managing across jurisdictional boundaries: fishery ...csis.msu.edu/sites/csis.msu.edu/files/gaden...

941

*Corresponding author: [email protected]

Managing Across Jurisdictional Boundaries: Fishery Governance in the Great Lakes and

Arctic-Yukon-Kuskokwim Regions

Marc Gaden*, charles c. KrueGer, and christopher i. GoddardGreat Lakes Fishery Commission

2100 Commonwealth Boulevard, Suite 100, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48105, USA

American Fisheries Society Symposium 70:941–960, 2009 © 2009 by the American Fisheries Society

Abstract.—Jurisdictional boundaries add a layer of complexity to the already dif-ficult task of managing fisheries. This paper outlines the challenges of cross-border management in the Great Lakes of North America and the Arctic-Yukon-Kuskokwim (AYK) region of Alaska and Yukon Territory and discusses the role of governance re-gimes established to facilitate fishery management in those regions. Management of the multi-jurisdictional Great Lakes fishery occurs without direct federal oversight. Eight Great Lakes states, the province of Ontario, and several U.S. tribes manage the sport, commercial, and subsistence fisheries within their jurisdiction, though the Ca-nadian and U.S. federal governments make important contributions as well. To help in the development of shared fishery policies, the nonfederal jurisdictions, with the support of the federal agencies and the binational Great Lakes Fishery Commission, signed A Joint Strategic Plan for Management of Great Lakes Fisheries, a voluntary, consensus-based agreement. Similar to the Great Lakes, political diffusion is also a characteristic of management of salmon in the AYK region. AYK fishery man-agement must consider state, federal, provincial, territorial, and international treaty jurisdictions. Different from the Great Lakes, federal involvement is much greater in the AYK region because of abundant federal lands combined with federal legislation (e.g., Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980) and the presence of international waters and treaties. Based on lessons from the Great Lakes, a pathway to increasing cooperation and effectiveness of AYK salmon management includes: identification of common interests; adoption of shared goals; information sharing; building of relationships among agencies and individuals; and use of consensus deci-sion-making and accountability mechanisms. Connecting all of the agencies affecting the salmon life cycle and fisheries in the AYK region through an appropriate forum or institution would enhance cooperative and effective AYK salmon management.

Introduction

Great Lakes fishery management oc-curs in a unique setting as nonfederal gov-ernments—the eight Great Lakes states, the province of Ontario, and the U.S. tribes—

have primary management authority, despite the international border that runs through four of the five lakes. Federal waters do not exist in the Great Lakes basin because state and pro-vincial boundaries extend to the international border or, in the case of Lake Michigan, to the center of the lake (Piper 1967). The non-

942 Gaden et al.

federal governments have maintained or at-tained authority over the fish in their waters.

The Great Lakes ecosystem is biological-ly complex and fish routinely transcend the basin’s many political borders. With so many management agencies present—and with each having independent authority to man-age the fishery resources in its waters—some level of cooperation was needed if manage-ment policies were to be more consistent with the needs of a lake or the Great Lakes basin as a whole. Multi-jurisdictional coop-eration allows fishery managers to leverage each others’ resources, better understand all available information, and undertake fishery management on a lake-wide or basin-wide level. Cooperation also prevents agencies from working at cross purposes or undermin-ing each others’ initiatives.

With no overarching authority to com-pel the jurisdictions to institute basin-wide or even harmonized management policies and with a strong interest in protecting their fishery management authority against fed-eral encroachment, the Great Lakes juris-dictions engaged in parochial and uncoop-erative behavior that lasted from the time of European settlement until the mid-20th cen-tury. Parochialism began to fade in the mid-1960s with the establishment of cooperative “lake committees”—committees where the federal, provincial, state, and tribal jurisdic-tions could share information and under-stand each others’ activities. Cooperation became more strategic with the signing in 1981 of A Joint Strategic Plan for Manage-ment of Great Lakes Fisheries, a nonbinding agreement that formalized the relationships among the jurisdictions and committed the participants to develop shared management objectives and fishery plans. The Joint Stra-tegic Plan remains the governance institu-tion that the jurisdictions use to coordinate their shared actions. The Joint Strategic Plan reflects a self-organization among the nonfederal jurisdictions, but also allows for

the federal governments and the bi-national Great Lakes Fishery Commission to partici-pate in the process. The commission, being the only bi-national fishery agency on the lakes, facilitates the plan’s implementation but does not possess the authority to compel the jurisdictions to behave in any particular way.

Fishery governance over Pacific salmon Oncorhynchus spp. in the Arctic-Yukon-Kuskokwim (AYK) region of Alaska and Yukon Territory illustrates similar challenges to those experienced in the Great Lakes re-gion. The AYK region includes the drainages of the Kuskokwim and Yukon rivers, as well as streams and rivers in the Norton Sound area of Alaska, although the salmon of this region move well beyond these borders into international marine waters. The State of Alaska, the United States, and Canada pro-vide a mosaic of management jurisdictions across which salmon must travel. Further, sub-adult salmon in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific likely use international waters or the waters of other countries (e.g., Rus-sia) as ocean feeding grounds. Management authority is complex and includes the State of Alaska, the U.S. federal departments of Interior and Commerce, and the Canadian federal government through the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. Bi-national issues concerning Yukon River salmon are managed by the Yukon River Panel through the Pacific Salmon Treaty between the United States and Canada. Multi-lateral management in international waters is the responsibility of the North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commis-sion. All jurisdictions share a common goal of managing for sustainable salmon fisheries. Different from the Great Lakes, however, is that subsistence fisheries for rural residents uniformly have priority over other fisheries in the State of Alaska and Yukon Territory.

In contrast to the Great Lakes, where the jurisdictions are organized through the Joint Strategic Plan, jurisdictions in the AYK re-

943Fishery Governance is the Great Lakes and AYK Regions

gion have not self-organized. Consequently, governance in the AYK region continues largely in an uncoordinated fashion, without the jurisdictions having a forum to seek con-sensus, develop shared objectives, and ex-change information. Some coordination does occur within drainages such as the Yukon River, but formal connections to governance of marine waters does not exist. This paper provides a short overview of jurisdictional authority in the Great Lakes region, presents a brief history of the evolution of cooperation in Great Lakes fishery management, and dis-cusses the regime—the Joint Strategic Plan—under which the jurisdictions cooperate. This paper also compares fishery governance in the Great Lakes region to governance in AYK region, identifies the important lessons from the Great Lakes regime, and suggests some potential applications of these lessons to AYK salmon management.

Fishery Management Authorities of

the Great Lakes Basin

Three levels of government are involved in Great Lakes fishery governance: (1) The nonfederal governments (states, the Province of Ontario, and the two U.S. intertribal agen-cies); (2) the U.S and Canadian federal gov-ernments; and (3) the bi-national Great Lakes Fishery Commission. Combined, fourteen jurisdictions—and many more agencies and departments within those jurisdictions—have some role in the Great Lakes fishery, though the nonfederal agencies have primary man-agement authority; the authority to regulate harvest, stock fish, and enforce fishery reg-ulations. Despite the large number of juris-dictions, the role of each type of jurisdiction is defined, accepted, and respected, and the management authorities tend to complement, not contradict or duplicate, each other (Fig-ure 1). Together, the bi-national, federal, and nonfederal management agencies approach

the Great Lakes from the same general per-spective and with the same goals in mind:

• Using science-based information as an in-put to management decisions;

• Sustaining Great Lakes fish stocks; Protect-ing biological diversity; Promoting balance between predators and prey; and

• Balancing the interests of stakeholders, in-cluding those of sport, commercial, and tribal fisheries, the environmental community, and many others.

Provincial, state, and tribal management authority

Primary management authority rests with the states, the Province of Ontario, and two U.S. intertribal agencies. This nonfederal management authority is found in constitu-tions and common law, and was recognized long ago by courts and tradition. Provinces own the fish in their inland waters, though the British North America Act (the Canadian Constitution) makes management somewhat confusing by suggesting that inland fish-ery management authority rests with both the provinces and the federal government (Ollivier 1962; Thompson 1974). To work through this awkward situation, Ontario and the federal government have established a working arrangement whereby Ontario de-velops fishery conservation regulations and then refers these regulations to the federal government for incorporation into the On-tario Fisheries Regulations under the federal Fisheries Act. The province of Ontario then implements the regulations (Dochoda 1999; Gibson 1973; Lamb and Lybecker 1999; Pip-er 1967; Rideout and Ritter 2002; Thompson 1974). Commercial fishing harvest in the Ca-nadian waters of the Great Lakes is regulated by individual transferable quotas. Such regu-lations are strictly a property issue and, there-

944 Gaden et al.

fore do not require federal approval (Brown et al. 1999).

Canadian First Nations do not have direct management authority in their treaty waters, as courts have ruled provincial and federal regulations do not inherently deny tribal ac-cess to fish. In the 1990 case R. v. Sparrow (R. v. Sparrow 1990), the court, while explicitly recognizing and affirming Aboriginal treaty rights, nevertheless held that fishing regula-tions were established to manage fisheries, not to limit Aboriginal rights, and that fed-eral regulatory authorities to manage fisher-

ies were valid. In the Canadian waters of the Great Lakes, Ontario manages on behalf of the First Nations, though the province negoti-ates fishery management agreements with the First Nations.

In the United States, the states and the tribes have a well-established authority to manage fish and wildlife, particularly the nonmigratory animals that remain entirely within their boundaries (Nielsen 1999; Piper 1967). While resource ownership and enu-merated powers define authority in Canada and in the United States, courts first couched,

Figure 1. Jurisdictional spheres of authority in Great Lakes fishery management (from Gaden 2007).


then abandoned authority based on ownership and instead derived authority mostly from enumerated powers. Over time, while states maintained their management authority, the federal government asserted its constitution-al powers to play a role in hitherto exclusive state fishery affairs. In the 1920 case Missouri v. Holland (Knaebel 1920), for instance, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a treaty—the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (USGPO 1918)—that intruded on state resource management authority; it ruled that because the constitu-tion granted treaty-making authority to the federal government, the federal power could supersede the state authority (Holmes 1920; Killian and Beck 1987; Knaebel 1920; Moore 1965; Willoughby 1979). The Missouri case did not deny the fundamental state right to manage resources, but rather it said that times can exist when the national interest is more important than a state interest (Willoughby 1979). Federal involvement in state fishery matters, however, is far from inherent and certainly neither absolute or exclusive. It is important to the nonfederal jurisdictions that the U.S. Constitution does not directly grant Congress the power to manage fisheries. The Tenth Amendment grants authorities not ex-pressly vested in the federal government to the states. Authority over fish, wildlife, and natural resources in state lands and waters is not an express power given to the federal government and, therefore, is retained by the states.

U.S. tribal authority is rooted in the 1832 Supreme Court decision Worcester v. Geor-gia (Peters [1832] 1901), where the court af-firmed that an Indian tribe is a political power with authority of self-governance (Cohen 1988). In the 1960s and 1970s, the tribes re-visited their still-valid treaties with the feder-al government and began to assert the fishing rights specified in those treaties; court cases affirmed those rights (Michigan Supreme Court 1971; Michigan Supreme Court 1976; U.S. Court of Appeals 1983; U.S. District

Court 1979). After those cases, tribal author-ity to issue licenses to their members would be protected and tribes would have the ability to block state regulations in the ceded waters, should tribes demonstrate the ability to regu-late their members effectively and uphold the state’s conservation goals (Busiahn 1985; Schlender (undated); Zorn 1989). Two U.S. intertribal authorities—the Chippewa-Otta-wa Resource Authority and the Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife Commission—exist in the Great Lakes basin to coordinate tribal fisheries management. Overall, tribal author-ity overlaps in many respects with state au-thority, as both states and tribes regulate har-vest, conduct assessment activities, enforce regulations, and undertake many similar day-to-day activities in the same waters.

On a day-to-day basis, the states, the Province of Ontario, and the two U.S. inter-tribal agencies exercise their fishery manage-ment authority by:

•Establishing and enforcing harvest reg-ulations;

•Issuing fishing licenses; •Stocking fish (primarily states though

some tribes as well); •Undertaking various fishery rehabilita-

tion initiatives; •Carrying out assessment activities; •Undertaking measures to protect habi-

tat; and •Protecting against the introduction of in-

vasive species.

Federal responsibilities

Even though the states, the province, and the two U.S. intertribal agencies retain pri-mary fishery management authority on the Great Lakes, the federal governments are also engaged in the process. Several federal agencies work with the nonfederal agencies to support fishery management. The federal agencies carry out sea lamprey control under

946 Gaden et al.

contract with the Great Lakes Fishery Com-mission; work to manage endangered species and restore locally extirpated native species (in consultation with the nonfederal authori-ties), most notably the lake trout Salvelinus namaycush and the lake sturgeon Acipenser fulvescens; contribute to the knowledge base by carrying out fish population assessment and other scientific research; negotiate bi-national agreements; support the common good through budget and other initiatives; protect and rehabilitate habitat; and have the trust responsibility toward tribes. Other fed-eral agencies not directly involved in fishery management are also involved in the overall management effort. For example, Environ-ment Canada, the U.S. Environmental Pro-tection Agency, and the binational Interna-tional Joint Commission implement laws and agreements to improve water quality in the Great Lakes.

Bi-national responsibilities

The two federal governments maintain a binational fishery agency on the Great Lakes—the Great Lakes Fishery Commis-sion. The commission was established by the 1955 Convention on Great Lakes Fish-eries—a treaty—though the commission’s management mandate is limited, largely because the states were reluctant to cede management authority to a bi-national body (Fetterolf 1980). The destructive sea lam-prey Petromyzon marinus, which invaded the lakes in the mid-20th century, prompted the state governments to consent to a bi-national fishery commission to address the basin-wide lamprey problem. The conven-tion granted sea lamprey management au-thority to the commission. The treaty also charged the commission with coordinating fisheries research on the Great Lakes and making recommendations to governments about fish stocks of common concern (U.S. Department of State 1956). Further, at the

request of the nonfederal governments, the commission facilitates the implementation of A Joint Strategic Plan for Management of Great Lakes Fisheries (GLFC 1997).

The Evolution of Cooperation and the

Great Lakes Joint Strategic Plan

The large number of government au-thorities in the Great Lakes basin, each with an independent right to manage its fisheries, resulted in incoherent policies. Said historian Margaret Beattie Bogue (2000):

“The divided jurisdiction over the fish-eries of the Great Lakes led to almost insur-mountable obstacles to conservation efforts. While partition does not always mean stale-mate, in this case the division of the waters hamstrung the state or provincial and national efforts to control the exploitation of the fish resource, a constraint recognized as increas-ingly important beginning in the 1870s as parts of the whole failed effort to find ways to control aggressive overfishing.”

Bogue’s history of Great Lakes fishing from 1833 to 1933, and data reports from the fishery assessments at the time, describe an era of rapidly depleting fish stocks caused by over-exploitation and a lack of political will to regulate (Bogue 2000; Cobb 1916; Hin-richs 1913; Joslyn 1905; Willoughby 1979). In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the many jurisdictions had differ-ing philosophies and willingness to conserve the resource. Each jurisdiction dealt with its own political mix of legislators and special interests; these interests usually thwarted fishery regulation (Bogue 2000; Willoughby 1979).

The frustration about political incoher-ence and the resulting fishery decay prompt-ed repeated attempts to coordinate policies and repeated calls for federal or binational pre-emption over nonfederal authority. Be-ginning in 1883 and continuing at a regular


pace for nearly 60 years, the jurisdictions convened no fewer than 27 international and interstate conferences, and the federal gov-ernments signed two binational treaties in an attempt to create a permanent mechanism for cooperative Great Lakes fishery manage-ment (Gallagher et al. 1942; Piper 1967). The states and province failed to cooperate pri-marily because they were unwilling to cede management authority to the federal govern-ments or to a binational institution (Fetterolf 1980); the nonfederal fishery managers were unable or unwilling to persuade their legis-latures to implement the recommendations of the many conferences and meetings (Gal-lagher et al. 1942).

Crisis and the emergence of a coordinat-ing institution helped bring an end to this “era-of-no-cooperation.” With the formation of permanent cooperative committees in the late 1940s to deal with the sea lamprey prob-lem and the demise of lake trout, agencies saw a strong need to address the sea lamprey on a basin-wide level and to share information and resources to restore the fishery ravaged by the sea lamprey and other problems. This emergence of cooperation received a boost in 1956 with the formation of the Great Lakes Fishery Commission as an entity the juris-dictions could turn to for help in facilitating ongoing interactions. Cooperation became more regular when the commission formed “lake committees” in 1964 “to strengthen the work of the States and Province in adminis-tering the fishery and to further the objectives of the Commission” (GLFC 1964). Federal and nonfederal agencies participated in these committees, though the participants limited their actions primarily to information sharing (as opposed to strategic actions) throughout the rest of the 1960s and 1970s.

Great Lakes fishery management, and the process to facilitate cooperation among many jurisdictions, began to change in the mid- to late-1970s when the jurisdictions were motivated to organize more formally,

partially due to a strong interest in strategic planning and partially due to a threat to their authority. “Planning,” says Crowe (1983), “is an integrated system for management that includes all activities leading to the de-velopment and implementation of goals, programs, objectives, operational strategies, and progress evaluation.” Strategic planning is not a particular project or initiative per se, rather, it is a “way of doing business . . . a system for decision-making.” By the 1970s, Great Lakes fishery managers were begin-ning to embrace the “ecosystem approach” to management (even though they likely had little shared understanding of that approach), which highlighted their interest in integrating other disciplines into fisheries and working across boundaries in a strategic fashion (Do-nahue 1988; Grumbine 1994; Krueger and Decker 1999). Strategic fisheries planning on a basin-wide level, many believed, would be beneficial to the Great Lakes community as it would communicate the goals and needs for the fishery; enhance agency, legislative, or public support for an initiative by ground-ing initiatives in clear plans; and help fishery managers keep pace with the broader envi-ronmental movement that was growing more sophisticated in other areas, such as water quality.

Another major force organizing the juris-dictions in the late 1970s was the possibility of U.S. federal intrusion into nonfederal fish-ery management affairs, particularly through the newly authorized Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (USGPO 1976). The act, signed in 1976 by President Gerald Ford, established a formal process for the federal government and the states to govern fishery management activi-ties in U.S. federal waters (i.e., from three miles to 200 mi from the coast). The federal National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminis-tration (NOAA) would lead the regional fish-ery management councils (Pacific Fishery Management Council 2005; USGPO 1976),

948 Gaden et al.

but because oceanic states have control over their fisheries to the three-mile limit, the act would provide for state involvement. Under this act, regional councils (made up of fed-eral and state managers, stakeholders, and other interested parties) were established to prepare and present fishery management plans to NOAA, conduct public hearings on the plans, submit periodic reports to NOAA, review fishery harvest policies, and review state and federal actions affecting the fisher-ies (Furlong 2002; USGPO 1976). The U.S. federal government would implement and en-force the plans through NOAA and the Coast Guard, respectively. Regional councils were set up in the expected places—the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts—where federal and state governments needed to cooperate to manage the fishery. About the same time the Magnuson Act went into force, the Comptrol-ler General of the United States concluded in a major report (GAO 1976) that “Congress should consider giving the Secretary of Com-merce [the head of NOAA] statutory author-ity to impose management measures on U.S. fisheries when states fail to do so.”

The regional fishery councils (under federal leadership) and the heavy-handed recommendation from the Comptroller Gen-eral suggested the possibility of a new era of federal dominance over fisheries and envi-ronment. Applying the Magnuson Act to the Great Lakes would have been a major change in Great Lakes fisheries governance, as feder-al waters do not exist in the Great Lakes and federally dominated regional councils would have pervaded state management. The solu-tion, many realized, was to create a regime to coordinate the jurisdictions’ activities in the spirit of the Magnuson Act, but in a way that was suited to the Great Lakes region. With a basin-wide strategic plan, the states reasoned, the U.S. federal government would have no pretense to usurp the nonfederal authority in the Great Lakes basin.1

A Joint Strategic Plan for Management of Great Lakes

Fisheries

The Joint Strategic Plan became the agencies’ mechanism for multi-jurisdictional, cooperative strategic planning. The plan calls for agencies to work together to identify their shared goals and objectives, and then to take the steps necessary to achieve them. The plan identifies four broad strategies—consensus, accountability, information sharing, and eco-system management—to make cooperation occur and succeed.

Consensus

The Joint Strategic Plan is rooted in ac-tion by consensus. Consensus is general agreement, the collective opinion, and the judgment reached by most of those con-cerned. Consensus occurs after all points of view have been heard and when no par-ticipant objects to the opinion (GLFC 1997). Joint Strategic Plan participants recognize that consensus does not mean unanimity, or that everyone is completely happy with the outcome, rather, it means everybody agrees or chooses not to disagree. By signing the plan, fishery management agencies pledge to reach consensus on proposed actions before they implement them. Agencies also agree that any change in fishery management practices that affects other jurisdictions must be agreed to by the other jurisdictions. This understand-ing of consensus was a direct reflection of the jurisdictional realities in Great Lakes fishery

1At the invitation of the nonfederal jurisdictions and the Great Lakes Fishery Commission, NOAA participated in the development of the Joint Strategic Plan and signed the plan in 1981. By involving NOAA in the process from the earliest stages, the jurisdictions were able to secure acceptance from the U.S. federal government for the Great Lakes fishery management regime under the Joint Strategic Plan instead of under a regional council.


management and, probably more than any other element of the plan, captured the es-sence of how cooperation occurred. The plan was not designed to force the jurisdictions to do something they do not want to do, rather, it was designed to help produce emergent com-monalities and strategic goals. The plan’s def-inition of consensus thus emerged out of the jurisdictions’ history of information sharing, coming together as equals, coming together voluntarily, and preserving their autonomy. In the rare instance where consensus cannot be achieved, the Joint Strategic Plan contains provisions for conflict resolution through the Great Lakes Fishery Commission or third parties.

Accountability

The plan’s second broad strategy is ac-countability. Even with the plan, agencies maintain their right to manage their own fish-eries and interact with their own stakehold-ers and legislatures. Some degree of shared accountability serves to encourage agen-cies to adhere to the shared objectives and plans developed through the plan’s process. Because the plan is nonbinding, it relies on “soft” accountability procedures (as opposed to “hard” procedures like law enforcement or sanctions) to encourage implementation. To promote accountability, the plan calls for the production of a decision record—primarily meeting minutes and published documents—to make the decisions and policies clear to the public and to each other. The Joint Strategic Plan also calls upon each agency to submit periodic reports about their activities on each lake and to provide each other with regular reports on progress toward reaching shared objectives. These accountability measures recognize agency independence while still acknowledging that being a part of the plan requires a mutual commitment to imple-ment the management plans. Regular, public reports and a decision record serve to keep

activities transparent. The plan’s account-ability provisions are “enforced” by the ex-istence of a strong “epistemic community” of peers who generally share the same values, philosophies, and scientific understanding of the resource (Haas 1992) and are able to ex-ert peer pressure or gently coerce colleagues into adhering to the norms of the community (Gaden 2007).

Information sharing

The third broad strategy is information sharing. All agencies rely on sound science and information for their management activi-ties. Information sharing is critical to coop-eration because it helps agencies make con-sistent decisions, it makes the decisions more sound and defensible, and it is economical because agencies can leverage resources. Information sharing also levels the playing field, as it prevents data hoarding, a practice known to happen with valuable products like scientific data. Information sharing is more difficult than might appear. Jurisdictions are often strapped for resources to collect data and even when the data are collected, they are often generated in a variety of formats. The plan calls for agencies to come to con-sensus on fishery management and assess-ment data needs, and to implement standards for recording, analyzing, and maintaining the information. The plan also envisions the agencies developing plans to assign who col-lects the data and seeks ways for agencies to work together to collect data. Agencies and the commission are expected to publish in-formation and make it available through con-venient means.

Ecosystem management

The final broad strategy outlined in the plan is ecosystem management. Beginning in the 1970s, officials in the Great Lakes region began to adopt the principle that the lakes

950 Gaden et al.

must be viewed as systems of interacting biotic and abiotic variables. Fishery manag-ers recognized that they needed to look be-yond fish or single species and instead con-sider and respond to all issues that affect the Great Lakes. Moreover, the officials realized that managing exclusively within their own waters was not an appropriate way to man-age. The Joint Strategic Plan calls for fishery agencies to integrate their fish community objectives with environmental objectives and plans developed through other processes. For example, the Canadian/U.S. Great Lakes Wa-ter Quality Agreement identifies “Areas of Concern” in the Great Lakes basin that have suffered significant environmental degrada-tion. Each area is to have a “Remedial Ac-tion Plan” that defines how the area is to be restored. The plans are intended to take into account “the interrelationships between land,

air, water, and all living things, including hu-mans, and involving all stakeholder groups in comprehensive management” (Hartig 1997). The Joint Strategic Plan calls upon fishery managers to work with environmental of-ficials involved in activities like Remedial Action Plans to integrate fishery needs and objectives with environmental needs and ob-jectives.

Lake committees and technical committees: The Joint Strategic Plan in action

With these four strategies for cooperative fishery management in mind, the jurisdic-tions use “lake committees” as the primary means to put the Joint Strategic Plan into ac-tion (Figure 2). Lake committees comprise high-ranking officials from fishery agencies on each lake who meet to address that lake’s

Figure 2. Organization of Lake Committees and Lake Technical Committees under the Joint Strategic Plan for Great Lakes Fisheries.


shared needs. For example, fishery managers from jurisdictions on Lake Huron—which include Ontario, Michigan, and the Chippe-wa-Ottawa Resource Authority—meet as the Lake Huron Committee. A Council of Lake Committees—comprising all members of the lake committees—addresses issues from a basin-wide perspective. The committees are the forum for agencies to work together to identify and achieve their shared goals and objectives. Each lake committee has at least one technical committee;2 some also have several focused “task groups,” that look at specific elements of the fishery such as the coldwater or percid fish communities. Tech-nical committees and task groups consist of field-level professionals from government and academic sectors who undertake such tasks as deciding on data needs, gathering data, interpreting data, and providing advice to the lake committees. Scientists, assessment biologists, and managers who have relevant data to share and who have suitable biologi-cal expertise are usually invited to participate in the technical committees. Technical com-mittees and task groups meet regularly and report to the lake committees.

Lake committee members integrate sci-ence (developed through the technical com-mittees and other processes) with fishery management policy. This structure allows the field researchers and assessment biolo-gists to develop a shared understanding of the science, as free as possible from politi-cal considerations and management biases. A major lake committee product, as called for under the plan, are Fish Community Objec-tives (e.g., Ryan et al. 2003). Fish Commu-nity Objectives are developed together by all of the agencies—federal, nonfederal, and bi-national—and represent the shared vision for

the desired composition of the lake’s ecosys-tem. Objectives often include expected har-vest yield and rehabilitation needs. The ob-jectives are based on recommendations from the technical committees and contain both fish and social objectives (such as expected constituent needs and target harvest levels). To fulfill the Fish Community Objectives, the lake committees and technical committees often produce specific restoration plans (e.g., Hansen 1996). Like the Fish Community Objectives, the plans are based on informa-tion generated through the lake and technical committees and reflect the deliberations and consensus among the members about what is needed and what is realistic. The agencies—together and individually—use the products of the lake committees to carry out fishery management.

Despite the high level of cooperation under the plan, the Joint Strategic Plan is not able to do several things. Because the plan is nonbinding, shared decisions do not force an agency to act, in any legal sense. The Joint Strategic Plan does not establish an overarching, centralized political author-ity to compel cooperation, so the Joint Stra-tegic Plan does not impinge upon, reduce, or abrogate the authority of the individual ju-risdictions. Finally, the Joint Strategic Plan does not alter federal responsibilities or the duties of the Great Lakes Fishery Commis-sion. The participants, while not bound to the decisions, are expected to adhere to the de-cisions made through the plan. Nonbinding agreements depend on the goodwill of mem-bers for implementation, as they tend to lack the enforcement mechanisms often found in binding agreements (Rabe 1997; Raustiala and Victor 1998; Victor 1997; Weiss 1999; Zimmerman 2002).

In the Great Lakes region, Joint Strategic Plan participants believe multi-jurisdictional governance can be fulfilled with a nonbinding agreement because members must be flexible in their response to fluctuating natural condi-

2Lake Ontario’s technical committee is less-formal than those on the other lakes because only two jurisdictions—Ontario and New York—manage the lake and because staff at all levels interact across the border on a continual basis.

952 Gaden et al.

tions (Gaden 2007). Moreover, participants believe a process that focuses on seeking and advancing shared goals is more valu-able than a process that constrains behavior, even though a binding process might enhance compliance. Members are well aware that historical and political realities in the region are such that, with diffuse political authority and guarded independence, a binding agree-ment would be out of the question. While the members acknowledge that the nonbinding Joint Strategic Plan does not compel action, they believe that it does change their thinking and behavior. Moreover, the Joint Strategic Plan is able to address compliance in a non-binding fashion by including mechanisms to ensure the participants implement agreed upon fishery management decisions. Such things as reliance on consensus, trust among

the members, ownership in decisions, and ac-countability—all elements of the Joint Strate-gic Plan process—help heighten the chances that shared decisions will be implemented (Gaden 2007).

The AYK Governance Regime

In Alaska, currently a four-track manage-ment system (Figure 3), whose parts do not automatically converge, exists (Linderman and Bergstrom 2009, this volume). The first track is multi-lateral fisheries management in the ocean beyond the 200-mi limit. Pacific salmon migrate great distances in the ocean and are harvested by several independent na-tions. In international waters (beyond 200 mi from a nation’s shores), governance oc-curs through the North Pacific Anadromous

Figure 3. The four-track AYK governance regime.


Fish Commission (NPAFC). Members of NPAFC include Canada, Japan, The Repub-lic of Korea, Russia, and the United States. NPAFC representatives are appointed by the respective governments and are responsible for estimating commercial salmon catch, un-derstanding the factors affecting salmon sur-vival, conducting salmon research (including convening scientific workshops and sympo-sia), sharing information about each party’s activities, and coordinating law enforcement. A single secretariat, located in Vancouver, British Columbia, supports NPAFC.

The second track, also in the ocean, is exclusively within the domain of the United States. The ocean waters from three miles out to 200 mi is referred to as the Exclu-sive Economic Zone (EEZ) and is managed through the North Pacific Fishery Manage-ment Council established by the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Manage-ment Act (USGPO 1976; Gisclair 2009, this volume). The council has broad representa-tion, including the State of Alaska, and is coordinated by the U.S. Federal government through the National Marine Fisheries Ser-vice. The State of Alaska has sole jurisdic-tional authority from the coastline out to three miles.

The third governance track occurs in Alaskan freshwaters, where salmon are man-aged by both the state and the federal gov-ernments. Prior to 1999, salmon management in all Alaska waters was the responsibility of the Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADFG) and a state regulatory Board of Fish-eries. The Board is supported by fourteen local advisory committees representing different geographic regions of the AYK, and its mem-bership includes stakeholders. This authority changed in 1999, when the U.S. federal gov-ernment assumed management responsibil-ity for subsistence fisheries on U.S. federal public lands in Alaska, which was consistent with the Alaska National Interest Lands Con-servation Act of 1980 (Bulkis 2002). While

salmon management of nonfederal freshwa-ters remains vested in the ADFG and Board of Fisheries, federal lands comprise large portions of the Yukon and Kuskokwim river drainages; management of federal waters for subsistence fisheries are under the purview of a regulatory Federal Subsistence Board. The Federal Subsistence Board has six members including one each from the federal agencies of Fish and Wildlife Service, Forest Service, National Park Service, Bureau of Land Man-agement, and Bureau of Indian Affairs, plus a chair appointed by the Secretary of Interior. The Federal Subsistence Board is advised by Regional Advisory Councils, which include rural stakeholders who are knowledgeable about, and have experience with the fisher-ies. Subsistence fishery regulations in federal waters generally parallel state management regulations.

Finally, the fourth track occurs in the Yu-kon River because the drainage and its salm-on cross the international boundary between U.S. (Alaska) and Canada (Yukon Territory) and involves state, territorial, and both fed-eral governments (Bue et al. 2009, this vol-ume). Much of the Canadian portion of the upper drainage of the Yukon River includes important spawning grounds for Chinook salmon Oncorhynchus tshawytscha and fall chum salmon O. keta. By agreement between the government of Canada and the govern-ment of the Yukon Territory, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) is responsible for fishery management in the Canadian por-tion of the Yukon River drainage. DFO works closely with the Yukon Salmon Committee, a regulatory advisory body representing stakeholders, to develop fishery management plans. Coordination of management of salm-on between the U.S. and Canada is provided though an agreement appended as an annex to the Pacific Salmon Treaty (Gisclair 2009). In 2002, after years of negotiation, agreement was reached on the conservation of Yukon River salmon between the U.S. and Canada.

954 Gaden et al.

This agreement created a bilateral Yukon River Panel, a process to set harvest quotas, and established management plans for Cana-dian-origin salmon stocks. The focus of the panel is on salmon stocks that pass through the Alaskan portion of the Yukon River and spawn in the Canadian part of the drainage; these stocks require U.S. protection to ensure adequate numbers pass upstream for spawn-ing and to provide for fisheries in Canada. The panel makes recommendations to man-agement agencies in both countries. A Joint Technical Committee composed of fishery managers and scientists from both countries advises the panel.

Though complex jurisdictionally, some common characteristics exist within the AYK salmon management regimes. First, ADFG, the Federal Subsistence Board, the Regional Fishery Management Council, NPAFC, and DFO manage for the conservation of salmon populations and sustainable fisheries. Sec-ond, subsistence fisheries have priority for harvest allocation over sport and commercial fisheries by all agencies. This priority for sub-sistence fisheries, in part, drives a third com-mon characteristic: stakeholder involvement. Solicitation of stakeholder advice within all agencies is well organized through advisory bodies that have regular meetings with the management agencies. Nevertheless, while the governance entities share these common characteristics, cross-cutting mechanisms do not exist to harmonize their activities beyond the reliance on members to share their knowl-edge about how the other entities operate.

Discussion

Multi-jurisdictional governance is es-sential in the Great Lakes region and there-fore, the governance regime established for the Great Lakes region—the Joint Strategic Plan—is highly tailored to the region. The plan emerged out of several unique con-

ditions including the existence of diffuse authority, nonfederal autonomy, a strong interest in maintaining jurisdictional inde-pendence, the threat of federal pre-emption of nonfederal responsibilities, the existence of a neutral third party (the Great Lakes Fishery Commission) to facilitate the Joint Strategic Plan process, and a mutual inter-est in strategic planning (Gaden 2007). By being a nonbinding agreement that focuses on shared goals and objectives, the plan re-spects jurisdictional independence. Had the plan not done so, it would either have been a weak agreement or would not have been ad-hered to. The plan calls for the development of shared fishery management strategies and operational plans, and, thus, focuses on the jurisdictions’ mutual interest in seeking and fulfilling mutual goals, instead of constrain-ing behavior. The plan relies on science and the field-level work of the technical commit-tees, thus underpinning shared decisions on sound information and making the policies more defensible. Finally, the plan depends on strong personal relationships among the fishery managers, as personal relationships lead to a strengthened epistemic community, trust, confidence that decisions will be imple-mented, and caring about future interactions (Axelrod 1984; Gaden 2007; Haas 1992).

The reliance on personal relationships among the fishery managers is probably the plan’s most important design principle. People and how they relate to each other are fundamental to the Joint Strategic Plan process. The process encourages members to know one another, as familiarity spawns trust or, at a minimum, an understanding that today’s interactions will affect future interac-tions (Axelrod 1984). The plan is designed to enhance the chances that members will care about the future by helping them benefit pro-fessionally from interactions, by creating op-portunities for rewarding social interactions, and by helping avoid future opportunity costs. Strong personal relationships help members


agree to courses of action with confidence that each will do their best to implement the decisions in the home jurisdiction.

Strong relationships built on trust, more-over, significantly enhance the chances that the shared decisions will be implemented. Fishery managers of the Great Lakes region are like-minded and operate as an epistemic community, a community of individuals who speak the same language and understand each others’ perspectives. The lake committee members communicate their philosophies, often have common mentors, and were edu-cated in similar biological programs. The lake committee and technical committee meetings are a place for these like-minded individuals to talk science and management. Members of this fishery management community know when science is not being adhered to, they care about the collegial community, and they are often familiar enough with each other to disagree without jeopardizing future interac-tions. The social functions and other outings make the meetings more enjoyable, but they also are a place to discuss issues, express new ideas, and help the members get to know one another better. These interactions are based on strong relationships, and such relation-ships are a key characteristic of the lake com-mittee process.

Perhaps most relevant to relationships in the Joint Strategic Plan process is precisely the fact that human interactions are fragile. Members are generally sensitive to the con-sequences of diplomatic missteps or acting in a recalcitrant manner. Not only does such behavior make relationships unpleasant, but members jeopardize future relations and op-portunities. Because the Joint Strategic Plan process is voluntary, dependent on the good-will of all for it to succeed, and could lead to substantial rewards for cooperative relation-ships, members likely pay extra attention to protecting and building relationships by taking great pains to work well with others. The Joint Strategic Plan benefited from the

fact that lake committees existed for fifteen years before the plan was produced. This pre-existence of a solid, respected, science-based epistemic community helped the plan from the start, as the members did not have to first establish the relationships needed for them to work together effectively.

Similarities and differences exist be-tween fishery management in the Great Lakes and salmon management in the AYK region. First, the fish of the Great Lakes readily move across political boundaries, cir-cumscribing governance as easily as salmon swim in the North Pacific and between the State of Alaska and Yukon Territory. As a re-sult, management throughout the entire life cycle requires cooperation among multiple jurisdictions. Second, among jurisdictions in the Great Lakes and AYK, interests in conservation, restoration, and the sustain-ability of the fisheries are shared and held in common among agencies. Third, although common interests occur, differences in man-agement focus also exist among individual jurisdictions within both the Great Lakes and the AYK region. For example, walleye Sander vitreus and yellow perch Perca flave-scens are managed for a commercial fishery by the Province of Ontario in Lake Erie, in contrast to the State of Ohio which manages solely for sport fisheries in Lake Erie for the same species. In Alaskan freshwaters, the federal government is solely concerned with the management of salmon for subsistence fisheries, whereas the State of Alaska, while having a similar priority for subsistence fisheries, must also balance the interests of commercial and sport fisheries.

Three striking differences occur between the management regimes of the Great Lakes and the AYK region. First, the histories that resulted in current agency relationships are different. The Joint Strategic Plan in the Great Lakes arose in the late 1970s in part out of a concern among the states about the possibili-ty for federal intrusion into state management

956 Gaden et al.

authority with the potential establishment of a federally led fishery management council in the Great Lakes region through the Mag-nuson Act (or FCMA). In contrast, whereas the state of Alaska did not want federal fish-eries management intrusion into freshwaters, these fears were realized with the assumption of authority for subsistence fishery manage-ment on federal lands in 1999 (Bulkis 2002). From this assumption of authority arose the management regime in Alaskan waters of the AYK region.

Second, in the Great Lakes, sub-national governments were partly driven to coopera-tion by a sincere interest to strategically seek and fulfill shared interests. Organization in the Great Lakes basin was voluntary and ex-ists only so long as it fulfills the needs of the fishery management agencies. In the AYK region, however, additional jurisdictions also arose, not through a common interest, but through a court order, federal legislation, and bi- and multi-lateral agreements. For instance, the state and federal jurisdictions managing subsistence fisheries were not a voluntary marriage, but one of force ordered by federal court. The genesis by force of the AYK partnership makes it fragile at best and adversarial at worst.

Third, in the Great Lakes region, the larger fishery research and management community including provincial, state, tribal, federal, and university participants are linked together through an epistemic community of like-minded professionals who interact regularly through ongoing processes—the lake committees and technical committees. In contrast, the management and research community of the AYK region is fragmented. For example, the Yukon River Joint Techni-cal Committee, as part of the Pacific Salmon Treaty between U.S. and Canada, does not meet with the Kuskokwim Salmon Work-ing Group (Linderman and Bergstrom 2009), even though they have common interests concerning salmon bycatch in the Bering Sea

(Gisclair 2009; Haflinger and Gruver 2009; Stram and Ianelli 2009). No overarching forum exists comparable to the Joint Strate-gic Plan, the lake committees, and the Great Lakes Fishery Commission that connects all those involved in the marine and freshwater regions that support salmon life history and AYK fisheries. The development of such a forum would promote coordinated manage-ment of salmon throughout the entire life cycle and be consistent with the ecosystem management approach.

Based on the Great Lakes experience, what might the future hold for management of AYK fisheries? With the passage of time, AYK management can benefit from a delib-erate effort to develop relationships among all agencies and individuals involved in the management of salmon throughout their life cycle. An analogous situation occurred in the Great Lakes when aboriginal interests were afforded management authority over treaty ceded waters in the 1980s (Gaden 2007). During the first ten or so years, consider-able resentment occurred among state fishery managers over this change in management authority. Nevertheless, over time the pres-ence of tribal authorities was accepted, and now 25 years later tribal representatives are regarded as full peers on the lake committees and lake technical committees, often serv-ing in leadership roles on those committees. In the AYK region, participants should en-deavor to establish formal processes to meet regularly and connect the four management tracks. Likely, with time, as federal subsis-tence and state fishery managers continue their involvement together, participants will come to better trust each other as full partners in cooperative management of salmon.

One possible pathway to improved co-operative management of AYK salmon can be developed based on the Great Lakes ex-perience. Many of the elements are already occurring in the AYK region and likely only need the passage of time to fully mature. First,


common or shared interests among the man-agement jurisdictions need to be identified and documented. Some have already been identified in this paper, and others undoubt-edly exist. Identifying the shared interests provides the platform for cooperative man-agement to occur. Second, from these shared interests, mutual goals of management can be developed and identified among the manage-ment jurisdictions. The development of the Joint Strategic Plan in the Great Lakes served this purpose. In particular, a commitment in the AYK region to an ecosystem approach for salmon management, characterized by work-ing across political boundaries and integrat-ing multiple disciplines into fishery manage-ment, could provide the conceptual construct to link different jurisdictions and interests. Third, information sharing has been a criti-cally important step in the Great Lakes man-agement under the Joint Strategic Plan and should be an important element in the AYK region as well. Information is power, and if participants come to consensus on data col-lection and interpretation, and if the same in-formation is available to everyone, then bet-ter, more defensible policies emerge and the playing field is leveled for all participants in the management process. The sharing of hon-est and high quality biological, social, and po-litical information about management of the salmon fisheries should occur. Full disclosure of information about AYK salmon will engen-der trust and respect among the management participants. Fourth, when trust and respect are built over time, a commitment to consen-sus decision making becomes possible. The passage of time is an important element be-cause it allows judgment of the consistency and honesty of behavior. Fifth, consensus de-cision making, when combined with trust and respect, will permit the development of the requisite accountability mechanisms that will ensure cooperative management.

Conclusion

Management authority over the Great Lakes fishery is spread among several non-federal jurisdictions, with some involvement by the Canadian and U.S. federal govern-ments and the bi-national Great Lakes Fishery Commission. While each jurisdiction’s scope of authority is relatively clear and respected, the lack of an overarching mechanism to tran-scend political boundaries existed for much of the history of the Great Lakes fishery and resulted in parochial or uncooperative be-havior. Lake committees were formed in the 1960s to help bridge jurisdictional divides and the interactions became more strategic in 1981 with the adoption of A Joint Strategic Plan for Management of Great Lakes Fish-eries. Agencies use the Joint Strategic Plan to reach consensus about their shared objec-tives, to share information, to pool resources, and to approach the fishery management in a more holistic fashion. The plan formalized a culture of cooperation that emerged from the lake committees of the 1960s and 1970s by providing a process for members to work together, reach consensus, pledge account-ability to each other, exchange information, and manage the lakes as an ecosystem. Be-cause the plan generated from the jurisdic-tions and was developed to serve the jurisdic-tions, members have a sense of ownership in the Joint Strategic Plan which heightens the chances that compliance with shared deci-sions will occur, even in the absence of pro-visions that bind.

The Joint Strategic Plan process helps fishery managers in the Great Lakes basin get to know each other and develop durable, working relationships, which builds trust and understanding. Above all, the process is rooted in science, as it relies on the work of the tech-nical committees as the foundation for man-agement decisions. The plan is highly suited to the governance conditions that emerged in the

958 Gaden et al.

Great Lakes, particularly the diffuse author-ity vested in the nonfederal jurisdictions, the fact that the jurisdictions wish to preserve their sovereignty, and the strong interest in seeking mutual objectives. By respecting jurisdictional independence, relying on science, calling for shared objectives and plans, and developing personal relationships, the Joint Strategic Plan contains design principles that help it succeed and make it robust.

The experiences with the Joint Strategic Plan in the Great Lakes might profitably be applied to AYK salmon management. Iden-tification of shared interests, development of common goals, adoption of ecosystem man-agement as an explicit foundation, informa-tion sharing, building of relationships among agencies and individuals, adoption of con-sensus decision making, and the use of ac-countability mechanisms could all serve to promote cooperative salmon management in the AYK region. We believe that an over-arching mechanism or institution is required that would connect the management interests from international waters, the Bering Sea, and North Pacific to the upper Yukon River in Yu-kon Territory and everything in-between in a common forum. Such a mechanism could be in the form of a nonbinding joint strategic plan for management of AYK salmon fisheries as is used in the Great Lakes. The advantages to such an agreement is its informal and nonbind-ing nature that does not threaten jurisdictional or constitutional authorities. Regardless of the mechanism used, connecting all of the agen-cies affecting the salmon life cycle and fish-eries should foster cooperative and effective AYK salmon management.

Acknowledgments

We thank the Great Lakes Fishery Com-mission for supporting this research and the Arctic-Yukon-Kuskokwim Sustainable Salm-on Initiative for their invitation to participate

in the symposium. We are also grateful to Barry Rabe of the University of Michigan, Elizabeth Brabec of Utah State University, Ann Chih Lin of the University of Michigan, and Denise Scheberle of the University of Wisconsin—Green Bay for their extensive comments on early versions of this manu-script. Finally, comments from John Hils-inger of the Alaska Department of Fish and Game greatly improved this article.

References

Axelrod, R. 1984. The evolution of cooperation. Basic Books, United States of America.

Bogue, M. B. 2000. Fishing the Great Lakes: an envi-ronmental history, 1833–1933. University of Wis-consin Press, Madison.

Brown, R. W., M. Ebener, and T. Gorenflo. 1999. Great Lakes commercial fisheries: Historical overview and prognosis for the future. In W. W. Taylor, and C. P. Ferreri, editors. Great Lakes fisheries policy and management: A binational perspective. Michi-gan State University Press, East Lansing.

Bue, F., J., B. M. Borba, R. Cannon, and C. C. Krue-ger. 2009. Yukon River fall chum salmon fisheries: management, harvest, and stock abundance. Pages 703–742 in C. C. Krueger, and C. E. Zimmerman, editors. Pacific salmon: ecology and management of western Alaska’s populations. American Fisher-ies Society, Symposium 70, Bethesda, Maryland.

Bulkis, L. S. 2002. Subsistence fisheries manage-ment on federal public lands in Alaska. Fisheries 27(7):10–18.

Busiahn, T. R. 1985. An introduction to native peoples’ fisheries issues in North America. Renewable Re-sources Journal 3(2):23–26.

Cobb, E. W. 1916. Federal control of interstate waters. Transactions of the American Fisheries Society 46:26–29.

Cohen. 1988. Cohen’s handbook of federal Indian law. United States Government Printing Office, Wash-ington, D.C.

Crowe, D. M. 1983. Comprehensive planning for wild-life resources. Wyoming Game and Fish Depart-ment, Cheyenne.

Dochoda, M. R. 1999. Authorities, responsibilities, and arrangements for managing fish and fisheries in the Great Lakes ecosystem. Pages 93–110 in W. W. Tay-lor, and C. P. Ferreri, editors. Great Lakes fisheries policy and management: a binational perspective. Michigan State University Press, East Lansing.

Donahue, M. 1988. Institutional arrangements for


Great Lakes management. L. K. Caldwell, editor. Perspectives on ecosystem management for the Great Lakes: A reader. State University of New York Press, Albany, New York.

Fetterolf, C. M. 1980. Why a Great Lakes Fishery Commission and why a Sea Lamprey Internation-al Symposium? Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 37(11):1588–1593.

Furlong, D. T. 2002. Fishery Management Councils. Improving Regional Ocean Governance in the United States. U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, Washington, D.C.

Gaden, M. 2007. Bridging jurisdictional divides: Col-lective action through A Joint Strategic Plan for Management of Great Lakes Fisheries. Doctoral dissertation. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Gallagher, H. R., A. G. Huntsman, D. J. Taylor, and J. Van Oosten. 1942. Report and Supplement. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.

GAO. 1976. Action is needed now to protect our fishery resources, GGD-76–34. U.S. General Accounting Office. Available: archive.gao.gov/f0202/093787.pdf (October 2006).

Gibson, D. 1973. Constitutional jurisdiction over envi-ronmental management in Canada. University of Toronto Law Journal 23:54–87.

Gisclair, R. R. 2009. Salmon bycatch management in the Bearing Sea walleye pollock fishery: threats and opportunities for western Alaska. Pages 799–816 in C. C. Krueger, and C. E. Zimmerman, edi-tors. Pacific salmon: ecology and management of western Alaska’s populations. American Fisheries Society, Symposium 70, Bethesda, Maryland.

GLFC. 1964. Minutes, Great Lakes Fishery Commis-sion Interim Meeting, December 2 and 3, 1964. Great Lakes Fishery Commission, editor. Great Lakes Fishery Commission Annual and Interim Meetings 1964–1965, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

GLFC. 1997. A Joint Strategic Plan for Management of Great Lakes Fisheries. Great Lakes Fishery Com-mission, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Grumbine, R. E. 1994. What is ecosystem manage-ment? Conservation Biology 8:1–12.

Haas, P. M. 1992. Introduction: Epistemic communities and international policy coordination. Internation-al Organization 46(1):1–35.

Haflinger, K., and J. Gruver. 2009. Rolling hot spot clo-sure areas in the Bering Sea walleye pollock fish-ery: estimated reduction of salmon bycatch during the 2006 season. Pages 817–826 in C. C. Krueger, and C. E. Zimmerman, editors. Pacific salmon: ecology and management of western Alaska’s populations. American Fisheries Society, Sympo-sium 70, Bethesda, Maryland.

Hansen, M. J., editor. 1996. A lake trout restoration plan for Lake Superior. Great Lakes Fishery Com-mission, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Hartig, J. H. 1997. Great Lakes Remedial Action Plans: Fostering adaptive ecosystem-based management processes. The American Review of Canadian Studies 27(3):437–458.

Hinrichs, H. J. 1913. Federal control over fish in bound-ary waters. Transactions of the American Fisheries Society 42:129–132.

Holmes, O. W. 1920. State of Missouri v. Holland, United States Game Warden. Pages 255–257 in S. Goldman, editor. Constitutional law: Cases and essays. Harper Collins, New York.

Joslyn, C. D. 1905. The policy of ceding the control of the Great Lakes from state to national supervision. Transactions of the American Fisheries Society 34:217–222.

Killian, J. H., and L. E. Beck, editors. 1987. The Con-stitution of the United States of America: analysis and interpretation, annotations of cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States to July 2, 1982. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress and U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.

Knaebel, E. 1920. Missouri v. Holland. 252 United States Reports 416. Banks and Brothers, New York.

Krueger, C. C., and D. J. Decker. 1999. The process of fisheries management. Pages 31–59 in C. C. Kohler, and W. A. Hubert, editors. Inland fisher-ies management in North America, 2nd edition. American Fisheries Society, Bethesda, Maryland.

Lamb, B. L., and D. Lybecker. 1999. Legal consid-erations in inland fisheries management. Pages 83–109 in C. C. Kohler, and W. A. Hubert, editors. Inland fisheries management in North America, 2nd edition. American Fisheries Society, Bethes-da, Maryland.

Linderman, J. C., Jr., and D. J. Bergstrom. 2009. Kuskokwim management area: salmon escape-ment, harvest, and management. Pages 541–599 in C. C. Krueger, and C. E. Zimmerman, editors. Pacific salmon: ecology and management of west-ern Alaska’s populations. American Fisheries So-ciety, Symposium 70, Bethesda, Maryland.

Michigan Supreme Court. 1971. People v. Jondreau, 384 Mich. 539. Michigan Supreme Court.

Michigan Supreme Court. 1976. People v. LeBlanc, 399 Mich. 31. Michigan Supreme Court.

Moore, J. N. 1965. Federalism and foreign relations. Duke Law Journal 1965(2):248–321.

Nielsen, L. A. 1999. History of inland fisheries man-agement in North America. Pages 3–30 in C. C. Kohler, and W. A. Hubert, editors. Inland fisher-ies management in North America, 2nd edition.

960 Gaden et al.

American Fisheries Society, Bethesda, Mary-land.

Ollivier, M. 1962. British North America acts and select-ed statutes, 1867–1962. Queen’s Printer, Ottawa.

Pacific Fishery Management Council. 2005. Informa-tion sheet: The Magnuson-Stevens Act. Pacific Fishery Management Council. Available: www.pcouncil.org/facts/msact.pdf (January 2007).

Peters, R. [1832] 1901. Worcester v. Georgia. Pages 515 in S. K. Williams, editor. 31 U.S. Supreme Court Reports 515, volume 31. The Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Company, Rochester, New York.

Piper, D. 1967. The international law of the Great Lakes: a study of Canadian-United States Co-operation. Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina.

R. v. Sparrow. 1990. 1 S.C.R. 1075, 70 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 46 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1.

Rabe, B. G. 1997. The politics of ecosystem manage-ment in the Great Lakes basin. The American Re-view of Canadian Studies 27(3):411–436.

Raustiala, K., and D. G. Victor. 1998. Conclusions. Pages 659–708 in D. G. Victor, K. Raustiala, and E. B. Skolnikoff, editors. The implementation and effectiveness of international environmental com-mitments: Theory and practice. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Rideout, S. G., and J. A. Ritter. 2002. Canadian and U.S. Atlantic salmon institutions and politics: where are the fish and who cares? Pages 93–116 in K. D. Lynch, M. L. Jones, and W. W. Taylor, editors. Sustaining North American salmon: per-spectives across regions and disciplines. American Fisheries Society, Bethesda, Maryland.

Ryan, P. A., R. Knights, R. MacGregor, G. Towns, R. Hoopes, and W. Culligan. 2003. Fish-Community goals and objectives for Lake Erie. Great Lakes Fishery Commission, Ann Arbor.

Schlender, J. H. (undated). The impact of the Voight case: On-going and upcoming issues. Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife Commission, Odanah, Wisconsin.

Stram, D. L., and J. N. Ianelli. 2009. Eastern Bering

Sea pollock trawl fisheries: variation in salmon bycatch over time and space. Pages 827–850 in C. C. Krueger, and C. E. Zimmerman, editors. Pa-cific salmon: ecology and management of western Alaska’s populations. American Fisheries Society, Symposium 70, Bethesda, Maryland.

Thompson, P. C. 1974. Institutional constraints in fish-eries management. Journal of the Fisheries Re-search Board of Canada 31:1966–1981.

United States Court of Appeals. 1983. LacCourte Or-eilles v. Voight, 700 F. 2nd 342. United States Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit.

United States District Court. 1979. U.S. v. Michigan, 623 F2d 448. United States District Court, West-ern District, Michigan.

USGPO. 1918. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, volume 16 U.S.C. 703–712. U.S. Government Printing Of-fice, Washington, D. C.

USGPO. 1976. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conser-vation and Management Act, volume 16 U.S.C. 1801–1882. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C.

Victor, D. G. 1997. The use and effectiveness of non-binding instruments in the management of com-plex international environmental problems. Pages 241–250 in M. Gavouneli, editor. American Soci-ety of International Law. Proceedings of the 91st Annual Meeting. Compliance with international environmental treaties: the empirical evidence. 11 April, Washington, D. C.

Weiss, E. B. 1999. The emerging structure of interna-tional environmental law. Pages 98–115 in N. J. Vig, and R. S. Axelrod, editors. The global envi-ronment. Congressional Quarterly Press, Wash-ington, D.C.

Willoughby, W. R. 1979. The joint organizations of Canada and the United States. The University of Toronto Press, Toronto.

Zimmerman, J. F. 2002. Interstate cooperation: Com-pacts and administrative agreements. Praeger, Westport, Connecticut.

Zorn, J. E. 1989. General principles of Indian law. Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife Commission, Oda-nah, Wisconsin.

managing across jurisdictional boundaries: fishery ...csis.msu.edu/sites/csis.msu.edu/files/gaden...

Documents