marie gunning john doe - maine · that gunning again sought to depose him, moved to quash the...
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MAINESUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2017ME78Docket: Cum-15-558Argued: October26,2016Decided: May4,2017Panel: SAUFLEY,C.J.,andALEXANDER,MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HJELM,andHUMPHREY,JJ.Majority: SAUFLEY,C.J.,andALEXANDER,MEAD,GORMAN,HJELM,andHUMPHREY,JJ.Dissent: JABAR,J.
MARIEGUNNINGv.
JOHNDOEMEAD,J.
[¶1] InAugust2013,MarieGunningbroughtsuitintheSuperiorCourt
(Cumberland County) against the anonymous publisher and writer(s)
(collectively JohnDoe)ofNewsasViewedFromaCrow’sNest(Crow’sNest),
a publication distributed locally in Freeport, Maine, and accessible on the
Internet,1whichGunningclaimedhadpublisheddefamatorystatementsabout
herinseveralof its issues. AfteraCaliforniacourtquashedasubpoenathat
GunningservedontheCrow’sNest’swebsitehostseekingtoidentifyDoe,the
Superior Court (Warren, J.) dismissed her complaint without prejudice for
1Doe’sbriefstatesthattheCrow’sNestisnolongeravailableontheInternet.
2
failure to effect service on the defendants. Gunning appeals from that
judgment.ThepublisheroftheCrow’sNest(Doe#1)cross-appeals,agreeing
with the court that Gunning is estopped by the California judgment from
continuing to seek the Does’ identities, and additionally contending that
Gunning cannot force theDoes to reveal their identities because theCrow’s
Nest is both nonactionable constitutionally protected parody and protected
anonymous speech. We conclude that Gunning is estopped by the prior
Californiajudgment,andweaffirmthejudgmentoftheSuperiorCourtwithout
reachingDoe’salternativearguments.
I.FACTSANDPROCEDURE
[¶2] In 2011, Gunning ran for the Freeport Town Council and was
defeated.Oneweeklater,theCrow’sNest,whichdeclaresunderitsmasthead
that it is “a parody look at the news,” published an “Election Special” issue,
whichincludedaphotographofthe“WickedWitchoftheWest”characterfrom
the classicmovieTheWizard of Oz next to Gunning’s name, alongwith the
caption “Aka: ‘Gunner Gunning’ ‘Miss Prozac 2003,’” and several purported
quotesfromGunning.SeveralotherpeoplewithapparenttiestoFreeportwere
treatedsimilarly.Gunning’scomplaintagainstDoeallegedthreecountsoflibel
andonecounteachoffalselightandintentionalinflictionofemotionaldistress
3
basedonthestatementsconcerningherinthe“ElectionSpecial”issue,aswell
asthoseappearinginfifteensubsequentissuesoftheCrow’sNest.
[¶3]GunningservedaCaliforniasubpoenaontheCrow’sNest’swebsite
host, seeking the names, email addresses, and IP addresses of anyone
associatedwiththepublication’swebsite.Does#1and#2,whofiledwritten
declarationsintheCaliforniaSuperiorCourtstatingthattheyweretheowner
and writer, respectively, of the Crow’s Nest website, moved to quash the
subpoena in that court, asserting that the Crow’s Nest was constitutionally
protected parody and that they had a constitutional right to speak
anonymously.InadecisionissuedonJanuary24,2014,thecourtgrantedthe
motiontoquash,rulingthat
[Gunning]mustmakeaprimafacieshowingoflibel....[She]failedtomakethisprimafacieshowing.TheCourtfindsthatwhilethecontentoftheCrow’sNestcouldbeseenasrudeanddistasteful,taking into consideration the context and contents of thestatementsatissue,itisaparody.ThespeechatissueintheCrow’sNest is protected under the First Amendment of theU.S.Constitution. Thestatementsarenotactionablespeechsuchthattheidentitiesofthewebsiteownerandpersonswhocommentor otherwisepublishmaterial printed in or postedonline at theCrow’sNestmustberevealedpursuanttothesubpoena.
Doev.Gunning,No.CPF-13-513271(Cal.Super.Ct.S.F.CountyJan.24,2014).
[¶4]GunningdidnotappealtheCaliforniajudgment.Threemonthsafter
thatjudgmentissued,GunningservedaMainesubpoenaonaTownofFreeport
4
employeeinordertodeposehimtolearnwhetherhewasthewriterforthe
Crow’sNest.Theemployeeobjectedtothesubpoenaandprovidedanaffidavit
averringthathehadneverhadanythingtodowiththeCrow’sNestandhadno
knowledgeofanyonewhodid. Fourteenmonthslater,theemployee,stating
thatGunningagainsoughttodeposehim,movedtoquashthesubpoenaonthe
grounds that Gunningwas collaterally estopped by the California judgment
fromfurtherdiscoveryseekingtolearntheidentitiesofDoes#1and#2,and
thathercomplaintfailedtostateaclaimthatcouldsurviveFirstAmendment
scrutiny.2Doe#1separatelymovedtoquashtheemployee’ssubpoenaand“to
barGunning from issuing anyotherprocess to compel thedisclosureof the
anonymousspeakersnamedinherComplaint,andtoenteranorderdismissing
theComplaint.”
[¶5]OnOctober22,2015,theSuperiorCourtissuedanordergranting
themotiontoquashanddismissingGunning’scomplaintwithoutprejudicefor
failuretoeffectuateservicepursuanttoM.R.Civ.P.3.3Thecourtsaidthat“[l]eft
toitsowndevices”itwould“concludethat[G]unninghassetforthaprimafacie
2Thecourtruledthattheemployee’sstandingtomakethoseargumentswasnotatissuebecause
Doe#1alsomovedtoquashthesubpoena.3AlthoughtheRuleordinarilyrequiresservice“within90daysafterthefilingofthecomplaint,”
M.R.Civ.P.3, the courtexplained thatanextensionof thatdeadlinewas implicit in itsdiscoveryordersinthecase.
5
caseandthatshehassubmittedevidencesufficienttosupporttheelementsof
herlibelclaim.”Thecourtfound,however,thatalthoughit“wouldbeinclined
to find that there is at least a factual dispute as to whether [one specific]
description of Gunning . . . would reasonably be understood to constitute a
parody”andthereforebeentitledtoFirstAmendmentprotection,
thecourtisnotwritingonacleanslateonthatissue....[W]hetheror not this court agrees with the California ruling, the issue ofwhetherGunninghasmadethenecessaryprimafacieshowing[ofan actionable claim] was actually litigated in California, wasdecidedadverselytoGunning,andwasessentialtotheoutcomeoftheCaliforniaaction. . . .Noappealwassought. Accordingly, theCalifornia decision is entitled to collateral estoppel effect andprecludesGunningfromrelitigatingthesameissuehereinMaine.
[¶6] Accordingly, the court quashed the subpoena and dismissed the
complaint for lack of service on the Does. Gunning appealed and Doe #1
cross-appealed.
II.DISCUSSION
[¶7]WefirstaddressthequestionofwhetherGunningisprecludedfrom
relitigatinginMainetheissueoftheconstitutionalprotectionaffordedtothe
statementsmadeabouther in theCrow’sNest. If she is, then theCalifornia
court’s determination that the statements are parody protected by the
First Amendment controls, and Gunning’s libel complaint fails to state an
6
actionableclaim.4 Inthatevent,thetrialcourtdidnotabuseitsdiscretionin
quashingtheFreeportemployee’ssubpoena,andweneednotreachtheDoes’
contention that the statements in the Crow’sNest, if reviewed de novo, are
entitled to protection either as constitutionally protected parody or as
anonymous speech. See State v. Marroquin-Aldana, 2014 ME 47, ¶ 33,
89A.3d519(“Wereviewacourt’sdecisiononamotiontoquashforanabuse
ofdiscretion.”).
[¶8]TheCaliforniajudgmentisconclusivetotheextentthatitquashed
thesubpoenaissuedtotheCrow’sNest’swebsitehost,aresultconcerninga
discretecollateralissuerelatedtoGunning’ssuitthatshedoesnotchallenge.
SeeBakerv.Gen.MotorsCorp.,522U.S.222,233(1998)(holdingthatpursuant
totheFullFaithandCreditClause,“thejudgmentoftherenderingStategains
4 Theelementsof a libel claimare “a falseanddefamatory statement concerninganother; an
unprivilegedpublicationtoathirdparty; faultamountingat leasttonegligenceonthepartofthepublisher;andeitheractionabilityofthestatementirrespectiveofspecialharmortheexistenceofspecial harm caused by the publication.” Cole v. Chandler, 2000 ME 104, ¶ 5, 752 A.2d 1189(list headings omitted). Gunning’s false light claim is similar, except that it involves propagatingdefamatoryinformationthrough“publicity”ratherthanby“publication.”Id.¶17.Ifthestatementsin the Crow’s Nest are constitutionally protected, then they are not “unprivileged,” and Gunningcannotsatisfythesecondelementofalibelclaim.SeeSimmons,Zillman&Gregory,MaineTortLaw§13-11at13-19(2004ed.)(“[Adefamation]actionthatmeetsallstatecommonlawrequirementsfor recovery may fail because a recovery for the plaintiff would unconstitutionally abridge thefreedomofspeechandpress.”).IfGunning’slibelclaimfailsforthatreason,herclaimforintentionalinflictionofemotionaldistressfailsaswell.SeeShayv.Walters,702F.3d76,83(1stCir.2012)(“TheSupremeCourthasmadeitpellucidthatafaileddefamationclaimcannotberecycledasatortclaimfornegligentorintentionalinflictionofemotionaldistress.”);Aultv.HustlerMagazine,860F.2d877,880 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1988) (“There is no independent cause of action for intentional infliction ofemotional distress based on the very same acts which are insufficient to support an action fordefamation.”),cert.denied,489U.S.1080(1989).
7
nationwide force”). Maine law, however, determineswhether the judgment
actstoforecloseGunning’sclaimsinthisState. SeeRestatement(Second)of
ConflictofLaws§95cmt.c(Am.LawInst.Supp.1989revisions)(“[L]ocallaw
oftheStatewherethejudgmentwasrendered...willbeconsultedtodetermine
whetherthejudgmentaffectstheclaimoronlysomeincidentalissue.Ifunder
thislawthejudgmentwasnotonthemeritsandsettledonlysomeincidental
issue...thejudgmentwillbeheldconclusiveinotherStatesonlyastotheissue
decidedandtheplaintiffwillremainfreetomaintainanactionontheoriginal
claim.”).
[¶9] In beginning that analysis, we have explained, applying
well-establishedlaw,that
[c]ollateral estoppel is the issue preclusion component of theprinciple of res judicata. It prevents the relitigation of factualissuesalreadydecided if the identical issuewasdeterminedbyapriorfinaljudgment,andthepartyestoppedhadafairopportunityand incentive to litigate the issue in a prior proceeding. . . . Thecourt’s conclusion that collateral estoppel applies is a legaldetermination;ourreviewofthatconclusionisthereforedenovo.
Grayv.TDBank,N.A.,2012ME83,¶10,45A.3d735(alterationandquotation
marks omitted) (emphases added); see Macomber v. MacQuinn-Tweedie,
2003ME121,¶22,834A.2d131(statingthat“[w]ehavelongrecognizedthat
8
thedoctrineofresjudicatahastwoprongs,”including“[i]ssuepreclusion,also
referredtoascollateralestoppel,”andclaimpreclusion).
A. IdenticalIssue
[¶10]Concerningthefirstelement,theissuedecidedbytheCalifornia
courtandthattobedecidedbyMainecourtsifGunningisnotestoppedfrom
relitigatingitisthesame—didGunningmakeoutaprimafacieshowingoflibel,
orwere the statementsmade about her in the Crow’s Nest shielded by the
FirstAmendmentfrombeingthebasisforalibelclaim.Thetrialcourtcorrectly
foundthat“GunningpreviouslylitigatedthatissueinCalifornia[.]”
B. FinalJudgment
[¶11]Gunningvigorouslyconteststhecourt’sdeterminationthat“[t]he
decision of the California Superior Court constituted a final decision on
Gunning’sapplicationforinterstatediscovery.”Nonetheless,theonlyissuethat
theCaliforniacourtwasaskedtodecidewaswhetherthesubpoenadirectedto
theCrow’sNest’swebsitehostshouldbequashed. Onceitdidso,therewas
nothing left for the California court to consider. See Fitzgerald v. Bilodeau,
2006ME122,¶4,908A.2d1212(“[A]judgmentisfinal,andnotinterlocutory,
when:(1)thetrialcourt’sactionfullydecidesanddisposesofthewholematter
leavingnothingfurtherfortheconsiderationandjudgmentofthetrialcourt;
9
and(2)nosubsequentproceedingsinthecasewillrendertheappellatecourt’s
decision immaterial.” (quotationmarksomitted)). The finalprovision in the
Californiacourt’sorderandthefinalnotationinthedocketentriesconcernthe
resolution of costs and attorney fees involved in adjudicating themotion—
indicativeofafinishedcase.
[¶12] Gunning’s argument that she isnot estoppedbecauseappellate
review of the California judgment was effectively unavailable to her is not
persuasive. She points to the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28
(Am. Law Inst. 1982), which provides that “relitigation of [an] issue in a
subsequentactionbetweenthepartiesisnotprecluded...[when][t]heparty
againstwhompreclusionissoughtcouldnot,asamatteroflaw,haveobtained
reviewofthejudgmentintheinitialaction.”Thefirstcommenttosection28
elaborates:“Thereisa[n]...exceptiontotheruleofpreclusionwhen...appeal
doesnotlie[]by...extraordinarywrit[.]”Id.cmt.a.
[¶13] The Restatement limits the exception, however, in saying that
“[t]he [section28]exception . . . appliesonlywhenreview isprecludedasa
matterof law. It doesnotapply in caseswhere review is availablebut is not
sought.” Id. (emphasis added). Here, review of the order quashing the
subpoenawasavailablebyextraordinarywritpursuanttotheCaliforniaCode
10
ofCivilProcedure,5butGunningoptednottoseeksuchreview. Accordingly,
theRestatementexceptiontothecollateralestoppeldoctrinethat is invoked
whennoappellatereviewisavailabledoesnotapply.
[¶14] AlthoughGunningarguesthatshewouldhavebeenrequiredto
show“immediateharm”inordertoobtainanextraordinarywritandchosenot
tofileapetitionbecauseshebelievedshewouldhavebeenunsuccessful,itwas
fortheCaliforniacourts,andnotGunning,tosaythatthelikelyterminationof
herMainelawsuitwasnotaqualifying“immediateharm,”orthatsomeother
groundforgrantingawritunderCalifornialawdidnotapply.
[¶15] Like Gunning, the dissent goes to great lengths to predict an
adverse ruling by California’s appellate courts had Gunning pursued
an extraordinary writ. Dissenting Opinion ¶¶ 23-26. That would be an
unnecessary exercise if Gunning had requested a writ, as was her right.
SeeCal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2029.650(a) (Deering, LEXIS through ch. 4 of the
2017 Reg. Sess.). In any event, we are not a California court, and it is
5TheCaliforniaCodeofCivilProcedureprovides:“Ifadisputearisesrelatingtodiscovery...any
request...toenforce,quash,ormodifyasubpoena,orforotherreliefmaybefiledinthesuperiorcourtinthecountyinwhichdiscoveryistobeconducted. . . .” Cal.Civ.Proc.Code§2029.600(a)(Deering,LEXISthroughch.4ofthe2017Reg.Sess.).Thereafter,“[i]fasuperiorcourtissuesanorder...resolvingapetitionunderSection2029.600...apersonaggrievedbytheordermaypetitiontheappropriate court of appeal for an extraordinary writ.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2029.650(a)(Deering,LEXISthroughch.4ofthe2017Reg.Sess.).
11
indisputablytruethatGunningdidnotpursuetheavenueofappellatereview
availabletoherunderCalifornialaw—thevenuethatshechose.Hadshedone
so, in addition to having a stronger argument in this appeal, that state’s
appellatecourtswouldhavehadanopportunitytoaddresswhatGunningand
thedissentcontendareseriouserrorsoflawintheCaliforniaSuperiorCourt’s
decision.SeeDissentingOpinion¶35.
C. FairOpportunityandIncentive
[¶16]GunningassertsthatalthoughinfurtheranceofherMainelawsuit
shecausedasubpoena tobeserved inCaliforniaand then fully litigated the
Does’motiontoquashit,she“didnothaveafullandfairincentivetolitigate
theissueintheCaliforniacourt”because“shehadanotheravenueavailableto
herfromwhichtoseekdisclosureoftheCrow’sNestauthors:thedepositions
thatwere being sought inMaine.” That position is counterintuitive at best.
AplaintiffinGunning’ssituationwouldbeverymotivatedtolitigateamotion
that (1) presumably involved considerable time and expense to pursue;
(2) would have potentially yielded all of what she continues to seek had it
succeeded,namelytheidentitiesandcontactinformationofthewebsite’shost
andcontributors;and(3)wouldpredictablylead,ifthemotiontoquashwere
granted, topreciselywhat occurred—aneffort to collaterally estopGunning
12
from relitigating in Maine the central issue of whether the Crow’s Nest
statementswereactionableatall.
[¶17]TheRestatementprovides,inacommentcaptioned“[l]ackoffair
opportunitytolitigateintheinitialaction,”that
the court in [a] second proceeding may conclude that issuepreclusionshouldnotapplybecausethepartysoughttobebounddidnothaveanadequateopportunityorincentivetoobtainafullandfairadjudicationinthefirstproceeding.Sucharefusaltogivethe first judgment preclusive effect should not occur without acompellingshowingofunfairness,norshoulditbebasedsimplyonaconclusionthatthefirstdeterminationwaspatentlyerroneous.
Restatement(Second)ofJudgments§28cmt. j. Gunningdoesnotmakeany
“compellingshowingofunfairness”sufficientforustoconcludethatshelacked
opportunityorincentivetofullylitigatethismatterinCalifornia.
[¶18] Furthermore, incharging thatourdecision isunfair toGunning
because“weareallowingtheCalifornialawtoprevent[her]frompursuingher
defamationcaseinthisstate,”DissentingOpinion¶37,thedissentignoresthe
factthatGunninghadafullopportunitytolitigatetheissueathandinthevenue
of her choosing. Had Gunning chosen to prosecute this Maine action by
pursuingdiscoveryinMaine’scourts—forexampleifshehadsoughttodepose
13
theFreeportemployeebeforeservingasubpoenainCalifornia,6orifshehad
withdrawnthesubpoenawhentheDoes’Californiamotiontoquashraiseda
potentiallydispositiveissue—thentheSuperiorCourtwouldhavedecidedthe
Freeport employee’smotion to quash based onMaine law, and either party
couldhaveappealedanadverserulingtothisCourt.Instead,Gunningopted,of
her own volition, to litigate a substantive issue in the California courts,
presumablyhopingforafavorableresult.Afterreceivinganunfavorableruling,
andchoosingnottopursueanappealofthatruling,shecannotsimplyelectto
relitigatetheverysameissueinvolvingthesamepartiesinanotherjurisdiction,
hopeful of obtaining a more favorable result. Such is the long-standing,
well-establisheddoctrineofcollateralestoppel. SeeGray,2012ME83,¶10,
45A.3d735.
D. Conclusion
[¶19] Because the issue decided by the California court in a final
judgmentwasthesameissuethatGunningseekstohaveaMainecourtrevisit,
namelywhethertheCrow’sNestenjoysconstitutionalprotectionsufficientto
foreclose her libel claim, and because Gunning had both opportunity and
6Inthatevent,iftheDoeshadintervenedandtheMainecourtruledthatGunninghadmadeout
aprimafaciecaseoflibel,thatjudgmentwouldhavehadpreclusiveeffectinCalifornia.
14
incentivetolitigatethatissueinCalifornia,sheisestoppedfromrelitigatingit
in the Maine action. See id. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion inquashing thesubpoenaservedon theFreeportemployee,or in
dismissing Gunning’s complaint for lack of service on the defendants as a
result.7 SeeMarroquin-Aldana,2014ME47,¶33,89A.3d519;M.R.Civ.P.3.
HavingconcludedthatthecourtdidnoterrinfindingthatGunningisprecluded
fromrelitigatingthedispositiveissue,wedonotaddressthequestionraisedin
the cross-appeal of whether on de novo review we would reach the same
conclusionasdidtheCaliforniacourt,andweoffernoopinionastowhether
thetrialcourtcorrectlyarticulatedMainelawconcerningtheextenttowhich
anonymousspeechisprotected.8
7 Gunningdoesnot challenge the court’s statement that, by agreement, if the subpoenawere
quashed then she “hadno furtheravenues topursuedisclosureof the identitiesof JohnDoes#1and#2.”
8Althoughthetrialcourtwenttoconsiderablelengthstosetouttheanalysisthatitwouldhaveappliedhaditbeen“writingonacleanslate”ontheissueofwhethertheCrow’sNest’sstatementsconcerning Gunning constituted actionable defamation, including citing a test articulated inDendrite International, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 760-61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001), thatdiscussion was dicta given the court’s ultimate conclusion that Gunning was estopped by theCaliforniadecision.WehavepreviouslymadementionofDendritebuthavenotadoptedit,andwedonotdosotoday. SeeFitchv.Doe,2005ME39,¶¶26-27,869A.2d722(“BecauseDoefailedtoraise the issue in the trial court,wedeclineat this time toconsider theextent towhich theFirstAmendment affects the consideration of motions to disclose information about anonymous ISPsubscribers.”).Thus,thedissent’sdiscussionofthetrialcourt’sDendriteanalysis,anditsdeclarationthat“wehavenotaddressedwhether theDendrite ‘heightenedburden’orsomeotherproceduralhurdleatthecommencementofthesuitwillbethelawofourstate,”DissentingOpinion¶34,simplycreateandthenattackastrawman. Seesupra¶7. Wetakenoissuewiththedissent’sappealtosovereigntywhenitsaysthat“[t]helawinthisareaisevolvingandweshouldbemakingourowndecisionastowhatisthebestpolicyforMaine,”DissentingOpinion¶39,buttoday’sopiniondoes
15
Theentryis:
Judgmentaffirmed.
JABAR,J.,dissenting.
[¶20] I respectfully dissent because I do not believe that a California
court’sorderconcerningadiscoverydisputeshouldbegivenpreclusiveeffect
on a defamation claim in Maine. The law addressing defamation claims in
CaliforniaandMaineisnotidentical,andbecauseofsignificantdifferenceswe
should not give deference to the California court’s order. For the reasons
discussed below, I would vacate the trial court’s decision and remand for
furtherproceedings.
I.DISCUSSION
A. RestatementofJudgments
[¶21]TheCourtreferstotheRestatement(Second)ofJudgments§28
(Am. Law Inst. 1982) to support its decision. Court’s Opinion ¶ 13. The
Restatementinfactsupportsvacationofthetrialcourt’sjudgment.Itreads:
nothavetheeffectthatthedissentfears.TheCaliforniadecisioniscontrollingonlyinthiscase,andthenonlybecausethat iswhereGunningchoseto litigate. Inthefuture, theLegislature is freetomake any policy judgment in this area that it deems fit within constitutional constraints, and,contrarytothedissent’saccusation,seeDissentingOpinion¶¶28,37,39,ourjurisprudenceremainsverymuchourown.
16
Althoughan issue isactually litigatedanddeterminedbyavalidand final judgment, and the determination is essential to thejudgment,relitigationoftheissueinasubsequentactionbetweenthepartiesisnotprecludedinthefollowingcircumstances:(1) Thepartyagainstwhompreclusionissoughtcouldnot,asamatteroflaw,haveobtainedreviewofthejudgmentintheinitialaction;or...(3)Anewdeterminationoftheissueiswarrantedbydifferencesinthequalityorextensivenessof theprocedures followed inthetwo courts orby factors relating to the allocationof jurisdictionbetweenthem;or(4)Thepartyagainstwhompreclusionissoughthadasignificantlyheavierburdenofpersuasionwithrespecttotheissueintheinitialactionthaninthesubsequentaction;theburdenhasshiftedtohisadversary;ortheadversaryhasasignificantlyheavierburdenthanhehadinthefirstaction;or(5)Thereisaclearandconvincingneedforanewdeterminationof the issue (a) because of the potential adverse impact of thedeterminationonthepublicinterestortheinterestsofpersonsnotthemselves parties in the initial action, (b) because it was notsufficientlyforeseeableatthetimeoftheinitialactionthattheissuewouldarise inthecontextofasubsequentaction,or(c)becausethepartysoughttobeprecluded,asaresultoftheconductofhisadversaryorotherspecialcircumstances,didnothaveanadequateopportunityorincentivetoobtainafullandfairadjudicationintheinitialaction.
Restatement(Second)ofJudgments§28.
[¶22]TheCaliforniadiscoveryorderagainstGunningmeetsseveralof
these exceptions to the general rule of issue preclusion. First, pursuant to
17
section28(1)Gunningcouldnothaveobtainedreviewofthejudgmentofthe
CaliforniaSuperiorCourt. Next,pursuant tosections28(3)and(4),because
California applies a different burden at the threshold of a case to litigants
making defamation claims than the burden applied in Maine, a new
determination of the issue iswarranted. Finally, pursuant to section28(5),
thereisaclearandconvincingneedforadeterminationinMaineofthescope
ofFirstAmendmentprotectionwhenitconflictswithaplaintiff’srighttoseek
recovery for defamation because this conflict involves important public
interests.
B. InabilitytoSeekReview
[¶23]TheRestatementprovidesthatrelitigationisnotprecludedwhere
“[t]hepartyagainstwhompreclusionissoughtcouldnot,asamatteroflaw,
have obtained review of the judgment in the initial action.” Restatement
(Second)ofJudgments§28(1).ThoughtheCourtassertsthatGunningshould
havesoughtreviewinCaliforniaoftheordergrantingDoe’smotiontoquash,
Court’s Opinion ¶¶ 13-15, I disagree that as a matter of law review was
availabletoGunning.
[¶24] The California Code of Civil Procedure provides that when a
Californiasuperiorcourtissuesanorderresolvingamotiontoquash,“aperson
18
aggrieved by the ordermay petition the appropriate court of appeal for an
extraordinarywrit.”Cal.Civ.Proc.Code§2029.650(a)(Deering,LEXISthrough
ch.4ofthe2017Reg.Sess.);Cal.Civ.Proc.Code§2029.600(a)(Deering,LEXIS
throughch.4ofthe2017Reg.Sess.).ThecaselawinCaliforniaindicatesthat
an extraordinarywrit is difficult to obtain: “[discovery] rulings are typically
vested inthetrialcourt’sdiscretion,andevenifanabusecanbeshownit is
oftenimpossiblefortheaggrievedpartytoestablishgroundsforinterlocutory
intervention.” O’Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 82
(Cal.Ct.App.2006).Onlywhenanimmediateharmisthreatenedbyfailureto
grantreview,“suchaslossofaprivilegeagainstdisclosure,forwhichthereis
nootheradequateremedy,”willreviewbegranted.Id.at83(emphasisadded);
see also Raytheon Co. v. Superior Court, 256 Cal. Rptr. 425, 427
(Cal.Ct.App.1989)(“[W]ritreviewisappropriatewhen[a]petitionerseeks
relieffromanorderwhichmayundermineaprivilege.”).
[¶25]TheextraordinarywritrequiredforGunning’sdiscoveryappealto
moveforwardinCaliforniaisnotavailabletoherbecausesuchawritwould
onlybegrantedifthefactswereflipped—toachievethewrit,theorderwould
needtohavebreachedsomeprivilege,ratherthanmaintainedit.Forexample,
reviewbyextraordinarywrithasbeengrantedwhenacourt’sorderdenying
19
motions to quash resulted “in the production of privileged materials and
threaten[ed] theconfidential relationship”betweenaclientandanattorney.
BankofAm.,N.A.v.SuperiorCourt,151Cal.Rptr.3d526,546(Cal.Ct.App.2013)
(quotationmarksomitted).NorwasGunningsubjecttotheimmediateharm
thatisrequiredtobegrantedanextraordinarywrit.Theonlyreviewpermitted
forthediscoveryorderwasbyextraordinarywrit,anditwas,asamatterof
Californialaw,unavailabletoGunning.
[¶26] It is unrealistic for theCourt to assumeotherwise. SeeCourt’s
Opinion¶13.Alitigantneednotgothroughalengthyandexpensiveprocess
todemonstrate something that is legally evident on its face. Wherewe can
plainlyseethatreviewofthediscoveryorderwasnotavailableinCalifornia,
pursuanttosection28(1)oftheRestatement,weshouldnotallowcollateral
estoppeltopreventGunningfromlitigatingherdefamationclaiminMaine.
C. DifferingBurdens
[¶27]TheRestatementalsoprovidesthatrelitigationisnotprecludedif
theissueisoneoflawanda“newdeterminationoftheissueiswarrantedby
differences in thequalityorextensivenessof theprocedures followed in the
two courts,” orwhere “[t]heparty againstwhompreclusion is soughthada
significantlyheavierburdenofpersuasionwithrespecttotheissueintheinitial
20
action.”Restatement(Second)ofJudgments§28(3)-(4).Here,bothofthese
exceptionsareimplicatedforessentiallythesamereason:thelawaddressing
the issue of whether or not the litigant has a “heightened burden” when
asserting a defamation action against an anonymous speaker has not
previously been decided by this Court. California, in contrast toMaine, has
adopteda“heightenedburden”standardrequiringaprimafacieshowingofthe
elements of the plaintiff’s claim in order to overcome a motion to quash a
subpoena seeking the speaker’s identity. See Krinsky v. Doe,
72Cal.Rptr.3d231,245(Cal.Ct.App.2008).ApplyingtheCalifornialawhere
imposes California’s “significantly heavier burden of persuasion” upon
Gunning.SeeRestatement(Second)ofJudgments§28(4).
[¶28] Thedraftersof thecomments to theRestatementassert that in
subsequentcasessuchas this, “themore flexibleprincipleof staredecisis is
sufficienttoprotectthepartiesandthecourtfromunnecessaryburdens.”Id.
cmt.b.“Aruleoflawdeclaredinanactionbetweentwopartiesshouldnotbe
bindingonthemforalltime,especially...whenotherlitigantsarefreetourge
thattheruleshouldberejected.Suchpreclusionmightundulydelayneeded
changes in the lawandmightdeprivea litigantofaright that thecourtwas
preparedtorecognizeforotherlitigantsinthesameposition.”Id.Allowingthe
21
California order to determine the outcome of Maine defamation claims by
collaterallyestoppinglitigationinMaineonthebasisofdiscoveryordersdelays
needed review of Maine law and deprives litigants of rights that would
otherwiseberecognized.
[¶29] Additionally,“reexamination[ofa legalprinciple] isparticularly
appropriatewhentheapplicationoftheruleofissuepreclusionwouldimpose
on one of the parties a significant disadvantage.” Id. cmt. c. This conflict
between a litigant’s right to access the courts and a defendant’s First
AmendmentrightsisanalogoustoMaine’santi-SLAPPstatute,whichimposes
a statutory burden upon those bringing claims that implicate a party’s
constitutionallyprotectedFirstAmendmentrights.See14M.R.S.§556(2016).
Inananti-SLAPPcase,uponashowingbythespeaker“thattheclaimsagainst
itarebasedontheexerciseofthatparty’sconstitutionalrighttopetition,”the
burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate prima facie evidence
through pleadings and affidavits that “at least one of the moving party’s
petitioning activities was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any
arguable basis in law and caused actual injury to the [non-moving party].”
Naderv.Me.DemocraticParty,2013ME51,¶¶13-14,66A.3d571;seealso
14M.R.S. § 556. This procedural hurdle placed before litigants inMaine is
22
similar to the“heightenedburden”hurdle imposedbyCaliforniaon litigants
pursuingadefamationactionagainstadefendantclaimingprotectedspeech
undertheFirstAmendment.
[¶30]Likeourjurisprudenceaddressingtheanti-SLAPPstatute,weare
facedwithaclashbetweenGunning’srighttoaccessthecourtsforredressof
grievances,andDoe’sFirstAmendmentrights.However,unliketheanti-SLAPP
protections,thereisnoMainelegislationnoranyMainecaselawimposinga
“heightened burden” upon litigants who bring defamation claims against
individualsclaimingthatFirstAmendmentprotection. Instead, there isonly
caselawinafewscatteredstatesthathaveplacedthistypeofthresholdhurdle
againstplaintiffs.Todate,wehavenotestablishedsuchahurdle,norhasthe
UnitedStatesSupremeCourt.ThereareseriouspolicyconcernsthatthisCourt
shouldconsiderpriortoplacingthistypeofobstacleinfrontoflitigants,notthe
leastofwhichiswhethersuchanobstacleshouldbeimposedbyusorbythe
MaineLegislature.
[¶31] Thepolicy concerns are significant. TheCalifornia court relied
uponKrinskytorequirethatGunningshowaprimafaciecaseofdefamation.
Krinsky, in turn,relieduponDendrite International, Inc.v.Doe,775A.2d756
(N.J. Super.Ct.App.Div.2001);Doev. Cahill, 884A.2d451 (Del. 2005); and
23
HighfieldsCapitalManagementL.P.v.Doe,385F.Supp.2d969(N.D.Cal.2004),
among other cases, to hold, after a thorough analysis ofmethods bywhich
courts in several jurisdictions balance the competing rights of access to the
courts and First Amendment protection, that California will require a
primafacieshowingbeforeallowingdiscoverytoproceedindefamationcases
againstanonymousspeakers.Krinsky,72Cal.Rptr.3dat241-46.TheKrinsky
courtundertookaCalifornia-specificassessmentofthecaselaw,notingthatit
wasaddressing “Californiasubpoenas”and that “specificDendrite criteria to
defeataprotectiveorderormotiontoquashmaylikewisebedependentonthe
differentpleadingandmotionproceduresacrossstates.”9Id.at244.Thecourt
evenpointedoutthatincertainstatesthesecondDendritecriterionwouldbe
“essential,”whereasinotherstates,itwouldbe“superfluous.”Id.
9 It is worth noting that the Dendrite court’s analysis emphasized that “New Jersey’s State
Constitutionaffordsevengreaterprotectiontopersons’rightstofreespeechthandoes[the]federalConstitution....”DendriteInt’l,Inc.v.Doe,775A.2d756,765(N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.2001).Othercourtshavethereforeapplieda“heightenedburden”toplaintiffsindefamationcasesbasedonstateconstitutionalprotectionsthatmayormaynotbecoextensivewiththeconstitutionalprotectionsguaranteed by the Maine Constitution, see id. at 766—protections that the Court here does notaddress.
24
[¶32]Weshouldengageinourownassessmentofwhethertoimposea
“heightened burden” in defamation claims against anonymous speakers
assertingFirstAmendmentprotection.10
D. PublicInterests
[¶33]Finally,theRestatementprovidesthatrelitigationisnotprecluded
when“[t]here isaclearandconvincingneed foranewdeterminationof the
issue. . .becauseofthepotentialadverseimpactofthedeterminationonthe
publicinterestortheinterestsofpersonsnotthemselvespartiesintheinitial
action.”Restatement(Second)ofJudgments§28(5)(a).
10Inthiscase,theMaineSuperiorCourtmistakenlyconcludedthatMaineandCalifornialaware
identical, imposing a “heightened burden” on litigants pursuing a defamation claim against ananonymous defendant. The court attempted to define the issue before it by stating that “[t]hemotionstoquashbeforethecourtturnonwhetherGunninghasmetherburdenofdemonstratingentitlementtoproceedwithdiscoverywhenherrightsareweighedagainstwhattheLawCourthasstated as ‘the recognized right to anonymous speech,’” citing to our decision in Fitch v. Doe,2005ME39,¶26,869A.2d722.
InFitch,however,DoeandamiciurgedtheCourttoadoptthe“heightenedburden”testenunciatedin Dendrite, and the Court declined to address the question because Doe failed to raise a FirstAmendmentissueinthetrialcourt.Id.¶27.AstheCourttodayacknowledges,Court’sOpinion¶18n.8,wehaveneverheldthatDendriteisthelawinourstate,orotherwiseindicatedthatDendriteoranysimilar“heightenedburden”wouldcontrolcasesinwhichaplaintiffseekstobringadefamationcase.
Itisthereforeinappositethat,relyingupontheelementsfromDendrite,whichtheCaliforniacourt
did not even cite, the Maine Superior Court would conclude that because “one of the essentialDendriterequirements”—whetherGunningestablishedaprimafaciecasesufficienttosupportherlibelclaim—was fully litigated inCaliforniaanddecidedadversely toGunning,collateralestoppelprecludesGunningfromrelitigatingherclaiminMaine.
25
[¶34]InMaine,wehavenotaddressedwhethertheDendrite“heightened
burden”orsomeotherproceduralhurdleatthecommencementofthesuitwill
bethe lawofourstate.11 EventhoughtheMaineSuperiorCourt in thiscase
indicated thatGunninghadpresented a prima facie case, theCourt today is
preventing Gunning from proceedingwith her defamation claims because a
CaliforniacourtinterpretingCaliforniastatelawconcludedthatpursuanttoan
analysis applied uniquely in California—which the Krinsky court found
“unnecessary and potentially confusing,”Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 244—
Gunninghadnotpresentedaprimafaciecase.Thisisnottheapproachthatwe
shouldtake.
[¶35]AlsoconcerningistheCaliforniacourt’sconclusionthatthespeech
at issue was parody and therefore protected by the First Amendment,
renderingthespeechnotactionable.12Whatconstitutesparodyincludesfactual
determinations best left to a jury. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine,
11TheCourtstatesinitsopinionthatifGunninghadlitigatedthemotiontoquashinMaineand
theMainecourthadruledthatGunninghadmadeoutaprimafaciecase,thatjudgmentwouldhavepreclusive effect in California. Court’s Opinion¶ 18& n.6. This argument ismisplaced becausepresently,underMainelaw,Gunningwouldnotberequiredtoestablishaprimafaciecasebeforeproceedingwithdiscovery.
12 The Court states that the claim for defamationwas for Doe’s comparison in newsprint of
Gunningwith the“WickedWitchof theWest” fromTheWizardofOz,aswellasacaptionstating“Miss Prozac 2003.” Court’s Opinion ¶ 2. The article concerning Gunning also contains amoreblatantlydefamatorystatement:“Rumorscontinuethat,Marieissufferingfromabipolardisorderwithacutedepressionandparanoia,amplifiedbysubstanceabuse.”
26
501U.S.496,522(1991)(statingthatwhen“[a]reasonablejurycouldfinda
materialdifferencebetweenthemeaningof[apublished,written]passageand
[a] tape-recorded statement,” the falsity of the published passage is a jury
question);Nike, Inc.v. “JustDidIt”Enters.,6F.3d1225,1232(7thCir.1993)
(discussingseveraltrademarkparodycasesinwhichsummaryjudgmentwas
vacatedbecause“[t]oomanydisputedfactsrequire[d]atrialforresolution”);
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L&L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 317-18, 320
(4thCir.1992)(holdingthatafederaldistrictcourtjudge“improperlyassumed
the jury’s role of determining” whether a t-shirt depicting a beer can was
parodywhenthedistrictcourtgrantedentryofjudgmentnotwithstandingthe
verdict, because “the jury was uniquely positioned to make the critical
determination in that regard”); San Francisco Bay Guardian, Inc. v. Superior
Court,21Cal.Rptr.2d464,468(Cal.Ct.App.1993)(“Itisnotforthecourtto
evaluate the parody as to whether it went ‘too far.’”); Kiesau v. Bantz,
686N.W.2d 164, 177 (Iowa 2004) (“To be a parody, the jurymust find the
alteredphotographcouldnotreasonablybeunderstoodasdescribingactual
facts...oractualevents....”),overruledonothergroundsbyAlcalav.Marriott
Int’lInc.,880N.W.2d699,708&n.3(Iowa2016).BecausetheCaliforniacourt
enteredintoitsownassessment,basedonreviewoftheparties’movingpapers,
27
ofwhetherthespeechconstitutedaparody,therebyreducingamixedquestion
of fact and law intoaquestionof law, theCalifornia court’sdiscoveryorder
shouldnothavepreclusiveeffectonthelitigationoftheissueinMaine.
[¶36] Furthermore, the Maine Superior Court stated that it believed
Gunninghadestablishedaprimafaciecaseofdefamationandthattherewasa
genuineissueoffactastowhetherDoe’sspeechconstitutedparody,butitfelt
compelledtocollaterallyestopGunningfromlitigatingtheissuebecauseofthe
Californiacourt’sdiscoverydecision.Unlessanduntilweimposea“heightened
burden”on litigants claimingdefamation, a jury, rather thana court, should
determinewhetherDoe’sspeechwasparody.Becauseofthestatusofthelaw
inMaine,theissuesintheCaliforniacourtarenotidenticaltothosebeforethe
courtinMaineanddonotwarrantpreclusiveapplicationofcollateralestoppel.
[¶37]DespitetheMainetrialcourt’sindicationthatGunningmayhave
satisfiedthe“heightenedburden”standard,weareallowingtheCalifornialaw
topreventGunningfrompursuingherdefamationcaseinthisstate.Mainehas
neverruledthatthereisa“heightenedburden”foraplaintifftomakeaprima
facieshowingofdefamationbeforeproceedingwithaclaim.Adecisionofthis
magnitude should not be decided by simply deferring to a California trial
court’s imposition of a “heightened burden” on a discovery order. See
28
Restatement(Second)ofJudgments§29(7)(Am.LawInst.1982)(statingthat
apartyshouldnotbeprecludedfromrelitigatinganissuewhen“[t]heissueis
oneof lawand treating itasconclusivelydeterminedwould inappropriately
foreclose opportunity for obtaining reconsideration of the legal rule upon
whichitwasbased”).
[¶38] “Decisions of this sort demonstrate that res judicata, as the
embodimentofapublicpolicy,must,attimes,beweighedagainstcompeting
interests, andmust, on occasion, yield to other policies.” Spilker v. Hankin,
188 F.2d 35, 38-39 (D.C. Cir. 1951). “[W]hen as here private litigation has
extensiveimplicationsofpublicimport,theruleofresjudicataorestoppelis
notallowedtostultifyreassessmentofthepriordecision.Thepublicinterest
supersedestheprivateinterest.”Griffinv.StateBd.ofEduc.,296F.Supp.1178,
1182(E.D.Va.1969).BecausethepublicinterestinMainecourtsestablishing
our own framework for balancing the rights at stake in this case outweighs
Doe’sinterestinnotrelitigatingtheissueofwhetherDoe’sspeechconstitutes
defamation,IcannotjointheCourt’sdecision.
II.CONCLUSION
[¶39]Therearesignificantissuesintoday’ssocietysurroundingsocial
media,blogs,andclaimsof“fakenews.”Thelawinthisareaisevolving,andwe
29
shouldbemaking our owndecision as towhat is the best policy forMaine.
Furthermore, as was done by the Maine Legislature with our anti-SLAPP
statute, the Legislature should determinewhether any “heightened burden”
should be imposed upon litigants at the filing stage. This important policy
decisionshouldnotberesolvedbyadiscoveryorderinCalifornia.
[¶40] IwouldvacatetheMaineSuperiorCourt’sdecisionandremand
thecasesothatitmayproceedasanyotherdefamationcasefiledinaMaine
court.
Gene R. Libby, Esq., Tara A. Rich, Esq., and Tyler Smith, Esq. (orally), LibbyO’BrienKingsley&ChampionLLC,Kennebunk,forappellantMarieGunningSigmund D. Schutz, Esq. (orally), Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios, LLP,Portland,forappelleeJohnDoeZacharyL.Heiden,Esq.,AmericanCivilLibertiesUnionofMaineFoundation,Portland,PaulAlanLevy,Esq.,PublicCitizensLitigationGroup,Washington,DC,andGeorgeJ.Marcus,Esq.,Marcus,Clegg&Mistretta,P.A.,Portland,foramicicuriae Public Citizen, Inc., and American Civil Liberties Union of MaineFoundationCumberlandCountySuperiorCourtdocketnumberCV-2013-359FORCLERKREFERENCEONLY