marke enlisting strategies

7/30/2019 Marke Enlisting Strategies

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Market-Enlisting

Strategies


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Cost-Benefit Review

What are the arguments for and against thequantification of ecological and health benefits?

What are the major limits on the ability of science toassess risks (and thus inform regulatory choices)?

What is ToSCA and what is its method of regulation?

What are the arguments for and against discounting

ecological or health benefits?


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Important Take-Aways

What are the different Market Enlisting Strategies?

Describe the underlying economic assumptions MarketEnlisting Strategies are dependent on for success.

What sections of the CAA use market enlistingstrategies? (EPA ET & Acid Rain Program)

RECLAIM. Benefits? Negative externalities?

The debate surrounding RGGI


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I absolutely believe a price on carbon is

essential. The question is how that pricestrategy will be delivered: by a charge or tax,by trading mechanisms, or something else

Steven ChuSecretary of DOE

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Market Strategy #1


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Market Strategy #2


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Market Strategy #3


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Market Strategy #4


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Why is it assumedMarketEnlisting Strategies work?


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Behavioral Assumptions


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Will firms act rationally?


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Clean Air Act:Emission Trading Program


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EPA Emission Trading Program#1


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Emission Trading Program #2


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Acid Rain Trading Program

Under what federal statute is the Acid RainTrading Program regulated?

Why is inter-source trading beneficial toboth sources with high abatement costs andsources with low abatement costs?


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Acid Rain Program

Was/Is the Acid Rain Program successful?

Why? (Hint: Compare the Acid Rain Programwith EPA ET Program)


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Emission Trading:

Where can it go wrong?


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Anyway Credits


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Forbearance Credits & InitialAllocation


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Hot air credits


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Emission Trading & Environmental Justice(Case Studies)


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Rule 1610The Road to RECLAIM

What does Rule 1610 allow stationarysource polluters to do? What do they get inreturn?

What is the rationale?


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RECLAIM(Regional Clean Air Incentives Market)


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The Harsh Reality of RECLAIM


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Environmental Justice?


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Inter-Pollutant Trading

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Reporting Issues


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Solutions?

Prohibit Toxic Trading

Prohibit trading into overburdened communities

Assess and prevent toxic hot spots and discriminatory impacts.

Prohibit trading out of pollution control/technology requirements.

Prohibit cross-pollutant trading

Allow affected communities to review and comment on proposed trades.

Ban inter-source trading between mobile, stationary, and area sources, and

Prohibit hot air credits that result from over allocating the baseline.


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RGGI(Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative)


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Emission Trading ProgramsComplications

Design Issues:

Allocation of Initial Allowances

Geographic or Temporal flexibility

Emission sources that are required or allowedto participate

Institutions established to facilitate trading


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Emission Trading ProgramsComplications

Implementation Issues

Certification of permits

Monitoring and reporting of emissions

Determining compliance and enforcing thetrading program

Maintaining and encouraging participation

marke enlisting strategies

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