Mass Attitudes to Democracy: Approaches and Assumptions

Vanessa Liston

Dept. of Political ScienceTrinity College DublinIrelandvliston@tcd.ie 18th June 2010

Political Culture

Attitudes (Almond and Verba, Inglehart & Welzel, Putnam)

Behaviours/Ways of relating (Chilton, 1988) “Culture is what is publicly expected and subscribed to, not what is individually preferred”.

Practical Norms (Olivier de Sardan, 2008)

Wilson (2000) The many voices of political culture World Politics 52

Bratton, M. and Mattes, R (2007) Learning about democracy in Africa: Awareness, Performance, and Experience American Journal of Political Science 51:1

Demand for Democracy Support for principle:

Democracy is preferable to any other form of government

In certain situations another form of government can be preferable

To people like me it doesn’t matter. Rejection of alternatives:

Strong leaderMilitary ruleOne political party

Supply of Democracy

In your opinion how much of a democracy is (your country) today?

Generally, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in (your country)?

Political Learning Theory

Attitudes to democracy (supply and demand) -> individual and national differences in what citizens learn from short/medium and long term experience about what it does. cognitive factorsnational legaciesperformance

Cultural School

Communal. 1. sense of individual responsibility 2. sense of risk tolerance.

Poltical community. National Identity Group identity: Traditional /Modern identity Civic Attitudes: Interpersonal trust

Social Structure

Class position Lived poverty Age Rural/urban status Gender Belong to numerically dominant ethnic

group

Institutional Influence

Members of organisations Partisan id Identify with winning party They test participation

voted in most recent election participated politically between elections (working for

candidate, party, contacting leaders, formal or informal etc.)

took part in a demonstration.

Performance theory

micro-macro economic evaluations government policy performance and structural adjustment creates inequality.

Bratton and Mattes claim

People consider delivery of political goods as well as economic ones.

They compare with previous regimes (long and medium term)

Cognitive awareness of politics and procedural aspects of democracy they may develop intrinsic attachments to it

Their political learning theory

Differences in demand and perceived supply of democracy should be predicted by individual learning experiences, nationally shaped.

political learning -> basis of attitudes -> democratic consolidation

Three dimensions

Political Goods Regime Comparison

Previous regimeLong term regime experience (Life-time,

generational and collective learning models) Cognitive Awareness

Formal educationUse of news media

Political Goods

freeness and fairness of last election ability to speak their mind whether they and their group receive fair

treatment government corruption government responsiveness performance of elected representatives performance of the president trustworthiness of state institutions

Regime Comparison

Medium Term Improved quality of life Increased political rights Feel safer Less government corruption

Long Term generational learning model (regime 18yrs) Life-time learning model (years under regimes) Collective learning (dominant post-colonial regime)

Cognitive Awareness

MeasuresFormal education Cognitive engagement with politics News media use Political efficacy Political information Understanding of term democracySubstantive v Procedural understandings

METHODS

Factor analysis Hierarchical Linear Modelling

RESULTS

Explaining DEMAND Demand is based on principle

Cognitive Awareness

Culture: Risk Tolerance

Regime Comparison +Political Rights

Political Goods + Gov. Responsiveness

Economy

Democracy

Collective Learning + Legacy of competition

Explaining Perceived SUPPLY

Political Goods + Performance of President + Freeness & Fairness of last election

Economy+ Economic Evaluations+ Government Policy

Regime legacy+ multiparty legacy+ one-party w competition- Settler rule

No cognitive factors

Institutional+ Identifies with winning party

Conclusions

“By developing greater cognitive awareness of its processes, through direct experience with the fruits of political performance and through national experiences with political competition, people learn both about the content of democracy as well as its consequences.”

“Africans’ positions in the social structure, their cultural values, and their institutional affiliations have little to offer in directly explaining how they think about democracy”.

Issue 1. Perception v ‘Reality’ of SUPPLY

“Democracy has a low probability of breakdown where two conditions Citizens demand democracy Judge that they are being supplied with it (leaders have

internalized and follow democray’s institutional rules)

“Perceptions of the supply of democracy will be more salient to democracy’s actual prospects than any objective scores ratings compiled by experts”.

This form of regime will only consolidate if ordinary people judge that democracy is being supplied.

Rhetorical or Logical Argument?

Kaufmann and Kraay (2008) Governance Indicators: Where are weWhere should we be going?, The World Bank Research Observer

Objective indicators are not used

Has to be supplied for people to believe it is supplied. Is it being supplied?

There are two main points to consider : Judgement implies decision based on Fact or

Observation. Beliefs do not have to be true.

Gettier “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? http://philosophy.ucsd.edu/faculty/rarneson/Courses/gettierphilreading.pdf

Issue 2. Survey Data on DEMAND

“A sustainable democracy requires citizens who demand democracy”.

Why do African’s demand democracy? normative measures only used basis of legitimacy

assumes none other are also legitimate Instrumental possibility not considered among others

Angelina Haugaerd states that demand for democracy in the early 1990s was “not necessarily more than a convenient cover term or legitimizing symbol for widely varying local political struggles” (Kenya).

Survey data

They state they can use survey data to estimate:

Legitimacy: Citizens demand democracy

Institutionalisation: Citizens believe their political institutions produce an acceptable degree of democracy

Demand: Intrinsic AND Instrumental possible? (Not within frame of inquiry. See inner/loser gaps later)

DEMOCRACY

Access to state resources

Issue of resource scarityPatronageGroup inequalities

Citizens

Elections stakes raised

Cross-sectional data

Source: Afrobarometer (2009) Popular Attitudes toward Democracy in Kenya: A Summary of Afrobarometer Indicators, 2003-2008

Are you happy with the way democracy works?

Low probability of breakdown where there is demand and perceived supply. What about control over violence no other legitimate systems false beliefs belief reality gaps

End of history

Democrats with Adjectives

Andreas Schedler & Rodolfo Sarsfield (2007)

European Journal of Political Research

46: 637-659

Measures

Anchor Variable:

“What do you think is better for the country: Democracy that respects the rights of all persons or dictatorship that guarantees economic progress even without respecting the rights of all persons”

5 indicators of liberal democracy

Freedom of organisation Freedom of expression Freedom of expression (Pluralism of

opinion on TV) Political equality (Indigenous participation) Political equality (Gay participation)

Hierarchical Cluster Analysis

Maximise in-group similarity, between group dis-similarity

3,099 (67.6% of cases) 6 clusters Table : 1 = authoritarian 2 = ambiguous

3 = democratic/liberal

Enhancing the validity & Cross-Cultural Comparability of Measurement in Survey Research

Gary King, Christopher J.L. Murray, Joshua

A. Salomon, Ajay Tandon (2004) American

Political Science Review Feb: 2004; 98, 1

Follow up papers: 2010 Improving Anchoring Vignettes: Designing Surveys

to Correct Interpersonal Incomparability http://people.iq.harvard.edu/~dhopkins/implement.pdf Manuscript, Harvard University, 2008

Comparing Incomparable Survey Responses: Evaluating and Selecting Anchoring Vignettes, Political Analysis (2006) http://pan.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/mpl011v1

Anchors: Software for Anchoring Vignette Data Journal of Statistical Software, 2007

Example: Reported MorbidityKerala Bihar

++ literacy -- literacy

++ longevity -- longevity

++ Reported morbidity (disease)

-- Reported morbidity

US ++++ Morbidity (higher than Kerala)

How to correct

Adjust using ‘Vingettes’ that represent increasing levels of political efficacy of hypothetical individuals.

Example Alison (score 5 – highest efficacy)Moses (score 1 – lowest efficacy)

Critical Citizens and Submissive Subjects

Devra C. Moehler (2009)

British Journal of Political Science, 39: 345 -

366

Premise

Elections are supposed to bolster legitimacy, engender compliance, moderate dissent and heighten citizen efficacy

Do elections fulfil these functions in Africa?

Or is there a difference between winners and losers?

If yes, is that because of perceptions of electoral integrity?

Hypothesized effect of winner status with evaluation of electoral integrity (med)

In other words…..

Winners believe their government institutions are more legitimate than losers (or independents)

Where there is a gap in legitimacy this can be explained by evaluations of election fairness.

Legitimacy Measures (dependent) Institutional Trust: How much do you trust the following

institutions (army, police, courts, electoral commission)

Consent to Authority: “Our government has the right to make decisions that all people have to abide by whether agreeing with them or not”

External Efficacy: “No matter who we vote for, things will not get any better in the future”

Defending democracy: “What would you do if the government took any of the following actions (Shut newspapers, dismissed judges, suspended parliament and cancelled next elections” R: Support the government, Do nothing, Contact elected rep, Support opposition party, join a protest or boycott, other

Explanatory Vars Free and Fair Elections Winner Status “Do you feel close to any political

party” (0 - 2) Government performance: Education, health,

creating jobs, stable prices (0-16) Economic performance: How satisfied with

economy today, one year ago, + 1 year (0-16) Electoral participation: Did you vote most recent

election, attended election rally, work for party/candidate (scale 0-3)

Political interest (0-3) Exposure to mass media (0-15) Education (0-3), Gender and Age (15-100)

Institutional trust among losers, non-partisans and winners

Note: Sign indicates winner–loser gap at 0.05 level of significance.

Consent to authority among losers, non-partisans, and winners

Note: Sign indicates winner–loser gap at 0.05 level of significance.

External efficacy among losers, non-partisans and winners

Note: Sign indicates winner–loser gap at 0.05 level of significance.

Willingness to defend democracy among losers, non-partisans & winners

Note: Sign indicates winner–loser gap at 0.05 level of significance.

Why?

“If the government took an action against

current democratic institutions, what would

you do?”

Forced to choose

Testing the gap: mediating variable

Do winners think elections are fairer than losers (b)?

Effects significant at p< .001

Evaluations of elections related to perceived legitimacy of institutions (c)?

Model B, variable significant p<0.001 across three measures

Mediation effect (a’) of elections on perceived legitimacy -> Yes but partial (difference between A and B Models)

Conclusions

Electoral integrity matter is only part of the answer in explaining gaps

Government performance and economic conditions matter more for institutional legitimacy.

Institutional legitimacy is based more on rational calculations than partisan affiliation.

Alternatives for research

Level of democracy, rule of law, type of political system, opposition party behaviour, and institutional performance (Liberal-democratic framework).

Cleaning up elections not enough to win support of losers.

Group Discussion Bratton & Mattes paper: is the proposition

of the first paper valid – “that perception of supply and demand can be regarded as predictors of democratic consolidation?”

What do the findings of Gary King et al. and Schedler & Sarsfield imply for knowledge derived from Afrobarometer studies (and other large-n survey studies)?

Positivism

King, Keohane and Verba (1994)Theories must be empirically verifiedDirectly observable implicationsFalsifiableReplicableVerifiable

Generalizability

CritiqueJames Johnson (2006) Consequences of Positivm: A

Pragmatic Assessment, Comparative Political Studies

Critiques the ‘New Orthodoxy’Concerned with causal effectsCausal explanation

Henry Brady states: “not exactly clear how explanation fits into KKV’s categories of descriptive and causal inference”

Example: Link between democracy and prosperity

Lack adequate theoretical account off the mechanisms that sustain the observed regularity

Complexity Theory

Shift our analysis from individual parts of a political system to the system as a whole

Complex adaptive systemsNon-linearShift, adapt and learn (evolution)

Emergence: complexity and patterns arise out of a multiplicity of relatively simple interactions. Rejection of reductionism

Sylvia Walby (2007) Complexity Theory, Systems Theory, and Multiple Intersecting Social Inequalities, Philosophy of the Social Sciences

Cultural Transmission Between and Within Generations

Alberto Acerbi and Domenico Parisi (2006)

Journal of Artificial Societies and Social

Simulation 9(1)

Cultural Transmission

Horizontal

ObliqueVertical

Parents Unrelated individual

PeerChild

Mushroom experiment Random assignment of connection

weights Agents that perform better are selected as

teachers Learned behaviour not the same – random

changes introduced Rare cases behaviour is better Reproduction of best individuals + and

constant addition of new variability =>acquisition across generations of more effective and better adapted behaviours

Hypotheses

Horizontal transmission way of introducing random noise in the cultural transmission process

Tradition environment: -

Changing environment: + (eliminate + create new behaviours)

Agent's visual field & the input encoding the content of the visual field

Generations

100 agents per generation (500 cycles) 500 generations No genetic inheritance Learning by cultural transmission and

evolution

How does cultural learning happen?

Learning in first 6 (out of10) epochs Each time teacher randomly chosen from 5 best

of previous generation/own generation 200 input patterns Output =? Same as teaching input?

Use error to modify behaviour (learning through repetition)

Aim towards 0 error

Learning through imitation

Inter-generational

Intra-generational

?

So what if any is the value of intra

generational learning

if agents can’t learn adaptive behaviours?

Noise is important for evolution

Certain quantity of statistical noise is necessary for the emergence of adaptive behaviors via either genetic or cultural transmission.

Removing Noise from Inter-generational teachers With noise (grey line) & Without noise (black line)

Change simulation

There is noise in cultural transmission (inter-generational transmission enough intra-generational not necessary)

Environment changes abruptly after the population has had time to adapt to the preceding environment.

The variable α specifies the probability that an individual will choose as its teachers the best individuals among its own peers, instead of choosing them among the best individuals of the preceding generation.

RESULTS

The results show that pure inter-generational transmission (α = 0) only very slowly makes it possible to adapt to such a rapid change in the environment.

Cultural transmission α = 0.3 (grey line) and α = 0, pure intergenerational transmission (black line)

Modelling

Epstein (2008) Explain (very distinct from predict) Challenge the robustness of prevailing theory

through perturbations Expose prevailing wisdom as incompatible with

available data

Other Inter-disciplinary Addresses causal explanation critique Bridges qualitative/quantitative divide

Other papers of interest…

Alam, Meyer, Ziervoegel and Moss (2007) The impact of HIV/AIDS in the Context of Socioeconomic Stressors: an Evidence-Driven Approach, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation

Timmerman & de Haan (2008) (Rotterdam Uni) Computational and mathematical approaches to societal transitions Computational Mathematical Organization Theory