MAINESUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2021ME62Docket: Sag-21-18Argued: July13,2021Decided: December14,2021Panel: MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HUMPHREY,HORTON,andCONNORS,JJ.

MARKR.MARTIN

v.

MARYLOUE.MACMAHANHORTON,J.

[¶1] Mark R. Martin appeals from judgments entered by the District

Court (West Bath, Raimondi, J.) establishing Dawn and James Ostrander as

defactoparentsoftwobiologicalchildrenofMartinandMarylouE.MacMahan;

allocatingparentalrightsandresponsibilitiesandchildsupportamongMartin,

MacMahan, and theOstranders; andamendinganexistingdivorce judgment

betweenMartinandMacMahan.1Martinarguesthatthatthecourtmisapplied

thelegalstandardsgoverningdefactoparentageandmadefindingsthatwere

notsupportedbyevidenceintherecord,includingbyadoptingamagistrate’s

findings in an interim order. We affirm the judgment establishing de facto

parentage,parentalrightsandresponsibilities,andchildsupport,butwevacate

1WeconsolidatedMartin’sappealsunderthecaptionforthedivorcematter.

2

the judgmentamendingthedivorce judgmentbecauseit is inconsistentwith

thejudgmentestablishingparentalrightsandresponsibilities,andweremand

sothattheinconsistencycanbecorrected.

I.BACKGROUND

[¶2]Thefollowingfactsandprocedurearedrawnfromtheprocedural

recordandfindingsmadebythecourtthataresupportedbyevidenceadmitted

atthefinalhearing.2SeeKilbornv.Carey,2016ME78,¶¶3,16,140A.3d461.

MartinandMacMahanarethebiologicalparentsoftwinsborninMarch2014.

Whenthechildrenwereborn,MartinandMacMahanlivedinArrowsicanddid

not have a vehicle. Dawn Ostrander, MacMahan’s lifelong friend, drove

MacMahantoprenatalcareappointments,drovethechildrenhomefromthe

hospital after they were born, and drove MacMahan and the children to

subsequent checkups. The Ostranders helped care for the children and

suppliedthenecessitiesofcare,suchasdiapers,wipes,formula,andclothing.

[¶3]Whenthechildrenwereaboutfourmonthsold,Martinmovedthe

family to Kansas, believing—incorrectly—that he would have housing and

employmentthere.InKansas,afterstayingaweekwithMartin’smotherand

2Thefactsrecitedheredonotincludethosethatthecourtadoptedfromthemagistrate’sinterim

orderwithoutcorroborativeevidentiarysupportfromthefinalhearing.Seeinfra¶20.

3

grandmother,thefamilymovedtoamotelandthenstartedlivingoutofacar.

While they were still in the motel, Martin began shoplifting DVDs to make

money.HewasarrestedinDecember2014andspentaboutaweekinjail.After

his release from jail, his criminal case was resolved and he was placed on

probationuntilOctober2015.HehasgenerallyremainedinKansassincethen.

[¶4] When Martin went to jail, MacMahan and the children had no

money, housing, or means of transportation. Desperate, MacMahan called

DawnOstrander,whodrove toKansas,broughtMacMahanand thechildren

back to Maine, and helpedMacMahan find a place to live. The Ostranders

resumed providingMacMahanwith the necessities of care for the children,

includingdiapers,wipes,formula,clothing,bassinets,andcarseats.

[¶5]Atfirst,thechildrenstayedwiththeOstrandersonweekendsand

forsomeovernightsduringtheweek.ByApril2016,thechildrenwereliving

primarily with the Ostranders, who provided for all aspects of their care.

Martindidnotprovideanysupportforthechildrenduringthistime.Onseveral

occasions between 2015 and early 2017, MacMahan, who was homeless at

times,toldMartinthatsheneededhelpandaskedhimtocomegetthechildren.

He responded that he could not. InApril 2016,when the children had just

turnedtwoyearsold,theOstrandersbeganprovidingfull-timecareforthemat

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therequestofacommunityorganizationconcernedaboutMacMahan’slackof

stablehousing,and,withlimitedexceptions,thechildrenhaveresidedwiththe

Ostrandersfull-timeeversince.DawnOstranderhasenrolledbothchildrenin

speechtherapyandhastransportedthemtothosesessionsforseveralyears.

[¶6] In June 2017, Martin came to Maine, believing that he had an

agreementwithMacMahanthathewouldtakecustodyofthechildrenforsome

period of time. When he arrived,MacMahan did not permit him to see the

children. Martin initiated a divorce action against MacMahan and then

returnedtoKansas.MartinreturnedtoMaineforavisitaroundChristmasin

2017; itwas the first time he had seen the children since being arrested in

KansasinDecember2014.

[¶7] In an agreed-upon divorce judgment issued in January 2018, a

Family Law Magistrate (Kidman, M.) awarded shared parental rights to

MacMahan and Martin, granted primary residence to MacMahan, and set a

contactschedulethatincludedatwo-monthvisitwithMartininKansasduring

thesummerof2018. Meanwhile,althoughthechildrenwerespendingsome

weekends at MacMahan’s home, they were otherwise living with the

Ostranders. InApril2018, theOstrandersobtainedaprotection fromabuse

5

orderagainstMacMahanonbehalfof thechildren.3 WhenMartin foundout

abouttheprotectionorder,4hecontactedtheOstranders,gavethemtemporary

legal authority over the children, and told them he would come to get the

childreninJune.Martinthenmovedtomodifythedivorcejudgment,seeking

primaryresidenceandsoleparentalrights.

[¶8] In June 2018, after the Ostranders filed petitions seeking

guardianship of the children, a Family LawMagistrate (Adamson,M.) held a

combinedinterimevidentiaryhearingonMartin’smotiontomodifythedivorce

judgment and the Ostranders’ guardianship petitions. The magistrate then

issued an interimorder inwhich shemade extensive findings and set forth

detailedarrangementsforthechildren’svisitwithMartininKansas,including

thattheywere“tobereturnedto[Maine]accordingtothe[divorce][j]udgment

...onAugust17,2018”5andthattheyweretobeallowedtohavecontactwith

the Ostranders while they were with Martin. The magistrate declined to

3Theprotectionorder,whichprohibitedMacMahanfromhavinganycontactwiththechildren,

wasbasedonthechildren’sreporttotheOstrandersofinappropriatebehaviortowardthembyamember of MacMahan’s household. The protection order was dismissed in May 2019 on theOstranders’motionafterMacMahanhadendedherrelationshipwiththepersoninquestion.

4MartinlatertestifiedthatthefatherofMacMahan’sotherchildrencalledhiminApril2018andtoldhimabouttheprotectionorderandthatthiswaswhenhefirstbecameawarethatthechildrenhadbeenlivingwiththeOstranders.5Accordingtothedivorcejudgment,Martinwastoprovideforthechildren’stransportationto

Kansas;MacMahanwastoprovidefortheirtransportationbacktoMaine.

6

otherwisemodifythedivorcejudgmentandissuednodecisionregardingthe

Ostranders’guardianshippetitions.6

[¶9]MartindidnotreturnthechildrentoMaineinAugust2018.Healso

did not comply with the interim order’s requirement that he allow the

Ostranders to have contactwith the children three times perweek. In late

October2018,aftertheOstrandersnotifiedthecourtthattheyhadnotbeen

allowedtospeakwiththechildrenforeightdays,thecourt(Dobson,J.)helda

hearingandthenauthorizedtheOstranderstopickupthechildreninKansas

assoonaspossible.

[¶10] The Ostranders drove to Kansas to pick up the children on

November1,2018;whentheyarrived,Martintoldthemtheycouldnottakethe

children until noon the next day. They slept in their car that night before

returning to Maine with the children. The children have resided with the

Ostranderseversince.

[¶11]MartinsawthechildrenforChristmasin2018andthenfortwo

weeksinKansasinthesummerof2019.Hespeakswiththechildrenonthe

6Withrespecttotheguardianshippetitions,however,themagistratenotedthat“while[Martin]

may be capable of caring for the children during [the summer 2018] visit, a strong bond hasdevelopedbetweenthe[]childrenandthe[Ostranders],whohaveprovidedfortheircareforthreeyears.[TheOstranders]aretheonlycaregivers[thechildren]havetrulyknown.The...[children]were delayed socially and developmentallywhen entering [theOstranders’] care and have sinceflourishedand receivedmedical andother therapeutic care. Itwould jeopardize the [children’s]well-beingtobreakthisbondoutofangerorspite.”

7

phone and over video chat. A court order would have permitted a visit in

Kansasduringthesummerof2020,butrestrictionsrelatedtotheCOVID-19

pandemic made that difficult. Martin suggested, in the alternative, that he

would come toMaine for a week-long visit, but after planning to do so, he

canceledthearrangements.

[¶12] Since 2016, the Ostranders have received a total of $100 in

financial support fromMartinand$85 in financial support fromMacMahan,

and they have received no state or federal financial aid in caring for the

children. According to the children’s teachers, the children are doing well

socially and academically, and the Ostranders are active and concerned

caretakers. The teachers have not had any contact with either Martin or

MacMahan.Martinagreed,duringhistestimony,thatheneverreachedoutto

the children’s teachers or health care providers because he “relied on [the

Ostranders] to keep [him] up to date on those things” and because hewas

“relyingonthemto[exercise]theparentalresponsibilitiesfor[his]children.”

[¶13]AfterreturningtoMainewiththechildreninNovember2018,the

Ostrandersfiledacomplaintandaffidavitseekingadeterminationofdefacto

parentage, parental rights and responsibilities, and child support. With the

agreementoftheparties,thecourtfoundinMay2019thattheOstrandershad

8

demonstrated standing to proceed with the defacto parentage action. See

19-AM.R.S. § 1891(2) (2021); see also, e.g.,Libby v. Estabrook, 2020ME71,

¶¶13-14,234A.3d197.

[¶14]Thecourt(Raimondi,J.)heldafinal,consolidatedhearingonthe

Ostranders’ guardianship petitions, their de facto parentage complaint, and

Martin’smotiontomodifythedivorcejudgment.Overthecourseoftwodays

in September 2020, it heard testimony from, among other people, Martin,

MacMahan,theOstranders,andtheguardianadlitem.Thecourtthenissued

an order addressing both theOstranders’ parentage complaint andMartin’s

motion tomodify the divorce judgment.7 The order incorporated extensive

findings,whichthecourtsetforthinaseparatedocument.Inthemiddleofa

section of that document titled “FACTUAL HISTORY,” the court referred to

findingsexpressedbythemagistrateintheJune2018interimorderandstated:

“Afterconsiderationoftheevidencepresentedtothiscourtatthehearingin

thismatter,thecourtadoptsthosefindings.”Thecourtthenrestated,verbatim,

manyofthefindingsexpressedintheJune2018interimorder.

[¶15]Inanothersectionofthecourt’sordertitled“LEGALANALYSIS,”

thecourtmadeadditional findingsspecificallyrelatedtotheelementsof the

7ThecourtdismissedtheOstranders’guardianshippetitionsasmoot.

9

Ostranders’de factoparentage claim, see 19-AM.R.S. §1891(3) (2021), and

concluded that the Ostranders hadmet their burden to prove, by clear and

convincingevidence,thattheyaredefactoparentsofthechildren.Specifically,

thecourtmadethefollowingfindings:

• ThechildrenhavehadregularcontactwiththeOstrandersfortheirentirelives and have resided primarily with the Ostranders since 2016, see19-AM.R.S.§1891(3)(A);

• TheOstrandershaveengagedincaretakingforthechildrensincebeforethe children were born, consistently providing emotional, financial,educational,andmedicalsupportforthechildrenonaday-to-daybasis,see19-AM.R.S.§1891(3)(B);

• The Ostranders have provided the only stable parenting the childrenhaveknown,andthechildrenaredeeplybondedtothem,see19-AM.R.S.§1891(3)(C);

• The Ostranders have accepted responsibility for the children withoutexpectingcompensation,see19-AM.R.S.§1891(3)(D);and

• Remaining with the Ostranders is in the children’s best interests, see19-AM.R.S.§1891(3)(E).

Thecourtalsofoundthat“MacMahandoesnotdisputethatshefosteredand

supported therelationshipbetween theOstrandersand thechildren.” As to

Martin, the court found that he knew, by no later than April 2018, that the

childrenhadbeenlivingwiththeOstranders;thatbeforethenheeitherknew

or“turnedablindeyeandchosenottoknow”;andthathehad“abdicatedhis

10

financialandpersonalresponsibilitytocareforthechildrenand...continues

todoso.”

[¶16]Addressingparentalrightsandresponsibilities,thecourtordered,

interalia,thatthechildren’sprimaryresidencewouldbewiththeOstranders

andthatparentalrightswouldbesharedamongtheOstranders,Martin,and

MacMahan, with the Ostranders having final decision-making authority.

Accordingly,thecourtdeniedMartin’smotiontomodifythedivorcejudgment,

decliningtogranthimsoleparentalrightsandprimaryresidence.Finally,the

courtissuedachildsupportorderandamendedsomeofthedivorcejudgment’s

provisions—includingthoseforchildsupportandforcontactbetweenMartin

and the children—to render the divorce judgment consistent with the

judgmentsettingforthparentalrightsandresponsibilitiesandchildsupport.8

[¶17]Withoutfirstmovingforamendedoradditionalfindings,cf.M.R.

Civ.P.52(b);Davisv.McGuire,2018ME72,¶2n.2,186A.3d837,Martinfiled

thistimelyappeal.See14M.R.S.§1901(2021);M.R.App.P.2B(c)(1).

8Thecourtmadeclearthatitsintentwastoamendthedivorcejudgmenttomakeitconsistent

with the judgmentestablishingde factoparentage,parental rights and responsibilities, and childsupport.Butalthoughthejudgmentestablishingparentalrightsandresponsibilitiesprovidesthatthechildren’sprimaryresidenceshallbewiththeOstrandersandawardsspecifiedrightsofcontacttoMartinandMacMahan,thecourtdidnotamendthedivorcejudgment’sconflictingprovisionthatthechildren’sprimaryresidenceshallbewithMacMahan.Wethereforevacatetheamendeddivorcejudgmentandremandthemattertoenablethecourttoresolvetheconflict.Seeinfra¶36.

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II.DISCUSSION

A. AdoptionofInterimFindings

[¶18]Martinfirstarguesthatthecourterredbyincorporatingfindings

fromtheinterimorderintoitsfinaljudgment.Hereliesprimarilyon4M.R.S.

§183(1)(E) (2021),whichprovides that “[i]nterimorders . . . are subject to

denovo reviewbya judgeat the finalhearing,” andM.R.Civ.P.110A(b)(7),

whichprovidesthat“[a]ninterimorderdoesnotconstitutethelawofthecase,

and the issuesmay be decided de novo at the final hearing.” Although the

statuteandrulebothtouchontheeffectofamagistrate’sinterimorder,neither

governs the precise issue here, which is the proper treatment of specific

findingsinaninterimorderbyacourtissuingafinaljudgment.Here,thecourt

heldatwo-dayfinalhearingbeforeadjudicating,initsfinaljudgment,Martin’s

motiontomodifythedivorcejudgmentandtheOstranders’parentageaction.9

[¶19]Althoughthecourtstatedthatitwas“adopt[ing]”themagistrate’s

findings, it also explained that it was doing so “[a]fter consideration of the

evidencepresentedtothiscourtatthehearinginthismatter.”Ontherecord

beforeus,wearesatisfiedthatthecourtviewedtheevidencepresentedatthe

finalhearingassupportingthefindingsthatthemagistratehadmadebasedon

9ThemagistratehadnotaddressedtheOstranders’parentagepetitionatall;thatpetitionwas

notfileduntilafterthemagistrateissuedtheinterimorder.

12

thetestimonypresentedattheinterimhearing.10Martincontendsotherwise,

buthedidnotaskthetrialcourttoclarifyitsstatement,reconsideritsfindings,

oralteroramenditsjudgment.SeeAdoptionbyJessicaM.,2020ME118,¶16,

239A.3d633(“Theappellantbearstheburdenofprovidinganadequaterecord

upon which the reviewing court can consider the arguments on appeal.”

(quotationmarksomitted));cf.M.R.Civ.P.52(b);59(e).

[¶20]WeagreewithMartinthatoneofthecourt’sfindingswasclearly

erroneous because there was no evidence admitted at the final hearing to

supportthefindingthatacaseworkerconcludedthatMartinhadneglectedthe

childrenbeforethefamilymovedtoKansas.Ultimately,however,theerrorwas

harmless.ContrarytoMartin’ssuggestion,thevastmajorityofthe“adopt[ed]”

findingswereindependentlysupportedbycompetentevidenceadmittedatthe

finalhearing,includingthecrucialfindingthat,beforeApril2018,“if[Martin]

was unaware that the [children]were not in [MacMahan’s] direct care, it is

becauseheturnedablindeyetothediresituationhere inMaine.” See infra

¶¶32-33. The court expressed that finding—alongwith the other findings

10TheOstrandersdonotarguethatthecourtcouldhaveadoptedtheinterimfindingspursuant

toM.R. Civ. P. 118(a)(2),whichprovides for reviewby the court of amagistrate’s final order orjudgment, or that the court could have taken judicial notice of the interim findings, see M.R.Evid.201(b);AdoptionbyJessicaM.,2020ME118,¶14,239A.3d633;InreScottS.,2001ME114,¶¶12-14,775A.2d1144.

13

centraltoitsdefactoparentagedetermination,see19-AM.R.S.§1891(3)—ina

separateportionofthejudgmentwithoutreferencetothestray,unsupported

findingconcerningthecaseworker’sobservations.Inthecontextofthecourt’s

entire order, it is highly probable that the erroneous finding did not affect

Martin’ssubstantialrights.SeeM.R.Civ.P.61;InreScottS.,2001ME114,¶25,

775A.2d1144;seealsoBanksv.Leary,2019ME89,¶¶15,18,209A.3d109

(highlightinga“court’slimitedrelianceon”anerroneouslyadmittedguardian

adlitemreporttoconcludethatharmlesserrorapplied).

B. DeFactoParentage

[¶21] Martin argues that, because the trial court did not find that he

affirmatively fostered and supported the Ostranders’ de facto parent

relationship with the children, we would need to interpret the de facto

parentage statute unconstitutionally in order to uphold the trial court’s

determination that the Ostranders are the children’s de facto parents. The

statuteprovides,inrelevantpart,asfollows:

3.Adjudicationofdefactoparentstatus.Thecourtshalladjudicateapersontobeadefactoparentifthecourtfindsbyclearandconvincingevidencethatthepersonhasfullyandcompletelyundertakenapermanent,unequivocal,committedandresponsibleparental role in the child’s life. Such a finding requires adeterminationbythecourtthat:

14

A.The person has resided with the child for a significantperiodoftime;

B.Thepersonhas engaged in consistent caretakingof thechild;

C.A bonded and dependent relationship has beenestablished between the child and the person, therelationshipwasfosteredorsupportedbyanotherparentofthe child and the person and the other parent haveunderstood, acknowledgedor accepted that or behaved asthoughthepersonisaparentofthechild;

D.The person has accepted full and permanentresponsibilitiesasaparentofthechildwithoutexpectationoffinancialcompensation;and

E.Thecontinuingrelationshipbetweenthepersonandthechildisinthebestinterestofthechild.

19-AM.R.S.§1891(3).

[¶22]Specifically,Martin’sargumentfocusesupontherequiredfindings

that“therelationshipwasfosteredorsupportedbyanotherparentofthechild”

andthat“thepersonandtheotherparenthaveunderstood,acknowledgedor

accepted that or behaved as though the person is a parent of the child,”

19-AM.R.S. § 1891(3)(C). Martin contends that for the statute to survive

constitutionalscrutiny,thestatutoryreferencesto“anotherparent”and“the

otherparent”mustbereadtorefertoeachandeverylegalparent.Martindoes

not challenge the court’s findings that the Ostranders proved the other

15

elementsoftheirdefactoparentageclaim,suchasthattheyprovidedresidence

andcareandexercisedparentalresponsibilitiesforthechildren,andweagree

thattherecordfullysupportsthosefindings.

[¶23] Martin’sargumentraisesa legal issueandafactual issue. First,

based on our case law explaining that a de facto parentage determination

implicatesalegalparent’sfundamentalrighttocontrolthecareandcustodyof

hisorherchild,e.g.,Pittsv.Moore,2014ME59,¶27,90A.3d1169,Martin

arguesthatfortheOstranderstosatisfytheirburdenundersection1891(3)(C),

theOstranders needed to prove thathe—apresumptively fit legal parent—

fostered or supported the children’s relationships with the Ostranders and

behavedasthoughtheOstranderswereparentsofthechildren,notjustthat

MacMahandidso.Second,hearguesthattherecordcontainsinsufficientproof

tosupportthatfinding.11

[¶24] Our task is thus to examine (1) whether, to avoid an

unconstitutionalresult,thestatutemustbereadasMartincontends,and,ifso,

(2)whetherthecourt’sfindingsaresupportedbytheevidence.Wereviewthe

11Martinalsoargues,forthefirsttimeinhisreplybrief,thattherewasinsufficientevidenceto

support findings thatMacMahan fosteredor supported the relationshipwith theOstranders andbehavedasthoughtheOstranderswereparentsofthechildren.BecauseMartinhasnotpreservedthatargument,weneednotaddressit,see,e.g.,BayviewLoanServicingv.Bartlett,2014ME37,¶24,87A.3d741,butwenoteherethatwearenotpersuaded.

16

court’sfindingsforclearerror,Kilborn,2016ME78,¶16,140A.3d461,and

we examine questions of constitutional law and statutory interpretation de

novo, In reD.P., 2013ME40, ¶ 6, 65A.3d 1216. “If at all possible,wewill

construe[a]statutetopreserveitsconstitutionality.”TownofBaldwinv.Carter,

2002ME52,¶9,794A.2d62.“Thus,whenthereisareasonableinterpretation

of a statute thatwill satisfy constitutional requirements,wewill adopt that

interpretation notwithstanding other possible interpretations of the statute

thatcouldviolatetheConstitution.”Naderv.Me.DemocraticParty,2012ME57,

¶19,41A.3d551(citationomitted).

[¶25]Aswehaveconsistentlyrecognized,effortsbypersonsotherthan

legalparents“toobtainparentalrightsthroughlitigation,overtheobjections

ofparents,implicatetheparents’fundamentalright[s]todirecttheupbringing

oftheirchildren.”Philbrookv.Theriault,2008ME152,¶17,957A.2d74;see

Pitts, 2014ME59, ¶¶ 11-12, 17, 24, 27, 90A.3d 1169;Rideout v. Riendeau,

2000ME198,¶18,761A.2d291(“[T]herighttodirectandcontrolachild’s

upbringing is a ‘fundamental’ liberty interest protected by the Due Process

Clause.” (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (emphasis

omitted))).Becauseacourt’sdeterminationthatapersonisadefactoparent

constitutesa“substantial”“intrusionintoa[legal]parent’sfundamentalrights”

17

thatis“nolesspermanentthantheterminationofparentalrights,”weapply

strictscrutinytoevaluatewhetherthatinterferenceimpermissiblyburdensthe

rightsatissue.Pitts,2014ME59,¶¶12,17,27,90A.3d1169;seeC.L.v.L.L.,

2015ME131,¶22,125A.3d350(“Thecreationbyacourtofanadditional,

legally recognized parental relationshipwith a child permanently alters the

relationshipsamongthechildandtheotherparents.”).

[¶26]WhenwedecidedPittsv.Moore,wehadpreviouslyrecognizedthat

ourcourts couldgrantparental rights toapersonother thanabiologicalor

adoptiveparent,12 but neitherwenor the Legislaturehad acted to establish

precisestandardsforsuchadeterminationthatwouldaccountfortheexacting

scrutinyrequired.SeePitts,2014ME59,¶¶19,24,90A.3d1169.Inaplurality

opinioninPitts,weheldthatapersonseekingdefactoparentagestatusmust

provebyclearandconvincingevidence“(1)[that]heorshehasundertakena

permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible parental role in the

child’slife,and(2)thatthereareexceptionalcircumstancessufficienttoallow

the court to interfere with the legal or adoptive parent’s rights.” Id. ¶ 27

(quotationmarksandcitationsomitted).

12 See Stitham v. Henderson, 2001 ME 52, 768 A.2d 598; C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 2004 ME 43,

845A.2d1146;Youngv.Young,2004ME44,845A.2d1144;Leonardv.Boardman,2004ME108,854A.2d869;Philbrookv.Theriault,2008ME152,957A.2d74.

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[¶27]Relevanttothiscase,weexplainedthefirstelementinmoredetail,

stating,

Wedefinea“permanent,unequivocal,committed,andresponsibleparentalrole”by looking to theelementsofde factoparenthoodemployedinMassachusetts:“Adefactoparentisonewhohasnobiologicalrelationtothechild[asaparent],buthasparticipatedinthechild’slifeasamemberofthechild’sfamily.Thedefactoparentresideswiththechildand,withtheconsentandencouragementofthelegalparent,performsashareofcaretakingfunctions....”

Id. ¶28 (quotingE.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711N.E.2d886, 891 (Mass. 1999)). “This

language,”westated,“giveslitigantsandcourtsalistofthenecessaryelements

fordeterminingwhetheranindividual’srelationshipwithachildispermanent,

unequivocal,committed,andresponsible.”Id.Wenotedthat“thetestaccounts

fortheintentofthelegalparentandtheputativedefactoparenttoco-parent,

asmeasuredbefore thedissolutionof their relationship,or the intentof the

legalparentthatthenon-parentactasparentinplaceofthelegalparent.”Id.

InKilborn,2016ME78,¶18,140A.3d461,wereiteratedthatthiselement“can

bemetbydemonstratingthat...alegalparentintendedforthenonparentto

actinplaceofthelegalparent.”Wealsomadeclearthatproofthatthelegal

parent“implicitly,ifnotexplicitly,consentedtoandencouraged”theputative

de facto parent’s parental role can suffice. Id. ¶¶ 19-21 (quotation marks

omitted).

19

[¶28] InJuly2016,whentheLegislatureenactedtheMaineParentage

Act,itcodifiedthesecommonlawstandards.P.L.2015,ch.296,§A-1(effective

July1,2016);Libby,2020ME71,¶16n.3,234A.3d197(notingthat19-AM.R.S.

§1891“codifie[d] thecommon lawprinciple thatapersoncannotbecomea

defacto parent unless the child’s legal parent recognizes the person as a

parent); Kilborn, 2016 ME 78, ¶ 1 n.1, 140 A.3d 461 (explaining that

section1891codifiedthefirstelementofthetwo-parttestsetforthinPitts);

L.D.1017,EnactedLawSummary(127thLegis.2015)(statingthatthestatute

“codifie[d]thedefactoparentdoctrine,nowfirmlyestablishedbycaselaw”).

Thus,thestatuteprovidesthatthecourtmustadjudicateapersonadefacto

parentifitfindsbyclearandconvincingevidence“thatthepersonhasfullyand

completelyundertakenapermanent,unequivocal,committedandresponsible

parentalroleinthechild’slife,”anditfurtherprovidesthat“[s]uchafinding

requires”fiveenumeratedsub-findings,13oneofwhichcontainsthelanguage

atissuehere:that

[a] bonded and dependent relationship has been establishedbetweenthechildandtheperson,therelationshipwasfosteredorsupportedbyanotherparentof thechildandthepersonandthe

13Thesearewhatwedescribedas“thenecessaryelements”fordeterminingwhetheraputative

defactoparent“hasundertakenapermanent,unequivocal,committed,andresponsibleparentalrolein thechild’s life,”which isnecessary toprotecta legalparent’s fundamental right tocontrol theupbringingofhisorherchildren. Pittsv.Moore,2014ME59,¶¶27-28,90A.3d1169(quotationmarksomitted).

20

otherparenthaveunderstood,acknowledgedoracceptedthatorbehavedasthoughthepersonisaparentofthechild.

19-AM.R.S.§1891(3)(C)(emphasisadded).

[¶29] In light of this precedent,we conclude that a putative de facto

parentmustprovetheelementsofsection1891(3)(C)astoalegalparentwho

appears14andobjectstothedefactoparentagepetition,asMartinhas.15 See

Davis, 2018ME72,¶20,186A.3d837 (“Given the legislativehistoryof the

[MaineParentageAct],weusethecommonlawthatthe[Act]laterattempted

to codify as one way to understand the Legislature’s intentions.” (footnote

omitted)). We therefore agree with Martin that in order for the court to

adjudicate the Ostranders de facto parents of the children, the Ostranders

neededtoprovethat“therelationshipwasfosteredorsupportedby”Martin

and thatMartinand theOstranders “understood, acknowledgedoraccepted

that or behaved as though” the Ostranders were parents of the children.

19-AM.R.S. § 1891(3)(C). To hold otherwise would potentially allow the

unilateralactionsofonelegalparenttocauseanunconstitutionaldilutionof

14Thestatuterequiresapersonseekingtobeadjudicatedadefactoparenttoservetheinitiating

pleadingsandaffidavit“uponallparentsandlegalguardiansofthechildandanyotherpartytotheproceeding.”19-AM.R.S.§1891(2)(A)(2021).15Thiscasedoesnotcallonustodecidewhetherthesamerequirementappliestolegalparents

whofailtoappearorwhoappearanddonotobject.Nordoesitpresenttheissueofwhatstandardsapplywhenanobjectingparenthasbeendeemedunfit.

21

anotherlegalparent’srights.SeeE.N.v.T.R.,255A.3d1,31(Md.2021)(“[T]o

declaretheexistenceofadefactoparentshipbasedontheconsentofonlyone

[legal]parent...underminesand,essentially,negates[anyotherlegal]parent’s

constitutionalrighttothecare,custody,andcontrolofthe...children.”).16

[¶30] Our conclusion is consistent with Maine’s de facto parentage

statute, which requires “all parents and legal guardians of the child” to be

servedwithadefactoparentagefiling,19-AM.R.S.§1891(2)(A),andthelaw

of other states, seeD.C. Code § 16-831.01(1) (LEXIS through all permanent

L.effectiveasofNov.17,2021) (definingde factoparent to requireholding

16InE.N.v.T.R.,theMarylandCourtofAppealsarticulateditsrationaleforrequiringashowingof

consentbyalllegalparents:

[I]nadditiontoinfringingonaparent’sindividualconstitutionalrighttocustodyandcontrolofhisorherchild . . . , therearepractical concernsattendant to judiciallycreatingadefactoparentshipwithouttheconsentofbothlegalparents.Creatingadefactoparentshipwiththeconsentofonlyoneparentwheretherearetwofitlegalparents and in the absence of exceptional circumstances would result incircumstancesthatmaybeunworkableforthelegalparents,thedefactoparent,andthe children involved. . . . [T]herewill inevitablybe circumstanceswherede factoparenthoodissoughtbyathirdpartyintheabsenceofexceptionalcircumstancesandwith both fit legal parents available and involved in a child’s life. Under suchcircumstances,topermittheconsentofjustoneparenttocreateathirdparentwithcustodial rights to a childwithout the consentof the secondparentmay result infamilies inMarylandwith children being subject to custody and visitation ordersbetween all three or perhaps more fit parents, who have little or no ability toco-parent, andwho possibly do not even know each other, a situation that couldrarelybeseentobeinthebestinterestofachild.

255 A.3d 1, 40 (Md. 2021) (citation omitted). The court also recognized that “consent”may be“implied”andmaybe“inferredfromalegalparent’sconduct”and“shownthroughactionorinaction,so long as the action or inaction is knowing and voluntary and is reasonably understood to beintended as that parent’s consent to and fostering of the thirdparty’s formation of a parent-likerelationshipwiththechild.”Id.at34.

22

oneselfoutasaparent“withtheagreementofthechild’sparentor,ifthereare

2parents,bothparents”);E.N.,255A.3dat30-32.17

[¶31]Importantly,however,section1891(3)(C)doesnotrequireproof

that every legal parent has given express consent to the de facto parent

relationship.Ifsuchconsentwererequired,therecouldbenolitigationofany

defactoparentageclaimbecausealegalparent’sobjectionwouldnecessarily

defeattheclaim.Rather,theproofthatsection1891(3)(C)requiresisthatthe

legalparentorparentshaverecognized,accepted,andsupportedtheformation

andgrowthof“[a]bondedanddependentrelationship”betweentheputative

de facto parent and the child, 19-A M.R.S. § 1891(3)(C). See Kilborn,

2016ME78,¶¶18-20,140A.3d461;Pitts,2014ME59,¶28,90A.3d1169;

Youngv.King,2019ME78,¶¶9-12,208A.3d762.Apersonseekingdefacto

parentagestatuscansatisfythesection1891(3)(C)burdenbydemonstrating

17Althoughwehavenothadoccasiontoaddresstheissuedirectlybefore,ourconclusionisalso

consistent with our own decisions. In Kilborn v. Carey, in affirming a de facto parentagedetermination on the merits before Maine’s de facto parentage statute became effective, weaddressedseparatelywhethersufficientevidenceexistedtosupportthetrialcourt’s findingsthateach legalparent fosteredandsupportedtherelationshipwith thede factoparent. 2016ME78,¶¶18-21,140A.3d461.Untilthiscase,ourdefactoparentagedecisionsunderthestatuteaddressedonlyissuesofstanding.SeeLibbyv.Estabrook,2020ME71,¶1,234A.3d197;InreChildofPhilipS.,2020ME2,¶1,223A.3d114;Youngv.King,2019ME78,¶1,208A.3d762;Lamkinv.Lamkin,2018ME76,¶1,186A.3d1276;Davisv.McGuire,2018ME72,¶1,186A.3d837.Insomeofthosedecisions,however,weaffirmedthedismissalofadefactoparentagepetitionforlackofstandingbecause one legal parent had not fostered and supported the relationship or acknowledged theputativede factoparentas aparent, andwedid sowithout consideringwhetheranyother legalparenthadfosteredorsupportedtheputativedefactoparentingrelationship.SeeDavis,2018ME72,¶¶10,30,32,186A.3d837;InreChildofPhilipS.,2020ME2,¶¶3,9,22,223A.3d114.

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that the child’s legal parent or parents have implicitly, through acts or

omissionsifnotthroughwords,fostered,supported,andacceptedtheperson’s

parental role. Kilborn, 2016ME78,¶¶18-21,21n.6,140A.3d461;Young,

2019ME78,¶10,208A.3d762.

[¶32]Here,thetrialcourtfound,contrarytoMartin’stestimony,thatat

leastbyApril2016,Martinkneworshouldhaveknownthatthechildrenwere

livingwith theOstranders and thathe “abdicatedhis financial andpersonal

responsibility to care for the children.” See Principles of the L. of Fam.

Dissolution:AnalysisandRecommendations§2.03cmt.c(Am.L.Inst.2002)

(explainingthatadefactoparentrelationshipmayformwithouttheagreement

of“[t]helegalparentorparents”wherethereis“acompletefailureorinability

ofanylegalparenttoperformcaretakingfunctions,”suchas“whenaparentis

absent, or virtually absent, from the child’s life”); In re Parentage of J.B.R.,

336P.3d648,653-54(Wash.Ct.App.2014)(concludingthatatrialcourtdid

noterrinfindingthataparent“consent[ed]toandfoster[ed]arelationship”

withadefactoparentby“voluntarilyabsent[ing]himselffromhischild’slife”).

Martin’spervasivefailuretoexerciseeitherhisparentalrightsorhisparental

responsibilities illustrates the principle that a legal parent’s omissions or

24

absencemaycreateavacuumintermsofcareandnurturethatisfilledbythe

defactoparentrelationship.SeeLibby,2020ME71,¶16,234A.3d197.

[¶33]Thecourt’sfindingsregardingMartin’sabdicationofhisrightsand

responsibilitiesareamplysupportedbytheevidenceintherecordandtheyare

sufficient to support the determination that Martin—at least implicitly—

understoodandacceptedthattheOstranderswerefulfillingparentalrolesfor

his children. TherecordevidencewentbeyondmereomissionsonMartin’s

part and included his testimony that he voiced affirmative support for the

Ostranders’ de facto parentage relationship with the children when he

expressedhisappreciationtothemfor“raising[his]girls,”andalsothathetook

anaffirmativesteptofostertherelationshipwhenhegrantedthemtemporary

legal authority over the children. It is true thatMartin’smotion tomodify

reflected a step toward asserting his own parental rights, but given the

evidenceofcommitmentsmadebutnotkeptonhispart,itdidnotdetractfrom

therecordevidencesupportingthecourt’sfindingsinfavoroftheOstranders.

SeeSulikowskivSulikowski,2019ME143,¶14,216A.3d893(“Thetrialcourt

isthesolearbiterofwitnesscredibilityanditisthereforefreetoacceptorreject

portionsoftheparties’testimonybasedonitscredibilitydeterminationsand

togivetheirtestimonytheweightitdeemsappropriate.”(citationomitted));

25

Handrahanv.Malenko,2011ME15,¶14,12A.3d79(“Acourtisnotrequired

tobelievethetestimonyofanyparticularwitness,...evenwhenthewitness’s

testimonyisuncontradicted.”(quotationmarksandcitationsomitted)).

C. Martin’sMotiontoModifytheDivorceJudgment

[¶34]Martinalsochallengesthecourt’sdenialofhisrequest,madevia

hismotiontomodifythedivorcejudgment,forsoleparentalrightsandforthe

childrentoliveprimarilywithhiminKansas.See19-AM.R.S.§1657(1)(2021).

“Wereviewanorderonapost-divorcemotion foranabuseofdiscretionor

error of law and review factual findings contained therein for clear error.”

Lewinv.Skehan,2012ME31,¶24,39A.3d58.“[O]nlyasubstantialchangein

circumstances since the entry of the most recent decree can justify the

modificationof thedecree,and . . . theoverridingconsiderationwhenevera

proposedmodificationissoughtisthebestinterest[s]oftheminorchildren.”

Levy,Maine Family Law § 6.6[1] at 6-61 (8th ed. 2013) (quotation marks

omitted).

[¶35] We do not agree with Martin that the court acted outside its

discretionwhenitdeclinedtofindthatMartinhaddemonstratedachangein

circumstances—sincetheentryofthedivorcejudgmentinJanuary2018—that

was substantial enough to justify themodifications he sought. See Smith v.

26

Rideout,2010ME69,¶¶15-18,1A.3d441;Villav.Smith,534A.2d1310,1312

(Me.1987)(explainingthatthetrialcourthasbroaddiscretiontodetermine

whetherachangeincircumstanceshasaffectedthechildren’sbestintereststo

adegreesignificantenoughtojustifyachangeofprimarycustody).Thecourt

thoroughlyexaminedthechildren’sbestinterestsinitsconsolidatedorderand

determined that those interests would be served by continued residence

primarilywith theOstranders and shared parental rights. It did not err or

abuse its discretion when, in accordance with those supported findings, it

declinedMartin’srequestforsoleparentalrightsandprimaryresidence.

D. Conclusion

[¶36] WeaffirmthejudgmentgrantingtheOstrandersparentalrights

and vacate the judgment amending the divorce judgment for three reasons.

First, to theextent that the trialcourterredby“adopt[ing]” themagistrate’s

interim findings, the error was harmless. Second, although the Ostranders

were required to prove that Martin—as a legal parent objecting to the

Ostranders’ de facto parentage petition—“fostered or supported” the

Ostranders’ parental role and “understood, acknowledged or accepted that

[role] or behaved as though the” Ostranders were the children’s parents,

19-AM.R.S. § 1891(3)(C), the court didnot errwhen it determined that the

27

Ostrandershadsustainedtheirburden.Finally,becausethecourt’samended

divorcejudgmentdoesnotprovidethatthechildren’sprimaryresidenceisto

be with the Ostranders, we vacate the judgment amending the divorce

judgment and remand to allow the court to remedy that remaining

inconsistency.

Theentryis:

The judgment establishing de facto parentage,parental rights and responsibilities, and childsupportisaffirmed.Thejudgmentamendingthedivorce judgment is vacated. The matter isremanded for the trial court to enter a newamended divorce judgment that is consistentwith the judgment establishing parental rightsand responsibilities and provides that thechildren’s primary residence shall be with theOstranders.

E.AnneCarton,Esq.,Brunswick,andMatthewC.Garascia,Esq.(orally),Auburn,forappellantMarkR.MartinJohnF.Zink,Esq.(orally),Freeport,forappelleesDawnandJamesOstranderVanessa A. Bartlett, Esq., Law Offices of Vanessa A. Bartlett, Portland, forappelleeMarylouE.MacMahanWestBathDistrictCourtdocketnumbersFM-2017-186;FM-2018-340’FORCLERKREFERENCEONLY