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Soviet Society in the 1980s:

Problems and Prospects25X1

A Research Paper

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State Dept. review completed

SecretSOV 82-10206XDecember 1982

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Approved For Release 2008/08/22 : CIA-RDP83T00853R000200180002-4Directorate of Secret Intelligence

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Soviet Society in the 1980s:Problems and Prospects

A Research Paper

The author of this paper is theOffice of Soviet Analysis, with contributions from 25X1

Comments and queries may beirected to the Chief, Policy Analysis Division,

SOVA, 25X1


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Key JudgmentsInformation availableas of 30 November 1982was used in this report.

Both Western observers and Soviet officials recognize that the SovietUnion now faces a wide array of social, economic, and political illsincluding a general social malaise, ethnic tensions, consumer frustrations,and political dissent. Precisely how these internal problems will ultimatelychallenge and affect the regime, however, is open to debate and consider-able uncertainty. Some observers believe that the regime will have littletrouble coping with the negative mood among the populace. Others believethat economic mismanagement will aggravate internal problems andultimately erode the regime's credibility, increasing the long-term pros-pects for fundamental political change. 25X1

Whatever the ultimate prognosis, these problems will pose a challenge forthe new Soviet leadership. The Politburo's approach probably will be basedon its assessment of the threat posed and the degree to which these issuescan be addressed by policy shifts. Three broad categories of problems—thequality of life, ethnic tensions, and dissent—are surveyed in this paper. Ofthese, popular discontent over a perceived decline in the quality of liferepresents, in our judgment, the most serious and immediate challenge forthe Politburo. the 25X1Soviet people are no longer confident that their standard of living willcontinue to improve. Popular dissatisfaction and cynicism seem to begrowing. This popular mood has a negative impact on economic productivi-ty and could gradually undermine the regime's credibility. Such discontenthas already led to some isolated strikes and demonstrations, developmentsthat immediately get the leadership's attention. Other manifestations ofdiscontent—crime, corruption, and alcoholism—are evident as well butpose no direct challenge to the regime. Such ills, nonetheless, have adetrimental effect on Soviet economic goals, are harmful to the socialclimate in general, and in turn are made worse by the slow rate ofeconomic growth. 25X1

Ethnic discontent--rooted in cultural, demographic, and economic prob-lems as well as political suppression—remains primarily a latent butpotentially serious vulnerability. Currently, there is no widespread, politi-cally disruptive protest or dissent among the Soviet nationalities. Theregime's policies—granting to national minorities some linguistic, territori-al, cultural, and administrative autonomy; raising the standard of living;expanding the educational base; and using overwhelming police powerwhen needed—have been largely successful so far. Although the potentialfor political unrest and sporadic violence in the Baltic republics remains


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high because of economic, demographic, and cultural grievances, Balticconcerns have little impact elsewhere in the USSR and can be suppressedif necessary. With more time (perhaps decades), however, similar problemscould become much more consequential in Muslim Central Asia, requiringthe regime to manage this problem more adroitly.[

Finally, the range of political, religious, and cultural discontent that isexpressed in the Soviet dissident movement does not, at present, seriouslychallenge the regime's political control, but the regime deals with it as if itdoes. Soviet dissidents cause concern because they have an internationalaudience and their activities embarrass the regime. Moreover, the leader-ship remains psychologically insecure and is unwilling to allow any hint ofchallenge to its authority, apparently because it fears such dissidents couldappeal to a wider audience by articulating more widely held discontentover food shortages and the like. For these reasons, the regime, particularlyof late, has used widespread arrests and imprisonment of dissident leaders,confinement in psychiatric hospitals, and exile to crush the movement. Themovement, however, is not likely to die and in the long run could grow if itcan capitalize on increasing discontent, cynicism, and alienation among thepopulace.

The sharp slowdown in economic growth since the mid-1970s is theunderlying problem that ties all these issues together and makes thempotentially more troublesome for the regime. Unless this trend is reversed,increasing alienation and cynicism, especially among young people, arelikely; and other social ills—crime, corruption, alcoholism—could getworse. The regime, to be sure, has impressive resources for trying to dealwith particular economic problems—especially in its centralized controlover priorities and resources, but a return to the more favorable economicconditions of the 1960s and early 1970s, when there were substantialimprovements in the standard of living, is highly unlikely. The pervasive 25X1police powers at the Politburo's disposal, when coupled with the Sovietpopulace's respect for author-ity, should, however, continue to provide the regime with the necessary 25X1strength to contain and suppress open dissent.

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Difficult decisions regarding resource allocation and new managementapproaches, nevertheless, will probably be needed to deal with the Politbu-ro's economic problems and to reverse the malaise that has set in. How thenew leadership will handle these issues over the long run is uncertain. Itspolicy options range from undertaking major "reforms" and reallocatingresources away from defense to greater reliance on administrative controlsand repression. Some mix of policies involving both directions might beattempted. No solutions it is likely to attempt, however, offer any certaincure for its growth problem and the malaise related to it. This situation willlikely require the leadership to fall back even more on traditional orthodoxmethods to control dissent and suppress challenges to its authority whilecontinuing efforts to avoid an overall decline in a "quality of life" that hasbecome the regime's real basis for legitimacy.

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Contents

Page

Key Judgments

Preface ix

The Soviet Regime and the Quality of Life 1

The Economy: A Leadership Dilemma 1

The Hard Choices 1

The Regime's Course—Steady as She Goes 1

Social Discontent 2

The Ordeal of Daily Life 2

Crime and Corruption 4

Youth Alienation 6

Soviet Health Care 8

The Family and the Role of Women 10

Alcoholism 12

The Nationality Issue 17

Sources of Conflict 17

Russification 17

Demographic Policy 17

Centralization Versus Decentralization 17

Resources 18

Problems on the Periphery 18

The Baltic Republics 18

The Ukraine 21

Central Asia 22

Dissent in the Soviet Union 25

Religious Dissent 25

Protest 25

Intellectual Dissent 30

The Dissidents 30

Reaction and Suppression 31

Conclusion 33

Top of the Agenda 33

Nationalities: A Problem on the Horizon 34

Political Dissent: Suppressed for Now 34

Coping With Problems: Present Policy and Future Options 34

Implications for US Policy 35

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Tables

1. USSR: State Budget Expenditures for Health

8 2. Personal Income and Expenditures on Alcoholic Beverages Per 14

Person Age 15 Years and Older, by Republic, 1970

3. Native Language Affinity and Knowledge of Russian as a

18Second Language

4. Comparison of Russian and Baltic Population Growth, 1959, 1970, 19and 1979

5. Comparison of Russian and Central Asian Population Growth, 221959, 1970, and 1979

6. Major Dissident Individuals and Organizations 26

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Preface Western observers have reported more on the array of Soviet social, economic, andpolitical ills in recent years than before.

I Just how serious these problems willbecome—and how successfully the Soviet leaders will deal with them—is an areaof great uncertainty. The Soviet regime still possesses great inner strength, but thechallenges are clearly growing. 25X1

This overview paper surveys a wide range of internal problems in the USSR—consumer frustrations, alcoholism, ethnic tensions, dissidence, to name a few.Treatment of many of these issues is necessarily brief, but the study, nonetheless,provides a better basis for assessing the Soviet Union's internal strengths and weaknesses in the years ahead.

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The Hard ChoicesThe Soviet Union now faces some difficult economicdecisions. In the late Brezhnev era, investment growthapparently was sacrificed to maintain modest growthin consumption and substantial growth in militaryspending. Continuing thiicourse will be harmful tothe economy, but changing priorities poses problemsas well. Under present circumstances, cutting con-

25X1sumption growth probably would not solve Sovieteconomic problems although additional funds mightbe freed for investment and defense. Without positiveincentives, however, worker morale could plunge evenfurther, and growth in labor productivity could stag-nate when a boost in both is needed.

The regime also recognizes that "social factors" arean underlying cause of lagging productivity growth. 25X1Cheating, bribery, black-market activity, and profit- 25X1eering permeate Soviet society.

alcoholism, Russia's hereditary plagu25xihas apparently risen in the 18 years of Brezhnev'sleadership as have the disorders associated with 0.'5)(1crime, family breakup, increased adult male aninfant mortality, absenteeism, inefficiency in the workplace, and industrial accidents. The leadership isattempting to combat the range of social ills, but theproblems are mostly intractable.

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The Soviet Regime andthe Quality of Life

Discontent over a perceived decline in the quality oflife in the USSR represents the most immediate andimportant challenge for the new leadership. UnderKhrushchev in the 1960s and under Brezhnev untilthe mid-1970s, wages were increased, more consumergoods were made available, the diet was enriched, andservices were improved. These results stimulated pop-ular desires for a better life but did not completelysatisfy them. As the rate of economic growth hasdeclined since 1978, the regime has had to cope withunfulfilled rising expectations. The new leadership isalready having to make some hard economic choicesbetween defense spending, investment, and consump-tion. The new post-Brezhnev leadership will also haveto decide the politically difficult issue of where toplace their investment rubles: in Central Asia, wheremost of the growth in labor force will occur; in thewestern USSR, where the industrial plants alreadyexist; or in Siberia, where the exploitation of naturalresources awaits the necessary industrial infrastruc-ture.

The section below surveys what is perhaps the mostimportant domestic issue confronting the leadership,the economy. Subsequent sections discuss the range ofother issues associated with the quality of Soviet life.

The Economy: A Leadership Dilemma

The primary source of economic growth in the SovietUnion has been increased amounts of productiveresources (labor and capital) rather than increasedefficiency of their use. However, additions to the laborforce have shrunk and are projected to shrink furtherduring the 1980s. This has occurred as access tonecessary raw materials and energy supplies hasbecome more expensive. Moreover, Soviet agricultureremains a drag on the entire economy, with four poor

harvests in a row, and the high cost of Soviet arma-ment programs siphons off needed men, material, and funds from other economic projects.1

The Regime's Course—Steady as She Goes 25X1With the phenomenon of widespread disaffection inPoland fresh in their minds, Soviet leaders are stillinclined to appease the beleaguered consumer. Thequality of the diet remains the key element in thisapproach and is the standard by which the Soviet

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populace judges its well-being. The regime has pur-sued various strategies to keep domestic food short-ages manageable. At the November 1981 plenum,Brezhnev described the food supply as the centraleconomic and political problem of the current Five-Year Plan. The food program announced at the May1982 plenum hopes to translate higher farm spendinginto more food on Soviet tables. Imports of foodproducts will continue to play a large role as well. Toensure that food shortages do not precipitate incidentsof worker unrest, the leadership is channeling morefood directly to industrial enterprises, but this has leftfood supplies in retail outlets strained.

The Soviet propaganda apparatus is pointing to thesemeasures as proof of its continuing commitment to theconsumer. To counter the problems of worker produc-tivity, the underlying social malaise that supports it,and labor discipline, the party may resort to moretraditional palliatives. The ideological campaign oflast year, which attacked consumerist attitudes andthe sole reliance on material incentives to increaseproductivity, may be stepped up. Tough measures toincrease discipline and decrease labor absenteeismand turnover may eventually be put forward as well.The leadership has heretofore lacked the political willor consensus, on the other hand, to pursue more majoreconomic reforms or policy innovations that mighthelp resolve its dilemma.

Social Discontent

Articles in the Soviet press indicate that the Sovietauthorities are clearly concerned about the forces ofsocial discontent in their nation, not only because theyimpact adversely on worker productivity but alsobecause they tend to weaken the social fabric. Thecrime and hooliganism that appear to be increasing,the soaring divorce rates, and the apparent increase inalcohol consumption suggest there is a palpable senseof life going stale and sour for many in the SovietUnion

I there seems to be an increased readiness tocheat, engage in black marketing, and peddle influ-ence; and ideological countermeasures are ineffective.

The situation does not immediately threaten theregime's stability, but over the long run it could undermine the leaders' legitimacy.

The Ordeal of Daily LifeSoviet published statistics demonstrate that strikingmaterial progress has been achieved in the USSRsince 1917, but they do not begin to convey thefrustrations of daily life. The seemingly endless list ofscarcities, the long shopping lines, the bewilderingvariety of regulations and bureaucratic requirements,and the indignities endured in even routine activitiesadd to the typical Soviet citizen's daily physical andmental burdens. Although the regime constantlylaunches campaigns to improve service and eliminateshortages, the leadership is almost powerless to im-prove the daily grind for most of its people.

"Horror Stories "About Shopping. The shopping ratrace, especially the queues, symbolizes the Sovietcitizen's predicament. In 1981, for example, a Sovietcorrespondent for Literaturnaya Gazeta took off fromMoscow for Krasnodar, the capital of a resort area onthe Black Sea. He deliberately left behind all theusual personal items (soap, razor, cologne, toothbrush,shaving cream, and so forth) to investigate reportsthat such items were unavailable in Krasnodar stores.The correspondent systematically visited every storein Krasnodar in an unsuccessful quest to buy thearticles. He managed to get only the last package ofrazor blades in one store and a child's toothbrush atanother (the toothbrush broke the following day).However, the correspondent later reported findingmost of the items he desired on the black market.

There are numerous anecdotal reports of a similarnaturel

• A Soviet scientist indicated that he waited fourhours to get a single copy (multiple copies areprohibited) of a few pages from a Lenin Libraryreference book.

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• Longtime Moscow residents reported in the 1970sthat it took six hours in line to buy a hat, 10 hours tobuy a rail ticket (to the Black Sea resort area), 10days (organized groups take turns in line) for achance to buy a new book of poetry, and two orthree years for a place in a sanatcUNCODED

/take two to 10 yearsto get a city apartment. (c)

Unequal Burden. According to Western newsmen inMoscow, Soviet citizens now, moreover, seem increas-ingly aware that the burden is not shared equally, aperception that exacerbates the normal frustrationsassociated with everyday Soviet life. At some factoriesand government agencies, for example, employeesmay order meat and other commodities unavailable instate stores. High party officials are entitled to shop atspecial stores closed to the general public, wherestocks of imported and scarce goods are sold atrelatively low prices. Housing, especially, has becomemore stratified with favorable treatment on the basisof employment, bureaucratic position personal con-nections, and bribery. money and contacts can reduce the waitingtime for an apartment from 10 years to two years orless.

Cars and dachas (summer homes) are also high on theconsumer's most-wanted list. Like other consumergoods in short supply, however, many new cars areparceled out among the well placed or well connected,leaving others who have the money with the option ofeither placing their names on long waiting lists—ayear is the minimum for less popular makes, accord-ing to a 1981 newspaper report—or heading for theused-car lot. Even in the used-car market, moreover, adual system prevails. Many cars are sold for relativelylow prices through an "official" used-car market

where the pecking order and waiting lists rival thosefor new cars. There is competition for dachas as well,with the best being reserved for the top leadership,followed by party and government officials and pro-fessionals in turn.

The most serious consumer food problem is meat 25X1supply. At a time when meat has become a keyindicator in the public mind of progress or stagnationin living standards, Soviet data show that the gap 25X1between meat supply and demand has increased atleast 12 percent since 1975.j

The poor prospects for the 1982 harvestindicate that the food situation in the Soviet Unionwill worsen still more. 25X1

The Soviet leaders have been extremely successful iQ5X1the past in persuading their people to defer gratifica-tions, and to take less now in exchange for promises ofa better future. This fact, along with the self-evidentprogress for most under the system, explains the 25X1Russian acceptance of the shopper's gauntlet, the longqueues, the poor quality of merchandise, and theshortages of food, consumer goods, and housing. 25X1Political problems, however, are rooted in the pros-pects for an ever-receding fulfillment of the promiseof a better future and, for some, a perceived decline intheir standard of living.

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25X1Food on the Table? According to Soviet data, theavailability of quality foods increased sharply in theSoviet Union between 1965 and 1975, but since thelate 1970s agricultural failures have led to the de-creased availability of milk, vegetables, and fruit, andthe supply of meat has not grown. The result is acutespot shortages across the entire range of foodstuffs.The regime has attempted to channel a larger share offoods directly to industrial installations to prevent 25X1worker unrest, leaving food supplies in retail outletsseverely strained. 25X1

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Crime and CorruptionThe Soviet Union appears to be facing an increasingcrime problem. Ten years ago the Soviet media rarelyacknowledged the existence of violence or hooliganism("intentional actions crudely violating public orderand expressing clear disrespect toward society," pun-ishable by six months to a year of confinement).Today, however, the press is full of articles on violentcrime. For example, in August 1981, Pravda reportedon an upsurge of street crime in Eastern Siberia,blaming prosecutors, police, and the public for theirlaxity. In September and October of 1981, a Lenin-grad newspaper described a series of muggings thathad taken place in the city

Despite the protestations of official ideology, thisupsurge in crime has little to do with bourgeoisinfluence from the past or susceptibility to Westerninfluence. Soviet crime, to judge from Soviet com-mentary, is associated with social problems foundgenerally in modern society—alcohol abuse, low edu-cational levels, broken homes, and the like. A 1971study of crime in Moscow, for example, reported that70 percent of those convicted of homicide committedtheir crimes while drunk. Studies of criminal behaviorby the Institute for the Study of Crime in the 1960sand 1970s found a high correlation between crime andinternal migration patterns. Crime has increased inthe developing cities of the far east and far north,where the social infrastructure is weakest, makingthese areas more undesirable places to live.

Economic Crimes. Economic crimes have probablybecome the most vexing for the regime. The ineffi-ciencies of the economic system and its failure toproduce sufficient quantities of food, consumer goods,and services have produced a burgeoning black-market economy amounting[

to perhaps 25 percent of the Soviet GNP. Legalrestrictions on private economic activity are honoredonly occasionally. Illegal speculation (purchase andresale of goods for profit) is rampant. The mostcommon forms of economic illegality include: theft ofgovernment property, large-scale cheating of custom-ers by the managers of retail stores, private produc-tion on the job, the unregistered private practice ofphysicians and dentists, and underground manufac-turing.

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Bribes are viewed by the Soviet public as an effectivemethod of solving one's problems in the social envi-ronment. In a series of interviews conducted withSoviet immigrants in 1977, nearly half of thosequestioned selected "bribery, pull, and connections"as the most effective way of solving problems. More-over, the prices of available consumer goods are oftenquite distorted and do not reflect demand, supply, orproduction costs.

Despite the pervasive nature of corruption withinSoviet society, the leadership so far at least has notattempted to tackle it head on. Its rhetoric andoccasionally well-publicized actions against corruptofficials have been largely cosmetic gestures thatmade little progress in reducing corruption within theelite or the society. Such half-hearted efforts

contrast sharply with the regime's stance on otherkinds of criminal activity. Elite involvement in corrup-tion has probably contributed to the regime's lack ofvigor in combating this phenomenon. To activelyattempt to root it out among the elite risks confronta-tion. The Brezhnev regime was probably also wary ofdamaging the reputation, and hence legitimacy, of theparty by prosecuting important members for corrup-tion.

The regime may recognize, in addition, that the"second economy" does satisfy demands in a systemwhere state industry cannot or will not satisfy them.In this sense, the black market serves as a safety valvethat helps to keep the entire system running. If theblack market helps to meet some demands of theSoviet population, the dissatisfaction and discontentthat might arise over the lack of consumer goods in

• General Zotov was removed as head of the Office ofVisas and Registration recently after reportedlyselling visas for as much as 12,000 rubles (1 rubleequals $1.34).

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• Rumors of corruption touching Brezhnev's family proliferated in 1982.1

• During 1982 in Azerbaijan the party press reportedon endemic extortion and bribery connected withgaining admission to institutions of higher learning.

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• In Georgia bribes are reportedly necessary to guar-antee everything from admission to Tbilisi MedicalInstitute to letters of recommendation to join theCommunist Party.

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25X1than 90 percent involve some form of forced labor,termed "correctional labor" in Soviet legal parlance.

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The Gulag approximately 1.5 percent of

the Soviet population (about 4 million people) are nowin the "gulag"—the Russian acronym for the Main 25X1Administration of Corrective Labor Camps. (TheUnited States in 1980 had a prison population of314,000—considerably less than 1 percent of thepopulation.) About 2.1 million Soviets are confined,some 400,000 in prisons and the rest in forced-laborcamps (or "colonies" as the Soviet authorities prefer).About 500,000 have been paroled but still must 25X1perform compulsory labor. There are about 300 pris-ons and over 1,000 labor camps in the USSR.

The inmates of prisons and the harsher labor colonieslive in cells, and the inmates of other camps live inbarrack-type accommodations.[

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Punishment. Soviet criminals are handled swiftlyunder the flexible provisions of the republic criminalcodes. The Ministry of Internal Affairs enforces thecodes: its militia maintains public order and arrestslawbreakers, and its prosecutors bring and prosecutecharges]

The Ministry of Justice runs the court system. Thecriminal code gives the procurator (the Soviet equiva-lent of the district attorney) wide latitude in determin-ing the specific charge under which a particularcriminal act will be tried and permits the court widelatitude in determining the sentence. Legal punish-ments range from public censure, removal from office,deprivation of rank, and banishment or exile to imprisonment, forced labor, or even deatl'

about half ofall sentences involve confinement, and probably more

25X1The penal system includes three basic kinds of forced-labor camps: correctional labor, educational labor,and colony settlements. Correctional labor camps varyin their harshness with the severity of the term.Juvenile offenders are sent to educational laborcamps, and most prisoners receiving only light punish-ment or who have been rewarded for good behaviorare assigned to correctional labor colony settlements.

25X1Persons convicted of "crimes against the state" re-ceive the harshest punishment; the number of peoplebeing punished for such crimes is probably about10,000. (Many of the offenses for which dissidents arecommonly tried are classified as such—see section ondissent.) 25X1

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signed to work in a wide variety of activities, particu-larly those that are physically dangerous or taxing,

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including manufacturing, construction, agriculture,and mining. These individuals have also been utilizedto develop the resource-rich areas of the Soviet fareast and north.

Justice in the Soviet Union. In addition to the wide-spread use of forced labor, the Soviet criminal justicesystem differs in several other respects from Westernsystems of justice. Law serves the interest of the partyand state. Soviet justice is designed to protect socialistproperty, not primarily to protect the citizen, and thecourts are treated as one of many controls to ensureimplementation of party and state goals. Although thelegal rights of Soviet citizens have been substantiallyincreased since Stalin's death, many of the rightsconsidered important in the West—such as habeascorpus (protection against illegal imprisonment) andpresumption of innocence—do not exist. The regimehas few constraints on its ability to use the law against its p_eo_plej

Soviet justice also emphasizes, to a degree not foundin the West, the role of the public in the administra-tion of justice and the use of social groups (vigilantes)rather than state organs to maintain law and order.The Soviets have relied on two voluntary organiza-tions: the Comrades' Courts (ad hoc courts set up infactories, apartments, and so forth, with popularlyelected judges) and the Peoples' Volunteers (druzhin-niki, who cajole citizens into obeying the law).

Effectiveness of Controls. The sharp rise in juvenilecrime indicates that the regime has fallen short of itsgoal to create "the new Soviet man."1

jpersons under 18 are responst. e or morethan half the crimes committed in the Baltic region.Furthermore, it was revealed that these youthfuloffenders, almost evenly divided between males and

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Much of the criminal activity in the USSR is connect-ed to the "second" economy and involves economiccorruption. Soviet authorities, worried that publicopinion will be adversely affected by shortages, haveattempted to lay much of the blame on such crimi-nals. For example, First Deputy Minister of InternalAffairs, Yuriy Churbanov (Brezhnev's son-in-law,who reportedly has been involved in corrupt activitieshimself) recently charged in an interview on RadioMoscow that black-marketeers are artificially creat-ing deficits to line their own pockets. (A new lawadopted in September 1981 substantially increasedpenalties for withholding goods from sale or acceptingmoney to procure goods and services not normallyavailable or in short supply.) The recent report by theSoviet press of the execution of a deputy minister offish industries for corruption was apparently meant tosignal the regime's concern and warn against high-level corruption. The removal of a high regional partyofficial in July 1982, reportedly for engaging incorruption with this deputy minister, tends to rein-force the idea that a strong signal is being given tocorrupt officials. The campaign, however, is not likelyto be very effective if other higher level officials whoare involved in corruption are allowed to remain inoffice. In fact, the consumer remains unimpressedwith official attempts to fight corruption and end shortagesj

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Youth AlienationSoviet leaders devote considerable effort and re-sources to indoctrinating Soviet youth with the oldsocialist virtues of love of physical labor and a 25X1willingness to sacrifice one's personal interest for theparty and state. The industrialization process hasinexorably produced a reward system, however, thatvitiates these ideals. Although young people aretaught in party youth organizations to believe that allwork is honorable, parents often attempt to pave their 25X1children's way through procurement of preferential treatment in university admissions and jobs.'


Soviet officials, moreover, indirectly admit that West-ern propaganda has been successful in exploiting thematerialism of its youth and in stimulating otherundesirable attitudes. An article by KGB First Depu-ty Chairman Viktor Chebrikov described the goal of"bourgeois propaganda" as nothing less than to "sab-otage the Communist convictions of young people andpush them into antisocial positions." In a June 1981Pravda interview, Estonian Party First SecretaryVayno also stated that "bourgeois centers" are spar-ing no efforts to instill in the Soviet people the "bacilliof moral spinelessness, spiritual acquisitiveness, andnational chauvinism." 25X1

Competing "Ideologies." Soviet officials must alsocontend with negative attitudes toward military serv-ice, revival of interest in religion, and nationalistexpressions. Pravda on 20 March 1982 providedgrowing evidence of official uneasiness about creepingpacifism on the home front. In an article on films,USSR People's Artist Aleksandr Zarkhi reproachedSoviet producers of war films for being heedless of thepotentially demoralizing impact of these movies onSoviet audiences. Similarly, Marshal Ogarkov, Chiefof the General Staff, in a speech given at an April1981 ideological conference and in a followup articleappearing in the party journal Kommunist, deplored"elements of pacifism" on the domestic scene. Ogar-kov complained that the present generation of Sovietyouth were underrating the threat of war emanatingfrom the West. Such examples of domestic pacifismmay signal popular dissatisfaction with the war inAfghanistan or indicate that this generation of Sovietyoung people is less willing to make the personalsacrifice necessary to maintain a high degree of 25X1military readiness.

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Materialism and Apathy. In spite of the barrage ofpropaganda aimed at eliciting "socially productivelabor," most Soviet young people apparently remainmaterialistic in outlook and are apolitical. In a pollconducted by Sotsialisticheskaya industriya in Feb-ruary 1982, Soviet youth clearly stated their prefer-ence for a stable career and material comfort. Successwas defined by 34 percent of the respondents as the"quantity and prestige of their possessions," such as anew car or a summer house, and not as contributionsto the "collective welfare." This emphasis on posses-sions is accompanied by a general cynicism towardlarger political issues and a recognition of the impo-tence of individuals in influencing political affairs.

Party officials have expressed concern over the loss ofideological vigor on the part of Soviet youth. Theseries of regional Komsomol Congresses in 1982provided a recent opportunity for party leaders toaddress this issue. Ukrainian party chief Shcherbit-skiy, for example, frankly acknowledged the lack ofideological zeal among Soviet youth. He beratedyoung people not only for their theoretical shortcom-ings but also for their "social passivity and relapsesinto middle classness." Leningrad party leader Roma-nov stressed the same theme, noting that for mostyoung Soviets, life may be getting too easy. Partyleaders Shevardnadze and Grishin even admitted thatdrug abuse and alcoholism among youth were signifi-cant problems, a strong indication that ideologicalcommitment is waning.

Western Threat. Soviet leaders continue to expressconcern, moreover, that this interest in material well-being is making people more vulnerable to Westerninfluences and "alien" ideas. The most explicit warn-ing of this type was voiced by Komsomol chief BorisPastukhov in his speech before the All-Union Komso-mol Congress in May 1982. Pastukhov stated that"moral and spiritual decline" can result from anuncritical acceptance of Western cultural models andfashions. He mentioned Polish developments to under-score the danger of allowing Western influences to gounchecked, declaring that more must be done toprotect youth from acquiring a taste for the Westernlifestyle.

Since the Polish crisis began, such warnings have beenfrequently repeated. Speaking at an April 1981 ideo-logical conference, the now deceased party secretaryMikhail Suslov emphasized the need to combat"alien" influences at home. He attacked "consumer-ist" attitudes and noted "the extremely dangerous"consequences of allowing consumer demands to dic-tate state policy. 25X1

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Current Rubles(billions)

PercentageShare 25X1

1965 6.7 6.61970 9.3 6.11975 11.5 5.51980 14.8 5.01981 14.8 5.0 25X11982 (Plan) 15.4 4.8

Soviet Health CareThe Soviet Union made significant improvements inits health care system during the first 50 years of itsexistence, but the system seems increasingly inade-quate to cope with changing health problems in thecountry. Investment in the system has not grownenough to head off problems. In fact, the share of thestate budget spent on health has been declining (see 25X1table 1). The regime has also failed to distributemedical care uniformly among various segments ofthe population.


Religion is viewed as a special problem for youth.Pastukhov, in his Komsomol Congress speech, assert-ed that various religious sects were becoming moreactive and called for increased efforts to counter thegrowth of religion among the young. Central Asianleaders have also demonstrated their concern with thisissue. Kazakh Party First Secretary Kunayev recentlydirected party workers to pay more attention toatheistic work. (Refer also to section on religiousdissent, pp. 25-30.)

Linkages between growing interest in religion andunacceptable expressions of nationalism have beenmade as well. In Lithuania, Republic Party FirstSecretary Grishkyavichus warned at an April 1982plenum that "clerical extremists" were using religionto promote "nationalist sentiments." Georgian leadershave also been particularly worried by the emergenceof antinationalist trends among young people. TheGeorgian Komsomol chief cautioned students against"playing at politics and pseudonationalist heroics."He also expressed regret that an increasing number ofyoung men were applying to enter the seminary.(Refer also to section on nationality problems, pp.18-24.)

Although the attitudes among Soviet youth are avexing problem for the regime, there is no indicationthat they represent a threat to regime control. As oneyoung Soviet professional commented to US Embassyofficials, "as long as the system presents the opportu-nity for advancement, no matter how slight, peoplewill continue to work within the system. No one reallycares about how bad conditions are throughout thecountry, as long as one can see hope for improvingone's own life." At the same time, the regime'sattempt to isolate materialism to a small number ofyoung people has clearly failed. Massive improve-ments in education resulting in an overabundance ofhighly trained young people have only exacerbatedthe problem. Moreover, it is now more difficult tosatisfy the youth by providing elements of the goodlife. Current ideological efforts directed toward theproblem of youth alienation, rather than encouragingself-sacrifice, appear only to increase cynicism. Thegap between the leadership and Soviet youth, there-fore, remains and could grow.

Table 1USSR: State Budget Expenditures for Health

The leadership has evinced growing concern abouthealth care performance in the face of greater de-mands on the system. In August 1982 a comprehen-sive party Central Committee and Council of Minis-ters decree addressed the most important issues. Itinstructed the Ministry of Health to expand andimprove health services in rural areas and directed theMinistry of Medical Industry to increase medicalsupplies in the country. The decree also called forimproved training of medical workers and specifiedworker incentives to improve on the performance ofthe large medical service bureaucracy. Perhaps mostimportant, the recent decree draws attention to theneed to work on the prevention of illness in the USSR.

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The Kremlin Polyclinic caters to the elite ofSoviet society.

Wide World a:,

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Systemic Problems. Because of the disparity in healthservices, some Soviets are opening their pocketbooksto buy better, more personalized care than the stateprovides them free of charge. The few legal fee-for-service clinics are apparently heavily used, and under-the-table payments to medical personnel are perva-sive. An illegal payment of 1,300 rubles, for example.may be necessary to ensure that a patient gets a 25X1surgeon with above-average skill. Beyond health careavailability, the system faces other challenges: con- 25X1flicting institutional goals, lack of preventive care, poor training, and technical bottlenecks. These are,,xinow being tackled, but whether successfully so re-mains to be seen. To keep hospital death statistics low,for examoleJ

Soviet authori-ties have encouraged "hopeless" patients to check outand return home. At the same time, hospital stays areprolonged, providing employment for many through 25X1medical make-work, but this contributes to a higherincidence of hospital-induced infection.

A major difficulty is that the Soviet system has 25X1focused on curing illness rather than preventing it.Soviet statistical data show that diseases that areeasily controlled in other countries run rampant in theSoviet Union. Influenza, for example, kills tens ofthousands of Soviet babies annually, and rickets

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Approved For Release 2008/08/22 CIA-RDP83T00853R000200180002-4Secret

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The new decree was probably related to growingrecognition of ptoblems in health care that are dem-onstrated in official statistics. The leadership actioncomes as economic planners have looked to labor-force expansion and efficiency to help the ailingeconomy—health care impacts directly on theand efficiency of the work force. According to Sovietdata, the USSR appears to be the only nation in theworld with a lower life expectancy now than 20 yearsago.' Death rates rose significantly for every agegroup between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s, increas-ing by 49 percent from its low point in 1964 of 6.9percent per 1,000 to 10.3 percent per 1,000 in 1981.Males in their forties were hardest hit, with lifeexpectancy for the average Soviet male falling from66 years in 1965 to the present figure of 62. Infantmortality rates, moreover, are high, may have risenduring the 1970s, and reflect sharp differences inhealth care between the European and non-Europeanparts of the country. Poor health care in rural areas,high rates of alcoholism and abortion in urban areas,the effects of influenza epidemics, and environmentalpollution are contributing factors.

Differential Treatment. Although the Soviet healthcare system is extensive (37 physicians per 10,000compared with 19 per 10,000 in the United States)and available to everyone free of charge, the quality ofservice is uneven. The general public is served by asystem of hospitals and outpatient polyclinics thatprovide a relatively low standard of care.

drugs are difficult tofind, hospitals are overcrowded and dirty, and apatient's family must often bring food from home tosupplement the hospital diet. Facilities in rural areasare particularly inadequate, largely because qualifiedpersonnel find work in outlying regions unattractive.In contrast, a closed system of hospitals, clinics, anddispensaries with superior facilities is administered bythe Ministry of Health's Fourth Main Administrationfor ranking party, government, and police officials.Some ministries maintain their own health servicesystems that presumably offer better care and serve asan incentive to attract workers.

' The publication of some statistical data useful as health indicatorsis restricted. The Central Statistical Administration has not re-leased age-specific mortality rates or life expectancy data since themid-1970s, probably because the regime is embarrassed by theresults.

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Women in the Workplace. The call of early Marxists 25X1for women to enter the labor force did not actuallyrepresent a radical break with the Tsarist past. By1917 women constituted 40 percent of factory em-ployees in Russia. What changed, of course, was thespread of an ideologyiupportive of women workingoutside the home. Work was portrayed not only as ameans of contributing to the national economy butalso as a source of personal development and even as aprerequisite for a woman to serve as an appropriaterole model for her children. Expanding educational

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opportunities facilitated women's employment pros-pects'.


remains one of childhood's scourges. Whereas 70percent of cervical cancer cases in the United Statesare identified in their early, potentially treatablestages, 60 percent of Soviet cases are not recognizeduntil they are terminal.

So far, the Soviet Union's economic plan has givenlow priority to developing and producing equipmentthat Western doctors associate with modern medicine. theUSSR operates only a few dozen kidney machines,and its few hundred available pacemakers are import-ed. Disposable equipment—syringes, needles, tubing,and bedding—are in short supply. The low prioritygiven to other consumer-oriented sectors results inadditional shortages. When output goals in othersectors are not met, the supply to the medical sector ofsuch nonmedical goods as automobiles, building mate-rials, and textiles becomes erratic. Because of fuelshortages, for example, only 30 percent of the gasrequirements for emergency vehicles are being met.

Future Challenges. The Soviet health care system willbe facing growing demands in the coming decade. Theage distribution of the population has changed mark-edly in the past 20 years, with the share of those 60years and over increasing from 9.4 percent to 15.4percent of the population. As the share of the elderlyincreases, disease patterns alter. Health planners willhave to decide whether to distribute a larger share ofmedical resources to the elderly, who have a higherincidence of serious illness, or continue to focus health resources on the economically active population.

An August 1982 decree is the latest in a series ofmeasures attempting to cope with problems in thehealth sector. In 1980 a decree banned women from460 job categories involving heavy and hazardouswork. A March 1981 decree aimed at stimulating thebirth rate provides for one year of partially paidmaternity leave. By encouraging mothers to stay athome to care for their babies, the decree could reducethe risk of exposure to disease at child-care facilities.A January 1982 resolution calls for the expansion ofsanatoriums and health resorts to be sponsored by thetrade unions.

The regime has put more pressure on the managers ofthe health care system by dramatically airing thefailures of the Ministry of Health at the March 1982meeting of the Supreme Soviet Presidium. The Minis-try was criticized for neglect of outpatient polyclinicsand emergency care as well as the insensitive anduncaring attitude shown by health service personnel.The press has also extensively publicized the short-comings of medical care in rural areas and the needfor greater responsiveness to the population's requestsand complaints regarding health services. Regardlessof these resolutions and decrees, unless the regimespends more money on health services, there is littlelikelihood for significant improvement in the future.

The Family and the Role of WomenLenin hoped Soviet rule would significantly improvethe status of women in the USSR. In reality there hasbeen much progress in achieving greater equalitybetween the sexes and of social advancement ofwomen under the Soviet system. Yet, Soviet womencannot be said to be "liberated" in the Western sense.Moreover, the Soviet family as an institution is also introuble. The high divorce rate, part of the price ofincreasing industrialization and urbanization, showsno signs of falling. It is especially high in urbanregions. Soviet sociologists continue to lament thepersonal costs of marital breakups in their writings.The leadership, whose prime interest lies in thesuccess of the economy, is chiefly dismayed by theadverse effect on the birth rate and, consequently, onthe country's labor resources.

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Contrasting dress styles of Soviet women inMoscow symbolize differing status of womenthroughout country.

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UPI

This work ideology fit well with the leadership's goalof rapid economic development, the result being thatwomen's labor today represents the backbone of theSoviet economy. According to published data, theSoviet Union has the highest female labor forceparticipation rates of any industrial society; over 51percent of all workers are women. The questionablework ethic among Soviet males has led to key jobs inindustry and construction being filled more and moreby women.

Despite the important economic role women play inthe economy, however, Soviet data indicate that wom-en have not moved up the career ladder on a par withmen:• Salaries for women are only 65 to 75 percent those

of men.• Women predominate in low-skilled, low-paying oc-

cupations including service industry work and cleri-cal positions.

• Women fill a disproportionately low share of themore prestigious and powerful positions in Sovietsociety.

Although women constitute 40.6 percent of all scienceworkers, only 10.9 percent of those.holding the title ofacademician are female. In the political arena, nowomen are on the Politburo, and only 8.5 percent ofCentral Committee members (full and candidate) arewomen.

Beyond the professional restrictions Soviet womenface, they continue to bear most of the burden forrunning Soviet households. Soviet men show littleinclination to share household duties, thus perpetuat-ing a highly unequal division of domestic labor.According to Soviet data, although men and womendevote equal time to paid employment, women devotean extra 28 hours a week to housework compared with12 for men. Child-care facilities, moreover, remaininadequate, forcing women to take additional unpaidmaternity leave despite the loss of earnings and jobopportunities involved. 25X1

Efforts by women to improve their quality of life havecentered mainly on limiting family size, with abortionrepresenting the primary method of birth control. 25X1

on average,each Soviet woman has six abortions in her lifetime-12 times the US figure. Even this estimate may 25X1underestimate the actual figure in the Europeansections of the country, because Muslim women havefewer abortions than their European compatriots.Discontent among Soviet women takes more destruc-tive forms as well: female alcoholism and drug abuseare on the rise, according to Soviet studies discussedat a June 1981 psychiatric conference in Moscow.Recent press articles have warned about the adverseeffects of alcohol and drugs on the health of both 25X1women and infants. 25X1The Family. The Soviet family is also coming understress. The Soviet divorce rate-3.5 per 1,000 popula-tion—is exceeded only by that of the United States.According to a number of Soviet sociologists, thefamily is shrinking, dissolving, and doing a poor job ofcreating the "new Soviet man." An article in Litera-turnaya gazeta sums up these shortcomings in thefour major roles attributed to the family:• The birth rate in the majority of Soviet families is

down sharply with the average family size nowbetween one and two children.

• The home takes too much energy, requiring somebillion hours of labor a year and an army of 120 to130 million service workers.

• The family is falling short in its role of educating 25X1the young.

• The family is not adequately satisfying the needs of the individual for love and humanism.

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family institutions. According to Pravda, this plan still awaits implementation.

Soviet scholars are caught trying tofind Marxist-Leninist explanations for problems thatin theory should not exist under socialism. Empirical 25X1research on this topic is also hampered by samplingsthat are too small and uncoordinated to providereliable conclusions. Such shortcomings suggest thatthe Soviets have an uphill battle to remedy this 25X1problem.

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The task of creating a stable family environmentappears fraught with so much difficulty that manySoviets are opting out of the process altogether.Singles now number in the tens of millions accordingto a recent article in Novy mir, and some Sovietauthorities see a trend toward rejection of marriageand child-bearing in favor of a more independent andcarefree lifestyle.

In explaining the deterioration of the family unit,Soviet experts point to several causes including urban-ization, industrialization, alcoholism, and the fecklessattitude of men toward marriage and family. Sovietwriters have only recently begun to recognize thatfemale liberation, rising levels of female educationand labor force participation, and family stability maynot be compatible. Living conditions, particularlyshortages in housing for newlyweds, scarcities of dailyconsumables, and the deadening chore of searchingand standing in line for them, are also pinpointed asobstacles to stable family life and having children. 1

Help for the Family. The key problem for the leader-ship is how to achieve an optimal balance between thecontribution of women to the labor force and theirfamily roles. The irreplaceable contribution of womento both production and reproduction militates againstmeasures that would seriously limit their roles ineither domain. The ongoing controversy is reflected inthe Soviet academic literature. Some family sociolo-gists favor the present balance of work and familyroles and focus on reducing the tension between thetwo by expanding the availability of consumer goodsand services. A number of Soviet scholars and jour-nalists who are more concerned about present demo-graphic trends, including Soviet demographer V. Per-evedentsev, advocate an all-out effort to increase thesocial status and material rewards of motherhood. Fornow the Soviet leadership appears to be leaning in thisdirection. The present Five-Year Plan, with its paidmaternity leave provisions, is designed to get Sovietwomen, particularly in the European areas of theSoviet Union and Siberia, to have more children.

AlcoholismAlmost every event or celebration in Soviet life, suchas a wedding, a funeral, a pay raise, or a bonus, ismarked by intense drinking. The press contains fre-quent complaints about drinking bouts on payday byfactory workers that often end in public brawls ordomestic disturbances. Heavy drinking causes signifi-cant disruptions in work, reduces labor productivity,leads to industrial and traffic accidents, has a high

1 correlation with crime (including juvenile delinquen-cy), contributes to family instability, and impactsnegatively on the health of the population. AlthoughSoviet authorities have on many occasions expresseddeep concern about the effect of alcohol abuse onSoviet society, the regime's vested interest in the saleof alcoholic beverages conflicts with measures de-signed to reduce consumption. Moreover, alcohol con-sumption functions as a kind of safety valve for pent-up social discontent. Such discontent would be moretroublesome to the regime if it took different formssuch as demonstrations or strikes.

The seriousness of alcohol abuse in the Soviet Unionis implied by the paucity of statistical informationavailable on the subject. Since the 1960s, much of thestatistical data that had been published, includinginformation on the production, consumption, and dis-tribution of alcoholic beverages, has disappeared fromstandard reference sources.

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Yet, the institutional resources committed to studyingand solving the problem remain skimpy. Two yearsago it was suggested that a "family council" beestablished under the Academy of Sciences to encour-age discussion of the ailing Soviet marriage and

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Published statistics based on consumption of state- 25X1

produced alcohol do not give the full picture, however.Illegal samogon (Russian slang for moonshine) hastraditionally contributed a major share of the totalalcohol consumed in the USSR. Although the real 25X1magnitude of this consumption is not known because.....the Soviets do not publish data on the subject,

one Soviet academician estimate that t125X1daily consumption of samogon increased from less 25X1than 1 liter per urban adult in the period 1955-57, to •over 2 liters per adult in the late 1970s.


— 14 nocnegssiii sonpoc: mix Ubi nposoAwre cooscso6oAnoe spew?

In this cartoon an interviewer asks a Soviet how Krokodil Che spends his free time. Alcohol abuse is ridi-culed in Soviet media, but the lack of leisuretime activities probably contributes to the prob-lem.

The principal conclusionis that alcoholism is on the rise in the Soviet

Union. per capita consump-tion of state-produced alcohol reached 9.23 liters in1979, an increase of 285 percent since 1955. Accord-ing to reliable estimates based on demographic dataand forensic medicine reports, moreover, deaths fromacute alcohol poisoning have been rising very rapidlysince the late 1960s and reached 40,000 in 1976 or15.9 deaths per 100,000 population. (In the same year,deaths in the United States from alcohol poisoningwere recorded at 400 or 0.18 per 100,000 population.)Such grim statistics arc believed to reflect both thelow quality of ethanol used in the production of

13

alcoholic beverages and the inadequacy of medicalattention to the problem (death from alcohol poisoningcan usually be prevented by prompt medical atten-tion). 25X1

Soviet press accounts affirm the dimensions of theproblem. For example, an article written jointly by aneconomist and a sociologist recently argued that"drunkenness is a threat to the social well-being of theentire nation and is a threat to the vital capabilities ofthe population." In a recent issue of Molodoy kom-munist, R. Lirmyan, a professor at the Academy ofthe USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, reported that37 percent of the male work force is chronicallydrunk, compared with 11 percent in 1925. The num-ber of drinkers under the age of '18 has also risensharply. In 1925 only 16.6 percent of those under age18 drank, whereas the proportion of today's under-age-18 drinkers exceeds 90 percent. Alcoholismamong women is growing as well. A study appearingin Literaturnaya gazeta found that, in 1970, one in 10alcoholics was female—a jump from the rate of one in15 women at the beginning of the century.

25X1Alcohol's Toll. The social consequences of drinking,are evident in Soviet publications, which have repof.'-'^'ed that more than half of all crimes in the USSR in 25x11971 were committed by intoxicated people, including90.9 percent of the cases of hooliganism, 76.4 percentof reported rapes, and 73.9 percent of all murders. Inthe case of teenagers, according to an April 1979edition of Trud, 70 to 80 percent of crimes committedwere linked to drinking.

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Table 2 Rubles per year

Personal Income and Expenditures on AlcoholicBeverages Per Person Age 15 Years and Older,by Republic, 1970 a

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PersonalIncome

Expenditures Expenditureson Alcohol on Alcohol

in PersonalIncome(percent)

USSR 1,124 146.5 13.0RSFSR 1,174 185.9 15.8

Ukraine 1,033 108.2 10.5Belorussia 1,054 119.9 11.4Uzbekistan 1,078 92.3 8.6Kazakhstan 1,118 162.1 14.5Georgia 1,027 65.1 6.3Azerbaijan 942 61.3 6.5Lithuania 1,289 141.9 11.0Moldavia 1,012 86.9 8.5

Latvia 1,276 179.1 14.0Kirghizia 993 131.1 13.2Tajikistan 941 65.0 6.9Armenia 1,145 74.9 6.5Turkmenistan 1,142 104.7 9.2Estonia 1,365 189.4 b 13.9

• Personal income data converted to income per person 15 years oldand older. Expenditures on alcoholic beverages include public diningmarkup.b Estonia is the only Soviet republic for which sales of "other foods"including alcoholic beverages have not been published since the early1960s. The value used here is a rough estimate. 25X1

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percentage of retarded children. According to theMoscow Psychiatric Research Institute, among alco-holic women the frequency of miscarriages, stillbirths,and deaths of babies in the first two years of life isthree to five times the national average. One-third of 25X1all children born to alcoholic mothers are mentallyretarded.1

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Consumption of alcohol is also a major contributingfactor to the rise in the divorce rate in the USSR. In astudy conducted in Orel (a region of the RussianRepublic) in the early 1970s, 71.4 percent of thewomen who filed for divorce cited their husbands'drinking as the primary cause for this action. Asimilar study completed in Riga in 1977 found thatapproximately 30 percent of the couples filing fordivorce mentioned alcohol abuse as the main reasonfor the dissolution of their marriage. A recent studyby Soviet demographer V. Perevedentsev deemed thatnearly half of all divorces initiated by women were onthe basis of their husbands' drunkenness. [

Losses to the Soviet economy caused by alcoholism are significant as well.

otal medical and rehabilitation expenditures foralcoholics approximate 2.2 billion rubles annually. Inaddition, alcoholism is responsible for loses in produc-tivity, reduced quality of output, industrial accidents,and high turnover of personnel. A Soviet journal hasreported that drinking on the job reduces productivityup to 30 percent. Regarding the impact of alcoholabuse on the quality of output, one study in Eko (thejournal of the Siberian branch of the Academy ofSciences) concluded that 40 grams of alcohol de-creased a worker's precision of movement by over 10percent. Every fourth industrial accident in the SovietUnion, moreover, is the result of drinking as areapproximately 37 percent of all traffic fatalities. In1975 nine out of 10 cases of tardiness or absenteeismwere reported to be caused by drinking.{

Economic losses also result from the diversion of everlarger amounts of the country's agricultural output toproduce alcohol. In addition to the agricultural prod-ucts used by the state to manufacture alcoholicbeverages, the production of samogon preempts asignificant share of the agricultural output as well.Particularly wasteful is the distillation of samogonfrom such ingredients as bread-the price of which isheavily subsidized by the state and thus less costlythan other ingredients for moonshiners to use.

Infant mortality is another serious consequence ofoverconsumption of alcohol. F. Uglov, a full memberof the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, hascalled attention to this danger and also to the relation-ship between alcoholic mothers and the increase in

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Dealing With the Problem. Sovietexperts attribute the severity of alcoholism in theUSSR to urbanization, industrialization, boredom,and the lack of consumer goods. The regime has notfought the problem by addressing fundamentalcauses. Rather, authorities have relied on propaganda,medical treaiment, and price increases. Soviet offi-cials use the media, film, and lectures to publicize thevarious negative effects of heavy drinking, but such propaganda campaigns have fallen on deaf ears.

Although the Soviets maintain an extensive system oftreatment facilities for alcoholic patients rangingfrom sobering-up stations to labor-treatment camps,the effectiveness of these treatment strategies remainslow. At the All-Union Psychiatric Congress in June1981, it was reported that in the Ukraine between 85and 90 percent of those treated revert to alcoholabuse. A Soviet medical report issued in 1974 alsorevealed that at least half the patients at labor-treatment camps resort to former drinking patternssoon after release. The lack of success of the Sovietmedical establishment in treating alcoholism is ex-plained by both the absence of a national program tocoordinate treatment and the fact that, according to astudy by a Soviet Ukrainian in 1981, 90 percent of allalcoholics receiving treatment have had the problemfive to 10 years before receiving initial therapy.

The Soviets have also sought to enact stricter lawsagainst those who are found intoxicated at work,including deprivation of bonuses and denial of permis-sion to use recreation centers. The effectiveness ofthese laws has been minimal, however, because laborshortages often force employers to cover up for alco-holic workers.

Rather than curbing Soviet citizens' intake of alcohol,the price increases appear to have led to more of thefamily budget going toward the purchase of alcoholor, in some cases, individuals switching to the cheaper,illegally distilled samogon. How the regime copeswith costs of alcohol abuse in the USSR is a continu-ing dilemma, with important socioeconomic dimen-sions.

Along with the monopoly on legal production and saleof alcohol, the regime has attempted to use pricing tocontrol consumption as well. A September 1981 de-cree raised the retail price of alcohol by an average of17 to 27 percent. Soviet figures indicate that, onaverage, about every tenth ruble in the family budgetis spent on alcohol and that in some rural areaspurchases of spirits consume nearly 30 percent offamily incomes (see table 2). In fact, the distillingindustry provides the largest income (10 to 12 percentof all state revenues) to the Soviet treasury of any single production enterprise in the country.

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The United State. Government ha* not recognizedthe incorporation of Eatania. Latvia, and Lithuaniainto the Soviet Union. Other boundary representationI. not necessarey authoritative.

Arctic Ocean

tn.

Mold.wiaS.S.R.

UkrainiaS.S.R.

Sea of Okhotsk

633278 12-82

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Demographic PolicyDemographic trends are also likely to increase nation-ality tensions and complicate Soviet decisions onresource allocations. According to published Soviet 25X1

data, the Russians are losing their majority status,and the Slavic and European areas of the USSR areshort of labor. Although the regime has adopted adifferentiated demographic policy designed to spurpopulation growth first in the Far Eastern, Siberian,and European regions of the Soviet Union and then inCentral Asia and the Caucasus, this effort can havean impact only in the long run. The policy, moreover,will not allow the regime to avoid the important

25X1economic, social, and political choices that will cut across nationality concerns during this decade.

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Centralization Versus Decentralization 25X1Economic administration and decisionmaking are alsomade more difficult because of the multinationalcharacter of the Soviet state. The need for greatereconomic effectiveness generates pressures for decen-tralization, which in turn could diminish the party'spolitical control. Khrushchev's decision to decentral-ize economic management under Sovnarkhozy (re-gional economic councils) was quickly reversed in theearly 1960s, at least partly because it appeared toencourage localist tendencies. Decentralization, none-theless, still has its proponents, with Georgian leaderShevardnadze among the most vocal. The issue isespecially contentious now as aspects of the new

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The Nationality Issue

Soviet nationality policy—the granting of nationalistlinguistic, territorial, and, to some extent, cultural andadministrative autonomy; raising the standard of liv-ing; expanding the education base; and using policeforce when needed—has been largely successful. Cur-rently, there is no widespread, politically disruptiveprotest or dissent among the 20 major nationalitygroups. Recent social and economic trends that arenot readily responsive to policy, however, provide thebasis for development of nationality discontent in thecountry: a rising national consciousness among themany ethnic groups, demographic change and eco-nomic problems, and the erosion of the supranationalCommunist ideology as a legitimating force. Accord-ingly, nationality discontent represents a latentthough potent vulnerability of the Soviet regime.

Sources of Conflict

Some aspects of Soviet nationality policy create ten-sion between the regime and its minority peoples.Efforts to promote bilingualism—use of Russian as asecond, if not a first, language—have created someresentment, and recent demographic policy hasseemed to favor Slays. Ethnic issues have, moreover,become interconnected with the party's efforts toallocate scarce resources among competing regionalclaimants.

RussificationLanguage policy is a sensitive issue in the USSR.Soviet authorities have consciously sought to makeRussian the lingua franca of the Soviet Union both tofacilitate communication and, most importantly, tointegrate, if not assimilate, many diverse people into acommon culture. Such linguistic Russification hasbeen partially successful. The 1979 census shows thatuse of Russian as a second language is increasing (seetable 3), but complete linguistic assimilation is far inthe future. Only 13 percent of the non-Russian popu-lation use Russian as a first language. Soviet efforts topush it, moreover, have produced a backlash of resent-ment. the US Embassyreported that in Georgia, for example, there wereprotests in 1978 against dropping Georgian as the

state language of the republic (the government backeddown). In 1980, 365 Georgian scholars issued a publicappeal for the retention of the native language inacademic life, and Western observers reported that inMarch 1981 more than 1,000 Georgians staged apublic demonstration to express their concern aboutlanguage policy. In the Baltic republics there havebeen similar protests over Sovietov.et .ancruacre nnlieiec


Percentage Regarding Language of Given Nationalityas Native Language

1959 1970 1979

Russians 99.8 99.8 99.9

Ukrainians 87.7 85.7 82.8

Belorussians 84.2 80.6 74.2

Percentage Claiming a Good Knowledgeof Russian as a Second Language

1970 • 19790.1

0.1

36.3

49.849.0

57.0

UzbeksKazakhsTajiks

TurkmensKirghiz

Azerbaijanis

97.6Armenians

89.9

Georgians 98.6 98.4 98.3

Lithuanians 97.8 97.9 97.9Latvians 95.1 95.2 95.0

Estonians

Moldavians 95.2 95.0

93.2 36.1 47.4

98.291.4

97.990.7

16.630.121.3

29.538,626,7

95.2 95.5 95.3

35.945.229.0

52.1

56.7

24.2

98.498.498.1

98.998.7

98.698.098.598.998.8

98.597.597.898.797.9

14.541.815.415.419.1

49.352.329.6

25.429,4

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Table 3Native Language Affinity and Knowledgeof Russian As a Second Language

Soviet food program (May 1982) are being debated-with proponents of regional control of agriculture atodds with Moscow-based proponents of centralizedcontrol.

ResourcesAllocation of resources among competing administra-tive and regional claimants is difficult in the best oftimes. This issue has become particularly sharp in thelast decade and will undoubtedly be a highly conten-tious issue in the 1980s as resources become increas-ingly scarce. Put simply, the Soviets do not have theresources to invest huge sums equally and simulta-neously in the sparsely populated but resource-richareas of Siberia, the older industrial areas of Europe-an Russia and the Ukraine, and the USSR's rapidlygrowing, but underdeveloped, Muslim areas. Theregional investment issue contributed in part to aleadership purge in the Ukraine in the early 1970s.

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Problems on the Periphery

Nationalism has not lost its political or emotionalforce in the USSR. The main forces of integration,modernization, and industrialization have themselvescontributed to the growth of discrete ethnic feelings.Several areas-Central Asia, the Baltics, the Cauca-sus, and the Ukraine-have populations that exhibitaspects of ethnic self-assertion that could, over thevery long term, lead to ethnic unrest and nationalistturmoil.

The Baltic RepublicsLong-term demographic, economic, and social trendsin the Baltic republics-particularly in Estonia andLatvia-favor gradual assimilation of these groups

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_1959 1970

Russians 114,114 129,015

Lithuanians 2,326 2,665

Latvians 1,400 1,430

Estonians 989 1,007


Table 4Comparison of Russian and Baltic PopulationGrowth, 1959, 1970, and 1979

Number of Persons of Given Nationality (thousands) Percentage Increase

into the dominant Russian mold. The pressures gener-ated by these developments, nonetheless, have led tosporadic violence and dissident activity and will makeMoscow's relationship with the Baltics peoples con-tentious for some time to come. Moscow appears tobelieve that these problems are manageable and al-lows its local prefects some leeway in appealing tolocal concerns. The Soviet leadership, however, hasdone little to alter policies that endanger the identityand native languages of the Baltic republics, andcontinued social strife over this issue is likely.

Population Trends in the Baltics. Demographic de-velopments pose a significant threat to the preserva-tion of a distinctive national identity among Estoniansand Latvians (see table 4). Both groups have very lowbirth and marriage rates, and high divorce and abor-tion rates. The favorable economic conditions in theseareas—a comparatively high standard of living, agood technical base, and relatively higher productivi-ty—combined with a manpower shortage have, fur-thermore, attracted huge numbers of Russian immi-grants. As a result, both native groups are likely tobecome minorities in their own republics by the end ofthe century. Ethnic Latvians comprise only 54 percentof their republic's population, and Estonians representless than 65 percent of theirs. In both republics,moreover, Russians enjoy majority status in majorcities including the capitals of Riga and Tallinn.

Local Hostility. Latvians and Estonians recognize thelink between industrialization, Russian immigration,and Russification pressure. Petitions have circulated

1979 1960-70 1971-79

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therecent economic s ow cnI—M-lit an t e subsequent deteri-oration in food supplies have also had a souring effecton relations between the Baits and the Russians. TheBaltic republics have traditionally enjoyed a relativelyplentiful supply of meat and dairy products and blamethe Russians for the reversal in the situation, datingfrom the mid-1970s. In late 1976 meat virtuallydisappeared from Latvian markets. Residents of therepublic were convinced that locally produced food-stuffs were being exported contrary to republic needs.A rash of violent incidents during 1977-78, includingthe sabotaging of trains headed for the RussianRepublic and the setting of fires at meat warehouses.suggested widespread resentment. By 1979 public 25X1discontent had also reached serious levels in Estonia.

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Despite the manifestations of nationalist discontent,the nationalist movements in the Baltic areas appear 25X1to suffer from a lack of formal leadership. Nationalistgroups lack consensus on goals, and they have failedto attract a broadly based membership. Most of thesegroups have quickly evaporated in the face of KGBpressure. Although the Baltic peoples tenaciouslycling to their language and culture, political autono-my or independence is not a realistic option, especiallyin the face of long-term demographic trends. Giventhis situation, the strategy of permitting some degreeof religious and cultural freedom while at the sametime dealing harshly with political dissent shouldserve to isolate nationalist groups and undermine theirpopular appeal.

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Language policy has become an even more sensitiveissue. The migration of Russians into the Baltics hasbrought with it increased demand for Russian lan-guage schools and increased pressure to use Russianin business transactions. In at least some areas ofLatvia and Estonia, Russian has become a prerequi-site for getting a good job or a good education. Thisthreat to local languages has spurred the developmentof anti-Russian feeling and led to civil disturbancesprotesting the heavy promotion of Russian at theexpense of native languages.

Agitation over the language issue reached crisis pro-portions in Estonia in the fall of 1980. According toEuropean press reports, several thousand studentsstaged protests in Tallinn and other cities against thecompulsory use of Russian, the scarcity of Estonianlanguage publications, and the replacement of theEstonian Minister of Education with a Russian. SixtyEstonian intellectuals later sent a letter to officialscalling for the removal of restrictions on the use ofEstonian and for measures to redress the heavy influxof Russians to their republic.

The protests appear to have had some impact. Repub-lic leaders seem more solicitous toward Estonianculture and language usage, and an all-union confer-ence on nationalities held in Latvia received widepublicity.

Lithuania Is "Different." Russification pressures aremuch less severe in Lithuania. The population growthrate among Catholic Lithuanians is much higher thanin the other two Baltic republics (see table 4). Therepublic remains predominately rural, and immigra-tion of Russians has been limited. Lithuanians, as aresult, still make up 80 percent of the republic'spopulation.

Lithuanian nationalism, nonetheless, is very strongand is directed against the Russians. As is the casewith Polish nationalism, the Roman Catholic Churchis closely identified with Lithuanian nationalism. De-spite regime pressure on believers and restrictions onthe training of new priests, officials acknowledge that75 percent of Lithuanians identify with the Catholicfaith. Regime harassment has, nonetheless, drivenmuch of the Church's activity underground. Thisunderground activity includes the publishing of the

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samizdat (illegal) periodical Chronicle, the longeststanding dissident publication in Lithuania. In 1979the Church even spearheaded a petition drive (collect-ing 350,000 signatures) demanding Lithuanian inde-pendence.

Ambivalence Over Poland. According to Embassyreporting, developments in Poland appear to havearoused mixed feelings in the Baltic area. On the onehand, many native residents admire the courage andinitiative of Polish workers in pressing the regime. Onthe other hand, they believe that Poland already has ahigher standard of living than the USSR and resentSoviet assistance that subsidizes Polish consumption.There appears to be widespread agreement, moreover,that Solidarity-type movements are simply not possi-ble in the USSR.

Local authorities, nonetheless, apparently believe thatPolish developments could produce some sympathyand made some largely symbolic adjustments in policyin the first months after worker unrest in Poland inAugust 1980. Officials in Latvia and Lithuania exhib-ited a new concern for workers' rights and interests inan attempt to head off any local agitation inspired bythe Polish model. In both Latvia and Lithuania,workers were elevated to membership in each repub-lic's Central Committee Bureau, an unusual honor.

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The UkraineThe Ukrainians are the largest and most influentialnational minority in the USSR. Their republic is themost populous, politically powerful, and economicallyimportant of the 14 minority republics. According tothe 1979 census, Ukrainians comprise 16 percent ofthe USSR's population and 74 percent of the popula-tion of the Ukrainian Republic. Politically, Ukraini-ans have fared well in Moscow, gaining substantialpolitical representation since Stalin's death. On thelocal level, the Ukrainian party is the largest regionalparty organization in the USSR, and its upper eche-lons are dominated by Ukrainians.

Although the Ukraine is relatively well integratedpolitically and socially into the Soviet state, potentialproblem areas remain. There has never been a strongRussian presence in the western part of the Ukraine,which was annexed by the Soviets during World WarII. Less than 5 percent of the population in mostwestern oblasts and under 8 percent in all of thewestern oblasts are Russian. The Uniate Church,moreover, a symbol of Ukrainian ethnic identity, isalso centered in the western part of the republic.Despite the antireligious pressures on it and theperiodic repressions of the Stalin and Khrushchevyears, the Church remains loyal to Rome and main-tains ties with coreligionists in Poland, Czechoslova-kia, and Italy.

The active promotion of the Russian language hasbeen bitterly resented by Ukrainian dissidents as well.Khrushchev's proposal in the late 1950s makingUkrainian an elective (rather than required) languagein Russian schools in the republic generated consider-able local opposition. Samizdat (illegal) publicationshave continued to protest the regime's handling ofUkrainian language and culture.

Recent reporting indicates that language assimilationpressures have not abated. Russian remains the pre-dominant language in higher education; in 1980 ap-parently only 34 percent of lectures at universities inthe republic were offered in Ukrainian. A significantportion of literary and scientific publications in the Ukraine, moreover, are only offered in Russian.

Ukrainian dissent has evolved away from the armedanti-Soviet resistance of World War II and the imme-diate postwar years toward a nationalism that isavowedly Marxist in content and appeals to Ukrainianelites. Oles Honchar, for example, published a novelcritical of the Russification process while retaining hisposition as head of the Ukrainian Writers Union. TheUkrainian party leadership (under former party leaderPyotr Shelest) has even used Ukrainian nationalism asa manipulative tool to get the most from Moscowwhile fostering relative toleration of such sentiment athome. Shelest protected some Ukrainian nationalistsin the 1960s while he championed economic decen-tralization and pushed to get the most for theUkraine's coal sector, while publicly complaining thathis republic was not receiving its fair share of resourceallocations in comparison with the Tyumen oilfields.Shelest even wrote a history of the Ukrainian peoplethat veered away from heretofore traditional Sovietinterpretations of Ukrainian nationalism. Such ac-tions made Shelest vulnerable to charges of bourgeoisnationalism and led in part to his removal as Ukraini-an party leader in 1972 and dismissal from the 25X1Politburo in 1973.

Impact af Poland. The Ukraine, like the Baltics, issusceptible to East European influence. The westernUkraine has historical ties with countries of thisregion, and Ukrainians are on both sides of the Sovietborder. As with the Czechoslovak crisis in 1968, 25X1Soviet Ukrainians have shown interest in events inPoland. 'Ukrainians fol-lowed events in Poland by listening to Polish televisionand radiobroadcasts and by reading underground

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25X1Regime Crackdown. Although there remains a perva-sive sense of Ukrainian ethnic identity and pride inUkrainian language, history, and culture, nationality-based separatism is a more latent than actual threatnow. The authorities have been very successful in 25X1controlling all kinds of dissent in the Ukraine byarresting the dissenters. Vladimir Shcherbitskiy, thecurrent party head, moreover, has moved effectivelyto rein in the nationalist manifestations tolerated byhis predecessor through extensive personnel changes among administrators of cultural affairsj

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Table 5Comparison of Russian and Central AsianPopulation Growth, 1959, 1970, and 1979

Number of Persons of Given Nationality (thousands) Percentage Increase

1959 • 1970 1979 1960-70 1971-79Russians 114,114 129,015 137,397 13.1 6.5Uzbeks 6,015 9,195 12,456 52.9 35.5Kazakhs 3,622 5,299 6,556 46.3 23.7Tajiks 1,397 2,136 2,898 52.9 35.7Turkmens 1,002 1,525 2,028 52.2 33.0Kirghiz 969 1,452 1,906 49.8 31.3

newspapers

\ The result of suchactivity is hard to gauge. Although events in Poland,prior to martial law, may have raised the vague hopefor eventual change in the Ukraine, the regime hassought to counter the impact by stepped-up propagan-da efforts.

Census data for 1979 indicate that Muslims are

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strongly inclined to concentrate in their native areas.For the major Muslim ethnic groups, at least 77percent and as many as 93 percent reside in their ownrepublics. This stay-at-home attitude has complicatedthe regime's efforts to use excess Central Asian laborin European Russia and Siberia. The Kremlin appar-ently will not be able to use this surplus labor pooleffectively without making significant cultural con-cessions and providing more material incentives orusing coercion.

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Central AsiaThis area remains culturally and socially resistant toSoviet assimilation. Islam, despite regime efforts,continues to have a strong influence on the way of lifein Muslim areas and serves to preserve a strong senseof national identity. This distinctiveness has compli-cated Soviet demographic policy, resource allocationdecisions, and military conscription. It does not seemlikely, however, to produce significant violent opposi-tion to the regime in the near future.

Demographic Trends. A demographic explosion isoccurring in Central Asia (see table 5). Birth rates inthe Muslim republics are from 1.5 to 2.5 times thosein predominantly Slavic republics. By the year 2000,these republics will contain some 20 percent of theSoviet population, up from some 15 percent at pres-ent. Moreover, by the end of the century 40 percent ofall Soviet children under age 10 will come fromMuslim areas.

Allocation Demands. The growing population in Cen-tral Asia is already increasing pressure on the regimeto increase allocations for industrial development andfor services to avoid a decline in the standard of livingand employment. Soviet planners have recently ac-knowledged that such demographic considerationsshould play a greater role in central planning. AGosplan deputy department chief even argued that allnew industries should be located in regions with highpopulation growth. Central Asian leaders (Kunayev,Rashidov, and Gapurov), moreover, lobbied hard formore funds for water diversion projects at the 26thParty Congress. Yet, the Soviet economy is alreadyoverburdened by defense expenditures, the need tomodernize increasingly obsolete industrial plants andequipment in the European USSR, and the desire toexploit the resources of the Far East and Siberia. InTashkent in March 1982, Brezhnev, in fact, went out

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The Soviet military may have to rely increasingly on Muslimnationalities to fill military ranks. Above, Corporal Abdyldayev. aKirghiz, is welcomed by his village elders.

of his way to dampen demands for more resources andto call for Central Asians to migrate to areas wherethey are needed more.

Implications for the Military. The demographicproblem also has ramifications for the military.' Theincreasing non-Slav share of the draft-age populationwill alter the composition of the Soviet armed forces.

in 1980, non-Slayshad risen to about a third of the draft-age popula-tion—for the first time Russians were in the minor-ity—and it projects that nearly 40 percent of 18-year-olds will be non-Slays by the end of the decade. TheMuslim republics will contribute some 30 percent ofthe draft-age population in that period. This growing

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number of Muslim conscripts in the SOviet militarycould affect the army's capability, morale, and reli-ability. 25X1The Soviet military requires educated soldiers who 25X1are proficient in Russian, but Central Asian recruits,

proticiency. As a consequence, Muslim soldiers havedo not have such

25X1been relegated to rear services' menial positions andconstruction troops. 25X1The presence of a higher percentage of Central Asiantroops in the coming years will also place pressure onthe regime to integrate these troops into the militarymore effectively. The military leadership has alreadydemonstrated sensitivity to nationality tensions in the

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armed forces and Russian chauvinism among itsofficers. An article published in Krasnaya zvezda in1980 appeared aimed at countering discriminatorypractices suffered by enlisted men and officers ofminority origin. Defense Minister Ustinov's ArmedForces Day address (23 Febuary 1982) echoed thistheme, stressing the need to increase non-Slavic repre-sentation in the officer corps.

Early in 1982 a new conscription law essentiallyeliminated educational deferments. This stop-gapmeasure will have only a marginal effect on the

Soviet military, however. It alsowill add to the Soviets' difficulty in providing aneducated civilian labor force.

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The Afghan experience, against the broader backdropof social and ethnic friction between Russians andnon-Slays, suggests also that the Soviet General Staffmay become less confident about the loyalty or obedi-ence of units in the event of potentially unpopularfuture military interventions. The invasion, particu-larly in its early stages, appears to have aroused someresentment among Central Asians. Riots were report-ed at a Tashkent induction center, and spontaneousdemonstrations against the intervention also occurredat the military commissariats in Issyk and Chilik,Kazakhstan. Muslim reservists in Afghanistan, more-over, may have refused to fire on their Muslim brothers in Afghanistan/

The rapid replacement of—Central Asian reservists in Afghanistan by regular

and mostly Slavic troops suggests in any case thatthey were not effective in dealing with the situationthe Soviets encountered there.

Islamic Fundamentalism. Moscow has always viewedreligion as a competitor for the loyalty of the Sovietpeople and has dealt directly with this threat inMuslim areas. The regime has been fairly successfulin controlling the public manifestations of Islam bylimiting the number of mosques, supervising the prac-tice of the faith through police and governmentaladministration, and restricting the number of admis-sions to its theological seminaries located in Bukharaand Tashkent.

Islam, nonetheless, maintains a strong grip on theculture of the Central Asian peoples and hinders thecreation of a uniform national culture. According toSoviet sociologists I !virtually allSoviet Muslims continue to marry within the faith,circumcise their sons, bury their dead in their owncemeteries, and observe a host of distinctive customsthat the regime has struggled for years to eradicate.To judge by articles in the press and leadership•speeches, local officials are troubled, moreover, by thenumber of "unofficial mosques" and the continuedexistence of Sufi brotherhoods (semisecret religiousgroups), which once formed the backbone of the mostmilitant anti-Soviet movement in the Caucasus. Thesensitivity to Sufi influence was indicated in a recentarticle in a party journal by a Muslim party leaderwho inveighed against "the acts of religious fanaticsand self-appointed mullahs."

The revolution in Iran and the Soviet intervention inAfghanistan, moreover, have made Islamic funda-mentalism a current issue for the leadership, andthese events play on the psychological fears of theMoscow-based leadership. Numerous public state-ments demonstrate official anxiety on this score. InDecember 1980, in an address to republic KGBofficers, then Azerbaijan Party First Secretary Gey-dar Aliyev emphasized the need for tighter securitymeasures on the Soviet-Iranian border, Aliyev'sspeech followed a tough statement by the republic 25X1KGB head warning that American intelligence ser-vices would attempt to use the situations in Iran andAfghanistan to influence Soviet Muslims. The regime

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it provides no procedural guarantees for exercisingthis right. The constitution also endorses the right ofantireligious propaganda (Article 124) to combat reli-gious beliefs. All former church property is owned bythe state, and state permission is required to use it forreligious purposes. Religious organizations wishing tohold services must register with the Council forReligious Affairs, the watchdog organ of the Councilof Ministers. 25X1

Religious groups that are not sufficiently compliantare not registered by the regime, effectively denyingthem legal status. Members of such unregistered 25X1groups are subject to harassment, and their leadersrisk arrest and imprisonment. According to Embassyreporting, various religious dissenters (especially Pen-tecostals, whose sects are not officially recognized bythe state) have been arrested in large numbers. Jewishemigration has slowed to a trickle—this probably hasmeant a growth of the "refusenik" (one who has beenrefused permission to emigrate) ranks—and the smallopposition group operating within the Russian Ortho-dox Church has been decimated by arrests.

25X1Religious belief, nonetheless, remains alive in theSoviet Union. Although no firm count exists, Soviet 25x1officials have admitted that as much as 15 to 25 percent of the population are believers.'


Dissent in the Soviet Union

The range of political, religious, and cultural discon-tent that is expressed in the Soviet dissident move-ment does not now seriously challenge the regime'spolitical control, but the regime deals with it as if itdoes. The KGB has moved against "antisocialistelements" with considerable zeal, and many dissidentactivists have been arrested and harassed.

Although the government has succeeded in isolatingand repressing dissident activity (see table 6), theregime's harsh reaction almost assures that the dissi-dent problem will continue. The regime's actions,moreover, reflect its own psychological insecurity andits unwillingness to allow any hint of challenge to itsauthority. The party, aware of its own evolution froma small conspiratorial group enjoying little popularsupport to a powerful body in control of the revolu-tionary process, feels it can take no chances. Theleadership is also well aware that popular discontentover issues involving living standards—food, housing,and consumer goods—could in time form the basis fornew, and potentially more challenging, dissidentmovements.

Aside from official repression, the dissident movementhas been hampered by its own internal divisions; it hasbeen fragmented, with various groups appealing todiverse internal audiences. The human rights move-ment, for example, has been unable to broaden itsappeal to include workers. Religious and nationalminorities, moreover, have tended to define their goalsnarrowly, failing to relate them to the broader strug-gle for civil liberties. The movement has also lacked acharismatic leader who might through force of per-sonality rally the disparate religious, nationalist, andhuman rights groups into a cohesive whole.

Religious Dissent

Soviet Marxists assert that religion should have norole in a socialist state. The Soviet Communist Party,in turn, has been unwilling to tolerate any rival claimon the loyalty and behavior of Soviet citizens, and ithas tried since the first decree on religion in 1918 tosuppress religious activity and belief. Although theconstitution provides for freedom of religious worship,

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In some Soviet republics the traditional religious faithis reinforced by minority nationalism. The localchurch often acts as a catalyst for nationality move-ments and as the guardian of a cultural tradition thatresists assimilation into the Soviet mainstream. The

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Monitor Soviet compliance Moscow Branch disbandedwith CSCE accords. 8 September 1982; others arePublicize human rights

inactive.abuses.


Table 6Major Dissident Individuals and Organizations a

Name

Origin and Important Members

Goals and Activities

Current Status

Helsinki Monitoring GroupBranches in Moscow, theUkraine, Lithuania, Geor-gia, and Armenia

Founded in May 1976 by Yuriy Orlov.Anatoliy ShcharanskiyYelena Bonner bTatyana OsipovaVyacheslav BakhminEduard ArutyunyanZviad GamsakhurdiyaNaum Meiman b

Sofia Kallistratova f -Ona Lukauskaite-Poshkeine b

Balys GayauskasMalva LandaOlcsana MeshkoViktoras PetkusAleksandr PodrabinckIvan KovalevFeliks SerebrovVladimir SlepakAnatoliy Marchenko

Psychiatric Abuses Watch Offshoot of Moscow Helsinki GroupGroup (with some overlapping membership).

Alelcsandr PodrabinekKiri11 PodrabinekAnatoliy KoryaginFeliks SerebrovVyacheslav Bakhmin

Publicize official abuse of InaCtive.psychiatry to suppress politi-cal dissent.

Amnesty InternationalUSSR Chapter

Andrey Sakharov

Founded in 1973. Officially recognizedby London headquarters in 1974.

Zviad GamsakhurdiyaSergey KovalevYuriy OrlovMikola RudenkoAndrey SakharovAnatoliy ShcharanskiyGeorgiy Vladimov

Human rights spokesman.

Supports position stated in Inactive.the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights regardingthe rights and welfare ofpolitical prisoners.

Leading spokesman for po-litical liberalization in theUSSR.Rallying point for many dis-sident groups.

Internal exile in Gorki), sinceJanuary 1980.

Christian Committee forDefense of Believers' Rights

Established in December 1976 by Rus-sian Orthodox priests and laymen.

Father Gleb YakuninViktor Kapitanchuk

Ensure rights of believers to Inactive.live according to their con-victions.Will assist anyone persecut-ed because of religious be-liefs regardless of specificcreed.

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Table 6 (continued)

Name

Origin and Important Members


Current Status

No hope of receiving exit per-mission in foreseeable future.

Active, but on reduced scale.

SMOT (Unofficial Trade Founded in October 1978 by VladimirUnion) Borisov.d Modeled on short-lived trade

union established by VladimirKlebanov.

Vsevolod KuvakinMark MorozovNikolay NikitinVladimir SlcvirskiyValery Senderov

Vashchenko and Chymkha- Pentecostals from Siberia who enteredb y families US Embassy in Moscow in June 1978.

Chronicle of the Lithuanian First identified in 1968. Due to severeCatholic Church

official harassment, editorial staff isconstantly changing.

Want exit permission to goto Israel. Lidiya Vashchenkostaged hunger strike earlierthis year in an unsuccessfulattempt to force regime togrant exit permission. Shewas allowed to return to herhome in Chernogorsk.Reports on activities of vari-ous dissident groups and onviolations of human rights inLithuania.Records nationalistic and re-ligious activities of Lithua-nians; publicizes these activ-ities in the West.

Protect rights of workers. May be active underground.Assist workers in bringinggrievances before authori-ties.Attempt to organize unoffi-cial unions in factories.

Initiative Group for Defenseof Rights of Invalids

Solzhenitsyn Fund

Founded in May 1978.Valeriy Fefelov d

Yuriy Kiselgv b

Olga Zaitseva d

Established in 1974 by A. Solzhenitsyn.Sergey KhodorovichMalva LandsIvan Kovalev

Works to protect economic Inactive.and social rights of handi-capped.Establish an official societyto ensure rights of invalidsare protected.

Provides support for political Active.prisoners and families, andthose unemployed becauseof human rights activity.Also aids unofficial Baptistorganizations.

Dudko Group Established in early 1970s.Father Dmitriy Dudko eLev Regelson eFather Gleb Yakunin

Supporters of Father Inactive.Dmitriy Dudko, a RussianOrthodox priest who openlycriticized spiritual emptinessof Soviet life; accused Rus-sian Orthodox hierarchy ofpassive compliance with gov-ernment repression of reli-gion.Free Russian OrthodoxChurch from state controland bring about a religiousrevival.

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Group for the Establishmentof Trust between the USSRand the USA

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Table 6Major Dissident Individuals and Organizations a (continued)

Name Origin and Important Members


Current Status

Medium for expression of Probably inactive.diverse views on political,philosophical, and religiousissues.Advocated democratic, non-Marxist socialism.

Journal established in May 1978. Cir-culated in Moscow and LeningradDefunct as of 1980, but reappearedunder new title Poiski i razmy-shleniya(Searches and Reflections).

Valeriy AbramkinVladimir GershuniYuriy GrimmViktor NekiplovViktor Sokirko •Petr Yegides d

Founded 4 June 1982 in Moscow; 14founding members; claims many sup-porters. Has collected over 400 signa-tures on petitions in Tallinn, Leningrad,and other cities.

Sergey Batovrin •Yuriy Khronopulo •Yuriy Medvedkov •Mikhail Ostrovskiy dLudmilla Ostrovskiy d

Work to preserve interna- Active.tional peace.Promote arms dialogue be-tween USSR and UnitedStates.Attempted to organize popu-lar disarmament campaign.

• Unless otherwise indicated, individuals are in labor camps orserving terms of internal exile.b Has never been arrested.• Served prison or jail term and released.d Emigrated or forced into exile.• Arrested; forced public recantation of views; released; inactive.r Recently arrested.

Lithuanian Catholic church and the Ukrainian Uni-ate church, for example, have played central roles innationality struggles in their respective republics (seepp. 20-21).

Government policies to repress and control religiousactivity have generated resistance as well. Althoughthe creation of religious councils has allowed theregime to keep tight rein on officially sanctionedreligious activity, it has driven many religious groups(for example, the Christian evangelists) underground.Baptists and others have sought the right to establishnew religious councils free from government interfer-ence, and they have petitioned international organiza-tions to gain the world's attention to improve the lot oftheir imprisoned coreligionists.

More recently, recognizing that any change in regimepolicy was unlikely, many evangelical Christians havepressured the government for permission to emigrate.The Vashchenko family, residing in the US Embassyin Moscow for four years while seeking to leave theSoviet Union, is perhaps the best example of suchdiscontent. Moreover, according to US Embassy re-porting, some 30,000 Pentecostals and Baptists haveapplied for exit visas, with only a few families beinggranted approval.

Although the Russian Orthodox Church has longoccupied a privileged position in the Soviet state, itsobsequious submission to state interests and police

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control has led to dissident activit y among some of theChurch faithful. unofficialstudy groups and religious seminars, organized byactivists and functioning entirely outside the formalChurch structure, have succeeded in awakening inter-est in the Orthodox faith among young people. Soclose has been the Church's cooperation with Sovietauthorities that small groups of Orthodox believershave charged the Patriarch (leader) with neglectingpastoral duties and responsibilities. The ChristianCommittee for the Defense of Believers Rights, forexample, founded by Father Gleb Yakunin in themid-1970s, indicted the Church hierarchy for at-tempting to serve two masters, God and the atheisticstate. In a 1978 letter to Church officials, FatherDmitriy Dudko, another activist priest, also attackedthe Church for accepting officially imposed limita-tions on its growth, lacking "independent" bishops,and not recruiting sufficient clergy. (Dudko was sub-sequently forced to withdraw his criticisms.)

The consciousness of Soviet Jews rose during the1970s, and many of them began to concentrate theirefforts on a new goal, emigration. The Soviet Govern-ment allowed increasing numbers to emigrate

because ithoped to defuse Jewish dissidence at home withoutresorting to internal repression. The downturn in US-Soviet relations, especially after the invasion of Af-ghanistan, has apparently minimized Soviet concernover outside opinion. In 1979, 50,000 Jews werepermitted to leave the Soviet Union, but the numberdeclined to 9,100 in 1981 (see figure). Local Jewishactivists from a number of cities including Moscowreported recently that emigration officials hadstopped accepting applications altogether. If the trendof visas issued to Jews through September 1982continues, the number of Jews permitted to leave in1982 will be about 3,000.

According to US Embassy reporting, the regime hasresponded to religious protest by arrests of activists,by use of the media to discredit religion, and by theimposition of overt legal controls on the activities ofbelievers. The arrest of Father Yakunin and thepublic recantation of Father Dudko are typical of thekind of pressure that both the official church leader-ship and the state exert to keep the clergy and the

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Number of Visas Issued

60,000

50,000

il

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30,000 A ■20,000

10,000Projected •

0 1970

72 74 76

78

80

58/967 10-82

religious membership under strict discipline. ViktorBelikh, bishop of an unregistered Pentecostal congre-gation in the Ukraine, was reported by the USEmbassy to have been summoned to KGB headquar-ters in March 1982 and warned that some 70 of hiscolleagues throughout the Soviet Union faced arrestunless they complied with registration requirements.Nikolay Goretoy, another Pentecostal bishop, wassentenced to seven years in a labor camp and fiveyears of internal exile for helping his parishioners toemigrate. According to samizdat, the Western press,and the US Embassy, a number of priests and nunsactive in the underground church in Lithuania areunder arrest, and three priests have been murderedsince 1980; their deaths, in the opinion of manybelievers, officially condoned.

The antireligious theme has been prominent in thepress as well. Much of the recent media attack hasstressed the linkage of growing religious interest and

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nascent pacifist tendencies among Soviet young peo-ple. Religion is also depicted as a Western-inspiredthreat to the military strength of the USSR. Anti-religious lectures and propaganda have picked up thistheme emphasizing that:• Religious interest among youth is not compatible

with security requirements.• Encouragement for religion comes from "Western

bourgeois circles."• Religion is a form of psychological warfare inspired

by the Vatican and the CIA.

The regime has also encouraged the use ofsecular rituals including formal wedding ceremoniesin the Palace of Culture to replace the ceremonialaspects of religion.'

The revival of religion is not solely spiritual in contentbut springs from a desire to rediscover nationalidentity and escape from the barrenness of officialideology. It is, thus, likely to continue.. The securityorgans and party apparatus appear confident thatthey can control religious discontent, but any increasein repression could engender even more frequentconflict and disturbances.

Intellectual Dissent

Like the Soviet religious activists, many Soviet intel-lectuals have risked harassment, imprisonment, psy-chiatric detention, and forced exile to express theirviews about political, economic, and social conditionsin the USSR. Their perspectives are diverse, rangingfrom the Westward-looking internationalism ofAndrey Sakharov to the introspective Slavophilism ofAleksandr Solzhenitsyn. Their tactics—letters andpetitions, public demonstrations, and samizdat publi-cations—have also been varied. Regardless, the re-gime has been flexible and sophisticated in bringingthis activity under control. Although dissidence em-barrasses the regime and captures international atten-tion, it does not threaten, at present, Soviet control.


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The DissidentsThe Soviet dissident movement got its real start in thepost-Stalin political thaw. Stalin's successors permit-ted novelists, poets, and historians to publicize theirviews and, in a limited way, to criticize past statepolicy. Khrushchev even used some of these intellectu-als—notably Solzhenitsyn—in his campaign to dis-credit Stalin. 25X1

Although the domestic environment became morehostile to such activity under Brezhnev, internationalconditions have provided dissidents with more oppor-tunity to disseminate their views to a wider audience,and initially with some protection against reprisals.Sakharov particularly has used his visibility in the 25x1West and his prestige within the USSR to goodadvantage. He has spoken out 'against Soviet foreignand domestic policy, criticized the Soviet humanrights record, and organized a Human Rights Com-mittee. In 1982 he staged a hunger strike that forcedthe regime to allow his stepson's wife to emigrate.

Although Sakharov is the most visible symbol of 25X1intellectual discontent in the USSR, others havejoined him in dissent by using the human rights 25X1provisions of the Helsinki accords. The first suchgroup was established in Moscow in 1976 by physicistYuriy Orlov. Branches quickly followed in theUkraine, Lithuania, Armenia, and Georgia. Orlov'sgroup established extensive contacts with other pro-test groups, and it was especially supportive of variousethnic groups, particularly Jews and ethnic Germansin their efforts to emigrate, a right guaranteed by theaccords. 25X1An offshoot of this Helsinki Committee, the Psychiat-ric Abuse Working Group, headed by AleksandrPodrabinek, researched psychiatric abuses in theUSSR. It collected and publicized information aboutthe uses of pyschiatry for political purposes and theconfinement of dissenters in mental hospitals as aform of punishment. The resulting work, a 265-pagedossier entitled Punitive Medicine, was subsequentlypublished in the West by Amnesty International. Itdetailed over 200 cases of forced confinement and the

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NATO Review

The 'father - of Soviet dissent, Andrey Sakha-rov, who is now under internal exile in the city ofGorky.

widespread use of drugs to "cure" these patients (forinstance, get them to recant their views). This bookwas instrumental in bringing condemnation of Sovietpsychiatric practices at an international psychiatric conference held in Honolulu in 1978.

Although the Helsinki groups had concentrated pri-marily on human rights issues and generally ignoredthe economic grievances of the populace, two organi-zations were formed in the late 1970s to protect therights of workers and to address this previouslyneglected constituency. The Free Trade Union found-ed by Vladimir Klebanov in 1977 attempted to offerblue-collar workers some protection against the poorworking conditions found in the Donbas region. In1978 SMOT (Free Inter-Professional Association ofWorkers) was started by Vladimir Borisov to defendworker interests and to protect employees from arbi-trary dismissal and other punitive measures. Theorganizations were hampered by the lack of a specificpolitical program and by the failure to involve asufficient number of workers. Shortly before his arrestin April 1981, Vsevolod Kuvakin, the Moscow head ofSMOT, noted that the organization had mainly at-tracted intellectuals, not rank-and-file workers.

Reaction and SuppressionThe regime has not hesitated to move quickly againstopposition groups to ensure their isolation from oneanother and from the population at large. Althoughsensitive to Western criticism in the past, the down-turn in relations with the West and particularly withthe United States has seriously diminished the limitedforeign leverage on the regime in the human rightsarea. r

In their efforts to prohibit unsanctioned politicalactivity, the Soviet authorities are greatly aided bylegal restrictions on freedom of speech, a judicialsystem that does not recognize fundamental rights ofthe accused, and a compliant medical establishmentthat is willing to label dissidents as sociopsychopaths.Although the Soviet constitution guarantees freedomof speech, press, assembly, and demonstrations, Arti-cle 70 of the RSFSR criminal code qualifies thesefreedoms by prohibiting both "fabrications which 25X1defame the Soviet state and social system" and"propaganda carried on for the purpose of weakeningthe Soviet regime." This article is supplemented byanother (190), which forbids the circulation in oral orwritten form of fabrications that defame the Sovietstate and social system. Conviction under these arti-cles can entail imprisonment for up to seven years,with an additional term of internal exile running from

These articles have been interpreted so broadly that ,5)(1almost any statement or action can be considered Lillegal. During Stalin's tenure, even the defacing of astatue or the telling of a political joke could beprosecuted under Article 70. Post-Stalin regimes havegenerally instituted legal proceedings only as a lastresort, preferring to use lesser penalties and frequentvisits by the KGB to make the point that an individ-ual's activities could have unhealthy consequences. Ifwarnings are not heeded, sanctions can be progres-sively tightened from searches of apartments by secretpolice, to loss of job, to arrests. Often, would-beemigrants are fired from their jobs upon applying forexit visas, denied other work in the field for which

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they are trained, and threatened with punishmentunder Article 209 (parasitism—illegal failure to workor be employed).

Once dissent has reached the point where legal actionis contemplated, the regime has several strategies tochoose. Prominent activists like Anatoliy Shcharans-kiy and Orlov may be sent to a strict-regime laborcamp. Under the ambiguous provisions of the correc-tional labor code, these individuals are routinelydenied visits from relatives, medical treatment, andproper diet. The regime may choose to avoid trialpublicity altogether—as it did with militant civilrights leader Gen. Petr Grigorenko and many oth-ers—by sending dissidents directly to psychiatric hos-pitals. In those establishments administered directlyby the Ministry of Internal Affairs rather than theMinistry of Health, political activists are treated tothe full array of therapy, including drugs and shocktreatment, as if they were truly insane. Upon comple-tion of prison terms, the dissidents are frequentlyexiled. 'estimates of "politi-cal" prisoners (a characterization not recognized inSoviet law) range as high as 10,000

Mostimprisoned dissidents are in Vladimir Prison (about160 kilometers west of Moscow) or in strict andspecial-regime correctional labor colonies in Pot'maor Perm. Political prisoners are reportedly kept at 80psychiatric institutions in the Soviet Union (there areabout 300 ordinary psychiatric hospitals in the USSRand some 20 special psychiatric hospitals or prisonsrun by the Ministry of Internal Affairs).

Forced exile abroad is another remedy that the regimeemploys, usually after the dissident has served inprison. For example, by the end of 1981, such dissi-dents as Aksenov, Borisov, Daniel, Ginzburg, Grigor-enko, Kopelev, Litvinov, Maksimov, Plyushch, Sin-yavsky, Solzhenitsyn, and Voinovich were in exile inthe West.

In some cases Soviet dissidents are harassed withoutever being charged. They lose their jobs, their chil-dren are denied a higher education, and their propertyis confiscated. Soviet authorities on occasion haveincarcerated dissidents for up to a year withoutbringing them to trial. (Human rights activist Anato-liy Shcharanskiy, for example, was arrested in March1977 and tried in July 1978.) By 1982 such dissidentgroups as the Psychiatric Abuse Working Group andthe Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring Committee hadbeen rendered inactive, the Moscow Helsinki Moni-toring Group was forced to disband, and the unofficialtrade union SMOT had been driven underground (although some of its activity may persist,

Andrey Sakharov has been exiledto Gorky since 1980, effectively isolated from contactwith Western correspondents, and continually ha-rassed by the KGB.

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In the recent past the regime has been at leastpartially responsive to the foreign criticism of itstreatment of dissidents, but it has never 'relaxedinternal control. In the early 1970s, for example, theregime tacitly moderated its repression of dissidents to25x1provide a more favorable atmosphere for reachingagreements with the West, especially with the United 25X1States, for its own reasons. It might be willing to do soagain if there appeared to be some foreign policy gain.The leadership, however, remains insecure and overlysensitive to internal discontent, and it will nevervoluntarily relax its vigilant stance on dissent.

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Conclusion

Although the wide array of Soviet social and econom-ic ills is evident and well documented, observers differin their assessment of the ultimate consequences ofthese problems for the Soviet regime. Som

pelleve that the regime has beengenerally successful in keeping popular expectationswithin bounds and will continue to do so he older generation isstill optimistic about the future, and, more important-ly, most Soviet citizens are so politically apatheticthat the pressure on the regime for significant politi-cal, economic, or social change is not great. Theregime's coercive powers are so massive, moreover,that development of organized resistance to Sovietpolicies would be exceedingly difficult. Thus, al-though these observers believe the regime probablywill make some change at the margins, they do notthink it will produce fundamental or radical transfor-mation of the political system.

Some \I

Ibelieve that social and eco-nomic forces are coming together that could producepressure over the long run for profound politicalchange. This school of thought holds that the popularperception of progress, upon which the regime's legiti-macy rests so heavily, is eroding. Even the Soviet-created middle class, according to this view, is becom-ing more pessimistic and appre ensive about thefuture. The younger generationmoreover, makes its judgments of Soviet performanceby comparing standards of living in the USSR withthose in the West and even Eastern Europe—a com-parison in which the USSR comes up short. Graduallyand subtly, according to this analysis, such percep-tions may influence the political establishment orultimately even lead to a fundamental change in thepolitical system.

Both of these assessments, of course, are highlyspeculative. This type of analysis is fraught withuncertainty, very incomplete information, and widelydivergent assumptions. It is possible, nonetheless, toobtain a more systematic and integrative look at theproblems themselves, focusing particularly on how theSoviet regime views, manages, and deals with theseproblems.'

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25X1The Soviet leadership, in effect, has formulated itsown assessment of its societal problems, and thisevaluation has guided its policy response. Its prioritieshave been set by judgments concerning the immedi-acy, seriousness, and solvability of the social and 25X1economic ills it faces. Clearly, the regime gives priori-ty to problems that: 25X1• Are pOlitical issues (dissidence) as opposed to mainly

social phenomena (crime). 25X1• Have immediate potential for producing popular

discontent (consumer frustrations) as opposed topossible longer term threats (ethnic tensions). 25X1

• Are susceptible to new policies (health care) as opposed to being largely intractable (alcoholism).

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The rhetoric and actions of the current Soviet leaders,

indicate that the regime is most concerned now abouteconomic problems and their effect on the Sovietpopulace. The leadership recognizes that economic25X1problems have the potential for creating populardiscontent and political disorder—something the Po-litburo sees as a serious threat, particularly in light ofdevelopments in Poland. Such problems also adverselyaffect popular morale and worker performance, whichtend to make economic performance in the highlylabor-intensive Soviet state even poorer. Economicdifficulties, in addition, exacerbate other internal 25X1problems such as crime and corruption and make itdifficult for the regime to find the resources to dealwith such politically less significant issues as alcohol-ism and health care. As a result, the economy iscentral to achievement of the regime's goals, mainte-nance of popular support, and control of many endem-ic social problems. 25X1

25X1The regime, to judge from its actions, does not viewmany of these social ills as politically important. Theleaders may also feel that if they get the economymoving, even the endemic social problems could bebetter controlled. 25X1

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Nationalities: A Problem on the Horizon

The regime has, from its inception, been very sensitiveto the nationality dimension in Soviet politics, and itscarrot-and-stick approach has generally been appliedmost effectively. Today, for example, there is nowidespread, politically disruptive protest or nationalistdissent among the Soviet nationalities. Moreover, it isdifficult to envision any serious political difficulty forthe regime in this area in the near term. Althoughdemographic trends and regime economic policiescould exacerbate ethnic tensions in the Baltics andproduce sporadic violence, Baltic grievances havelittle impact elsewhere in the USSR, can be con-trolled, and, if necessary, suppressed.

Over the long term, however, the nationality problemwill assume much greater importance and become apotentially significant vulnerability. Demographictrends, for example, will have the greatest impact inthe next few decades, adversely impacting on labordistribution and probably increasing conflict overregional resource allocation—developments that willheighten nationality tensions. Thus, the regime's pres-ently rather successful approach toward dealing withSoviet nationalities will come under increased strainin the decades ahead, and it will require more adroithandling and perhaps changes in policies.

Political Dissent: Suppressed for Now

The regime treats any political challenge to its inter-nal authority seriously. Although dissent in the SovietUnion does not constitute a threat to the regime, theregime goes to considerable effort to make sure thedissident movement remains impotent. Thus far theSoviet leadership has been very successful in isolatingand repressing political, religious, and cultural dissentthrough widespread arrest and imprisonment of dissi-dent leaders, confinement in psychiatric hospitals, andexile. Over the next decade or so the dissident move-ment has little prospect for developing a sufficientlybroad social base to challenge the regime. In the longterm, however, dissidence could become more wide-spread—because of dissatisfaction with living stand-ards, a continuing decline in ideological commitment,and an apparent resurgence of interest in religiousfaith.

Coping With Problems:Present Policy and Future Options

From the perspective of the Soviet leadership, eco-nomic difficulties impact on the entire range of socialproblems that it must manage. Unless it can find asuccessful economic strategy, there is every likelihoodthat economic growth will stagnate, consumer frustra-tions will grow, ethnic tensions will intensify, and discontent will become more threatening.

The Brezhnev regime, although concerned about theeconomy, apparently believed its course would besuccessful over the long run and felt no need to alterit. Although the new Soviet leadership would proba-bly prefer to continue Brezhnev's course for a while(and has so far signaled its intention to do so), it is notlikely to have this luxury for very long. Reducedeconomic growth—between I and 2 percent for thisdecade—will probably compel the new leaders toconsider other options more seriously. The Politburowill have to deal more directly with whether:• Changes must be made in resource allocation strate-

gy that now favors defense and consumption overinvestment.

• Serious management reform should be undertakenthat allows some decentralization, increased use ofmaterial incentives, and a greater role for marketforces.

• More draconian and orthodox measures would rein-still discipline in society and stimulate more produc-tive labor.

• The regime should fall back on its Slavic base andraise the banner of Russian nationalism as the basisfor political legitimacy.

These choices and other related ones are interdepend-ent and define two broad policy directions futureSoviet leaders are likely to consider. A reformistpackage would probably involve:• Diversion of funds away from defense budget

growth to investment and, possibly, consumption.• Movement toward greater decentralization in eco-

nomic management (perhaps including greater reli-ance on market mechanisms to move resources andlabor).

• More political and cultural decentralization alongnationality lines.

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It is by no means certain which course or combinationof policies the new leadership will adopt. Too little isknown about its own preferences, perceptions of c25X1rent problems, and the impact that succession poli-

1 have on its deliberations.however, many middle-level officials long

tor a more forceful Soviet internal policy and belie"-greater discipline and order are sorely needed. A 25X1policy slant in this direction, thus, would seem morelikely. As the new leadership consolidates its positionand as younger officials enter the secondary ranks ofthe Politburo, we should get some clues as to the newleaders' perceptions of the problem and the coursethat has the greatest support.

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Western policies, nonetheless, may be able to exacer-bate continuing Soviet weaknesses. Although tradedoes not determine Soviet internal policy, its denialcould force more difficult resource allocation choiceson the leadership, making it pay a higher domesticprice in terms of quality of life to continue the presentpriority for defense or leading it to some cutback inthe rate of military growth. Western trade, in addi-tion, would probably be essential to any major effortat economic reform. The attraction some Western 25X1values hold for the Soviet people, moreover, canprobably be marginally exploited to increase popularpressure on the regime, but the regime's reactionwould be likely to be more harsh repression.

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No Soviet leadership has permitted such a permissivecourse. The regime could opt, on the other hand, for amore draconian approach that emphasized discipline,sacrifice, and order. This path in its extreme formwould probably lead to:• Continued high priority for military spending.• A shift in allocations away from consumption to-

ward investment.• Much greater discipline in the workplace.• Linkage of pay to work and performance and

perhaps increased sanctions against absenteeismand idleness.

• Even more centralization of power in Moscow.• Forced migration of labor and a more assertive

reliance on Russian nationalism to generate politicallegitimacy.

These policies could also be coupled with a return to aform of one-man rule as well. Such a choice wouldrequire a commitment to use harsh measures torepress the popular backlash and discontent that itwould be likely to generate.

Both options entail significant risks and uncertainties,but both would probably address some of the prob-lems the regime faces. A tilt in favor of the consumerand economic reform, for example, might addresssome of the root causes of the social malaise, spurhigher productivity, strengthen popular support forthe regime, and make societal problems more man-ageable. At the same time such a course couldinitially be both economically and socially disruptive.Economic managers would lack clear and consistentguidance for their decisions, and workers would beforced to accept a greater measure of responsibilityfor their livelihood. The authoritarian approach, onthe other hand, would increase control and preservethe regime's resource allocation preferences at theexpense of a deepening social malaise, declining pro-ductivity, possibly declining economic growth, andperhaps the exacerbation of ethnic tensions.

Given the political realities—the controversy sur-rounding either program and the difficulty reachingconsensus—some middle-range course involving ele-ments of both options could be adopted. Variouseconomic reform measures might be coupled, and areconsistent, with a more demanding attitude towardwork; defense spending growth could be cut back atthe margin; and heavy investments in agriculture

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might no longer be favored (such investment haddepended on Brezhnev's strong support). Investmentto spur long-term heavy industrial growth—the key toeconomic revival—would get additional funds.

Implications for US Policy 25X1

US and other Western influence on the evolution ofthe Soviet political system and its internal policies isquite limited. The forces supporting "liberalization"are weak and will probably become a factor only inthe very long term. Moreover, despite the evidentweaknesses of the system, Soviet history demonstratesthat the regime can still call upon deep patriotic roots.It can probably also count on continued relativepassivity of the population, particularly to externalappeals. 25X1

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