MAPA VS C-A (275-286)

Mapa purchased from TWA Trans World Airlines 2 airline tickets in Bankok Thailand, for Los Angeles- New York – Boston St. Louis –Chicago, all of the USA. The domicile of the carrier TWA was Kansas City, Missouri USA, Where its principal place of business was likewise located. The place of business of TWA where the contract was made was in Bangkok Thailand. The place of destination was Chicago-USA. The MAPAS left Manila on board Pal for L-A, They left checked in 7 pieces of luggage’s at TWA counter at JFK airport but failed to board the plane because they went to the wrong gate. Hey were however allowed to take a later TWA plane to Boston which was delayed because of the thunder storm. Upon arrival at Boston they were only retrieved 3 out of 7 luggage’s which loss was immediately reported to TWA with a total value of S 2,560 as constituting full satisfaction of their claim which the MAPAS accepted as partial payment for the actual loss of their baggage’s. Thereafter MAPA filed a case against TWA in the Philippines Similar to the case of Santos III, TWA move to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction based on section 28(1) Warsaw contending that the complaint should have been brought either in Bangkok where the contract was entered into, or in Boston which was the place of destination or in Kansas City which was the carriers domicile and principal place of business. MAPAS claimed that the WARSAW convention was not applicable because the contract was not an International Transportation as contemplated under the provision of the WARSAW convention the RTC as affirmed by the C-A dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Is the Warsaw Convention applicable?

Held: Warsaw convention was not applicable because the contract does not involve an “INTERANTIONAL TRANPORTATION” base on the two categories.

(1) that where the place of departure and the place of destination are situated within the territories of two High Contracting Parties regardless of whether or not there be a break in the transportation or a transshipment; and

(2) that where the place of departure and the place of destination are within the territory of a single High Contracting Party if there is an agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the sovereignty, mandate, or authority of another power, even though the power is not a party of the Convention.

Whether the contracts were of international transportation is to be solely determined from the TWA tickets issued to them in Bangkok, Thailand, which showed that their itinerary was Los Angeles-New York-Boston-St. Louis-Chicago. Accordingly, since the place of departure (Los Angeles) and the place of destination (Chicago) are both within the territory of one High Contracting Party, with no agreed stopping place in a territory subject to the sovereignty, mandate, suzerainty or authority of another Power, the contracts did not constitute 'international transportation' as defined by the convention.

Santos vs. Northwest Orient Airlines (GR 101538, 23 June 1992)

En Banc, Cruz (J): 13 concur

Facts: Augusto Benedicto Santos III is a minor and a resident of the Philippines. Northwest Orient Airlines (NOA) is a foreign corporation with principal office in Minnesota, U.S.A., and licensed to do business and maintain a branch office in the Philippines. On 21 October 1986, Santos purchased from NOA a round-trip ticket in San Francisco, U.S.A., for his flight from San Francisco to Manila via Tokyo and back. The scheduled departure date from Tokyo was 20 December 1986. No date was specified for his return to San Francisco. On 19 December 1986, Santos checked in at the NOA counter in the San Francisco airport for his scheduled departure to Manila. Despite a previous confirmation and re-confirmation, he was informed that he had no reservation for his flight from Tokyo to Manila. He therefore had to be wait-listed.

On 12 March 1987, Santos, represented by his father and legal guardian Augusto Benedicto Santos, sued NOA for damages in the RTC Makati. On 13 April 1987, NOA moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. On 1 February 1988, the lower court granted the motion and dismissed the case.

Santos appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the lower court. On 26 June 1991, Santos filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied. Santos then came to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court denied the petition, with costs against Santos.

G.R. No. 171092. March 15, 2010.

EDNA DIAGO LHUILLIER, petitioner, vs. BRITISH AIRWAYS, respondent.

FACTS: On April 28, 2005, petitioner Edna Diago Lhuillier filed a Complaint for damages against respondent British Airways before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. The tortuous conduct by the flight attendants of said Airways, which prompted petitioner to file a case for damages, allegedly transpired when petitioner boarded respondent’s flight 548 from London, United Kingdom to Rome, Italy. On May 30, 2005, respondent, by way of special appearance through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the respondent. Respondent alleged that only the courts of London, United Kingdom or Rome, Italy, have jurisdiction over the complaint for damages pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, Article 28(1) of which provides:

“An action for damages must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, either before the court of domicile of the carrier or his principal place of business, or where he has a place of business through which the contract

has been made, or before the court of the place of destination.”

ISSUE: Whether or not Philippines, a signatory to the Warsaw Convention, should adhere to the provision of the Warsaw Convention in the determination of its jurisdiction with respect to a case for damages involving a tortuous conduct committed by an airline personnel while in an international carrier against a Filipino citizen.

HELD: Yes. It is settled that the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country.

In Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines, 210 SCRA 256 (1992), we held that: The Republic of the Philippines is a party to the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, otherwise known as the Warsaw Convention. It took effect on February 13, 1933. The Convention was concurred in by the Senate, through its Resolution No. 19, on May 16, 1950. The Philippine instrument of accession was signed by President Elpidio Quirino on October 13, 1950, and was deposited with the Polish government on November 9, 1950. The Convention became applicable to the Philippines on February 9, 1951. On September 23, 1955, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 201, declaring our formal adherence thereto, “to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof may be observed and fulfilled in good faith by the Republic of the Philippines and the citizens thereof.”

The Convention is thus a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government and, as such, has the force and effect of law in this country.

PanAm World Airways vs. Rapadas (GR 60673, 19 May 1992) Third Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 4 concur

Facts: On 16 January 1975, Jose K. Rapadas held Passenger Ticket and Baggage Claim Check 026- 394830084-5 for Pan American World Airways Inc.’s (PanAm) Flight 841 with the route from Guam to Manila. While standing in line to board the flight at the Guam airport, Rapadas was ordered by PanAm’s hand carry control agent to check-in his Samsonite attache case. Rapadas protested pointing to the fact that other co-passengers were permitted to handcarry bulkier baggages. He stepped out of the line only to go back again at the end of it to try if he can get through without having to register his attache case. However, the same man in charge of handcarry control did not fail to notice him and ordered him again to register his baggage. For fear that he would miss the plane if he insisted and argued on personally taking the valise with him, he acceded to checking it in. He then gave his attache case to his brother who happened to be around and who checked it in for him, but without declaring its contents or the value of its contents. He was given a Baggage Claim Tag P-749-713. Upon arriving in Manila on the same date, 16 January 1975, Rapadas claimed and was given all his checked-in baggages except the attache case. Since Rapadas felt ill

on his arrival, he sent his son, Jorge Rapadas to request for the search of the missing luggage. PanAm exerted efforts to locate the luggage through the Pan American World Airways-Manila International Airport (PAN AM-MIA) Baggage Service. On 30 January 1975, PanAm required the Rapadas to put the request in writing. Rapadas filled in a Baggage Claim Blank Form. Thereafter, Rapadas personally followed up his claim. For several times, he called up Mr. Panuelos, the head of the Baggage Section of PAN AM. He also sent letters demanding and reminding the petitioner of his claim. Rapadas received a letter from PanAm’s counsel dated 2 August 1975 offering to settle the claim for the sum of $160.00 representing PanAm’s alleged limit of liability for loss or damage to a passenger’s personal property under the contract of carriage between Rapadas and PANAM.

Refusing to accept this kind of settlement, Rapadas filed the instant action for damages on 1 October 1975. Rapadas alleged that PanAm discriminated or singled him out in ordering that his luggage be checked in. He also alleged that PanAm neglected its duty in the handling and safekeeping of his attache case from the point of embarkation in Guam to his destination in Manila. He placed the value of the lost attache case and its contents at US$42,403.90. According to him, the loss resulted in his failure to pay certain monetary obligations, failure to remit money sent through him to relatives, inability to enjoy the fruits of his retirement and vacation pay earned from working in Tonga Construction Company (he retired in August 1974) and inability to return to Tonga to comply with then existing contracts. The lower court ruled in favor of complainant Rapadas after finding no stipulation giving notice to the baggage liability limitation. The court rejected the claim of PanAm that its liability under the terms of the passenger ticket is only up to $160.00. However, it scrutinized all the claims of Rapadas. It

discredited insufficient evidence to show discriminatory acts or bad faith on the part of PanAm. The trial court ordered PanAm to pay Rapadas by way of actual damages the equivalent peso value of the amount of $5,228.90 and 100 paengs (Tongan money), nominal damages in the amount of P20,000.00 and attorney’s fees of P5,000.00, and the costs of the suit. The trial court also dismissed PanAm’s counterclaim.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision. Hence, the petition for review.

The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court ordered PanAm to pay Rapadas damages in the amount of US$400.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency at the time of actual payment, P10,000.00 in attorney’s fees, and costs of the suit.

Cathay Pacific Airways vs. CA (1993)

Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification that of the trial court by increasing the award of damages in favor of private respondent Tomas L. Alcantara.

Facts: On 19 October 1975, respondent Tomas L. Alcantara was a first class passenger of petitioner Cathay Pacific Airways from Manila to Hongkong and onward from Hongkong to Jakarta. The purpose of his trip was to attend the following day, October 20, 1975, a conference with the Director General of Trade of Indonesia. He checked in his luggage which contained not only his clothing and articles for personal use but also papers and documents he needed for the conference.

Upon his arrival in Jakarta, respondent discovered that his luggage was missing. Private respondent was told that his luggage was left behind in Hongkong. For this, respondent Alcantara was offered $20.00 as "inconvenience money" to buy his immediate personal needs until the luggage could be delivered to him. The respondent, as a result of the incident had to seek postponement of his pre-arranged conference.

When his luggage finally reached Jakarta more than twenty four hours later, it was not delivered to him at his hotel but was required by petitioner to be picked up by an official of the Philippine Embassy.

Respondent filed a case for damages in the CFI of Lanao del Norte which ruled in his favour.

Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming the decision of the CFI but by modifying its awards by increasing the damages.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not applying the Warsaw Convention to limit the liability of the respondent airline.

Ruling: No.

xxx… although the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country, being a treaty commitment assumed by the Philippine government, said convention does not operate as an exclusive enumeration of the instances for declaring a carrier liable for breach of contract of carriage or as an absolute limit of the extent of that liability. The Warsaw Convention declares the carrier liable for damages in the enumerated cases and under certain

limitations. However, it must not be construed to preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. It does not regulate, much less exempt, the carrier from liability for damages for violating the rights of its passengers under the contract of carriage, especially if wilfull misconduct on the part of the carrier's employees is found or established, which is clearly the case before Us. For, the Warsaw Convention itself provides in Art. 25 that —

"(1) The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his wilfull misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance with the law of the court to which the case is submitted, is considered to be equivalent to wilfull misconduct."

(2) Similarly the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the said provisions, if the damage is caused under the same circumstances by any agent of the carrier acting within the scope of his employment."

When petitioner airline misplaced respondent's luggage and failed to deliver it to its passenger at the appointed place and time, some special species of injury must have been caused to him. For sure, the latter underwent profound distress and anxiety, and the fear of losing the opportunity to fulfill the purpose of his trip. In fact, for want of appropriate clothings for the occasion brought about by the delay of the arrival of his luggage, to his embarrassment and consternation respondent Alcantara had to seek postponement of his pre-arranged conference with the Director General of Trade of the host country.

In one case, his Court observed that a traveller would naturally suffer mental anguish, anxiety and shock when he finds that his

luggage did not travel with him and he finds himself in a foreign land without any article of clothing other than what he has on.

Thus, respondent is entitled to moral and exemplary damages. We however find the award by the Court of Appeals of P80,000.00 for moral damages excessive, hence, We reduce the amount to P30,000.00. The exemplary damages of P20,000.00 being reasonable is maintained, as well as the attorney's fees of P25,000.00 considering that petitioner's act or omission has compelled Alcantara to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest.

LUFTHANSA GERMAN AIRLINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL

G.R. NO. 83612; NOVEMBER 24, 1994DIGEST NO. 12

Facts: On September 17, 1984, Lufthansa, through SGV, issued ticket for Antiporda's confirmed flights to Malawi, Africa. Thus, on September 25, 1984, Antiporda took the Lufthansa flight to Singapore from where he proceeded to Bombay on board the same airline. He arrived in Bombay as scheduled and waited at the transit area of the airport for his connecting flight to Nairobi which was, per schedule given him by Lufthansa, to leave Bombay in the morning of September 26, 1984. Finding no representative of Lufthansa waiting for him at the gate, Antiporda was able to get in touch with Lufthansa, through the help of Air India. Ten minutes later, Gerard Matias, Lufthansa's traffic officer, arrived, asked for Antiporda's ticket and told him to just sit down and wait. Matias returned with one Leslie Benent, duty officer of Lufthansa, who informed Antiporda that his seat in Air Kenya Flight 203 to Nairobi had been given to a very important person of Bombay who was attending a religious function in Nairobi. Antiporda protested, stressing that he had an important professional engagement in Blantyre, Malawi. He requested that the situation be remedied but Air Kenya Flight 203 left for Nairobi without him on board. Stranded in Bombay, Antiporda was booked for Nairobi via Addis Ababa only on

September 27, 1984. He finally arrived in Blantyre at 9:00 o'clock in the evening of September 28, 1984, days late for his appointment with people from the institution he was to work with in Malawi.

Antiporda's counsel wrote the general manager of Lufthansa in Manila demanding damages for the airline's malicious, wanton, disregard of the contract of carriage. Apparently getting no positive action from Lufthansa, he filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint against Lufthansa which the trial court in its decision favored Antiporda.

Lufthansa elevated the case to the Court of Appeals arguing that it cannot be held liable for the acts committed by Air Kenya on the basis of that they merely acted as a ticket-issuing agent in behalf of Air Kenya; consequently the contract of carriage entered into is between respondent Antiporda and Air Kenya, to the exclusion of petitioner Lufthansa; under sections (1) and (2) Article 30 of the Warsaw Convention, an airline carrier is liable only to untoward occurrences on its own line.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision on the trial court. Failing to obtain a favorable decision, Lufthansa filed this petition for review on certiorari. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not Lufthansa is liable for damages in the case at bar.

Held: In light of the stipulations expressly specified in the ticket defining the true nature of its contract of carriage with Antiporda, Lufthansa cannot claim that its liability thereon ceased at Bombay Airport and thence, shifted to the various carriers that assumed the actual task of transporting said private respondent. We, therefore, reject Lufthansa's theory that from the time another carrier was engaged to transport Antiporda on another segment of his trip, it merely acted as a ticket-issuing agent in behalf of said carrier. In the very nature of their contract, Lufthansa is clearly the principal in the contract of carriage with Antiporda and remains to be so, regardless of those instances when actual carriage was to be performed by various carriers. The issuance of a confirmed Lufthansa ticket in favor of Antiporda covering his entire five-leg trip abroad successive carriers concretely attests to this. This also serves as proof that Lufthansa, in effect guaranteed that the successive

carriers, such as Air Kenya would honor his ticket; assure him of a space therein and transport him on a particular segment of his trip.

British Airways vs. CA (GR 121824, 29 January 1998) Third Division, Romero (J): 3 concur, 1 concur in result

Facts: On 16 April 1989, GOP Mahtani decided to visit his relatives in Bombay, India. In anticipation of his visit, he obtained the services of a certain Mr. Gumar to prepare his travel plans. The latter, in turn, purchased a ticket from British Airways (BA) where the following itinerary was indicated (Manila [MNL], PR 310Y, 16 April, 1730H, Status OK; Hongkong [HKG] BA 20M, 16 April, 2100H, Status OK; Bombay [BOM], BA 19M, 23 April, 0840H, Status OK; Hongkong [HKG], PR 311 Y; Manila [MNL].” Since BA had no direct flights from Manila to Bombay, Mahtani had to take a flight to Hongkong via Philippine Airlines (PAL), and upon arrival in Hongkong he had to take a connecting flight to Bombay on board BA. Prior to his departure, Mahtani checked in at the PAL counter in Manila his two pieces of luggage containing his clothings and personal effects, confident that upon reaching Hongkong, the same would be transferred to the BA flight bound for Bombay.Unfortunately, when Mahtani arrived in Bombay he discovered that his luggage was missing and that upon inquiry from the BA representatives, he was told that the same might have been diverted to London. After patiently waiting for his luggage for one week, BA finally advised him to file a claim by accomplishing the “Property Irregularity Report.”

Back in the Philippines, specifically on 11 June 1990, Mahtani filed his complaint for damages and attorney’s fees against BA and Mr. Gumar before the trial court (Civil Case CEB-9076). After appropriate proceedings and trial, on 4 March 1993, the trial court

rendered its decision in favor of Mahtani, ordering BA to pay Mahtani the sum of P7,000.00 for the value of the two (2) suit cases; US$400.00 representing the value of the contents of Mahtani’s luggage; P50,000.00 Pesos for moral and actual damages and 20% of the total amount imposed against BA for attorney’s fees and costs of the action. The Court dismissed BA’s third party complaint against PAL.

Dissatisfied, BA appealed to the Court of Appeals, which however, on 7 September 1995, affirmed the trial court’s findings in toto, with costs against BA. Hence, the appeal by certiorary.

The Supreme Court modified the decision of the Court of Appeals, reinstating the third-party complaint filed by British Airways dated 9 November 1990 against Philippine Airlines. No costs.

SAVELLANO v. NORTHWEST AIRLINES

2003 Jul 8 G. R. No. 151783

Facts:

Petitioners Victorino, Virginia and Deogracias, all surnamed Savellano, were on board Northwest Airlines Flight 27 bound for Manila when the pilot made an emergency landing in Seattle because of a fire which has started in one of plane’s engine. As a result, they were billeted at a hotel nearby and instructed that they can use the same boarding passes the next day. The family received a call, that midnight, advising them to be at the airport by 7:00 a.m. for their departure, thus making them skip breakfast. When petitioners reached the airport, they were belatedly advised that instead of flying to Manila they would have to board NW Flight bound to Los Angeles for a connecting flight to Manila. In Los Angeles, they found out that no flight was

posted bound for Manila, thus it was only after complaining that the flight was changed to include Manila. On arrival at the Manila airport, Col. Delfin teased the petitioners for taking the longer and tiresome route to the Philippines. Thus, they filed a complaint for damages because they suffered inconvenience, embarrassment, and humiliation for taking a longer route. The RTC ruled in favor of and granted moral damages to petitioners because they were excluded from the Seattle-Tokyo-Manila flight to accommodate several Japanese passengers for Japan. On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of the lower court and held that there was no basis for the award of moral damages finding no bad faith, negligence or malice in transporting petitioners via the Seattle-Los Angeles-Seoul-Manila route.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners are entitled to moral damages as a consequence of the breach by respondent airline of its air-carriage contract?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court was not convinced when petitioners imputed impute oppression, discrimination, recklessness and malevolence to respondent. There is no persuasive evidence that they were maliciously singled out to fly the Seattle-Los Angeles-Seoul-Manila route. It appears that the passengers of the distressed flight were randomly divided into two groups. One group was made to take the Tokyo-Manila flight; and the other, the Los Angeles-Seoul-Manila flight. The selection of who was to take which flight was handled via the computer reservation

system, which took into account only the passengers’ final destination.

The records show that respondent was impelled by sincere motives to get petitioners to their final destination by whatever was the most expeditious course -- in its judgment, if not in theirs. Though they claim that they were not accommodated on Flight 27 from Seattle to Tokyo because respondent had taken on Japanese passengers, petitioners failed to present convincing evidence to back this allegation. In the absence of convincing evidence, respondent could not be found guilty of bad faith.

Petitioners have failed to show convincingly that they were rerouted by respondent to Los Angeles and Seoul because of malice, profit motive or self-interest. Good faith is presumed, while bad faith is a matter of fact that needs to be proved by the party alleging it.

In the absence of bad faith, ill will, malice or wanton conduct, respondent cannot be held liable for moral damages. Article 2219 of the Civil Code enumerates the instances in which moral damages may be awarded. In a breach of contract, such damages are not awarded if the defendant is not shown to have acted fraudulently or with malice or bad faith. Insufficient to warrant the award of moral damages is the fact that complainants suffered economic hardship, or that they worried and experienced mental anxiety.

Philippine Airlines v. Savillo

Facts:

Savillo was a judge of the RTC of Iloilo

He was invited to participate in the 1993 ASEAN Seniors Annual Golf Tournament in Jakarta Indonesia.

So, in order to take part in such event, he purchased a ticket from PAL with the following itinerary: Manila-Singapore-Jakarta-Singapore-Manila.

PAL would take them from Manila to Signapore, while Singapore Airlines would take them from Singapore to Jakarta.

When they arrived in Singapore, Singapore Airlines rejected the tickets of Savillo because they were not endorsed by PAL. It was explained that if Singapore Airlines honoured the tickets without PALS’ endorsement, PAL would not pay Singapore Airlines for their passage.

Savillo demanded compensation from both PAL and Singapore Airlines, but his efforts were futile. He then sued PAL after 3 years, demanding moral damages.

PAL , in its MTD, claimed that the cause of action has already prescribed invoking the Warsaw Convention (providing for a 2 year prescriptive period). Both RTC and CA ruled against PAL.

Issues:

What is the applicable law, the Civil Code or the Warsaw Convention? Has the action prescribed?

Held:

The Civil Code is applicable. Therefore the action has not yet prescribed for the prescription period is 4 years.

If cause of action claims moral damages, not covered by Warsaw Convention. Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention provides for

liability on the part of a carrier for “damages occasioned by delay in the transportation by air of passengers, baggage or goods. Article 24 excludes other remedies by further providing that “(1) in the cases covered by articles 18 and 19, any action for damages, however founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in this convention.” Therefore, a claim covered by the Warsaw Convention can no longer be recovered under local law, if the statue of limitations of two years has elapsed.

Nevertheless, this Court notes that jurisprudence in the Philippines and the United States also recognizes that the Warsaw Convention does not “exclusively regulate” the relationship between passenger and carrier on an international flight.

In U.S. v. Uy, this Court distinguished between the (1) damage to the passenger’s baggage and (2) humiliation he suffered at the hands of the airline’s employees. The First cause of action was covered by the Warsaw Convention which prescribes in two years, while the second was covered by the provisions of the Civil Code on torts, which prescribes in four years.

In Mahaney v. Air France (US case), the court therein ruled that if the plaintiff were to claim damages based solely on the delay she experienced- for instance, the costs of renting a van, which she had to arrange on her own as a consequence of the delay the complaint would be barred by the two–year statute of limitations. However, where the plaintiff alleged that the airlines subjected her to unjust discrimination or undue or unreasonable preference or disadvantage, an act punishable under the US law, then the plaintiff may claim purely nominal compensatory damages for humiliation and hurt feelings, which are not provided for by the Warsaw Convention.

In the Petition at bar, Savillo’s Complaint alleged that both PAL and Singapore Airlines were guilty of gross negligence, which resulted in his being subjected to “humiliation, embarrassment, mental anguish, serious anxiety, fear and distress” therefore this case is not covered by the Warsaw Convention.

When the negligence happened before the performance of the contract of carriage, not covered by the Warsaw Convention. Also, this case is comparable to Lathigra v. British Airways. In that case, it was held that the airlines’ negligent act of reconfirming the passenger’s reservation days before departure and failing to inform the latter that the flight had already been discontinued is not among the acts covered by the Warsaw Convention, since the alleged negligence did not occur during the performance of the contract of carriage but, rather, days before the scheduled flight.

In the case at hand, Singapore Airlines barred Savillo from boarding the Singapore Airlines flight because PAL allegedly failed to endorse the tickets of private respondent and his companions, despite PAL’s assurances to Savillo that Singapore Airlines had already confirmed their passage. While this fact still needs to heard and established by adequate proof before the RTC, an action based on these allegations will not fall under the Warsaw Convention, since the purported negligence on the party of PAL did not occur during the performance of the contract of carriage but days before the scheduled flight. Thus, the present action cannot be dismissed based on the Statue of Limitations provided under Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention.