MAN AS PARTICIPANT TO NATURAL CREATION ENLOGUE AND IDEAS OF HERMENEUTICS IN BIOLOGY

Sergei V.CHEBANOV

Sechenov Institute of Evolutionary Physiology and Biochemistry, Russian Academy of Sciences, St.Petersburg, Russia

Rivista di Biologia, vol.87-1, 1994, pp.39-55.

1.HERMENEUTIC STUDIES IN BIOLOGY a) Introduction b) Biohermeneutics c) Hermeneutics of biology 2.ENLOGUE AS QUASIPERSONAL INTERACTION a) Enlogue as reciprocal projection b) An enlogue participant as a being c) Enlogue and non-enlogue 3.ENLOGY AND ITS FUNDAMENTAL PROPERTIES a) Enlogy as a morphological category b) Enlogy as intensional aspect of information c) Enlogical processuality as intensional time d) Enlogy and multiformity of truth 4.ENLOGUE'S PLACE IN BIOLOGY a) Enlogue and biology b) Enlogue and hermeneutic approach to biology

Abstract

Now, that the hermeneutics is coming into being again, there aresufficient reasons to determine the set of interpretation processes inorganisms as biohermeneutics and the field of interpretation ofbiologists' activity as hermeneutics of biology. The basic category ofbiohermeneutics and hermeneutics of biology is enlogue (cf. dialoguein M.Buber sense). Enlogue is quasipersonal interaction between LivingBeings or Living Being and Sensible Being when one enlogue's

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participant is projecting his organization into organization of otherparticipant(s). On this reason a concept is developed of the world asa net of actual and potential enlogues, instrumental investigation asreduced enlogues, biological interaction as special type of enlogue,etc.

1. HERMENEUTIC STUDIES IN BIOLOGY*a) Introduction.* It has been shown in earlier works (CHEBANOV, MARTYNENKO, 1990a,b)that there exist five different types of approach to language:hermeneutic, philological, linguistic, semiotic and pragmalinguistic.At present, one of them - namely, the hermeneutic approach: is cominginto being again as development of pragmalinguistic one. Central category of hermeneutics is interpretation. We caninterpret texts, things, actions etc. But when anyone makes someinterpretation, he believes there is something, which exists besidevisibility and we can know this invisible reality by investigation ofvisibility. If we deal with language, our capability of such

interpretation is based on nonarbitrary language sign, its motivationand, as a consequence, unlimited fullness of sense. Now, while the hermeneutization of humanitarian disciplines isbeing developed and some domains of biosemiotics (SEBEOK, 1979,STEPANOV, 1971) appear to be involved in it, I find sufficient reasonsto call this trend `biohermeneutics` sensu lato (CHEBANOV, MARTYNENKO,1990a, b).

*b) Biohermeneutics.* The object of biohermeneutic studies is the semiotic aspect ofLiving Being as centaurus-object (after G.P. Tshedrovitski;centaurus-object is characterized by heterogeneity, heterohierarchity,and heterochronity, i.e. has many semantic dimensions reflected ininterdisciplinary descriptive pictures - CHEBANOV, 1988). The semanticdimensions describe the centaurus-object as a unity of substratum(semantophore) and its sense. In this light, somatic and physiologicalorganization of Living Being is functioning as semantophore, i. e. asan exponent of semiotic means, whose nature of the substratum isimportant for its semiotic performance. The most vivid example of biohermeneutic conception is that ofgenetic code. Being semiotic in its essence and enriched by linguisticand philological ideas, it has acquired some hermeneutic features(CHEBANOV, 1993).

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Many other biological concepts develop in a similar way, thusmodifying the ideas about intracellular and intraorganism recognitionof mediators and hormones (i.e., endosemiotics after (SEBEOK, 1979)),and about interorganism interaction by means of pheromones, postures,odors, coloring, etc.(i.e., zoo- and phytosemiotics), including thephysiological aspect of verbal communication in man(cf.BODEN,1985). General trend in phenomenology is to be described by linguists,and mechanisms by biologists. Thus, biologists consider, so to speak,a text together with its author, printing-press, and reader (SHAROV,1990), while among philological disciplines only hermeneutics takesall these into its scope, other branches considering the text out ofits broad actual context.

*c) Hermeneutics of biology* Processes of hermeneutic interpretation exist not only in livingbeing but biologist interprets this living being too. I claim that theanalysis of such interpretation is the object of the hermeneutics ofbiology (see examples of the analysis in CHEBANOV, 1993).

2. ENLOGUE AS QUASIPERSONAL INTERACTION

*a) Enlogue as reciprocal projection.* The essence of all the above mentioned biohermeneutic situationscan be treated as being of enlogical nature. The starting point of the conception of enlogue has been anattempt to draw attention to the internal form of the term`information` (= en-logy, cf. CHEBANOV, 1984), which implies that a`form` is brought into something inherent in another thing (which isthe source of the form). Here, enlogue is an introduction of a logosinto something (en-log-ation), a projection of the form of one thinginto another. The notion of enlogy was proposed by Ilya S. Dvorkin at the annual(1980) meeting of the Workshop on Theoretical Biology, where I claimedthat the consideration of Living Being in terms of information wasalways preceded by the objectivation of Living Being. The new term

allows to avoid undesirable connotations and interferences with thenotion of information in communication theories. As it has been noted by I.Dvorkin and then by other scientists,the concepts of enlogue and enlogy have much in common with theM.Buber's ideas about dialogue (BUBER 1970). In dialogue, however,physical substratum becomes unimportant because of generalsense-directedness of the process, whereas in enlogue, a content-fullform is embodied -42-

in substratum (cf. the notion of semantophore). In enlogue there canneither be "objects", nor "I" inherent to a dialogue and this is thereason to qualify enlogue as quasipersonal interaction. Let us, take as an illustration the question whether a dog isferocious or not. There can be no general answer to this questionsince the dog is aggressive against some people, being quiet andgentle with others. I.e., it can be said that against certain personthe dog more often shows its aggression than against another one (orthat some people provoke aggression more often than others). In similar situations a projection of one participant`sorganization onto that of another is characteristic. The projection isreciprocal (two-directional). Thus, the organization of each of theparticipants depends on the interaction the participant takes part in,and it is impossible to imagine a participant as such apart from itsinteraction; - it would be simply senseless, because every enloguecreates in him a definite image, the `enlogy` of the participant. Theenlogy is defined a) by the participant`s nature, b) by the nature ofother participant(s), c) by the character of the enlogue (CHEBANOV,1993). To make clear the notion of enlogy we suggest color and taste.Neither color nor taste are properties inherent in electromagneticwaves or molecules, they are sooner characteristics of humanperception, which doesn't prevent them from being regarded asimportant properties of substances (cf., however, saying like `Degustibus et coloribus non est disputandum`, where the enlogical natureof taste and color is made explicit). The above mentioned features of enlogue suggest that it should betreated as a basic notion to describe the cognition of reality - and,hence, as the foundation of reality. So the universe can be consideredas a network of potential and actual enlogues. The notion of enlogue can be compared with that of feedback incybernetics; but enlogue is something more than interaction because ofits projective character. Enlogue and enlogy have common features with noesis and noema inphenomenologists` conceptions; however, enlogue can be carried out notonly by means of reason (rationally), which makes it possible todiscuss enlogues other than rational. Enlogies are comparable with `intensional objects` by Husserl. Themore so, that the intensional objects occur in non-rational acts (likefantasies, dreams, memories, desires, etc.). But enlogy is inherent inthe very being, it isn`t a product or a property of mind,consciousness or psyche. Some similarities can be observed betweenenlogy and interpretation in phenomenological aesthetics. The maindifference is that there is no enlogy apart from an enlogue by whichan enlogy is formed and therefore always preceded.

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Full-scale enlogue is close to Jaspersian notion of communication,though this closeness is but relative, since it is only in the conceptof enlogue that the transformation of participants is emphasized.

The same problems were studied by Ricoeur, but from a differentpoint of view, and the results sharply diverge: `distantiation` andobjectivization cannot be accepted within my approach.

*b) An enlogue participant as a being* Formally, a being can be defined as an enlogy of a participant ofa given enlogue (cf. Dasein as a correlate of an interpretation ofSein, according to Heidegger). It implies a being's high degree offlexibility and activity, its great receptive and assimilativeabilities. A being-partner interaction often has a typological andeven individual, not universal, character and that is why a being canhave individual (`personal`) features. A participant can be involved in more than one enlogue at onetime. The participant, hence, is presented by a different being inevery enlogue. Thus, an electron appears as two different beings(enlogies): wave and particle. This feature of the activity ofphysical beings (especially in quantum mechanical systems) has beenreflected in the notion of corpuscular-wave dualism, as well as in theCopenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics and in the idea thatphysical objects can resist researching them. Much more evident are the features of a being in microorganisms,plants and animals (which are Living Beings). Among them, higheranimals and humans are endowed with psyche, and furthermore, some ofthem are Sensible Beings endowed with reason. In certain situationshumans can also be psychic or mystic beings. By treating cognitive enlogue participants as beings it ispossible to avoid the shortcomings of extreme views on the nature ofinterpretation. Thus, within the framework of this approach, theforming of a personality cannot be treated as a projection of theobject`s organization into an unstructured subject, and, at the sametime, it is impossible to see the external world as an externalprojection of man`s internal organization (Cf. RICOEUR, 1975). Thus, in European philosophy, reality is traditionally regarded asan ensemble of things-in-themselves not opposed to one another. If anopposition is introduced of `active agent vs something to which theactivity is directed`, then the pair of things is viewed as being asubject and an object, while the ensemble of objects is viewed asforming an ontology (the picture of reality in the subject`s mind). However, it is senseless to speak about a thing as such or a thingin itself when discussing enlogue because the `objects` turn out too

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complicated by the qualities of `subject`, and vice versa (`subjects`complicated by `objects' qualities). In cognitive enlogue bothparticipants (if they are two) are equally important to theirquasi-dialogue, but one of them has its reason as a source ofcognitive activity(Sensible Being), whereas the other can be, say,Living Being (CHEBANOV, 1988).

*c) Enlogue and non-enlogue.*With the notion of enlogue being so wide, an important distinctionshould be made between that which is enlogue and that which is not.Although, strictly speaking, every interaction is an enlogue, it wouldbe of low heuristic value to qualify as enlogues the degeneratedcases, especially those which can get an exhaustive description interms of a number of invariant parameters or those which are productsof algorithmic procedures, or those having universal (not individualor typical) character. Such `non-enlogical` processes are not very numerous, but theirnumber is increasing since our technological civilization requires

greater standardization not only in technosphere, but also in humaneducation and communication, which means that more interactions becomenon-enlogues. In technocratic societies, there is a domination oforientation on the superficial level of reality, and therefore theworld is becoming governed by `objective laws` in a greater degree,any alteration of these laws being beyond human power. The domain ofenlogue is thus being reduced. This situation gives rise to a mass urge for inverted enlogues,such as extrasensory and psychedelic practices, or the usedepersonalized sex as a sport. In extreme cases, all these lead togenerating enlogies isomorphic to one of the participants (CHEBANOV,1988): mechanistic world picture, for instance, is isomorphic to asubject possessing no more than reason, vision and a simplemanipulation capacity (cf. in Persian poetry: a sage in love movingapart the curls of his Beloved-truth to see her face, sees only amirror with his own reflection in it). In the cases when the enlogical character of a process is beyondany doubt, the processes are given a marginal status of something likeparapsychology or mystics. But in spite of all this cultural pressure,the more pronounced is the individuality of a man, the deeper hetransforms the things he gets in touch with, the more he animates andenlogizes them. The macrostructures complementing the natural language(SEBEOK, 1979) play a considerable role in these processes. Such a transfiguration of things and animals is regarded assomething quite natural by spiritually oriented people, whose enloguewith a stone or, say, with a star isn't more uncommon to them than anyother enlogue (take, for instance, the sermon to birds by St.Francisof Assisi, or Russian anchoret's intercourse with bears). Here thedifference between enlogue and

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dialogue disappears. Unfortunately, the enlogues in physics andchemistry (e.g., in crystals or in quantum mechanic systems) are outof the scope of this paper. But the fact of their existence itself isthought provoking. Much more common are the enlogues in human activity and in LivingBeings.

3.ENLOGY AND ITS FUNDAMENTAL PROPERTIES

*a) Enlogy as a morphological category.* The internal form of the words `en-log-y` and `in-form-ation`implies that there is certain relation of these concepts withmorphology. And this is really so. Enlogy, in this respect, should bedefined as an entelechial unity of form and steresis (the term ofAristotle). I mean by 'form' in this case a set of internaldistinctions of a thing, while steresis is the absence of form (form`sown "His Other" (Sein Andere, after I.Kant, cf. CHEBANOV, 1984)).Although several kinds of steresis were mentioned by Aristotle, hegave no detailed explanation of the source of steresis. In theconception I have been trying to present here, steresis appears to bea projection of the second participant`s form, whereas enlogy shouldbe regarded as a result of the reciprocal projection of theparticipants` organization. It must be noted that enlogy is provided by the activity of atleast one participant. That is why the unity of form and steresis isentelechial. Up to now this interpretation proposed by A.V. Goguinproved to be most fruitful (ROUSSO, CHEBANOV, 1985,1988).

*b) Enlogy as intensional aspect of information.*

In spite of the fact that the internal form of the terms isquasi-synonymous, it would be better to oppose the two concepts,because enlogy can be treated as a qualitative aspect of information:enlogy is that which is being projected from one thing onto the other,but not the amount of what is projected. This feature is indispensablefor approaching a qualitative information theory.

*c) Enlogical processuality as intensional time* Time can be treated as an aspect of changeability in a givenindividual (according to the morphological conception of time, seeMEYEN, 1989:170-185). Given that every individual is a sort of enlogy(CHEBANOV, 1984), it is possible to qualify the intensional time asenlogical processuality (cf. crystallodynamic time, in ROUSSO,CHEBANOV, 1985). It should be taken into account that time is anattribute not of the individual itself, but of a definite enlogy ofthe individual; that is to say, every individual exists in manydifferent times, each of which is defined

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by a corresponding enlogue and its participants. Thus, time turns outto be defined not only by the matter investigated, but also by theinvestigator himself and, consequently, both individuals taking partin the interaction are heterochronous in their nature (afterG.P.Tshedrovitsky). As to the extensional time, it is similarlyrelated to information, the amount of which is defined through thenotion of entropy. In some special cases of enlogue (`degenerated`enlogues discussed below) the course of time depending on theparticipants` properties should be described, for instance, in thespecial theory of relativity (such phenomena as the slowing down of aclock). The enlogical processuality can be metrically andtopologically various (e.g., non-eudoxean).

*d) Enlogy and the multiformity of truth.* By the logical status of enlogy, every enlogy of given participanthas the same predicates as truth. There can be no marked enlogies ableto pretend, with more reasons than other, to be truth. The categoriesof enlogue and enlogy are not identical with the existingphenomenologists' notions primarily due to the general objectivistorientation of European culture. Abandoning this tradition allows todiscover the value of enlogies per se, with their dependence on theparticular features of Man, whatever the nature of these features maybe: individual features of constitution (like the sensibility tophenylalanine), or supposedly pathological (like daltonism), ortypological (like Sensible Being's mental organization). Sinceenlogies are extremely various, building up their typology appears tobe quite a complicated task. That is why any attempt to draw up acomprehensive and exhaustive typology of enlogues seems to be anunrealizable enterprise. Some enlogues involve more than twoparticipants. Thus, e.g., praying before icon is an enlogue of aprayer, an icon, and Holy Spirit; the icon, in its turn, is the resultof an enlogue involving Holy Spirit, the icon-painter, and the personrepresented in the icon, while the individuality of the icon-painteris a fruit of his enlogues with other people and circumstances. Theidea of a holy image as a sort of enlogy is crucial for understandingthe nature of enlogue (though, in this case distinction betweendialogue and enlogue is disappeared), and it is in iconoclasticcontroversies that this idea has been formed.

4. ENLOGUE'S PLACE IN BIOLOGY

*a) Enlogue in biology* There is a great variety of enlogues and enlogies in biology. Tobegin with, umwelt is an enlogy (UEXKULL, 1909): the environment of an

-47-organism is different to every two organisms in the same locus ofspace, due to the different transformations of space by each of thetwo organisms creating their umwelts with their own relevant features.Thus, umwelt proves to be an enlogy of space as a result of anorganism-space enlogue (if the enlogue is regarded from the point ofview of the organism). It is remarkable that umwelt is treated as oneof the key categories of biosemiotics (STEPANOV, 1971; SEBEOK, 1979). Of course, biologists are also concerned with enlogues in livingbeings, where semiotic means are involved. The studies of theseenlogues are subject of hermeneutics of biology. A biological researchcan often be present as an enlogue, though purely operational orinstrumental investigation also occur.

*b) Enlogue and hermeneutic approach in biology* A biologist (Sensible Being), in his work, comes across asurprising variability of organisms. This variability is considered asan attribute of life, as is the substances high flexibility whichdepends on the state of the organism. The classical morphology in thespirit of Goethe attempted to grasp organic forms (distinguishing aform implied in figures, cf. gene as idea CHEBANOV,1984). Old biology,born of the conception of the world as a Book, regarded the form asfull of sense, and every organism as a text component. This outlookhas been rejected in the course of the futile fight againstanthropomorphism in biological conceptions, and later only higheranimals` behavior was acknowledged as eventually having a certainsense. However, modern ethology though carefully avoidinganthropomorphism, cannot help using a semantic approach in thedescription of non-hominal umwelts (SEBEOK, 1979). The study of umwelt forming mechanisms reveals that only thosefeatures of environment - and of other beings - can be perceived byLiving Being, whose perception is predetermined by Living Being`sorganization (i.e., a set of the invariants of perception isgenetically determined). When describing enlogies, all this should betaken into account. In the middle of the XX century, one more discipline emerged whichcan do nothing without the notion of semiosis: it was moleculargenetics. The matter of this domain has proved to have the samemechanisms that have been found out in ethology and neurophysiology,and it is on this basis that biosemiotics is being formed. Bringinginto a system the evidences emerging from biosemiotic studies leads tothe revival of hermeneutic ideas some of which were already quiteobvious to biologists (such as the importance of semantophore, thenon-arbitrary, though not strictly definite, character of the relationbetween an organism and its sense, the plurality of interpretations ofevery organism, etc.). -48-

There is an alternative way to comprehend Living Being: SensibleBeing can occupy the position of another Living Being in the enlogue.But in this case Sensible Being turns out to be on the razor-edge,facing two dangers: one to step out of anthropomorphic conceptes, theother to be carried away by the temptation of infernal mysticism ofparapsychological enlogue violating natural limits of beings. At thesame time, if Sensible Being is consciously using his position as ahuman being, this can allow him to reveal a genuine pious enlogue withLiving Being; but biologists are not very much welcome this kind of

knowledge, they are still unable to be conscious that a man is theprincipal actor in a biological research, where he does not merelydiscover the laws of nature, but takes part in the Creation of theworld in his creative enlogue which is one of the kinds of hermeneuticactivity.

*Acknowledgments* The conception of enlogue is a fruit of collectivethought. I am extremely grateful to my colleagues for theircooperation, especially to Valery D. Dymshits and Ilya S. Dvorkin whohave given some valuable hints on the text.

St. Petersburg, July 1992

pp. 49-54 Italian translation

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