificial state, did not have a normal period of

reprieve after independence, but was beset by severe cleavages that would shape the

state. The primary issues as identified by Mabille were centralization, secularization and

industrialization; language policy would later be added to this list of contentious issues.

Often these issues took on a regional dimension and remain important factors in today‟s

politics.

Belgium: A Secular State?

The role of the church immediately became a point of contention, with the

primary parties having different conceptions of the role of the church in education and

social services. This debate was waged between clerical parties and liberals, who were

often militantly anti-clerical. The main battle took place over education; liberals felt that

the establishment of Catholic universities and primary schools represented a dangerous

monopoly. Attempts to moderate the influence of the Church in public education met

strong resistance from Catholics. (Bitsch, 2004 p. 112). A regional dimension became

evident, as Wallonia, highly influenced by secular French ideals, resisted the Catholic

monopoly and more traditional Flanders resented attacks on the Church. These issues

first emerged in the early days of the Belgian state and reemerged with a vengeance

after World War II. (Mabille, 1996 p. 30).

The Debate over Industrialization and Economic Development

At the end of the 1840s, Belgium faced a severe economic crisis, especially in

Flanders whose domestic textile industry was destroyed by the mechanization of the

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trade. This, combined with poor harvests, led to famine, disease, emigration and most

importantly, increasing levels of social and political discontent. The economic

expansion which took place in Belgium and much of Western Europe from 1850 to

1873 was unique, marked by a dramatic regional disequilibrium. Wallonia profited

while Flanders still reeled from the destruction of its traditional textile industries.

The Birth of the Flemish Movement

Shortly after independence, the Flemish population confronted a severe regional

economic imbalance, a perceived foreign policy overtly oriented towards France and the

dominance of French-speaking elites to the exclusion of the Flemish. At its origin, the

Flemish movement was not anti-Belgian, nor did it advocate federalism or autonomy. Its

raison d’être was simply to improve the status of the Flemish language within the

Belgian state and was seen by many as a response against the francification of the

Belgian state and population. (Bitsch, 2004 p. 120). Although the Flemish language did

not face outright persecution, its inferior status hindered social mobility among Flemish

speaking citizens and served to solidify a monopoly on power of Francophones.

Walloon elites often adopted a paternalistic attitude towards their Flemish counterparts.

Their relative social and economic underdevelopment was attributed to use of a

provincial dialect and the adoption of French was believed to be the means of economic

development.

Several scholars argue that the movement, as it developed, aimed to "fortify the

independence of the Kingdom by the rejection of French influence, promoting a national

tradition in fact anti-French and anti-Dutch" (Wils, 1996 p. 52; Vos 1993 p. 134). It was

highly influenced by the literary world, many of whom wrote in French to reach a wider

audience while promoting the standardization of the language, adopting Dutch spelling

and grammar. In 1840, the movement launched a petition demanding bilingualism in the

Flemish provinces which received 13,000 signatures. This movement generated support

from wide segments of society p. the clergy, which saw the French language as a vessel

for anti-clericalism and impiety, the creative world which was heavily influenced by

Romantic ideals and especially by the Flemish middle class who confronted a glass

ceiling in the social sphere as a result of a French-leaning administration and the

advanced economic development of Wallonia.

- 59 -

Despite this action and the fact that a majority of Belgium‟s citizens spoke

Flemish, their demands were largely ignored. Their ranks swelled in the 1840s, when

Flanders was hit by a severe economic crisis. Flemish disillusionment increased,

bolstered by the region‟s economy which grew in the late nineteenth century and

suffrage movements which made the political spectrum more accessible to the general

population. Both the Flemish Movement and that of Wallonia which arose as a response

to Flemish demands emerged outside the party structure, although party affiliations are

evident from the early days, reflecting different traditions and interests. Walloons had a

tendency to align with liberals and socialists while the majority of Flemings supported

the religious-based parties.

The Rise of the Party System

The need for unity and the influential role of King Leopold I are, according to

Yves Manhés , the elements which prevented the immediate development of political

parties. It was not until 1846 that the Liberal Party was created, heavily influenced by

freemason and anticlerical thought. Until the formation of their rightist counterpart in

1884, they held a monopoly on power, despite a return to unionism in the 1850s and

Catholic government in the 1870s. The party‟s anticlerical stance pushed Catholics to

form their own party. In the late 1870s and 1880s, socialist currents in the form of

workers parties began to develop, bringing Flemish and Walloon organizations under

the umbrella of the Belgian Workers Party.

The Walloon Movement

The Walloon Movement did not spring from deep-seated cultural identifications

or political discrimination but was in fact, a reaction against the Flemish movement,

with practical demands. The Movement rejected the proposed introduction of

bilingualism in Wallonia and monolingualism in Flanders where many French-speakers

had found lucrative careers. The movement was first supported by the liberals and

socialists who distrusted the Flemish Movement‟s close ties with Catholicism. This

actually served to reinforce Flemish identification with clerical movements. (Vos, 1993

p. 137).

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Attempts to Reform the System

In 1856, the Belgian government created an official Commission of Grievances

which in 1859 published a report addressing linguistic issues in Belgium. It advocated

general bilingualism in Flemish areas and French-unilingualism in French-speaking

areas. (Vos, 1993 p. 134). However, this did not solve the underlying problem faced by

Flemish nationalists. If French was to remain the dominant language in education,

administration and industry, the trend of francification would continue, as the middle

classes saw the French language as key to social mobility. Francophones argued against

reforms, which would pose a threat to the current linguistic monopoly and oust

exclusively French speakers from leadership positions in Flanders. Small changes were

enacted to appease the movement, including the introduction of subsidies for Flemish

literature. However, this was not sufficient and the Flemish movement organized with

the realization that their demands were unlikely to be met without concentrated action.

In the 1870s, Flemish politicians pushed through several laws regarding

linguistic issues. This was a result of several shocking cases in which unilingual

Flemish-speakers faced legal action in a language they did not understand resulting in

severe punishments, including the death penalty. In 1873, a law was passed regarding

language usage in the courts, 1878, in the administration and 1883, in official secondary

education. However, these laws did not imply the implementation of bilingual policies

but applied only to unilingual Flemish speakers. (Vos, 1993 p. 135). It was only in the

1880s and 1890s that the first bilingual policies were passed, which dealt with monetary

policy, postage stamps and the official newspaper. In 1898, Flemish efforts were noted

with the recognition of the equality of French and Dutch, however symbolic.

Politicization of the Flemish Movement

The Flemish movement evolved in the second half of the nineteenth century,

shifting its focus from linguistic and literary identity to linguistic equality and

bilingualism. “It was under no illusions that Dutch-speakers in Belgium would have to

be bilingual if they were to play a role in public life. Yet it wanted French-speaking

officials in Flanders to bear at least some of the cost of bilingualism” (Vos, 1993 p.

134).

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In 1900, boosted by increased political participation, the Flemish movement

expanded its political program to reflect this evolving interest from solely linguistic

issues to incorporate a broader “cultural nationalism.” Vos argues that this identity was

distinct from the larger Belgian identity and promoted “culture as a whole, on group

solidarity and emancipation, on economic, social and educational development of the

Flemish nation and on the creation of new „Flemish institutions.” (1993 p. 136-7).

Within this framework, nationalists pushed for a unilingual territory and state support to

enhance economic development in the region. It was within this economic context that

the movement gained widespread acceptance. Flemish-speakers who were at a

disadvantage vis-à-vis their French speaking counterparts became increasingly

politically engaged. The Flemish movement found itself being absorbed into mainstream

political parties, especially with traditionalist Catholic parties, rather than liberals who

were strongly anti-clerical, anathema to Catholic Flanders. The view that the Catholic

and Flemish identities were intrinsically linked became widespread. (Vos, 1993 p. 135).

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A Common Threat- A Common Hope?

Belgium in the First World War

As Europe tottered towards the brink of war, Flemish politics were reaching a

new level, emphasizing a national cultural revival rather than solely linguistic rights.

Vos explains that this movement was not like later movements, as it remained

compatible with Belgian patriotism. (1993 p. 137). Electoral reforms had expanded the

vote to a greater proportion of the population, increasing support for both the Catholic

party and reforms of linguistic policy. In Belgium‟s first years, politics were dominated

by the Catholic and Liberal parties, who tended to undo the other‟s policies when taking

office. In the 1880s, the socialist Belgian Workers Party entered the political arena,

gaining particular support among the workers of highly industrialized Walloons, but

little in Flanders, where they were distrusted for their supposedly anti-clerical views.

One of the key issues in this period was the creation of a Flemish university. This

movement gained significant support from members of all three parties, Catholic,

Socialist and Liberals. In 1910, a petition was signed by 100,000 citizens. (Fitzgerald,

1996 p. 31). However, its implementation was interrupted by the tensions which led to

the First World War.

Albert I sought guarantees of Belgian neutrality from Germany. When he failed

to do so, he began increasing the military resources of Belgium, despite strong

opposition. In 1913, obligatory military service was finally passed. It was during the

military occupation that Belgian nationalism and regional identities were put to the test.

The Flemish movement was both strengthened and radicalized during the war

due to the treatment of Flemish soldiers in the Belgian army. From 1910 to 1914,

several reforms were proposed to end the unilingual nature of the armed forces.

However these reforms were largely unsuccessful and those which did succeed did so

only in 1913 and therefore lacked the time to be fully implemented before the outbreak

of war.

The German occupiers sought to undermine the Belgian state, dividing it into

Walloon and Flemish administrations, and favoring the Flemish region. (Manhés, 2005

p. 138). The occupiers engaged in Flamenpolitik and pandered to nationalists by

promising the long-awaited Dutch-speaking university in Ghent. During the war, a front

movement developed which envisioned the postwar Belgium as a federal state with self-

government for the region. However, only a minority of Flemish-speakers supported the

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German occupiers, notably the Activists which formed a puppet government and

advocated an administrative division of the country. (Vos, 1993 p. 137). The majority of

the population remained loyal to the unified Belgian state, hoping only for reforms to

increase equality among the two groups once the war ended.

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Democracy and Dissent

The 1920s and 1930s

Belgium struggled to rebuild infrastructure destroyed by the German occupation,

increase political participation and democratic development and cope with the

nationalist and fascist forces sweeping Europe. While Belgium would quickly return to

its prewar prosperity, it was highly integrated in the international system and would be

vulnerable to the global economic crises of the period. King Albert, for his part,

promised a new society in which national cohesion would be strengthened. While

charges of collaboration on both sides seemed to threaten the very fabric of Belgian

society, it served in fact, in some groups to strengthen Belgian identity as people were

anxious to disassociate themselves with the extremist and collaborationist activities that

took place during the Great War.

Electoral Reforms

Universal male suffrage was introduced and used to determine the results of the

first elections in 1919. The liberals, long accustomed to dominance, faced the greatest

electoral losses. The Catholics would remain an integral part of the coalition

governments during the entire interwar period. In periods of economic and social crisis,

broad coalitions were formed. Despite or perhaps due to these reforms, the government

coalitions were highly unstable but then, as in now, ministerial positions were often

occupied by the same elites, lending consistency.

Radicalization of the Flemish Movement

Due to his participation during the war, Albert I was aware of the detrimental

effect of excluding Flemish speakers and he affirmed the necessity of a bilingual army

and of greater linguistic equality. (Manhés, 2005 p. 143). However, these reforms were

slow in coming and Flemish proponents of linguistic equality quickly became

disillusioned.

The Flemish movement, which had gained strength in the prewar period, was

discredited by accusations of collaboration and found itself divided. The majority of

Flemings retained their prewar stances, advocating increased linguistic equality and

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cultural cohesion. Vos describes their goals as “unilingualism in Flanders and a form of

cultural autonomy via a legally guaranteed replacement of French by Dutch in public

life” (1993 p. 138). This goal was not incompatible with the unitary structure of the

Belgian state and these moderates pushed for reforms from within the existing party

system, drawn especially to the Christian Democratic Party. A radical minority

supported by disillusioned soldiers and young intellectuals developed into Flemish-

nationalists, advocating the federalization or in some cases, the dissolution of the

Belgian state, which would entail Flemish independence or incorporation into the

Netherlands.

However, as demands were unfulfilled, there was a gradual evolution of the

Flemish movement, which “created an environment and a mental framework within

which the commitment to Belgium gradually gave way to a solely Flemish-nationalist

sentiment. This sentiment was to attract not only the radical political nationalists, but

also the strategically moderate supporters of the language laws. “There was now a

Flemish culture alongside the official and still much stronger officially bilingual Belgian

culture, which in turn had assumed a slightly more Francophone character” (Vos, 1993

p. 139). This would increase the efficacy of political mobilization and differentiation.

There was also an economic motivation, as the discovery of coal in Flanders

further accelerated the shift in industry as these resources were exploited. Following the

First World War, financial institutions and industries were centered in the Flemish cities

of Brussels and Antwerp. This would empower the middle classes of Flanders and lead

to a greater push for regionalization. This was viewed by ruling elites as a threat to their

economic and political power and was resisted, especially by Francophones.

Greater Cohesion among Walloons

The Walloon movement capitalized on the disgrace of Fleming collaboration and

distrust of the nascent Flemish identity which seemed to threaten both the Belgian state

and Francophone dominance therein. Vos writes that after

the end of the war everything that was Flemish was regarded as unpatriotic by

French-speakers, Belgian patriots and left-wing opinion. A wave of

francification engulfed the country. The language laws of the thirties were

continually broken to the detriment of Dutch. At the same time the southern

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provinces saw a revival of Walloon-Belgian sentiment. This was considered

perfectly compatible with respectable Belgian patriotism”

1993 p. 140.

Rather than serving the interests of the state, this solidified Flemish distrust of their

counterparts, emphasizing the dominance of Francophone and often overtly French

interests.

Flirtation with Fascism

In June of 1936, a broad coalition was formed to lead the government. While the

government did make changes, including the implementation of a 40-hour workweek,

public opinion largely felt that the reforms failed to address serious political, economic

and international problems. In the 1930s, both Flemish and Walloon militants were

increasingly attracted by the fascist ideologies sweeping Europe. Some turned to these

extremist parties, including the VNV, the Flemish National League, which emphasized

the necessity of greater discipline and Flemish nationalism. Rex, based in Wallonia had

the largest electoral support among the extremist groups, coming in fourth after the

traditional parties. Rex rejected the capitalist nature of Belgian society and advocated a

return to authority and the implementation of corporatism. The effects of these parties

were compounded by a lack of unity within the Catholic union, which split along

regional lines, the Flemish wing advocating Flemish nationalism and going so far as to

negotiate with VNV. (Manhés, 2005 p. 147-8). The traditional political actors were

forced to grapple with these new forces in a time of increasing crisis. In 1937, in order

to appease the demands of the Flemish right, those who had collaborated with the

German occupation were granted amnesty.

Preparing for War

After the First World War, Belgian‟s politicians remained committed to

neutrality, despite its obvious failure to prevent German invasion. Faced with internal

turmoil but secure in its economic position, Belgium did not seek to enhance its

influence on the international stage, with the exception of its limited colonial activities

in Africa. It was not until the 1930s that the geographically vulnerable state began to

view Hitler‟s Germany as a threat. Leopold III attempted to develop a new security

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policy, one of mains libres.. By this point, the threat of fascist Germany was becoming

increasingly real, and this policy was endorsed by a once resistant government coalition.

However, the policy which entailed closer relations with France was cited by Flemish

nationalists as further evidence of Walloon dominance, a dominance which would put

the country in opposition to one of its powerful neighbors. (Manhés, 2005 p. 150). The

lack of time coupled with the absence of strong internal support for militarization,

Belgium was ill-prepared to defend itself. Despite courageous efforts, was quickly

overrun and placed under German military occupation.

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World War II: Collaboration and Resistance

King Leopold III, following the example of his father in the first conflict, refused

to evacuate in face of the German army despite the objections of the government-in-

exile which had relocated first to France and then to London. He hoped to protect the

country and negotiate safety for Belgian prisoners of war. Objections to and support for

this act would divide the country immediately following the war and lead to his

abdication.

While a common threat can often promote greater unity and cohesion in a state,

for Belgium, the German invasion and occupation only served to augment ethnic

conflict. The Walloon Rexists entered into the Nazi camp with their leader affirming the

German character of the nation and advocating its annexation. (Bitsch, 2005 p. 155).

Initially, Flemish nationalists collaborated with the Reich, in hopes of gaining

independence with the support of the powerful Germany. Germany once again engaged

in Flamenpolitik, supported by the VNV and De Vlag which pushed for annexation of

Flanders into the Reich and negotiated the release of Flemish prisoners. Both Walloons

and Flemings were subjected to forced labor and deportation of large segments of the

population, which quickly lead to disillusionment with the fascist cause. The majority of

the collaborationists quickly realized that Flemish independence was not part of Hitler‟s

grand vision for a postwar Europe and renounced the fascist collaboration and adopted a

pro-Belgian, anti-federalist stance.

This change would come too late, as Walloons would not easily forgive this

betrayal, while conveniently forgetting the actions of the Rexists. They perceived fascist

leanings as characteristic of both the Catholic Flemings and King Albert. As a result

some advocated an independent republic of Wallonia or absorption of the region into

France. One of the most significant political developments was a Walloon Catholic

party which would foster a greater sense of ethnic identity. Mabille writes that the war

and politics of occupation gave birth to a Walloon national conscience that would only

accept Belgium “under certain conditions” (1996 p. 73). The war would force a dramatic

change in Belgian politics.

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Crisis and Change:

1945 to 1950s:

Belgium was both economically and politically damaged by World War II,

having split definitively into factions, with anger and recriminations on both sides. The

Walloons emerged from the war radicalized, demanding a federal state, on equal terms

with the Flemish nationalists who were by now tainted by their flirtations with the Nazi

regime and weakened by charges of collaboration. Although Francophones had long

dominated Belgian society, they feared that acquiescence to Flemish demands

compounded with demographic and economic shifts would leave them vulnerable to

majority rule.

Fortunately, Belgium was able to regain its economic prosperity quickly,

enhanced by cooperation between all social elements, employers were pleased with state

supports, workers and unions benefited from reforms enhancing their stability and

positions. However, this growth took on a regional character, with the majority of new

investment going to Flanders rather than Walloon industries which were struggling even

before the war. These issues quickly culminated in a crisis, manifesting in a bitter

dispute divided largely along linguistic lines over the fate of Belgium‟s monarch.

The Question of the King

While previous kings were viewed as a symbol of unity, the question of the fate

of King Leopold III catalyzed the Belgian public. Leopold remained in Belgium and

negotiated with Hitler over the fate of Belgian soldiers taken prisoner by the German

army. He was taken to Austria and liberated by American troops but his status remained

unclear, polarizing public opinion. The Catholics, overwhelmingly Flemings, supported

his actions and advocated his return to power while non-Catholics disputed his right to

rule. In 1950, a referendum was held to decide his fate and the results showed the stark

divide between Flanders and Wallonia, with Flanders voting 72 percent in favor of his

return to power, in Wallonia he received 42 percent in favor and fared minimally better

in Brussels, receiving 48 percent of the vote. Despite receiving a total of 58 percent in

favor, rioting erupted over his return, resulting in three deaths. As a result, the king

abdicated in favor of his son Baudouin. (Manhés, 2005 p. 163). Catholics in Flanders

viewed this as an affront to their pride and yet another instance in which the majority of

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Flemish voices were overruled by a Francophone minority. This, according to Louis

Vos, combined with the persecution of former Flemish-nationalist collaborators,

strengthened, their sense of Flemish identity. (Vos, 1993 p. 140).

The Ramifications of Collaboration

While the majority of the population remained loyal to the Belgian state,

collaboration with the Nazi occupiers did occur in both the Flemish and Francophone

communities. The judicial system dealt first with those guilty of baring arms against the

Belgian state, which included those individuals, armed or not, who were at the service of

the German army or its auxiliary branches, including the SS. This also applied to

women and children who had worked with the German division of the Red Cross.

Political cooperation was more ambiguous and those prosecuted included journalists for

the German paper and members of those supported by the Reich. The courts adopted a

different approach from that imposed after the First World War, realizing that economic

contacts were inevitable, and even beneficial, and therefore not punished. (Manhés,

2005 p. 159).

However, the charges of political collaboration fell largely on Flanders and the

Flemish were considered pro-German because of the nature of Flemish nationalism. The

repression of both collaborators and the Flemish movement themselves was considered

by many to be a contributing factor the rise of a new breed of Flemish nationalism. Vos

writes that “the punishment caused dissatisfaction among large sections of the Flemish

people who felt that many idealists were punished simply because of their Flemish

sympathies” (1993 p. 139).

The Flemish movement was now considered tainted by its fascist affiliations.

Instead of breaking the Flemish movement, Flemish organizations experienced an

increased mobilization of the Flemish movement within cultural parties and

parliamentary initiatives. The revitalization was fostered by Catholic educational and

social organizations.

The School Crisis

The question of secular versus religious education had always been a factor in

Belgian politics. Opinion was drastically different between Catholics, who had a long

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established system of education, liberals and socialists. In the tumultuous years shortly

following the war, Christian Democrats had increased state funding of religious schools

and, according to the opposition, increased the role of the Catholic Church in state

affairs. (Manhés, 2005 p. 163). When a coalition of socialists and liberals came to power

in 1954, they attempted to implement major changes, reducing and restricting financial

aid to religious institutions. (Vos, 1993 p. 141). In 1955, legislation was proposed that

would increase control over the educational system and limit funding to those areas in

need of it. This action resulted in massive protests in Brussels and forced the proponents

to retreat. In 1958, the question was resolved with the School Pact, a result of

cooperation of all major parties, recognizing the freedom of school choice and free

education at all levels. However, the fallout from this battle would persist, in particular,

strengthening Flemish Catholic identity, especially among the younger generations. The

issues of collaboration, the monarchy and educational policy dominated the postwar

political scene. However, as these contentious issues were resolved, emphasis returned

to linguistic and regional policy which had yet to be resolved.

The Return of Regional Movements

While the Walloon movement gained support in the aftermath of the war, the

Flemish movement was slow to develop, due to charges of collaboration and

disorganization. In 1945, at the first Walloon Congress held in Liège the first votes were

shocking, with the majority of participants voting for the dissolution of the Belgian state

and the reattachment of the region to France. A second vote found this view to be

reactionary, and the majority of voters advocated a division of Belgium into linguistic

communities while maintaining the existence of the larger Belgian state. It was not until

1947 that the Flemish reorganized under the auspices of the Algemeen Vlaams Komitee,

incorporating the cultural organizations that existed before the war. It is notable that

candidates in favor of autonomy were not present in this organization until 1949.

(Manhés, 2005 p. 152). These organizations and political parties perpetuating

autonomist and federalist demands would become very important in the next decade.

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Economic Boom, Economic Bust: The Shift of Economic Power to Flanders

Introduction

The 1960s were a turning point in Belgian history, characterized by dramatic

shifts in the balance of economic and demographic power, a strengthened Flemish

movement and a concentrated Walloon defense. After the war, the more moderate wing

of the Flemish movement reinvigorated itself, adopting the ideology of the Christian

workers. Advocating economic regionalism, Flanders sought to address its relative

economic underdevelopment with a series of policies, including educational initiatives,

which served to strengthen Flemish as the language of enterprise. Its growing economic

power helped it push through these reforms and increased its assertiveness. (Keating, et

al 2003 p. 75).The Walloons on the other hand faced economic and demographic

stagnation rather than underdevelopment and reacted out of fear rather than confidence.

Political parties formed to represent these disparate and often opposing interests.

Growth of Regional Parties and the Strengthening of the Walloon Movement

The parties designed to represent regional rather than ideological interests had

their strongest electoral showing in the late 1960s and 1970s. While support ebbed in the

late 1970s, regional parties had clearly become a permanent feature in the Belgian

political scene, vital in forming necessary majorities for reforms. (Fitzgerald, 1996 p.

125). They also served to force traditional Belgian parties, including the Socialists and

Christian Democrats, to incorporate regionalist rhetoric into their party platforms to

retain dwindling electoral support.

Dissatisfaction with the economic situation in Wallonia led to increasing strikes

in the 1960s. The bitter strikes of 1960-1, a result of severe decline in the aging

industries of the south, led to greater unity among the Walloon movement. (Fitzgerald,

1996 p. 125). Eventually these organizations entered into the party system, with the

Parti Wallon which formed in 1965 and the Rassemblement Walloon which followed.

These parties sought federal reform and revitalized the Walloon national movement.

They were supported by workers who felt that a regional government, which was likely

to favor socialist policies and state intervention, could better address the extreme

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structural problems which faced the region. By nature, the Walloon Movement was

ideologically left-wing and contrasted with its Flemish counterpart, which is inherently

rightist, emphasizing the preservation of culture and a common national identity.

Attempts at Reform

The need for a serious reform became increasingly evident in the 1960s. While

both Dutch and Walloons agreed on the need, the means were the subject of intense

debate. The Flemish advocated devolution of powers to language communities, which

were viewed as cultural institutions while Walloons defended economic autonomy for

the southern region, powers necessary to address the economic decline that had beset the

once prosperous region, Brussels wanted to retain its Francophone nature. (Keating, et

al. 2003 p. 77).

In the early 1960s, the government led by Lefevre and Spaak finally sanctioned

the principle of unilingualism in Flanders and Wallonia, with a bilingual Brussels. As

part of these reforms, the institutions addressing issues of culture and education were

divided along linguistic lines and legislation was passed dealing with language policy.

In 1962, a new linguistic frontier was drawn with four Flemish provinces, four

Francophone provinces and the division of Brabant in accordance with linguistic

distribution. These lines were fixed, as linguistic questions on the census were

disallowed at this point. (Manhés, 2005 p. 173). These reforms represented a fulfillment

of traditional demands, but a whole new slate had emerged in the postwar period,

including the demand for cultural and political autonomy for linguistic communities.

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The Failure of Accommodation and the End of the Unitary state-

The 1970s

In the 1960s, a unilingual territory was finally realized in Flanders. The 1960s

saw the emergence of a class of Flemish politicians who had been educated entirely in

Dutch-speaking schools and/or universities and who were thus more vocal in demanding

a strict observance of the language laws. (Swenden, 2003 p. 3). These political elite

often adopted the nationalistic rhetoric that would be key to mobilizing voters and

forcing change among traditional parties. Their discontent with the status quo

manifested itself in Leuven, when Flemish nationalists that demanded that the French

speaking portion of the Catholic University be relocated to Walloon territory. After

strikes and violence, these demands were met, but like all attempts, they only

perpetuated further strife, as anti-Flemish sentiment developed in Wallonia and

Brussels. As a result of these tensions, both Walloon and Flemish nationalist parties

gained at the ballot box. To meet these demands, the government sought structural

solutions, including constitutional reform in 1970 which created cultural councils and

regional authorities, divesting competences over cultural affairs and economic

development respectively to these institutions. This reform and its impact will be

analyzed further in chapter four. The unitary structure was no longer effective in the

management of regional demands and had to be replaced. While the need was evident,

the means were subject to intense debate.

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Towards a Federalist Belgium, the 1980's

In the early 1980s institutional reform was put on hold in order to deal with

economic problems besetting the country. However, the intended reforms could not be

delayed for long. Flanders had become more assertive, approaching the matter as a

“powerful national entity.” The merger of the linguistic community and regional

government allowed it a greater range of maneuver than that of the Francophone

community and the Walloon region, which did not possess this degree of administrative

and territorial continuity, as they encompassed both the German community and ever

contentious Brussels. (Manhés, 2005 p. 176).Wallonia also suffered for its constant

emphasis on economic issues and a lack of strong national consciousness.

A Stronger Cultural Council and Regional Governments

The regional governments were also formed, realizing the goals of the 1970

reforms. The regional council would eventually be directly elected, and the number of

members would be proportional to the number of deputies at the national level.

Competences were divided between the state and the region. Regional economic policy

was perhaps the most important, as Wallonia struggled to invest in and subsidize its

ailing industries while Flanders adopted more market oriented policies. The regions

were financed by allocations from the state although taxation was envisaged.

From 1988 to 1989, constitutional reforms were enacted allowing the expansion

of regional powers and adding additional institutions. In 1990, these fledgling

institutions were put to the test when the Francophone community failed to meet its

financial responsibilities in its education system and relied on the national government

for handouts. Manhés writes that “in economic fields, the fracture between Flemings

and Walloons led to fears of the existence of a collective will to live” (2005 p. 177).

Wallonia feared Flanders‟ economic dominance while Flanders resented subsidizing

failing industries in the south. These points of contention contributed to the rejection of

governmental actors in favor of regional rightist parties in the elections of 1991.

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Belgium 1993: The End or the Beginning?

The government which took power in 1992 began a new round of constitutional

reforms, which included an additional transfer of competences to the communities and

direct elections to community institutions. It affirmed the federal nature of the system in

the first article of this constitution and ended the special status of the Brabant region,

which was previously bilingual, dividing it between the regions. This was meant to

solve the regional conflicts which had divided the country for so long. Walloons,

allowed the power to manage their economic affairs, were content to stop here. However

the Flemish demands continued, aided by the persistence of the extreme right.

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Conclusion

Belgium‟s “final” federalization would only last for 2002 and throughout this

period, strife between the two main ethnic groups would continue. The extreme right,

while losing some electoral support, remains an important factor in Belgian politics,

especially within Flanders. Although parties such as Vlaams Belang and Front National

focus on issues such as immigration and economic policy, their party platforms remain

antagonistic to the Belgian state.

The balance of power between Flanders and Wallonia has shifted dramatically

from the early period of French dominance. The movements representing regional

interests have evolved also, the Flemish Movement began a small, marginalized group

struggling for linguistic recognition, to the main force of Belgian politics, while

Wallonia lost its historic dominance and was prodded towards a federal state by its

Flemish counterparts. One is unable to predict the future. The large majority of demands

have been met, with a high degree of competences divested to the communities, yet

demands continue and the devolution of the state will eventually reach its limits.

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CHAPTER FOUR

ENTRENCHING ETHNIC CONFLICT:

BELGIUM’S MOVE TOWARDS FEDERALISM AND ITS IMPACT

The unitary state with its laws, structures and functions has been outmoded by reality.

The communities and regions must take their place in the renovated structures of the

states, better adapted to the country’s specific situations

Prime Minister Gaston Eyskens

Introduction

Belgium‟s move towards federalism was a slow process, pushed forward only

under intense pressure. The first challenge to the unitary state came more than a century

after its foundation, when a meeting of Francophone leaders in 1945 voted in favor of an

autonomous Wallonia in a federal Belgium, a move largely in response to the Belgian

experience in World War II and the already evident decline in economic productivity in

Wallonia. However, the leaders quickly retreated from this position and the federalist

mantra was then adopted by the Flemish nationalists that emerged in the 1950s. "Ethnic

demands and conflict management strategies were initially non-territorial, but

increasingly acquired a territorial aspect" (Hooghe, 2003 p. 73). Despite rising calls for

federalization, the established leaders resisted reforms until absolutely necessary, when

their political grip was weakened by electoral support for the regionalist parties. At the

time of the first reform, all agreed that something had to be done to appease the

population and sustain political control, although no end point was envisaged.

All of the major parties had an interest in protecting their unified control of the

policymaking process. The Catholics and Socialists, however, could tolerate

limited reforms if it meant they could be dominant regional actors in Flanders

and Wallonia, respectively. Such reform would require the dissolution of

parliament, the holding of constituent elections, and a two-thirds majority to pass

new constitutional amendments. Despite the fear of amending the existing

governing system, the major parties knew that the two-thirds rule guaranteed

consociational bargaining, ensuring their control of the amendment process

Newman, 1996 p. 76.

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Despite Prime Minister Eyskens assertion that the unitary state was dead, many

scholars argue that the reforms of 1970 were not meant to introduce a federalist system,

but were designed to preserve the unitary state in the face of federalist demands by

making small concessions to regionalist groups. Parties which operated on both sides of

the linguistic divide still existed, although they had disappeared by the time of the

subsequent reforms. They remained committed to a unitary state, feeling that a total

federalization would threaten their monopoly on power and the viability of the Belgian

state itself. (Deschouwer, 2006 p. 903). This piecemeal approach was unsuccessful. The

failure to implement reforms lead to the collapse of several governments and the

ethnoregionalist parties continued to garner votes.

In response, the traditional parties adopting regionalist platforms in the 1980s as

they ceded electoral support to regionalist parties such as Vlaams Unie and Vlaams Blok

in Flanders, Front Démocratique de Francophones in Brussels and the Rassemblement

Walloon in the South. Despite a drop in support for the regionalist parties during this

period, Belgium continued on its path towards federalism. By now the traditional

parties, in their regional reincarnations, had adopted distinctly ethnoregionalist

platforms, realizing this was the only way to retain influence. In 1993 the federalist

nature of the Belgian state was formally declared in the constitution. Belgium had been

transformed from a unitary state struggling to grapple with regionalist demands to a

federal state struggling with the same issues.

Despite its flaws, the Belgian system has been remarkably effective in

minimizing conflict, preventing an outbreak in violence or outright secessionism,

largely because it maintained consociational characteristics which prevented a

majoritarian system from taking root and completely alienating one side or the other.

(Deschouwer, 2002 p. 159). However, as a consociationalist system relies on secret

negotiations and favors, stability has come at the expense of the Belgian polity‟s

confidence, which is increasingly disillusioned with the elite-driven political system.

The division of politics into regionalist camps has not helped the already fractured

Belgian society, which seems to rally only in the face of scandal or sport. The extreme

right feeds on this dissatisfaction and calls for further regionalization of competences

persist.

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The Federal Reform of 1970: A Reluctant Move towards Federalism

Throughout the 1960s regionally based political parties mobilized support in

favor of federalization. After the linguistic lines were made permanent in 1964, it was

possible to speak of federalism along territorial lines. Once what Lefebvre calls the

“formal territorialization of the linguistic problem” was complete, pressure intensified

further as the ethnoregional parties had a concrete base from which to mobilize support.

(2003 p. 127). It was this competition, rather than a belief in federalism, which forced

the establishment to deal with the problem. Pressure eventually emerged from both sides

of the linguistic divide but was initiated by Flemish nationalists. Already faltering

economically, the Francophones feared they would face further problems if the drive

towards federalism was the result of a unilateral effort of the Flemings. Caselli and

Coleman offer this theory which can be applied to the Walloon response:

a majority that would otherwise prefer peaceful coexistence, engages in

repression and discrimination against the minority in order to prevent the latter

from attempting a grab for power. Similarly, in a multi-group world, a group that

would otherwise prefer peace may be induced to participate in an aggressive

coalition in order to preempt the constitution of an alternative aggressive

coalition that excludes it

2005 p. 4.

In an interesting reversal of roles, the Rassemblement Walloon advocated economic

autonomy to protect Walloon interests against the central government which it accused

of being a dominated by the North. (Buelens & Van Dyck, 1998 p. 53). The RW drew

support from socialist voters who were concerned about the maintenance of Wallonia‟s

social welfare system in light of the faltering economy and the Flemish economic

dynamism and belief in free market principles. Their platform in 1968 advocated

reforms to "assure for Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels the largest possible autonomy in

their political, economic, social and cultural organization." (Newman, 1996 p. 70-1).

Brussels was even more wary as the Francophone enclave feared cooperation

between the Flemings and Walloons would lead to its total exclusion. The Front

Démocratique de Francophones, founded in response to the linguistic measures of the

1960s and the rise of ethnoregionalist parties in both Flanders and Wallonia, ran

primarily on a platform of linguistic choice for education and administration and was

supported by both Flemish and Francophones who continued to view the French

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language as key to social mobility. “The FDF was first and foremost a liberal defender

of individual rights rather than a true community party" (Newman, 1996 p. 73).

Originally, the party remained committed to a unitary Belgian state but as federal

reforms seemed inevitable fears arose that it would be excluded from decision-making

carried out by the Walloon and Flemish regions, and it adopted a federalist platform that

would put Brussels on equal footing with the other units. (Buelens & Van Dyck, 1998 p.

56). After the first reforms, the FDF became almost passionately federalist, advocating

Brussels as a region of its own, running on the slogan of “Bruxellois, master in your

own house.” The Flemish side rejected this as it would allow a two-one balance in favor

of the Francophones rather than the parity that prevailed. As a result, compromise

compromis à la belge, as Carter terms it, left the issue for another day. (2002 p. 15).

Several institutions and procedures were introduced in order to ensure

cooperation among the linguistic groups and the peaceful resolution of ethnic conflict.

Significantly, these mechanisms maintained traditional consociationalist tendencies of

mutual vetoes and compromise. There was a formal devolution of power to the regions

and cultural communities, which was necessary because the linguistic border and the

territory were not congruent in all situations. Linguistic regions and cultural

communities governed by community councils which consisted of members of the

national parliament. These councils had full legislative powers in several defined areas.

Citizens living in formally bi-lingual Brussels were assigned a community on the basis

of the language they habitually spoke. (Pilet, 2005 p. 399). The regions, Flanders,

Wallonia and Brussels had, at this point, no special authority but this was to be granted

later in specific social and economic areas. Brussels and the German population also had

smaller cultural institutions. (Newman, 1996 p. 77).

In the central government, the principle of linguistic parity was to prevail despite

demographic differences. The Belgian cabinet which was to consist of equal numbers of

French-speaking and Dutch-speaking ministers as was the Brussels administration.

In regards to the legislative, new rules require the consent of a double majority in

order to enact further institutional reforms and implement the reforms proposed in this

constitutional session. This principle stipulates an overall majority of two-thirds and a

simple majority in each language group. (Deschouwer, 1999 p. 102). This prevents the

Flemish, by now a demographic and economic majority, from advocating further

devolution or actions without the consent of the Francophone minority. (Lefebvre, 2001

p. 127).

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An alarm bell procedure also restricts unilateralism and majority rule. When

legislation is proposed that one linguistic group considered potentially harmful, they

could vote to suspend further debate. It requires support from twenty-five percent of the

given language group. At this point the national government is required to propose a

solution within 60 days. Although the alarm bell procedure has yet to be used, it has had

a moderating influence on political actors, obligating them to negotiate and find an

acceptable solution for all parties involved, and avoid the political fallout of a stalemate.

This procedure, essentially a veto, is typical for the Belgian consociationalist system

which is designed to prevent majoritarianism and encourage compromise. The original

Belgian constitution required a two-thirds majority for any constitutional change. These

measures could only be enacted following the dismantling of the parliament and new

elections and were meant to ensure that parliament could not change the constitution

without support from all major political actors. (Hooghe, 2004 p. 19).

The articles did not entail extensive devolution of competences to the regions,

thus showing the reluctance of the establishment to dismember the central government.

Many felt that the reforms would stop here, having offered some guarantees. The

measures, including the roles and competences of the communities required extensive

implementation by the parliament and would now be subject to the stringent double

majority procedure. As no one had a grand vision of a federalist Belgium, attempts to

pass the implementing legislation would prove to be the foil of six governments between

1970 and 1980. The measures were finally pushed through by a coalition led by

Wilifried Martens but would be revised as demands for further regional autonomy and

meaningful competences intensified. (Covell, 1982 p. 451).

The 1970 reform, with its emphasis on compromise rather than majoritarian rule,

implemented a system which favored conflict management over efficiency. Political

elites, threatened with alarm bell procedures and vetoes, are forced to reach a

compromise, or pay politically for their inaction. Deschouwer writes of the reforms

“Either there is a compromise that is acceptable for both communities, or there is no

longer any government” (Deschouwer, 2006 p. 905).

Despite its success in mitigating ethnic conflict for the moment, the division of

language groups would signal the death of multilingual political parties and by the end

of the decade, they would have dissolved completely. The reform served to polarize the

once united national parties and in effect institutionalized ethnic conflict, framing every

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political debate along linguistic lines and encouraging political entrepreneurs to adopt

increasingly aggressive political platforms.

As the mainstream political actors co-opted the regionalist and federalist rhetoric

of the ethnoregionalist parties to maintain electoral support and meet demands, the

parties lost momentum. Flemish and French-speaking actors spoke increasingly for their

community or region in the first place, and began systematically to observe a Flemish-

French or regional balance in national politics" (Hooghe, 1995 p. 138). In the late

1970s, Volksunie and the Rassemblement Walloon were drawn into coalitions designed

to pass the necessary legislation laid out in the constitutional reform. This would allow

their entry into the traditional Belgian system but would be at their peril, drawn into

what Newman describes as a “Faustian bargain that helped ensure the creation of a

federal Belgium at the expense of party unity and support” (1996 p. 61).

The manner in which these reforms were carried out further distanced the

Belgium people from their government. Newman explains that

it was not the voters who determined the scope or direction of regionalization in

Belgium. Rather the major parties had used regionalization as a way of dividing

the ethnoregional parties so that they could control the political agenda. In a

sense, they had moved toward regionalization with limited input from the

ethnoregional parties

1996 p. 92.

Only the Volksunie, which was older and more experienced than FDF and RW and

competed on a more diverse platform, would be able to withstand these tactics.

Volksunie, accused of selling out by more radical elements in the Flemish nationalist

movement, began to develop a more comprehensive party platform, adopting stances on

militarism and environmental policy. (de Winter 1998 p. 33). However, they were

undercut by Vlaams Blok, a splinter group that advocated Flemish independence and

adopted increasingly xenophobic rhetoric.

After the mid-seventies, the regional parties lost seats in parliament, from 44 in

1974 to 13 in 1991. (Eatwell, 1997 p. 43). However, they had accomplished their

objective, setting Belgium on the path towards federalization and forcing the

mainstreaming of regionalist ideologies. The halted, reluctant reforms perhaps created

more resentment and encouraged the push for autonomy, especially among the Flemish.

By reason of the alarm-bell procedure, the requirement of concurrent majorities

for special laws, equal representation in the national government, and a

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multiparty political system that requires coalitions, the francophone political

parties have considerable leverage in the national parliament to ensure that their

interests are taken into account in any negotiated deal. Many Flemish resent

these antimajoritarian elements, which they often characterize as antidemocratic"

Mnookin, 2007

The emphasis on parity, despite the obvious demographic and economic differences

coupled with historical resentment of Flemish dominance spurred many Flemish

nationalists to increasingly radicalized positions.

The Egmont Pact

In 1977, it was clear that more progress towards a federal state must be made.

This progress had been hindered by the fragile nature of coalitions. In order to do so

effectively a broad majority coalition was formed, incorporating both traditional parties

and regional movements. The government needed to reconcile differing needs, as

Flanders sought to ensure the recognition of linguistic, territorial and cultural unity

while Wallonia sought the means to counter its economic decline independently. The

Egmont Pact would have created powerful regional institutions which could tax and

conclude international agreements. These institutions were to be run by elected

assemblies and legislatives, largely free from centralized control. (Fitzgerald, 1996 p.

128). While these aims fulfilled the demands of the parties, they included constitutional

reforms which needed to be implemented in stages, rendering the process vulnerable to

fluctuations in coalitions and political tides. In the end, the CVP rejected the agreement,

arguing that the project was unconstitutional, would undermine the federal state and hurt

Flemish living in the periphery of Brussels, thus halting the process. (Fitzgerald, 1996 p.

130). Notably, in 1978 the final division of Belgian political parties was complete, they

were now divided along linguistic lines and each found varying levels of political

support amongst the region. (Manhés, 2005 p. 175). However, just a few years later, a

similar model would be adopted and would this time succeed, even though the question

of Brussels would be frozen in order to ensure cooperation.

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Reform of the 1980s Conflict Prevention or Cooperation?

The legislation of 1980 was difficult to enact but necessary to fulfill the reforms

adopted in 1970. This entailed a regionalization including the expansion of regional

autonomy and the granting of new, and exclusive, competences to the community.

Unlike the German system in which the national body sets general goals and allows the

Lander to implement specific statutes, the regions, communities and federal government

were each given exclusive competences over specific areas and the acts that each made

were given equal status as national law.

The goal of this reform, according to Hooghe, was to minimize conflict by

creating “watertight compartments” on every level. This effort was complicated by the

fact that regional and community councils were not yet directly elected and made up of

members of the federal parliament. In addition, the regions and communities relied on

the federal government for funds, lacking the power of tax although this reform allotted

greater resources. The regions were financed by the central government and the sums

were determined on the basis of three equal criteria: population, personal income tax

paid and territorial surface area. The Communities received their funding on the basis of

a 45/55 rule, reflecting the demographic makeup of the French and Flemish

communities. (Gérard, 2001).

The existence of cultural and regional bodies also created divisions as there was

no broad agreement on “whether the territorial or the nationality principle should take

priority” (Hooghe 2003 p. 86). This problem was only relevant for Wallonia and the

Francophone region, as 1980 brought the formal merger of the Flemish Community and

Flanders as a region. This system was decidedly asymmetrical and allowed Flanders to

act more efficiently and strengthen regional identification. (Manhés, 2005 p. 176).

Regions are considered territorial entities, granted power over aspects such as

administration, agriculture, economic policy, environment, transportation. Communities

have so-called “personal competences” which are restricted to the linguistic territory,

and included the services such as the protection of minors and health policy.

To deal with the inevitable disputes between linguistic groups and federal bodies

the Court of Arbitration was formed in 1980, designed to restrict conflict to the political

rather than social sphere. Consisting of judges and retired politicians, the Court also

observed the principle of linguistic parity. It was vested with the responsibility of

guarding the legal division of competences and assuring that all legislation respected the

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constitutional provisions of equality, protection of ideological and philosophical

minorities (granted in the 1970 reform), and freedom of education. This court was

weaker than similar courts in Germany, Canada and US but was nevertheless influential.

(Hooghe, 2003 p. 90). Once put into effect, it was judged to be fair, and was

strengthened by the subsequent round of reforms to allow anyone with appropriate

standing to approach the court. (Carter, 2001 p. 15).

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1989: Reform under Duress

Like so many of Belgium‟s extensive reforms, the 1989 constitutional revision

was precipitated by a crisis. The Happart affair touched about regional and linguistic

nerves. Happart was a former Member of the European Parliament and served in 1988

as the mayor of Fouron, a town that had been transferred from Wallonia to Flanders as

part of a 1962 agreement. This transfer took place in spite of a referendum that rejected

the move. Happart led the fight against this action which continued to provoke anger

twenty years later. Upon his reelection, he refused to take an exam that would prove his

competence in Flemish, a requirement for all mayors in Flanders. This led to a new

election which he again emerged the victor, however, a new electoral law disqualified

him. (Carter, 2001 p. 17-18). The Walloon Socialist party faced intense political

backlash among Francophones who had always hoped for the return of Fouron.

(Manhés, 2005 p. 177).

The government fell as a result of this controversy and a new plan was enacted

to further reform the Belgian system. The plan involved three phases, the first of which

was to deal with the festering issue of Brussels which previous reforms had failed to

address, the recognition of Francophone rights in the Flemish suburbs of Brussels and

the creation of a Brussels-Capital region with powers equal to those of the Walloon and

Flemish region. The creation of the Brussels-Capitals Region, envisaged in early

reforms, was finally settled in exchange for special minority guarantees for the small,

but vocal, Flemish population. (Hooghe, 2003 p. 84). In addition, the Court of

Arbitration which had been deemed remarkably effective found its jurisdiction was

extended in this phase. The second phase allowed the German-speaking Community to

engage in international relations and the powers of the Regions and Communities were

clarified. The final phase included direct elections to the Regions and Community

institutions. (Carter, 2001 p. 17-18).

While the regions and communities were granted some fiscal autonomy, their

powers to tax remained limited which allowed the federal government to retain control

over the process. They were allowed to make infrastructure investments in the region

but the federal government retained control over the energy production, national airline,

nuclear plants, postal service, railways and telecommunications. (Hooghe, 2003 p. 87).

A transition period of ten years was agreed upon to minimize the political repercussions

for participants in an agreement that was described as “suboptimal for either side” but

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better than the alternative extremes of maintaining the status quo or separatism.

(Hooghe, 2004).

While ethnic issues, in the form of linguistic conflict, had calmed, economic

issues took on ethnic and regional undertones, especially as Belgium faced economic

crisis in the 1980s. At this point, several political groups became more independence

oriented, with economic justification. Secession would allow rich Flanders to end

transfers to relatively poor Wallonia, transfers which were subsidized by high taxes on

the successful industries of Flanders. Wallonia, which remained committed to its social

welfare system and its struggling state owned enterprises would be free to pursue more

redistributive policies which Flanders had blocked. However, there were economic

deterrents as well. Although the European Community was developing, barriers to

international trade did exist and trade across the regions was high. Flanders would lose

its extensive domestic markets and would likely be saddled with the large part of

Belgium‟s enormous public debt. Wallonia would lose the taxes and transfers on which

it depended to fund its social welfare system. (Hooghe, 2004 p. 24). Perhaps a more

important aspect, both symbolical and practical, was Brussels, often considered the glue

that held Belgium together, if only because both sides refused to give it up.

Included in the 1989 reform was the power to deal with education, granted to the

communities. This enforced a total separation of Flemish, French and German education

systems. In Brussels, the system was split according to linguistic affiliations. This is an

unusual practice even for a federal regime and is significant for social reasons

especially. “The central Belgian authority has barely any policy instruments to promote

or socialize a shared Belgian culture, assuming the existence of a political will to do so”

(Billiet, et al 2006 p. 914-5).

This reform, which satisfied no one, had to be revised just four years later,

especially after the catastrophic elections of 24 November 1991, so-called Black

Sunday, which led to a rejection of the government parties, in favor of the left and the

right, Vlaams Blok, which tripled its electoral returns, while the ecologists in Wallonia

more than doubled theirs, reflecting the growing rejection of the traditional parties and

their means of operation. (Manhés, 2005 p. 177).

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1993: The “Final” Reforms

The 1992 to 1993 constitutional reform, the apparent final reform or “the roof on

the house” was carried out in three separate legislative phases. (Bitsch, 2004 p. 266).

The new constitution affirmed for the first time the federal nature of the Belgian state in

the first article of the Constitution. At this point “Belgium [has been] a federal state

made up of communities and regions” (Pilet, 2005 p. 399). This was not just a symbolic

concession to a disillusioned electorate but had entailed a significant transformation of

the Belgian system. Measures carried out by the Dehaene government included the

implementation of traditional federal institutions and mechanisms, such as senate

reform, the redrafting of electoral districts, increase in fiscal autonomy, procedural

autonomy over each level. International competences and treaty power, which had been

alluded to in both 1970 and 1980 were finally clarified. (Hooghe, 1995 p. 139).

Federal Level Community Level State Regional

Level

Language Region

House of

Representatives

Senate

King

Flemish

Community Council

French Community

Council

German

Community Council

Joint Commission

Flemish Region

Walloon Region

Brussels-Capital

Flemish-speaking

French-speaking

German-speaking

Bilingual Region

The reforms were characterized by an additional transfer of competences and the

direct elections to federal institutions which would begin with the general elections of

1995. (Deschouwer, 1998 p. 121).

Federal Competences Community Competences Regional Competences

Defense Arts Agriculture

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Fiscal & monetary policy

Justice

Security

Social Security

Culture

Education

Health Policy

Language

Welfare

Youth Affairs

Employment

Energy

Environment &

Conservation

External trade

Housing

Industrial restructuring

Land use planning

Local transport

Regional airports

Roads & waterways

Urban renewal

At this point, federal competences included issues of high-politics, monetary

policy which has since been largely ceded to the European Union. The federal

government does make general regulations and restrictions but the communities and

regions maintain exclusive competences in many things. It is important to note that

despite the adoption of traditional federalist mechanisms, the consociational nature of

Belgian politics remain, evident in the transfer of competences. The powers are only

transferred after a compulsory agreement has been concluded, allowing the federal

government to orchestrate some aspects of policy. (Poirier, 2002 p. 37). Despite

attempts to enact clear divisions of power, conflicts do occur, due to contradictory

competences, several of which Poirier outlines p.

Preventive health is a community matter, while health care insurance falls under

federal jurisdiction;

Unemployment insurance is federal, while the placement of the unemployed is

left to the regions. Professional training is carried out by the communities.

The educational system is set by the communities while professional programs

must be recognized at the federal level.

Poirier, 2002 p. 28.

Interestingly, both the communities and regions possess the power to enter into

international agreements dealing with those issues, as long as it is in the interest of the

Belgian state as a whole. The European Community which was rapidly increasing in

relevance, also played an important role. In the Interministerial Conference for External

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Affairs, the federal government, regions and communities agreed upon the composition

of the Belgian representation in the Council of Ministers and negotiation strategy and

voting. The reforms of 1980 required the ratification at the community level if the text

fell within its competences. When Maastricht entered into force, the fact that it

contained provisions on culture, education, health, vocational training and youth meant

that the treaties must be approved in the national parliament and by the community

councils, and the Community Commission of Brussels. (Hooghe, 1995 p. 147).

The implementation of a federalist system should have destroyed the Volksunie

and Vlaams Blok, and would have done so if they had remained focused only on the

federalist issue. However, both had adapted their party platforms to remain politically

relevant. The Volksunies‟ new slate of demands included community representation in

European and international organizations and the construction of a confederal state in

which Wallonia and Flanders would have independence and share responsibility for

Brussels. (de Winter, 1998 p. 46). While all ethnoregionalist parties lost electoral

support in the 1990s, they retained their influence as the mainstream parties continued

the practice of co-opting some of their more moderate demands, therefore inspiring

them to radicalize further to remain politically relevant.

Although this reform was presented as the final round, a success according to

Hooghe who indicates that conflict has abated and centrifugal forces have calmed

themselves, as a result, talk of additional reforms arose shortly after the 1993 agreement.

(2003 p. 90-1).Walloons would have been content of the reforms had stopped here while

the Flemings pushed for more. (Manhés, 1994 p. 180). The previous reforms had largely

succeeded in pacifying contentious and symbolic linguistic issues, dividing competing

populations administratively and territorially. French and Flemish-speakers were

according equal standing and both had equal access to government administration and

power.

However, as new economic challenges arose and the regions differed in their

approach to them, the demands for reform became more and more strident, especially

from the Flemish side which resented the financial transfers stipulated by the federal

government (Hooghe, 2004 p. 4). In 1999, the Flemish parliament offered new

legislation to remedy this situation, demanding increased financial and fiscal autonomy

and the defederalization of the social security system, demands which Deschouwer

writes were immediately rejected by the Francophones as a “a clear and deliberate

attempt to reduce or even to break the financial solidarity between north and south and

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thus as a direct attack on the viability of the Walloon region,” a precursor to

secessionism. (1998 p. 137). The nature of the conflict between Walloons and Flemings

had evolved, once based on cultural issues, it now deals with more practical economic

and political disputes. However, one symbolic issue does remain, and that is the issue of

Brussels, overwhelmingly Francophone in nature, its inhabitants are spreading into the

legally Flemish-speaking suburbs.

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2001 and Beyond

Demands for further reforms persisted and each side made concessions in order

to best serve their interests. Flanders pushed for a greater regionalization of social

security, enhanced fiscal autonomy and powers over agriculture. They sought greater

control over the economic system, hoping to reduce taxes and encourage investment.

The Liberal-Socialist-Green government of Wallonia conceded on many of these

demands in exchange for greater funding for its education system which faced a severe

financial deficit. However, social security remained outside the scope of these

negotiations despite Flemish intent. (Deschouwer, 1998 p. 134). In addition, the transfer

of fiscal autonomy which was enacted in 2001 was conditional on the conclusion of

compulsory agreements before the transfer took place. (Poirier, 2002 p. 37).

In 2001, reforms were introduced to facilitate greater cooperation and hopefully

alleviate some of the issues plaguing the political system. These mechanisms, outlined

by Poirier included

Non-binding consultation

Concertation: a mechanism designed to encourage formal cooperation

agreements but which has no effect on the actor‟s freedom of action

Association agreements which allow participation of the federal bodies in

the drafting of federal norms and standards

Joint-decision making procedures

Representation which allows the regions and communities to send

representations to the federal level

Poirier, 2002 p. 32

In 2003, the federal level conceded competence over agriculture and external

trade, two sectors that had already been hollowed by the European Union. This was

accompanied by the transfer of additional financial resources, and came at high financial

cost and indicated, according to Hooghe, the tenuous position of the federal state by the

fact that it was willing to “take out a mortgage on its hard-won financial solvency in

return for placating intense subnational demands for greater financial resources for

education policy and greater fiscal autonomy" (2003 p. 95). Demands for further

reforms are likely to continue and scholars debate just how far the reforms can go while

preserving the Belgian state.

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Conclusion

Deschouwer writes that the slow, almost stuttering process of reforms was a

result of both the high threshold for reforms and different interests on both sides. The

constant failure of proposals for reforms, like the proposals by the Flemish parliament in

1999, may have actually served to force comprehensive reforms by aggregating the

problems and creating a crisis which prevented the typical superficial remedies from

being applied.

But after a governmental crisis a new government had to be formed by parties of

both sides. When things really became troublesome, the risk of a total deadlock

of the political system actually helped to produce the awareness that a solution

had to be found, and then a solution was found indeed

Deschouwer 1998 p. 135.

However, in each session, issues were left unaddressed and as regional and community

bodies gain confidence, the calls for greater devolution are likely to continue as it has

become politically profitable to blame problems on the greater Belgian state or on ones

neighbor rather than taking responsibility for them. Ethnic conflict, at least at the

political level, persists and has even intensified as the economic disparities between the

two regions have increased and European regional integration has reduced the apparent

political cost of independence.

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CHAPTER FIVE

ANALYZING THE EFFICACY OF BELGIAN FEDERALISM:

THE MITIGATION OF CONFLICT AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF DIFFERENCE

It is hard to avoid the impression that Belgian government in the latter two thirds of the

postwar period has been more an exercise in crisis management than a considered

implementation of substantive policy programs

Bergman et al, 1994 p. 224.

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Introduction

In 2007, Belgium is a federal state, albeit one with strong consociational aspects.

Despite an intense process of devolution, ethnic conflict, at least in the political sphere,

persists and crises occur with startling regularity. Institutions designed to reduce conflict

between Flemings and Walloons are in place, although debate continues over whether

they truly do so.

The process of federalization was part of the problem. Politicians undertaking

reform in 1970 did not have an endpoint in mind. They were acting purely to quell

unrest and retain political support in the face of new political opposition. Acting in what

Karl Deschouwer describes as the “classical Belgian way,” the system lurched from

crisis to crisis, reforming only when absolutely necessary (Deschouwer 2006 p. 903). In

consociational tradition, reformers avoid outright disputes, leaving serious issues for the

next round of reforms and another group of political elites. However, this piecemeal

process only allows the issues, like the status of Brussels and its surrounding suburbs, to

fester. When reforms do occur, as in 1970, 1980, 1989, 1991 and 2003, the participating

parties work to maintain their grip on power rather than creating viable, long-lasting

reforms.

Despite the development of mechanisms designed to mitigate conflict, clashes

between the linguistic groups persist. This is a result of several factors

The existing political actors have found that they can shirk responsibility for

economic, social and political conditions by passing the blame to the federal

government and presenting further devolution of competences to the community and

the regions as the only solution.

The far right, at least in Flanders remains electorally significant. This forces actors

across the spectrum to co-opt nationalist platforms in order to remain politically

relevant.

Belgian society is highly segregated, to the point which one can ask if Belgians truly

exist. This is the effect of linguistic differences and increasing monolingualism as

well as a political system which presents Flemings and Walloons in opposition

rather than in cooperation.

Although this process of devolution seems unstoppable, several centripetal

forces do exist which would indicate that the Belgian state, at least for now is a viable

one.

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Public opinion is increasingly in favor of the maintenance of the existing political

system, or at least the maintenance of the Belgian state. Surveys have indicated

widespread commitment to the continued existence of Belgium in its current form.

Some citizens even advocate increased centralization. Despite some regional

variations, Belgian identity is experiencing resurgence.

While the European Union may make secessionism a more palatable outcome,

evidence suggests that the EU encourages cooperation between Flemings and

Walloons, spurs a distribution of competences between multiple supranational,

federal and regional levels which in turn increases independence within the confines

of the state.

Brussels is often presented as the child that prevents parents from separating for fear

of losing custody. Flanders is unlikely to declare independence and sacrifice

Francophone Brussels. However, the issue of the Flemings in Brussels and the

Francophones in the Flemish suburbs of the capital may provoke further disputes, as

we will see at the conclusion of this chapter.

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Causes and Nature of Ethnic Conflict in Belgium:

Belgium as a Divided Society

Ethnic conflict in the land of chocolate and beer rarely attracts international or

scholarly attention because of its peaceful nature. In an analysis of Belgian history,

Hooghe found that violent disruptions have only occurred when ethnic disparities are

combined with other symbolic issues. The royal question juxtaposed deep-seated

loyalties and religious sentiment with the school war being distinctly religious in tone

and the coal and steel crises was a result of socio-economic conflict. Because of the

distinct cultural, religious and economic differences between the regions, these disputes

automatically took on territorial attributes (Hooghe, 2006 p. 13). In an increasingly

secular Belgium led by a king who is more a symbol than an actor in the political scene,

violence because of ethnoterritorial conflict seems unlikely, however the nature of

conflict in Belgium is so severe that it threatens the very viability of the Belgian state.

The compromise “à la Belge” is not an attempt to foster unity but rather to avoid

conflict. Politicians tend to advocate further separation or pillarization to mitigate

conflict (Lefebvre, 2003 p. 121). While this has been remarkably effective in preventing

violence and general upheaval, Belgium is now a deeply divided society. A divided

society is described by Reilly as one which is “both ethnically diverse and where

ethnicity is a politically salient cleavage around which interests are organised for

political purposes, such as elections” (2001 p. 4). Looking at Belgium, which has

willingly separated itself into several economic, political and social entities, one can see

the truth behind this. Donald Horowitz outlines three characteristics of a deeply divided

society, examining the larger socio-economic implications.

1. Issues of ethnicity and identity are present in many issues, including

development, education, labor relations, business policy and taxation.

2. Capital and labor are organized on ethnic grounds.

3. Organizational pluralism is strong in party systems.

Belgium failed to generate a sense of unity and after 170 years of existence, meets these

characteristics. Education and social policy are the responsibility of the subnational

units. Regional disparities are framed in ethnic, linguistic and cultural terms. Investment

across linguistic lines is rare, as is employee mobility, largely due to linguistic issues.

The party system is deeply divided, at the moment, there is no politically relevant party

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that campaigns across Belgium and the system is set up in such a matter that a

Francophone in Brussels cannot vote for a Flemish party.

Some scholars question the historical basis of the linguistic and ethnic

communities, describing them as the product rather than the impetus of the conflict.

Keating et al found that Wallonia does not often employ ethnic and historical

justifications when it pushes for autonomy. It seeks to protect and re-develop its

autonomy (Keating et al, 2003 p. 75). Flanders, on the other hand, engages in

traditional processes of nation building, addressing the oppression of the Flemish people

by the Francophone elite. These variations coincide with the historical development and

the relationship between the two groups. The French-speaking Walloons did not have

their cultural existence threatened by the presence of the Flemish-speakers, while for

most of Belgium's history, Flemish speakers were forced to assimilate and adopt the

French language to participate in the political and economic spheres.

The Symbolic Role of Language

The linguistic issue is perhaps the most symbolically significant. Language

issues get the most attention because they are highly visible and symbolic. Seemingly

minor issues, such as the use of language in public spaces can erupt into controversy.

The names of cities, towns and regions and the language of leaders have become

increasingly important. Signs throughout Flanders have been vandalized, the French

translation removed. This conflict is particularly salient in the Flemish suburbs of

Brussels. French speakers have encountered difficulties and even hostility when they

attempt to speak French. Flemings fear that should they be accommodated,

Francophones would populate the district and threaten Flemish control. Belgian citizens

cannot communicate with one another nor do they have to. They tend to view their

differences as fundamental and irreconcilable, a fact that is exploited by politicians in an

attempt to win votes. Debates are framed in terms of us versus them, attributing serious

structural and economic problems to the other side, something that is politically

profitable but in the long term, unsustainable. “Politicians in divided societies face

powerful incentives to play the 'ethnic card' and campaign along narrow sectarian lines,

as this is often a more effective means of mobilising voter support than campaigning on

the basis of issues or ideologies” (Reilly, 2001 p. 4). The politicization of ethnic

demands therefore leads to the “growth of zero-sum, winner-take-all politics in which

- 100 -

some groups are permanently included and some permanently excluded” (Reilly, 2001

p. 4). In Belgium, anti-majoritarian principles form the core and can be credited with

ensuring that ethnic conflict, although at times virulent, remains peaceful. This ensures

that one segment does not dominate the other. However, unpopular decisions are

portrayed as being pushed through by a Flemish majority or blocked by a Francophone

minority.

Federalism has served to soften the linguistic element of strife between Flanders

and Wallonia. The two regions are now largely unilingual territories. This territorial

division has allowed Belgium to move past the linguistic conflicts that once defined it.

However, linguistic issues have been replaced by economic ones “as the economic gap

first reversed itself and then grew in favor of the more prosperous Flanders, the ethnic

groups have shifted their emphasis to economics” (Hooghe 2004 p. 4).

Socio-Economic Issues

Scholars debate the influence of economic issues on the continuance of ethnic

conflict. However, no one will deny that the process of federalization has shifted

attention away from necessary economic reforms. After two decades of economic

hardship, Belgium gained ground in the 1990s (Swenden, 2003 p. 14). However,

federalization has been expensive and during the reform process, politicians tended to

throw money at the regions and communities to ensure acquiescence. Huge economic

disparities do exist between the two linguistic groups. Flanders has successfully

modernized while Wallonia clings to failing industries and relies heavily on federal

support. Many districts of Wallonia have excessively high levels of unemployment.

Economic transfers southward are stipulated by the federal government, leading to

resentment and stereotyping from the South. Flanders tends to express the sentiment that

their economic growth is inhibited by undue restrictions on industry and investment

designed to prop up the ailing South; while Wallonia fears that they will be forced to

adopt Flanders‟ market friendly tactics at the expense of the worker. The federal

government cannot continue to devolve aspects of economic decision making, lacking

both the competences and the resources to do so. In 2007, Flemish politicians continued

to push for the devolution of competences for healthcare, social security and taxation.

This move was resisted by the Walloons fearing it would lead to an end of transfers

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which support the Walloon economy, a larger economic rift and an additional shift in

investment.

Some scholars view addressing problems of economic equality as key to

assuaging ethnic conflict. “If, however, the problem can be viewed as one involving

economic inequality, a solution is possible, given the limits of a country's economic

resources, and its citizens' will to reverse chronic economic disparities” (Morris Hale,

1997 p. 13). However, others, like Keating and Fraga emphasize the permanent nature

of ethnic conflict and the pitfalls of policy making. “State policies aimed at combating

the current causes of majority-minority group conflict will not only prove ineffective

after a relatively short period, but they may feed new, emerging causes” (Fraga, et al

1992 p. 11). Attempts to address economic inequality that is fueling discontent among

one group may lead to charges of favoritism among the other. While in some societies

ethnic conflict decreases during prolonged periods of economic prosperity, it cannot be

relied upon to quell problems indefinitely (Fraga, et al 1992 p. 12). Economic success

may embolden demands for autonomy or independence, as it has in Flanders.

Hooghe considers the emphasis on economic issues excessive, finding that

territorial conflict escalated in the 1960s, a period of unprecedented prosperity. In the

late 1970s and early 1980s, a period characterized by stagnation, high unemployment

and deficit spending, ethnic conflict once again permeated Belgian society (Hooghe,

2004 p. 81). However, it would perhaps be better to expand our attention beyond

numbers and statistics to the perception of economic wellbeing.

While scholars once thought that regionalism was spurred by economic

underdevelopment, the cases of relatively wealthy Catalonia, the Basque country and

Flanders show that this is not necessarily the case. “Both underdevelopment and

superior economic performance are invoked as grounds for complaining about the

center” (Majone, 1990 p. 72). Perhaps we should shift our attention from economic

statistics to the values and perceptions that they represent. In Belgium, Walloons and

Flemings are engaged in a competition for political dominance, economic superiority

and government resources. The values placed on significant socio-economic norms

diverge in substantial ways. Walloons seek to remedy their economic problems while

Flanders seeks recognition of its historical status and freedom to employ free market

economics. Wallonia began advocating autonomy as Flanders gained power. They

feared that in a unitary state, their voice may be cancelled out by those in economically

and demographically powerful Flanders. Not only are these objectives difficult to

- 102 -

reconcile, but they permeate social relations. Walloons are perceived by Flanders as

being lazy while Flemings are considered to be excessively capitalistic.

Paradoxically, it was economic differences that kept the Belgian state together in

the face of severe political crisis. In 1989, Belgium faced a dire crisis. The government

had been beset by economic recession, political scandals and the rise of the extreme

right. At this point, a split seems preferable to the constant conflict. However, it did not

occur because of important financial considerations. While European integration

progressed, the free flow of goods was not yet developed enough to compensate for the

loss of the Walloon market for Flemish goods. The public debt was, and remains today,

enormous, and that burden would have fallen upon taxpayers in both countries.

Walloons would also have seen an end to transfers to prop up its ailing health and

pension systems. In true Belgian style, these issues persist today: Flemings resent

transfers made southward, and while the public debt has shrunk, the majority of the debt

burden falls upon wealthier Flanders. While goods can and do move freely throughout

the European Union, Wallonia is still the number one buyer of Flemish goods. As will

be discussed later, it was primarily economic disputes rather than cultural or linguistic

issues that caused government formation to grind to a halt in the summer of 2007.

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From Consociationalism to Federalism: What Remains

Despite seemingly irreconcilable differences, the Belgian state has proven

resilient by forming governments, engaging in European affairs, ensuring economic

performance and preventing an outbreak of violence or secessionism. It is enabled by its

unique political system in which principles of mutual vetoes and elite bargaining are

carried out under the auspices of what Fitzgerald defines as a consociationalist-federalist

system and Deshouwer describes as extreme federalism.

As Daniel Elazar explained, consociationalism has a limited lifespan. It is natural

that as a modern democracy develops, certain consociationalist aspects will have to be

abandoned or adapted to ensure economic and political efficiency and democratic

accountability. However, consociationalism and the formal federalism that typically

replaces it share several important characteristics (Elazar, 1991 p. 24). Belgium, once

the poster child for consociationalism, now possesses federalist institutions which are

designed to moderate conflict while its political elites operate using the principles of

consociationalism that remain deeply engrained in the Belgian political system. Scholars

have identified several consociationalist mechanisms that are present in modern Belgian

society, including the emphasis on power sharing and the presence of mutual vetoes to

ensure the protection of each community, an emphasis on proportionality and parity in

government coalitions (Deschouwer, 2002 p. 159).

As discussed in Chapter 2, consociationalism and federalism share several

important aspects. Both devices are non-majoritarian devices, thus suited for societies in

which cleavages, whether ethnic, religious or ideological are severe. As we will see in

this chapter, these political systems rely heavily on elites and may create a disconnect

between the political and social spheres. They also share several important weaknesses,

including a reliance on elite bargaining rather than popular participation and vetoes

which can foster political inertia.

Swenden argues that the emphasis on compromise and mutual vetoes has

resulted in a situation in which the “Belgian center is more confederal than federal due

to consociationalist mechanisms” (2006 p. 205). Each group possesses a veto that can

bring any policy formation to a halt (Mnookin, 2007). The devolution of competences

has expanded to such an extent that the regions see themselves as politically,

economically and legislatively viable. “the more successful a multination federal system

is in accommodating national minorities, the more it will strengthen the sense that these

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minorities are separate peoples with inherent rights of self-government, whose

participation in the larger country is conditional and revocable” (Kymlicka, 2001 p.

115).

Deschouwer contests the idea that Belgium is and was a consociationalist

society, defined by political stability, despite plurality. He concludes that upon

examination of the characteristics of postwar Belgium, one must agree that

"consociationalism is thus not a constant feature of Belgian post-war politics. The

picture one gets is very mixed, with fairly long periods of crisis and attempts to solve

them in a majoritarian, non-consociational way. Only when the crisis intensifies do

elites opt for consociational devices (Deschouwer, 2006 p. 898). In the latest crisis,

consociationalist mechanisms are still in place but Flanders has shown itself

increasingly willing to flex its political muscle to spur change.

Consociational mechanisms that persist are due to path dependency. To solve

religious and social issues, Belgium relied on consociationalist principles. “When a

pattern of conflict resolution, in this case consociationalism, has existed in a country for

decades, it becomes part of the country‟s political culture. Therefore, this pattern of

conflict resolution is difficult to break up, and tends to remain the guiding line even

when new types of conflicts emerge" (Pilet, 2005 p. 408).

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Belgian Federalism Defined

Federalism has been successful in Belgium. Since the 1990s, political formations

have been remarkably stable once the herculean task of governing coalitions is

complete. However, it may be considered too successful. Political actors “routinely and

systematically present more federalism as the means to put emerging scandals to rest,”

often overlooking the possibility of more effective and less costly solutions

(Maesschalk, Van de Walle 2006 p. 1014). Johanne Poirier identifies several

characteristics of Belgian federalism.

1. It is a centrifugal process and devolution is likely to continue;

2. It is bipolar, reforms being spurred by actions by the two primary language

groups;

3. It is multipolar, while two language groups are in contention, numerous federal

and federated entities exist, including Brussels.

4. The competences of the federal government, the regions and the community may

overlap and will require cooperation. Numerous relationships can take place.

5. Belgian federation is asymmetrical. The Flemish regions and communities are

fused, while the Francophone community, which includes Brussels and the

Walloon community, is not. It is completely separate and cooperation is

complicated.

6. Belgium federalism is based on extremely intricate designs and veiled in

ambiguity. This has necessitated a reliance on complex and formal mechanisms

for cooperation.

Poirier, 2002 p. 25.

Multilevel Governance

Deschouwer speaks of an extreme federalism. The federal level has been nearly

emptied, its powers ceded to the regions, communities, and in some cases, the European

Union. He attributes this to the dual party system in which no party operates throughout

the whole country, leaving the center defenseless against further regionalist attacks

(1998 p. 135). “Each [political actor] has the tendency to defend the periphery rather

than the center” (van Haute 2007 p. 11). The de-Belgification of the party system

“prevented the Belgian population from showing their views on the linguistic conflict.

- 106 -

Although they can still choose between Catholic and Liberal Party viewpoints, and even

between more or less regionalist parties, they generally cannot choose between the

Flemish and Walloon point of view" (Eatwell, 1997 p. 44).

While "society, parties and institutions are neatly split along the linguistic

borderline” policy making is not so neatly divided (Deschouwer, 2006 p. 908). Despite

strong centrigual forces, substate units are rarely able to act unilaterally “it often

happens that another authority has crucial policy instruments, that one government‟s

action interferes with the competencies of other levels, or that externalities are created”

(Hooghe, 2004 p. 75). While this spurs cooperation, it can also bring subunits into direct

conflict. “And still some actors have to bridge the division at the elite level and need to

do so in a consociational, in a non-majoritarian way" (Deschouwer, 2006 p. 908).

Belgium embodies the ultimate in multilevel governance, although perhaps not

exactly as intended by scholars. Not only has the federal government been deprived of

competences, but it has been deprived of exclusively federal politicians as well. Parties,

and party elites are regionally based, although they occupy regional and federal, and

often local and European positions (Deschouwer, 1999 p. 103). “Federal representatives

act as agents of their language communities because they stand for monolingual parties”

(Swenden, 2006 p. 227).

In typical federalist democracies, politicians pay their dues at the regional or

state level in hopes of rising to the national level. In 1995, the formation of directly

elected regional parliaments with increased powers took place. MPs which held offices

in both were forced to choose in which body they would continue to serve. A large

majority chose to serve on the regional level (Stolz ,2003 p. 237). Power is now

concentrated with the regions and the communities. The federal level is now hollowed.

it is no longer as politically advantageous to serve in the Senate. (Hooghe, 1995 p. 142).

This has created a personal political incentive amongst politicians to push for additional

devolution of competences.

In order to gain control over the institutional context of their careers, they should

be interested in a high degree of institutional autonomy for their region – the

autonomy to shape and reshape political institutions within the confines of the

region according to their career interests. Such an interest in institutional

autonomy may go hand in hand with demands for autonomous competencies in

the policy-making process (increasing the power and prestige of regional

positions), yet it is not necessarily linked to it

- 107 -

Stolz, 2003 p. 225.

Belgium lacks clear demarcation between federal and regional party levels and the

constant level hopping that occurs leads to decreased democratic accountability

(Swenden, 2006 p. 170-1). While multilevel governance is lauded for its connection to

the people, Belgian voters feel increasingly disconnected from the elite-driven political

process, expressing their dislike for the secret negotiations and bargaining that occurs by

disengaging from politics and supporting radical parties.

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Institutions, Mechanisms and Fundamental Principles

The nature of Belgian conflict is peaceful but pervasive. Politicians have used ethnic

antagonism to win votes for decades, hence two separate political cultures have

developed. Deeply divided societies like Belgium do not have the natural cooperation

that others do. Keating explains that

Most systems have evolved norms and conventions as to how actors will

behave and how their demands are to be limited. This is easier in culturally

homogeneous societies, where there is trust and shared identity. The irony is

then that those societies in which federalism is most needed, i.e. divided

societies without trust and goodwill, are those in which it is most difficult for

it to work

Keating, 2007 p. 38.

Institutions must therefore take the place of a shared sense of purpose and identity.

Poirier attributes the implementation of formal, highly developed mechanisms to the

fear that "cooperation would not occur spontaneously in this new federalism of

„dissociation‟. It is thus argued that the degree of suspicion which gave rise to the

federalist movement required the provision of explicit cooperative mechanisms (Poirier,

2002 p. 31). Governmental relations are therefore highly formal, a result of the

“antagonistic nature of Belgian politics” and a “distrust of political arrangements"

(Poirier, 2002 p. 24). Party elites are reluctant to give the appearance of camaraderie or

excessive cooperation which may fuel the claims of ethnoregionalist parties.

The Role of the Legislature

The reform of 1970 had an important influence on the composition and

functioning of the parliament. Representatives were asked to choose and represent one

of the two language groups. This move assumed “that the country is [was] divided into

language groups and that each language group has [had] its own elites, its own

representatives" (Deschouwer, 2006 p. 902). This inhibited the development or

maintenance of multiple identities. It also ensured that politicians must appeal only to

their own linguistic group, not to the majority of the population.

The Belgian Senate, a hybrid of the American Senate and the German Bundesrat is

composed in the following way:

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Groups Composition

Directly elected MPs 25 Flemish

15 Francophone

Delegates from the regional and

community councils

10 Flemish

10 Francophone

1 German speaker

Appointed by the directly elected MPs and

delegates

6 Flemish

4 Francophone

The Senate deals with constitutional reform and legislation involving the

organization of the state (Hooghe, 2003 p. 89). DeWitte describes the Senate as the

“forum of expression of subnational interests” (De Witte, 2006 p. 205), rather than an

institution that represents the Belgian state as a whole. The Senate has actually ceded

responsibility in several key areas. De Winter and Dumont describe it as a “reflection

chamber,” where federal and regional/community levels meet and interact. (De Winter,

Dumont 2006 p. 964).

Federalization also led to a reduction in the size of the House and the Senate,

effectively reducing the size of the national political class while creating a new class

active at the regional and community level. This class has all the constructs of a state,

with a minister-president, a civil service and a system to finance parties (Brans, de

Winter, 2003 p. 48). MPs operate in an almost schizophrenic environment. Parties in

the federal government must play the fairly majoritarian game of regional politics

(including the request for even more autonomy) and the consociational game of federal

politics simultaneously (van Haute, 2007 p. 11). Constrained by their commitment to the

regional party line and delicate coalition agreements, they seek out ways to prove that

the are responsive to increasingly skeptical voters, they engage in local politicking,

including “case work, local office-holding, pork-barrel politics and local symbolic

representation” (De Winter, Dumont 2006 p. 967).

Formal Mechanisms

Several mechanisms exist to ensure consensus on issues involving both linguistic

groups when such debates take place in the legislative forum. The alarm bell procedure,

while seldom employed, is wielded as a political tool. When 25% of the MPs of a given

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language group, (the Francophones most likely, considering demographics) feel that a

given proposal is against their interest, they can activate the alarm bell which would

suspend debates and put the matter before the federal government. While never used and

rarely threatened, the procedure is an important tool for Francophones but a dangerous

one. Should they enact the procedure, it might be viewed as yet another case of a

minority suppressing the will of a majority. When the federal or regional governments

signal a conflict, the task of solving the problem falls to the Concentration Committee.

Composed of the federal prime minister, five ministers from the federal government and

six members of the regional and community governments, the committee operates on

the principle of linguistic parity. The Committee has sixty days to solve a conflict.

Should they fail to do so, the suspension of discussion is lifted and the conflict remains

unsolved (Deschouwer, 1998 p. 136). While both these mechanisms are constitutionally

enshrined, they are seldom used. Elites prefer the politically safer and private

negotiations to legislative actions which may symbolize outright conflicts.

The Principle of Parity

The principle of parity and mutual checks is a traditional consociationalist

technique, employed “when parties are not keen to vacate a central policy area."

Belgium first adopted this tactic during the school war to deal with the religious

cleavage. Deputy Ministers and ministers were from different pillars to ensure balance

(Hooghe, 2003 p. 92).

As Flanders has gained economic and demographic strength, many nationalists

feel that the Belgian system, with its reliance on parity, fails to reflect the true reality of

Belgian society. This leads to the rejection of the anti-majoritarian principles under

which Belgium has existed. "Demands first cast in terms of parity can ripen into

demands for priority or exclusivity" (Horowitz, 1985 p. 197).

While the principle of parity, especially in appointments to the political sphere or

civil service, is widely accepted, Horowitz finds that it is rarely satisfying to those

involved. Minority and majority groups both claim that they are underrepresented.

(Horowitz, 1985 p. 225). In Belgium, Francophones resent their lack of influence,

especially as the prime minister usually comes from Flanders, while the Flemish realize

they have been shortchanged when demographics are considered.

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While the Constitution demands that the principle of parity be respected in the

cabinet and the distribution of administrative posts, this is mostly symbolic. Ethnic

conflict is unlikely to occur in this sphere. It is, however, likely to occur in the Senate.

Therefore, principles of power-sharing and mechanisms which prevent one group acting

unilaterally in a way that damages the interest of the others are the most important.

Flemish nationalists originally advocated equality for their language, culture and role in

political life.

Anti-Majoritarianism

All scholars of ethnic conflict emphasis that conflicts are never truly solved but

can be accommodated peacefully. It is up to the institutions to “allow conflicts to

formulate, find expression and be managed in a sustainable way" (Reilly 2001 p. 5).

Belgium has relied on anti-majoritarian mechanisms in decision-making for decades.

When Francophones were faced with a Flemish demographic and economic majority,

the leadership instituted principles of equality in governing bodies, like the cabinet.

While this is viewed by many as ideal, it may perpetuate conflict. "Unlike ranked ethnic

groups, which are ascriptively defined components of a single society, parallel groups

are themselves incipient whole societies and indeed may formerly have constituted more

or less autonomous whole societies" (Horowitz, 1985 p. 23). While a majority of

representatives within the Senate come from Flanders, the system of representation

requires support from both sides. Should a majority attempt to enact a measure dealing

with linguistic or community without the support of both sides, safety procedures exist

to slow this process.

While these alarm bell and arbitration procedures are rarely employed, the threat

of their use forces compromise. However some scholars suggest that the anti-

majoritarian principles on which the Belgian state relies have played a role in

perpetuating conflict. “Even if ethnic competition is "objectively" fair, it is likely to be

perceived as unfair whenever it occurs within structures that generate grievances that

spoil relations between competitors” (Belanger, Pinard 1991 p. 449). Consociational

mechanisms are viewed as serving the interests of the Francophone community and

create a situation in which the central state is dominated by the periphery (De Witte,

2006 p. 205).

The anti-majoritarian tradition has come under attack due to the lack of of

democratic accountability and the unfair advantage held by Francophones. Because of

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various formal mechanisms, “the francophone political parties have considerable

leverage in the national parliament to ensure that their interests are taken into account in

any negotiated deal” (Mnookin 2007). Reforms are typically carried out outside of the

general political system. The Parliament and general government were usually isolated

from the reform process. Negotiations took place between the main parties rather than in

the Parliament (van Haute, 2007 p. 10). Flemings would prefer that debates over

reforms and ethnic relations take place within the governmental sphere, especially the

Parliament where they hold a majority. Francophones insist that reforms take place in

institutional forums (van Haute, 2007 p. 13). When Yves Leterme, the politician

responsible for government formation following the June 2007 elections presented his

conditions shortly before abdicating his role, constitutional reform approved by a

majority rather than all political actors was one of them. This was unacceptable to the

Francophone Christian-Democrats who feared ceding control over the process.

Belgium political elites relied on the survival of the traditional pillar system.

While competitors did emerge, Christian Democrats, Liberals and Socialists had the

advantage, possessing enormous social capital due to the ability to ensure the

distribution of services and funds and appoint civil servants (Maesschalk, Van de Walle

2006 p. 1007). However, as the twentieth century came to a close, the traditional system

and society was faced with a shock. Throughout the 1990s, new parties on both the right

and the left entered the political arena with surprising success (Deschouwer, 2002 p.

167). Scandals and the appearance of corruption and cronyism were decried by youth

who no longer identified or relied upon traditional pillars (Craeybeckx, et al 2004 p.

275). The accountability of the Belgian state was questioned. In addition to threats from

upstarts, the traditional system faced defection. The system in which the three parties

competed fiercely but cooperated when necessary to retain their grip on power was

broken. The Flemish Liberal Party adopted a new name and attacked its former partners,

rallying against patronism, clientelism and the deeply embedded system of social

supports (Deschouwer, 2002 p. 167). However, the traditional parties retain their

influence, despite the fact that Belgian citizens themselves are increasingly disillusioned

by the political elite. Researchers found that in 1961, 97.1% of Belgian votes went to

traditional parties. In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the share of the electorate fell

to 76.1. While this was part of a larger European trend, the percentage change was twice

the average (Mair, 1998 p. 85). This disillusionment has led to a shift in identities,

towards the localities and the region.

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The Price of Devolution

The Belgian system does not allow for the drastic reforms necessary for political

and economic progress. Problems were solved by disbursing funds (Maesschalk, Van de

Walle 2006 p. 1011). As a result, Belgium‟s path towards federalism has been

particularly expensive. Funds distributed to one region must be matched in the other.

This has led to unnecessary projects and the emphasis on parity has failed to reduce

tensions. “the Flemish object to evenly divided allocations while contributing more than

one-half of the tax base. In a sense, the meticulous pursuit of equity has provided the

fodder for further demands for regional autonomy" (Bruening, Ishiyama, 1998 p. 118)

Often, the government seeks to ensure acquiescence and peace by giving each

group control over the issues that matter most to them, an effective if expensive

technique (Swenden, 2003 p. 14).

Belgian conflict brokers traditionally applied this technique to the allocation of

ministerial portfolios. They often gave big expenditure departments like defence,

public works, or public housing to Walloon Socialist ministers, who could

thereby create jobs for the declining Walloon economy. They allocated

agriculture and culture to Flemish Christian democrats, who wanted to satisfy

their sizeable rural constituency or felt pressure from cultural nationalists.

Hooghe, 2003 p. 91.

However, the government has reached a point in which there is not much more to give.

Flemings continue to advocate the division of the social security system and of

healthcare; while Walloons claim that their demands for autonomy have been satisfied

and fear the economic burden should they be forced to take on the administration of

these systems.

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The Importance of the Party System

The Belgian pillar system was not originally divided along ethnic lines, as

discussed in previous chapters. While the Belgian pillar system has been besieged by

protest parties and alternative forms of identification, the traditional parties remain

socially and politically important. Often, party affiliation is necessary to secure some

public goods and employment. Instead of ensuring the maintenance of control by the

pillars, this process of clientelism has been increasingly viewed as corrupt, sparking

anger amongst those disadvantaged by their lack of participation. In addition, the youth

no longer strongly identify with the pillars.

There is significant variation in the success of the traditional parties according to

regions. Swenden posits this is because a “party‟s general ideology corresponds with the

socioeconomic or religious profile of most of the voters who live in that particular

region” (Swenden, 2006 p. 145). This is true for Belgium. The Socialist Party in

Wallonia has traditionally found its greatest support in Wallonia and continues to do so

because of the need for a substantial economic aid to both individuals and industries.

The pillar system which defined Belgium‟s political scene shortly after the country

came into being is still in existence although it has adopted a linguistic and ethnic

flavor. "Belgium‟s pillar parties neatly follow the demarcation lines of these territorially

defined subcultures….no pillar party represents more than one subculture"

(Deschouwer, 1999 p. 104).

The rise of ethnoregionalism challenged the traditional position of the so-called

pillar parties. However, liberals, Christian-Democrats and socialists worked, sometimes

in tandem, to retain control over the political process. Ruling elites consented to

federalist reforms only when they knew that it was necessary to retain their influence.

(Hooghe, 2003 p. 93). The parties were unlikely to concede to a political shift which

would essentially write them out of office. They enacted reforms from a relatively

strong position.

Assured of their own bases of support, party leaders often met in extra-

parliamentary bargaining sessions to negotiate consociational and neo-

corporatist agreements. These negotiations could bypass parliament and

guarantee the stability of the system by limiting the possibly destabilizing

involvement of unwanted parliamentary actors or the public

(Newman, 1996 p. 60).

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The Christian Democrats, Socialists and Liberals have retained their

organizations despite challenges. They control important aspects of political and social

life. The influence of the traditional pillars persists, despite reduced support. They play a

role in the composition of electoral rolls; civil servants are often selected from pillar

organizations. “the spokesmen of pillar organizations, agencies of socio-economic

representation, governmental bodies, mixed or quasi-governmental agencies, and

political parties participate continuously in the decision-making process" (Billiet, 1997

p. 67). “The citizens are mainly linked to their pillar organisations and parties by means

of patronage rather than by ideological mobilisation" (Deschouwer, 2006 p. 897). In

Flanders, the Catholic pillar is comprised of a large number of cultural institutions,

hospitals and health insurance providers, schools, trade unions and youth movements.

(Billiet, 1997 p. 66).

The Fragmentation of Political Parties

In Belgium, the political system appears at first glance to be highly unstable.

Until the 1980s, governments survived their terms and political parties exchanged power

frequently. However, the elites remain an influential presence, often serving under

multiple governments, sometimes in the very same positions. This was historically true

as well, "although there were 13 cabinets between 1944 and 1961, there were only eight

Prime Ministers, four Ministers of Foreign Affairs and seven Ministers of Finance"

(Deschouwer, 2006 p. 896). This allows for continuity but also PERPETUATES the

perception that voting does not actual result in real change. Belgium leads Europe in

party fragmentation. It has averaged 6.9 parliamentary parties since 1968 and the

average government is formed by 4.4 parties. This results in an extremely long process

of government formation. (De Winter, Dumont 2006 p. 958).

The Problem of Government Formation

The lack of a pan-Belgian party system creates serious obstacles for the state and

sometimes requires complicated maneuvering. Keating et al cite the lack of visibility at

the regional level of policy making as the most important issue. As part of an attempt to

ensure the congruency of regional and federal coalitions, elections at both levels were

held at the same time. The parties "present the regional and the federal levels as a single

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political game, as one single reservoir of power for policy making" (2003 p. 80). In

1995 and 1999 this resulted in the formation of symmetrical and congruent coalitions

which “an institutional environment very close to the one of the old unitary state”

(Deschouwer, 2006 p. 907). The result is a situation strongly favorable to existing

political elites and the maintenance of the status quo.

Intergovernmental and federal intra-governmental relations will again be a

matter of the same small group of party elites, striking an agreement with each

other to take on board the issues on which they can find solutions and to keep

away the matters on which no agreement can be found”

Deschouwer, 2006 p. 908.

It is in this context that the consociationalist flavor of Belgian politics is most

pronounced, a country which relies on, in the words of Arend Lijphart, an “elite cartel to

turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy”

Government formation has always been rife with conflict. Parties split along

linguistic lines and geographic disparities when it came to support for the parties.

Governments must be formed from the electoral leaders and Flemings were left

wondering about the presence of Socialists when they voted overwhelmingly for

conservatives. The system may be flawed in that it assumes that electoral movements

are the same at both levels. This is not necessarily true, as “the parties in the two party

system move in different directions.” It has become increasingly difficult to form a

government that reflects the expectations of the voters, resulting in a situation in which

“there is no direct electoral control and sanctioning of the central government.

(Deschouwer, 1998 p. 130). When the federal and regional elections coincided,

government formation was easier. Now that those elections are held at different times, it

is even more complicated.

The federalization of Belgium coincided with the rise of ethnic nationalism.

Certain nationalist groups are considered too radical to be incorporated into the

government. As a result, government formation has become increasingly complex. De

Winter and Dumont found that from 1946 to 1966, government formation took only 20

days. In elections held from 1968 to 2003, the process took 43 days on average.

However, once the difficult process of coalition building is formed, governments since

1987 have been remarkably stable. (De Winter, Dumont 2006 p. 958). These numbers

are trumped by the crisis that followed the June 2007 federal elections. In December of

2007, a government had still not been formed and the minister in charge of formation

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resigned in frustration. Belgian governments often do not reflect the demands and

desires of voters. Parties that lose are more likely to be included in coalitions than those

who win (De Winter, Dumont 2006 p. 959).

In 2006, Peters outlined several characteristics of Belgian politics which would

challenge the success and viability of the government. The Belgian party system has

always been highly fragmented but the success of Vlaams Belang, which is subject to a

cordon sanitaire in coalition formation, has complicated matters. (Peter, 2006 p. 1089).

Within the Flemish parliament especially, government coalitions will have to seek

support from far outside their ideological family, leading to formations that do not seem

to reflect the wishes of the people. Because of the electoral success of the Flemish far

right “unusual and large coalitions have to be formed to keep Vlaams Blok out of

office” cooperation will become more difficult. (Jagers, Walgrave, 2006 p. 2).

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Does a Belgian Society Exist?

Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different

languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of representative

government, cannot exist. … The same incidents, the same acts, the same system of

government, affect them in different ways; and each fears more injury to itself from the

other nationalities than from the common arbiter, the state. Their mutual antipathies are

generally much stronger than jealousy of the government.

John Stuart Mill

Yves Leterme was asked by a reporter to sing the Belgian national anthem.

Instead of singing of “invincible unity,” he launched an appeal to the “children of the

fatherland,” in fact, France‟s anthem La Marseillaise. While Rosa Montero, a Spanish

journalist, praised Leterme for his lack of nationalism, writing “Imagine a country free

of all cheap patriotism, of all that nationalist fervor that has caused so much bloodshed

along the centuries. A world where the fact that you are born in such and such a corner

of the world is not presented as a personal achievement” She was correct in her

assumption that Leterme, someone who had defined Belgium as an “accident of history”

did not possess the fervent nationalism of many European leaders. While Belgium is

often viewed as a post-national state, nationalism, sometimes extreme, lurks within its

borders. If one looked at Flemings and Walloons individually, one could argue that

Belgium is made up of some highly nationalistic parts and this nationalism is channeled

against the Belgian state, a phenomenon which Hooghe describes as asymmetrical,

rooted in Flanders rather than Wallonia and Brussels.

Empirical evidence suggests that despite the inability on the part of the Belgian

population to sing the national anthem or identify the event that precipitated Belgian

independence, Belgian national identity may be growing. Despite regionalization,

Belgian identity has increased since the 1980s. “The development of regional

governance institutions in Belgium has not gone hand in hand with a deepening of

regional identity” Multiple identities can be and are held by Belgian citizens, Hooghe

describes regional and national identities as “not exclusive but complementary” (2004 p.

65). However, a lack of widespread regional nationalism has not inhibited the increase

of nationalist conflict. Political movements often represent a small but vocal minority.

(Hooghe, 2004 p. 66). Before 1986, most Flemings identified with Flanders first. Since

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then, Belgium has formed the basis of identity. (Billiet, et al. 2006 p. 916). (De Winter,

1998 p. 42).

The Development of Divergent Identities

For quite some time, Belgian society functioned very well despite its bilingual

nature. It was led by Francophone political elites. The agrarian and industrial classes of

Wallonia spoke Walloon or Picard, but under French rule, underwent increasing

francification. Flanders, characterized by rural underdevelopment and a lack of a

standardized language was unable to combat this dominance. Ambitious Flemings

adopted the French language as a key to social and economic mobility. However, once

Flanders began to assert its economic and demographic influence, Flemish language

institutions, schools and media developed. The education system was divided and

parents were often restricted in their school choice to avoid increasing francification.

This impaired cultural, political and economic exchange, making total separation seem

less implausible.

As a result, the linguistic borders became increasingly entrenched. The political

leaders who emerged in the 1960s and 1970s were educated in Flemish schools and

spoke Flemish as a matter of principle, although they were often fluent in French as

well. However, out of these borders arose two separate societies with divergent interests,

ideologies and cultures. Flanders turned towards the Anglo-Saxon model, promoting

English-language education to achieve an economic edge. Francophones, never

particularly interested or proficient in Flemish, found themselves disadvantaged by laws

which required bilingualism in Brussels.

As a result "two different cultures have gradually emerged, with diverging social

sensitivities, fashions and customs. This trend towards cultural divergence was

institutionalised and, at the same time, enhanced by the subsequent reforms of the state"

(Billiet, et al. 2006 p. 914). The ideal Belgian citizen who would read a Francophone

paper in the morning and watch Flemish news at night has been replaced by a Fleming,

Walloon or Bruxellois who is almost wholly centered on his or her region, rarely

following or even attempting to understand the perspectives of other parties in the

federalist system.

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Flemish Nationalism as the Threat to Belgitude

Flanders has experienced significant ethnic mobilization. Many Flemish citizens

partake in social organizations and institutions that “act as agencies of cultural

reproduction of regionalist feelings” (De Winter, 1998 p. 42). Flanders has historically

aligned itself politically with Christian Democrats and has shown civic engagement with

Catholic auxiliary organizations and a Christian-democratic trade union. Keating et al

cite the electoral strength of the Christian-democratic party and the position of Christian

organizations operating within Flemish society despite the drop in popularity of

Christian Democrats. (Keating, et al 2003 p. 79). Flemings, who have fought to develop

and preserve their cultural identity tend to be more insular when faced with foreigners.

(Billiet, et al. 2006 p. 924). This has translated into electoral gains for the right.

Flemish nationalism draws from several segments. Stereotypically, the young,

undereducated male tends to support highly nationalistic parties. However, Vlaams

Belang also draws from the children of Flemish nationalists who fought for political

representation in the 1960s and 1970s. (Hooghe, 2004 p. 83). Support from this segment

may diminish as in unilingual, prosperous Flanders they are unlikely to face

discrimination and may be turned off by Vlaams Belang‟s overt xenophobia. “Unlike

their grandparents or even their parents, young adult Dutch-speakers who live in

Flanders cannot reasonably invoke any discriminatory practices which may be linked to

the language which they speak" (Swenden,2003 p. 15).

Keating found that although Flanders expresses a greater level of support for

decentralization than Belgium as a whole, there exists a significant segment of the

population that supports a return to centralization. However, elites have failed to reflect

that change in public opinion. (Keating, 2004 p. 87). This is a result of a process that

“estranges national politics from the electorate, which has only a rather distant control

over the whole process” weakening federal culture. (Keating, 2007 p. 21).

Staunch pro-Belgian sentiment or “Belgitude” does exist. However, the source

of it shows the vast social divide between the North and South. In Flanders, progressive

political actors support the continued existence of the Belgian state. Among Walloons,

support is concentrated amongst traditional citizens, especially older ones, who

remember and perhaps yearn for the days of Francophone dominance, both political and

economic. (Hooghe, 2004 p. 85).

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The Role of the Monarchy

While distrust of politicians and the political system is rampant, Belgium's

monarchy has remained a point of unity. In a study conducted in 2003, 52 percent of

Belgians agreed with the statement posed by surveyors "we should be happy that we

have a King because the country would fall apart otherwise" (Billiet et al. 2006 p. 919).

In a remarkable reversal of circumstances, Francophones whose vociferous protests

forced the abdication of King Albert following World War II, now look to the King as a

source of unity. Jaaks Billet and his fellow researchers discovered significant regional

discrepancies however. In Flanders 43 percent of those polled agreed that the King is a

source of unity while in Wallonia 63 percent agreed. They attribute to this to the fact

that autonomist sentiment is much more widespread in Flanders than Wallonia. (2006 p.

919). The King, anxious to ensure the unity and survival of the Belgian state, rejects

autonomist calls and speaks out in favor of Belgian unity, leading Flemish nationalists

to believe that he panders to Francophones. These different approaches were clear when

Crown Prince Phillipe criticized extremist Vlaams Belang. Flemish parties condemned

him for breaking the royal tradition of silence on political matters while Francophones

praised him for his involvement. (Erk, 2005 p. 500).

The Disconnect between the Belgian Public and Politicians

Belgian citizens, broadly characterized by distrust of traditional leaders, have

become increasingly apathetic to a government, disillusioned by the appearance of

inefficiency and clientelism, and angry with the federal government‟s failure to respond

to pressing social and economic concerns. They have become increasingly radicalized,

turning towards newer parties, including environmental parties and to the extreme right.

These votes, whether originating out of a sense of protest or a sense of ideology, are

nevertheless highly influential in structuring the Belgian state.

As a result of decreased bilingualism, political isolation and social distrust, a

huge gap has emerged between Flemings, Walloons and Bruxellois. However, a lack of

affiliation with the Belgian state and the impetus towards further devolution has perhaps

been overstated. The Belgian populace as a whole, whether in Flanders and Wallonia,

has moved away from regionalist identification, towards stronger affiliations with class,

locality, the Belgian state and Europe as a whole. Yet, regionalist parties and demands

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for regionalization persist. Research has shown that despite the predominance of

demands for reforms on the basis of a need for regional autonomy, citizens are

becoming actually less attached to the regions. They are, however, demanding changes

in employment, economic and social policy which political elites must satisfy. The fact

that the federal center has been divested of these competences by both the subnational

units and the supranational European Union can only fuel resentment of the center

which is unable to respond to voters‟ demands.

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The Most Europeans of the Europeans: Belgium in the EU

For Belgium, as for several states, the European Union is a way not only to forget an

unhappy history, but also to smother the internal difficulties of the present

Barker 1998.

Europe is OK and Europe can always go on. In the meantime, Belgium is dealing with

its own problems

Deshouwer, Van Assche 2005 p. 8

The Most European of the Europeans

While its neighbors are plagued with intense and divisive debates about the role

of the European Union, Belgium has remained staunchly committed to a highly

integrated Union. Criticisms that do emerge mainly focus on the fact that treaties and

conferences have not gone far enough. The public is remarkably free of the

Euroskepticism which plagues France and the Netherlands. It is a result, some argue, of

wider disillusionment with the Belgian political system which is dominated by elites and

their interests. This, Beyers and Trondal assert, manifests itself in two different ways,

inspiring calls for greater devolution of the Belgian state, but also facilitating the

transfer of competencies to the European Union. (2006 p. 936).

Even nationalist parties, which in other European countries tend to reject the

process of integration which infringes on sovereignty, adopt pro-European standpoints.

The ethnoregionalist Vlaamsunie originally resisted European integration, hoping to

achieve an independent state. However, as the Community began to take on additional

competences and gain economic strength, VU adopted a pro-European stance, believing

that “Flanders could more easily achieve full independence yet still prosper

economically and remain integrated in the international political community within the

framework of a politically and economically united Europe” (De Winter 1998 p. 35).

“Not all of them vote in favour, but those voting against use more or less the same

arguments as those voting in favour" (Deshouwer, Van Assche 2005 p. 11). Voices of

dissent often criticize treaties for not going far enough.

Interestingly, Belgium‟s path for devolved federalism roughly mirrored the

development and integration of the European Union. “Flemish demands for federal

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reforms have followed the schedule of economic, political, and monetary integration of

the European Community” (Lefebvre, 2003 p. 128).

Michael Keating argues that Belgium is uniquely suited to European integration,

as

history has left to Belgium a relatively weak sense of national identity and that,

unlike in France, elites failed to build a unified and culturally prestigious nation

state, so that the transition to a post-sovereign political order in Europe has been

less painful as a result

2004 p. 53.

While support for European integration is nearly universal, the reasons for strong pro-

European sentiment, like most policy issues, are subject to regional variation. Flanders

views the Union as a positive force than may spur further devolution, while Wallonia

expects European funds to revitalize the region. (Deshouwer, Van Assche 2005 p. 19).

Centrifugal and Centripetal Forces

Some see Europe as the glue that holds Belgium together while others feel that it

introduces additional centrifugal forces, that the federal government is being hollowed

from above and below. Many scholars, including Donald Horowitz argue that federalism

is best suited to competitive situations in which there are more than two religious, ethnic

or ideological groups engaged in conflict. The insertion of the European Union into the

Belgian political relationship may exacerbate existing problems or reduce them.

According to Liesbet Hooghe, Belgium‟s participation in the Union has had several

ramifications for Belgian federalism. It holds the country together by reducing the

expected benefits of separatism and “constrains policy divergences among Belgian

actors.” (Hooghe, 2004 p. 82-3). “Europeanisation mitigates or softens the dual nature

of Belgian federalism and it has stimulated a gradual development towards more

cooperative forms of formal and informal governance" (Beyers, Bursens 2006 p. 1075).

While Flemish nationalists speak of control over important issues like

immigration and economic policy, an independent Flanders or Wallonia would likely

face similar restrictions on its sovereignty. However, a very small state seems viable

within a European Union, effectively reducing the costs of separatism. (Hooghe, 2004 p.

82-3). Keating predicts that “As the Union strengthens, the Flemish movement will

strengthen its resources to be prepared for the eventual disappearance of the Belgian

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state” (Keating, 2004 p. 84). As discussed in the review of literature, the devolution of

powers and competences can allow a substate entity to take on the trappings of the state.

While this may undercut demands for secessionism at times, these regions realize that

the larger state is not necessary for economic and political viability. This is true for

Belgium, which has divested many powers to both the European Union and the regions

and communities that form the federal state. The participation of the substate units at the

European level may embolden the regions.

The Flemish community and the Walloon region especially have proved to be

viable administrations, capable of organizing society and economy as effectively

as the Belgian state. They could probably take care of their external relations as

efficaciously as the Belgian federal State, which can command only slightly

more resources within the context of the European Community

Hooghe, 1995 p. 136.

Even the far right, which in most member states tends to be skeptical of European

integration and even anti-Europe, may benefit; both the Front National and Vlaams Blok

gained legitimacy when they received seats in the European Parliament in 1989.

(Deshouwer, Van Assche 2005 p. 10). In addition to the increase in political profiles, it

put them into contact with other European populist movements.

Multilevel Governance and the European Union

While the European Union requires Belgium to adopt a unitary stance, Belgium

retains its dualist characteristics even when participating in European affairs and has

shown itself willing to forfeit its vote rather than force a compromise. The Directorate of

European Affairs, the so-called P11, coordinates Belgian positions taken in European

institutions. 25 participants from the all levels of government meet frequently. The

regions and community representatives were included following the treaty of

Maastricht. Decisions require consensus, ensuring that the federal and federated units

are accorded equal standing. However, this can create conflict as the units work to

protect their powers and leads to a situation in which theoretically, a small minority can

block progress. “In matters that fall within Community competences even the German-

speaking community – which accounts for roughly 65,000 German-speaking Belgians –

could theoretically block a decision" (Kovziridze, 2002 p. 137). Because Belgium must

speak and vote with one voice in the Council of Ministers, should they fail to reach

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consensus, Belgium would be unable to participate. (Beyers, Trondal 2006 p. 936). This

occurs fairly frequently, according to Kovziridze, as competences are often held

exclusively by the community and region. Each entity has different goals and means of

operation. To avoid outright internal conflict, the government may decide to avoid

taking a stance on a particular issue. (Kovziridze, 2002 p. 139).

The Council of Ministers, in which Belgium has five votes, proves to be the

most contentious area of interaction as Belgium is prohibited from splitting those votes

and must come to an agreement in order to act effectively within this body. (Hooghe,

1995 p. 146). While they must promote a Belgian line, according to Keating, they often

“use the opportunity to press their own concerns" (Keating, 2004 p. 156).

Elections to the European Parliament are determined according to linguistic

affiliation, rather than residence. Two constituencies were created, Flemish and

Francophone. Residents of Brussels were divided according to their primary language.

(Deschouwer, 2006 p. 903). Although the first direct elections took place in 1979, when

Belgium was just beginning its process of federalization, the voting regions were strictly

divided. There was no question of a multilingual election, a precursor of what was to

happen in statewide and regional elections. Belgium has 24 seats in the European

Parliament, one of which is reserved for the German-speaking community. Francophone

voters in Wallonia and Brussels elect nine, while Flemish voters elect fourteen.

(Deshouwer, Van Assche 2005 p. 8).

When seeking European funds and development assistance, the regions have

constitutional rights to participate at the European level. The Constitution allows the

regions to submit development plans directly to the Commission, while regions in all

other member states, besides Germany, must go through their national government.

(Balchin, et al 1999 p. 159).

However, conflicts at the EU level do exist. A significant portion of policy

competences has been devolved to regional and community authorities. At times, the

actions of the regions or communities can bring the Belgian state as a whole into

conflict with the ECJ. The federal state lacks the enforcement mechanisms to ensure

compliance. As the EU expands its input into social and cultural policy, conflicts are

likely to occur more frequently.

Certain European Union and European policies have threatened to upset the

delicate political balance. The Council of Europe‟s voluntary Charter on Regional and

Minority Languages has yet to be ratified in both France and Belgium. Belgium fears

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that should they sign the charter, which encourages the recognition and promotion of

minority languages, Francophones in the Flemish periphery of Brussels would assert

their rights, upsetting the fragile settlement. (Keating, 2007 p. 17).

While some speak of Belgians as the ideal Europeans, willing to sacrifice

nationalist attachments for the grand European project, “public opinion is more

characterised by indifference instead of articulated support or opposition" (Beyers,

Trondal 2006 p. 936). The public is positive towards Europe, perhaps because it has no

other choice, viewing its own government with distrust. Regions, protective of their hard

won responsibilities, may begin to feel threatened by the European Union‟s extension of

competences. Surveys show that while many Belgians push for the federal government

to cede control over taxation, social security and health care, they do not wish for the

European Union to be given these competences. Should Belgium experience economic

decline or an influx of outsiders, the Flemish far right could potentially mobilize against

the European Union, leading to the adoption of Euroskeptic or even anti-EU views.

(Deshouwer, Van Assche 2005 p. 5).

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The Problem of Brussels

Like a father who never files for divorce because he is unwilling to give up custody of a

child, many Flemings--who might otherwise favor independence--would prefer to stay in

an unsatisfying Belgian marriage, where the spouses are leading separate lives, than

give up Brussels

Mnookin 2007.

Brussels, like the EU it houses, has an interesting role in ethnic relations and the

survival of the Belgian state is debatable. Brussels, the “meeting point of the Flemish

and French communities” is also a site and symbol of considerable conflict. (Swenden,

2006 p. 258). Although many theories have been set forth on the division of Belgium,

the role of Brussels and its periphery have never been clearly addressed. The Manifesto

for an Independent Flanders in Europe argues that the two new countries which would

result from the division of Belgium should share responsibility for the city along with

the European Union. Others propose that Brussels should become the ultimate capital of

Europe, a free city supported by the European Union. (Mnookin, 2007). A Francophone

city in the heart of Flanders, Brussels has a highly international character, due to the

institutions and diplomats who have taken up residence there.

Neither side would cede control of Brussels easily. The failure to definitively

resolve the status of Brussels has perhaps held the country together. “Without Brussels,

an institutional hyphen in which the Flemish and French communities take a strong

interest, the case for two independent states, Flanders and Wallonia, could be made

more easily” (Swenden, 2006 p. 255).

In the largely homogenous territories of Flanders and Wallonia, ethnic conflict is

restricted to political jibs and the occasional vandalism of bilingual street signs.

However, in the periphery of Brussels, conflict is most salient. As the city grows,

Brussels natives and foreign diplomats have sought housing in the suburbs of Brussels,

which is Flemish territory and offers facilities only in Flemish. The Flemish view this

growing Francophone minority as a threat to territorial homogeneity and their control

over the area refer to Brussels as an “oil stain” (Newman, 1996 p. 60). Issues have

arisen over the treatment of these Francophones and have prompted a significant crisis

in Belgian politics which will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.

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CHAPTER SIX

THE FUTURE OF THE BELGIAN STATE

Bye-Bye Belgium?

December 2007

We are two different nations, an artificial state created as a buffer between big powers,

and we have nothing in common except a king, chocolate and beer

Filip Dewinter

Vlaams Belang

Living together in a one country is impossible if year after year the minority prevents

the majority to realize its most important desires

Het Laaste Nieuws

As this work neared completion, the Belgian state experienced a severe crisis

which threatened the long-term viability of the state.

Federal elections held in June 2007 failed to yield a clear leader, and coalition

talks were undermined by gaffes by the minister in charge of governmental formation

and demands from the Flemish community which Francophones in Wallonia and

Brussels deemed unacceptable. The Christian Democrats and Liberals together won 81

of the 150 parliamentary seats and agreed to form a coalition, but demands from the

Flemish for more autonomy and the redrawing of Brussels-area districts have presented

serious obstacles. While the failure to quickly form a government may represent a

minor bump and is certainly not a new occurrence, this crisis is unique for both its

length and nature. Belgium “beat its post-war record for squabbling” The previous

record for government-formation was 148 days set in 1988. (The Economist 8 Nov

2007). As this thesis was being completed, the parties were still in negotiation,

complicated in November by a move by Flemish parliamentarians to strip French-

speakers living in the Flemish districts of Brussels of certain privileges.

The current situation should not be surprising. The run-up to the elections was

especially contentious, issues were framed in ethnic terms and it was clear that the

existing financial system and the status of Brussels would be challenged. The financial

implications of federalism emerged as contentious political issues in the spring of 1999

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when the Flemish Parliament voted to increase financial and fiscal autonomy and

defederalize parts of the social security system. Francophones viewed this move as a

“clear and deliberate attempt to reduce or even to break the financial solidarity between

north and south and thus as a direct attack on the viability of the Walloon region." While

some steps towards fiscal autonomy were taken, they were small and the issues became

an important part of the June 2007 federal elections and the subsequent government

formation. (Deschouwer, 1998 p. 137). In 2006, Karl Deshouwer described a situation

in which government formation at the federal level would be a time for intense and

lengthy negotiations.

“The formation of a new federal government furthermore could remain a

moment at which the segmental elites can force each other to accept

negotiations. The default option is then no federal government, while the

regional governments can be formed or can go on. This situation has so far never

occurred, but one can imagine that it could be easier than before to live – at least

for a while – with a caretaker government at the federal level”

Deschouwer 2006 p. 908

Just one year later, a remarkably similar situation occurred. Although his methods were

characterized as inflammatory and irresponsible, it is necessary to grant him credit.

After extensive interviews and research, Dutilleul spoke of a possible crisis that would

destroy the Belgian state, a stalemate in which demands were so strictly entrenched that

it would force dissolution. The film envisioned a scenario in which, faced with a failure

to form a coalition, the Flemish parliament would vote for secession. Vlaams Belang did

so in October but the move was firmly rebuffed by mainstream parties, symbolizing a

commitment to the Belgian state, if not in its current incarnations.

Belgian life continues despite the lack of government, lending support to those

who say that the federal government is a hollow shell and has no real influence on day

to day affairs. Former Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt rules in a caretaker capacity,

allowed to implement existing laws but not enact new ones. (Hans, 2007). “The country

is governed largely by a patchwork of regional bureaucracies, so trains run on time, mail

is delivered, garbage is collected, the police keep order” (Scolino, 2007). However,

pressing issues do exist, including the drafting of the 2008 federal budget and the

signing of the Lisbon Treaty. (Hans, 2007).

In early November, there were signs that the crisis was abating. Agreements

were formed amongst the Flemish and French parties in the proposed coalition on issues

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of labor and social policy, judicial reform and immigration. However, just a few days

later, Flemish parliamentarians employed their majority to vote in favor of curtailing the

rights of 150,000 French-speakers in the 35 hybrid communes in Flemish Brabant, the

suburbs of Brussels. Brussels, and its increasingly Francophone suburbs, have been an

issue of contention for decades. Flemings fear the expansion of the French community

into Flemish territory. During the 1970s, the two groups agreed to accord Francophone

speakers rights as linguistic minorities but allow Flanders to maintain regional

jurisdiction. (Stroobant, 2007). While the demographics have evolved, politicians are

reluctant to address the issue, fearing that it would lead to ill-will and outright conflict.

The move would effectively strip French-speakers from the Halles-Villvorde of B-H-V

of the right to vote for French-speaking politicians in Brussels and have court cases

heard by French-speaking judges.

This move was significant when the “Belgian pact” Belgium‟s tradition of anti-

majoritarianism and consociationalist bargaining is considered. (The Economist 8 Nov

2007). This was the first time that Flanders wielded its political weight to push through

a measure rather than engaging in negotiations. (Hans, 2007). Francophones viewed the

move as “an act of grave political aggression” which “severed national unity” and the

Francophone community parliament voted a “conflict of interest” which would prevent

the move from taking place for 120 days. (Stroobant, 2007a). They stormed out in

protest of the bill and may also activate the alarm bell procedure which would allow

them to block the move for another two months. More immediately, liberal and centrist

Francophone political parties withdrew from the process of coalition formation. During

the months of negotiation that led to the rift, Belgians “could pretend that five months of

talks over forming a new government were merely an extreme form of business as

usual” (The Economist, 8 Nov 2007).

On November 30th

, Yves Leterme set forth an ultimatum to the parties which

were meant to form the governing coalition. It consisted of three conditions, all of which

must be accepted by the parties. His plan included a constitutional convention in 2008

which would consider the devolution of responsibilities for social security and taxation

from the federal to regional government. The reform would be subject to a majority vote

rather than subject to minority vetoes. (Coppi, 2007). The Flemish Christian Democrats

and liberals on both sides backed the plan but the Francophone Christian Democrats

refused, largely due to the threat to social security.

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As a result, the King designated outgoing Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt to

resume coalition talks. The Flemish-speaking PM, who resigned following his party‟s

decline in the June elections, has experienced resurgence in popularity. Belgians that

were polled expressed greater confidence in his ability to lead than Leterme, who was a

controversial figure. He will seek special powers from the Belgian Parliament to act on

crucial economic issues and been defined by crisis and subsequent compromise. He will

attempt to gather enough support from both sides to begin the process of Constitutional

reform. Should this occur, Flanders should be sufficiently appeased and a governing

coalition can be formed. He has unofficially given himself one month to do so, although

some commentators predict that he will stay in office in this limited capacity until the

regional elections in 2009.

While 30,000 Belgians marched on Brussels to express their unity, Belgium‟s

future is uncertain. The constant discord has led to further disillusionment amongst

voters and many may be driven by the right. The differences between Flemings and

Walloons now seem irreconcilable, as a result of the political posturing and attacks that

emanated from both sides. Flemish Christian Democrat Mark Eyskens said that “saliva

flows, but not blood” indicating that the conflict is dramatic but peaceful. However,

should it continue, tensions will flare and agreements between parties and citizens will

become more difficult.

What Comes Next…

This failure to form a lasting government may represent a minor bump and is

certainly not a new occurrence; similar crises have occurred in previous years. However,

the nature and magnitude of this crisis indicates a fundamental shift and may have

unintended consequences for the existing political system. However, the demands have

never been so clearly stated by both sides and political actions seem to indicate a

rejection of anti-majoritarian principles. Belgium has long been ruled by consociational

practices, avoiding direct conflict by secret negotiations which take place in remote

locations. This excluded the far right from participation but also excluded the Belgian

public, who found themselves increasingly isolated from both the policy-makers and the

policy. Judging from the recent crisis, anti-majoritarian principles have failed to prevent

ethnic conflict.

- 133 -

Most agree that a substantial reform of the state is necessary, not just to deal

with community conflict but to address economic and social problems. However, the

nature of the reform is up for debate. It is clear that these problems cannot be pushed

aside. It seems bizarre that ethnic relations in Belgium have reached arguably their

worst crisis at a moment when Belgians themselves are feeling increasingly attached to

the Belgian state, lending credence to the theory that ethnic conflict may be engineered

by politicians, rather than a result of inherent differences between the two groups. The

political sphere does not necessarily reflect the demands of the voters, which can be

dangerous and have potentially dramatic consequences for Belgium. There has been

discussion amongst politicians and scholars dealing with ways to bring the political

sphere closer to the public one. While many politicians advocate further devolution,

scholars theorize that fundamental changes in the political structure may be more

helpful.

Deeply divided societies are unique in their structure and support "voters are

normally ethnic voters, who are no more likely to cast their vote for a member of a rival

group than rival ethnic parties are to court their support" (Reilly, 2001 p. 10). In

Belgium, this is true, the unitary Belgian party, the Belgische Unie-Union Belege (BUB)

receives fewer votes than the Maoist party. However, Donald Horowitz emphasizes the

necessity of reforming the electoral system of a divided country in such a way that

parties must seek support outside their ethnic, religious or linguistic group to gain

power. (Horowitz, 1985 p. 598).

To build support from other groups, candidates must behave moderately and

accommodatively on core issues of concern. In ethnically divided societies, this

means that electoral incentives can promote much broader changes in political

behaviour even small minorities have a value in terms of where their votes are

directed, as small numbers of votes could always make the difference between

victory and defeat for major candidates

Reilly 2001 p. 10.

This could perhaps be a viable solution for Belgium; politicians would be forced to

eliminate their reliance on nationalist and regionalist rhetoric to inspire voters. However,

it seems impossible to imagine Belgium‟s core parties willingly increasing their

competition when a system of divide and conquer has served them so well.

To avoid the present difficulties inherent in government formation, “it seems

more logical and easier to abolish federal elections and to make the composition of the

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federal parliament dependent upon regional elections than to persuade the linguistically

split parties to join forces again” (Swenden, 2006 p. 285). However, Flemish and

Francophone politicians are perhaps moderated by the fact that they have to see and

interact with their rivals at the federal level. Should all decisions be made at the regional

and community level, they would not be held accountable to their governing partners.

Often, issues are hashed out during this period and they emphasize the importance of

compromise to the parties engaged in the process.

The referendum is used successfully in several other states, Switzerland

especially, to guide policy and ensure that the voters consent to and support

constitutional change. Referendums have not been employed in Belgium. Belgium has

worked to avoid the possibility of direct confrontation. Political activity is likely to take

place behind closed doors where it is revocable and subject to elite bargaining. The

historical precedent does not bode well for their employ. When a referendum was held

on the return of King Leopold III following World War II, the only sectarian violence

that Belgium has ever witnessed took place. (Swenden, 2003 p. 6). While Flanders voted

to allow the King to stay, 57% of Francophones voted for his removal. “The result of the

referendum was thus not respected and a typically consociational and negotiated

compromise was reached to get out of this so-called King‟s Question" (Deschouwer,

Van Assche, 2005 p. 8). While it appears that Belgians would vote overwhelmingly for

the maintenance of the Belgian state, should they not or should significant regional

disparities exist, it would be difficult to foster political cooperation. Ambiguity is one of

the keys of Belgian politics and politicians are reluctant to cede their right to engage in

quiet negotiations.

Whatever the method, it is clear that Belgian federalism is in peril. While it is

likely that Belgium will survive this conflict and form a government as soon as political

leaders realize that it is disadvantageous for the conflict to continue, serious damage has

already been done. Without a significant reform of the political system, the next crisis

will come sooner rather than later and the tradition of peaceful compromise may be

broken.

- 135 -

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