marquez vs. alindog

G.R. No. 184045.January 22, 2014.*SPOUSES NICASIO C. MARQUEZ and ANITA J.MARQUEZ, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES CARLITOALINDOG and CARMEN ALINDOG, respondents.

Remedial Law Special Civil Actions ExtrajudicialForeclosure of Mortgage It is an established rule that thepurchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is entitled to thepossession of the property and can demand that he be placed inpossession of the same either during (with bond) or after theexpiration (without bond) of the redemption period therefor.It isan established rule that the purchaser in an extrajudicialforeclosure sale is entitled to the possession of the property andcan demand that he be placed in possession of the same eitherduring (with bond) or after the expiration (without bond) of theredemption period therefor. To this end, the Court, in ChinaBanking Corp. v. Sps. Lozada (China Banking Corp.), 557 SCRA177 (2008), citing several cases on the matter, explained that awrit of possession duly applied for by said purchaser shouldissue as a matter of course, and thus, merely constitutes aministerial duty on the part of the court.

Same Writs of Possession The issuance of a writ of possessionto a purchaser in a public auction is a ministerial act. After theconsolidation of title in the buyers name for failure of themortgagor to redeem the property, the writ of possession becomes amatter of right.In the case of Spouses Espiridion v. Court ofAppeals, 490 SCRA 273 (2006), the Court expounded on theministerial nature of the foregoing issuance as follows: Theissuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in a public auctionis a ministerial act. After the consolidation of title in thebuyers name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem theproperty, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right.Its issuance to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosuresale is merely a ministerial function. The trial court has nodiscretion on this matter. Hence, any talk of discretion inconnection with such issuance is misplaced.

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* SECOND DIVISION.

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VOL. 714, JANUARY 22, 2014 461

Marquez vs. Alindog

Same Special Civil Actions Extrajudicial Foreclosure ofMortgage The possession of the mortgaged property may beawarded to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure unless athird party is actually holding the property by adverse title orright.The ministerial issuance of a writ of possession in favor ofthe purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, however,admits of an exception. Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court(Rules) pertinently provides that the possession of the mortgagedproperty may be awarded to a purchaser in an extrajudicialforeclosure unless a third party is actually holding theproperty by adverse title or right. In the recent case of RuralBank of Sta. Barbara (Iloilo), Inc. v. Centeno, 693 SCRA 110(2013), citing the case of China Banking Corp., the Courtillumined that the phrase a third party who is actually holdingthe property adversely to the judgment obligor contemplates asituation in which a third party holds the property byadverse title or right, such as that of a coowner, tenant orusufructuary. The coowner, agricultural tenant, andusufructuary possess the property in their own right, and they arenot merely the successor or transferee of the right ofpossession of another coowner or the owner of theproperty. Notably, the property should not only bepossessed by a third party, but also held by the third partyadversely to the judgment obligor. In other words, asmentioned in Villanueva v. Cherdan Lending InvestorsCorporation, 633 SCRA 173 (2010), the third person musttherefore claim a right superior to that of the originalmortgagor.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision andresolution of the Court of Appeals.The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Puracan Law Office & Associates for petitioners. Hazel A. Ballesteros for respondents.

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462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDMarquez vs. Alindog

PERLASBERNABE,J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] arethe Decision[2] dated February 29, 2008 and Resolution[3]dated August 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 97744 finding no grave abuse of discretion onthe part of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City,Branch 18 (RTC) in issuing the Orders dated November 14,2005[4] and January 17, 2007[5] in SCA No. TG052521.Based on these orders, a writ of preliminary injunction wasissued against petitionersspouses Nicasio C. Marquez andAnita J. Marquez (Sps. Marquez), enjoining them fromtaking possession of the property subject of this casedespite the consolidation of their title over the same.

The Facts

Records show that sometime in June 1998, petitionerAnita J. Marquez (Anita) extended a loan in the amount ofP500,000.00 to a certain Benjamin Gutierrez (Gutierrez).As security therefor, Gutierrez executed a Deed of RealEstate Mortgage[6] dated June 16, 1998 over a parcel ofland located in Tagaytay City with an area of 660 squaremeters, more or less, covered by Transfer Certificate ofTitle (TCT) No. T13443[7] (subject property), registeredunder the name of Benjamin A. Gutierrez, married toLiwanag Camerin (Sps. Gutiererez). The mortgage wasduly annotated on the dorsal

_______________[1] Rollo, pp. 1032.[2]Id., at pp. 3541. Penned by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao,

with Associate Justices Mario L. Guaria III and Sixto C. Marella, Jr.,concurring.

[3] Id., at pp. 4243.[4] Id., at pp. 6970. Penned by Presiding Judge Edwin G. Larida, Jr.[5] Id., at pp. 7172.[6] Id., at pp. 7677.

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[7] Id., at pp. 7375.

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VOL. 714, JANUARY 22, 2014 463Marquez vs. Alindog

portion of TCT No. T13443, which Sps. Marquez hadverified as clean prior to the mortgage.[8]

Since Gutierrez defaulted in the payment of his loanobligation, Anita sought the extrajudicial foreclosure of thesubject property. At the public auction sale held onJanuary 19, 2000, Anita emerged as the highest bidder forthe amount of P1,171,000.00.[9] Upon Gutierrezs failure toredeem the same property within the prescribed periodtherefor, title was consolidated under TCT No. T41939[10]on November 5, 2001 (in the name of Anita J. Marquez,married to Nicasio C. Marquez) which, however, bore anannotation of adverse claim[11] dated March 2, 2000 in thenames of respondentsspouses Carlito and Carmen Alindog(Sps. Alindog). Said annotation was copied from an earlierannotation on TCT No. T13443 made only after the subjectpropertys mortgage to Sps. Marquez.

Subsequently, or on March 21, 2000, Sps. Alindog filed acivil case for annulment of real estate mortgage andcertificate of sale with prayer for damages against Sps.Marquez and a certain Agripina Gonzales (Gonzales) beforethe RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. TG1966 (annulmentcase). In their complaint,[12] Sps. Alindog alleged that theypurchased[13] the subject property from Gutierrez way backin September 1989, but were unable to secure a certificateof title in their names because Gonzales to whom theyhave entrusted said task had deceived them in that theywere assured that the said certificate was already beingprocessed when such was not the case.[14] Eventually, theyfound out that the property

_______________[8] Id., at p. 36.[9] Id., at pp. 8081.[10] Id., at pp. 8283.[11] Id., at p. 83.[12] Id., at pp. 8487.[13] See Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 1989 id., at pp. pp. 90

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91.[14] Id., at pp. 3637.

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had already been mortgaged to Sps. Marquez, and thatwhen they tried to contact Gonzales for an explanation, shecould no longer be found. Separately, Sps. Alindog averredthat when the mortgage was executed in favor of Sps.Marquez, Gutierrez was already dead.[15]

In their defense,[16] Sps. Marquez disputed Sps.Alindogs ownership over the subject property, arguing thatthe purported sale in the latters favor was never registeredand therefore, not binding upon them. Further, theyinsisted that their certificate of title, TCT No. T41939, wasalready indefeasible, and cannot be attacked collaterally.

Meanwhile, on March 16, 2005, Anita filed an ex partepetition for the issuance of a writ of possession[17] (ex partepetition) before the RTC, docketed as LRC Case No. TG051068, claiming that the same is ministerial on the courtspart following the consolidation of her and her husbandstitle over the subject property. Impleaded in said petitionare Sps. Gutierrez, including all persons claiming rightsunder them.

The RTC Rulings and Subsequent Proceedings

In an Order[18] dated August 1, 2005, the RTCgranted Anitas ex parte petition and thereby directed theissuance of a writ of possession in her favor. Consequently,a notice to vacate[19] dated September 23, 2005 was issuedby Acting Sheriff Teodorico V. Cosare (Sheriff Cosare)against Sps. Gutierrez and all persons claiming rightsunder them. Sps. Alindog were served with a copy of thesaid notice to vacate on September 27, 2005.[20]

_______________[15] Id., at p. 37.[16] See Verified Consolidated Answer (With Special/Affirmative

Defenses and Counterclaims) id., at pp. 92103.[17] Id., at pp. 105108.[18] Id., at p. 113.

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[19] Id., at p. 115.[20] Id., at p. 118.

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Claiming that they would suffer irreparable injury if theimplementation of the writ of possession in favor of Sps.Marquez would be left unrestrained, Sps. Alindog soughtthe issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/orwrit of preliminary injunction with prayer for damages,[21]in a separate case docketed as SCA No. TG052521[22](injunction case) which was raffled to the same court.

While it appears that the RTC issued a 72hour TRO onSeptember 29, 2005 in Sps. Alindogs favor, recordsnonetheless show that said order was not extended to a full20day TRO.[23] To this end, the Sheriffs Return[24] datedNovember 14, 2005 shows that Sheriff Cosare was able toimplement the writ of possession on November 11, 2005,turning over the possession of the subject property to Sps.Marquez.

After further proceedings on the injunction case, theRTC, through an Order[25] dated November 14, 2005,issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Sps.Marquez from taking possession of the subject propertyuntil after the controversy has been fully resolved on themerits. The said issuance was based on the RTCsappreciation of the initial evidence adduced by Sps.Alindog, concluding that they appear to have a right to beprotected. Thus, notwithstanding the consolidation of Sps.Marquezs title over the subject property, the RTC grantedSps. Alindogs prayer for injunctive relief, holding that anyfurther dispossession on their part would cause themirreparable injury.[26]

_______________[21] Id., at pp. 116120.[22] Initially docketed as Civil Case No. TG052521.[23] Rollo, p. 69.[24] Id., at p. 114.[25] Id., at pp. 6970[26] Id., at p. 70..

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Aggrieved, Sps. Marquez moved for reconsideration,[27]essentially pointing out that, as the confirmed andregistered owners of the subject property, they are entitledto its possession as a matter of right. They argued thatpursuant to Sections 7[28] and 8[29] of Act No. 3135,[30] asamended by Act No.

_______________[27]See Motion for Reconsideration with Urgent Prayer to Recall/Defer

Issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction id., at pp. 132139.[28] Sec. 7.In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the

purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance of the province or placewhere the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possessionthereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amountequivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, toindemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made withoutviolating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of thisAct. Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in form of an exparte motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property isregistered, or in special proceedings in the case of property registeredunder the Mortgage Law or under section one hundred and ninetyfour ofthe Administrative Code, or of any other real property encumbered with amortgage duly registered in the office of any register of deeds inaccordance with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of the courtshall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees specified inparagraph eleven of section one hundred and fourteen of Act NumberedFour hundred and ninetysix, as amended by Act Numbered Twentyeighthundred and sixtysix, and the court shall, upon approval of the bond,order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of theprovince in which the property is situated, who shall execute said orderimmediately.

[29] Sec. 8.The debtor may, in the proceedings in which possessionwas requested, but not later than thirty days after the purchaser wasgiven possession, petition that the sale be set aside and the writ ofpossession cancelled, specifying the damages suffered by him, because themortgage was not violated or the sale was not made in accordance withthe provisions hereof, and the court shall take cognizance of this petitionin accordance with the summary procedure provided for in section onehundred and twelve of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninetysix and ifit finds the complaint of

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4118,[31] the RTC was legally bound to place them inpossession of the subject property pending resolution of theannulment case. Further, it is their position that thepurpose for the issuance of the injunctive writ i.e., torestrain the implementation of the writ of possession had already been rendered moot and academic by its actualenforcement in the interim.

For their part, Sps. Alindog filed a Motion for Approvalof Cash Bond and to Regain Possession[32] of the subjectproperty.

In an Order[33] dated January 17, 2007, the RTC deniedthe motion of Sps. Marquez, while granted that of Sps.Alindog. Unperturbed, Sps. Marquez elevated the case tothe CA on certiorari.[34]

The CA Ruling

In a Decision[35] dated February 29, 2008, the CA deniedSps. Marquezs petition as it found no grave abuse ofdiscretion on the RTCs part when it issued the injunctivewrit that en

_______________ the debtor justified, it shall dispose in his favor of all or part of the

bond furnished by the person who obtained possession. Either of theparties may appeal from the order of the judge in accordance with sectionfourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninetysix but the order ofpossession shall continue in effect during the pendency of the appeal.

[30] Entitled AN ACT TO REGULATE THE SALE OF PROPERTY UNDER SPECIALPOWERS INSERTED IN OR ANNEXED TO REAL ESTATE MORTGAGES.

[31] Entitled AN ACT TO AMEND ACT NUMBERED THIRTYONE HUNDRED ANDTHIRTYFIVE, ENTITLED AN ACT TO REGULATE THE SALE OF PROPERTY UNDERSPECIAL POWERS INSERTED IN OR ANNEXED TO REALESTATE MORTGAGES.

[32] Posting a cash bond in the amount of P500,000.00 by way of amanagers check CA Rollo, pp. 181182.

[33] Rollo, pp. 7172.[34] Id., at pp. 4467.[35] Id., at pp. 3541.

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joined Sps. Marquez from taking possession of the subjectproperty. It observed that Sps. Alindog had indeedadduced prima facie proof of their right to possess thesubject property[36] while the annulment case waspending, adding that the latters right to remain inpossession[37] proceeds from the fact of the subjectpropertys earlier sale to them. Thus, while Sps. Marquezconcededly had a right to possess the subject property onaccount of the consolidation of the title in their names, theCA nonetheless found no fault on the part of the RTC forproceeding with caution[38] in weighing the conflictingclaims of the parties and subsequently issuing the writ ofpreliminary injunction in Sps. Alindogs favor.

Dissatisfied, Sps. Marquez moved for reconsideration[39]which was, however, denied in a Resolution[40] datedAugust 6, 2008, hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the CourtThe essential issue in this case is whether or not the CA

erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part ofthe RTC when it issued the injunctive writ which enjoinedSps. Marquez from taking possession of the subjectproperty.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is meritorious.It is an established rule that the purchaser in an

extrajudicial foreclosure sale is entitled to the possession ofthe property and can demand that he be placed inpossession of the same either during (with bond) or afterthe expiration (without bond) of the redemption periodtherefor. To this end, the

_______________[36] Id., at p. 39.[37] Id.[38] Id., at p. 40.[39] Id., at pp. 207220.[40] Id., at pp. 4243.

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Court, in China Banking Corp. v. Sps. Lozada[41] (ChinaBanking Corp.), citing several cases on the matter,explained that a writ of possession duly applied for by saidpurchaser should issue as a matter of course, and thus,merely constitutes a ministerial duty on the part ofthe court, viz.:[42]

The procedure for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estatemortgage is governed by Act No. 3135, as amended. Thepurchaser at the public auction sale of anextrajudicially foreclosed real property may seekpossession thereof in accordance with Section 7 of Act No.3135, as amended, which provides:

SEC.7.In any sale made under theprovisions of this Act, the purchaser maypetition the Court of First Instance of theprovince or place where the property or anypart thereof is situated, to give himpossession thereof during theredemption period, furnishing bond inan amount equivalent to the use of theproperty for a period of twelve months, toindemnify the debtor in case it be shown thatthe sale was made without violating themortgage or without complying with therequirements of this Act. Such petition shallbe made under oath and filed in form or anex parte motion in the registration orcadastral proceedings if the property isregistered, or in special proceedings in thecase of property registered under theMortgage Law or under section one hundredand ninetyfour of the Administrative Code,or of any other real property encumberedwith a mortgage duly registered in the officeof any register of deeds in accordance withany existing law, and in each case the clerkof court shall, upon

_______________[41] 579 Phil. 454 557 SCRA 177 (2008).[42] Id., at pp. 470473 pp. 193196, citing De Gracia v. San Jose, 94 Phil. 623,

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625626 (1954), and IFC Service Leasing and Acceptance Corporation v. Nera, 125Phil. 595 19 SCRA 181 (1967).

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the filing of such petition, collect the feesspecified in paragraph eleven of section onehundred and fourteen of Act Numbered Fourhundred and ninety six as amended by ActNumbered Twentyeight hundred and sixtysix, and the court shall, upon approval ofthe bond, order that a writ of possessionissue addressed to the sheriff of theprovince in which the property issituated, who shall execute said orderimmediately.

The Court expounded on the application of the foregoingprovision in De Gracia v. San Jose, thus:

As may be seen, the law expresslyauthorizes the purchaser to petition for awrit of possession during the redemptionperiod by filing an ex parte motion underoath for that purpose in the correspondingregistration or cadastral proceeding in thecase of property with Torrens title and uponthe filing of such motion and the approval ofthe corresponding bond, the law also inexpress terms directs the court to issue theorder for a writ of possession. Under thelegal provisions above copied, the order fora writ of possession issues as a matterof course upon the filing of the propermotion and the approval of thecorresponding bond. No discretion isleft to the court. And any questionregarding the regularity and validity of thesale (and the consequent cancellation of thewrit) is left to be determined in asubsequent proceeding as outlined in section8. Such question is not to be raised as ajustification for opposing the issuance of the

writ of possession, since, under the Act, theproceeding for this is ex parte.

Strictly, Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, refers toa situation wherein the purchaser seeks posses

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sion of the foreclosed property during the 12month periodfor redemption. Upon the purchasers filing of the ex partepetition and posting of the appropriate bond, the RTC shall,as a matter of course, order the issuance of the writ ofpossession in the purchasers favor.

In IFC Service Leasing and Acceptance Corporation v.Nera, the Court reasoned that if under Section 7 of Act No.3135, as amended, the RTC has the power during the periodof redemption to issue a writ of possession on the ex parteapplication of the purchaser, there is no reason why itshould not also have the same power after theexpiration of the redemption period, especiallywhere a new title has already been issued in thename of the purchaser. Hence, the procedure underSection 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, may be availed of bya purchaser seeking possession of the foreclosed property hebought at the public auction sale after the redemptionperiod has expired without redemption having beenmade.

x x x xIt is thus settled that the buyer in a foreclosure

sale becomes the absolute owner of the propertypurchased if it is not redeemed during the period ofone year after the registration of the sale. As such, heis entitled to the possession of the said property andcan demand it at any time following theconsolidation of ownership in his name and theissuance to him of a new transfer certificate of title.The buyer can in fact demand possession of the land evenduring the redemption period except that he has to post abond in accordance with Section 7 of Act No. 3135, asamended. No such bond is required after the redemptionperiod if the property is not redeemed. Possession of theland then becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as

confirmed owner. Upon proper application and proof oftitle, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes aministerial duty of the court. (Emphases andunderscoring supplied citations and emphases in theoriginal omitted)

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In the case of Spouses Espiridion v. CA,[43] the Courtexpounded on the ministerial nature of the foregoingissuance as follows:[44]

The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in apublic auction is a ministerial act. After theconsolidation of title in the buyers name for failureof the mortgagor to redeem the property, the writ ofpossession becomes a matter of right. Its issuance toa purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale ismerely a ministerial function. The trial court has nodiscretion on this matter. Hence, any talk of discretion inconnection with such issuance is misplaced.

A clear line demarcates a discretionary act from aministerial one. Thus:

The distinction between a ministerial anddiscretionary act is well delineated. A purelyministerial act or duty is one which an officer ortribunal performs in a given state of facts, in aprescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of alegal authority, without regard to or the exerciseof his own judgment upon the propriety orimpropriety of the act done. If the law imposes aduty upon a public officer and gives him the right todecide how or when the duty shall be performed, suchduty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty isministerial only when the discharge of the samerequires neither the exercise of official discretion orjudgment.

Clearly, the use of discretion and the performance of aministerial act are mutually exclusive. (Emphases andunderscoring supplied citations omitted)

The ministerial issuance of a writ of possession in favor

of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale,however,

_______________[43] 523 Phil. 664 490 SCRA 273 (2006).[44] Id., at pp. 667668 pp. 276277.

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admits of an exception. Section 33,[45] Rule 39 of the Rulesof Court (Rules) pertinently provides that the possession ofthe mortgaged property may be awarded to a purchaser inan extrajudicial foreclosure unless a third party isactually holding the property by adverse title orright. In the recent case of Rural Bank of Sta. Barbara(Iloilo), Inc. v. Centeno,[46] citing the case of China BankingCorp., the Court illumined that the phrase a third partywho is actually holding the property adversely to thejudgment obligor contemplates a situation in which athird party holds the property by adverse title orright, such as that of a coowner, tenant or usufructuary.The coowner, agricultural tenant, and usufructuarypossess the property in their own right, and they are notmerely the successor or transferee of the right ofpossession of another coowner or the owner of theproperty. Notably, the property should not only bepossessed by a third party, but also held by the thirdparty adversely to the judgment obligor.[47] In otherwords, as mentioned in Villanueva v. Cherdan LendingInvestors Corporation,[48] the third person must thereforeclaim a right superior to that of the originalmortgagor.

In this case, it is clear that the issuance of a writ ofpossession in favor of Sps. Marquez, who had alreadyconsolidated

_______________[45] Section33.Deed and possession to be given at expiration of

redemption period by whom executed or given.xxx.Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or

redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title,


interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the property as of the time ofthe levy. The possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser orlast redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actuallyholding the property adversely to the judgment obligor. (Emphasissupplied)

[46] G.R. No. 200667, March 11, 2013, 693 SCRA 110.[47] Id., at p. 115, citing supra note 41, at pp. 473474 emphases

supplied.[48] G.R. No. 177881, October 13, 2010, 633 SCRA 173.

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their title over the extrajudicially foreclosed property, ismerely ministerial in nature. The general rule as hereinstated and not the exception found under Section 33,Rule 39 of the Rules should apply since Sps. Alindoghinged their claim over the subject property on theirpurported purchase of the same from its previous owner,i.e., Sps. Gutierrez (with Gutierrez being the originalmortgagor). Accordingly, it cannot be seriously doubtedthat Sps. Alindog are only the latters (Sps. Gutierrez)successorsininterest who do not have a right superior tothem.

That said, the RTC therefore gravely abused itsdiscretion when it issued the injunctive writ which enjoinedSps. Marquez from taking possession of the subjectproperty. To be sure, grave abuse of discretion arises whena lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution,the law or existing jurisprudence.[49] Here, while the RTChad initially issued a writ of possession in favor of Sps.Marquez, it defied existing jurisprudence when iteffectively rescinded the said writ by subsequently grantingSps. Alindogs prayer for injunctive relief. The RTCsfinding anent the initial evidence adduced by Sps. Alindogconstitutes improper basis to justify the issuance of thewrit of preliminary injunction in their favor since, in thefirst place, it had no authority to exercise any discretion inthis respect. Jurisprudence is clear on the matter: withoutthe exception under Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rulesavailing, the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of thepurchaser of an extrajudicially foreclosed property such


as Sps. Marquez in this case should come as a matter ofcourse, and, in such regard, constitutes only a ministerialduty on the part of the court. Besides, it was improper forthe RTC to have issued a writ of preliminary injunctionsince the act sought to be enjoined, i.e., the implementationof the writ of possession, had already been accomplished inthe interim

_______________[49] Tagolino v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.

202202, March 19, 2013, 693 SCRA 574, 599600, citing Fernandez v.Commission on Elections, 535 Phil. 122 504 SCRA 116 (2006).

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and thus, rendered the matter moot. Case law instructsthat injunction would not lie where the acts sought to beenjoined had already become fait accompli (meaning, anaccomplished or consummated act).[50] Hence, since theconsummation of the act sought to be restrained hadrendered Sps. Alindogs injunction petition moot, theissuance of the said injunctive writ was altogetherimproper.

All told, by acting averse to wellsettled jurisprudentialrules and resultantly depriving Sps. Marquez of their rightof possession over the subject property, the Court thereforeconcludes that the RTC gravely abused its discretion inthis case. In effect, the CAs contrary ruling thereto ishereby reversed and set aside, which consequentially leadsto the nullification of the writ of preliminary injunctionissued by the RTC in favor of Sps. Alindog, and thereinstatement of the writ of possession issued by the samecourt in favor of Sps. Marquez. It must, however, be notedthat these pronouncements are without prejudice to anyseparate action which Sps. Alindog may file in order torecover ownership of the subject property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. TheDecision dated February 29, 2008 and Resolution datedAugust 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No.97744, as well as the Orders dated November 14, 2005 andJanuary 17, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay


City, Branch 18 in SCA No. TG052521 are herebyREVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the writ ofpreliminary injunction in SCA No. TG052521 isNULLIFIED, while the Writ of Possession in LRC CaseNo. TG051068 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo and Perez,JJ., concur.

_______________[50] Transfield Philippines, Inc. v. Luzon Hydro Corporation, G.R. No.

146717, November 22, 2004, 443 SCRA 307, 339.

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Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed andset aside.

Notes.Purchaser at an extrajudicial foreclosure salehas a right to the possession of the property even duringthe oneyear redemption period provided the purchaserfiles an indemnity bond. After the lapse of the said periodwith no redemption having been made, that right becomesabsolute and may be demanded by the purchaser evenwithout the posting of the bond. (Cua Lai Chu vs. Laqui,612 SCRA 227 [2010])

The obligation of a court to issue a writ of possession infavor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure saleceases to be ministerial, once it appears that there is athird party who is in possession of the property and isclaiming a right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor.(Royal Savings Bank vs. Asia, 695 SCRA 511 [2013])

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marquez vs. alindog

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