STIA-430

Professor Heyman

May 7th, 2007

Countering The Threat Posed

By MANPADS To

Commercial Aviation

By

Jeremy White

Terrorists have long been fascinated with attacking commercial airlines as they

represent symbols of what they perceive to be the opulent modernization of the western

world. However, beyond the theatrical value of downing planes, the airline industry also

accounts for a large part of the American economy. Travel and tourism are now the

largest industry in the world with US commercial airlines and their related businesses

bringing in over $150 billion in revenue last year and employing nearly 1.1 million

people.i Air travel is part of the backbone of American business with passengers in the

year 2000 taking over 600 million trips.ii Although it was short, the three-day air travel

suspension following the attacks of September 11th, 2001 had a significant impact upon

the airline industry as well as the US economy as whole from which it took over a year to

fully recover. While a considerable amount money has been invested to ensure the

internal security of planes, they remain incredibly vulnerable to external attacks from

shoulder fired missiles. More correctly known as MANPADS (Man-portable air-defense

systems), these missiles are widely available on the black market and are known to be in

the possession of terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda.

Currently, no commercial aircraft in the United States are equipped with

countermeasures to defend against MANPAD attacks. Over the forty-year history of their

use, these weapons have an alarmingly high probability of kill percentage upward of 70%

when fired at unprotected aircraft.iii It is no wonder then that while addressing the Asia-

Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, former Secretary of State Colin Powell warned

that “no threat is more serious to aviation” than MANPADS.iv The probability of such an

attack is extremely high with at least 27 terrorist groups having confirmed or suspected

possession of MANPADS. There have been at least ten attacks since 1994 targeting

commercial aircraft with four planes being downed including one in which the Presidents

of Rwanda and Burundi were traveling.v With the hardening of airport security and

terrorists’ lingering obsession with high profile attacks on airplanes, the chances of a

MANPAD attack being attempted in the near future is extremely high.

MANPAD Systems

MANPADS are very popular among terrorists because they are relatively cheap,

easily portable, simple to use, and inflict large amounts of damage. In its most basic

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form, a MANPAD consists of a missile packaged in a tube with a seeker head, a

launching mechanism known as the “gripstock,” and a battery. Weighing between thirty

and forty pounds, they are highly mobile and can be easily concealed. The typical missile

can be assembled and launched in as little as 30 seconds at targets flying anywhere up to

15,000 feet at a range of three-to-five miles.VI Traveling at a velocity of Mach-2, the time

between launch and detonation is approximately five seconds, giving any countermeasure

an extremely short window in which to be effective. While the factory-manufactured

shelf life of these weapons tends to be around 22 years, MANPADS as old as 28 have

been used effectively in terrorist attacks.vii

There are six different classifications of MANPAD technology in existence. First

generation infrared (IR) missiles are known as tail chase weapons as they pursue the

hottest thermal signature they detect, which typically is emitted by an aircraft’s exhaust.

These models can only be fired at their target from behind and are very susceptible to

interference from simple countermeasures such as flares. The most popular first

generation MANPADS currently in use are the American Redeye, the Chinese HN-5, and

the Soviet SA-7. These are the most likely shoulder fired missiles to be found within a

terrorist organization’s arsenal. Second generation models are slightly more sophisticated

using coolants to cool the seeker head enabling it to filter out interference from most

types of flares. These missiles are also capable of attacking their target from any angle.

They come in the form of the American Stinger, the Soviet SA-14, SA-16 and the

Chinese FN-6.viii Third and fourth generation MANPADS are essentially flare-proof and

can only be defended against using sophisticated laser systems, which will be discussed

later. The British have developed a CLOS missile system that uses radio waves to target

aircraft. While extremely hard to defend against, this weapon is unlikely to be used by

terrorists due to the high level of skill necessary to operate them.ix

Proliferation of MANPADS

According to the US State Department there are around twenty countries that over

the past forty years have produced around one million MANPADS.x The US Air Force

Counterproliferation Center conservatively estimates that around 6,000 of these weapons

are currently outside of the control of governments worldwide. The majority of the

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versions available on the black-market are low-tech first generation weapons that sell for

around $5,000 a piece.xi However, more sophisticated later generation models are known

to have sold for up to $250,000. Terrorists acquire these weapons through international

arms merchants such as Hemant Lakhani, a British citizen with Al-Qaeda connections

who was arrested in February 2003 for attempting to smuggle 50 MANPADS from

Russia into the United States.xii Three other arms dealers were similarly caught in 2005

trying to import 200 Russian SA-18 missiles into the US.xiii These examples serve as

undeniable proof that terrorists are actively and aggressively attempting to use MANPAD

technology to down aircraft on US soil.

Many sophisticated MANPADS have also ended up in terrorists’ hands as a result

of decades of US and Soviet involvement with rebel movements in their efforts to gain

the upper hand in the Cold War. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the CIA is

known to have provided Mujahideen fighters with approximately 1,000 Stinger missiles

in the mid-1980’s. The Mujahideen used the Stingers very effectively against Soviet

helicopters and have likely recently turned the leftover munitions against US forces

deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ironically, the US government was initially hesitant to

provide the Afghani’s with such dangerous weapons out of fear that they would one day

be turned against American forces. The CIA is also known to have delivered FIM-92A

Stingers to the UNITA rebels in Angola in order to aid in their overthrow of their pro-

communist government.xiv According to a recent report issued by the Government

Accountability Office (GAO), the Department of Defense (DOD) has failed to keep

accurate records of the quantity and destination of Stinger missiles sold oversees.xv A

similar event occurred in November, 2002 when the Russian government officially

admitted that “tens of thousands” of MANPADS had been stolen from its arsenal over the

years.xvi

Past Incidents of MANPAD Attacks

A report released by the Congressional Research Service in 2003 estimates that of

the 35 recorded attacks involving MANPADS being fired on civilian aircraft, 24 planes

were downed, killing over 500 people. However, the majority of these attacks were

against non-jet engine planes and helicopters. Overall there have been five reported

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MANPAD attacks on civilian jet-powered aircraft of which two resulted in mass

deaths.xvii While we have yet to see widespread use of MANPADS against large civilian

aircraft, the military has seen its planes come increasingly under attack. According to

General W. Handy, Combatant Commander of US Transportation Command during

Operation Iraqi Freedom, the threat to aircraft from MANPADS “is perhaps the greatest

threat we face anywhere in the world.”xviii From May 2003 to November 2003, there

were 19 attacks involving surface-to-air missiles in the vicinity of Baghdad International

Airport.xix During that time period, a Russian made SA-14 (a.k.a. Strela-3) struck a

Belgium-based DHL Airbus 300 cargo plane. While the pilots managed to avoid the other

missile that was fired, the one hit they sustained was enough to damage their left wing,

knock out the flight controls and disable all three hydraulic systems. The airplane’s crew

survived but the plane was damaged beyond repair.xx

On November 28th, 2002, Al-Qaeda attempted its first MANPAD attack on a

civilian aircraft when terrorists fired on a Boeing 757-300 owned by Israeli Arkia

Airlines. Al-Qaeda positioned two teams on each side of the runway as the Israeli airline

was taking off. Once the plane was in the air, the terrorists simultaneously fired Soviet

Strela-2M missiles at the plane carrying 261 passengers and 10 crew. Luckily, due to Al-

Qaeda’s inexperience with MANPADS at the time, the two missiles missed their target.

According to witnesses, the missiles were fired while the plane was barely 500 feet in the

air, which is well below the Strela-2M’s minimum target altitude of 800 meters.xxi

Unfortunately, Al-Qaeda is unlikely to make this mistake again and in the future will

likely use a more close range missile such as the Stinger, which can hit targets as low as

200 meters (660 feet).xxii

In the most recent high profile attack on a commercial airliner in 2006, a

congressional delegation from the House Armed Services Committee was targeted by a

Russian SA-18 missile, one of the most sophisticated MANPADS available.

Representatives Rob Simmons, Jeb Bradley, John Spratt and Neil Abercrombie were

traveling onboard a military C-130 transport plane on a trip from Baghdad to Kuwait

when the attack occurred. Fortunately, that particular C-130 was equipped with one of the

most sophisticated countermeasures systems currently on the market and was able to

deflect the incoming missile.xxiii This event is significant in that not only did it confirm

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that terrorists are in possession of later generation MANPADS but that the

countermeasure systems currently used by the military are capable of defending against

high-tech missiles.

The Potential Economic Impact of a MANPAD Attack

In 2005, the RAND Corporation published a detailed analysis of the economic

impact to the United States of a successful attack against a commercial airliner by a

MANPAD. The author’s of the study divided economic loss into three categories:

“immediate tangible losses from the attack, losses to travelers and airlines due to a shut

down of air travel, and losses to travelers and airlines due to a decline in demand for air

travel.”xxiv Using the recorded losses suffered by the airline industry during and after the

three-day suspension of air travel following the 9/11 terrorist attacks,gave RAND the

basis for its economic projections.i RAND Corporation, “Protecting Commercial Aviation Against the Should-Fired Missile Threat,” p.1ii Ibid.iii James Whitmire, “Shoulder Launched Missiles: The Ominous Threat To Commercial Aviation,” p.3iv Matt Schroeder, “MANPADS Proliferation,” p.1v James Whitmire, “Shoulder Launched Missiles: The Ominous Threat To Commercial Aviation,” p.4vi Ibid., p.11vii Ibid., p.11-12viii Ibid., p.13ix Ibid., p.14x US State Department, “The MANPADS Menace: Combating the Threat to Global Aviation from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems,” http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/53558.htmxi James Whitmire, “Shoulder Launched Missiles: The Ominous Threat To Commercial Aviation,” p.11xii Ibid., p.9xiii Ibid., p.30xiv Ibid., p.19xv GAO, “Further Improvements Needed in U.S. Efforts to Counter Threats from Man-Portable Air Defense,” May 13th, 2004xvi James Whitmire, “Shoulder Launched Missiles: The Ominous Threat To Commercial Aviation,” p.19xvii C. Bolkom, B. Elias, and A. Feickert, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress: Homeland Security: Protecting Airliners from Terrorist Missiles, 2003xviii James Whitmire, “Shoulder Launched Missiles: The Ominous Threat To Commercial Aviation,” p.5xix Ibid., p.6xx Ibid.xxi Ibid., p.5-6xxii Raytheon, Directory of US Military Rockets and Missiles: FIM-92 Stinger, http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-92.htmlxxiii James Whitmire, “Shoulder Launched Missiles: The Ominous Threat To Commercial Aviation,” p.5xxiv RAND Corporation, “Protecting Commercial Aviation Against the Should-Fired Missile Threat,” p.7

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Due to their large size and lack of maneuverability during take off and landing, it

is more than likely that a commercial aircraft would be damaged beyond the point of

repair if struck by a MANPAD. Depending on the model, the average large passenger

plane costs between $200 and $250 million dollars each and carry approximately 300

passengers per flight. While there is no generally accepted dollar amount that can be

assigned to the value of a human life, the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund made

an average death claim payment of around $2.1 million to the victim’s families based

upon calculated lifetime earning potential.xxv In the event that similar payments were

given to the families of those who died in a 300-person plane, the total would come to

$630 million. Combined with the additional loss of the plane, the total immediate

economic loss of a MANPAD attack on a fully loaded passenger plane would come to

approximately $880 million. Furthermore, insurance rates for airliners would likely

skyrocket immediately following the downing of a plane by a shoulder fired missile.

In the event of a successful MANPAD attack on a commercial airline, air traffic is

likely to remain suspended until the government can reasonably assure the American

people that it has taken measures to prevent additional airplanes from being targeted in

the future. Based upon data collected from the days immediately following the 9/11

attacks, RAND estimated that the combined consumer and producer losses from a one-

day suspension of air travel would be approximately $500 million. The net loss to the US

economy gets exponentially higher the longer the airline shutdown continues with

estimated losses of $3.4 billion for a one week suspension of air travel and $14 billion for

one month suspension.xxvi

If the American people’s reaction to a future attack on the airline industry mirrors

their behavior following 9/11, we can expect that a shutdown of one day will likely

reduce the number of people flying by 10% over the following two weeks. RAND

predicted that a one week suspension would likely lead to a decrease in air travel by 15%

for the subsequent six month period following the attack. A month long shut down is

predicted to reduce the airlines’ business by nearly 25% over an 18-month period.xxvii

9/11 taught us that despite additional security measures being put in place to counter the

xxv Ibid.xxvi Ibid., p.9xxvii Ibid.

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threat, the memory of the attack still lingered in the public’s mind causing air travel to

decline by 8% over the following year and resulting in 14% of airline workers losing

their jobs.xxviii RAND estimates that if the government were made fully aware of the

potential damage that a MANPAD attack could have on the America economy that it

would be more willing to pay $12 billion to avoid an incident that would negatively

impact the airline industry for over 6 months and $50 billion to avoid an attack that

would reduce air travel for over a year and a half.xxix

Countermeasure Systems

There are essentially three main categories of countermeasures to MANPADS:

flares, laser jammers, and high-energy lasers (HELs). The first two of these

countermeasures act to confuse the seeker heads on missiles in order to cause them to

miss their target. These systems are currently deployed on a limited number of military

aircraft. Various countermeasure systems employing high-energy lasers are currently

under development, but none have yet to be deployed in the field. These sophisticated

systems hope to surpass other countermeasures by actually destroying missiles in flight.

Flares:

Flares are the most basic type of MANPAD countermeasure. The different types

of flares are broken down into three categories based on their level of sophistication:

conventional, advanced, and covert. Conventional flares were originally designed to

counter first and some second generation infrared (IR) missiles. After being deployed,

these flares are designed to produce a stronger IR signature than the targeted aircraft so

that the seeker head on the MANPAD will choose to lock onto the flare rather than the

plane.xxx The flares are deployed automatically after an onboard optical or radar sensor

detects an incoming projectile. Although effective against some older MANPADS, most

second and third generation shoulder fired missiles can distinguish between flares and

planes due to their flight pattern, spectral properties and heat intensity. More advanced

flares attempt to counter the missile’s power of discrimination by employing a cocktail of

xxviii Ibid.xxix Ibid.xxx James Whitmire, “Shoulder Launched Missiles: The Ominous Threat To Commercial Aviation,” p.40

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flares, which all burn at different temperatures emitting a variety of light wavelengths.

The version of these flares considered best suited for use at commercial airports are

known as covert flares due to their low probability of starting ground fires and their lack

of apparent visibility.xxxi

Although flares have proven to be an effective countermeasure in the past, the

weapon systems being employed by terrorists today are becoming increasingly more

sophisticated. For example, even the most advanced flares are completely useless against

laser beam riders that target a laser spot fixed on an aircraft by a human operator. They

are similarly ineffective against radio frequency command-guided missiles, such as the

British Blowpipe.xxxii While flares are a relatively cheap countermeasure that is currently

available for deployment, they are not a cost effective choice as terrorists could easily

render them ineffective by simply purchasing more advanced MANPADS.

Laser Jammers:

Newly available for deployment, laser jammers have proven effective against

both first and second generation MANPADS. Formally known as directed infrared

countermeasures (DIRCM), laser jammers work by overloading the signal emitted by a

missile’s seeker head and then replaces that signal with a modulated one that diverts the

missile off course and away from its target.xxxiii These systems are mounted on a

moveable turret located on the hull of the aircraft. After a missile launch is detected by

the plane’s onboard tracking system, optical sensors are used to direct the laser mounted

turret so that it may quickly make contact with the missile’s seeker head. Some of the

more advanced systems are “threat adaptive” meaning that they can identify the type of

incoming missile and reprogram the codes contained within their laser beams to

specifically target that model missile. Laser jamming systems are now deployed on

approximately 300 military aircraft flying in hazardous airspace, such as Baghdad.

Northrop Grumman and BAE systems are currently the top developers of DIRCM

technology in the United States.xxxiv

xxxi Ibid., p.41xxxii RAND Corporation, “Protecting Commercial Aviation Against the Should-Fired Missile Threat,” p.18xxxiii Ibid., p.19xxxiv James Whitmire, “Shoulder Launched Missiles: The Ominous Threat To Commercial Aviation,” p.42

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Laser jammers are however not without their downsides. Just like with flares,

DIRCM systems are ineffective against laser beam riders, radio frequency guided

missiles and focal plane imaging IR seekers.xxxv There is also a potential for false alarms,

which can be triggered by a few natural and manmade sources such as “high-intensity

lamps, aircraft afterburners, corona discharges, and lightening.”xxxvi While not very

likely, there is also a slight chance that the system could fire its laser at other objects

besides MANPADS and possibly blind people on the ground. However, it is important to

note that while there is a potential risk of blindness that the US Air Force has not

experienced any eye safety malfunctions with the laser jamming systems currently in

use.xxxvii The high cost of installing and maintaining these systems on board all

commercial aircraft is another potential downside that will be addressed later in detail.

High-Energy Lasers:

High-Energy lasers (HELs) are ground-based systems that seek to destroy all

incoming artillery ranging from shells to missiles. Northrop Grumman’s Hornet system is

the first HEL system to be designed to protect commercial airports. The system has

essentially three components: a radar system to establish vectors currently occupied by

friendly aircraft, an infrared search and track system (IRST), and a megawatt-class

deuterium fluoride chemical laser weapon.”xxxviii Northrop Grumman claims that its

Hornet system has the capability to defend a designated area from up to three missiles at

once at a range of up to five kilometers. In order to cover the area of a large airport such

as Reagan National, up to three of these systems would be required.xxxix Perhaps the

greatest advantage of employing high-energy lasers to defend airports is that once the

system is properly developed, it will be capable of countering every current and future

model of MANPAD. However, the best estimates claim that the start of HEL production

is at least two to three years away.xl

xxxv Ibid.xxxvi RAND Corporation, “Protecting Commercial Aviation Against the Should-Fired Missile Threat,” p.20xxxvii Ibid., p.19xxxviii Ibid., p.21xxxix Ibid.xl Ibid., p.22

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HEL systems present many of the same dangers as laser jammers. There is always

the possibility that the targeting system may malfunction and accidentally blind a

passenger onboard a plane or perhaps someone on the ground. However, systems such as

the Hornet present a much greater risk as a technical malfunction could lead to the

accidental destruction of a civilian aircraft. Since the time between launch and detonation

of a MANPAD is only a few seconds, it is not possible for these systems to have a human

failsafe component. It is thus absolutely necessary for the HEL and laser jamming

systems to be completely automated, increasing the chances of friendly fire. Another

concern with both these systems involves whether or not the technology involved can be

safety shared and exported to other countries. Sensor processing algorithms, laser jam

codes, and HEL systems are considered classified technology, which could be dangerous

in the wrong hands.xli It will fall to policymakers to decide whether protecting American

aircraft abroad is worth the price of sharing this sensitive technology.

Estimated Costs of Countermeasures

According to the aforementioned RAND study, there are 6,800 unprotected

commercial aircraft currently operating over the United States.xlii It has been suggested

that in order to guarantee the safety of these planes that America must follow the Israeli

example and begin to equip all commercial aircraft with some form of laser jamming

system. RAND estimates that the cost of a total fleet installation would come to $11.2

billion over four years.xliii The cumulative average unit production cost (AUPC) is

estimated to be $1.3 million. In addition to the cost of installation, RAND further predicts

that the added operating and support cost per airplane would be $300,000 a year, which

would ultimately cost the airline industry a total of $2.1 billion a year in addition to the

upkeep on the planes themselves. Airlines would also likely have to spend around

$45,000 more a year per aircraft on fuel, as the laser jamming systems are predicted to

increase a plane’s drag by 0.4%.xliv Maintenance on these complex countermeasure

systems would also be likely to lead to an increase in late departures. According to

xli Ibid.xlii Ibid., p.23xliii Ibid., p.25xliv Ibid., p.26

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RAND, the revenue loss for each hour of delayed departure is $10,000, which with the

estimated repair time of 30 minutes for short haul flights would likely lead to a net loss of

$400 million across the airline industry over the course of a year.xlv

Cheaper Countermeasure Alternatives

Since neither the airline industry nor the Federal government appears willing to

foot the bill for retrofitting all US commercial aircraft with laser jamming systems, a

more cost effective countermeasure is required. Instead of installing countermeasures on

each individual aircraft, it would be much cheaper for airports to install systems that

protect all planes in their vicinity. As aircraft are only vulnerable to MANPAD attacks in

the 10 to 15 minute period during takeoff and landing, they only logically need to have

active countermeasures in place when they are in the vicinity of an airport. There are two

different systems currently under development that could perform this function at a

relatively minor cost.

Raytheon’s Vigilant Eagle is a ground based airfield defense system that uses

microwave energy to counter surface-to-air missiles. According to Raytheon, “Vigilant

Eagle uses a simple technique of illuminating the missile body with electromagnetic

energy tailored to divert the missile thus providing a dome of protection around airports,

protecting all aircraft during the most critical phases of flight.”xlvi The system is

comprised of three interconnected primary components: “a distributed missile detect and

track subsystem (MDT), a command and control system, and the Active Electronically

Scanned Array (AESA), which consists of a billboard-size array of highly efficient

antennas linked to solid-state amplifiers that provide the beam that diverts the

missile.”xlvii Vigilant Eagle has a much lower false alarm rate than other systems as each

missile detection is confirmed by two other sensors in an overlapping grid. The command

and control system is also capable of instantly pinpointing the location of a missile launch

and can quickly communicate this information to law enforcement officials as a result of

its interoperability with civilian communication systems.xlviii

According to Raytheon, Vigilant Eagle has proven itself to be both safe and

effective in the field. The electromagnetic fields transmitted by Vigilant Eagle are

xlv Ibid., p.27

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reported to be well within Occupational Safety and Health Administration Standards for

human exposure and do not interfere with aircrafts’ electronic systems.xlix The multiple

sensors used to detect the presence of a missile further decrease the chances that the

system will accidentally fire at a friendly target. In addition to its proven field

effectiveness and superior safety, Vigilant Eagle is considerably cheaper to install and

maintain than many other countermeasure systems. The US Air Force estimates that if

Vigilant Eagle were installed at 53 of the nation’s busiest airports that it would be

capable of protecting 84% of aircraft in the United States. Raytheon estimated that each

system would cost $25 million to install, which would come to $1.325 billion for their

initial installation.l According to RAND, this is only slightly more than the immediate

costs ($880 million) associated with the downing of one large aircraft.li

The other system under consideration is known as Project Chloe, named after a

character on the popular television thriller, 24. The Chloe system is composed of a

combination of proven technologies incorporating Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)

retrofitted with Northrop Grumman’s Guardian anti-missile system. The Guardian system

is currently in its third phase of testing for use on commercial aircraft. The Nemesis

system upon which Guardian is based is currently operationally deployed on U.S. Air

Force and Special Operation Forces aircraft.lii Guardian is a laser jamming system that is

comprised of an external pod attached to the underbelly of an aircraft that scans in all

directions for incoming missiles. Once an incoming missile is detected, the system’s

turret quickly fires a laser at the munitions guidance system, forcing it off course.liii The

Chloe system would have the advantage of being able to protect an area much larger than

that of a ground-based system. The idea behind using UAV’s as a MANPAD

countermeasure involves them patrolling the airfield from an altitude of 60,000 to 65,000

xlvi Raytheon, Vigilant Eagle Airport Protection System, p.1xlvii GlobalSecurity.org, “Raytheon to Demonstrate Aircraft Protection System Under DHS Contract, October 23rd, 2006xlviii Raytheon, Vigilant Eagle Airport Protection System, p.1xlix Ibid., p.1-2l James Whitmire, “Shoulder Launched Missiles: The Ominous Threat To Commercial Aviation,” p.49-50li RAND Corporation, “Protecting Commercial Aviation Against the Should-Fired Missile Threat,” p.7lii Mathew Johnson, “Cost and Issue as S&T Readies to Test Aircraft Protection Drones,” in Congressional Quarterly, April 20th, 2007liii Ibid.

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feet, which will allow them to protect aircraft during all stages of landing and takeoff,

while remaining well above the flight deck of commercial aircraft.liv According to the

DHS Undersecretary for Science & Technology, Jay Cohen, a higher powered laser will

likely be needed for the UAV mounted systems than what was envisioned for use by

commercial aircraft because of the high altitude at which they operate.lv

According to project manager, Kerry Wilson, testing of UAV’s for missile

defense is slated to begin late this summer and finish in the early fall. If the Chloe system

proves successful, it would represent the most cost-effective countermeasure. The UAV

platform that will be used has yet to be determined, but the choice is between General

Atomics Predator B drone and Northrop Grumman’s Global Hawk. The cost of equipping

a UAV with a Guardian laser system will be about $1 million per unit. While the Global

Hawk is capable of flying at higher altitudes (60,000 feet), they carry an expensive price

tag starting at $20.3 million. The Predator B is comparatively cheaper at $9 million each.

If the Predator B can be modified to fly above its current maximum altitude of 50,000

feet, it is likely to be chosen as the favored platform.lvi If the Chloe system were selected

to protect the same 53 busiest airports that Northrop Grumman recommended its Vigilant

Eagle be used in, then the total cost of installation would come to $1.06 billion. This

calculation assumes that the Guardian is attached to a Predator B and that each airport

purchases two UAV’s to be used one at time. The cost of installing the Chloe system

would thus be $265 million less than Vigilant Eagle.

Consequence Mitigation

In the event that terrorists do successfully perpetrate a MANPAD attack against a

US aircraft, the government’s main priority should be restoring the public’s confidence in

the security of air travel. As was demonstrated earlier, the airline industry is an integral

part of the US economy representing billions of dollars in annual revenue and employing

over a million people. The US government must act as it did after the 9/11 attacks and be

seen taking visible steps to improve airport security. While external countermeasures

liv Ibid.lv Sharon Weinberger, “Drones vs. Missiles,” in Wired Magazine, March 7th, 2007lvi Mathew Johnson, “Cost and Issue as S&T Readies to Test Aircraft Protection Drones,” in Congressional Quarterly, April 20th, 2007

14

such as Chloe and Vigilant Eagle are capable of providing the necessary protection

against MANPADS, they are not visible enough to the public. Passengers need to be able

to see the heightened level of security as they do now during TSA screenings. This paper

thus recommends that in the immediate aftermath of a MANPAD attack that the US

government begin installing Guardian laser jammers on the hulls of all commercial

aircraft. Since the mass installation of these systems would likely take an extensive

amount of time to complete, aircraft waiting to be retrofitted should be provided with

decoy systems. This will be a necessary measure in order to offset the negative economic

ramifications of a long-term air travel shut down. It does not necessarily matter if it is

publicly known that some of the systems are decoys as their presence is still likely to

have a deterring effect as terrorists will not be able to spot which aircraft are vulnerable.

They will then likely try to find a different weakness in our security to exploit.

Conclusion & Recommendations

It is clear to everyone working in the security field that terrorists armed with

MANPADS represent one of the greatest threats to US national security. Since 9/11, the

security within airports, while not perfect, has become a major deterrence to terrorists

attempting to attack aircraft internally. Having a propensity for soft targets, terrorists

have now focused their attention to attacking planes from the outside where they can do

an equal amount of damage as any shoe bomber. Whatever countermeasure the

government chooses to invest in needs to be implemented as soon as possible. Attacks on

aircraft employing MANPADS are on the rise; especially in Iraq where more and more

terrorists are becoming skilled operators of shoulder fired missiles. In addition to relying

on technology to defend the homeland, efforts to locate and destroy the many thousands

of MANPADS being exchanged on the international black market must be doubled.

Additionally, the US government and its allies must develop a better system for

safeguarding the tens of thousands of dangerous weapons in their arsenals in order to

prevent them from falling into the wrong hands.

While effective countermeasures are rather expensive, if policymakers were to

look at the economic data pertaining to the consequences of a successful MANPAD

attack in the United States, they would clearly see that the cost of doing nothing far

15

outweighs a small investment in better security. The necessary technology currently

exists to counter the MANPAD threat, which can now be done in a cost effective manner.

It is the conclusion of this paper that the Chloe system employing UAV’s equipped with

the Guardian laser jammer is the best choice for defending America’s airports. The

technology involved in Project Chloe has already been developed and proven effective in

the field. UAV’s can also cover a much larger area than ground-based systems, which

will be especially important for bigger airports such as JFK or Reagan. Although the

Vigilant Eagle system is likely to have fewer false alarms due to its multiple independent

sensors, the Chloe system is simply more cost effective. Just as the 9/11 commission

recommended, we must start to make better use of our imaginations when it comes to

homeland security. Taking proactive steps now to protect commercial aviation will likely

save us from potential economic disaster and could possibly deter terrorists from

attempting MANPAD attacks in the future.

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Bibliography

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