m.a. thesis measuring the american public mood …. thesis measuring the american public mood toward...

M.A. Thesis

Measuring the American Public Mood toward

Israel

Guy Freedman

This thesis was carried out under the supervision

of Dr. Amnon Cavari from the M.A. program

of the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy & Strategy

at the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya

28th December, 2016

Abstract

Research into American public opinion toward Israel generally finds a supportive Amer-

ican public, becoming even more supportive as time progresses. This research has

usually focused on snapshots of data—single surveys containing many Israel-related

questions—or longitudinal analyses of a select few questions. In this thesis I am inter-

ested in the underlying feature of these items: an American public mood toward Israel.

To what extent is this mood—a general disposition Americans have toward Israel—

reflected in survey items that relate to Israel? The goal of this thesis is to test whether

such an underlying mood exists, to identify it and to provide a framework to measure it.

Using a set of CFA models of over 40 surveys, I demonstrate the common prefer-

ences Americans express when asked for their opinion of Israel in various formats and

uncover a multidimensional mood that survey items reflect. Measuring this mood in-

cludes a great deal of sensitivity to events and encompasses nearly all relevant public

opinion items that are available. The American public mood demonstrates a generally

supportive outlook on Israel, but also reveals instances in which, contrary to popular

belief, Americans are less supportive of Israel. I believe this research advances our

understanding of the underlying support for Israel in the American mind.

i

Contents

1 Introduction 1

2 Public Opinion and Foreign Policy 4

3 American Public Opinion toward Israel 93.1 American Sympathies: The Common Measure of Support for Israel . . 93.2 American Attitudes toward Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

4 Verifying an American Public Mood 254.1 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254.2 Data & Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284.3 Results: Confirming the Underlying Feature of an American Public

Mood toward Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

5 Measuring the American Public Mood 435.1 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 465.3 Addressing a (Potential) Temporal Bias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

6 Conclusions 55

7 Appendix: Public Opinion Items 59

References 67

ii

List of Tables

4.1 CFA Models (Anchor: Sympathy) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

4.2 CFA Models (Sympathy Unavailable) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

4.3 CFA Models (Two-Factor Models) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

5.1 Weighting the Dimensions of the American Public mood toward Israel 45

7.1 Category: Israel vs. Others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

7.2 Category: Israeli Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

7.3 Category: Evaluation of Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

7.4 Category: Israeli Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

7.5 Category: American Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

7.6 Category: Other Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

iii

List of Figures

3.1 American Sympathies in the Arab-Israeli Conflict (1967-2016) . . . 11

3.2 American Sympathies in the Arab-Israeli Conflict (1947-1949) . . . 15

3.3 American Views on Jewish Independence (March, 1948) . . . . . . . 18

3.4 American Views on Aid to Israel (1971-2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

3.5 American Views on Israel as an Ally (1977-2015) . . . . . . . . . . . 21

3.6 American Views on Israel as a Vital Interest (1978-2002) . . . . . . 22

4.1 Two Factor Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

5.1 Multidimensional Mood toward Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

5.2 American Public Mood toward Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

iv

Guy Freedman: Measuring the American Public Mood toward Israel v

“[. . . ] Hence, all my Flatland friends—when I talk to them about the un-

recognized Dimension which is somehow visible in a Line—say, ‘Ah, you

mean BRIGHTNESS’: and when I reply, ‘No, I mean a real Dimension’,

they at once retort, ‘Then measure it, or tell us in what direction it extends’.”

– (Abbott, 1884) –

Chapter 1

Introduction

A large body of work into the special relationship between Israel and the United States

(U.S.) emphasizes the role of an American public with favorable and supportive attitudes

toward Israel. Support for Israel is usually demonstrated by analyzing various items

repeatedly asked in public opinion polls. Research has either made use of snapshots,

analyzing a number of items asked together in a single survey, or of longitudinal data,

analyzing changes over time. Snapshots offer the use of a broad set of items, but are

limiting because they relate to a specific point in time. Longitudinal data can overcome

this limitation but includes a limitation of its own—the availability of only a few items

that were asked frequently enough, in relatively regular intervals, over a large span of

time, and that maintained consistency in wording.

The most frequently asked item—and therefore most frequently used in research—

is the ‘sympathy’ item, which asks respondents “in the dispute between Israel and the

Palestinians, which side do you sympathize with more—Israel, or the Palestinians”?

This item has a number of advantages that appeal to researchers, including its relative

consistent wording, the fact that it incorporates viewing Israel in opposition to a second

1

Guy Freedman: Measuring the American Public Mood toward Israel 2

entity, and its frequency. Between 1947, when the item first appeared in public opinion

polls, and 2016 the item appeared in 237 polls (an average of 3.4 polls a year). Between

1967, when the item began to appear in polls more frequently, and 2016, it appeared in

228 polls (4.6 polls a year on average). Despite its many advantages, using the sympathy

item as an indicator of support for Israel may be improved by accounting for additional

dimensions of the attitudes Americans hold toward Israel.

In this thesis I am in interested in whether or not there exists an American pub-

lic mood toward Israel, and to what extent the various public opinion items that are

available, express this mood. An American public mood refers to a general disposi-

tion Americans have toward Israel that manifests itself in similar preferences in public

opinion items. I argue Americans who largely favor Israel will express this favorabil-

ity across different public opinion items, and Americans who largely oppose Israel will

express their opposition across the different items. Taken together, we may be able to

measure the mood of the American public toward Israel, moving on a continuum of

support for Israel at one end, to opposition to Israel at the other end. The goal of this

thesis is to confirm the existence of such an underlying mood and to provide a frame-

work to measure it. To do so, I will demonstrate the common preferences Americans

express when asked for their opinion of Israel, its leaders, its policies and its relation-

ship with the United States (U.S.). I will use these different survey items—previously

treated separately in longitudinal research—to uncover a multidimensional mood, and

provide scholars with a comprehensive longitudinal index of the mood of Americans

toward Israel.

To achieve this goal, I use a series of confirmatory factor analyses on all U.S. sur-

veys that include four or more items relating to Israel and demonstrate how the different

proxies of support all measure the same underlying mood toward Israel. I offer a method


of coding all public opinion items that relate to Israel using three options: pro-Israel

stances, anti-Israel stances and neutral stances. Finally, I employ Stimson’s dyad ratio

algorithm (1999) for estimating policy moods and provide an aggregated annual mea-

surement of the American mood toward Israel over time (1947-2016). The American

public mood toward Israel can therefore be imagined as a multidimensional concept,

comprised of many parallel, but not separate, dimensions.

This thesis has both theoretical and methodological contributions to the existing lit-

erature and our understanding of American public opinion in the special relationship

between Israel and the U.S. First, scholars relying on public opinion items in quan-

titative and qualitative research, may benefit from the ability to use varying items to

measure support for Israel, rather than limit themselves to a recurring set of specific

items, namely sympathy. Second, a measure of support for Israel over time—developed

on the basis of all relevant items that are available—may provide scholars with an over-

all measurement of American public attitudes toward Israel that may be used either

as an explanatory or as an outcome variable in other research relating to the special

relationship, namely elite rhetoric, presidential decision-making, congressional votes

and media coverage. Third, scholars and practitioners alike may benefit from the un-

derstanding that positive and negative responses to the various Israel-related items that

appear in public opinion polls represent an overall measure of mood toward Israel.

I begin the thesis with a discussion of the literature on American attitudes concerning

American foreign policy and toward Israel. Next, I present my argument that there exists

an underlying mood in public responses to survey items concerning Israel and present

a series of confirmatory factor analysis models to test this argument. Finally, I develop

an annual index of this American public mood. I conclude with the contribution of my

findings to our understanding of American public views toward Israel.

Chapter 2

American Public Opinion and Foreign

Policy

Any endeavor to analyze or explain American public attitudes on a specific foreign

policy—the relationship with Israel—is naturally framed in the context of American

public attitudes on foreign policy. In this chapter I briefly review the literature on public

attitudes in the U.S. toward foreign policy.

Initial research into this field following WWII, largely dismissed American public

opinion on foreign policy on two grounds: (1) because it seemed volatile and ideolog-

ically unstructured, easily swinging from one world view to another (Almond, 1950;

Converse, 1964; Miller, 1967); and (2) because Americans overall exhibited low levels

of knowledge in foreign affairs (Almond, 1950; Bailey, 1948; Kriesberg, 1949).

At the height of the American debate concerning the Vietnam War, researchers be-

gan to find evidence challenging the consensus that public opinion on foreign policy

was volatile and unstructured. A major critique on the earlier research revolved around

their use of simplistic survey items. Research using a wider range of survey items that

4


allowed respondents to express their views rather than sort into simply favoring or op-

posing the administration’s policies, suggested clear, strong and stable views on foreign

policy among the mass public (Caspary, 1970; Holsti, 2004; Page & Shapiro, 2010;

Verba et al., 1967; Verba & Brody, 1970). Even when shifts were evident in mass atti-

tudes, research was able to rule them out as random shifts, and explain them as largely

being event-driven (Page & Shapiro, 2010; Peffley & Hurwitz, 1992; Shapiro & Page,

1988).

Zaller’s (1992) Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS) theory provided a major contribution

to our understanding of public opinion. The RAS model suggests people offer opinions

based on the information they have received, accepted to be true or useful and are able to

easily access (sample) at any given point in time. The more politically-engaged public

may receive more messages, but be less prone to accept them if they contradict their

prior beliefs, whereas the less engaged public may receive less messages, but find it

easier to accept new information that contradicts their prior beliefs. Public opinion

is therefore not a simple “doorstep response”, which is “made up as they go along”

(Alvarez & Brehm, 2002, p. 218), but rather a construct of predispositions. This model

offers an explanation as to how people form and provide opinions on events and/or

issues they lack relevant information about. This may especially be true on issues such

as foreign policy, an issue on which Americans demonstrate little interest and low levels

of knowledge, yet offer opinions nonetheless (Page & Bouton, 2006).

Over time the messages the American public has received from its elites have also

become clearer, because of the erosion of the bipartisan consensus on foreign issues

between Republicans and Democrats during the early stages of the Cold War. Follow-

ing the Vietnam war and especially following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a once

unique realm of bipartisanship, elites and the two parties have increasingly offered dif-


ferent views on foreign affairs (Beinart, 2008; McCormick & Wittkopf, 1990; Page &

Shapiro, 2010; Sobel, 2001). With clearer and more abundent elite messages available,

mass attitudes toward foreign policy have likewise diverged along ideological lines on

the appropriate role of the U.S. in the world (Holsti, 2004; Sobel, 2001; Wittkopf &

Maggiotto, 1983; Wittkopf & McCormick, 1993) offering an additional explanation for

the formation of public attitudes toward foreign policy and the shifts in mass opinions

on the topic.

The general understanding in current research is that public opinion on matters of

foreign policy is in fact coherent, structured and the fluctuations in a relatively stable

pattern can be reasonably explained (Aldrich, Gelpi, Feaver, Reifler, & Sharp, 2006;

Bardes & Oldendick, 1978; Baum & Groeling, 2010; Holsti, 2004, 2011; Hurwitz &

Peffley, 1987; Page & Bouton, 2006; Page & Shapiro, 2010; Peffley & Hurwitz, 1992;

Sobel, 2001; Wittkopf & Maggiotto, 1983). It is therefore no longer dismissed so easily,

nor is it considered to be random. Even so, there remains the question of why is public

opinion—specifically on foreign policy—important?

From a normative point of view, the study of public opinion on foreign policy is

important because public opinion in democratic institutions is the free expression of

the public’s will of and citizens’ preferences (Hume, 1964; Locke, 1689; Peters, 1995)

on the desired policy to handle external relations, threats and allies. Policy makers in

democracies should therefore pay attention to what the public wants (Manza, Cook, &

Page, 2002; Page & Bouton, 2006; Page & Shapiro, 2010). In other words, understand-

ing what the public wants and why, is a value in and of itself in a democracy.

Devising methods to correctly identify what the public wants and how its opinions

are formed, may also allow us to understand better its impact on policy. Empirically,

some evidence suggests that American leaders take mass attitudes into consideration—


either as a constraint on their policies, or by devoting effort to shape public opinion in

support of their policies. It is a difficult task proving a direct causal link between the

attitudes of the mass public and choosing or changing a policy at the elite level (Holsti,

2004; Powlick & Katz, 1998). Yet, research has been able to identify that presidents and

decision-makers actively pursue favorable mass opinions of their policies, in order to

justify them and successfully implement them (Bennet & Paletz, 1994; Ostrom. & Job,

1986; Rosenau, 1961; Sobel, 2001; Wittkopf & McCormick, 1993). The most recent

example of this is the attempt of the Bush administration to garner public support for

the war in Iraq in 2003 (Holsti, 2011). Critics have even argued that the influence mass

opinions have on decision-makers in democratic regimes may be dangerous because

presidents and elected representatives are often compelled to act based on the will of the

people, rather than what they believe is in the best interest for the people (de Tocqueville,

1835; Lippmann, 1995).

Despite the difficulty in identifying this causal link, and while the extent of the

public’s influence on foreign policy may be debated (e.g. Manza et al., 2002; Page &

Bouton, 2006), the literature offers a number of examples of instances in which public

opinion in the U.S. may have affected policy. President Johnson’s decision to reduce

U.S. involvement in Vietnam despite the fact that he had not achieved the goals he

set out, is believed by some to have been largely influenced by an American public

who had grown tired of the war and of it’s toll on American soldier’s lives. Other

examples include President Kennedy’s inability to open relations with China because

of opposition among the mass public, President Ford’s difficulty in pursuing a more

activist policy in Angola in 1975 and, following mass critique on his previous caution,

President George Bush’s decision to invade Panama in 1989 and his management of the

Gulf War in 1991 (Kusnitz, 1984; Small, 2004; Sobel, 2001; Weissberg, 1976).


Following this line of thought, developing a measure of the American public mood

toward for Israel may assist us in understanding the ‘special relationship’ that has devel-

oped between the two countries and the policies chosen—or not chosen—by the U.S.

toward Israel. For example, are presidents asked to approve high aid packages to Israel

because of an American public who largely favors aid to Israel? Or, are they able to

approve such packages because of a supportive public? And have Israeli leaders been

compelled to make certain concessions to Arab countries/the Palestinians because of a

constraining view among the American public? — These are empirical questions that

may be analyzed using a longitudinal measure of Americans’ mood toward Israel. In

the next chapter, I review the literature and findings on American public opinion con-

cerning American support for Israel and raise the challenges these present in accurately

assessing public support for Israel.

Chapter 3

American Public Opinion toward

Israel

What do we know of how Americans view Israel and what explains their opinions to-

ward Israel? In this chapter I provide a review of the existing literature on American

public opinion toward Israel as well as various public opinion items available for anal-

ysis. My goal is to demonstrate the supportive American views toward Israel as seen

both in the literature and in public opinion data, but also to raise certain questions re-

garding how we measure support for Israel among the American public and what are

the difficulties we might encounter when doing so.

3.1 American Sympathies: The Common Measure of

Support for Israel

The relationship between Israel and the U.S. is a unique case in modern politics and in-

ternational relations, often referred to as a ‘special relationship’ (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1998;

9


Bickerton, 2009; Lewis, 1999; Mordsen, 2009; Quandt, 2005; Reich, 1984; Thomas,

2007). Research emphasizes the role of many institutions on the development of this

relationship. These include presidents, Congress, pro-Israel interest groups, the me-

dia and public opinion. A great deal of research has been devoted to describing the

views of the American public toward Israel and explaining what influences these views.

Figure 3.1 for example, demonstrates the favorable views toward Israel based on the

most common measure used in previous work: sympathies in the Arab-Israeli con-

flict (See Bard & Pipes, 1997; Cavari, 2012, 2013; Gilboa, 1987; Mayer, 2004; Ryn-

hold, 2015). The sympathy question asks respondents “in the dispute between Israel

and the Arabs/Palestinians, which side do you sympathize with more—Israel, or the

Arabs/Palestinians”? 1 Asked regularly since 1967, the figure suggests Americans have

largely sympathized more with Israel than with the Arab/Palestinian side. Starting at a

little over 40% in 1967, American sympathies toward Israel have gradually increased

to nearly 60% in recent years. American sympathies toward the Arab/Palestinian side

have remained low, but have also steadily risen from virtually none at all, to a little under

20%. Not plotted in the figure are the share of respondents offering no clear preference

by reporting ‘both’, ‘neither’, ‘don’t know’ or refusing to answer, which has steadily

declined (Cavari & Freedman, 2015) to roughly 20%.

The sympathy measure is not the only public opinion item to appear in polls and

scholarly work but it is the most common. Yet, it appeals to researchers for a number

of reasons. First, it provides a measure of support that incorporates viewing Israel in

opposition to a second entity (the Arabs/Palestinians). When respondents are asked

to express their support for—or opinion of—another country, it is relatively easy to

1The item contrasts Israel and the main party in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Initially, the item asked forsympathies for Israel vs. Arab countries. Gradually, starting in the 1980s this item began replacing Arabcountries with the Palestinians, because they have become the main party in the conflict nowadays.


Figure 3.1: American Sympathies in the Arab-Israeli Conflict (1967-2016)

0

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%P

erc

ent

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015Year

Israel Arabs/Palestinians

In the dispute between Israel and the Arabs/Palestinians, whichside do you sympathize with more − Israel, or the Arabs/Palestinians?

Note: American sympathies have largely favored Israel over the Arab/Palestinian side, though both serieshave steadily increased over time. The lines represent Lowess smoothing lines with a bandwidth of 0.2.Not displayed are respondents who refrained from choosing a specific side by reporting ‘both’, ‘neither’,‘don’t know’ or refused to answer. N=313,045 across 228 surveys, available from the iPoll archive of theRoper Center.

express support if they are not asked to choose between two sides. Choosing one side

over the other makes the decision harder on respondents because choosing to support

one side or the other, comes at a cost. Second, the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli conflict has

been a topic on the American foreign agenda for over 60 years. Measuring support for

Israel using a topic that relates to the conflict and the American foreign agenda frames

the question in a meaningful context from an American point of view. Finally, from a

methodological point of view, it is relatively consistent in wording and in the choices

provided to respondents, which minimizes potential errors and provides scholars with

a comparable measure over time to examine longitudinal trends. It is by far the most


frequently asked item, providing researchers with over 200 data points since 1967 for

analyzing a general trend and over 120 data points for individual-level analysis.

Despite its many advantages, it may also have some drawbacks. First, the item asks

respondents about their sympathies. Sympathy is a moral emotion, suggesting feelings

of compassion or concern for another’s plight that include an ethical judgement of the

value in the other’s actions (Giner-Sorolla, 2013; Scheler, 2008). The feelings a public

or people feel toward another country may influence their views on the appropriate

policy toward said country (Page & Bouton, 2006). This is therefore one dimension

of the American public mood that may be linked to other dimensions, but it may not

account for all other dimensions. We may empirically test this link, and how well this

item accounts for other dimensions besides emotions. Page and Bouton (2006, p. 80)

even suggest that “warm feelings toward Israel have not automatically translated into

specific pro-Israel policy preferences,” further questioning the validity of using this or

other items exclusively on their own as an appropriate measure of support.

Second, in reviewing public opinion trends toward Israel, Page and Shapiro (2010,

p. 251) state the following:

“United States public opinion about the Middle East has followed a gen-

erally stable pattern of support for Israel but reluctance to get directly in-

volved in conflict. Within this basic framework, opinions have changed

somewhat in response to major events like wars and peacemaking attempts

and the Palestinian uprising. [. . . ] But levels of support for Israel have

varied with circumstances and events; support declined somewhat in the

1980s, for example, after Israel’s invasion of Lebanon and especially after

the Iran-Contra affair and the onset of the Palestinian Intifada.”


However, reviewing American sympathies in figure 3.1, do not necessarily demon-

strate such reactions to events. Between 1967 and 1985, sympathies toward Palestinians

did indeed rise from almost no sympathies at all to a little under 20% and has since re-

mained stable. These are the exact years in which Israel gained control of Jerusalem

and the West Bank, and the conflict became focused on Israeli-Palestinian tensions.

At the same time, sympathy for Israel rose from about 40% to about 50% and expe-

rienced a second rise at the turn of the century. While this suggests some reaction to

events—rooted both in domestic developments concerning U.S. foreign policy and in

foreign developments in the conflict itself—based on the sympathy item, support for

Israel seems to be increasing at a relatively regular pace and may not fully capture the

variation in the mood of the American public.

Third, while it is true that the conflict has long been a topic on the American for-

eign agenda, it not the only context in which the U.S. may support Israel. Scholars

and practitioners have offered many explanations to the special relationship and have

demonstrated it in a myriad of aspects, including common shared values, democratiza-

tion, Cold War politics, mutual interests, etc. To what extent do Americans associate

the conflict—and their views toward it—with their views of these other aspects in the

relationship between the two countries?

Finally, despite its relative frequency, it too suffers from gaps—points in time when

the item did not appear in public opinion polls and is unavailable. For example, in the

years 1994-1997, the sympathy item was not asked. Other times, it may have been

asked only once a year or once every two years. These intervals may inhibit our ability

to measure the American public mood toward Israel if we rely only on this one item,

and if attitudes toward foreign policy is often event-driven, these gaps in our data may

not properly capture the shifts in the public mood. In the next section, I present public


opinion data concerning the U.S.-Israel special relationship and demonstrate what the

analyses of these items reflect and the difficulties we encounter when examining them

separately.

3.2 American Attitudes toward Israel

The U.S. is considered by many to be Israel’s greatest ally and at least since the 1960s

(Bar-Siman-Tov, 1998), it has consistently and increasingly offered support for Israel,

more than any other country in the world. In this section I offer a review of public

opinion items, corresponding to major events and aspects of the U.S.-Israel relationship.

My goal is to demonstrate the supportive views Americans hold toward Israel, while

emphasizing that looking closely, this support varies over time, and across topics.

In 1947, President Truman voted in favor of the U.N partition plan, which included

an independent Jewish state in the land of Israel alongside an Arab state, and he subse-

quently decided to recognize Israel as a sovereign state on the eve of its independence on

May 14th, 1948 (Druks, 2001). Americans largely favored the partition plan and sympa-

thized with Israel (Gilboa, 1987). Figure 3.2 plots responses to the few occurrences of

the sympathy item throughout 1947-1948. A greater share of Americans sympathized

with the Jews in Palestine (mean=32.00%, SD=4.04) than with the Arabs (Mean=12.76,

SD=1.67).2 The two dashed lines respectively mark the U.N. partition vote (November

29th, 1947) and Israel’s date of independence (May 14th, 1948). The remaining 50-60%,

not displayed in the figure are respondents who refrained from choosing a specific side

(mean=55.38%, SD=4.78).2The survey for October 1947 was conducted a month prior to the war that broke out between the two

sides and asked respondents a hypothetical question—who would they sympathize with, if a war brokeout between the two. This may explain the slightly lower sympathy for Jews in this survey.


Figure 3.2: American Sympathies in the Arab-Israeli Conflict (1947-1949)

0

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%P

erc

ent

01oct1947 01apr1948 01oct1948 01apr1949Date

Jews Arabs

In the conflict in Palestine, do you sympathize with the Arabs or with the Jews?

Note: American sympathies on the eve of Israel’s independence indicate support for Israel was 12-22%higher than that of Arabs. The two dashed lines respectively mark the U.N. partition vote (November29th, 1947) and Israel’s date of independence (May 14th, 1948). The lines represent Lowess smoothinglines with a bandwidth of 0.4 (the lowest possible given the dispersion of the data points). N=10,914 fromeight surveys.

Figure 3.2 suggests that on the eve of Israel’s independence, Americans supported

Israel more than they did the Arabs, by a margin of 12-22% (the mean gap in favor of

Israel is 19.25%, SD=3.45). However, the distribution of sympathies also suggests that

on average, 55% of Americans expressed no clear position on the matter. In September

1948, 29% of Americans felt Israel “had the most right on its side” vs. 17% who felt

the Arabs were “more” right and 56% did not express a clear view. This item touches

less on an emotional identification, and more on a rational evaluation of who is more

justified. Yet, results resemble that of the sympathy question: only a small margin

in favor of Israel and a majority of Americans with no clear preference. In contrast,


Figure 3.3 plots responses to a survey from March 1948, asking respondents if the U.S.

should support a Jewish state—if the Jews were to declare one. The picture here is

slightly clearer: Americans supported the establishment of Israel by a 41 point margin;

51% of Americans felt the U.S. should support such a move and only 10% opposed.

The share of Americans abstaining is still quite large (39% combined), though roughly

15 points less than on the sympathies item. In 1956, Israel’s invasion into the Sinai

peninsula with the support of Britain and France, was met with great opposition from

the Eisenhower administration (Hahn, 2006). A 1956 poll asking the sympathy item

demonstrated 15% of Americans were more sympathetic toward Israel, five precent

sympathized with Egypt and 80% of Americans had no clear preference between the

two.

That a large portion of Americans did not have an opinion on the issue in 1948 —

or were unwilling to share it—is not surprising considering it was a new topic on the

American agenda and we might have expected little awareness to the issue among the

public. It would take time—perhaps not until the Kennedy and Johnson administrations3

(Bar-Siman-Tov, 1998; Little, 1993)—before Israel would become a meaningful part of

American foreign policy and Americans would develop an interest in Israel, or acquire

sufficient knowledge about it. In 1956 the issue became more complicated. On the one

hand, we might expect Americans to support Israel, yet their leadership did not. This

confusion among the public may have caused such a large share of Americans to abstain

from offering a clear preference. This image is important when developing a mood

index for American views toward Israel, because demonstrating a supportive American

public based on the ten point margin in favor of Israel is a significant distortion of the

3In fact, it was President Kennedy in 1962 who first suggested to Golda Meir, then Israel’s ForeignMinister that “The United States has a special relationship with Israel really comparable to what it haswith Britain over a wide range of issues.” (Bar-Siman-Tov, 1998)


true image: a majority of 80% had no clear preference. Such a mood index will have

to simultaneously capture the share of Americans with positive views toward Israel, the

share of Americans with negative views toward it, and the share of Americans with no

clear preference.

The literature on survey data has long debated how to treat nonresponses—respondents

who abstain from answering a specific survey item (See for example Berinsky, 2004;

Brehm, 1993; Converse, 1976; Faulkenberry & Mason, 1978; Krosnik et al., 2002;

Lawrence, 1989; Schuman & Presser, 1980). In many cases, we may be justified in

ignoring these nonresponses, for instance when trying to explain why a person may

choose one option over another, nonresponses may be unhelpful. However, I argue that

a proper mood index, should be able to express how big a share of the public has no

clear preference, because that in itself, demonstrates a certain public mood.

American support for Israel has manifested itself in many ways. Among them, since

the early 1970s, the U.S. has provided Israel with considerable amounts of economic

and military aid over the years, congruent with the American commitment to guaran-

teeing Israel’s qualitative military edge over its enemies (Clarke, 1995; McCain, 2007;

Sharp, 2010). The two most recent examples of this: the sale of 33 F-35 fighter jets—the

most advanced ever developed in U.S. history—to Israel (a benefit no other country in

the world has enjoyed. See The New York Times, 2016a) and a $38 billion aid package

to Israel (New York Times, 2016b). Figure 3.4 plots the amount of yearly aid pro-

vided to Israel in billions of dollars (USAID, 2016), together with American attitudes

toward providing aid to Israel. Aid to Israel peaked in the 1970s with over $12 billion in

1979 when Israel and Egypt signed the peace agreement, brokered by the U.S. (Princen,

1992; Smith & Stam, 2003; Telhami, 1990). Aid to Israel has since then steadily de-

clined though Israel remains the largest recipient of U.S. aid to date (receiving over $200


Figure 3.3: American Views on Jewish Independence (March, 1948)

51%

10%

21%18%

Encourage them Oppose them Neither, stay out Don’t know

Suppose the Jews in Palestine go ahead on their own and set up a Jewish state

anyhow. What should be the policy of our government toward the new Jewish state?

Note: The majority of American felt the U.S. should support a Jewish state—if the Jews were to declareone. N=1289.

billion all together—nearly $80 billion more than the runner-up, Egypt; see Cavari &

Nyer, 2016; Nathanson & Mandelbaum, 2012; Sharp, 2015; USAID, 2016). Following

a short period of opposition to aid to Israel (see Gilboa, 1987), throughout most of the

last 50 years, Americans have largely been split over the issue. Up until roughly the

year 2000, an average of 45% of Americans favored providing aid to Israel compared to

an average of 41% who opposed (leaving only 14% with no opinion). However, since

the turn of the 20th century we are witnessing an increasing gap in favor of aid to Is-

rael, reaching nearly 20 points in 2012 (58% in favor, 40% oppose). The figure plots

1971-2012 because data on public attitudes toward aid to Israel exist frequently only

from 1971 onwards. This is most likely because prior to 1971, aid to Israel amounted

to only one percent of U.S. foreign aid (Gilboa, 1987). In comparison, in 2016, aid


to Israel comprises 53% of U.S. foreign aid (Sharp, 2015). That pollsters began ask-

ing this question regularly since 1971, when aid to Israel became substantial, suggests

that the public mood toward Israel developed a new dimension, relating directly to U.S.

policy and affecting the American taxpayer. Pollsters, and perhaps policy-makers, de-

veloped an interest in the public’s views on aid to Israel, only when aid to Israel became

a substantial issue on the foreign agenda.

Figure 3.4: American Views on Aid to Israel (1971-2012)

0

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Perc

ent

24

68

10

12

Bill

ions o

f D

olla

rs

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010Year

Favor Aid Oppose Aid US aid to Israel

Note: Americans were split on support for aid to Israel till the year 2000. Since then, the majority ofAmericans have increasingly favored aid to Israel, though aid to Israel, in light gray in the background,has steadily declined over the years. The lines for public attitudes are Lowess smoothing lines with abandwidth of 0.2. N=171,509 across 121 surveys.

In other areas, that relate more directly to the special relationship between Israel

and the U.S., we may find even higher levels of support for Israel among the Ameri-

can public. Research into the special relationship has suggested the shared interests the

two countries have in common have allowed for the development of such a relation-


ship (Lewis, 1999; Reich, 1984; Thomas, 2007). These shared interests have resulted

in extensive military cooperation (intelligence, U.S. army bases, joint exercises, joint

military developments and more) as well as close diplomatic relations (Bard & Pipes,

1997; Cohen, 2012; Freedman, 2012). During the Cold War, Israel gained favor with the

U.S. because of its alliance with the Western bloc and provided the U.S. with a gateway

into the Middle East, an area under heavy soviet influence (Lewis, 1999; Quandt, 2005;

Reich, 1984). Israel even proved itself a formidable ally in 1970, when at the request of

the U.S., it moved forces into the Golan Heights. Following Jordanian activity in Pales-

tinian refugee camps in its territory, Soviet backed Syria threatened to retaliate against

Jordan. The U.S., tied up at the time in Vietnam, was unable to offer an immediate move

of its own and Israel agreed to act, thereby signaling to Syria that it would not be able

to act against Jordan without due punishment (Garfinkle, 1985; Freedman, 1991).

Indeed, reviewing what the American public feels concerning Israel as an ally and

a strategic asset, demonstrates very supportive Americans views of Israel. Figure 3.5

plots how Americans view Israel—as an ally, a friendly nation, unfriendly or an enemy.

Since the late 1970s, when the item was asked relatively consistently, most Americans

have viewed Israel either as an ally or a friendly nation. The percentage of Americans

who view Israel as an ally has risen from 30% to a little under 50% while those view-

ing Israel as a friendly nation has declined from over 40% to roughly 30%. Coupled

together, positive attitudes toward Israel have ranged between 70-80%. Less than 10%

have viewed Israel as an enemy and unfriendly perceptions of Israel peaked at 20% in

the early 1990s but has since declined to 10%. Not displayed are respondents who ex-

pressed a neutral stance or preferred not to answer, which declined from 20% in the late

1970s to 5% in recent years.

Whether or not mutual interests and Israel’s reliability as an ally are important to the


Figure 3.5: American Views on Israel as an Ally (1977-2015)

0

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%P

erc

ent

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015Year

Ally Friendly Unfriendly Enemy

Tell me if you feel that Israel is a close ally of the U.S., is friendly, but not a close ally,is not friendly but not an enemy, or is unfriendly and an enemy of the U.S.

Note: Americans largely see Israel as an ally or friendly nation. Not displayed are respondents whoexpressed a neutral stance or preferred not to answer. Lines are Lowess smoothing lines with a bandwidthof 0.2. N=67,907 across 54 surveys.

special relationship at large, clearly Americans see Israel as an ally. A similar pattern

emerges when reviewing whether or not Americans view Israel as a vital interest. Amer-

icans have consistently viewed Israel as a vital interest, as depicted in Figure 3.6. The

lowest percentage of Americans who felt Israel was a vital interest was 64% in 1994

and the highest was 79% in 2002.

Despite these trends of overwhelming support for Israel, Americans have exhib-

ited slightly different patterns concerning U.S. actions in the United Nations. In 1975,

following the U.N. resolution 3379 claiming Zionism is racism and a form of racial

prejudice (Lewis, 1976), 49% of Americans disapproved of this vs. nine percent who

approved (and 42% were unsure). In 1979 the PLO and some Arab countries wished to


Figure 3.6: American Views on Israel as a Vital Interest (1978-2002)

78%

8%

75%

15%

76%

11%

67%

20%

64%

22%

69%

25%

79%

17%

1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002

Tell me whether you feel the U.S. does or does not have a vital interest in Israel.

Does Does not

Note: An overwhelming majority of Americans have consistently viewed Israel as a vital Americaninterest. The item appeared in a 1999 survey as well; 1998 represents the mean of both years: 69% feltIsrael was a vital interest in both 1998 and 1999; 22% in 1998 and 27% in 1999 felt Israel was not a vitalinterest. N=40,914 across eight surveys.

amend U.N. resolutions 242 and 338, which recognized Israel’s right to exist, to include

recognition of the right of Palestinian Arabs to self-determination. An August 1979 sur-

vey found 47% of Americans favored an American veto of this measure in the Security

Council and 36% opposed. However, in 1993, following Israel’s decision to deport 400

Palestinians to Lebanon, Americans were slightly less supportive of Israel’s chosen pol-

icy: 41% of Americans favored U.N. sanctions on Israel and 38% opposed. In 1997, the

U.S. vetoed a Security Council vote condemning Israel for its plan to build 6,000 Jewish

homes in East Jerusalem. Americans were completely split: 43% felt the U.S. was right

to veto this vote and 43% felt the U.S. was wrong. Finally, 47% of Americans approved

of the 2002 Security Council resolution calling on Israel to withdraw its troops from


certain occupied territories, and 28% disapproved.

If we were to measure the mood of Americans based on their views toward these

Israeli, American and international policies, results would suggest a mixed mood. On

some of the items above, Americans were closely split between two opposing views.

On other issues, they favored Israel and on some they did not. This image adds new

perspectives to American public support for Israel, as depicted so far by other items

(mainly the sympathy item).

Finally, American views toward Israel are not limited to Israel as a foreign state,

but also its involvement within the U.S, namely pro-Israel interest groups. These are

comprised largely of, but not limited to, Jewish organizations (AIPAC, more recently J-

Street and others), and they have been successful in promoting a pro-Israel agenda both

in Congress and in the presidency (Bard, 2009; Bickerton, 2009; Thomas, 2007; Wax-

man, 2012). This line of research has also generated a critical point of view concerning

American support for Israel. Perhaps the strongest of these is the work of Mearsheimer

and Walt (2009), arguing that the pro-Israel lobby has caused the U.S. to pursue policies

that are not in its best interest. Yet, the American public does not necessarily share this

view. Based on nine survey items (N=10,351) asked sporadically between 1973 and

2002, only about a third of Americans agreed that pro-Israel groups in the U.S. had too

much influence over U.S. decision making (mean=30.38%, SD=6.83) and more than

half of Americans did not agree (mean=51.75%, SD=8.38).

So far I have presented many aspects of American views toward Israel and toward

the special relationship it shares with the U.S., as well as the how existing literature has

measured these public views. While overall, Americans seemed to have been support-

ive of Israel, I have demonstrated instances where this was not the case, often relying

on measures other than the sympathy item. It is not entirely clear what these separate


indicators of public support for Israel actually mean. It seems there are many ways to

measure support for Israel among the American public. The literature has largely fo-

cused on one item more than others—sympathy—and rarely has it focused on more than

one item at the same time. Even research that has utilized a number of different items

(e.g. Cavari, 2012; Gilboa, 1987; Rynhold, 2015) has not attempted to explain how

these separate indicators may present one complete image of public support for Israel.

In the next chapter empirically test the possibility that these different items measure one

single mood Americans have toward Israel.

Chapter 4

Verifying an American Public Mood

toward Israel

In the previous chapter I demonstrated different measurements of American public sup-

port for Israel. Having reviewed the data available and their use in research, I argue their

is an underlying feature in the responses people provide to survey questions relating to

Israel. This feature is the American public mood toward Israel. In this chapter I outline

the main points of my argument and empirically test whether or not public opinion items

reflect this underlying mood, and to what extent the different items do so.

4.1 Hypotheses

Support for Israel does not consist of a single dimension. Each of the items presented

in the previous chapter, and indeed other items not yet presented, are the product of

a multidimensional mood Americans have toward Israel, expressing support, opposi-

tion, polarization, confusion and perhaps indifference. Borrowing from the literature on

25


policy mood (e.g. Carsey & Harden, 2010; Kertzer, 2013; Stevenson, 2001; Stimson,

1999), I suggest inferring from a multitude of public opinion items on Israel, to capture

this underlying mood. Policy mood typically refers to the movement of public opinion

on a liberal-conservative scale. Stimson’s (1999) measurement of mood provided such

a scale and offered an explanation for shifts of opinion on various policy issues as an

overall result of the policy mood of Americans. Kertzer (2013) for example develops

such a multidimensional policy mood on foreign policy.

What exactly is a policy mood? Best (1999, p. 722) offers the following definition:

“Policy moods are latent attitude structures underlying specific aggregate

preferences, which propel these preferences in directions consistent with

their outlook. They imply that the public sees policy issues through general

dispositions that color their opinions on these topics [. . . ].

Theoretically, identifying policy moods is a straightforward process. It re-

quires collecting a random sample of salient policy issues over a partic-

ular time frame, and then factor-analyzing standardized aggregate prefer-

ences toward these issues. Common movement among alternative survey

responses reflects an underlying policy mood in the preferences of the mass

public”

Following the same logic, I suggest a similar concept on a microlevel—the mood

toward Israel. The policy mood toward Israel is not so much a liberal-conservative con-

tinuum, but rather moves between two opposing ends, opposition to- and support for-

Israel.1 When the public becomes more sympathetic of Israel or of the Palestinians, or

when they approve of U.S. vetoes in the U.N. security council, etc., these measurements1Though testing the correlation between movement on such a scale and movement on a liberal-

conservative scale may be an interesting empirical question for future research.


begin to capture the policy mood of Americans toward Israel. My general hypothesis

therefore is the existence of an American public mood toward Israel. This should man-

ifest itself in an overall consistency among items; at any given time, a person with a

supportive mood toward Israel, should express supportive opinions toward Israel when

asked a series of different questions relating to Israel. Taken together, these responses

for an entire sample should reflect the underlying American mood (H1).

The various public opinion items represent different dimensions of the mood toward

Israel. While I do expect to find an underlying mood in these items, I do expect some

items to show greater consistency compared to others. I expect the greatest consistency

among items that contrast Israel and a second party (Arabs or Palestinians), and items

that assess one’s approval of Israeli policies. A person who is more sympathetic to-

ward Israel, or feels Israel is more justified than the Palestinians, will be more likely

to approve of Israeli polices. I expect lower consistency on items that ask for a general

evaluation of Israel and measure favorability toward Israel because it is easier to express

favorable opinions when there is no cost, compared to the previous two examples, which

include a cost of choosing one party over another or of the implications of a given policy.

Items that relate to Israeli leadership and to American policies toward Israel should also

yield lower levels of consistency, because they each include additional components that

are not directly related to the mood toward Israel. I expect all of these various items to

reflect a dimension of the American public mood toward Israel, but the extent to which

they do so may vary according to the dimension it relates to and external factors that

may be of influence (H2)

Finally, I expect little to no consistency on items that ask for evaluations of parties

who oppose Israel. When Israel is not part of the explicit context, expressing favorable

views toward the Palestinians may not necessarily translate into expressing opposition


toward Israel on other items. This is in fact not part of a mood toward Israel, and may

perhaps be a separate mood Americans might have toward Palestinians/Arabs. I include

this category of items and this hypothesis in order to test and demonstrate the limits of

the American public mood toward Israel, and to differentiate between items that may

express this underlying mood and those that may not (H3).

4.2 Data & Method

For the purposes of this research I use the dataset assembled at the APOI Project (Amer-

ican Public Opinion toward Israel, http://apoi.idc.ac.il) consisting of all avail-

able items from Roper iPoll, asked in public opinion polls, that relate to Israel from

1947 onwards. The dataset has two versions: A topline-level dataset and an individual-

level dataset. The topline-level dataset includes all available polls that relate to Israel

and consists of the final percentages in each question. The individual-level dataset is

a subset of the topline dataset. It includes all of the responses to the various items at

the respondent level: Each observation is a respondent in a survey and contains their re-

sponses to various questions. This dataset allows for both individual-level analysis (how

does respondent i respond to items x, y, w & z) and for group-based measurements of

support for Israel (Republicans vs. Democrats, religious groups, education levels, racial

groups and so on). This level of analysis is not possible at the topline level, but it is also

more difficult to obtain because many surveys are unavailable at the individual-level.

To test the existence of an American public mood toward Israel, I rely on the in-

dividual level-dataset and code all public opinion items in the following manor: Any

position expressed by respondents that is pro-Israel will be coded as one category—a

pro-Israel response. Any position that is in opposition to Israel will be coded as a sep-

http://apoi.idc.ac.il


arate category—opposition. This coding may be somewhat tricky. For example, some

people—Americans, Israelis or otherwise—may oppose Israeli settlements in the West

Bank, but to them, this may stem from a position of support for Israel because they be-

lieve the settlements are an obstacle to peace for Israel. In such instances, when it may

be somewhat unclear, I therefore code the various options into pro-Israel and opposition

to Israel based on the policy promoted by Israel. If Israel promotes settlements, a stance

that expresses support for Israel in this topic, should be to support Israeli settlements.

Finally, any position that either expresses a neutral stance toward the issue, or the

lack of opinion about the issue, will be coded as nonresponse2. Item nonresponse refers

to responses that survey respondents offer that refrain from choosing one of the valid

options presented to them, e.g. “don’t know”, “neither option”, refusing to answer,

etc. (Krosnik et al., 2002; Luskin & Bullock, 2011). Excluding these categories from

the analysis may distort the picture - increasing the margins between pro-Israel and

opposing-Israel stances when item nonresponse is low, and decreasing the margins when

item nonresponse is high. Researchers often exclude nonresponses from their analysis,

understandably, because usually, they do not help us understand the preferences of the

public. Public opinion research has long debated the meaning, the importance and the

decision to include or exclude nonresponses (see for example Berinsky, 2004; Converse,

1976; Lawrence, 1989; Luskin & Bullock, 2011). However, in this case, they may be

meaningful. When item nonresponse is low, whatever the margins between the valid

options, they may accurately represent support because almost all respondents opted in

by providing an opinion. But, when they are high, what can we surmise of support? In

the 1948 example from chapter chapter 3 the mean level of sympathy was almost 20%

2Neutral stances are very rare. In almost all cases nonresponse refers only to expressing a lack ofopinion. See Appendix 7.


higher in favor of Israel (Israel = 32%, Arabs = 13%) but a mean of 55% refrained from

providing a response. Does this allow us to conclude that the majority of Americans

supported Israel on the eve of it’s independence? How does this support fare compared

to the current 40% margin when item nonresponse is less than 20%. In other words, I

treat this as its own category in my models.

Appendix 7 details all of the survey items that relate to Israel and that are available

together with at least three other items in the same survey. It is important to have

at least four items together for the statistical models I will present below—confirmatory

factor analysis. Throughout this thesis I will often make use of the brief item short name

to refer to the different items. For each question, the Appendix lists the full question text,

the years in which the item is available at the individual level and the coding scheme

of its responses. Finally, I classify each item into one of the six categories below (the

items in Appendix 7 are sorted into six matching tables, one for each category):

1. Israel vs. others–items that ask respondents to choose between two sides, Israel

and an opposing party;

2. Israeli policies–items that ask respondents for their opinion concerning policies

Israel has implemented;

3. Evaluation of Israel–items that ask respondents for their feelings or general opin-

ion of Israel, regardless of a specific policy or other parties;

4. Israeli leadership–items that ask respondents for their evaluation of Israeli lead-

ers;

5. American policies–items that ask respondents for their opinion concerning Amer-

ican policies toward Israel;


6. Evaluation of opposing parties–items that ask respondents for their opinion con-

cerning an opposing party to Israel

For illustration purposes, an item asking whether the U.S. should be spending more

or less on aid to Israel, would be classified as category 5 (American policies). The

responses “more” or “the same amount” would be classified as pro-Israel, “less” or

“none” would be classified as opposition to Israel and any other response (“don’t know”

or refusing to answer, marked as DKR in the Appendix) would be classified as a neutral

response).

To test the existence of an American public mood toward Israel, and the extent that

each of the items available stems from this mood, I estimate a series of 27 confirmatory

factor analysis models (CFA) in R (Rosseel, 2012) to test which items measure support

for Israel together with the sympathy item. 3 Each model includes bootstrapping of 1000

samples and utilizes maximum likelihood for missing data. While many surveys do

include the sympathy item together with other Israel-related items, not all do. Therefore,

the first set of CFA models focuses only on surveys that include the sympathy item

together with at least three more items. A minimum of four items (sympathy plus an

additional three) is required in order to estimate CFA models and assess goodness of

fit. Therefore, I focus on surveys with four items or more. I test each survey separately,

because each survey includes different items, and each survey is taken at a different time

by a different pollster.

After establishing which items measure support together with sympathy, I estimate

a second set of 14 models, which focuses on all surveys that include at least four Israel-

3I prefer a CFA approach to an exploratory approach (EFA) because CFA models assume there isroom for error. In other words, they assume that some variance in the items may not originate in theproposed factor. It is therefore considered a more rigorous test and better suits my theoretical hypothesisof a single mood (Acock, 2013).


related items, but do not include the sympathy item—in order to see if they together

measure the same concept of a public mood. This allows to test the hypothesis of a

mood without necessarily making the sympathy item central. Indeed results, suggest

the American public mood is not contingent on sympathies.

Finally, I construct an additional CFA model allowing for two separate factors: a

mood toward Israel and a mood toward the Palestinians. This requires surveys that

include a large number of items that relate to Israel and a large number of items that

relate to the Palestinians. Only two surveys allow for such a model: ABC/WP survey

from 1989 and NYT survey from 1998. The goal of this model is to compare results

to the one-factor model and test whether items that do not relate directly to Israel, but

rather relate directly to parties other than Israel, are more relevant as a separate mood

(H3). While these two models are somewhat anecdotal—because the number of surveys

that include enough questions to estimate such a model are limited to only two—they

assist in providing further confirmation for H3.

Taken together, if the results of a total of 43 separate CFA models, each including a

different combination of items available in public opinion surveys, all point in a similar

direction, this will serve a strong confirmation of the existence of an American public

mood toward Israel.

4.3 Results: Confirming the Underlying Feature of an

American Public Mood toward Israel

The results of the first set of CFA models are presented in Table 4.1. I Include in this

first set only surveys that include four items or more, and at least one of them is a


version of the sympathy item. For each model, I detail the pollster, the date of the

survey, measures of goodness of fit and the CFA coefficient for each item. I treat the

sympathy item as the anchor in each model for consistency purposes, and because of

its advantages and its importance in previous research. It is therefore set to 1.00 in all

models and receives no p values. All other items are tested compared to the sympathy

item and are free to demonstrate weaker or stronger effects compared to the sympathy

item. I chose the sympathy item because of its central role in the literature and because

from a methodological point of view, it provides the greatest number of models with

consistent comparisons.

The models confirm my overall hypothesis that in almost all cases, all Israeli-related

items load onto one single factor. In other words, when people are faced with a question

that somehow relates to Israel, if they generally support Israel, they will provide a pro-

Israel stance on almost all related questions, regardless of the specific topic; the opposite

is true if they generally oppose Israel.

This first set of 27 CFA models confirms my hypothesis (H1) that there exists an

American public mood toward Israel and the items in public opinion surveys reflect this

mood. Almost all items are significant and positive (except for one model in 1998 using

an LAT survey), and all models indicate a good fit: CFI and TLI measures are both

higher than 0.9 and often higher than 0.95; RMSEA and SRMR are lower than 0.08 and

in most cases even lower than 0.06; χ2 is usually not significant, but it is significant in

some models. However, this measure is less accurate when samples are as big as they

are in these models.

The varying effects different items have also confirm H2: these items reflect the

American mood toward Israel, but the extent to which they do so varies according to

the subject of the question and additional components it may include. The significant


Table 4.1: CFA Models (Anchor: Sympathy)

Gallup 26 Nov. 1978 (n = 1546) CFI=1.00, TLI=0.99, RMSEA=0.02, SRMR=0.01, χ2(2) = 3.32sympathyarabs 1.00 sympathypalestinians 0.70∗∗∗ israelipmtherm 1.27∗∗ israeltherm 0.90∗∗

israelvi 0.49∗∗∗

Gallup 19 Mar. 1979 (n = 1563) CFI=1.00, TLI=1.01, RMSEA=0.00, SRMR=0.00, χ2(1) = 0.04sympathyarabs 1.00 israelenough −1.21 egyptenough −0.97 favorips 0.31∗∗

Roper 22 Aug. 1981 (n = 1979) CFI=1.00, TLI=1.00, RMSEA=0.00, SRMR=0.01, χ2(1) = 0.95sympathyarabs 1.00 favorips 0.18 ips israelagree 0.13 militaryaidisrael 0.10LAT 8 Jul. 1982 (n = 1102) CFI=0.94, TLI=0.91, RMSEA=0.07, SRMR=0.03, χ2(9) = 51.27∗∗∗

sympathyarabs 1.00 attention2israel 0.93∗∗∗ israelipm 1.10∗∗∗ lebanonwar01 0.80∗∗∗

militaryaidisrael 1.34∗∗∗ opinionisrael2 1.14∗∗∗

ABC/WP 17 Aug. 1982 (n = 1002) CFI=1.00, TLI=1.00, RMSEA=0.02, SRMR=0.13, χ2(5) = 6.21sympathyarabs 1.00 sympathypalestinians 0.85∗∗ lebanonwar01 1.23∗∗∗ israelipm 0.93∗∗∗

israelally1 0.94∗∗∗

Roper 30 Oct. 1982 (n = 2000) CFI=0.98, TLI=0.94, RMSEA=0.06, SRMR=0.03, χ2(2) = 18.05∗∗∗

sympathyarabs 1.00 opinionisrael2 1.15∗∗∗ israelipm 1.12∗∗∗ favorips 0.68∗∗∗

Gallup 12 Nov. 1986 (n = 1547) CFI=0.96, TLI=0.93, RMSEA=0.06, SRMR=0.03, χ2(8) = 59.18∗∗∗

sympathyarabs 1.00 sympathypalestinians 0.96∗∗∗ militaryaidisrael 0.82∗∗∗ lebanonwar01 0.59∗∗∗

israelvi 0.10∗ israeltherm 0.30∗

LAT 7 Apr. 1988 (n = 2128) CFI=0.96, TLI=0.94, RMSEA=0.04, SRMR=0.03, χ2(19) = 87.18∗∗∗

sympathyarabs 1.00 favorips −0.36∗∗∗ israelchangeattitude 0.36∗∗∗ israeltherm 0.56∗∗∗

jewishinfluence 0.51∗∗∗ militaryaidisrael 1.33∗ opinionisrael2 1.04∗∗∗ opinionplo 0.62∗∗∗

ABC/WP 3 Apr. 1989 (n = 1525) CFI=0.95, TLI=0.91, RMSEA=0.06, SRMR=0.04, χ2(28) = 171.26∗∗∗

sympathyarabs 1.00 sympathypalestinians 1.23∗∗∗ blameproblemspal 0.88∗∗∗ aidisrael 0.58∗∗∗

relwithisrael 0.47∗∗∗ opinionplo 0.36∗ opinionisrael2 0.79∗∗∗ israelinfluence 0.79∗∗∗

israelally1 0.57∗∗∗ favorips 0.44∗∗∗

CBS/NYT 8 Jun. 1990 (n = 1084) CFI=1.00, TLI=1.03, RMSEA=0.00, SRMR=0.00, χ2(1) = 0.03sympathyarabs 1.00 israelally1 0.68∗∗∗ favorips 0.45∗∗∗ aidisrael 1.00∗∗∗

Gallup 15 Nov. 1990 (n = 1662) CFI=0.99, TLI=0.98, RMSEA=0.03, SRMR=0.02, χ2(7) = 19.30∗∗

sympathypalestinians 1.00 militaryaidisrael 1.83∗∗∗ israelvi 0.57∗∗∗ israeltherm 1.73∗∗∗

israelipmtherm 1.34∗∗∗ economicaidisrael 1.74∗

Gallup 17 Mar. 1991 (n = 1005) CFI=1.00, TLI=0.97, RMSEA=0.03, SRMR=0.01, χ2(1) = 1.84sympathypalestinians 1.00 opinionisrael2 0.43∗∗ importance −0.63∗∗∗ favorips 1.28∗∗∗

ABC 15 Sep. 1991 (n = 1233) CFI=1.00, TLI=1.01, RMSEA=0.00, SRMR=0.00, χ2(2) = 0.43sympathyarabs 1.00 relwithisrael 1.07∗∗∗ israelinfluence 1.50∗∗∗ aidisrael 1.31∗∗∗

CBS/NYT 7 Oct. 1991 (n = 1280) CFI=0.96, TLI=0.90, RMSEA=0.05, SRMR=0.02, χ2(4) = 15.16∗∗

sympathyarabs 1.00 settlements 0.57∗∗∗ israelinfluence 1.04∗∗∗ favorips 0.59∗∗∗

economicaidisrael −0.05Martilla & Kiley, inc. 1 May 1992 (n = 1301) CFI=0.97, TLI=0.95, RMSEA=0.05, SRMR=0.03, χ2(13) = 49.31∗∗∗

sympathyarabs 1.00 sympathypalestinians 1.07∗∗∗ proisraelgroups 1.07∗∗∗ opinionisrael2 1.28∗∗∗

iswp 1.38∗∗∗ israelally1 1.35∗ economicaidisrael 1.40∗∗∗

LAT 1 Apr. 1998 (n = 848) CFI=0.98, TLI=0.96, RMSEA=0.03, SRMR=0.02, χ2(5) = 8.24sympathypalestinians 1.00 israelipm −1.62∗∗∗ settlements −1.88∗∗∗ jewishinfluence −0.05favorips −1.10∗∗∗

∗p < 0.05∗∗p < 0.01∗∗∗p < 0.001


CFA Models (Continued)

NYT 20 Apr. 1998 (n = 1395) CFI=0.93, TLI=0.90, RMSEA=0.06, SRMR=0.04, χ2(46) = 239.25∗∗∗

sympathyarabs 1.00 sympathypalestinians 1.13∗∗∗ aidisrael 1.09∗∗∗ favorips 0.46∗∗∗

israelally2 0.22∗∗∗ israelenough 1.21∗ israelinfluence 1.05∗∗∗ israelipm 0.66∗∗∗

jewishinfluence 0.32∗∗∗ opinionisrael2 0.95∗∗∗ opinionplo 0.30∗∗∗ ploenough 0.23∗∗∗

Gallup 25 Jul. 1999 (n = 1021) CFI=0.95, TLI=0.90, RMSEA=0.07, SRMR=0.03, χ2(5) = 29.22∗∗∗

sympathypalestinians 1.00 israelipm 0.59∗∗∗ militaryaidisrael 4.42∗∗∗ importance 1.43economicaidisrael 4.23∗∗∗

Gallup 26 Jan. 2000 (n = 1044) CFI=0.98, TLI=0.90, RMSEA=0.07, SRMR=0.02, χ2(2) = 11.98∗∗

sympathypalestinians 1.00 ussideshould 0.53∗∗∗ opinionpalestinianauthority 1.58∗∗ opinionisrael2 2.58∗∗∗

importance 0.69∗∗∗

Gallup 15 Sep. 2001 (n = 1032) CFI=1.00, TLI=1.00, RMSEA=0.00, SRMR=0.00, χ2(2) = 0.57sympathypalestinians 1.00 ussideshould 0.82∗∗∗ militaryaidisrael 1.22∗∗∗ economicaidisrael 1.18∗∗∗

CBS/NYT 28 Oct. 2001 (n = 1024) CFI=1.00, TLI=1.01, RMSEA=0.00, SRMR=0.01, χ2(2) = 1.31sympathyarabs 1.00 opinionisrael2 0.31∗ opinionplo 0.14 favorips 0.13CBS 2 Apr. 2002 (n = 616) CFI=0.98, TLI=0.97, RMSEA=0.04, SRMR=0.02, χ2(9) = 18.94∗

sympathypalestinians 1.00 supportisrael2 1.07∗∗∗ israelipm 0.85∗∗∗ israelinfluence 1.04∗∗∗

israelforce 1.01∗∗∗ importance 0.16∗

CBS 18 Apr. 2002 (n = 1119) CFI=0.98, TLI=0.97, RMSEA=0.05, SRMR=0.02, χ2(5) = 18.21∗∗

sympathypalestinians 1.00 supportisrael2 0.81∗∗∗ israelipm 0.69∗∗∗ israelforce 0.64∗∗∗

favorips 0.21∗∗∗

ABC/WP 21 Apr. 2002 (n = 1207) CFI=0.98, TLI=0.97, RMSEA=0.04, SRMR=0.03, χ2(14) = 37.42∗∗

sympathypalestinians 1.00 economicaidisrael 0.93∗∗∗ militaryaidisrael 0.81∗∗∗ blameproblemspal 1.01∗∗∗

israelforce 0.73∗∗∗ supportisrael1 0.81∗∗∗ tmpressureisrael 0.41∗∗∗

ORC 3 Aug. 2006 (n = 1047) CFI=0.99, TLI=0.97, RMSEA=0.06, SRMR=0.02, χ2(4) = 16.73∗∗

sympathyhezbollah 1.00 militaryaidisrael 1.47∗∗∗ israelforce 1.55∗∗∗ israelally2 0.39∗∗∗

economicaidisrael 1.27∗∗∗

PSRA 13 Aug. 2006 (n = 1506) CFI=1.00, TLI=0.99, RMSEA=0.03, SRMR=0.01, χ2(2) = 4.84sympathypalestinians 1.00 supportisrael2 0.88∗∗∗ lebanonwar02 1.25∗∗∗ blameproblemshezb 0.96∗∗∗

PSRA 11 Jan. 2009 (n = 1503) CFI=0.99, TLI=0.98, RMSEA=0.05, SRMR=0.02, χ2(2) = 9.33∗∗

sympathypalestinians 1.00 supportisrael2 0.92∗∗∗ castlead 1.31∗∗∗ blameproblemspal 0.88∗∗∗∗p < 0.05∗∗p < 0.01∗∗∗p < 0.001

effect for items contrasting Israel vs. other parties—such as opinions toward who in

the conflict is to blame or which of the two sides is more justified—are strongly and

significantly aligned with sympathies. People who sympathize more with Israel over

Arab nations, are very likely to sympathize with Israel over the Palestinians, and are

likely to feel Israel is more justified and that the Palestinians are to blame.

I find a similar effect concerning views toward Israeli policies. In almost all cases,

this refers to Israel’s use of force—from the first Lebanon war in 1982, all the way


through to Gaza and the West Bank in recent years. Other policies usually refer to Israeli

settlements and Israel’s policies toward an independent Palestinian state. Here too, I

find significant effects for the loading of these items on a single factor. While choosing

between two sides directly entails a cost, supporting Israeli policies indirectly entails a

cost. For instance, approving of Israel’s use of force does not exist in a vacuum. Rather,

it refers to Israel’s use of force against Lebanon/Hezbollah/The Palestinians/Hamas/etc.

Items from these two categories generally exhibit similar effects. An additional item that

stands out is whether or not Israel has done enough to promote peace with Egypt, which

has no significant effect.

Emotional and general evaluations of Israel are consistently significant and usually

have a moderate effect, compared to categories above. I expected to find a moderate

effect because viewing Israel favorably is easier than choosing between Israel and a

second party. In other words, for some people emotional evaluations of Israel may align

with sympathies and items that require choosing between two sides. But, this is not

necessarily the case for all respondents. Therefore, items in this dimension of the mood

toward Israel are important, but not as important as items in first two dimensions.

On the dimension of Israeli leadership, I find mixed results. Coefficients are signif-

icant, and in standardized values, they usually range from relatively low figures (0.15)

to moderate ones (0.57). This category however has the lowest effects. American views

toward Israeli leadership are tied to other dimensions of attitudes toward Israel, but they

are not as strong. I find stronger effects for items relating to American policies toward

Israel and the conflict. Items such as those that relate to providing Israel with aid and

whether not the U.S. should express support for Israel, have moderate to high effects.

Items concerning parties other than Israel (namely, the Palestinians) are hardly part

of the American public mood toward Israel (H3). While these items are usually signifi-


cant, two things stand out. First, they are usually very weak compared to items in other

categories. Second, if they are not weak, they are in fact negative. Suggesting that they

are in fact completely reversed compared to other items. This is not surprising. A per-

son who supports Israel and consistently sympathizes with Israel over the Palestinians,

may still believe that the Palestinians deserve a country, and in fact that an indepen-

dent Palestinian state may bring an end to the conflict. This confirms my expectation

that these items are not part of the American public mood toward Israel and therefore

should not be taken into account.

Two additional effects stand out. First, the effect of the importance item—asking

how important it is for the U.S. to resolve the conflict—is usually significant, but very

weak. While the American public mood may explain opinions toward Israel and result

in an alignment of views across various dimensions of support for Israel, this does not

imply that Americans necessarily prioritize this issue. Second, questions relating to the

influence of American jews or pro-Israel groups on American policies, are either weak

or non existent (no significance). For Americans, their views toward Israel originate in

one source—their mood toward Israel—while their views toward American Jews and

American organizations are separated. For them, supporting Israel is a separate concept

from their views on the activities of such organizations, in relation to Israel. This is an

important finding in itself in the research of American public opinion toward Israel, and

deserves further analysis in future research.

In the next set of models, I use surveys that contain at least four items, but that do

not include the sympathy question. In each survey, the first variable listed serves as an

anchor and is therefore set to 1.00. I use these models to confirm the trends found in

previous models and to demonstrate the extent that Israel-related items load onto a single

factor even when the sympathy item is not used as a baseline, suggesting that measuring


the American public mood is not contingent on the sympathy item being available. The

results of these models are presented in Table 4.2 and further confirm my hypotheses:

items relating to Israel are positive and significant, their strength varies according to

the topic they touch on, and items relating only to parties besides Israel, as well items

asking for the importance of resolving the conflict, are not part of the American public

mood toward Israel (because they are either very weak or in fact negative).

Table 4.2: CFA Models (Sympathy Unavailable)

Yankelovich 17 Sep. 1981 (n = 1222) CFI=1.00, TLI=1.01, RMSEA=0.00, SRMR=0.00, χ2(1) = 0.52attitude2israel 1.00 attitude2arabs −3.73∗∗∗ attitude2palestinians −3.55∗∗∗ supportisraelimportance 0.26∗∗∗

NBC/AP 15 Jun. 1982 (n = 1588) CFI=1.00, TLI=0.99, RMSEA=0.03, SRMR=0.01, χ2(2) = 3.87militaryaidisrael 1.00 lebanonwar01 1.57∗∗∗ lebanonisraelretreat 0.84∗∗∗ favorips −0.42∗∗∗

Yankelovich 7 Oct. 1982 (n = 1010) CFI=1.00, TLI=1.01, RMSEA=0.00, SRMR=0.00, χ2(2) = 0.17militaryaidisrael 1.00 israelally1 0.82∗∗∗ negotiationwplo 0.39∗∗ supportisraelimportance 0.95∗∗∗

Yankelovich 28 Jan. 1988 (n = 322) CFI=1.00, TLI=0.99, RMSEA=0.03, SRMR=0.02, χ2(2) = 2.48aidisrael 1.00 israelforce 0.60∗∗∗ jewishinfluence 0.65∗∗∗ favorips −0.10ABC 28 Jul. 1991 (n = 1205) CFI=0.95, TLI=0.90, RMSEA=0.06, SRMR=0.03, χ2(5) = 26.58∗∗∗

israelally1 1.00 opinionisrael2 1.01∗∗∗ settlements 0.75∗∗∗ opinionplo 0.11∗


ABC 19 Sep. 1993 (n = 1006) CFI=1.00, TLI=0.98, RMSEA=0.04, SRMR=0.01, χ2(2) = 4.60opinionisrael2 1.00 iswp 1.16∗∗∗ opinionplo −0.73∗∗∗ favorips −0.87∗∗∗

aswp −1.21∗∗∗

Gallup 25 Oct. 1994 (n = 1492) CFI=1.00, TLI=1.01, RMSEA=0.00, SRMR=0.01, χ2(4) = 2.89israeltherm 1.00 israelvi 0.26∗∗∗ economicaidisrael 0.69∗∗∗ israelipmtherm 0.72∗∗∗

favorips −0.08Gallup 10 Nov. 1998 (n = 1507) CFI=0.98, TLI=0.93, RMSEA=0.03, SRMR=0.01, χ2(2) = 4.40israelvi 1.00 israelipmtherm 1.84∗∗∗ economicaidisrael 2.10∗∗∗ favorips −0.16PSRA 7 Dec. 2001 (n = 1003) CFI=0.98, TLI=0.94, RMSEA=0.04, SRMR=0.02, χ2(2) = 5.43blameproblemspal 1.00 israelforce 0.83∗∗∗ pressurewho 0.40∗∗∗ usfavorips 0.29∗∗

Harris 19 Mar. 2002 (n = 1014) CFI=0.96, TLI=0.92, RMSEA=0.07, SRMR=0.03, χ2(2) = 26.98∗∗∗

supportisrael1 1.00 blameproblemspal 0.95∗∗∗ israelforce 1.24∗∗∗ israelipm 1.02∗∗∗

sharonenough 0.73∗∗∗

UMARY 18 May 2003 (n = 1256) CFI=1.00, TLI=1.00, RMSEA=0.00, SRMR=0.01, χ2(2) = 1.27economicaidisrael 1.00 ussideshould 1.14∗∗∗ importance 0.30∗∗∗ blamenopeace 1.36∗∗∗

Gallup 23 Jul. 2006 (n = 1005) CFI=1.00, TLI=1.01, RMSEA=0.00, SRMR=0.00, χ2(1) = 0.02ussideshould 1.00 lebanonwar02 1.02∗∗∗ israelforce 0.98∗∗∗ importance 0.31∗∗∗

CBS/NYT 25 Jul. 2006 (n = 1127) CFI=1.00, TLI=1.00, RMSEA=0.02, SRMR=0.01, χ2(2) = 2.68supportisrael2 1.00 blameproblemshezb 0.88∗∗∗ israelforce 1.26∗∗∗ opinionisrael2 1.25∗∗∗

CCGA 29 May 2014 (n = 2108) CFI=1.00, TLI=1.00, RMSEA=0.00, SRMR=0.00, χ2(1) = 0.07ussideshould 1.00 militaryaidisrael 1.15∗∗∗ israeltherm 1.42∗∗∗ economicaidisrael 1.11∗∗∗

∗p < 0.05∗∗p < 0.01∗∗∗p < 0.001


Thus far I have tested the possibility that all items that relate to Israel—even if

the main topic of the questions is the Palestinians—load onto a single mood toward

Israel factor. However, there is the possibility that the responses to these items stem

from two separate but related positions (factors): mood toward Israel vs. mood toward

the Arab/Palestinian side. The two may share some items (for instance the sympathy

item) but other items may fit better when separated into two factors. Testing this is

extremely limited to surveys that have enough items from both theoretical factors. Only

two surveys from those available meet these criteria: ABC/WP survey from 1989 and

NYT survey from 1998. Figure 4.1 illustrates the two factors tested in each of these

surveys.

Results further confirm previous findings (see Table 4.3). In both models, the mea-

sures of goodness of fit indicate a close fit and all estimates are positive and signifi-

cant except for one, which approaches significance (blameproblemspal in the ABC/WP

model, p = 0.052). The fact that all coefficients are significant suggests that items that

relate to both Israel and the Palestinians can be used in the measurements of the mood

toward Israel and as a separate possible mood toward the Palestinians. The items that

relate directly to Israel remain positive and significant on the mood toward Israel fac-

tor. In addition, coefficients for items that relate directly to the Palestinians, such as the

opinion of the PLO or favoring an independent Palestinians state, are significant on the

mood toward Palestinians factor. These items were not usually significant or positive in

models that placed them on the mood toward Israel factor. These results are somewhat

anecdotal because the data available for such a test are limited to these two surveys,

but nonetheless, they assist in further confirming the existence of the American public

mood toward Israel, found in the previous 41 models.


Figure 4.1: Two Factor Models


Table 4.3: CFA Models (Two-Factor Models)

ABC/WP 3 Apr. 1989 (n = 1525) CFI=0.97, TLI=0.95, RMSEA=0.04, SRMR=0.03, χ2(30) = 119.67∗∗∗

ISRAEL: sympathyarabs 1.00 sympathypalestinians 0.55∗∗∗ blameproblemspal 0.27 aidisrael 1.87∗∗∗

relwithisrael 1.31∗∗∗ israelally1 1.16∗∗∗ israelinfluence 2.07∗∗∗ opinionisrael2 1.68∗∗∗

PALESTINIANS: sympathyarabs 1.00 sympathypalestinians 2.02∗∗∗ blameproblemspal 1.58∗∗∗ opinionplo 0.69∗∗∗


NYT 20 Apr. 1998 (n = 1395) CFI=0.95, TLI=0.92, RMSEA=0.05, SRMR=0.04, χ2(44) = 185.47∗∗∗

ISRAEL: sympathyarabs 1.00 sympathypalestinians 0.72∗∗∗ opinionisrael2 1.76∗∗∗ israelinfluence 1.90∗∗∗

jewishinfluence 0.53∗∗∗ israelipm 1.13∗∗∗ aidisrael 1.97∗∗∗ israelenough 2.11∗∗∗

israelally2 0.38∗∗∗

PALESTINIANS: sympathyarabs 1.00 sympathypalestinians 1.68∗∗∗ opinionplo 0.52∗∗∗ ploenough 0.37∗∗∗

favorips 0.69∗∗∗∗p < 0.05∗∗p < 0.01∗∗∗p < 0.001

4.4 Summary

This chapter can be summed up in three major findings. First, I am able to confirm

the existence of an underlying public mood toward Israel, in the responses of people to

Israel-related items. When faced with expressing support for- or opposition to- Israel

in a number of different aspects, people who generally support Israel will express this

support on most opinion items. People who generally do not support Israel will express

their opposition to Israel on most opinion items. The models presented in this chapter

include a great deal of information. On the one hand, a model that would be able to

include all items together may be more appealing. However, this is not possible because

most surveys include only a few items together and rarely are these the same items

across different surveys. On the other hand, similar results across so many models

might be a good indicator of the items that do—and do not—measure support for Israel.

While I was able to identify some items that do not necessarily originate in an American

public mood, and therefore cannot be used to measure such a mood, most items do serve

as strong measurements.

Second, using the sympathy items as an anchor reveals that this is indeed a strong


measure of support for Israel. This is important for our ability to use this item in research

to measure support. However, it is not the only item and many other items measure the

mood toward Israel at a similar level. This item can however serve as a good baseline

for support. This is especially true during years when there are limited public opinion

items available.

Finally, the extent to which different items measure the American public mood to-

ward Israel varies according to the topics they touch on and additional components,

which may influence how Americans answer such questions. In order to include these

items in a combined measure of mood, I will have to account for this variance. In the

next chapter I propose a method for combining these different items, as different but

not separate, dimensions of the American public mood toward Israel. Taken together,

they may reveal a multidimensional image of the American mood toward Israel, more

sensitive to major events in U.S.-Israel relations and more complete over time.

Chapter 5

Creating a Measure of the American

Public Mood toward Israel

In the previous chapter I empirically confirmed the existence of an underlying mood in

the attitudes Americans have toward Israel. In this chapter I offer a method for com-

bining the various public opinion items together, to create an index of this American

mood.

5.1 Method

To create such an index, I rely on all available questions from all available polls (that

proved relevant in the previous section) and combine them using Stimson’s (1999) dyad-

ratio algorithm in wcalc software to produce a smoothed annual weighted mean of all

relevant public opinion items—i.e. a single measure of the American public mood to-

ward Israel. I weight each item according to the results of the CFA models because not

all items are equal in their ability to measure the American public mood toward Israel.

43


Based on the results of the previous section, and in accordance with my hypotheses,

I exclude from my index of American public mood items that relate directly to the

Palestinians only, and not to Israel. I also exclude items that proved too weak, such as

the importance of resolving the conflict, or the influence of Jewish Americans on U.S.

policy. A total of 1,167 items between 1947 and 2016 remain.

I begin by addressing the difficulties in combining all of the different items together.

There are two major difficulties when combing such items together. First, how to cal-

culate the mean of each question? Because responses are coded into three categories—

pro-Israel, opposing-Israel, and nonresponse—we cannot rely on simple percentages. If

there were only two categories, I could use the percentages of only one category, and

the remaining difference would represent the second category. For instance, if 60% of

respondents expressed a pro-Israel stance, we could surmise that 40% expressed some

form of opposition to Israel. However, the three categories are important for our un-

derstanding of the American mood, and as I showed previously in chapter 3, simple

percentages of different questions may mean different things.

To overcome this difficulty, I use the formula in equation 5.1 to calculate the strength

of support for- or opposition to- Israel. Let p be the proportion of pro-Israel stances in

a given item, and o the proportion of respondents in opposition to Israel. I begin by

calculating the simple difference between the two. Next, I divide this by the sum of 1 and

the proportion of people offering nonresponse (marked d). If d = 0, indicating nobody

offered nonresponses, the simple margin between pro-Israel stances and opposing-Israel

stances is the result of the equation. But, the larger d becomes, the more it minimizes

the difference between the two extremes. The result is a measure ranging from −1 (full

opposition to Israel) to +1 (full support for Israel). A result of 0 either means no-one

has any opinion on the issue whatsoever, or the two sides are completely split, right


down the middle.

A Formula for Measuring the American Public Mood toward Israel

Mood =p−o1+d

(5.1)

The second difficulty is that while I have confirmed my expectation that different

items measure different dimensions of the same mood, I have also found these dimen-

sions are not equal in strength. Some measure this mood to a greater extent than others.

To overcome this difficulty, I rely on the mean standardized coefficients for each cat-

egory that the items belong to, following Best’s definition (1999, see Chapter 4). I

normalize the standardized coefficients, so that sympathy, which served as an anchor,

always receives a weight of 1. Then, all other items are multiplied by the same factor

to achieve normalized weights. For instance, if the mean standardized coefficient of the

first category is equal to 0.62, multiplying it by 1.62 will yield a product of 1. Next, I

multiply the mean standardized coefficients of all categories by 1.62, to assign them a

relative weight. These weights allow me to calculate a weighted-mean of all items in

the dataset. See Table 5.1 with the final weights of each category.

Table 5.1: Weighting the Dimensions of the American Public mood toward Israel

Dimension N Items Mean std. Coef. WeightIsrael vs. others 349 0.62 1.00Israeli policies 209 0.62 1.00Evaluation of Israel 162 0.57 0.92Israeli leadership 86 0.41 0.67American policies 361 0.49 0.80

I use Stimson’s (1999) dyad-ratio algorithm to smooth each of the three possible


responses (pro-Israel, opposing-Israel, nonresponse), using the weights specified in Ta-

ble 5.1. The result is an annual weighted mean of each series. Next, at each point in

time (in this case, every year) I input the proportions of each of the three series into the

formula in Equation 5.1 to produce a multidimensional annual index of the American

public mood toward Israel.

5.2 Results

In the coming section I demonstrate the results of the process described above. I begin

by demonstrating the American public mood as five separate dimensions and conclude

with one final measure of this multidimensional mood. In Figure 5.1, I plot the results

of smoothing the items. I smooth each of the five categories separately to reveal an

image of the five dimensions in the American public mood toward Israel. Up until the

1970s, data on American public opinion toward Israel is relatively scarce. Variation is

therefore relatively small and this period should be interpreted with caution.

American views on the policies Israel implements indicate contested views: support

for Israeli policies is mostly low or negative, suggesting Americans are either split on

this topic, or a large portion of Americans find it difficult to offer an opinion on this

aspect. Support for Israel was high during the Six Dar War in 1967, but declined in

the 1970s, characterized mostly by disapproval of Israeli policies. The two Israeli poli-

cies in question here were: the debate over the lands Israel conquered in 1967 and the

its treatment of Arab refugees, and Israel’s role in the energy crisis brought on by the

Arab oil embargo. By 1980 approval of Israeli policies returns to the middle ground

surrounding the peace process with Egypt. However, during the 1980s Americans once

again disapprove of Israeli policies, which included the bombing of Iraq’s nuclear reac-


tor in 1981, the invasion into Lebanon in 1982, Israel’s involvement in the Iran-Contras

affair in the mid 1980s and the first Intifada during 1987-1988. The early 1990s saw

a surge in support for Israeli policies following the peace process with Jordan and the

Oslo peace accords with the Palestinians. The break down of the latter brought support

for Israel’s policies to a negative low. By 2002, at the height of the second Intifada sup-

port for Israel’s policies returned to the middle ground and continued to vary with the

various violent episodes between Israel and the Palestinians throughout the last decade.

Figure 5.1: Multidimensional Mood toward Israel

−1 (Opposition)

0 Neutral

+1 (Support)

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Year

Israel vs. Others Israeli policies

Evaluation of Israel Israeli leadership

American policies

The category for American policies include what people think should be the correct


policy toward Israel, an evaluation of current American policies toward Israel and the

items relating to U.S.-Israel relationship. Overall support for Israel is high and from the

1980s onwards, support for Israel in this dimension is the highest. Two major theoretical

explanations may explain this trend. First, Americans may find it easier to express

support for Israel when it is removed from the context of the conflict and focuses more

on the relationship between the U.S. and Israel. Second, on items where Americans are

asked to evaluate American policies toward Israel, expressing support for Israel is often

expressed via approval of American policies. In other words, for Americans, approving

of an American policy that is in place—providing aid to Israel, publicly supporting

Israel, treating Israel as a close ally, etc.—is easier compared to evaluating the policies

of Israel, an external actor. However, it may also include other factors that influence

one’s position, such as general views toward foreign aid. Given the results of these items

in previous chapter, and the possible influence of other such factors, it is important to

take this into account using a slightly weaker weight when moving on to combine these

items compared to other items.

Emotional evaluation of Israel—having positive or negative views toward Israel—

is also almost always highly supportive of Israel. This perhaps captures best just how

strongly American views are favorable toward Israel. Supportive evaluations of Israel

rise in the late 1970s and reach a peak in 1981, probably as a result of the peace pro-

cess with Egypt. In the late 1980s, this trend declines and reaches the middle ground,

suggesting Americans may be split at this point in time, when the first Intifada emerges

and the Palestinian issue becomes prominent in international affairs. The peace pro-

cess slowly causes this to rise, and eventually as time progresses Americans become

increasingly supportive in their evaluation of Israel.

While Americans may be supportive of Israel, Israel’s leadership does not enjoy such


favorable views. In the 1970s Americans largely supported Israeli leadership but this

quickly declined and has remained mostly negative throughout the entire period. This

too deserves a weaker weight based on the previous chapter. Finally, contrasting Israel

vs. other actors—mostly the Arabs/Palestinians—presents a supportive image toward

Israel. Only in this category are Americans faced with choosing to either support Israel

or support an opposing actor. Because this is the only category where support for Israel

must come at the expense of another actor, and vice versa, this measurement of support

is very strong. This category includes the sympathy item, items asking which of the

two sides is responsible for the violent conflict, who the U.S. should support and so on.

The trend itself resembles that of the first two categories—Israeli policies and American

policies toward Israel—rising and declining in similar instances, and overall presenting

a supportive American public.

In Figure 5.2 I create one weighted measure of mood, combining all five categories,

using the weights calculated earlier. The final measure of the American public mood

is able to capture all dimensions together. I plot this measure together with key events

in the conflict and U.S.-Israel relations. Reviewing Figure 5.2 a clear pattern emerges.

Americans have consistently been supportive of Israel, but this support has fluctuated

over time. This trend clarifies the change in public support for Israel following many

events and is far more sensitive to changes in the American mood compared to reviewing

single items. For instance, note the drop in support in the 1956 Suez Crisis when Israel,

together with the U.K. and France invaded the Sinai Peninsula, much to the disapproval

of President Eisenhower. American support for Israel rises in 1991 surrounding Israel’s

restraint in the First Gulf War and the Madrid Peace Conference. The breakdown of

the Oslo Peace Accords in the late 1990s result in minimal to no support and with the

turn of the 21st Century—following 9/11, the War on Terror and the rounds of violence


between Israel and the Palestinians—support for Israel rises and eventually reaches its

highest point in 2015-2016.

Figure 5.2: American Public Mood toward Israel

−1 (Opposition)

0 Neutral

+1 (Support)

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Year

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Timeline

To some extent, Figure 5.1, which breaks down the public mood into its separate

components, assists in interpreting the overall measure of mood presented in Figure 5.2.

It is clear that while Americans largely support Israel, their views on Israel’s policies and

Israeli leaders often pull down this support to reveal a less supportive mood. However,


situating Israel in comparison to other parties, mainly the Palestinians, and the policies

the United States implements toward Israel balance the American mood up toward the

more supportive attitudes.

The American public mood toward Israel does not exist in a vacuum. It is part of a

larger set of views toward foreign policy and the United States’ role in the world. It is

therefore possible that the public mood toward Israel is capturing a broader sentiment—

an American public more internationalist in its views toward foreign policy. In other

words, when Americans favor internationalism, the mood toward Israel becomes more

supportive, but when they favor isolationism, the mood moves closer toward the middle

ground (neutrality). This is an important question that requires empirical analyses of

its own. However, even if such views are influenced by Americans becoming more

internationalist, why would this necessarily drive the American mood upward? An

internationalist approach may push for a more active American foreign policy, but why

should being more active necessarily translate into increased support for Israel? This

suggests that while movement away from the neutral center may be a result of increasing

internationalist sentiments among the American public, the fact that it moves toward

support rather than opposition, is a reflection of the nature of the supportive American

public mood toward Israel. This is especially true considering the American public

favors humanitarian intervention (Hildebrandt, Hillebrecht, Holm, & Pevehouse, 2013);

while the public may be conflicted as to who is more justified in the conflict—Israel or

the Palestinians—if the humanitarian conditions in Gaza might garner increased public

support for American intervention, this should result in less, not more, support for Israel.

Furthermore, I find no difinitive empirical studies suggesting Americans have be-

come predisposed to internationalism over time. Drezner (2008) suggests political elites

are more disposed to internationalism than the mass public. Kertzer (2013), suggests the


public becomes more isolationist when domestic, namely economic, conditions are dire.

Why then do we see an increase in support following 2009? In 2008, the U.S. faced its

worst economic crisis in over 75 years (Altman, 2009) and President Obama was elected

with a clear agenda to reduce the United States’ military involvement overseas and to

serve as a fair mediator between Israel and the Palestinians (Brzezinski, 2010). Yet

support for Israel during these years not only increases, moving further away from the

balanced center, but reaches its highest peak throughout Israel’s entire history. This

further demonstrates the unique nature of the American public mood toward Israel, as

demonstrated in Figure 5.2.

5.3 Addressing a (Potential) Temporal Bias

The method I’ve used in this thesis to construct an index of an American mood toward

Israel, relies on using all available items in public opinion polls that relate to Israel,

reducing this list only to those items found relevant, and creating a weighted average of

them. One concern that arrises from this procedure is the possible temporal bias that it

creates: The trend is influenced by whatever items were asked at a particular time. So if

in a given year, an item relating to Israeli leadership is available, but it is not available

in the next, this may create a bias in the measurements that the index relies on.

I address this concern from both theoretical and methodological points of view.

First, in most cases, items that appear in public opinion polls are usually asked specif-

ically when they are relevant (Stimson, 1999). In other words, items concerning sym-

pathies in the conflict, who is to blame, who the U.S. should support, whether or not to

approve of Israel’s use of force, and so on, usually appear in public opinion polls during

or immediately following a specific event—in this case, violent peaks in the conflict


between Israel and the Palestinians. Pollsters tend to ask these questions when they are

relevant and of interest. I demonstrated this when reviewing American views on aid

to Israel (Figure 3.4), which began appearing in public opinion polls only when aid to

Israel became substantial. Even when items are not necessarily pertinent to a specific

event, they are usually frequent enough to correct any temporal bias, rather than create

one. For instance, opinions concerning aid to Israel or general favorability of Israel.

Second, Stimson’s (1999) actual algorithm addresses this bias by receiving all data

points from each of the three series together (pro-Israel, oppossing-Israel, nonresponse).

By moving forward and backward on each series, the smoothing process creates an

average of all data points, while simultaneously being sensitive to movements that may

be larger than simple survey errors, and limiting their impact on the smoothed data,

when they seem to be inconsistent with other data points.

Third, Best (1999) suggests correcting any possible bias in the sample of items using

a weighting scheme based on how frequent the items are—in order to represent how

salient they should be. I did not impose a second weighting scheme to my data because

that would interfere with the first weighting scheme, designed to increase the impact

of those items that proved more relevant and minimize the impact of those that did

not. However, to some extent, my own weighting scheme addresses this issue as well

because the items that were more frequent, proved to have the greatest effect (sympathy,

blame, aid, etc.). Since I tested each survey separately, this is not simply a result of an

item-frequency bias (which may have been true had I tested all items from all surveys

in one single CFA model).

Fourth, the temporal bias may be more important in higher resolutions. If I were to

measure the American public mood on a quarterly basis, the temporal bias may become

meaningful because a quarter might only have one data point; if that data point is a ques-


tion with unusually high or low support, that could create too strong a bias. However,

for now, I measure this on an annual basis, which allows for a larger number of ques-

tions each year and any bias that was not already corrected by the smoothing process or

by using weights, should be minimized by the combination with other questions.

Lastly, results seem to make sense. Even if some temporal bias is caused by the

odd item that appeared alone at a given time-point, it was not enough to create an index

that seemed far from the truth. Examining Figure 5.2, I am able to easily explain the

changing movement of the mood index. As I demonstrated in the figure itself, and as

the literature suggests, such changes are usually rooted in the events preceding them. If

the index suggested any unexplained changes, this would be a bigger concern.

Chapter 6

Conclusions

How to best measure public support for a foreign country is a theoretical, methodolog-

ical and practical question. In this thesis I have attempted to contribute to existing lit-

erature and research into the U.S.-Israel special relationship by providing a framework

that may provide answers to such a question. That a basic public mood may explain the

item responses we find in surveys relating to Israel is not necessarily surprising, but it is

a phenomena that needs validating. The series of CFA models on varying public opin-

ion items that relate to Israel indeed provide indication for an underlying feature of this

mood. Yet, not all items are necessarily relevant. When items tap into something other

than support or favorability—such as was seen in the item referring to the importance

of resolving the conflict—these items are less meaningful. As are items that only relate

to Israel indirectly and shift the focus of respondents to other actors.

The CFA models also validate an assumption thus far left unchecked in public opin-

ion research concerning Israel: the ability of the sympathy item to measure support for

Israel. Results indicate sympathy is a strong measure of support when comparing be-

tween the various versions of sympathy—vs. Arabs, Palestinians or Hezbollah—and

55


when comparing them to other items. The strength of these findings is the ability to

expand our scope of available items in public opinion research and include more mea-

sures, besides the sympathy items in qualitative and quantitative research. How to take

these different items together is another question.

Plotting the five different types of items revealed a multidimensional image of sup-

port that contrary to popular belief, has included also public opposition to Israel. These

usually revolve around the policies Israel chooses to adopt and Israeli leadership. Other

items however—U.S. policies, U.S.-Israel relationship, conditioning support on choos-

ing between two sides and general favorability toward Israel—are mostly supportive

and all seem to be increasing in recent years. Relying on the relative strength of each

category of items, as seen in the CFA models, offers one method of combining these

items. Weighting the categories so that the influence of categories that proved weaker

and that may include other theoretical aspects is slightly diminished compared to other

items, allows for a more educated combination of these categories.

The general trend of this combined measure resembles that which we have al-

ready seen—a supportive American public, becoming even more supportive as time

progresses. It’s innovation however, is in its greater sensitivity to events. If public

opinion on foreign policy is event-based, we would expect to see support increasing or

decreasing following important events. Viewing support for Israel using a single series

of items—sympathy or aid to Israel for example—did not reveal such a sensitivity to

events. The final measure however, in Figure 5.2 clearly demonstrates this and research

concerning public opinion toward foreign policy may further benefit from implementing

similar methods to learn from public opinion items as a whole, rather than single survey

items..

How can this research develop in this future? Research focusing on why the Amer-


ican public supports Israel may now have one measure to use as an outcome variable

during most of Israel’s existence. Moreover, it has the potential to test hypotheses on the

different dimensions of support. For instance, how is support—public or otherwise—for

Israel affected by personal tensions between the leaders of the two countries and how

does this effect change from dimension to dimension. Treating the longitudinal mood

as a time series may reveal if an when changes in the public mood are significant and

why.

Research into the influence of public opinion on American foreign policy and on

other institutions involved in designing these policies may also benefit from such a mea-

sure. There is also room to repeat the same process using items that relate to other coun-

tries. One of the difficulties thus far in such comparisons has been that aside from Israel,

no country has had one single public opinion item asked repeatedly and frequently over

the years. This method allows the vast amount of data that does exist to be used and

compared across countries. Such a comparison may allow us to better understand this

measure of support itself. While we’re able to say when—and perhaps why—Americans

are more or less supportive of Israel, having comparable measures for other countries

may allow us to reveal the changes in American preferences as time goes by, and reveal

which countries enjoy the greatest public support. Such comparisons may also provide

insights into the influence of internationalist and isolationist outlooks on the mood to-

ward Israel—are changes in the mood toward Israel part of an overall trend in views

toward foreign policy or are they independent? I would add to this a comparison of the

mood toward Israel, to other measures of policy moods (e.g. Kertzer, 2013; Stimson,

1999), to see if and how these are connected.

Finally, perhaps most intriguing from my point of view, is repeating the process on

an individual level in order to break up the measure of support into groups. Considering


the ever-growing importance of parties in American foreign policy and the attitudes

toward it, comparing Republicans and Democrats may provide us with an even more

meaningful image of American support for Israel, and may even help explain some of

the trends we’re witnessing. Changes in the overall mood may originate in changes that

specific publics have undergone, namely within the Republican party. Both Democrats

and Republicans remain largely supportive of Israel, but Republican support has surged

in recent years, explaining some of the increase in the positive sentiment found in Figure

5.2 (Cavari, 2013; Gries, 2014; Rynhold, 2015). Other meaningful groups to compare

include the various religious groups in the U.S. who are important both to the U.S.-

Israel relationship and to American politics at large, racial groups, levels of education,

and more. How does the public mood change when separating it into these different

groups and how can we explain such differences?

I believe this research is an important continuation of the research into public sup-

port for Israel and may be an important step forward in our understanding of the U.S.-

Israel special relationship, and the role of public opinion in it. This research may be a

first important step in measuring public moods toward subtopics within foreign policy,

and opens the door for new questions and provides us with the ability to provide them

with answers. Replicating the method here, we may continue to measure the mood of

the public toward foreign nations and foreign policy, overcoming methodological lim-

itations of availability of data (repeated survey items offering longitudinal data) and

understanding the fluctuations in American public opinion toward foreign policy, as an

expression of an event-sensitive public mood.

Chapter 7

Appendix: Public Opinion Items

In the following six tables, I present the public opinion items used in the CFA models in

chapter chapter 4. Each table corresponds to a different category of items and lists their

short-name used throughout this thesis, their full question text, the years it was available

for individual-level analysis and the coding of the possible responses (responses marked

DKR refer to ‘do not know’ or refusing to answer).

59


Table 7.1: Category: Israel vs. Others

Item Short Name Question Text Years Available Pro-Israel Oppose-Israel

Nonresponse

blamenoips Who is mostly responsible for thefact that the Palestinians do not havea state of their own - Israelis or thePalestinians themselves?

2007 Palestinians Israel other/DKR

blamenopeace Do you think Israel or the Arabcountries is more to blame for thelack of progress in settling their dif-ference?

1991, 2003 Arab coun-tries

Israel other/DKR

blameproblemsarabs Which side do you feel is more toblame in this dispute–Israel or theArabs?

1953, 1955-1956,1977

Arabs Israel other/DKR

blameproblemshezb Turning to the Middle East, who doyou think is more to blame for thefighting between Israel and Hezbol-lah in Lebanon? Is Israel more toblame, Hezbollah more to blame, orare both equally to blame?

2006 Hezbollah Israel other/DKR

blameproblemslebanon Israel and Lebanon have been ne-gotiating about withdrawing Israelitroops from southern Lebanon. Noagreement has been reached. Whichcountry is more responsible for thefailure to reach an agreement – Is-rael, Lebanon, or are both countriesequally responsible?

1983 Lebanon Israel other/DKR

blameproblemspal Regardless of your overall feelingstoward Israel and the Palestinians,who do you think is more to blamefor the recent violence - Israel or thePalestinians?

1989, 2000-2003,2009

Palestinians Israel other/DKR

right In your opinion, which side is morein the right?[Egypt/Arabs] or Is-rael (in the present trouble betweenthem)?

1948, 1955 Israel Egypt/Arabs DKR

sympathyarabs In the dispute between Israel andthe Arabs, which side do you sym-pathize with more—Israel or theArabs?

1948-1949, 1956,1964, 1967, 1969-1970, 1973-1975,1977-1986, 1988-1992, 1998, 2001,2002, 2006, 2010

Israel Arabs both/neither/DKR

sympathyhezbollah Based on what you have read orheard about the conflict in the Mid-dle East, are your sympathies morewith Israel or more with Hezbollah?

2006 Israel Hezbollah both/neither/DKR

sympathypalestinians In the dispute between Israel andthe Palestinians, which side do yousympathize with more, Israel or thePalestinians?

1978-1982, 1988-1993, 1997-2014

Israel Palestinians both/neither/DKR

ussideshould In the Middle East conflict, do youthink the United States should takeIsrael’s side, take the Palestinians’side, or not take either side?

1977, 1998, 2000-2004, 2006, 2008,2011-2012, 2014

Israel Palestinians DKR


Table 7.2: Category: Israeli Policies


Nonresponse

castlead Over the past few weeks, there hasbeen a significant military conflictbetween Israel and Hamas in theGaza Strip....Do you approve or dis-approve of the military action Israelhas taken in the Gaza Strip?

2009 Approve Disapprove DKR

ips israelagree If the PLO (Palestine Liberation Or-ganization) agreed to recognize Is-rael as a Jewish State and alsostopped its military raids on Israel,do you think Israel should agree tothe idea of a homeland for Pales-tinian refugees on territory now heldby Israel, or don’t you think theyshould agree to such a Palestinianhomeland?

1977-1978, 1980-1982

no yes DKR

israelchangeattitude Do you think the Israelis mustchange their attitude before peacecan come to the Middle East or doyou think that’s not necessary?

1988, 1998 no yes DKR

israelenough Do you think Israel is or is not doingall it should to bring about peace inthe Middle East?

1978-1979, 1998 yes no DKR

israelforce Do you think the Israelis’ use offorce in responding to violence bythe Palestinians has been excessive,or is appropriate given the circum-stances?

1956, 1978, 1988,2000-2002, 2006,2009-2010, 2012,2014

appropriate/approve

excessive/disap-prove

DKR

lebanonwar01 In general, how do you feel aboutIsrael’s recent actions in Lebanon?Would you say you: approvestrongly, approve, disapprove, disap-prove strongly?

1982 approve disapprove DKR

lebanonwar02 Do you approve or disapprove of themilitary action Israel has taken inLebanon?


negotiationwplo The Israeli government says that itwill not deal with the PLO (Pales-tine Liberation Organization) or withArab nations until they recognize Is-rael’s right to exist as a Jewish state.Do you think this position is reason-able or unreasonable?

1979, 1982, 1985 reasonable unreasonable DKR

settlements Do you think it is all right for Is-rael to build settlements in Pales-tinian Territories, or do you thinkthey should not?

1991, 1998, 2009 should should not DKR

targetedkilling As you may know, the Israeli gov-ernment has adopted a policy of tar-geting and killing Palestinians whothe Israelis suspect of being terror-ist leaders. Do you approve or disap-prove of this policy?



Table 7.3: Category: Evaluation of Israel


Nonresponse

israelally1 Do you think that Israel is or is not areliable ally of the United States?

1981-1982, 1986,1989-1992

yes no DKR

israelally2 Do you consider Israel an ally ofthe United States, friendly but not anally, unfriendly, or an enemy of theUnited States?

1982-1983, 1985,1988, 1990, 1998,2000-2001, 2006,2010-2011, 2013-2014

ally/friendly unfriendly/enemy

DKR

israelinfluence Do you think Israel has too much in-fluence, too little influence, or theright amount of influence on Amer-ican foreign policy makers in Wash-ington?

1981, 1989, 1991,1998, 2002

rightamount/toolittle

too much DKR

israeltherm I’d like you to rate these countrieson this feeling thermometer. If youfeel neutral toward a country, giveit a temperature of 50 degrees. Ifyou have a warm feeling toward acountry, give it a temperature higherthan 50 degrees. If you have a coolfeeling toward a country, give it atemperature lower than 50 degrees.)What temperature would you giveto... Israel?

1978, 1982, 1986,1990-1991, 1994,2002-2006, 2014

51−100 1−49 50 / DKR

israelvi Many people believe that the UnitedStates has a vital interest in certainareas of the world and not in otherareas. That is, certain countries ofthe world are important to the U.S.for political, economic or securityreasons. I am going to read you alist of countries. For each, tell mewhether you feel the U.S. does ordoes not have a vital interest in thatcountry....Israel.

1978, 1982, 1986,1990, 1994, 1998-1999, 2002

yes no DKR

jewishinfluence Do you think that Jews have toomuch influence, too little influence,or the right amount of influence onAmerican foreign policy in the Mid-dle East?

1964, 1975, 1979,1987-1988, 1998

rightamount/too little

too much DKR

opinionisrael2 Next, I’d like your overall opinionof some foreign countries.) What isyour overall opinion of...Israel? Isit very favorable, mostly favorable,mostly unfavorable, or very unfavor-able?

1982-1984, 1986,1988-1989, 1991-1993, 1996, 1998,1999-2001, 2006,2009-2011, 2014

favorable/mostlyfavorable

unfavorable/mostly un-favorable

DKR

proisraelgroups Do you think pro-Israel groups in theUnited States have too much influ-ence on United States policy, or not?

1988, 1992 rightamount/toolittle

too much DKR

zionisticinfluence Now just a few questions about theMiddle East. A number of groupshave been mentioned as having toomuch influence on the United States’Middle East policy. Do you feelthat...Zionist organizations... have orhave not had too much influence?

1975, 1979 rightamount/too little

too much DKR


Table 7.4: Category: Israeli Leadership


Nonresponse

israelipm Is your opinion of Israel Prime Min-ister [name] favorable, unfavorableor haven’t you heard enough abouthim?

1978-1979, 1982-1983, 1988, 1994,1997-2000, 2002-2003, 2012, 2014

favorable unfavorable DKR

israelipmscale You will notice that the ten boxeson this scale go from the highest po-sition of plus five for someone youhave a very favorable opinion of–allthe way down to the lowest positionof minus five–for someone you havea very unfavorable opinion of. Howfar up or down the scale would yourate each of the following?)... Men-achem Begin

1982 +1−+5 −5−−1 0 DKR

israelipmtherm Now I would like you to rate someAmerican and foreign leaders on thisthermometer scale.) What tempera-ture would you give to... Prime Min-ister [name] of Israel.

1978, 1982, 1990,1994, 1998, 2002

51−100 1−49 50 / DKR

iswp Would you say the leaders of Israelsincerely want to be at peace with theArab nations or not?

1992-1993 yes no DKR

sharonenough Do you think the Prime Ministerof Israel, Ariel Sharon, has doneenough to promote peace in the Mid-dle East, or don’t you think so?

2002 enough not enough DKR


Table 7.5: Category: American Policies


Nonresponse

aidisrael Do you think that the federal gov-ernment should be spending more,less, or is it spending about the rightamount on aid to Israel

1981, 1986, 1988-1991, 1998

more/rightamount

less/none DKR

attention2israel Do you think the (United States)government has paid too much at-tention to the problems of Israel...orabout the right amount...or do youthink the government hasn’t paidenough attention to the problems ofIsrael?

1982 right /notenough

too much DKR

attitude2israel Do you feel that the administrationhas been too soft, too hard, or justabout right so far in its dealings withIsrael?

1979-1981, 1986 too hard too soft rightamount/DKR

attitude2palestinians Do you feel that the [Carter/Reagan]administration has been too soft, toohard or just about right in its dealingswith the Palestinian people?

1979, 1981 too soft too hard rightamount/DKR

economicaidisrael Do you think economic aid to Is-rael should be increased, decreased,kept about the same, or stopped alto-gether?

1948, 1982, 1990-1992, 1994, 1998-1999, 2001-2003,2006, 2011-2012,2014

Increased/the same

Decreased/Stopped

DKR

importance As far as you are concerned, shouldthe development of a peaceful solu-tion to the Arab-Israeli situation inthe Middle East be a very impor-tant foreign policy goal of the UnitedStates, a somewhat important goal,not too important, or not an impor-tant goal at all?

1955, 1988, 1991,1993, 1999-2000,2002-2004, 2006,2009

very/somewhatimportant

not too im-portant /notat all

DKR

lebanonisraelretreat Do you approve or disapprove ofthe Reagan Administration’s requestthat Israel withdraw its forces fromSouthern Lebanon?

1982 no yes DKR

militaryaidisrael Thinking about the military aid theUnited States provides Israel for mil-itary purposes, do you think US mili-tary aid to Israel should be increased,kept the same, or decreased?

1955-1956, 1973,1975-1976, 1978,1980-1983, 1985,1986-1988, 1990-1991, 1999, 2001-2003, 2006, 2011,2012, 2014

increased/the sameamount

decreased DKR

pressurewho Once the violence between Israeland the Palestinians has lessened,which of the following do you thinkthe U.S. (United States) should do?...Put more pressure on Israel to nego-tiate over basic differences with thePalestinians, put more pressure onthe Palestinians to negotiate over ba-sic differences with Israel, put morepressure on both sides, put morepressure on neither side

2001-2002, 2004 Israel Palestinians other/DKR


Category: American Policies (Continued)


Nonresponse

relwithisrael Please tell me if you agree or dis-agree with the following statement,or if you have no opinion either way–’The US (United States) should re-duce its ties to Israel in order tolessen the acts or terrorism againstus.’

1977, 1981, 1989,1991, 2001-2002

disagree agree DKR

supportisrael1 Do you think the United Statessupports...Israel–too much, about theright amount, or too little?

2001-2003, 2006,2011

rightamount/too little

too much DKR

supportisrael2 What should the United States doin the conflict between Israel and[Hezbollah militants in Lebanon/thePalestinians]? Should the UnitedStates government publicly supportIsrael, should it say or do nothing, orshould it publicly criticize Israel?

2002, 2006, 2009 support criticize do nothing/DKR

supportisraelimportance Let’s talk about Israel and the MiddleEast. Do you think it is very impor-tant that we continue to support Is-rael, somewhat important, or not thatimportant?

1977, 1981-1982,1985

important/somewhatimportant

not that/not at allimportant

DKR

supportpalestinians2 Do you think the United States sup-ports...the Palestinians–too much,about the right amount, or too little?

2006 too much rightamount/too little

DKR

tmpressureisrael In trying to arrange a peace settle-ment between Israel and the Pales-tinians, do you think the [Clin-ton/Bush/Obama] administration isputting too much pressure on...theIsraeli government, too little pres-sure or about the right amount?

1998, 2002, 2013 too much rightamount/too little

DKR

ussideisrael Thinking about the Mideast situationthese days, do you think the U.S.(United States) should take Israel’sside more, less or about as much asit has in the past?

2001, 2003, 2005 =more/same

less DKR


Table 7.6: Category: Other Parties


Nonresponse

aswp Would you say the leaders of theArab nations sincerely want to be atpeace with Israel or not?

1993 no yes DKR

attitude2arabs Do you feel that the Reagan adminis-tration has been too soft, too hard orjust about right in its dealings withother Arab nations?

1981 too soft too hard rightamount/DKR

egyptenough Do you think Egypt is or is not doingall it should to bring about peace inthe Middle East?

1978-1979 no yes; DKR

favorips Do you favor or oppose the estab-lishment of an independent Pales-tinian state on the West Bank and theGaza Strip?

1977, 1979-1984,1988-1991, 1993-1994, 1998-2003,2009, 2011

no yes DKR

opinionpalestinianauthorityWhat is your overall opinion of...thePalestinian Authority? Is it veryfavorable, mostly favorable, mostlyunfavorable, or very unfavorable?

2000 unfavorable/mostly un-favorable


DKR

opinionplo Is your overall opinion of thePalestine Liberation Organization–the PLO–very favorable, mostly fa-vorable, mostly unfavorable, or veryunfavorable?

1988-1989, 1991,1993, 1998, 2001

unfavorable/mostly un-favorable


DKR

ploenough Do you believe the PLO (PalestineLiberation Organization) has doneenough to prove that it is interestedin peace, or hasn’t it done enough?

1998 not enough enough; DKR

tmpressurepal In trying to arrange a peace settle-ment between Israel and the Pales-tinians, do you think the [Clin-ton/Obama] administration is puttingtoo much pressure on...the Palestini-ans, too little pressure or about theright amount?

1998, 2013 too little rightamount/too much

DKR

usactiveips Should the U.S. (United States) ac-tively work to help establish a Pales-tinian state or not?

2002 no yes DKR

usfavorips Now, do you think the United Statesshould or should not favor creating aPalestinian state?

1990, 1996, 2001,2002, 2011

should not should DKR

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