major jury matter attorneys for plaintiff€¦ · you should take this paper to your lawyer at...

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McELDREW YOUNG MAJOR JURY MATTER James J. McEldrew, III, Esquire Daniel Purtell, Esquire Ian M. Bryson, Esquire Attorney Identification: 36411, 310376, 321359 123 South Broad Street, Suite 2250 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 19109 215-545-8800 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Attorneys for Plaintiff ________________________________________________ KATHRYN McGILL, as Administrator of the : COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ESTATES OF THOMAS and DELORES PARKER : PHILADELPHIA COUNTY 1610 Herron Drive : JUNE TERM, 2018 West Chester, Pennsylvania 19380, : : NO.: Plaintiff, : v. : JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

: BARCLAY FRIENDS : 700 N. Franklin Street : West Chester, Pennsylvania 19380; : : THE KENDAL CORPORATION : 1107 E. Baltimore Pike : Kennett Square, Pennsylvania 19348; : : JOHNSON CONTROLS FIRE PROTECTION LP : f/k/a SIMPLEXGRINNELL LP : 4700 Exchange Court, Suite 300 : Boca Raton, FL 33431; : : AQUA PENNSYLVANIA, INC. : 762 West Lancaster Avenue : Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania 19010; : : AQUA AMERICA, INC. : 762 West Lancaster Avenue : Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania 19010; : : C. RAYMOND DAVIS & SONS, INC. : 2124 Kimberton Road : Phoenixville, PA 19460; : : :

Case ID: 180601317

Filed and Attested by theOffice of Judicial Records

12 JUN 2018 04:07 pmM. BRYANT

mailto:[email protected]



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MARCO PROTECTION SYSTEMS, LLC : 288 Boot Road : Downingtown, PA 19335; : : KOHN ENGINEERING : 4220 Mountain Road : Macungie, PA 18062; and : : DANIEL H. SOCKET, STRUCTURAL : ENGINEERS, PC. : 2735 Haverford Road : Ardmore, Pennsylvania 19003, : : Defendants. : ________________________________________________:

NOTICE TO DEFEND

NOTICE You have been sued in court. If you wish to defend against the claims set forth in the following pages, you must take action within twenty (20) days after this complaint and notice are served, by entering a written appearance personally or by attorney and filing in writing with the court your defenses or objections to the claims set forth against you. You are warned that if you fail to do so the case may proceed without you and a judgment may be entered against you by the court without further notice for any money claimed in the complaint of for any other claim or relief requested by the plaintiff. You may lose money or property or other rights important to you. You should take this paper to your lawyer at once. If you do not have a lawyer or cannot afford one, go to or telephone the office set forth below to find out where you can get legal help.

Philadelphia Bar Association Lawyer Referral

and Information Service One Reading Center

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19107 (215) 238-6333

TTY (215) 451-6197

AVISO Le han demandado a usted en la corte. Si usted quiere defenderse de estas demandas expuestas en las paginas siguientes, usted tiene veinte (20) dias de plazo al partir de la fecha de la demanda y la notificacion. Hace falta ascentar una comparencia escrita o en persona o con un abogado y entregar a la corte en forma escrita sus defensas o sus objeciones a las demandas en contra de su persona. Sea avisado que si usted no se defiende, la corte tomara medidas y puede continuar la demanda en contra suya sin previo aviso o notificacion. Ademas, la corte puede decider a favor del demandante y requiere que usted cumpla con todas las provisiones de esta demanda. Usted puede perder dinero o sus propiedades u otros derechos importantes para usted. Lleve esta demanda a un abogado immediatamente. Si no tiene abogado o si no tiene el dinero suficiente de pagar tal servicio. Vaya en persona o llame por telefono a la oficina cuya direccion se encuentra escrita abajo para averiguar donde se puede conseguir asistencia legal.

Asociacion De Licenciados De Filadelfia Servicio De Referencia E

Informacion Legal One Reading Center

Filadelfia, Pennsylvania 19107 (215) 238-6333

TTY (215) 451-6197

Case ID: 180601317

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McELDREW YOUNG MAJOR JURY MATTER James J. McEldrew, III, Esquire Daniel Purtell, Esquire Ian M. Bryson, Esquire Attorney Identification: 36411, 310376, 321359 123 South Broad Street, Suite 2250 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 19109 215-545-8800 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Attorneys for Plaintiff ________________________________________________ KATHRYN McGILL, as Administrator of the : COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ESTATES OF THOMAS and DELORES PARKER : PHILADELPHIA COUNTY 1610 Herron Drive : JUNE TERM, 2018 West Chester, Pennsylvania 19380, : : NO.: Plaintiff, : v. : JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

: BARCLAY FRIENDS : 700 N. Franklin Street : West Chester, Pennsylvania 19380; : : THE KENDAL CORPORATION : 1107 E. Baltimore Pike : Kennett Square, Pennsylvania 19348; : : JOHNSON CONTROLS FIRE PROTECTION LP : f/k/a SIMPLEXGRINNELL LP : 4700 Exchange Court, Suite 300 : Boca Raton, FL 33431; : : AQUA PENNSYLVANIA, INC. : 762 West Lancaster Avenue : Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania 19010; : : AQUA AMERICA, INC. : 762 West Lancaster Avenue : Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania 19010; : : C. RAYMOND DAVIS & SONS, INC. : 2124 Kimberton Road : Phoenixville, PA 19460; : : :

Case ID: 180601317




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MARCO PROTECTION SYSTEMS, LLC : 288 Boot Road : Downingtown, PA 19335; : : KOHN ENGINEERING : 4220 Mountain Road : Macungie, PA 18062; and : : DANIEL H. SOCKET, STRUCTURAL : ENGINEERS, PC. : 2735 Haverford Road : Ardmore, Pennsylvania 19003, : : Defendants. : ________________________________________________:

CIVIL ACTION COMPLAINT

Plaintiff, Kathryn McGill, as Administrator of the Estates of Thomas and Delores Parker,

by and through her undersigned counsel, McEldrew Young, brings this Civil Action Complaint

against Defendants, Barclay Friends; The Kendal Corporation; Johnson Controls Fire Protection

LP f/k/a SimplexGrinnell LP; Aqua Pennsylvania, Inc.; Aqua America, Inc.; C. Raymond Davis

& Sons, Inc.; Marco Protection Systems, LLC; Kohn Engineering; and Daniel H. Socket,

Structural Engineers, PC, and alleges, upon information and belief, as follows:

NATURE OF THE ACTION

1. The Barclay Friends Senior Living Community is located at 700 North Franklin

Street, in a residential area of West Chester, Pennsylvania, and faces in an eastern direction. The

land slopes upward, from north to south. It is a two-story, wood-framed structure, with an

asphalt-shingled roof and brick and vinyl siding exterior.

2. Plaintiff’s decedents, Thomas and Delores Parker, suffered from dementia and

resided in the Woolman Building—the facility’s dementia wing—in rooms 212A and 213A.

Case ID: 180601317

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3. Mr. and Mrs. Parker were devoted parents of three daughters, Kathryn McGill,

Barbara McDonald, and Marilyn Parker; and loving grandparents of six grandchildren and five

great-grandchildren. They cherished time with family above all else.

4. On November 16, 2017, at approximately 10:45 PM, a deadly fire engulfed and

spread throughout the Woolman Building at the Barclay Friends facility—killing four residents,

including Plaintiff’s mother and father, Thomas and Delores Parker—and injuring more than 27

others.

5. The fire originated on the rear outdoor patio when an employee, in violation of

policy, carelessly discarded a lit cigarette into a trashcan containing combustible materials that

was in close proximity to the building’s exterior wall.

6. The fire was allowed to quickly breach and spread unabated throughout the

building due to a combination of, inter alia, an unenforced nonsmoking policy that led to the

Case ID: 180601317

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start of the fire, an improperly constructed exterior wall that allowed the fire to breach the

building’s interior, a woefully inadequate fire protection system that was found to have been

turned off before the fire, a poor evacuation plan, and insufficient external water for firefighter

hoses.

7. Thomas and Delores Parker were not evacuated from the building and were

unable to escape the blaze, thereby suffering terrifying, gruesome, agonizing and lonely deaths.

Four days later, their remains were excavated from the rubble inside the charred shell of their

former home.

Case ID: 180601317

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PARTIES

8. Plaintiff, Kathryn McGill, is an adult individual residing at 1610 Herron Drive,

West Chester, Pennsylvania 19380.

9. Plaintiff is the daughter of Thomas and Delores Parker, deceased, and is the

Administrator of their Estates.

10. On January 17th, 2018, Kathryn McGill was appointed as Administrator of the

Estate of Thomas Parker by the Register of Wills of Chester County.

11. On February 5th, 2018, Kathryn McGill was appointed as Administrator of the

Estate of Delores Parker by the Register of Wills of Chester County.

12. Defendant, Barclay Friends, is a corporation or otherwise defined business entity

organized and existing under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, with a principal

place of business located at 700 N. Franklin Street, West Chester, Pennsylvania 19380.

13. At all relevant times, Defendant, Barclay Friends, was acting by and through its

employees, servants, and actual, apparent, and/or ostensible agents, acting within the course and

scope of their employment, service, and/or agency.

Case ID: 180601317

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14. Defendant, The Kendal Corporation (“Kendal”), is a corporation or otherwise

defined business entity organized and existing under the laws of the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania, with a principal place of business located at 1107 E. Baltimore Pike, Kennett

Square, Pennsylvania 19348.

15. At all relevant times, Defendant, Kendal, was acting by and through its



16. Defendant, Johnson Controls Fire Protection LP f/k/a SimplexGrinnell LP

(“Johnson Controls”), is a limited partnership or otherwise defined business entity organized and

existing under the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, with a principal place of

business located at 4700 Exchange Court, Suite 300, Boca Raton, FL 33431.

17. Defendant, Johnson Controls, merged with SimplexGrinnell, LP

(“SimplexGrinnell”) in September 2016, and therefore, Defendant, Johnson Controls, is liable

for the negligent, grossly negligent, careless and/or reckless conduct of SimplexGrinnell, under

the de facto merger doctrine of corporate successor liability. Fizzano Brothers Concrete Products

v. XLN Inc., 42 A.3d 952 (2012).

18. At all relevant times, Defendant, Johnson Controls, was acting by and through its



19. Defendant, Aqua Pennsylvania, Inc. (“Aqua PA”), is a corporation or otherwise


Pennsylvania, with a principal place of business located at 762 West Lancaster Avenue, Bryn

Mawr, Pennsylvania 19010.

Case ID: 180601317

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20. Defendant, Aqua America, Inc. (“Aqua America”), is a corporation or otherwise


Pennsylvania, with a principal place of business located at 762 West Lancaster Avenue, Bryn

Mawr, Pennsylvania 19010.

21. Hereinafter, Defendants, Aqua PA and Aqua America will be referred to

collectively as “Defendants, Aqua.”

22. At all relevant times, Defendants, Aqua, were acting, individually and/or

collectively, by and through their employees, servants, and actual, apparent, and/or ostensible

agents, acting within the course and scope of their employment, service, and/or agency.

23. Defendant, C. Raymond Davis & Sons, Inc. (“Davis & Sons”), is a corporation or

otherwise defined business entity organized and existing under the laws of the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania, with a principal place of business located at 2124 Kimberton Road, Phoenixville,

PA 19460.

24. At all relevant times, Defendant, Davis & Sons, was acting by and through its



25. Defendant, Marco Protection Systems, LLC (“Marco”), is a limited partnership or

otherwise defined business entity organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware,

with a principal place of business located at 288 Boot Road, Downingtown, PA 19335.

26. At all relevant times, Defendant, Marco, was acting by and through its employees,

servants, and actual, apparent, and/or ostensible agents, acting within the course and scope of

their employment, service, and/or agency.

Case ID: 180601317

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27. Defendant, Kohn Engineering, is a fictitious name or otherwise defined business

entity organized and existing under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, with a

principal place of business located at 4220 Mountain Road, Macungie, PA 18062.

28. At all relevant times, Defendant, Kohn Engineering, was acting by and through its



29. Defendant, Daniel H. Socket, Structural Engineers, PC (“DHSSE”), is a

professional corporation or otherwise defined business entity organized and existing under the

laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, with a principal place of business located at 2735

Haverford Road, Ardmore, Pennsylvania 19003.

30. At all relevant times, Defendant, DHSSE, was acting by and through its



JURISDICTION AND VENUE

31. Defendants, individually and collectively, are subject to jurisdiction in the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because the negligent, grossly negligent, careless and/or

reckless acts and/or omissions complained of herein occurred in Pennsylvania.

32. Venue is proper in Philadelphia County because Defendants, individually and/or

collectively, regularly conduct business in Philadelphia County.

33. At all relevant times, Defendant, Barclay Friends, purposely established

significant contacts in Pennsylvania, has carried out, and continues to carry out, substantial,

continuous and systematic activities in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and regularly

Case ID: 180601317

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conducts business in Philadelphia County, inter alia, targeting and advertising to potential

clientele in Philadelphia.

34. At all relevant times, Defendant, Kendal, purposely established significant

contacts in Pennsylvania, has carried out, and continues to carry out, substantial, continuous and

systematic activities in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and regularly conducts business in

Philadelphia County, inter alia, targeting and advertising to potential clientele in Philadelphia.

35. At all relevant times, Defendant, Johnson Controls, purposely established



conducts business in Philadelphia County, inter alia:

a. Johnson Controls is licensed as a contractor by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to perform work in Pennsylvania, including Philadelphia County;

b. Johnson Controls regularly contracts to perform work to install, inspect, test and/or maintain life, fire and safety systems in Philadelphia County; and

c. Johnson Controls has an office in Philadelphia, which it uses to target and serve clients in Philadelphia County.

36. At all relevant times, Johnson Controls’ subsidiary, SimplexGrinnell, regularly

conducted business in Philadelphia County, inter alia:

a. SimplexGrinnell is licensed as a contractor by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to perform work in Pennsylvania, including Philadelphia County;

b. SimplexGrinnell regularly contracts to perform work to install, inspect, test and/or maintain life, fire and safety systems in Philadelphia County;

c. SimplexGrinnell has an office in Horsham, Pennsylvania, which it uses to target and serve clients in Philadelphia County;

d. SimplexGrinnell’s website has a page dedicated to Philadelphia, which states:

Case ID: 180601317

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Philadelphia

Tyco SimplexGrinnell is a longtime industry leader, offering single source solutions, trained and certified staff, and a nationwide network of offices that brings expertise direct to your door. With one million customers, 130 local offices, and over 200 years of history in the fire business, Tyco SimplexGrinnell is advancing safety and security for organizations of all sizes in a wide range of industries. With offices located throughout the country, our national footprint provides tremendous depth in our ability to meet our clients’ needs agilely and effectively from coast to coast. Service has always been a top priority for us. That’s why we’re committed to providing you with the expert care you need to ensure your system always works at its best to protect your facility.

e. SimplexGrinnell’s website and online marketing materials include a large photo of the Philadelphia skyline;

f. SimplexGrinnell’s website states that it hosts fire and life safety education courses in Philadelphia;

g. SimplexGrinnell regularly avails itself of the Philadelphia court system and has filed many lawsuits in Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas as a plaintiff. See, e.g., SimplexGrinnell v. Temple University, Phila.Com.Pl. No. 1012W0017; SimplexGrinnell v. Marketplace Redwood LP, et al., Phila.Com.Pl. No. 0702W0071; SimplexGrinnell v. Temple University, Phila.Com.Pl. No. 0709W0080; SimplexGrinnell v. North Philadelphia Health Systems, Phila.Com.Pl. No. 160902174; SimplexGrinnell v. Precision Electric Inc., Phila.Com.Pl. No. 080801712; SimplexGrinnell v. Drexel University, Phila.Com.Pl. 050601440; and

h. SimplexGrinnell’s corporate records show that it has a registered agent in Philadelphia: CT Corporation System.

37. At all relevant times, Defendants, Aqua, purposely established significant contacts

in Pennsylvania, have carried out, and continue to carry out, substantial, continuous and

systematic activities in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and regularly conduct business in

Philadelphia County, inter alia, providing water utility services to clientele in Philadelphia.

38. At all relevant times, Defendant, Davis & Sons, purposely established significant


Case ID: 180601317

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Philadelphia County, inter alia:

a. Davis & Sons belongs to the American Institute of Architects, Philadelphia Chapter; b. Davis & Sons enjoys the benefit of advertising its projects to readers and subscribers of the periodical, The Philadelphia Architect; and c. In 2015, Davis & Sons renovated the Philadelphia Cricket Club, located at 415 W. Willow Grove Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19118.

39. At all relevant times, Defendant, Marco, purposely established significant



Philadelphia County, inter alia, targeting, advertising to and providing fire protection services to

clientele in Philadelphia.

40. At all relevant times, Defendant, Kohn Engineering, purposely established



conducts business in Philadelphia County, inter alia:

a. Kohn Engineering belongs to the Philadelphia Chapter of the Society of Fire Protection Engineers;

b. Kohn Engineering’s website states it “assessed, evaluated and recommended fire protection for 70 to 80 different facilities” in Philadelphia; and

c. Kohn Engineering published a client list on its website stating it performed fire protection consulting services for multiple companies located in Philadelphia County.

41. At all relevant times, Defendant, DHSSE, purposely established significant



Case ID: 180601317

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Philadelphia County, inter alia, targeting, advertising to and providing services to clientele in

Philadelphia.

FACTS

I. THE FIRE AND THE DEATHS OF THOMAS AND DELORES PARKER

42. The Barclay Friends Senior Living Community is located at 700 North Franklin

Street, in a residential area of West Chester, Pennsylvania, and faces in an eastern direction. The

land slopes upward, from north to south. It is a two-story, wood-framed structure, with an

asphalt-shingled roof and brick and vinyl siding exterior.

43. At the time of the incident, The Woolman Building functioned as the Personal

Care section of the complex and housed 41 residents—all or most of whom were dementia

patients or suffered other memory impairments—including Plaintiff’s mother and father, Thomas

Parker, age 92, and Delores Parker, age 89.

44. At all relevant times, the Barclay Friends facility was owned, managed,

maintained, operated, controlled, and/or facilitated by Defendants, Barclay Friends and/or

Kendal.

45. On November 16, 2017, at approximately 10:45 PM, a fire ignited on an outdoor

patio on the west side of the Woolman Building at the Barclay Friends facility.

46. Fire patterns and burn damage at the scene indicated that the flames spread up the

vinyl siding and progressed inward and upward into the interior of the west side of the structure.

47. Woolman Building was engulfed in a raging inferno, and no action was taken to

evacuate Thomas and Delores Parker to safety.

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48. The inferno spread unchecked and uncontrolled, and roared through the Woolman

Building’s Personal Care wing, where Thomas and Delores Parker were trapped alone in their

rooms on the second floor.

49. The fire gutted the entire two-story Personal Care unit.

50. Unable to escape, Mr. and Mrs. Parker suffered gruesome, agonizing, and lonely

deaths.

51. Two other tenants, Theresa Malloy, age 85, and Mildred Gadde, age 93, were also

killed.

52. 27 people were injured, and 133 residents were displaced.

53. More than 400 emergency responders arrived at the scene to battle the 50-foot-

high blaze and evacuate the community’s 137 residents.

54. On November 21, 2017, four days later, the remains of Thomas and Delores

Parker were excavated from the rubble inside the charred shell of their former home.

II. ORIGIN AND CAUSE: DEFENDANTS FAILED TO ENFORCE A STRICT NON- SMOKING POLICY

55. The fire ignited at approximately 10:45 PM on an outdoor patio on the west side

of the Woolman Building at the Barclay Friends facility.

56. The fire started when an employee, who had been smoking on the Woolman

patio, carelessly discarded a lit cigarette into a trashcan containing combustible materials that

was in close proximity to the building’s exterior wall.

57. At all relevant times, pursuant to the applicable standard of care for housing

persons on supplemental oxygen therapy, Defendants, Barclay Friends and/or Kendal, were

responsible for enforcing a strict non-smoking policy at the facility, because Barclay Friends

residents required supplemental oxygen. Smoking cigarettes or other tobacco products in close

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proximity to concentrated oxygen would substantially increase the risk of fire and therefore

increase the risk of serious injury or death to the residents.

58. “No Smoking” was a long-standing and posted policy and signs such as the one

below were posted throughout the facility:

59. Defendants, Barclay Friends and/or Kendal, failed to strictly enforce the required

non-smoking policy for employees, residents, and visitors.

60. A post-fire inspection identified used cigarette butts littering the property,

demonstrating not only that the non-smoking policy was unenforced, but also that Defendants,

Barclay Friends and/or Kendal, had actual or constructive notice of the unreasonable risk of

harm posed by their employees’, or others’, frequent smoking on the premises.

III. DEFENDANTS FAILED TO PROPERLY EVACUATE THOMAS AND DELORES PARKER FROM THE BUILDING

61. After the fire started, Defendants, Barclay Friends and/or Kendal, failed to

properly evacuate the residents of the Woolman Building, including Thomas and Delores Parker.

62. Thomas and Delores Parker were elderly dementia patients and, although they

were capable of using stairs, their age, physical condition and dementia rendered them unable to

timely descend the two flights of stairs to the first-floor exit without assistance.

63. In their day-to-day lives at the facility, the Parkers were accustomed to using the

elevator to travel between the first floor and second floor where they resided, however, the

elevator was automatically shut down at the time of the fire.

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64. Without help from Defendants’ staff or access to the elevator, Thomas and

Delores Parker had no means of timely escape.

65. Instead of locating and evacuating the Parkers, Defendants, Barclay Friends

and/or Kendal, left them behind to burn to death.

IV. AN IMPROPERLY CONSTRUCTED EXTERIOR WALL ALLOWED THE FIRE TO BREACH AND SPREAD THROUGH THE BUILDING, AND THE FIRE ALARM WAS NOT LOUD ENOUGH TO ALERT THE RESIDENTS OF THE EMERGENCY

66. The Barclay Friends facility was constructed in 1997 by Defendant, Davis &

Sons, the general contractor.

67. Defendant, Davis & Sons, was involved in the preparation or the scope of the

architectural plans and/or employed the now-defunct architectural firm, NBL Associates, PC

(“NBL”), and Neil B. Liebman, AIA, to design the architectural plans.

68. Defendant, DHSSE, by and through its principal, Daniel H. Socket, P.E., signed

and sealed the architectural drawings.

69. Construction documents show that the exterior wall was improperly built: a ½

inch gypsum board should have been installed under the vinyl siding, which would have:

a. bolstered the fire resistance rating of the exterior wall for exposure to fire from the outside;

b. delayed and/or prevented the spread of the fire into the building’s interior; including the floor/ceiling assembly;

c. allowed more time for evacuation; and,

d. allowed the residents a chance to attempt to escape on their own.

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70. Post-fire inspection photos demonstrate that the necessary ½ inch exterior gypsum

board was not included in the ultimate construction:

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71. Further stripping the Parkers of precious time to escape the blaze, the sound of the

fire alarm did not meet the requisite decibel value as required by the building codes in the

resident bedrooms, and therefore was not loud enough to timely alert the Parkers of the fire.

V. THE SPRINKLER SYSTEM FAILED TO DISCHARGE WATER BECAUSE THE SPRINKLER VALVE WAS CLOSED AND THE TAMPER SWITCH MONITORING THE VALVE FAILED TO SOUND AN ALARM A. Water was cut off from the sprinkler system before the fire started

72. Once the fire entered the interior of the structure, the fire protection system should

have triggered, thereby controlling and/or suppressing the fire and allowing time for evacuation.

73. The sprinklers were designed to respond to a rise in temperature.

74. Once the system was triggered by the increased temperature, water was intended

to flow freely through the pipes toward a fire. The sprinklers covered the basement, first floor,

second floor, and attic of the Woolman Building.

75. However, before the fire, the valve responsible for controlling the flow of water

into the piping system—Valve “A”— had been closed, effectively cutting off the flow of water

to the sprinklers. The below photograph shows the position of the valve stem as it was found

immediately after the fire: fully depressed below the handle and into the gate, indicating that the

valve had been fully closed with no water passing through it.

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76. Therefore, when the fire entered the interior of the structure, although the system

was presumably triggered or actuated due to the increase in temperature, no water flowed to the

sprinklers because the main fire protection valve was turned off.

77. Further, a post-incident investigation revealed that the sprinkler piping was

clogged with sediment and debris, which may have blocked the flow of water even if Valve A

was open.

B. The Valve A tamper switch was improperly installed, calibrated, inspected and/or maintained and failed to alert that the valve had been closed

78. Valve A was designed and equipped with a tamper switch that should have

actuated a supervisory trouble alarm when the fire protection valve, Valve A, was turned off.

79. However, because the tamper switch had been improperly designed, installed,

inspected, and/or calibrated, it failed to provide a notification that Valve A had been closed.

80. In fact, testing of the tamper switch on Valve A revealed that when the valve was

fully closed, the tamper switch on Valve A registered the valve as being fully open—a total

failure of the switch’s only function.

81. Therefore, the tamper switch did not signal a warning that the flow of water had

been cut off to the sprinkler system.

82. Testing on the tamper switches attached to at least three other sprinkler valves,

which were downstream from Valve A, revealed similar malfunctions: further demonstrating the

building’s fire protection system had been improperly installed, inspected and/or maintained.

83. The door to the mechanical room, which housed Valve A and the remainder of the

fire suppression system, had been locked; thereby preventing anyone from reopening the valve

and allowing water to flow freely to the sprinkler heads.

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84. Thus, the sprinklers never delivered water onto the flames as required, and the

system intended to monitor the functionality of the sprinklers did not identify and notify of the

failure.

VI. EVEN IF THE SPRINKLERS WERE TURNED ON—THE SPRINKLER SYSTEM WAS IMPROPERLY DESIGNED, THERE WERE NOT ENOUGH SPRINKLERS TO PROTECT THE ENTIRE BUILDING AND THE SYSTEM WAS WOEFULLY INADEQUATE FOR FIGHTING A FIRE (FACTS PLEAD IN THE ALTERNATIVE)

A. Even if Valve A was open, the Woolman Building was designed with insufficient fire protection

85. As previously mentioned, the Personal Care unit was designed by Defendant,

Davis & Sons, by and through NBL and Mr. Liebman.

86. Defendants designed the building with a partial basement, a first floor, a second

floor and an attic.

87. The first and second floors were supported by open web wood truss joists.

88. An unsprinklered combustible concealed space existed between the basement

ceiling and first floor, and between the first-floor ceiling and the second floor.

89. The roof sloped 6:12 and was supported by pre-engineered wood trusses.

90. The facility was designed with three distinct units: Skilled Care, Administration,

and Personal Care—the unit where Plaintiff’s mother and father, Thomas and Delores Parker,

resided at the time of their death.

91. In designing the Personal Care unit, Defendant, Davis & Sons, by and through

NBL and Mr. Liebman, determined that the Personal Care wing constituted an Institutional-1 (“I-

1”) use and occupancy group under the 1993 BOCA National Building Code (“BOCA”), which

had a direct impact on the design requirements for the building’s sprinkler system.

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92. An I-1 structure is defined as a building “which houses six or more individuals

who, because of age, mental disability, or other reasons, must live in a supervised environment

but who are physically capable of responding to an emergency situation without personal

assistance.” Under the BOCA Code, an individual’s mental condition—such as Thomas and

Delores Parkers’ dementia—can render them physically incapable of responding to an

emergency.

93. This was a critical design error because the Woolman Building—the Personal

Care unit—functioned as the facility’s dementia wing; and its residents, including Thomas and

Delores Parker, were not physically capable of responding to an emergency situation without

personal assistance due to their dementia.

94. The building’s classification as an I-1 use group is critical because the

classification has direct impact on the design requirements for the building’s fire suppression

system—a properly classified I-1 unit, in which residents are physically equipped to escape a fire

on their own, can have less fire protection than a building that houses dementia patients who, as

in this case, are not capable of appreciating and responding to a fire in time to escape on their

own.

95. Because the Woolman Building housed residents, such as Thomas and Delores

Parker, who because of their age, physical ability and mental disability could not escape a fire on

their own, the building should have been classified as an I-2 unit, which requires extra fire

protection—e.g., additional sprinklers—under the standards in NFPA 13.

96. Instead, due to the improper classification as an I-1, the Personal Care section was

sprinklered to the less-stringent NFPA 13R standard, which allows a lower hydraulic design

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density, omission of sprinklers in combustible concealed spaces, in small closets and in

bathrooms that meet the criteria outlined in NFPA 13R.

97. This design flaw allowed the fire to spread quicker and allowed less time for the

building’s residents, particularly Thomas and Delores Parker, to escape.

B. Even if Valve A was open and the building had the proper number of sprinklers, the sprinkler system was improperly designed with inadequate water pressure and failed to discharge water onto the fire

98. Upon information and belief, Defendant, Marco, was the fire protection contractor

hired by the general contractor to design the facility’s water-based fire protection system.

99. Defendant, Marco, designed the fire protection system and sprinkler system, by

and through its employee and/or agent Donald L. Vess.

100. Defendant, Kohn Engineering, and Donald J. Kohn, PE, reviewed and approved

the sprinkler designs prior to the application for a building permit.

101. Therefore, both Defendants, Marco and Kohn Engineering, were responsible for

ensuring the sprinkler system was properly designed.

102. The approved fire protection drawings consist of twelve (12) 30 x 42-inch

drawings, FP-1 through FP-11, which detail the valve, pipe, and sprinkler layout.

103. The approved hydraulic calculations consist of seven (7) hydraulic design areas.

104. Defendant, Marco, along with, by and/or through Mr. Vess, designed wet pipe

systems for the heated areas of the Personal Care, Administration, and Skilled Nursing units, and

dry pipe systems for the unheated areas of the Personal Care, Administration, and Skilled

Nursing units.

105. In designing a sprinkler system, several variables must be accounted for and

considered in calculating the requisite sprinkler system pipe diameter; otherwise the system

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could fail to produce enough water pressure or flow to discharge water from the sprinkler heads

during a fire.

106. Factors to be considered include, but are not limited to: Static P.S.I., Residual

P.S.I., water flow, and the design of the underground water supply—these figures were

significantly different between the fire protection drawings and the hydraulic calculations, when

they should have matched, demonstrating design errors in the sprinkler system.

107. For example, on FP-1, Defendants Marco and Kohn Engineering, along with

and/or through Mr. Vess, identified the water data as Static 90 P.S.I, Residual 20 P.S.I., Flow of

363 gallons per minute (“GPM”), and the underground water supply as being six (6) inches in

size.

108. However, on the hydraulic calculations, Defendants intentionally misrepresented

and/or negligently miscalculated the water data as Static 90 P.S.I., Residual 20 P.S.I., a different

flow of 663 GPM, and a different underground water supply of eight (8) inches in size.

109. Additionally, on one design document, Defendants Marco and Kohn Engineering,

along with and/or through Mr. Vess, identified the lineal feet of pipe, from the inside of the

personal care basement to the water mains on Goshen Avenue as being only 50 feet with a tee,

gate valve and 90-degree bend.

110. However, the site drawings identified different information showing 620 feet

from the building to the connection on Goshen Avenue with a 90-degree bend, three (3) 45-

degree bends, tee and gate valves.

111. Additionally, Defendants Marco and Kohn Engineering, along with and/or

through Mr. Vess, incorrectly applied NFPA 13R omissions and reductions in the design of the

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Personal Care section, despite the BOCA requirement for an NFPA 13 system. In violation of the

required NFPA 13, Defendants:

1. omitted sprinklers in combustible concealed spaces;

2. hydraulically calculated a density of only .081 GPM/sq. ft.;

3. hydraulically calculated design areas smaller than required; and,

4. calculated only 12 GPM flowing from the hydraulic design area sprinklers, despite the requirement for “not less than 13 GPM per sprinkler to the number of design sprinklers.”

112. Further, on the Area No. 2 Hydraulic Calculation Summary Sheet (for a portion of

the Personal Care unit) Defendants incorrectly identified that a “14.8 GPM/sq. ft.” density was

used.

113. In reality, on the Area No. 2 Summary of Sprinkler Outflows, the computer

program identified the actual sprinkler flows being 12.00 to 12.58, which by a simple

mathematical equation confirms that only a .081 GPM/sq. ft. density was calculated by

Defendants, who intentionally and/or negligently failed to identify a .081 density on the Area

No. 2 hydraulic calculations, which would have been appropriate for this building.

114. On all of the other hydraulic area calculations, Defendant identified a seemingly

appropriate density of .1 or .15 GPM/sq. ft.

115. Based on Defendants’ aforementioned intentional misrepresentations and/or

negligent miscalculations, they designed and installed a one-inch CPVC main to supply 286

sprinklers in the Personal Care unit—which was inadequate to deliver the necessary amount of

water to the sprinkler heads in the event of a fire.

116. Additionally, Defendants Marco and Kohn Engineering, along with and/or

through Mr. Vess, failed to compute the true and correct distance up the slope of the attic, and

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therefore designed small orifice sprinklers not equipped to protect 100% of the attic in violation

of NFPA 13.

117. Moreover, in violation of NFPA 13, the attic sprinklers were not within 12 inches

of the peak, were not calculated with the proper hydraulic design area, and did not have the

minimum discharge pressure.

118. Given the totality of the design errors, the sprinkler system was not equipped to

suppress a fire.

119. Further investigation will likely lead to the identification of additional design

errors.

VII. THE WATER UTILITY FAILED TO PROVIDE ENOUGH WATER TO MEET THE DEMAND FOR FIREFIGHTER HOSES

120. In 1997, at the time the Barclay Friends facility was constructed, the water utility

was the Borough of West Chester.

121. Thereafter, the water main infrastructure was purchased, and operated at a profit,

by Defendants, Aqua.

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122. Defendants, Aqua, had an individual and/or collective duty to provide “reasonably

adequate and safe service to its customers,” meaning the utility must deliver a supply of water

sufficient to meet the demand of both interior fire protection equipment, such as the sprinkler

system, and external fire department hoses. See 52 Pa. Code § 65.17.

123. A recording of the firefighter radio from that evening indicates that firefighters

did not have sufficient water pressure to fight the fire.

124. Firefighters can be heard over the fire radio informing dispatch that there was not

enough water flow from the hydrants at the scene: “We need more water pressure, if you can ...

We are not really getting anything ... Totally losing water pressure here ... Tell [Aqua] it is a

priority of urgency.”

125. “There is no water pressure at all at the scene,” another firefighter says over the

radio.

126. Ultimately, the firefighters needed to pump water from a local hospital over 1200

feet away, resulting in significant delay.

127. With the fire left unchecked and uncontrolled, the inferno roared through the

Woolman Building’s Personal Care wing, where Thomas and Delores Parker were trapped alone

in their separate rooms on the second floor.

128. Just a few weeks before the fire, Aqua announced plans to replace the water main

that services the fire hydrants at Barclay Friends in an effort to “improve firefighting capabilities

in the area.”

129. Aqua spokesperson, Donna Alston, stated “[l]arger mains carry more water,

which increases water flow. Greater flow satisfies greater demands, including those for

firefighting.”

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130. Similar local projects within blocks of Barclay Friends have been conducted by

Defendants, Aqua, who in 2016 spent $234 million replacing aging water infrastructure in the

area, and in April 2017 announced plans for an additional $292 million in infrastructure

improvements throughout that year.

131. Aqua’s own statements about improving lacking firefighting capabilities at

Barclay friends, coupled with the firefighters’ statements over the fire radio stating there was not

enough water despite several requests to Aqua to increase their supply, demonstrates Aqua failed

to provide adequate water supply to the Barclay Friends facility.

VIII. OVERVIEW OF DEFENDANTS’ NEGLIGENCE, GROSS NEGLIGENCE, CARELESSNESS, RECKLESSNES AND/OR OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT

132. The macabre deaths of Thomas and Delores Parker were caused by Defendants,

acting individually and collectively, as follows:

133. Defendants allowed rampant cigarette smoking at the Barclay Friends facility

despite the known, significant risks of catastrophic injury or death to the facility’s residents—and

ultimately, this led to a fire that caused the deaths of four people, including the Parkers, and

seriously injured countless others.

134. Had Defendants properly constructed the Woolman Building’s exterior wall with

the ½ inch fire retardant gypsum board that was required by the architectural drawings, the

building’s exterior wall would have been properly rated to resist the spread of the fire from the

outdoor patio to the building’s interior.

135. Once the building caught fire, the fire alarm system—which Defendants had

failed to ensure met the decibel level required by the building codes—was not loud enough to

timely notify the Parkers that their lives were in danger.

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136. And instead of implementing an evacuation plan, Defendants left Thomas and

Delores Parker to burn to death in their rooms.

137. The fire spread so quickly that the Parkers did not have time to even attempt to

escape on their own because Defendants had turned off the water to the sprinkler system before

the fire started thereby rendering the fire suppression system completely useless.

138. However. even if there was water flowing to the sprinkler system, Defendants had

improperly installed fewer sprinklers than necessary to protect the building from burning up.

139. Further, even assuming the water was turned on, Defendants had improperly

designed the sprinkler system with woefully inadequate water pressure, and therefore, the system

likely would have been overwhelmed by the fire anyway.

140. Once Defendants allowed the building to become a raging inferno, they failed to

provide sufficient external water pressure for firefighters to combat the fire.

141. Defendants’ actions were negligent, grossly negligent, careless, reckless and/or

outrageous.

142. Therefore, Defendants, Barclay Friends, Kendal, Johnson Controls, Aqua, Davis

& Sons, Marco, Kohn Engineering, and/or DHSSE, are jointly and severally liable for the

catastrophic injuries and deaths of Plaintiff’s decedents, Thomas and Delores Parker.

WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL CLAIMS

143. Plaintiff, Kathryn McGill, hereby brings Wrongful Death claims pursuant to 42

Pa. C. S. § 8301 (the Pennsylvania Wrongful Death Statute), and Pa. R. C. P. 2202(a), as

Administrator of the Estates of Thomas and Delores Parker, deceased, on her own behalf, and on

behalf of all persons entitled by law to recover damages as a result of the wrongful deaths of

Thomas and Delores Parker.

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144. The names of all persons legally entitled to recover due to the wrongful deaths of

Thomas and Delores Parker are:

a. Kathryn McGill (daughter);

b. Barbara McDonald (daughter); and,

c. Marilyn Parker (daughter).

145. At no time during the lives of Thomas and Delores Parker did they, or anyone on

their behalf, bring an action to recover for personal injuries, and/or no other action has been

brought to recover for their death under the aforementioned statute.

146. Plaintiff, Kathryn McGill, claims all available damages under the Pennsylvania

Wrongful Death Statute, including, but not limited to, loss of financial contributions, future

services, support, society, comfort, affection, guidance, tutelage, and contribution that Plaintiff’s

decedents, Thomas and Delores Parker, would have rendered to the wrongful death beneficiaries

but for their traumatic, untimely, and unnatural deaths occurring as a result of the negligence,

gross negligence, carelessness, recklessness and outrageous conduct that is the subject of the

present action.

147. Plaintiff, Kathryn McGill, claims damages for payment of all expenses.

148. Plaintiff, Kathryn McGill, also brings a Survival Action under the Pennsylvania

Survival Statute, 42 Pa. C. S. § 8302, and pursuant to Pa. C. S. § 3373, for all damages

recoverable under the statute, including, but not limited to, loss of income both past and future,

pain and suffering prior to death, and emotional distress suffered by Plaintiff’s decedents,

Thomas and Delores Parker, from the time of first impact and/or injury to the final impact that

ultimately caused their deaths.

Case ID: 180601317

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COUNT I: NEGLIGENCE PLAINTIFF v. BARCLAY FRIENDS and KENDAL

149. Plaintiff incorporates by refence the allegations contained in all previous

paragraphs as if fully set forth at length herein.

150. The aforesaid fire and resulting catastrophic injuries, suffering and death

sustained by Plaintiff’s decedents, Thomas and Delores Parker, were caused as a direct and

proximate result of the negligence and/or carelessness of Defendants, Barclay Friends and/or

Kendal, acting individually and/or collectively, with all Defendants herein, by and through their

duly authorized employees, servants, and/or agents, which consisted of the following:

a. Vicarious liability for the negligent, grossly negligent, careless, reckless and wanton acts of smoking in a non-smoking facility by its employees, servants and/or agents;

b. Vicarious liability for the negligent, grossly negligent, careless, reckless and wanton acts of failing to extinguish a cigarette in a non-smoking facility by its employees, servants and/or agents;

c. Failing to implement the non-smoking policy for residents, visitors, and/or Defendants’ employees, servants, and/or agents;

d. Failing to strictly enforce the non-smoking policy for residents, visitors, and/or Defendants’ employees, servants, and/or agents;

e. Vicarious liability for the employee, servant and/or agent who started the fire; f. Failing to prevent a fire from starting and/or spreading; g. Failing to establish, create, promulgate, implement, enact, enforce and/or facilitate

proper procedures for preventing the start and/or spread of a fire; h. Failing to establish, create, promulgate, implement, enact, enforce and/or facilitate

proper procedures for fire safety; i. Failing to establish, create, promulgate, implement, enact, enforce and/or facilitate

proper emergency response and evacuation plans, policies and/or procedures; j. Establishing improper, inadequate and/or unsafe emergency response and evacuation

plans, policies and/or procedures; k. Failing to establish, create, promulgate, implement, enact, enforce and/or facilitate

proper procedures for reporting a fire; l. Failing to establish, create, promulgate, enact, enforce and/or facilitate proper

procedures for accounting for all residents after an emergency situation and/or evacuation;

Case ID: 180601317

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m. Failing to properly train and/or instruct employees, servants and/or agents how to properly respond to an emergency and/or evacuate residents of the facility;

n. Failing to adequately train, plan and/or supervise persons responsible for supervising an emergency response and/or evacuation of the residents;

o. Failing to establish, create, promulgate, enact, enforce and/or facilitate proper procedures for instructing residents in proper fire safety, emergency preparedness and evacuation;

p. Failing to properly account for and evacuate all residents of the facility, including Plaintiff’s decedents, Thomas and Delores Parker;

q. Failing to conduct required emergency evacuation drills; r. Failing to properly maintain records of required emergency evacuation drills; s. Failing to ensure that the fire suppression and/or sprinkler systems were properly

installed, inspected, maintained and/or repaired; t. Failing to establish, create, promulgate, implement, enact, enforce and/or facilitate

proper procedures for installing, inspecting, maintaining and/or repairing the fire protection and/or sprinkler systems to ensure they were in proper working condition;

u. Failing to properly install, inspect, maintain and/or repair the sprinkler pipes to ensure they were not clogged with debris and/or otherwise ensure they were in proper working condition;

v. Failing to properly install, inspect, maintain and/or repair the sprinkler valves to ensure they were open and/or otherwise ensure they were in proper working condition;

w. Failing to properly install, inspect, maintain and/or repair the tamper switches to ensure they were in proper working condition;

x. Failing to establish a system for ensuring that the fire protection and/or sprinkler systems were not tampered with;

y. Failing to ensure that the fire suppression and/or sprinkler systems were in proper working condition;

z. Failing to ensure that the sprinkler pipes and/or valves were in proper working condition;

aa. Failing to ensure that the tamper switches attached to the fire protection valves were in proper, working condition;

bb. Failing to establish, create, promulgate, implement, enact, enforce and/or facilitate proper procedures for installing, inspecting and/or maintaining the tamper switches attached to the fire protection valves;

cc. Improperly installing the facility’s fire protection and/or sprinkler systems, including the dry pipe, wet pipe, and/or antifreeze systems;

dd. Failing to ensure the fire protection and/or sprinkler systems complied with all applicable laws, codes and/or regulations;

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ee. Allowing a fire suppression and/or sprinkler system that violated code to exist; ff. Allowing a fire suppression and/or sprinkler system that would not effectively

suppress or control a fire to exist; gg. Failing to ensure the design and/or construction of the facility complied with all

applicable fire safety laws, codes and/or regulations; hh. Failing to ensure all combustible construction, including combustible concealed

spaces in the floor/ceiling assembly(s), were adequately protected by sprinklers as required by all applicable laws, codes and/or regulations;

ii. Failing to ensure that the fire alarm was loud enough to alert residents of a fire in violation of the applicable requirements, laws, codes and/or regulations;

jj. Failing to ensure the building’s roof, floors, floor assemblies, doors, and interior and exterior walls were in compliance with all applicable fire safety and/or fire resistance rating requirements, laws, codes and/or regulations;

kk. Failing to ensure the facility had the requisite fire hydrants, hose stations, and/or water pressure for firefighters responding to a fire;

ll. Failing to ensure the facility had the required number of portable fire extinguishers; mm. Failing to establish, create, promulgate, implement, enact, enforce and/or facilitate

proper procedures for reporting a fire and/or other emergency; nn. Failing to ensure proper routes of access for fire department and/or emergency

vehicles; oo. Failing to establish proper and accessible evacuation and egress routes; pp. Failing to have in place the proper automatic fire detection systems; qq. Violating OSHA 1910.38, 1910.39, 1910.159, 1910.160, 1910.161, 1910.164, and

1910.165; rr. Violating NFPA 13, Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems; specifically,

regarding installation of sprinklers in combustible concealed spaces; ss. Violating NFPA 25, Standard for the Inspection, Testing and Maintenance of Water-

Based Fire Protection Systems; tt. Violating 1993 BOCA Code Sections 504.1, 504.2, 504.4, 606.1, 705.1, 705.2, 710.3,

715.5, 904.1, 906.1, 906.2, 906.2.1, 918.1, 918.4, 918.4.1, 1014.11, 1019.1, 1019.2, 1019.3, 1403.5, and 1506.1.3;,

uu. Violating 2009 International Fire Code Section 310.1, 310.2, 404.1, 404.2, 404.3, 404.3.1, 404.3.2, 405.1, 405.2, 405.3, 405.4, 405.5, 406.1, 408.5, 408.5.1, 408.5.2, 408.5.3, 408.5.4, 408.5.5, 901.6, 903.5, 907.1, 907.2.6.1, 907.3, 907.9.2, 907.9.5, 4601.1, 4603.1, and 4603.6.2;

vv. Any/all additional acts of negligence, carelessness and/or recklessness identified through subsequent discovery; and,

ww. Any/all additional violations of applicable requirements, laws, codes and/or regulations.

Case ID: 180601317

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151. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence, gross negligence, carelessness

and/or recklessness of Defendants, Barclay Friends and/or Kendal, Plaintiff’s decedents, Thomas

and Delores Parker, suffered catastrophic injuries, suffering and death, for which Defendants are

jointly and severally liable.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Kathryn McGill, individually and as Administrator of the

Estates of Thomas and Delores Parker, deceased, demands damages of Defendants, jointly and

severally, for separate sums in excess of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00), including punitive

damages, delay damages pursuant to Pa. R. Civ. P. § 238, interest and allowable costs of suit and

brings this action to recover same.

COUNT II: RECKLESS AND OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT PLAINTIFF v. BARCLAY FRIENDS and KENDAL



153. Upon information and belief, the fire that took the lives of Thomas and Delores

Parker was started by an employee, servant and/or agent of Defendants, Barclay Friends and/or

Kendal, who was smoking on the back patio of the Woolman Building and recklessly discarded

said cigarette without ensuring it was completely extinguished, despite their knowledge that

smoking on the premises was in violation of posted non-smoking signs and a strict non-smoking

policy.

154. The facility was required to be a strictly non-smoking facility, and Defendants,

Barclay Friends and/or Kendal, were responsible for strictly implementing and/or enforcing the

non-smoking policy for their employees, servants and/or agents, as well as residents and/or

visitors.

Case ID: 180601317

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155. Defendants, Barclay Friends and/or Kendal, knew or should have known that

failing to strictly enforce the non-smoking policy could result in serious injury, suffering and

death to residents of the facility, specifically but not limited to, Thomas and Delores Parker.

156. Despite this knowledge, Defendants, Barclay Friends and/or Kendal, recklessly,

wantonly and/or willfully failed to implement and/or enforce the no smoking policy for their

employees, residents, and/or visitors.

157. As a demonstration of the Defendants willful, wanton and reckless misconduct,

after the fire consumed the building and took the lives of four residents, a search of the property

identified approximately eighty-five used cigarette butts littering the grounds of the facility; and

neighbors of the facility regularly observed employees, servants and/or agents of Defendants,

Barclay Friends and/or Kendal, smoking on the premises, including where the fire started on the

back patio of the Woolman Building.

158. Defendants, Barclay Friends and/or Kendal, had actual and/or constructive

knowledge of their employees, servants and/or agents smoking on the premises.

159. Despite this knowledge, Defendants, Barclay Friends and/or Kendal, allowed their

employees to continue smoking in clear violation of the non-smoking policy.

160. The failure of Defendants, Barclay Friends and/or Kendal, to prevent their

employees, servants, and/or agents from smoking on the property, despite actual and/or

constructive knowledge thereof, exhibited a willful, wanton and reckless disregard for the health

and safety of the residents of the facility as well as members of the public.

161. The actions and/or inactions of Defendants, Barclay Friends and/or Kendal, and

their individual and/or collective failure to prevent their employees, servants and/or agents from

smoking on the property, exhibited a reckless indifference to the health and safety of the

Case ID: 180601317

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residents of the facility as well as members of the public, specifically but not limited to Thomas

and Delores Parker.






COUNT III: NEGLGENCE PLAINTIFF v. BARCLAY FRIENDS, KENDAL, DAVIS & SONS and DHSSE





proximate result of the negligence and/or carelessness of Defendants, Barclay Friends, Kendal,

Davis & Sons, and/or DHSSE, acting individually and/or collectively, with all Defendants

herein, by and through their duly authorized employees, servants, and/or agents, which consisted

of the following:

a. Failing to ensure the design of the facility complied with all applicable fire safety laws, codes and/or regulations;

b. Failing to ensure the construction of the facility complied with all applicable fire safety laws, codes and/or regulations;

c. Failing to ensure all combustible construction, including combustible concealed spaces in the floor/ceiling assembly(s), were adequately protected by sprinklers as required by all applicable laws, codes and/or regulations;

d. Failing to ensure the building’s roof, floors, floor assemblies, doors, and interior and exterior walls were in compliance with all applicable fire safety and/or fire resistance rating requirements, laws, codes and/or regulations;

Case ID: 180601317

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e. Failing to ensure the facility had the requisite fire hydrants, hose stations, and/or

water pressure for firefighters responding to a fire;

f. Failing to ensure proper routes of access for fire department and/or emergency vehicles;

g. Failing to design the building in accordance with NFPA 13 as required;

h. Failing to ensure that the exterior wall was properly built with the required ½ inch gypsum board installed under the vinyl siding;

i. Failing to ensure that combustible concealed spaces were protected with the required 5/8-inch gypsum board and/or non-combustible insulation;

j. Failing to properly review the building designs before approving them;

k. Failing to establish, create, promulgate, implement, enact, enforce and/or facilitate proper procedures for the proper design of a building of this type and occupancy;

l. Failing to establish, create, promulgate, implement, enact, enforce and/or facilitate proper procedures for the proper construction of a building of this type and occupancy;

m. Establishing improper, inadequate and/or unsafe plans, policies and/or procedures for the proper design of a building of this type and occupancy;

n. Establishing improper, inadequate and/or unsafe plans, policies and/or procedures for the proper construction of a building of this type and occupancy;

o. Failing to establish proper and accessible evacuation and egress routes;

p. Failing to properly train and/or instruct employees, servants and/or agents how to properly design a building of this type and occupancy;

q. Failing to adequately train, plan and/or supervise persons responsible for properly constructing a building of this type and occupancy;

r. Vicarious liability for the negligent, grossly negligent, careless, reckless and wanton acts of failing to ensure the design and/or construction of the facility complied with all applicable fire safety laws, codes and/or regulations by its employees, servants and/or agents;

s. Violating OSHA 1910.38, 1910.39, 1910.159, 1910.160, 1910.161, 1910.164, and 1910.165;

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t. Violating NFPA 13, Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems; specifically, regarding installation of sprinklers in combustible concealed spaces;

u. Violating 1993 BOCA Code Sections 504.1, 504.2, 504.4, 606.1, 705.1, 705.2, 710.3, 715.5, 904.1, 906.1, 906.2, 906.2.1, 918.1, 918.4, 918.4.1, 1014.11, 1019.1, 1019.2, 1019.3, 1403.5, and 1506.1.3;,

v. Violating 2009 International Fire Code Section 310.1, 310.2, 404.1, 404.2, 404.3, 404.3.1, 404.3.2, 405.1, 405.2, 405.3, 405.4, 405.5, 406.1, 408.5, 408.5.1, 408.5.2, 408.5.3, 408.5.4, 408.5.5, 901.6, 903.5, 907.1, 907.2.6.1, 907.3, 907.9.2, 907.9.5, 4601.1, 4603.1, and 4603.6.2;

w. Any/all additional acts of negligence, carelessness and/or recklessness identified through subsequent discovery; and,

x. Any/all additional violations of applicable requirements, laws, codes and/or regulations.


and/or recklessness of Defendants, Barclay Friends, Kendal, Davis & Sons, and/or DHSSE,

Plaintiff’s decedents, Thomas and Delores Parker, suffered catastrophic injuries, suffering and

death, for which Defendants are jointly and severally liable.






COUNT IV: RECKLESS AND OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT PLAINTIFF v. BARCLAY FRIENDS, KENDAL, DAVIS & SONS and DHSSE



166. Defendants, Barclay Friends, Kendal, Davis & Sons, and/or DHSSE, were

responsible for designing and/or constructing the Barclay Friends facility, including the Personal

Case ID: 180601317

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Care wing—the Woolman Building—where Plaintiff’s decedent’s, Thomas and Delores Parker,

resided and ultimately burned to death.

167. At all times relevant, Defendants, Barclay Friends, Kendal, Davis & Sons and/or

DHSSE, knew or should have known that failing to ensure that the building was properly

constructed according to the applicable code and/or fire safety requirements could result in

serious injury or death to the residents of the facility.

168. Despite this knowledge, Defendants, Barclay Friends, Kendal, Davis & Sons

and/or DHSSE, failed to ensure that the building was properly constructed according to the

applicable code and/or fire safety requirements.

169. As a demonstration of the Defendants willful, wanton and reckless misconduct,

after the fire consumed the building and took the lives of four residents, an investigation of the

property identified multiple design and/or construction errors, including, but not limited to, the

omission of a required ½ inch gypsum board under the vinyl exterior, which would have

significantly improved the fire resistance rating of the exterior wall for exposure to fire from the

outside.

170. Defendants, Barclay Friends, Kendal, Davis & Sons and/or DHSSE, had actual

and/or constructive knowledge of their employees, servants and/or agents failure to ensure that

the building was properly constructed according to the applicable code and/or fire safety

requirements.

171. The failure of Defendants, Barclay Friends, Kendal, Davis & Sons and/or

DHSSE, to ensure that the building was properly constructed according to the applicable code

and/or fire safety requirements, despite actual and/or constructive knowledge thereof, exhibited a

Case ID: 180601317

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willful, wanton and reckless disregard for the health and safety of the residents of the facility as

well as members of the public.

172. The actions and/or inactions of Defendants, Barclay Friends, Kendal, Davis &

Sons and/or DHSSE, and their individual and/or collective, total failure to ensure that the

building was properly constructed according to the applicable code and/or fire safety

requirements, exhibited a reckless indifference to the health and safety of the residents of the

facility as well as members of the public, specifically but not limited to Thomas and Delores

Parker.






COUNT V: NEGLIGENCE PLAINTIFF v. JOHNSON CONTROLS, MARCO and KOHN ENGINEERING





proximate result of the negligence and/or carelessness of Defendants, Johnson Controls, Marco

and/or Kohn Engineering, acting individually and/or collectively with all Defendants herein, by

and through their duly authorized employees, servants, and/or agents, which consisted of the

following:

Case ID: 180601317

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a. Failing to properly design, install, inspect, maintain and/or repair the fire suppression system and/or sprinkler systems;

b. Failing to properly perform the required hydraulic calculations in designing the fire suppression system and/or sprinkler systems;

c. Failing to properly calculate the required pipe size in designing the fire suppression system and/or sprinkler systems;

d. Failing to properly calculate the required sprinkler flows for the fire suppression system and/or sprinkler systems;

e. Failing to design, install, inspect, maintain and/or repair the fire suppression system and/or sprinkler systems in accordance with NFPA 13;

f. Failing to properly design, install, inspect, maintain and/or repair the fire suppression system and/or sprinkler systems to ensure adequate water flows for external firefighter hose streams;

g. Failing to properly design, install, inspect, maintain and/or repair the fire suppression system and/or sprinkler systems to ensure adequate water flows for the sprinkler system;

h. Failing to identify, recognize, appreciate and/or repair the defective and/or dangerous condition(s) of the fire suppression and/or sprinkler systems;

i. Failing to maintain the fire suppression and/or sprinkler systems in proper, working condition;

j. Failing to properly monitor, test, inspect and/or repair the fire suppression and/or sprinkler systems;

k. Allowing a dangerous condition(s) to exist within the fire suppression and/or sprinkler systems;

l. Failing to properly design, install, inspect, maintain and/or repair the valve system, specifically but not limited to, “Valve A” on the fire suppression and/or sprinkler systems;

m. Closing and failing to re-open the “Valve A” that controls the flow of water to the fire suppression and/or sprinkler systems;

n. Failing to ensure that the “Valve A” that controls the flow of water to the fire suppression and/or sprinkler systems was open and/or otherwise properly operational;

o. Failing to properly design, install, inspect, maintain and/or repair the tamper switches on the fire suppression and/or sprinkler systems valves;

p. Failing to that the tamper switches on the fire suppression and/or sprinkler systems valves were in proper, working condition;

q. Failing to ensure that the tamper switches were properly calibrated and in proper working order;

Case ID: 180601317

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r. Failing to properly design, install, inspect, maintain and/or repair the fire suppression and/or sprinkler systems to ensure that all required areas of combustible material were accounted for and/or properly covered by required sprinklers;

s. Failing to ensure the proper flow of water through open valves, pipes and/or sprinklers of the fire suppression and/or sprinkler systems;

t. Performing improper and/or incomplete test, inspections and/or maintenance of the fire suppression and/or sprinkler systems;

u. Failing to ensure any and all electrical components of the fire suppression and/or sprinkler systems were in proper working condition and appropriately communicated with the system;

v. Failing to ensure the fire suppression and/or sprinkler systems would actuate when required;

w. Failing to ensure the alarm systems properly communicated with the local fire department;

x. Failing to properly maintain the dry pipe, wet pipe, and/or antifreeze systems; y. Hiring incompetent employees, servants and/or agents; z. Failing to ensure proper auditing and/or supervising of inspections, testing, repairs

and/or maintenance of the fire suppression and/or sprinkler systems by its employees;

aa. Failing to properly and adequately train its employees, servants and/or agents regarding how to properly design, install, inspect, repair and/or maintain the fire suppression and/or sprinkler systems;

bb. Failing to maintain any and all components of the fire suppression and/or sprinkler systems in compliance with applicable laws, codes and/or regulations, including, but not limited to, the standards promulgated by the National Fire Protection Association, including NFPA 13 and NFPA 25;

cc. Violating OSHA 1910.159, 1910.160, 1910.161, 1910.164 and 1910.16; dd. Violating 1993 BOCA Code Sections 904.1, 906.1, 906.2, 906.2.1, 918.1, 918.4,

and 918.4.1; ee. Violating 2009 International Fire Code Sections 901.6, 903.5, 907.1, 907.2.6.1,

907.3, 907.9.2, and 907.9.5. ff. Any/all additional acts of negligence, carelessness and/or recklessness identified

through subsequent discovery; and, gg. Any/all additional violations of applicable requirements, laws, codes and/or

regulations.


and/or recklessness of Defendants, Johnson Controls, Marco and/or Kohn Engineering,

Case ID: 180601317

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Plaintiff’s decedents, Thomas and Delores Parker, suffered catastrophic injuries, suffering and

death, for which Defendants are jointly and severally liable.






COUNT VI: RECKLESS AND OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT PLAINTIFF v. JOHNSON CONTROLS, MARCO and KOHN ENGINEERING

176. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all previous


177. Defendants, Johnson Controls, Marco and/or Kohn Engineering, were responsible

for designing, installing, inspecting, testing, maintaining and/or repairing the fire suppression

and/or sprinkler systems and ensuring that the systems were maintained in proper working

condition.

178. Defendants, Johnson Controls, Marco and/or Kohn Engineering, knew or should

have known that its failure to properly design, install, inspect, repair, test and/or maintain the fire

suppression and/or sprinkler systems to ensure the systems were in proper working condition

could result in severe injuries, suffering and death of the residents of the residents of facility,

specifically but not limited to, Thomas and Delores Parker.

179. Despite this knowledge, Defendants, Johnson Controls, Marco and/or Kohn

Engineering, failed to properly design, install, inspect, repair, test and/or maintain the fire

suppression and/or sprinkler systems to ensure the systems were in proper working condition.

Case ID: 180601317

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180. Additionally, Defendants, Johnson Controls, Marco and/or Kohn Engineering,

failed to properly design, install, inspect, test, repair and/or maintain the pipes, valves and tamper

switches of the fire suppression and/or sprinkler systems to ensure they were in proper, working

condition; despite knowing that failure to do so could result in severe injuries, suffering and

death of the residents of facility, specifically but not limited to, Thomas and Delores Parker.

181. Finally, Defendants, Johnson Controls, Marco and/or Kohn Engineering, failed to

ensure, inter alia, that the sprinkler system covered all combustible material, that the Valve A

was open and that the tamper switches were functioning properly.

182. Defendants committed multiple inexcusable failures at nearly every level of the

system, despite knowing that such failure could result in severe injuries, suffering and death of

the residents of facility, specifically but not limited to, Thomas and Delores Parker.

183. Defendants, Johnson Controls’, Marco’s and/or Kohn Engineering’s, failure to

properly design, install, inspect, repair, test and/or maintain the fire suppression and/or sprinkler

systems to ensure that the systems were in proper, working condition exhibited a reckless, willful

and wanton disregard for the health and safety of the residents of the facility and members of the

public, specifically but not limited to Thomas and Delores Parker.






Case ID: 180601317

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COUNT VII: NEGLIGENCE PLAINTIFF v. AQUA PA and AQUA AMERICA





proximate result of the negligence and/or carelessness of Defendants, Aqua, acting individually

and/or collectively with all Defendants herein, by and through their duly authorized employees,

servants, and/or agents, which consisted of the following:

a. Failing to ensure adequate water flow to the Barclay Friends facility sufficient to supply the demand for the fire protection system;

b. Failing to ensure adequate water flow to the Barclay Friends facility sufficient to supply the demand for external firefighter hoses;

c. Failing to ensure adequate water flow to the Barclay Friends facility sufficient to supply the demand for both the fire protection system and external firefighter hoses operating simultaneously;

d. Failing to ensure adequate water flow to the Barclay Friends facility sufficient to ensure the fire protection system would not be overwhelmed by the fire;

e. Failing to design, install, inspect, maintain and/or repair the proper infrastructure for ensuring adequate water supply to the Barclay Friends facility;

f. Failing to provide “reasonably adequate and safe service to its customers,” including the Barclay Friends facility, in violation of 52 Pa. Code § 65.17;

g. Failing to establish, create, promulgate, implement, enact, enforce and/or facilitate proper procedures for ensuring the proper water flow to the Barclay Friends facility;

h. Establishing improper, inadequate and/or unsafe plans, policies and/or procedures for ensuring the proper water flow to the Barclay Friends facility;

i. Failing to properly train and/or instruct employees, servants and/or agents how ensure the proper water flow to the Barclay Friends facility;

Case ID: 180601317

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j. Vicarious liability for the negligent, grossly negligent, careless, reckless and wanton acts of failing to ensure the proper water flow to the Barclay Friends facility in compliance with all applicable fire safety laws, codes and/or regulations by its employees, servants and/or agents;

k. Any/all additional acts of negligence, carelessness and/or recklessness identified through subsequent discovery; and,

l. Any/all additional violations of applicable requirements, laws, codes and/or

regulations.


and/or recklessness of Defendants, Aqua, Plaintiff’s decedents, Thomas and Delores Parker,

suffered catastrophic injuries, suffering and death, for which Defendants are jointly and severally

liable.






COUNT VIII: RECKLESS AND OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT PLAINTIFF v. AQUA PA and AQUA AMERICA

187. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all previous


188. Defendants, Aqua, was responsible for ensuring adequate water flow to the

Barclay Friends facility sufficient to supply the demand for the fire protection system as well as

external fire hoses.

189. Defendants, Aqua, knew or should have known that its failure ensure adequate

water flow to the Barclay Friends facility sufficient to supply the demand for the fire protection

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system as well as external fire hoses could result in severe injuries, suffering and death of the

residents of the residents of facility, specifically but not limited to, Thomas and Delores Parker.

190. Despite this knowledge, Defendants, Aqua, failed to properly ensure adequate

water flow to the Barclay Friends facility sufficient to supply the demand for the fire protection

system as well as external fire hoses.

191. Defendants committed inexcusable failures, despite knowing that failure to supply

adequate water flow could result in severe injuries, suffering and death of the residents of

facility, specifically but not limited to, Thomas and Delores Parker.

192. Defendants’ failure to properly ensure adequate water flow to the Barclay Friends

facility sufficient to supply the demand for the fire protection system as well as external fire

hoses exhibited a reckless, willful and wanton disregard for the health and safety of the residents

of the facility and members of the public, specifically but not limited to Thomas and Delores

Parker.






Respectfully Submitted,

McELDREW YOUNG /s/ James J. McEldrew, III, Esquire____ JAMES J. McELDREW, III, ESQUIRE DANIEL PURTELL, ESQUIRE IAN M. BRYSON, ESQUIRE Attorneys for Plaintiff, Kathryn McGill, Administrator of the Estates of Thomas and Delores Parker

Case ID: 180601317

Case ID: 180601317

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