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IFC – FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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INFORMATION FUSION CENTRE 103 Tanah Merah Coast Road, #02-01

Singapore 498750

Tel: +65 9626 8965 (Hotline)

+65 6594 5728 (Office)

Fax: +65 6594 5734

[email protected]

www.infofusioncentre.gov.sg

05 Mar 18

UPDATE ON MARSEC SITUATION IN IFC’S AOI – January to December 2017

The Information Fusion Centre (IFC) recorded the Maritime Security (MARSEC)

Situation in the IFC’s Area of Interest (AOI) since Jan 16, with data corresponding from

Jan 13. This document contains briefs covering separate maritime security categories which

IFC monitors and reports on. All incidents were grouped into the following categories for

2017: Contraband Trafficking (CT); Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IUU);

Irregular Human Migration (IHM); Maritime Terrorism (MT); Maritime Incidents (MI);

Theft, Robbery and Piracy at Sea (TRAPS). These briefs have been produced with IFC data

collated from open sources and incorporates inputs from the International Liaison Officers

(ILOs) deployed at the IFC.

The aim of this document is to provide an update to the MARSEC situation in the IFC’s AOI

for each MARSEC threat category for Jan – Dec 2017 and highlight any observed changes in

patterns or modus operandi when compared with preceding years.

It should be duly noted that all data and information in this document was obtained from open

sources, and only constitute what was reported. It is not an exact representation of all

incidents that have occurred at sea as incidents may go un-reported to local or flag-state

authorities. Any reference to analysis made from this document should take into

consideration the above-mentioned limitation. We hope you find this update useful in shaping

and/or cueing your respective MARSEC operations accordingly.

Yours Sincerely,

<via email>

SLTC Raymond Ong

Head Information Fusion Centre


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Acknowledgements

This document is made possible with the active collaboration and effort of the following

officers:

CAPT Jean-Rene Degans, France ILO

CDR Eduardo Zevallos Roncagliolo, Peru ILO

CDR Jianpeng Zhu, China ILO

CDR Surachai Saiwongpanya, Thailand ILO

CDR Vuong Dinh Manh, Vietnam ILO

LCDR Andrew William Carey, United

Kingdom ILO

LCDR Andrew Wilson, New Zealand ILO

LCDR Aston Talbot, New Zealand ILO

LCDR Joseph T Dimayuga, Philippines ILO

LCDR Kyaw Thet Tin, Myanmar ILO

LCDR Mark Williams, Australia ILO

LCDR Mohd Nor Hadidi Ismail, Malaysia

ILO

LCDR Richard Elsom, Australia ILO

LCDR Tejinder Pal Singh, India ILO

LCDR Yohanes Berchmans Cahyono,

Indonesia ILO

MAJ Eric Ang, Head Shipping Engagement

LT David Copeland, United States ILO

LT Mao Sovanda, Cambodia ILO

LT Norlaila Binti Awang Harlip, Brunei ILO

LT Tomoya Kimura, Japan ILO

LTA Chong De Xian, IFC Staff Officer

LTA Nicholas Yong, IFC Staff Officer


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Contents

Maritime Terrorism (MT) & Theft, Robbery and Piracy at Sea (TRAPS)

4

Contraband Trafficking (CT)

18

Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing (IUU)

34

Irregular Human Migration (IHM)

42

Maritime Incidents (MI)

45


4


1. Maritime Terrorism (MT) & Theft, Robbery and Piracy at Sea

(TRAPS)

Figure 1: TRAPS-MT Incident Locations in 2017

Figure 1 indicates the IFC’s AOI TRAPS-MT incident locations from Jan to Dec, 2017. The

incidents were geographically recorded and color-coded for profiling purposes, reflecting a

total of eight sub-groups (ref. legend). Based on the incident locations, a total of seven

hotspots were identified:

1. Batangas and Manila Anchorage,

2. Chittagong Anchorage and Approaches,

3. Sulu and Celebes Sea,

4. Samarinda anchorage,

5. West Java,

6. Singapore Strait, and,

7. South China Sea.


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In addition, four other anchorages which share similar incident profiles were identified in

areas with fewer incidents and characterised by little to no violence1. The four areas share the

same pattern with all incidents occurring during periods of darkness and/or low visibility,

with most of the incidents occurring while the vessels were at anchor. These areas are:

1. Dumai anchorage,

2. Belawan anchorage,

3. Quangninh anchorage, and,

4. Tianjin anchorage.

Figure 2: Snapshots of the anchorages of Dumai, Quang-Nih, Belawan and Tianjin

Key events for 2017:

1. Theft of Oil Cargo

a. A foiled-piracy attempt occurred, involving a product tanker carrying diesel

oil, while underway at vicinity 54NM east off Kuala Dungun, Malaysia.

Civilian-stakeholder vigilance, cooperation and information-sharing between

the respective governmental authorities led to a timely and successful

1 Perpetrators were reportedly unarmed and typically escaping when spotted by crew members.


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operational response, which prevented oil siphoning and ensured the swift

arrest of 10 perpetrators and the detention of one pirate vessel.

b. A Thailand-Flagged Chemical/Products Tanker (C.P. 41) loaded with 3.8

million litres of diesel was attacked by six armed men near Kuantan, Malaysia

while heading from Singapore to the southern Thai province of Songkhla (Lat

03°55.27'N, Long 103° 52.8'E) on 232100H Jun 2017. Armed with guns and

knives, the perpetrators boarded the vessel, captured the captain and the crew

members and destroyed communications equipment, before pumping 1.5

million litres of fuel into their ship and subsequently fleeing the area.

c. A Thailand-Flagged product tanker “MGT 1”, was attacked by 10 perpetrators

while the vessel was underway at (Lat: 05°05.53N, Long: 104°14.45E) on

070103H Sep 2017. Another three perpetrators were waiting on a small fast

boat alongside the product tanker. Once in control, they forced the crew to

siphon 900 tons (of the 2000 tons on-board) of diesel oil onto a pirate’s

mother-ship. The MMEA Special Forces Team was deployed using an AW-

139 helicopter, boarding the MGT-1 approximately three hours later. 10

perpetrators were apprehended, while the other three perpetrators and the

mother-ship managed to escape. There was no further news on the stolen fuel

or the mother-ship. All of the crew members were safely rescued.

d. A Malaysian-Flagged tug and barge “EVER PROSPER” and “EVER

OMEGA” was boarded by an unknown number of perpetrators (Lat 2 12

40.08N, Long 107 06 18.66E) on 221716H Nov 2017. Perpetrators removed

fuel from the tug EVER PROSPER and stole the barge-in-tow, EVER

OMEGA, which contained 3700 tons of crude palm kernel oil. The company

reported that six of the 10 crew were also taken with the barge. The Malaysian

Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) and the Indonesia Marine Police

(IMP) were subsequently informed, and on 222140H Nov 2017, the

Indonesian ILO reported that the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) confirmed the

barge EVER OMEGA was recovered, with the six crew on-board unharmed.


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2. Kidnap for Ransom

a. The Trilateral Cooperative Agreement (TCA) led to positive

developments/outcomes pertaining to the successful pursuit operations

launched against elements of the Abu Sayaf Group (ASG). Coordinated

police, ground, air and naval operations conducted simultaneously by the

respective government agencies in the tri-boundary area effectively curtailed

the ASG’s ability to conduct sea-based kidnapping.

b. A Malaysian-Flagged fishing boat (registration number BN 838/4F) with its

engine still running was found abandoned in waters off Langawan island (Lat:

06°04.00N, Long:118°20.00E) in southern Philippines on 191405L Jan 2017.

The suspected abduction (which was later confirmed) involved three

Indonesian crew members, who were identified as Hamdan Salim (29),

Subandi Sattu (47), and Sudaling Samandung (26).

c. A Philippines-Flagged fishing trawler, while sailing near Pangutaran town off

Sulu (Lat: 6° 34'N Long: 120° 26'E), was attacked by a group of perpetrators

on-board a speedboat on 142015L Oct 2017. Five crew members were

subsequently abducted by the perpetrators once the trawler was boarded.

d. A Vietnam-Flagged motor vessel “GIANG HAI” was attacked at 17NM North

of Pearl Bank, Tawi-Tawi, Philippines (Lat: 6° 9'4.00"N, Long:

119°39'4.00"E) on 192015L Oct 2017. After destroying the vessel navigation

systems, the perpetrators killed one crew member and abducted a further six.

(There were 17 Crew Members in total).

e. A Philippines-Flagged tug boat “SUPER SHUTTLE TUG 1” was attacked

1.7NM off Sibago Island, Philippines, while towing the cargo vessel “SUPER

SHUTTLE RORO 9” (Lat: 6° 42’ 33.26”N, Long: 122° 24’ 51.84”E) on

231215L Mar 2017. At least three armed perpetrators boarded the vessels, and

two of the crew members on-board were abducted. There were no further

reports.

f. A Philippine-Flagged fishing boat was attacked by at least five suspects who

boarded the boat in the southern waters of the Philippines (Lat: 06°52'0.00"N,

Long. 122° 1'60.00"E) on 092000L Jan 2017, killing eight of the 15 crew

members on the spot. Two crew members were found nearby and the other


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five crew members earlier reported as missing were later found hiding on a

nearby island after they were able to escape from the boat.

3. Attacks at Sea

a. A Taiwan-Flagged fishing boat “JIN JIN HE FA 2” was attacked by an

unidentified iron shell boat, 113NM (22 37N 117 45E) southwest of Penghu,

Taiwan. Three robbers came on-board and took away $200,000 in Taiwanese

currency (US$6578). After being informed by the Taiwan Coast Guard,

China’s Shantou Coast Guard arrested the iron boat and 14 suspects offshore

of the city of Shantou on 14 Jul 2017.

b. A Singapore-flagged tug boat “JAYA CRYSTAL” and her barge, were

attacked while underway off Cox Bazar, Bangladesh (Lat: 21°11'0.00"N,

Long: 91°43'0.00"E) on 231000H Jan 2017. The perpetrators approached the

vessel on several skiffs and succeeded in boarding the vessel. A fire

subsequently broke out on the barge. The perpetrators subsequently left the

vessel when a Bangladeshi naval asset arrived on-scene. The crew members

were unharmed and nothing was stolen.

General Observation(s):

Figure 3: Yearly recorded number of incidents per month for 2015, 2016 and 2017

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC

Yearly recorded Number of Incidents per

Month

2015 2016 2017


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There is a decrease in the total number of TRAPS-MT incidents recorded for 2017, as

compared to 2015 and 2016. A total of 119 incidents were recorded for the period in review,

which corresponds to a decrease from 149 incidents in 2016 and 258 incidents in 2015,

respectively. The downward trend of incidents reflects the stakeholders’ increased security

awareness, and increased collaboration and responses from navies and maritime security

agencies, together with the shipping community. According to the yearly profile covering

monthly incident occurrences for the past three years (2015-2017), there is an upward trend

of incidents from Aug to Dec 2017 as compared to the previous years’ data.

Figure 4: Profiling of the type of incidents (left) and the type of vessels targeted (right)

In addition, majority of the 119 incidents recorded involved sea theft (41%), followed by

attempted actions (31%) and sea robbery (16%). Tankers accounted for the majority of

incidents (34%), followed by bulk carriers (26%), container ships (12%), and tug & barges

(10%). The type of vessels affected also corresponds to the volume of traffic undertaken by

these particular vessel types.


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Hotspots Profile(s) and Key Observation(s):

Figure 5: Overview of hotspot in relation to volume and level of violence in 2017

The illustration above provides an overview of each hotspot in relation to the level of

violence, and the volume of incidents in each area. The majority of the hotspot areas involve

low levels of physical violence, characterized by the perpetrators’ non-confrontational

behaviour. However, the South China Sea and the Sulu and Celebes Sea were notable for

their medium to high level of violence, which is defined by armed perpetrators threatening,

injuring and/or taking the crew for kidnap for ransom (KFR) purposes.

Singapore Straits and Approaches

Compared to the overall AOI’s hotspots which constitutes an average of 10-20 incidents per

hotspot, the Singapore Strait and its nearby approaches registered a higher range of incidents

at 26 incidents (out of the 119 recorded incidents in the AOI).


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Figure 6: Incidents within the Singapore Straits and its approaches in 2017

Key Observation(s) (refer to IFC spot commentary 1-18 for details):

1. Vessels which are anchored or stationary outside of designated anchorage areas

covering the eastern approaches to the Singapore Strait were more susceptible to

attacks, as compared to those in designated anchorage areas adjacent to the Singapore

Strait;

2. There is a developing trend of vessels being targeted in both the eastbound and

westbound lanes, within the eastern part of the Singapore Strait. The number of

westbound vessels being attacked has increased as compared to the previous year’s

trends of targeting eastbound vessels;

3. Majority of the attacks against vessels anchored and underway occurred during night

time or in periods of low visibility;

4. Vessel types which constitute a larger percentage of the overall traffic volume (i.e.

numerically more in absolute numbers); and vessels which operate at slower speed

and with lower freeboards are more likely to be targeted in this area;

5. More than half (14) of the reported incidents (26) were foiled due to crew alertness

and diligent observation of best practises, e.g. regular patrols and locking down access

points; and timely reporting to coastal authorities; and,


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6. Level of violence is low, as characterised by the perpetrators’ non-confrontational

behaviour.

Sulu-Celebes Sea

Figure 7: Incidence in the Sulu-Celebes Sea in 2017

Key Observation(s):

1. Incident timings and day of occurrences are not indicative of any trends or patterns;

2. The type of vessels targeted were tankers, container ships, cargo ships and fishing

vessels, which is consistent with data collected by the IFC since 2015, that vessels

characterized by low freeboard, low speed and limited manoeuvrability (fishing

vessels, tugs and barges) while in transit near island have the highest number of

reported incidents that is related to kidnapping and maritime terrorism.


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3. Over 77% of the incidents in the area happened while the vessels were underway,

60% of which were successful. Of the incidents that were not successful, the

perpetrators were either foiled by Philippines’s law enforcement agencies, or by

detection and evasive manoeuvres resulting from the ship’s vigilance and early

warning practices;

4. High level of violence has been recorded in this area with perpetrators taking crew

members for kidnap and for ransom (KFR) activities;

5. KFR incidents perpetrated by ASG involving transiting vessels have significantly

reduced due to increased coordination and combined military and law enforcement

operations conducted by Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia under Trilateral

Cooperative Agreement (TCA) (refer to IFC Spot Commentary 5/17 for details);

Manila and Batangas Anchorage

Figure 8: Incidents in the Manila and Batangas Anchorage in 2017

Key Observation(s):

1. Sea theft is prevalent in both anchorage areas, constituting most of the recorded

incidents. Level of violence is low with perpetrators indicating non-confrontational


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behaviour. However, perpetrators were reported to have carried knives and tools for

forcible entry and self-protection when necessary;

2. Tankers constitute the larger percentage of the overall volume in Batangas, while

container ships were the main targets in Manila;

3. Over 78% of all incidents were at anchor and over 89% of all incidents were

successful;

4. All incidents transpired during the period of darkness;

5. Common items lost/taken in Batangas anchorage are brass-made items such as

signal/forecastle bells, fire nozzles, hydrant covers/caps, airline valve caps:

6. Common items lost/taken in Manila anchorage are Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)

equipment, breathing apparatus, fireman’s outfits, life rafts and immersion suits.

Chittagong Anchorage and Approaches

Figure 9: Incidents in the Chittagong Anchorage and its Approaches in 2017

Key Observation(s):

1. The time and day of incidents occurring are not indicative of any trends or patterns,


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2. 72.7% of incidents were observed to have occurred in Jan, Feb and Dec, 2017;

3. Majority of the incidents recorded are sea thefts, characterized by low level of

violence with perpetrators indicating non-confrontational behaviour. However,

perpetrators were reported to carry knives and tools for forcible entry;

4. The types of vessels targeted in this area are tugs, barges and container vessels, most

of which were anchored at the time of the incidents. Of all the incidents that occurred,

over 82% were successful;

5. Over 66.6% of the incidents in which the perpetrators were reportedly spotted were

successful.

South China Sea

Figure 10: Incidents in the South China Sea in 2017

Key Observation(s):

1. All incidents transpired during periods of darkness, and when all involved vessels

were underway;

2. All incidents in the area were successful attacks;


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3. The types of vessels targeted were tugs & barges, as well as tankers. Within this area,

there were three cases of oil cargo theft, involving perpetrators that employed similar

modus operandi (MO);

4. Incidents occurring near the Anambas islands have also been consistently noted since

2016, with three sea robbery incidents occurring in 2016 and 2017;

5. Medium level of violence was employed by the perpetrators, with crew being held-up

and harmed into submission.

West Java and Samarinda

Figure 11: Incidents in the West Java and Samarindain 2017

Key Observation(s):

1. All of the incidents occurred during periods of darkness;

2. The types of vessels targeted include tankers and bulk carriers at anchor, consisting of

seven in West Java and six in Samarinda;


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3. The items stolen by perpetrators tend to be small items such as crew member’s

personal belongings, ropes and paint. There were no reports of ship’s spares being

stolen;

4. Four of the recorded incidents were not reported to local authorities.


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2. Contraband Trafficking (CT)

Introduction:

Contraband Trafficking (CT) is a lucrative business that commands significant revenue

through the transfer of illegal goods, involving both organised syndicates at the transnational

level and individuals at the domestic level. The aim of this update is to correlate the

MARSEC situation in IFC’s AOI for 2017 on CT, to identify trends on specific hot spots and

potential maritime routes previously reported.

Definitions:

Contraband Trafficking is defined as the act of conducting trade or business, especially of

an illicit kind, of goods that are prohibited by law from being exported or imported; illegally

imported or exported goods.

To provide clarity and alignment in this report, the following terms are as defined:

1. Drugs Smuggling: When the smuggled goods are substances with a physiological

effect on the body E.g. Methamphetamine, Cocaine, Cannabis;

2. Natural Resources Smuggling: When the smuggled goods are resources that are

harvested from nature E.g. Gold, Sandalwood, Wood, Gas, Sand;

3. Domestic Products Smuggling When the smuggled goods are either common

household products or manufactured items E.g. rice, flour, salt, gas cylinders, plastic,

cars;

4. Cigarettes Smuggling: When the smuggled goods are a product of the tobacco plant

E.g. cigarettes, cigars;

5. Wildlife Smuggling: When the smuggled goods are live animals or animal parts listed

under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and

Flora (CITES); E.g. elephant tusk, pangolin scales, tortoises, sloths;

6. Fuel Smuggling: When the smuggled goods are any kind of fuel E.g. diesel, petrol,

Marine Gas Oil (MGO);


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7. Weapons Smuggling: When the goods smuggled are designed for inflicting bodily

harm or any form of damage E.g. guns, explosives etc.;

General Overview

Figure 1: Contraband Trafficking Incidents in IFC’S AOI for 2017

Figure 1 gives a general overview of various CT incidents that occurred in the IFC’s AOI in

2017. The IFC has classified the incidents recorded nto eight categories (as shown in the

legend). Each of the sub-categories has been analysed in detail in the subsequent part of the

report. There were a total of 353 reported CT incidents in 2017, which reflects a reduction in

comparison to 2016 (390 incidents reported) and an increase in 2015 (316 incidents reported).

The comparison has to be assessed with two important aspects in mind; 1) stringent

preventive measures undertaken by various law enforcement agencies, and 2) the activeness

and frequency of such incidents being reported by the resident media. Figure 2 depicts the

data shown above.


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Figure 2: Number of CT Incidents in the months of Jan-Dec in 2015, 2016, and 2017

The graph below reflects the categorical percentage of various goods smuggled in the IFC’s

AOI in 2017. Drugs remained the most smuggled category with 134 reported incidents,

followed by domestic products (88 reported incidents) and wildlife smuggling (48 reported

incidents). Cigarettes (35 reported incidents), natural resources (21 reported incidents) and

fuel (18 reported incidents) make up the remaining contraband smuggled within the maritime

domain of the IFC’s AOI. It should be noted that the numbers signify the smuggling that was

undertaken through maritime routes and, that weapons smuggling was the least reported

contraband (only four reported incidents).

Figure 3: Percentage of incidents in accordance to category

39%

25%

14%

10%

6% 5% 1%

NUMBER OF INCIDENTS AS PER CATEGORY

DRUGS

DOMESTIC PRODUCTS

WILDLIFE

CIGARETTES

NATURAL RESOURCES

FUEL

WEAPONS


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Key Observations:

A total of 134 cases of drugs smuggling were reported in 2017. Throughout the year, there

was little seasonal variation with an average of 10 to 11 incidents per month, with the lowest

in Aug 2017 (five) and the highest in Feb 2017 (12).

1. Product analysis: The most common smuggled drugs in the region were

Methamphetamine (including its precursors), Cannabis, Heroin, Cocaine, and small

amounts of other drugs like Ganja, Hashish, and Hash etc. Although by the number

of incidents, Cannabis remained the most commonly smuggled drug (49%), followed

by Methamphetamine (22%), Heroin (13%) and Cocaine (2%), the pattern was

different in terms of quantities. When considering the quantity of drugs that was

smuggled, Methamphetamine (48%) was the highest, followed by Heroin (24%),

Cannabis (21%) and Cocaine (7%). This means that although there were more

incidents in which drugs are seized, the quantities in which it was seized were

smaller. Thus, although there were lesser seizures pertaining to Methamphetamine in

the AOI, the quantities seized continue to be significantly higher.

Figure 4: Percentage of incidents as per quantity

48%

24%

21% 7% METH

HEROIN

CANNABIS

COCAINE

PERCENTAGE AS PER QUANTITY


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Figure 5: Percentage of incidents as per number of seizures

Drugs Smuggling

A brief summary on major prevalent drugs in the area is given below.

1. Cannabis: This was the most smuggled drug reported in the AOI in terms of number

of seizures, and the third most smuggled drug in terms of quantity. On an average, 4-5

incidents pertaining to Cannabis smuggling were reported each month, predominantly

in Sri Lanka and areas adjoining Palk Strait. There were also occasional marijuana

seizures reported in India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Hong Kong.

2. Methamphetamine: This was the most smuggled drug reported in the IFC’s AOI in

terms of quantity, and the second most smuggled drug in terms of number of seizures.

On average, two to three incidents pertaining to Methamphetamine smuggling were

reported each month. The drug was smuggled in various forms across the AOI i.e.

between Bangladesh and Myanmar’s border as Yaba tablets, Shabu in Philippines and

sometimes in the form of precursors for the drugs in Taiwan and China. While

Indonesia reported the highest number of seizures, other countries had relatively high

number of seizures as well, such as Bangladesh, China, Philippines, Taiwan and

Thailand. Some of the more notable seizures involved one ton of methamphetamine in

Indonesia in the month of Jul 2017, and in Taiwan in Sep 2017.

3. Heroin: This was the third highest smuggled drug reported in the IFC’s AOI, in terms

of the number of seizures, and the second most smuggled drug in terms of quantity.

49%

22%

13%

2% 14% CANNABIS

METH

HEROIN

COCAINE

OTHERS

PERCENTAGE AS PER NUMBER OF SEIZURES


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The highest number of seizures occurred in Sri Lanka, although in small quantities (a

few kilograms). However, Indian authorities made a major seizure of 1.5 tonnes in the

month of Jul 2017. There were occasional seizures of Heroin in Japan, Malaysia and

Taiwan.

4. Cocaine: This was the fourth most smuggled drug reported in the IFC’s AOI in terms

of both quantity as well as the number of seizures. Major seizures happened in

Myanmar in Feb 2017.

5. Others: There were other drugs which were seized in the IFC’s AOI in small

quantities. The various drugs in circulation in lesser quantities continue to be Ganja,

Hashish, Hash, tramadol tablets, Pregablin, tobacco products and other illegal

medicinal products. There was no particular pattern established pertaining to these

drugs.

Sri Lanka and areas adjoining the Palk Strait remains a drug-smuggling hot spot, although

the majority of the seizures undertaken by Sri Lanka’s maritime enforcement agencies

(mainly the Sri Lankan Navy) occurred inland, rather than at sea. These inland areas in

Sri Lanka reported the highest number of Cannabis seizures, although there were

occasional seizures which were also related to Heroin and Cocaine. This year saw a major

increase in successful seizures by Indonesian enforcement agencies pertaining to

Methamphetamine, with almost 52% of seizures of the drug within the AOI undertaken

by Indonesian authorities. This possibly means that greater volumes of the drug are being

smuggled in this area, but it may also reflect the stronger bilateral/multilateral counter-

drug cooperation at the operational level.


24


Figure 6: Number of drug seizures as per country

Domestic Products Smuggling

A total of 88 cases of domestic products smuggling were reported in 2017. Throughout the

year there was little seasonal variation with an average of 7 incidents per month. The month

with the lowest incidents was Oct 2017 (five) and the highest being Mar and Apr 2017 (nine

each).

0 50 100

Sri Lanka

Malaysia

China

Philippines

Myanmar

Bangladesh

Cannabis

Meth

Heroin

Cocaine

Others

NUMBER OF DRUG SEIZURES AS

PER COUNTRY


25


=

Figure 7: Number of Domestic products smuggling incidents as per category

The patterns observed are similar to previous years, with food items being smuggled between

Indonesia, Malaysia and within the Philippines, and goods (especially electronics) being

smuggled from Hong Kong to China. Of all countries, Indonesia had incidents in all

categories of goods, ranging from alcohol, electronics and rice. Although it was not as wide-

ranging as the incidents in Malaysia and the Philippines, the diversity is broader in

comparison, from bulk food smuggling to luxury cars. In other areas, smuggling appeared to

be more specific: electronics and luxury items (cars, jade etc.) tended to occur in China/Hong

Kong. Most incidents were reported from Malaysia (24), Indonesia (22) and the Philippines

(20) with the main trend being goods that are traditionally necessities, of low value per item

and in large quantities. For example 75% of incidents in Hong Kong are luxury items

compared to incidents in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, where 65% of incidents

were necessities. Alcohol smuggling was most prevalent in Indonesia and Malaysia. It has

been observed that the general motivation behind domestic products smuggling is to evade

local taxes and customs duties.

35%

21%

16%

14%

14%

NUMBER OF INCIDENTS AS PER CATEGORY- DOMESTIC PRODUCTS

Food/Cooking items

Necessities

Luxury Items

Alchohal

Electronics


26


Figure 8: Number of domestic products seizures as per country

Wildlife Smuggling

A total of 48 cases of wildlife smuggling were reported in 2017. The frequency of incidents

was higher between Jul and Sep, 2017 with the most number of incidents reported in Sep

2017 (Nine) and the least in Apr 2017 (One).

0 10 20 30

Malaysia

Philippines

Indonesia

China

Sri Lanka

Hong Kong

India

Cambodia

Food/Cooking Items

Necessities

Luxury Items

Alchohal

Electronics

NUMBER OF DOMESTIC PRODUCTS

SEIZURES AS PER COUNTRY


27


Figure 9: Number of Wildlife smuggling incidents as per category

Whilst a variety of contrabands pertaining to wildlife were smuggled through the IFC’s AOI,

the major categories that were observed to be smuggled are shown in Figure 9. Sea cucumber

smuggling was the most prevalent, with the majority of seizures occurring between India and

the Sri Lankan coast. Smuggling of endangered turtle species and tortoises was observed in

Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia. Most of the pangolin scales seizures happened in

Malaysia, Indonesia and Hong Kong. Major ivory and elephant tusks seizures were

undertaken in Vietnam, Cambodia and Hong Kong. Crocodile and shark fin seizures were

also observed in Hong Kong and China, indicating an increased demand for these items,

which are used in manufacturing traditional medicines and consumed as food. Attempts were

also made to smuggle ornamental fishes into Vietnam.

33%

16% 15%

10%

8%

8% 5% 5%

NUMBER OF INCIDENTS AS PER CATEGORY -

WILDLIFE SMUGGLING Sea Cucumbers

Turtles

Pangolin scales

Ivory

Crocodile meat

Shark fins

Ornamental fish

Birds


28


54%

11%

11%

9%

6% 6% 3%

NUMBER OF CIGARETTES SEIZURES AS

PER COUNTRY MALAYSIA

INDONESIA

SINGAPORE

SRI LANKA

HONG KONG

TAIWAN

THAILAND

Figure 10: Number of Wildlife smuggling incidents as per category

Cigarettes Smuggling

A total of 35 cases of cigarettes products smuggling were reported in 2017. There was little

seasonal variation throughout the year, with an average of two to three incidents per month.

The highest number of incidents were reported in Dec 2017 (five), and none in May 2017.

Figure 11: Number of cigarettes seizures as per country

Cigarettes are a common commodity for smuggling, as they can be used for both black

market goods and a barter currency. The majority of cigarette smuggling incidents in the

maritime domain were reported from Malaysia (19) and when combined with Thailand,

0 5 10

India

Indonesia

Sri Lanka

Vietnam

Hong Kong

China

Malaysia

Brunei

Cambodia

Sea Cucumbers

Turtles

Pangloin scales

Ivory

Crocodile meat

NUMBER OF WILDLIFE SEIZURES AS

PER COUNTRY


29


Indonesia and the waters around Singapore, it accounted for 80% of the total reported

cigarette smuggling incidents within the IFC’s AOI. Some taxes in the region are now as high

as 90%. The pattern seen in South East Asia can be attributed to the supply and demand

issue, considering the price differences across the region caused by varied taxes. Even though

regional countries continue to increase tax laws to deter smoking, and step up efforts in

educating their people about the personal harm caused by nicotine, the demand for cigarettes

continues. This is because nicotine is not an illegal drug that warrants severe punishments,

unlike several other types of illegal drugs. Cigarette smuggling is a low risk, high profit

business with many willing to pay for cheaper cigarettes. Key considerations for cigarette

smugglers are as follows:

1. Lower price smuggled cigarettes can be sold for less compared to legitimate

cigarettes;

2. Higher rate of return that can be made when smuggling and avoiding taxes and duties,

and

3. High local demand for cigarettes

The bi-product of cigarette smuggling methods and routes may be associated as test routes for

other counterfeit goods, or be used to test narcotics, weapons or other human trafficking

routes at a transnational criminal level, as proposed by the United Nations Office on Drugs

and Crime (UNODC) this year.

Natural Resources Smuggling

A total of 21 cases of natural resources smuggling were reported in 2017. A greater number

of incidents were reported in the second half of the year with an average of zero to one

incident in the first half of the year and two to three incidents in second part of the year. The

highest numbers of incidents were reported in Jul 2017 (five), with none in the month of May

2017.


30


Figure 12: Number of Natural resources smuggling incidents as per category

The only natural resources reported being smuggled in the IFC’s AOI were gold (eight

reported incidents), wood (11 reported incidents), and sand (two reported incidents), with

smuggling of wood involving mainly sandalwood (seven), and in one case of charcoal

smuggling in Indonesia, in which the origin of the charcoal was believed to be illegal

mangrove wood. There were 8 smuggling incidents involving gold: In India (seven), these

related to the smuggling of gold (in relatively small quantities) from Sri Lanka in small boats.

Sri Lankan gold smuggled to India attracts only a small rate of return but is more likely

considered less risky that smuggling other good like narcotics. The Indian domestic market

for gold is also large; hence it is easy for smugglers to find a buyer in India. The total

reported weight of smuggled Gold was 68.7kg, with the highest single quantity being 16.3kg.

The single case in Japan was reported as 206kg and was the largest single seizure in Japan's

history. Other local news sources have reported on prolific gold smuggling in Japan

associated with organised criminal activities. The prevalence of gold in smuggling is because

it is a good commodity for laundering money, as it has global value and can be re-formed

relatively easily.

The incidents of wood smuggling (11), relates mostly to sandalwood (seven), accounting for

63% of wood related smuggling. Sandalwood is the second most valuable wood in the world

after African Blackwood, and Sandalwood oil is highly regarded for its fragrance in many

52% 38%

10%

NUMBER OF INCIDENTS AS PER CATEGORY-

NATURAL RESOURCES

WOOD

GOLD

SAND


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religions and is widely used as base oil in perfume manufacturing. It grows slowly and illegal

felling is leading to the species being logged unsustainably. Other wood incidents, and those

related, are more likely related to reclamation and construction demands.

Figure 13: Number of natural resources seizures as per country

Fuel Smuggling

A total of 18 cases of natural resources smuggling were reported in 2017. Throughout the

year, there was little seasonal variation with an average of one to two incidents per month.

The highest number of incidents was reported in Aug 2017 (four) with none in the month of

Jun 2017.

0 5 10 15

India

Indonesia

Hong Kong

Philippines

Malaysia

Japan

Sri lanka

Gold

Wood

Sand

NUMBER OF NATURAL RESOURCES

SEIZURES AS PER COUNTRY


32


Figure 14: Number of fuel smuggling incidents as per category

Figure 15: Number of fuel seizures as per country

Trends for fuel smuggling remain similar as seen in previous years. Malaysia remains a

cheaper source of diesel in ASEAN and as such, a large number of fuels related incidents

(12) have occurred there. With the areas around Singapore and Indonesia included, it

accounts for 89% of the incidents recorded by the IFC. These incidents are categorised by

barrels or drums on vessels with no documentation to account for its purchase, and fuel

47%

40%

13%

NUMBER OF INCIDENTS AS PER CATEGORY-

FUEL

DIESAL

PETROL

MARINE GAS OIL

0 5 10 15

Malaysia

Indonesia

Singapore

Vietnam

Sri LankaDiesalPetrolMGO

NUMBER OF FUEL SEIZURES AS PER COUNTRY


33


cargos delivered from bunker vessels not matching exactly to the volumes supplied. Incidents

tend to be occurring either at sea or near coastal borders, indicating that smugglers are taking

advantage of the gains made by selling cheaper fuel and avoiding taxes and duty with

commodities that are in demand.

Weapon Smuggling

There were only four incidents reported in 2017 pertaining to weapon smuggling. Two

incidents occurred in Jun 2017, both involving the smuggling of martial arts weapons in

Hong Kong, and another two incidents reported in Nov 2017, involved 21 illegal fire arms in

the Philippines and 41 pressure mines in Sri Lanka.


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3. Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing (IUU)

Introduction:

The continual population growth in Asia and local fishing communities has placed increasing

pressure on marine resources and fisheries. As a result of overfishing in Southeast Asia, the

inherent lack of fish, or the severe depletion of fish stocks in certain territories, has propelled

fishing fleets to venture into neighbouring waters. This is compounded by the fact that across

the region, there are territories with a longstanding culture and history of fishing. Driven by

poor economic and social conditions among coastal communities, the locals are more

inclined to turn to illegal fishing due to the potential profits it can bring. The heavy maritime

traffic and huge area of interest makes it easy for IUU vessels to operate, and conversely

difficult for maritime agencies to monitor these activities. The possibility of a lack of proper

navigating equipment and suitable charts, on the part of the fishermen also makes it difficult

for them to identify maritime borders or to keep track of their positions where they are

allowed to fish. Other limitations include limited resources available for regional countries’

monitoring and enforcement resources, and a lack of cooperative frameworks on combating

IUU.

Definitions:

Many references to IUU fishing fail to differentiate clearly between the three forms of

fishing, and illegal fishing is often used incorrectly as shorthand, even if the term may not

accurately describe the form of fishing in question. Hence, for purposes of this report, IFC

has adopted the definitions provided by Food and Agriculture Organization of the United

Nations (FAO) International Plans of Action.

1. Illegal fishing refers to activities conducted by national or foreign vessels in waters

under the jurisdiction of a state, in contravention of national laws, international

obligations or those relevant to a regional fisheries management organization;

2. Unreported fishing refers to activities that have either been unreported or misreported

to the relevant national authority or fisheries management organization whose laws

have been contravened;


35


3. Unregulated fishing refers to activities conducted by vessels without nationality, or

by those flying the flag of a state not party to the regional fisheries management

organization, in a manner that is inconsistent with state responsibilities for the

conservation of living marine resources under international law or conservation and

management measures of that organization.

Area of Interest (AOI) and Regional Hot Spots:

Based on the open-source information it has gathered, the IFC has identified five hotspots in

the region (see figure 1). These include the Philippines archipelagic waters, the Gulf of

Thailand, the South China Sea, the Yellow sea and the waters of India and Sri Lanka.

Figure 1: Regional Hotspots

General Trends involving Modus Operandi:

As IUU fishing takes place all-year round and throughout the IFC’s AOI, many types of

fishing tactics and techniques can be observed. Aside from using nets and trawls, the most

common form of IUU fishing, other types include the Danish seine, blast fishing or the use of


36


sodium cyanide. The size of vessels used for IUU fishing may vary, depending on the width

and depth of the waters. Small vessels tend to operate in coastal waters while larger vessels

operate outside of territorial waters. Similarities are evident across hotspots in terms of the

mode and timings of operation. The operators usually operate at night under the cover of

darkness using wooden fishing trawlers. These operators also attempt to blend in with the

local fishermen by changing their hull registration numbers, carrying fake licenses or bearing

a fake flag. The illegally caught marine products are then brought either to local markets,

shipped to neighbouring states or sold directly to foreign vessels, usually via illegal transfer

at sea.

Regional Distribution:

Philippines Archipelago

Figure 2: Philippines Archipelago

The most prominent IUU areas are in Central Visayas and Moro Gulf, Western Mindanao.

The local Filipino fishermen engage in IUU fishing by using methods such as Danish seine

fishing, blast fishing, cyanide fishing and unload their catch to fish ports nearby. While some


37


of these products are brought to local markets, others are shipped to neighbouring states or

sold directly to foreign vessels in the surrounding waters. The Philippines Bureau of Fisheries

and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) crafted a national plan of action against IUU fishing and

froze the distribution of fishing licenses for three years. It conducted recruitment of additional

maritime law enforcement personnel and implemented the VMS for Monitoring, Control and

Surveillance. BFAR also actively exchanges information with neighbouring coastal states.

Gulf of Thailand

Figure 3: Gulf of Thailand

The IUU fishing vessels in the Gulf of Thailand comprise of both locals and foreigners.

However, the number of IUU fishing activities by local vessels dramatically decreased since

Thailand has mustered its strength in combating IUU fishing. Therefore, poaching by foreign

vessel becomes a major concern in this area. The Gulf of Thailand has become a hotspot of

the IUU fishing, due to the overlapping of the maritime boundaries between Thailand and its


38


neighbouring countries. Local fishing vessels as well as foreign fishing vessels poach at

night in national or neighbouring waters, shifting swiftly from one place to another to avoid

detection and arrest by local authorities.

South China Sea

Figure 4: South China Sea

Data collected by the IFC indicates that IUU fishing is a serious problem in the South China

Sea. IUU fishing activities by foreign fishing vessels occur mostly in the waters of South and

Southwest of Vietnam. Some local fishermen are venturing far into the high seas to fish for

high-value marine resources such as sea turtles, tuna and sea cucumbers. This has led to some

cases of arrests in neighbouring countries’ waters. However, there are challenges in

monitoring and enforcement by the coastal states, as foreign IUU vessels have a tendency to

disguise themselves amongst local vessels to avoid detection.


39


India and Sri Lanka

Figure 5: India and Sri Lanka waters

In 2017, the IFC s identified the waters between Sri Lanka and India as IUU hotspots. In

these areas, illegal fishing activities are either domestic issues or in most cases, an inability to

respect maritime boundaries by fishermen, who mostly do not have any equipment allowing

them to precisely determine their positions at sea. There were a high number of reported local

illegal fishing practice incidents in Sri Lanka. This reflects the pro-activeness of the Sri

Lankan Navy in eradicating and reporting local illegal fishing practices in their area. In

addition, from a historical perspective, these fishermen were used to fishing without such

boundary-constraints and it will require time and effort to resolve these legacy issues.


40


Yellow Sea

Figure 6: Yellow Sea

There were reports of violent confrontations between foreign poachers and the South Korea

Coast Guard, which have led to a series of near-misses, collisions, injuries and fatalities on

both sides. Enforcement of the limits of each country’s exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and

the negotiation regarding to maritime territorial boundaries are ongoing.

Observations of the Way Ahead:

According to the data collated and the compiled situational picture, it is evident that some

efforts has been made towards achievable solutions when dealing with the IUU Fishing

threat, and more can still be done:

1. Monitoring, Control and Surveillance: Countries can adopt more effective and

efficient monitoring systems to keep track of their own fishing vessels and ensure


41


that they do not fish illegally in foreign waters, which also comprises of a more

thorough system of registration of local fishing vessels.

2. Information dissemination on fishery laws: Local governments and fishery

organizations can conduct continuous information, education and communication

programmes for local fishermen, fishing communities and commercial fishing

companies with regards to foreign fishery laws;

3. Information-sharing networks: Better information with regards to restricted

territorial waters, and demarcated boundaries can be shared actively between

countries to raise awareness among fishermen;

4. Coordinated Patrols: Neighbouring countries and enforcement agencies can step up

coordinated patrols in adjacent areas and initiate more collaboration to combat illegal

fishing;

5. Resolve the tension of maritime boundaries dispute: Claimant states must seek to

resolve tensions between pursuing maritime sustainability and retaining unlimited

access. Sovereignty and sustainability needs to be separated in the South China Sea.

Claimants might explore multilateral options under UNCLOS, which mandates that

regions shall cooperate as required to formulate and elaborate international rules,

standards, and recommended practices and procedures for the protection and

preservation of the marine environment.


42


4. Irregular Human Migration (IHM)

Figure 1: Location of IHM incidents from Jan to Dec, 2017 in IFC's AOI. Three

hotspots were identified: I-Coastal Area of Pengerang, II- Sulu and Celebes Sea, III-

Coastal Area of Sri Lanka

Key Observation(s):

1. Law enforcement: A total of 66 IHM incidents have been recorded in the AOI in

2017, a decrease from the figures of 2015 and 2016 respectively, and the majority of

these incidents occurred in West Malaysia, Sabah and Indonesia. The decrease in

IHM incidents from 2016 to 2017 is likely due to Malaysia’s implementation of two

sea bases in the waters of East Sabah to strengthen security control, and combat cross-

border crimes under the control of the Police and the National Security Council.

Mechanism introduced, such as the new communications systems with applications

I

II

III

ILLEGAL WORKERS FILIAL MIGRATION /

RELIGIOUS AND TRADE ATTEMPTED EMIGRATION

VIA SEA


43


for mobile devices has enabled the local maritime community to report any suspicious

activities and emergencies promptly.

2. Established Multilateral Cooperation: A set of practical co-operative measures

were undertaken by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand to form a joint

patrol known as the Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP) has helped to ensure the countries

around the Strait of Malacca and Singapore achieve effective operational responses to

MARSEC challenges. While the MSP has been set up primarily to counter piracy and

sea robbery threats, it has also enabled enforcement in areas such as IHM.

3. Hot-spot Highlighting

a. (Malaysia, Johor) Pengerang's coastal area: The highest number of illegal

immigrants detained - hotspot for illegal immigrants seeking employment.

b. (Malaysia, Sabah) Sulu and Celebes Sea: Immigrants attempted

to illegally travel for filial, religious and trade reasons.

c. Sri Lanka: More than 50 illegal immigrants were

apprehended for attempting to migrate illegally abroad via the sea.

Figure 2: Number of IHM incidents for each month from Jan 2015 to Jun 2017. There

were fewer recorded cases across the months from 2015 to 2017.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC

NUMBER OF INCIDENTS PER MONTH

2015 2016 2017


44


Figure 3: Number of IHM incidents for 2017, based on locality of occurrence.

The numbers of IHM incidents in the last 12 months has greatly reduced, however, the

Malacca Straits and Sabah remain the main areas of illegal migration. The relatively high

illegal migrant activity is likely to be based on economic reasons, due to better employment

opportunities in Malaysia and Singapore. Southern Indonesian ports are historically used as a

'stepping stone' to other countries, such as Australia by human trafficking networks.

18

14 10

4

3

3 2

2 2 1 1

AREA OF INCIDENTS West Malaysia

Sabah

Indonesia

Sri Lanka

Hong Kong

Bangladesh

Australia

Philippines

Singapore

South Korea

Japan

Taiwan


45


5. Maritime Incidents (MI)

Introduction:

This report, compiled using open-source data recorded in 2017, aims to provide readers with

a better understanding of the location and types of maritime incidents occurring in the

Information Fusion Centre’s (IFC) Area of Interest (AOI). For the year of 2017, 711 maritime

incidents were reported in the IFC’s AOI. This is a 6.4% increase compared to the same

timeframe in 2016. This observed increase in the number of recorded incidents since 2015

may be attributed to improved processes of data collection and incident reporting in the

region. The following analysis will look at the data recorded in 2017, and identify possible

trends within the IFC’s AOI. The following six categories will be examined: (1) Grounding,

(2) Sunk/Capsized, (3) Collision, (4) Unauthorised Activity, (5) Violent Confrontation, and

(6) the “Ghost Vessel” Phenomenon.

Definitions:

To provide clarity and alignment in this report, the following terms are as defined as follows:

a. Maritime Incident: Incidents involving vessels in the maritime domain that do not

pertain to TRAPS & MT, IHM, IUU and Contraband smuggling. Incidents due to

weather may appear in this category;

b. Grounding: An incident involving an impact between the bottom of a vessel’s hull

and the seabed or coastline, resulting in the vessel being unable to carry on or proceed

with her journey without assistance;

c. Sunk/Capsized: An incident which involves or results in a vessel being overturned or

submerged in the water completely (less submarines);

d. Collision: Any incident involving physical impact between two or more vessels, or a

vessel and any other floating or still object;

e. Unauthorised Activity: An incident arising from vessels engaging in activities that

are not compliant to the rules and regulations which apply in a specific area, or

activities which are carried out without official permission from the authorities over

the area.


46


f. Violent Confrontation: Any hostile situation that involves any form of firearms or

violence;

g. Incident: Incidents involving vessels in the maritime domain that do not pertain to

other previously defined incident categories i.e. fire, gas leak, man overboard (MOB),

MEDEVAC, missing vessel etc.;

h. “Ghost Vessel”: Vessels with no living crew on-board. A ghost vessel can either be

abandoned, or may contain the cadavers of crew members;

i. Registered Vessel: A vessel registered with an IMO number.

General Observation(s):

Figure 1: Monthly breakdown of maritime incidents in IFC’s AOI over three years

A total of 711 maritime incidents were recorded by IFC in 2017, which is an increase from

668 in 2016, as well as from 578 in 2015. The increase of the number in recorded incidents

may be attributed to an improved data collection process and reporting of incidents in this

region. Another plausible factor is that of more extreme weather conditions at sea resulting in

the increase of incidents.


47


Figure 2: Breakdown of types of maritime incidents in 2017

From data recorded in 2017, vessels sinking or capsizing, collisions, and other causes such as

fire, explosion, missing vessels and Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) incidents account for

a majority of all maritime incidents in IFC’s AOI.

Figure 3: Breakdown of types of vessels involved in maritime incidents in 2017

13%

10%

26% 37%

10%

2% 2%

TYPES OF INCIDENTS

Collision

Vessel Groundings

Vessel Sinkings and Capsizings

Incidents (Fire, Explosion, Vessel Missing,

MEDEVAC,...)

Recreationnal Incidents

Violent Confrontation

Unauthorized Activities

5% 8%

7%

4% 4%

2%

11%

3%

38%

4%

3% 4%

4% 3%

TYPES OF VESSELS INVOLVED IN INCIDENTS Container Vessel

Bulk Carrier

Tanker

Ferry / Passenger Vessel

Navy, CG, Police Vessels

Tug & Barge

General Cargo Vessel

Other Registred Vessel

Fishing Vessel

Unregistred Ferry

Tourist Boat

Unregistred Cargo Vessel

Speed Boat

Other Unregistred Vessel


48


The main types of vessels involved in maritime incidents are fishing vessels (38%), general

cargo vessels (11%), bulk carriers (8%) and tankers (7%). The following sections will

provide a more detailed breakdown of maritime incidents and analysis of potential trends and

patterns IFC has identified.

SAR Operations & MI Human Cost:

This section summarises the number of Search and Rescue (SAR) and Medical Evacuation

operations carried out in 2017, as well as statistics on people rescued, dead and missing.

The IFC recorded a total of 403 SAR and 30 MEDEVAC operations in 2017, with a total of

5,421 people rescued and 1,835 people dead or missing. Of the 1,835 dead or missing people,

194 (10.6%) people were seafarers, including ship crew and sailors, 1,113 (60.6%) were

fishermen and the remaining 528 (28.8%) comprised of people that do not earn their

livelihood out at sea, such as tourists, migrants and ship passengers.

It is worth noting that the majority of deaths and missing person cases have been largely due

to natural disasters or capsized vessels. One such key event was Cyclone Ockhi (which will

be elaborated on later in the document), which accounted for 685 (more than half) of the dead

or missing fishermen.


49


Vessel Grounding:

Figure 4: Location of Vessel Groundings Incidents in IFC’s AOI in 2017

The IFC recorded a total of 57 registered vessel grounding incidents in 2017, within the AOI.

Of these, general cargo vessels (25%), bulk carriers (21%), tankers (16%) and ferries (12%)

accounted for a majority of grounding incidents recorded. It is worth noting that there were

three grounding incidents in the Kalimantan Strait (which separates the islands of Borneo and

Java): one bulk carrier on 24 Mar 2017, one tanker on 12 Apr 2017 and one bulk carrier on

20 Nov, 2017.

It is also worth noting that around 35% of grounding incidents occurred in and around

Indonesian waters. This could be attributed to the geography of Indonesia as an archipelagic

nation with large bodies of water surrounded by many islands, thus increasing the risk of

grounding as vessels potentially sail too close to these islands. Other factors may include

vessels in poor conditions, bad weather, or a lack of proper navigation aids.


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Vessel Sinking & Capsizing

Figure 5: Location of Vessel Sinking and Capsizing Incidents in IFC’s AOI in 2017

A total of 27 registered vessels which were sunk and capsized were recorded in 2017.

General cargo vessels (63%) were the most common type of vessels involved, accounting for

more than half of the 27 incidents. Of note in 2017 was Typhoon Damrey in Nov 2017,

which caused eight Vietnamese cargo ships to sink, with 25 crew members missing and four

or ten reported dead. It was regarded as the biggest maritime disaster in Vietnam’s maritime

history, with about 18 Search and Rescue (SAR) assets from the Vietnamese Navy and Coast

Guard being deployed for SAR operations. Typhoon Damrey also caused the sinking of over

1,000 fishing vessels.


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Collisions

Figure 6: Location of Collisions in IFC’s AOI in 2017

There were 75 collisions, involving a total of 323 registered vessels that were recorded in the

IFC’s AOI in 2017. General cargo vessels (25%), bulk carriers (59), tankers (18%) and

container vessels (11%) accounted for a majority of registered vessels involved in collisions.

It is worth noting that of the 75 collisions, 27 (36%) involved collisions between fishing

vessels and merchant vessels, and a majority of these incidents occurred primarily in the

waters between South Korea and Japan, off the coast of India in front of Cochin, and off the

coast of Vietnam. Eleven (41%) of these 27 collisions were hit-and-run incidents in which the

merchant vessel which collided with the fishing vessel left the scene immediately, without

attempting to stop and assist the other vessel. Of these 11 collisions, six (55%) remains

unsolved. Lastly, despite collisions with fishing vessels accounting for less than 40% of all

collisions in 2017, the number of dead or missing people in collisions involving fishing

vessels accounts for almost 50% (57 dead/missing out of 119 overall) of all dead or missing

people arising from collisions overall.


52


Unauthorised Activity

There were 11 maritime incidents involving unauthorised activities recorded by the IFC in

2017. Almost all the incidents were illegal anchoring activities (73%), with dredgers (36%)

and tankers (27%) accounting for a majority of unauthorised activities. Other unauthorised

activities recorded included underwater exploration (9%), illegal dumping (9%) and sand

mining (9%). It should be noted that due to the illegal nature of unauthorised activities, the

data we present may not provide a complete picture of the extent of unauthorised activities in

the AOI.

Violent Confrontation

There were 15 cases of violent confrontation in the IFC’s AOI in 2017. All violent

confrontations involved fishing vessels, with confrontations generally occurring between

fishing vessels and constabulary forces such as the coast guard, police and naval forces, or

between other fishing vessels. The highest concentration of confrontations occurred in the

Philippines (27%) and Sri Lanka (27%), followed closely by Indonesia, India, Vietnam and

South Korea.

“Ghost Vessel” Phenomenon

Lastly, this section will highlight the few incidents involving “ghost vessels”, which are

vessels which are abandoned with no crew or people on-board, or may contain cadavers

instead. These vessels are generally found to be of North Korean origin, and have been found

primarily in the coastal areas of Japan. The IFC recorded a total of four incidents of “ghost

vessels”, all of which occurred in Nov and Dec 2017. In contrast, the Japanese Coast Guard

has stated that a total of 104 North Korean fishing boats had been caught drifting into

Japanese coastal waters in 2017, the biggest number recorded so far.


53


Figure 7: Incidents of fishing boats that had drifted into Japanese coastal areas in Nov

2017 (Images courtesy of Japan ILO)

The image above shows the incidents of fishing boats that had drifted into Japanese coastal

areas in Nov 2017. Here, the Japanese Coast Guard reported a total of nine incidents,

compared to the two incidents recorded by the IFC. The key reasons for the appearance of

these vessels could be due to the fact that these vessels are either very old or unfit for sea due

to various reasons. As a result, many of these vessels ended up either sinking, or are unable to

complete their journey due to rough seas.

Key Event: Cyclone Ockhi

Cyclone Ockhi occurred in Dec 2017, hitting the coastlines of Southern India which left 685

fishermen either dead or missing, accounting for about 37% of all dead or missing people

recorded in 2017. This saw the Indian Navy undertake its biggest humanitarian aid and

disaster relief operation since the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami, carrying out SAR operations for

more than four weeks which covered approximately 450,000 square miles in adverse weather

conditions for missing fishermen, vessels in distress and stranded fishermen requiring

assistance. A total of 16 ships, two helicopters and two fixed-wing aircraft (including the long

range maritime reconnaissance aircraft P8I from the Indian Navy), 10 ships, one helicopter


54


and two fixed-wing aircrafts from the Indian Coast Guard, and two helicopters and one fixed

wing aircraft from the Indian Air Force were deployed for the SAR and HADR operations.

845 people were successfully rescued by the Indian Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard, as

well as by other agencies, including merchant vessels.

maritime security marsec) ifc’s area of interest (aoi) report/2017/ifc … · of pearl bank,...

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