march 2015 cases
TRANSCRIPT
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LEGAL ETHICS: DISBARMENT
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 7158, March 09, 015
!OLANDA A. ANDRES, MINETTE A.MERCADO, AND ELITO ".
ANDRES , Complainants, v. ATT!.SALIMATHAR V. NAMBI, Respondent .
Based on the foregoing, we have no basis tohold respondent administratively liable forgross ignorance of the law. However, we notethat respondent had consistently andobstinately disregarded the Court’s and IBP’sorders. It is on record that respondent totallyignored the Court’s June , !""#$esolution%& directing him to 'le his
Comment. He also failed to attend themandatory conference before the IBP’sCommission on Bar (iscipline despitenotice.%) *either did he 'le his PositionPaper. +s a former abor +rbiter, respondentshould -now that orders of the court are notmere re/uests but directives which shouldhave been complied with promptly andcompletely.0!" He disregarded the oath hetoo- when he was accepted to the legalprofession 1to obey the laws and the legalorders of the duly constituted legal
authorities.’ 2 2 2 His conduct wasunbecoming of a lawyer who is called uponto obey court orders and processes and ise2pected to stand foremost in complyingwith court directives as an o3cer of thecourt.0!% 4ection !, $ule %5& of the $ules of Court provides64ec. !. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; groundstherefor . 7 + member of the bar may bedisbarred or suspended from his o3ce asattorney by the 4upreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other grossmisconduct in such o3ce, grossly immoralconduct, or by reason of his conviction of acrime involving moral turpitude, or for anyviolation of the oath which he is re/uired tota-e before admission to practice, or fora #$%%&'% ($)o*+($+c+ o& a- %a#&'%or(+r o& a )'+r$or co'r/, or for corruptlyor willfully appearing as an attorney for aparty to a case without authority so to do.
8he practice of soliciting cases at law for thepurpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or bro-ers, constitutesmalpractice. 9:mphasis supplied;
Considering that this appears to berespondent’s 'rst infraction, we 'nd it properto impose on him the penalty of reprimandwith warning that commission of the same orsimilar infraction will be dealt with moreseverely.
HEREORE, theCourt RE"RIMANDS respondent +tty4alimathar
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warranted when a lawyer abandons his
lawful wife and maintains an illicit
relationship with another woman who has
borne him a
child.5&chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
+tty. Catindig’s subse/uent marriage during
the subsistence of his previous one de'nitely
manifests a deliberate disregard of the
sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and a3rmed
by our laws. By his own admission, +tty.
Catindig made a moc-ery out of the
institution of marriage, ta-ing advantage of
his legal s-ills in the process. He e2hibited a
deplorable lac- of that degree of morality
re/uired of him as a member of the bar,
which thus warrant the penalty of
disbarment.
8he Court is not unmindful of the rule that
the power to disbar must be e2ercised with
great caution, and only in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously a>ects the
standing and character of the lawyer as an
o3cer of the Court and as a member of the
bar. here a lesser penalty, such as
temporary suspension, could accomplish the
end desired, disbarment should never bedecreed. *evertheless, in this case, the
seriousness of the o>ense compels the Court
to wield its power to disbar, as it appears to
be the most appropriate penalty.
+tty. Catindig’s claim that (r. Pere@’s
allegations against him are not credible since
they are uncorroborated and not supported
by a3davits contrary to 4ection %, $ule %5)
B of the $ules of Court, deserves scant
consideration. air and the purported
love letter to +tty. Baydo that was signed by
+tty. Catindig
8he Court has consistently held that in
suspension or disbarment proceedings
against lawyers, the lawyer en=oys the
presumption of innocence, and the burden of
proof rests upon the complainant to prove
the allegations in his complaint. 8heevidence re/uired in suspension or
disbarment proceedings is preponderance of
evidence.5)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
8he presentation of the anonymous letter
that was received by (r. Pere@ only proves
that the latter indeed received a letter
informing her of the alleged relations
between the respondents it does not prove
the veracity of the allegations therein4imilarly, the supposed love letter, if at all
only proves that +tty. Catindig wrote +tty
Baydo a letter professing his love for her. It
does not prove that +tty. Baydo is indeed in a
relationship with +tty. Catindig
HEREORE, in consideration of theforegoing dis/uisitions, the Court resolves
to ADO"T the recommendations of theCommission on Bar (iscipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. +tty. 8ristan
+. Catindig is found G;ILT! of grossimmorality and of violating the awyer’s
?ath and $ule %."%, Canon and $ule ."5
of the Code of Professional $esponsibility and
is hereby DISBARRED from the practice oflaw.
et a copy of this (ecision be entered into
the records of +tty. 8ristan +. Catindig in the
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?3ce of the Bar Con'dant and his name
is ORDERED STRICEN from the $oll of +ttorneys. i-ewise, copies of this (ecision
shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and circulated by the Court
+dministrator to all appellate and trial courts.
8he charge of gross immorality against +tty.
Karen :. Baydo is hereby DISMISSED forlac- of evidence.
8his (ecision ta-es e>ect immediately.
LABOR LA: ILLEGAL DISMISSAL
G.R. No. 11
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*onetheless, the Court agrees with the C+’s
dismissal of the award of moral and
e2emplary damages for lac- of merit. 8here
is no satisfactory proof that the concerned
o3cers of HPC acted in bad faith or with
malice in terminating Farrales.
*otwithstanding the +’s assertion to this
e>ect, Farrales’ bare allegations of bad faith
deserve no credence, and neither is the mere
fact that he was illegally dismissed su3cient
to prove bad faith on the part of HPC’s
o3cers.5& But concerning the award of
attorney’s fees, Farrales was dismissed for a
Limsy charge, and he was compelled to
litigate to secure what is due him which HPC
un=usti'ably withheld.
HEREORE, premises considered, thepetition for review is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
%elas#o, "r., (Chairperson), $eralta, %illarama,
"r., and "ardelea, ""., concur.
LABOR LA: ILLEGAL DISMISSAL
G.R. No. 19088, March 13, 015
ONORE V. MONTERO, EDGARDO N.ESTRA=ERO, RENING ". "ADRE, GABRIELA. MADERA, HERMINIO T. TACLA,NELSON C. VILORIA, DEMETRIO >."A?ARILLO, ALREDO R. AGANON,RE!NALDO AVILA, ALBERT T. R;I4,NESTOR !. !AGO, HART! M. T;"ASI,AG;STIN R. AVILA, ?R. OR MARCOS R.AVILA, BONIACIO B. GAANO, ?OSELITO
D. C;ENTA, ?ONAS ". ESTILONG,DOMINADOR C. CANARIA, GENARO C.RONDARIS, HERARDO M. D;LA!,RANLIN A. RAVINA, ?R., AND R;BENC. CABELLO, $etitioners, v. TIMESTRANS"ORTATION CO., INC., ANDSANTIAGO RONDARIS, MENCOR"TRANS"ORT S!STEMS, INC., VIRGINIA R.MENDO4A AND RE!NALDOMENDO4A, Respondents
8he petitioners contend that the period when
they 'led a labor case on Day %, %))& but
withdrawn on Darch !!, %))) should be
e2cluded from the computation of the four
year prescriptive period for illegal dismissa
cases. However, the Court had already ruled
that the prescriptive period continues even
after the withdrawal of the case as though no
action has been 'led at all. 8he applicability
of +rticle %%EE5of the Civil Code in labor
cases was upheld in the case
of &nter#ontinental Broad#asting Corporation
v. $anganiban5& where the Court held that
although the commencement of a civi
action stops the running of the statute of
prescription or limitations, its dismissal or
voluntary abandonment by plainti> leavesthe parties in e2actly the same position as
though no action had been commenced at
all.05)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In li-e manner, while the 'ling of the
complaint for illegal dismissal before the +
interrupted the running of the prescriptive
period, its voluntary withdrawal left the
petitioners in e2actly the same position as
though no complaint had been 'led at all 8he withdrawal of their complaint e>ectively
erased the tolling of the reglementary
period.
+ prudent review of the antecedents of the
claim reveals that it has in fact prescribed
due to the petitioners’ withdrawal of their
labor case doc-eted as *$C $+BI"%
%""." Hence, while the 'ling of the said
case could have interrupted the running of
the fouryear prescriptive period, the
voluntary withdrawal of the petitioners
e>ectively cancelled the tolling of the
prescriptive period within which to 'le their
illegal dismissal case, leaving them in e2actly
the same position as though no labor case
had been 'led at all. 8he running of the four
year prescriptive period not having been
interrupted by the 'ling of *$C $+BI"%
%"", the petitioners’ cause of action had
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already prescribed in four years after their
cessation of employment on ?ctober !#,
%)) and *ovember !, %)). Conse/uently,
when the petitioners 'led their complaint for
illegal dismissal, separation pay, retirement
bene'ts, and damages in !""!, their claim,
clearly, had already been barred by
prescription.%chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
4adly, the petitioners have no one but
themselves to blame for their own
predicament. By their own allegations in
their respective complaints, they have barred
their remedy and e2tinguished their right of
action. +lthough the Constitution is
committed to the policy of social =ustice and
the protection of the wor-ing class, it does
not necessary follow that every labor dispute
will be automatically decided in favor of labor. 8he management also has its own
rights. ?ut of concern for the less privileged
in life, this Court, has more often than not
inclined, to uphold the cause of the wor-er in
his conLict with the employer. 4uch leaning,
however, does not blind the Court to the rule
that =ustice is in every case for the
deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the
established facts and applicable law and
doctrine.!
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
HEREORE, the (ecision dated +ugust!&, !"") and $esolution dated (ecember %%,
!"") of the Court of +ppeals in C+.$. 4P
*o. %"#!#" are AIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
%elas#o, "r., (Chairperson), Del
Castillo,' %illarama, "r., and "ardelea, "".,
concur
LEGAL ETHICS: DISBARMENT
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 759@, March 11, 015
ALVIN S. ELICIANO, Complainant , v. ATT!CARMELITA BA;TISTALO4ADA, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
4u3ce it to say that practice of lawembraces Many activity, in or out of courtwhich re/uires the application of law, legaprocedure, -nowledge, training ande2perience.M It includes MNperformingO actswhich are characteristics of the NlegalOprofessionM or MNrendering any -ind ofOservice NwhichO re/uires the use in anydegree of legal -nowledge ors-ill.0%chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the instant case, +tty. o@adas guilt isundisputed. Based on the records, there is nodoubt that +tty. o@adas actuations, that is,in appearing and signing as counsel for andin behalf of her husband, conducting oro>ering stipulationQadmission of factsconducting direct and crosse2amination, alconstitute practice of law. Furthermore, the'ndings of the IBP would disclose that suchactuations of +tty. o@ada of activelyengaging in the practice of law in JuneJuly!"" were done within the period of her two9!;year suspension considering that she wassuspended from the practice of law by thisCourt in Day , !""#. It would then appearthat, at the very least, +tty. o@ada cannotpractice law from !""# to !""&. 8hus, it isclear that when +tty. o@ada appeared forand in behalf of her husband in Civil Case *o.%"%
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forget that she is 'rst and foremost, ano3cer of the court who is bound to obey thelawful order of the Court.
Ander 4ection !, $ule %5& of the $evised$ules of Court, as amended, willfuldisobedience to any lawful order of asuperior court is a ground for disbarment orsuspension from the practice of law6chan$oblesvirtualawlibrary
4:C. !. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; groundstherefor . + member of the bar may bedisbarred or suspended from his o3ce asattorney by the 4upreme Court for anydeceit, malpractice, or other grossmisconduct in such o3ce, grossly immoralconduct, or by reason of his conviction of acrime involving moral turpitude, or for anyviolation of the oath which he is re/uired tota-e before admission to practice, or for awillful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority to doso. 8he practice of soliciting cases at law forthe purpose of gain, either personally orthrough paid agents or bro-ers, constitutesmalpractice.%E
+tty. o@ada would have deserved a harsher
penalty, but this Court recogni@es the fact
that it is part of the Filipino culture that amidan adversity, families will always loo- out
and e2tend a helping hand to a family
member, more so, in this case, to a spouse.
8hus, considering that +tty. o@adas
actuation was prompted by her a>ection to
her husband and that in essence, she was
not representing a client but rather a spouse,
we deem it proper to mitigate the
severeness of her penalty.
Following the recent case of %i#tor C. !ingan
v. tty. Romeo Calubauib and "immy $.
Baliga,%# citingMolina v. tty. Magat ,% where
this Court suspended further respondents
from the practice of law for si2 9#; months for
practicing their profession despite this
courts previous order of suspension, we,
thus, impose the same penalty on +tty.
o@ada for representing her husband as
counsel despite lac- of authority to practice
law.
(isbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that
aims to purge the law profession of unworthy
members of the bar. It is intended to
preserve the nobility and honor of the legal
profession. hile the 4upreme Court has the
plenary power to discipline erring lawyers
through this -ind of proceedings, it does so
in the most vigilant manner so as not to
frustrate its preservative principle. 8he
Court, in the e2ercise of its sound =udicia
discretion, is inclined to impose a less severe
punishment if, through it, the end desire of
reforming the errant lawyer is
possible.%&chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
HEREORE, premises considered, +ttyCarmelita 4. Bautistao@ada is
found G;ILT! of violating 4ection !,%) $ule%5& of the $ules of Court, and is
hereby S;S"ENDED for a period of si2 9#;months from the practice of law, with
a ARNING that a repetition of the same orsimilar o>ense will warrant a more severe
penalty.
et copies of this (ecision be furnished allcourts, the ?3ce of the Bar Con'dant and
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their
information and guidance. 8he ?3ce of the
Bar Con'dant is DIRECTED to append acopy of this (ecision to respondent’s record
as member of the Bar
+tty. o@ada is DIRECTED to inform theCourt of the date of her receipt of this
(ecision, so that we can determine the
rec-oning point when her suspension shal
ta-e e>ect
8his (ecision is immediately e2ecutory
SO ORDERED
%elas#o, "r., (Chairperson), %illarama, "r.,
Reyes, and "ardelea, ""., concur
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COMMERCIAL LA: VESSEL CIVIL LA:RES I"SA LO>;IT;R
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 195331, March 11, 015
;NNON ONER O THE VESSEL MVCHINA ?O!, SAMS;N SHI""ING LTD., ANDINTERASIA MARINE TRANS"ORT,INC., $etitioners, v. ASIAN TERMINALS,INC., Respondent .
R'%$ o& /h+ Co'r/
*he Court agrees +ith the C that the petitioners are liable to *& for the damagesustained by the latters unloader. -o+ever,the Court nds the petitioners liability to bebased on uasi/deli#t and not on a #ontra#t of #arriage. *he Court li0e+ise deems it
proper to modify the rate of interests on theamount of damages imposed by the C uponthe petitioners.
8he Court notes that the shipowner andshipowner’s agent, 4amsun, are all =uridical
entities not registered and not doingbusiness in the Philippines. It was thecharterer’s agent, Inter+sia, a dulyregistered domestic corporation, which had'led the instant petition for itself and onbehalf of the shipowner and 4amsun.!E In thecourse of the proceedings too, none of theparties had raised issues anent the validity of the service of summons and the courts’ac/uisition of =urisdiction over the persons of the petitioners.
8he petitioners present two issues for theCourt’s resolution, to wit6 9a; the applicabilityof the doctrine of res ipsa louitur in the caseat bar and 9b; who participated and shouldthus assume liability for the loading of thesoybean meal cargo.
In its (ecision dated January 5", !""), the$8C declared that while +8I indeed sustaineddamages to its unloader, liability thereforcannot, however, be established with
certainty.
In the assailed decision, the C+, on the otherhand, discussed in detail why and how thethree re/uisites to the application of thedoctrine of res ipsa louitur are found to beattendant in the case at bar. 1irst , the comingling of the two foreign metal ob=ectswith the soybean meal cargo and theconse/uent damage to +8I’s unloader is anaccident which ordinarily does not occur inthe absence of someone’snegligence. Se#ond, the foreign metaob=ects were found in the vessel’s Hold *o. !,which is within the e2clusive control of thepetitioners. *hird, records do not show that+8I’s negligence had in any way contributedto the damage caused to its unloader
8he Court agrees with the C+ anent +8I’sentitlement to the payment of damages fromthe petitioners and the applicability of thedoctrine of res ipsa louitur . However, theCourt 'nds as misplaced the C+’s applicationof the laws on maritime commerce andcontracts of carriage for reasons discussedbelow.
Th+r+ $) o co/rac/ o& carr$a+*+/#++ /h+ +/$/$o+r) a( ATI
8here is no contract of carriage between +8Ion one hand, and the shipowner, 4amsunContiSuincyBunge ..C., and Inter+sia, onthe other. It li-ewise bears stressing that thesub=ect of the complaint, from which theinstant petition arose, is not the damagecaused to the cargo, but to the e/uipment ofan arrastre operator. Further, +8I’scontractual relation is not with thepetitioners, but with the consignee and withthe Philippine Ports +uthority 9PP+;
In Delgado Brothers, &n#. v. -ome &nsuran#e
Company and Court of ppeals,
!#
the Courtdiscusses the functions of an arrastreoperator, vi 6chan$oblesvirtualawlibrary
Ander this provision, petitioner’s functions asarrastre operator are 9%; to receive, handle,care for, and deliver all merchandiseimported and e2ported, upon or passing overovernmentowned wharves and piers in thePort of Danila, 9!; as well as to record orchee- all merchandise which may bedelivered to said port at shipside, and in
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generalN,O 95; to furnish light and waterservices and other incidental services inorder to underta-e its arrastre service. *otethat there is nothing in those functions whichrelate to the trade and business of navigation 2 2 2, nor to the use or operationof vessels 2 2 2. Both as to the nature of thefunctions and the place of their performance9upon wharves and piersshipside;, +/$/$o+r) )+r6$c+) ar+c%+ar%- o/ ar$/$+. +s we held inthe Ma#ondray case, /h+- ar+ o ($+r+/&ro /ho)+ o& a (+o)$/ar- or#ar+ho')+a. ranting, arguendo, thatpetitioner’s arrastre service depends on,assists, or furthers maritime transportation 22 2, it may be deemed merely in#identalto itsaforementioned functions as arrastreoperator and does not, thereby, ma-epetitioner’s arrastre service maritime incharacter.! 9Citations omitted, italics in theoriginal, emphasis and underscoring ours;8he functions of an arrastre operatorinvolve the handling of cargo deposited onthe wharf or between the establishment of the consignee or shipper and the ship’stac-le. Being the custodian of the goodsdischarged from a vessel, an arrastreoperator’s duty is to ta-e good care of thegoods and to turn them over to the partyentitled to theirpossession.0!&chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
8he legal relationship between an arrastreoperator and a consignee is a-in to thatbetween a warehouseman and a depositor.+s to both the nature of the functions andthe place of their performance, an arrastreoperator’s services are clearly not maritimein character.0!)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In &nsuran#e Company of 2orth meri#a v. sian *erminals, &n#.,5" the Court e2plainedthat the liabilities of the arrastre operator for
losses and damages are set forth in thecontract for cargo handling services it hade2ecuted with the PP+. Corollarily then, therights of an arrastre operator to be paid fordamages it sustains from handling cargoesdo not li-ewise spring from contracts of carriage.
However, in the instant petition, thecontending parties ma-e no references at allto any provisions in the contract for cargohandling services +8I had e2ecuted with the
PP+.
Ar/$c%+ 173 o& /h+ N+# C$6$% Co(+ a(/h+ (oc/r$+ o& res ipsa loquitur a%-
*otwithstanding the above, the petitionerscannot evade liability for the damage causedto +8I’s unloader in view of +rticle !%# ofthe *ew Civil Code, which pertinentlyprovides asfollows6chan$oblesvirtualawlibrary
+rt. !%#. hoever by act or omissioncauses damage to another, there being faultor negligence, is obliged to pay for thedamage done. 4uch fault or negligence, ifthere is no pree2isting contractual relationbetween the parties, is called a /uasidelictand is governed by the provisions of thisChapter.cralawredIn *aylor v. Manila 3le#tri# Railroad and !ightCo.,5% the Court e2plained that to establish aplainti>’s right to recovery for /uasidelicts,three elements must e2ist, to wit6 9a;damages to the plainti> 9b; negligence byact or omission of which defendantpersonally, or some person for whose acts itmust respond, was guilty and 9c; theconnection of cause and e>ect between thenegligence and thedamage.5!chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
*egligence, on the other hand, is de'ned asthe failure to observe that degree of care,precaution and vigilance that thecircumstances =ustly demand, wherebyanother su>ersin=ury.55chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the case under consideration, the partiesdo not dispute the facts of damage upon+8I’s unloader, and of such damage beingthe conse/uence of someone’s negligenceHowever, the petitioners deny liability
claiming that it was not established withreasonable certainty whose negligence hadcaused the comingling of the metal barswith the soybean meal cargo. 8he Court, onthis matter, agrees with the C+’s dis/uisitionthat the petitioners should be held =ointlyand severally liable to +8I. +8I cannot befaulted for its lac- of direct access toevidence determinative as to who among theshipowner, 4amsun, ContiSuincyBunge andInter+sia should assume liability. 8he C+ hade2haustively discussed why the doctrine
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of res ipsa louitur applies. 8he metal barswhich caused damage to +8I’s unloader wasfound comingled with the cargo inside Hold*o. ! of the ship, which was then within thee2clusive control of the petitioners. 8hus, thepresumption that it was the petitioners’collective negligence, which caused thedamage, stands. 8his is, however, withoutpre=udice to the petitioners’ rights to see-reimbursements among themselves from theparty whose negligence primarily caused thedamage.
A o($ca/$o o& /h+ $/+r+)/) $o)+(o /h+ (aa+) a#ar(+( $) $ or(+r.
+nent the interests imposed by the C+ uponthe damages to be paid to +8I, modi'cationof the same is in order.
In 2a#ar v. 4allery 1rames,5 the Courtdeclared6chan$oblesvirtualawlibrary
To r+ca$/'%a/+ a( &or &'/'r+ '$(ac+,/h+ '$(+%$+) %a$( (o# $ /h+ ca)+o& Eastern Shipping ines ar+accor($%- o($+( /o +*o(- BS"MBC$rc'%ar No. 799, a) &o%%o#):
I. hen an obligation, regardless of itssource, i.e., law, contracts, /uasicontracts,delicts or /uasidelicts is breached, thecontravenor can be held liable for damages.
8he provisions under 8itle T
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ascertained, until full satisfaction thereof.
HEREORE, the (ecision dated *ovember%", !"%" of the Court of +ppeals in C+.$.
C< *o. )5%# is AIRMED #$/hMODIICATION. 8he petitioners, An-nown?wner of the
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views regarding the election and other
related issues may choose not to, for fear of
reprisal or sanction by the C?D::C. (irect
resort to this court is allowed to avoid such
proscribed conditions. $ule #E is also the
procedural platform for raising grave abuse
of discretion.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courtsof =ustice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether ornot there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac-
or e2cess of =urisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the
overnment.E#9:mphasis supplied;
8he more relevant provision for =urisdiction in
this case is +rticle
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direct e2ercise of the sovereignty. 8he
principle of e2haustion of administrative
remedies yields in order to protect this
fundamental right.
prior e2haustion of administrative remedies
may be dispensed with and =udicial action
may be validly resorted to immediately6 9a;
when there is a violation of due process 9b;when the issue involved is purely a legal
/uestion 9c; when the administrative action
is patently illegal amounting to lac- or
e2cess of =urisdiction 9d; when there is
estoppel on the part ofthe administrative
agency concerned 9e; when there is
irreparable in=ury 9f; when the respondent is
a department secretary whose acts as
analter ego of the President bear the implied
and assumed approval of the latter 9g; whento re/uire e2haustion of administrative
remedies would be unreasonable 9h; when it
would amount to a nulli'cation of a claim 9i;
when the sub=ect matter is a private land in
land case proceedings 9=; whenthe rule does
not provide a plain, speedy and ade/uate
remedy or 9-; when there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of =udicial
intervention.M
emon test in that case, such that aregulation is constitutional when6 9%; it has a
secular legislative purpose 9!; it neither
advances nor inhibits religion and 95; it does
not foster an e2cessive entanglement with
religion
+ FI*+ *?8:
e maintain sympathies for the C?D::C inattempting to do what it thought was its duty
in this case. However, it was misdirected.
C?D::C’s general role includes a mandate
to ensure e/ual opportunities and reduce
spending among candidates and their
registered political parties. It is not to
regulate or limit the speech of the electorate
as it strives to participate inthe electora
e2ercise.
8he tarpaulin in /uestion may be viewed as
producing a caricature of those who are
running for public o3ce.8heir message may
be construed generali@ations of very
comple2 individuals and partylist
organi@ations.
8hey are classi'ed into blac- and white6 as
belonging to M8eam PatayM or M8eam Buhay.M
But this caricature, though not agreeable tosome, is still protected speech.
8hat petitioners chose to categori@e them as
purveyors of death or of life on the basis of a
single issue W and a comple2 piece of
legislation at that W can easily be
interpreted as anattempt to stereo type the
candidates and partylist organi@ations. *ot
all may agree to the way their thoughts were
e2pressed, as in fact there are other Catholic
dioceses that chose not to follow the
e2ample of petitioners.
4ome may have thought that there should be
more room to consider being more broad
minded and non=udgmental. 4ome may
have e2pected that the authors would give
more space to practice forgiveness and
humility.
But, the Bill of $ights enumerated in ourConstitution is an enumeration of our
fundamental liberties. It is not a detailed
code that prescribes good conduct. It
provides space for all to be guided by their
conscience, not only in the act that they do
to others but also in =udgment of the acts of
others.
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Freedom for the thought we can disagree
with can be wielded not only by those in the
minority. 8his can often be e2pressed by
dominant institutions, even religious ones.
8hat they made their point dramatically and
in a large way does not necessarily mean
that their statements are true, or that they
have basis, or that they have been
e2pressed in good taste.
:mbedded in the tarpaulin, however, are
opinions e2pressed by petitioners. It is a
specie of e2pression protected by our
fundamental law. It is an e2pression
designed to invite attention, cause debate,
and hopefully, persuade. It may be
motivated by the interpretation of petitioners
of their ecclesiastical duty, but their
parishioner’s actions will have very realsecular conse/uences. Certainly, provocative
messages do matter for the elections.
hat is involved in this case is the most
sacred of speech forms6 e2pression by the
electorate that tends to rouse the public to
debate contemporary issues. 8his is not
speechby candidates or political parties to
entice votes. It is a portion of the electorate
telling candidates the conditions for theirelection. It is the substantive content of the
right to su>rage.
8his. is a form of speech hopeful of a /uality
of democracy that we should all deserve. It is
protected as a fundamental and primordial
right by our Constitution. 8he e2pression in
the medium chosen by petitioners deserves
our protection.
H:$:F?$:, the instant petition is$+*8:(. 8he temporary restraining order
previously issued is hereby made permanent.
8he act of the C?D::C in issuing the
assailed notice dated February !!, !"%5 and
letter dated February !, !"%5 is declared
unconstitutional.
4? ?$(:$:(.
MARVIC M.V.. LEONEN+ssociate Justice
4C’s JA$I4(IC8I?*, C:$8I?$+$I, HI:$+$CHR
?F C?A$84, P?I8IC+ SA:48I?*, (?C8$I*:
?F :TH+A48I?* ?F +(DI*I48$+8I
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Danila in view of private respondent former
President Joseph :=ercito :strada’s 9former
President :strada; dis/uali'cation to run for
and hold public o3ce.
8he dis/uali'cation of former President
:strada under 4ection " of the C in
relation to 4ection %! of the ?:C was
removed by his acceptance of the absolute
pardon granted to him.
4ection " of the C identi'es who are
dis/uali'ed from running for any elective
local position. $isosense involving moral turpitude or for ano>ense punishable by one 9%; year or more
of imprisonment, within two 9!; years after
serving sentenceN.O 9:mphasis supplied.;
i-ewise, 4ection %! of the ?:C provides for
similar prohibitions, but it provides for an
e2ception, to wit6
4ection %!. (is/uali'cations. 7 2 2 2 unless
he has been given plenary pardon or granted
amnesty. 9:mphasis supplied.;
+s earlier stated, $isosense involving mora
turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any
public o3ce, whether local or nationa
position.
8a-e notice that the applicability of 4ection
%! of the ?:C to candidates running for loca
elective positions is not unprecedented. In
Jalos=os, Jr. v. Commission on :lections,5 the
Court ac-nowledged the aforementioned
provision as one of the legal remedies that
may be availed of to dis/ualify a candidate in
a local election 'led any day after the last
day for 'ling of certi'cates of candidacy, but
not later than the date of proclamation.5& 8he
pertinent ruling in the Jalos=os case is /uoted
as follows6
hat is indisputably clear is that false
material representation of Jalos=os is a
ground for a petition under 4ection &
However, since the false materia
representation arises from a crime penali@ed
by prision mayor, a petition under 4ection %!
ofthe ?mnibus :lection Code or 4ection " of
the ocal overnment Code can also be
properly 'led. 8he petitioner has a choicewhether to anchor his petition on 4ection %!
or 4ection & of the ?mnibus :lection Code
or on 4ection " of the ocal overnment
Code. 8he law e2pressly provides multiple
remedies and the choice of which remedy to
adopt belongs to petitioner.5) 9:mphasis
supplied.;
8he third preambular clause of the pardon
did not operate to ma-e the pardon
conditional.
Contrary to $isos
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rights to su>rage and to see- public elective
o3ce have been restored.
8his is especially true as the pardon itself
does not e2plicitly impose a condition or
limitation, considering the un/uali'ed use of
the term Mcivil and political rightsMas being
restored. Jurisprudence educates that a
preamble is not an essential part of an act as
it is an introductory or preparatory clause
that e2plains the reasons for the enactment,
usually introduced by the word
Mwhereas.M" hereas clauses do not form
part of a statute because, strictly spea-ing,
they are not part of the operative language
of the statute.% In this case, the whereas
clause at issue is not an integral part of the
decree of the pardon, and therefore, does
not by itself alone operate to ma-e thepardon conditional or to ma-e its e>ectivity
contingent upon the ful'lment of the
aforementioned commitment nor to limit the
scope of the pardon.
?n this matter, the Court /uotes with
approval a relevant e2cerpt of C?D::C
Commissioner Daria racia Padaca’s
separate concurring opinion in the assailed
+pril %, !"%5 $esolution of the C?D::C in4P+ *o. %5!%% 9(C;, which captured the
essence of the legal e>ect of preambular
paragraphsQwhereas clauses, vi@6
8he present dispute does not raise anything
which the !" January !"%" $esolution did not
conclude upon. Here, Petitioner $isosect on the absolute nature of the
pardon e2tended by former President +rroyo
to herein $espondent. 8his ruling is
consistent with the traditional and customary
usage of preambular paragraphs. In the case
of :chegaray v. 4ecretary of Justice, the
4upreme Court ruled on the legal e>ect of
preambular paragraphs or whereas clauses
on statutes. 8he Court stated, [email protected]
Besides, a preamble is really not an integra
part of a law. It is merely an introduction to
show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the
origin of rights and obligations. here the
meaning of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the preamble can neither
e2pand nor restrict its operation much less
prevail over its te2t.
If former President +rroyo intended for the
pardon to be conditional on $espondent’s
promise never to see- a public o3ce again,
the former ought to have e2plicitly stated thesame in the te2t of the pardon itself. 4ince
former President +rroyo did not ma-e this an
integral part of the decree of pardon, the
Commission is constrained to rule that the
5rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted
as a condition to the pardon e2tended to
former President :strada.! 9:mphasis
supplied.;
+bsent any contrary evidence, former
President +rroyo’s silence on former
President :strada’s decision torun for
President in the Day !"%" elections against,
among others, the candidate of the politica
party of former President +rroyo, after the
latter’s receipt and acceptance of the pardon
spea-s volume of her intention to restore
him to his rights to su>rage and to hold
public o3ce.
here the scope and import of the e2ecutiveclemency e2tended by the President is in
issue, the Court must turn to the only
evidence available to it, and that is the
pardon itself. From a detailed review ofthe
four corners of said document, nothing
therein gives an iota of intimation that the
third hereas Clause is actually a limitation
proviso, stipulation or condition on the grant
of the pardon, such that the breach of the
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mentioned commitment not to see- public
o3ce will result ina revocation or
cancellation of said pardon. 8o the Court,
what it is simply is a statement of fact or the
prevailing situation at the time the e2ecutive
clemency was granted. It was not used as a
condition to the e3cacy orto delimit the
scope of the pardon.
:ven if the Court were to subscribe to the
view that the third hereas Clausewas one
of the reasons to grant the pardon, the
pardon itself does not provide for the
attendant conse/uence of the breach
thereof. 8his Court will be hard put to discern
the resultant e>ect of an eventual
infringement. Just li-e it will be hard put to
determine which civil or political rights were
restored if the Court were to ta-e the roadsuggested by $isosrage
and to hold public o3ce. 8he afore/uoted
te2t ofthe e2ecutive clemency granted does
not provide the Court with any guide asto
how and where to draw the line between the
included and e2cluded political rights.
Justice eonen emphasi@es the point that the
ultimate issue for resolution is not whether
the pardon is contingent on the condition
that former President :strada will not see-
=another elective public o3ce, but it actually
concerns the coverage of the pardon 7
whether the pardon granted to former
President :strada was so e2pansive as to
have restored all his political rights, inclusive
of the rights of su>rage and to hold public
o3ce. Justice eonen is of the view that thepardon in /uestion is not absolute nor
plenary in scope despite the statement that
former President :strada is Mhereby restored
to his civil and political rights,M that is, the
foregoing statement restored to former
President :strada all his civil and political
rights e2cept the rights denied to him by the
unremitted penalty of perpetual absolute
dis/uali'cation made up of, among others,
the rights of su>rage and to hold public
o3ce. He adds that had the President chosen
to be so e2pansive as to include the rights of
su>rage and to hold public o3ce, she should
have been more clear on her intentions.
However, the statement MNhOe is hereby
restored to his civil and political rights,M to
the mind of the Court, iscrystal clear 7 the
pardon granted to former President :strada
was absolute, meaning, it was not only
unconditional, it was unrestricted in scope
complete and plenary in character, as the
term Mpolitical rightsMadverted to has a
settled meaning in law and =urisprudence.
ith due respect, I disagree too with Justice
eonen that the omission of the /ualifying
word MfullM can be construed as e2cluding therestoration of the rights of su>rage and to
hold public o3ce. 8here appears to be no
distinction as to the coverage of the term
Mfull political rightsM and the term Mpolitica
rightsM used alone without any /uali'cation
How to ascribe to the latter term the
meaning that it is MpartialM and not MfullM
de'es one’s understanding. Dore so, it wil
be e2tremely di3cult to identify which of the
political rights are restored by the pardonwhen the te2t of the latter is silent on this
matter. :2ceptions to the grant of pardon
cannot be presumed from the absence of the
/ualifying word MfullM when the pardon
restored the Mpolitical rightsM of forme
President :strada without any e2clusion or
reservation.
8herefore, there can be no other conclusion
but to say that the pardon granted to former
President :strada was absolute in theabsence of a clear, une/uivocal and concrete
factual basis upon which to anchor or
support the Presidential intent to grant a
limited pardon.
8o reiterate, insofar as its coverageis
concerned, the te2t of the pardon can
withstand close scrutiny even under the
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provisions of +rticles 5# and % of the
$evised Penal Code.
8he C?D::C did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lac- or e2cess of
=urisdiction in issuing the assailed
$esolutions.
In light of the foregoing, contrary to the
assertions of $isos