Mapping Debris Fields of Lost US Ships from the 1944 Battle of Leyte GulfMidshipman 1/C Buinauskas, USN, Class of 2020; Advisor: Professor Peter L. Guth

IntroductionIn the aftermath of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the Allied Forces lost one

light carrier, two escort carriers, two destroyers, and one destroyer-escort.

Some of these ships’ wrecks were more intact, which made the ship

whose wreck it was easily identifiable. An example of this is the

Casablanca-class Escort Carrier USS St. Lo, which was identifiable by a

clear “63” painted on the hull. The other wrecks, however, consisted

merely of scrap metal and ship parts, none of which alone were enough

to lead to identification. In these circumstances, the location, size, and

parts of the wreck were all considered in identifying the ship it belonged

to. This was the case for a pile of scrap metal off the coast of Samar,

which was recently identified as the Fletcher-class Destroyer USS

Johnston (Werner, 2019). Another destroyer, the USS Hoel, was sunk in

the same general location as the USS Johnston, which made identifying

the wreck difficult. However, the location of the wreck being in the

southern part of the area where the battle took place was what led the

wreck to be claimed as that of the USS Johnston (Werner, 2019). Using

videos I obtained of the wrecks, I was able to locate the final resting

places of the two ships and determine the orientations in which they hit

bottom, in order to present how the wreck looks today – after spending

the last 75 years on the sea floor, more than 4000 meters beneath the

ocean’s surface.

BackgroundThe Battle of Leyte Gulf took place from 23-26 October, 1944. Preceding

the battle, the Japanese Imperial Navy’s First Mobile Fleet launched

Operation Shō in order to counter the impending Allied landings in the

Philippines (NHHC, 2019a). This operation consisted of sending the

majority of Japan’s remaining ships in a desperate attempt to inflict

damage upon the US forces. The ploy successfully drew Admiral William

F. Halsey’s Third Fleet away from the Leyte Gulf area, which exposed

the northern flank of Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kincaid’s Seventh Fleet

(NHHC, 2019a). This left the most northwesterly task unit, Rear Admiral

Clifton A. F. Sprague’s TG 77.4.3, call sign “Taffy 3,” to battle four

Japanese battleships, six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and 11

destroyers – a battle later deemed the Battle off Samar, the largest naval

battle of World War II (NHHC, 2019b). Taffy 3 was comprised of six

escort carriers, three destroyers, and four destroyer escorts, of which

were no match for the Japanese. Of these, the destroyers USS Johnston

and USS Hoel, and carriers USS Gambier Bay and USS St. Lo were sunk.

MethodologyWe used the MICRODEM GIS program (Guth, 2009) for most of the

analysis, supplemented with Google Earth (Google, 2015). Professor

Guth obtained videos of the two shipwrecks taken by the Research Vessel

Petrel from the Naval History and Heritage Command. I went through

the videos, and screenshotted significant images of the ships and their

debris. I then created a database with each video the image was

screenshotted from, the time in the video of the screenshot, the latitude,

longitude, altitude, and heading of each screenshot, and a description of

what I thought the image might be. The database allowed me to create a

map of the debris fields with points at the locations of each image. Then,

I created icons for each image, and exported both debris field maps to

Google Earth. After that, I found plans for the 1944 Casablanca-class

carrier and Fletcher-class destroyer, and overlaid the plans on top of the

debris fields in Google Earth. I sized the plans to-scale, and rotated them

in the orientation of the wrecks based on my identification of key

features. Finally, I created a layer in Google Earth to overlay the icons, to

create a complete image of both debris fields (Figures 3&4).

ConclusionThe Battle off Samar was not a victory for the 113 of those who lost

their lives fighting for the USS Johnston, or the 186 of those doing the

same for the USS St. Lo (Werner, 2019). However, being able to

identify our lost ships and honor those lives lost in the pursuit of our

country’s liberty might be enough to take a small step towards

lessening the defeat. Due to our generation’s ability to utilize

technology such as the RV Petrel’s imaging systems, we were able to

dive over 4000 meters deep in the Leyte Gulf to identify two lost

World War II ships, the carrier USS St. Lo and what is likely to be the

destroyer USS. Johnston. We were then able to pinpoint the locations

of the wrecks and their respective debris, and create a database

detailing each debris piece. Using the GIS program, we were able to

map the debris fields and showcase the exact locations of the pieces.

We now know exactly where our lost ships are, the orientation in

which they sank, and have pictures of what the debris looks like to

date, over 75 years after the conclusion of the Battle of Leyte Gulf. In

order to protect and respect the wreck sites as war graves, the exact

locations have not yet been released to the public, as to prevent grave

plundering of any magnitude.

Acknowledgements: We used the freeware GIS MICRODEM (Guth, 2009) for the majority of this study.

The Naval History and Heritage Command provided the videos of the shipwreck, which were video-

graphed by the Research Vessel Petrel.

ResultsAfter creating the debris fields, I determined that the USS St. Lo sunk

facing southwestward, since the ship stayed relatively intact and the

bow of the wreck faced southwest at approximately 225° (Figure 1).

The two furthest pieces of debris had a distance of 273.9 meters

between them, with the furthest piece hitting the sea floor at 98.07

meters away from the ship. According to the general plans, the St. Lo

was about 19 meters wide, so the debris field spread a significant

distance from the ship itself (U.S. Naval Repair Base San Diego,

2019a). I then determined that the USS Johnston sunk facing

northwestward at about 300°, since the bow of the ship sank relatively

northwestward of the rest of the debris, while other debris correlating

with further-astern-related parts of the ship sank southeast relative to

the bow (Figure 2). Unlike the St. Lo, the debris field was scattered,

since the destroyer was demolished into many pieces, making the ship

difficult to identify. The two furthest pieces of debris had a distance of

401.2 meters between them; which, from a ship whose original beam

was about 11.5 meters wide, makes for a much larger range than the

debris field of the St. Lo (U.S. Naval Repair Base San Diego, 2019b).

DiscussionGiven that the USS St. Lo was sunk by a kamikaze pilot, it makes sense

that the majority of the ship remained together. Taking a hit from a

Japanese plane would sink a carrier, but would not create enough force

to tear the ship into a multitude of pieces. Because of the manner in

which the St. Lo was sunk, there were larger pieces of debris scattered

around the wreck, but not in the same quantity that a ship sunk by

hundreds of 5 and 14-inch rounds would incur, like what happened to

the USS Johnston (New World Encyclopedia, 2019). Since the USS

Johnston was sunk by enemy fire, the ship was torn into pieces. While

sinking, the pieces would have floated away from the wreck, and

landed on the seafloor further distances away. Since the debris pieces

were smaller, they were more susceptible to ocean currents, which

could have moved the debris even further from their initial landing

sites, creating a larger debris field.

Figure 2. Aerial view of the general plans for the U.S. Fletcher-class destroyer, overlaid

onto its debris field.

Figure 1. Aerial view of the general plans for the U.S. Casablanca-class carrier, overlaid

onto its debris field.

Figure 3. Debris field of the USS St. Lo.

Figure 4. Debris field of the USS Johnston.