lw u l.vj ulblw uu u l.vj u u\jt ulb from: commanding officer and commander task element 95.11 ......

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,• ' . C1lE116/GRP/jhc ' llAIJOENG ST!u\rT (CVE-116) c/o Fleet Post Offtee San Francisco, California Al2/l0 1-'1 •o Ser: 005 - 1 -- _"' ,_ rm rD1 n rn: IT\\n (;'\ n LW uu u l.VJ u u\Jt ulb From: Commanding Officer and Commander Task Element 95.11 To: Chief of Naval Operations Via: (l) Commander Task Group 95.1 (2) Commander Task Force NINETY-FIVE (3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet DECLASSifiED (4) Commander Nuvul Forces, Far East (5) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet Subj: Action Report 17 December 1951 through 28 December 1951 Ref: (a) Article 0705 Navy Regulations (b) OPNAV INST 3480.4 (c) CINCPACFLT INST 3480.1 (d) CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-51 (Revised) (o) CTE 95.11 GpOrdor 2-51 Enol: (1) Sample Air Schedule (2) Chart showing area of operations (3) USS BADOZNG STRAIT ltr serial 1341 of 20 November 1951 1. In accordance with references (a), (b), (c), and (d), tho action report of Task Element 95.11 for the period 17 December 1951 through 26 December _ 1951 is submitted herewith. The Commanding Officer, USS STR.;.IT (CVE-116) was CTE 95.11 during this period. 2. The report is divided into 6 parts, as listed belou: Part I Part II Part III Part IV Part V Part VI General Narrative. Chronological order of events. Remarks on performance of ordnance material and equip- ment, including ammunition expenditure. Summary of own and enemy battle damage. Personnel performance and casualties. Comments and recommendations. Part r • GENERAL NARRATIVE (1\) During the period 17 December 1951 through 28 December 1951, the USS BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116) under the command Captain Roy L. JOHNSON, 626o6/ 1310, USN, and with Marine Aircraft Squadron VMF-212 embarked, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph A. GRAY, 06207/7302, USMC, Commanding Officer, operated as a

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  • ------------~--------------~--~~~ ~ ,• ' . C1lE116/GRP/jhc ' u.s.s~ llAIJOENG ST!u\rT (CVE-116)

    c/o Fleet Post Offtee San Francisco, California

    Al2/l0 1-'1 •o Ser: 005 -~) 1- - _"' ~--

    ~~lqJ ,_

    rm rD1 n rn: IT\\n (;'\ n LW uu u l.VJ u u\Jt ulb

    From: Commanding Officer and Commander Task Element 95.11 To: Chief of Naval Operations Via: (l) Commander Task Group 95.1

    (2) Commander Task Force NINETY-FIVE (3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet DECLASSifiED (4) Commander Nuvul Forces, Far East (5) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet

    Subj: Action Report 17 December 1951 through 28 December 1951

    Ref: (a) Article 0705 Navy Regulations (b) OPNAV INST 3480.4 (c) CINCPACFLT INST 3480.1 (d) CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-51 (Revised) (o) CTE 95.11 GpOrdor 2-51

    Enol: (1) Sample Air Schedule (2) Chart showing area of operations (3) USS BADOZNG STRAIT ltr serial 1341 of 20 November 1951

    1. In accordance with references (a), (b), (c), and (d), tho action report of Task Element 95.11 for the period 17 December 1951 through 26 December _ 1951 is submitted herewith. The Commanding Officer, USS Bt~.DOENG STR.;.IT (CVE-116) was CTE 95.11 during this period.

    2. The report is divided into 6 parts, as listed belou:

    Part I

    Part II

    Part III

    Part IV

    Part V

    Part VI

    General Narrative.

    Chronological order of events.

    Remarks on performance of ordnance material and equip-ment, including ammunition expenditure.

    Summary of own and enemy battle damage.

    Personnel performance and casualties.

    Comments and recommendations.

    Part r • GENERAL NARRATIVE

    (1\) During the period 17 December 1951 through 28 December 1951, the USS BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116) under the command o~ Captain Roy L. JOHNSON, 626o6/ 1310, USN, and with Marine Aircraft Squadron VMF-212 embarked, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph A. GRAY, 06207/7302, USMC, Commanding Officer, operated as a

  • ,.

    D£CLASSI FlED G~ll6/Gl!P/jhc Al2/10 Ser: 005

  • ,. . ' OECLASSif-1 ED

    CVEU6/GRP/jhc Al2/l0 Ser: 005

    Part, II • CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS (gont 1d)

    18 December - Refueled USS PORTERFIELD.

    llMl C!L'.RITY joined the soreon, as previously directed. A total of 41 flights (14 of which were defensivo) wore flown this date. The weather was generally good. Major R. F. STUBBING, 020335/7302, USMCR, encountered ground fire while on an armed reeonnaissnnca mission and his aircraft received a direct hit by a 20MM shell which exploded in the engine a.ccessory section, ea.using a. fire to brenk out. Tho pUot wns nblo to got two miles out over T~\EDONG INLET before bailout. He received minor cuts and burns and w~s rescued by n helicopter from tho USS MANCHE:STER (CL-82) patrolling thnt area..

    VMF-212 aircraft nceompliahad the follouing:

    ORDNANCE EXPENDED MISSIONS

    20 500 lb GP bombs l4 CI.P

    160 5 n HVli.R rockets 4 Armed Reconnaissance

    26 3.5" rockets 4 Airspot

    8 Napalm bombs 4 Strike

    28,200 Rounds .50 cal. ammo 15 TarCnp

    19 December - HMCS ATHABASKAN and HMS CHARITY refueled from tho R\DOENG STRAIT.

    191725/ HMS CHARITY detached to carry out night patrol assignment in the PAEGNYONG-00 area. Tho remainder of the forca retiring southward for the night.

    A total of 42 fiights (10 of which were defensive) ware f"lotm this date. Weather was generally good.

    VMF-212 aircraft accomplished the following:

    ORDN.\NCE EXPENDED

    25 500 lb. GP bombs

    224 5 n HVAR rockets

    6 Napnlm bombs

    30,000 Rounds .• .50 cal. l'lJl'lr.J.O

    3

    MISSIONS

    10 CI.P

    11 Armed Reconnaissance

    1 Photo

    20 TarCop

  • "

    , . 191'152/

    OECLI'\SSIFIEQ CVE116/GRP/jhc 1.12/10 Ser: 005

    Peather reconnnissnnce plano from VP-3IX, based in Japan, reported sighting 30 un ... identified tra'lrlers at Latitude 36-ZON, Longitude 123-DOE,

    Commander Task Force 95 directed CTE 95.11 to investigate.

    192017/ HMCS ATHI.BASKAN and USS PORTERFIEW detached from the screen to conduct search for reported tr~wlers.

    20 December - HMCS ATHABASKAN and USS PORTERFIEW rejoined formation at first light. Results of search negative~

    201648/

    CTE 95.11 wns directed to fUrnish CAP for coastal convoy cnroutc to INCHON.

    Refueled USS PORTERFIELD and HMCS ATHABASKAN.

    USS PORTERFIELD detached to carry out night p~trol assigned in tho P1l:EGNYONG-OO area. The remainder of tho force retiring soutro•ard for the night,

    A total of 39 flights (18 of ITbieh ~ore defensive) wore flown this date. Wee thor in gonoral was good.

    VMF-212 aircraft acconplished the following:

    8RD;;ANCE EXPENDED MISSIONS

    11 500 lb. GP bombs 18 CAP

    145 5" W!AR rockets 21 TarCap

    10 Napalm bombs

    17,700 Rounds .50 cnl, ammo

    21 December ... USS MA.NCHESTER, with USS EVERSOLE as escort, joined v~ith TE 95.11 at kotitudc }8~25N nnd Longitude 124-lOE,

    211653/

    2ll658/

    GTE 95.11 conferred with Roar Admiral DYER, CTF-95, aboard tho 1JSS MANCHFSTER.

    Major R. F. STUEBING, USMCR was returned from the USS MANCHESTER via helicopter.

    USS MANCHESTER and USS EVERSOLE do patted,

    HMCS ATHABli.SKAN wa.s detached to night patrol ossignmont in the PAEGNYONG-Do area,

    Only 2 flights (these being CAP) ware flown this date, Weather remained foggy ell day,

    4

  • '

    DECLASSl FlED CVEll6/GRP/jhc Al2/10 Ser• 005

    ·22 ))ecembor - Refueled HMCS f.TIIA!li.SKAN, and CHS CHARITY,

    A total of 12 flights (2 of which were defensive) were flown this date. Weather remained foggy untll early aftP-rnoon.

    VMF·212 aircraft accomplished the following:

    ORDNI\NCE EXPENDED MISSIONS

    8 500 lb. GP bombs 2 CAP

    92 5" HVAR rockets 4 Armed Reconnaissance

    4 Napalm bombs 2 Airspot

    6,700 Rounds oi' .50 eel. !llnlllO 4 Te.rCap

    23 December • Rofuolod USS PORTERFIELD

    231701/

    A total of 35 flights (10 of which uere defensive} rrorc nown this date. Weather was exoollcnt.

    Detached USS PORTERFIELD to carry out night pntrol assignment in tho p:,EGNYONG-00 area.

    VMF-212 aircr~ accomplished the following;

    ORDNANCE EXPE!!j)ED MISSIONS

    24 500 lb. G? bot:lbs 10 C.\P

    191 511 HVAR rockots 6 Armed Roconn~issance

    24,000 Rounds of .50 cal. ammo 19 TarCap

    24 Docombsr - Refueled HMCS ATH/1.&\SKI.N.

    241710/

    A total of 42 flights (10 of which wore defensive) were tlown this date. freather was excellent.

    HMCS ATH.'i.Bt..SKl+N detached to carry out night patrol n.ssignment in the PI.EGNYONG-00 area.

    VMF-212 aircraft accomplished the following:

    ORDNANCE EXPENDED

    8 1000 lb. GP bombs

    20 500 lb. GP bombs

    191 511 !WAR rockets.

    5

    MISSIONS

    10 C.\P

    12 ~rmed R0connaissance

    20 TarCap

  • DECLASSIF\£.0 .

    OlljlNANCE !p(PENDilJ)

    61 3.5" rockets

    4 Napalm bombs

    3S,500 Rounds of .50 cal. a~rno

    CVEll6/GRP/jhc Al2/10 Ser: 005

    MISSIONS

    25 December - HlvB CHAlUTY detached to night patrol assignnont in the PAEGNYONG-DO area.

    No flight operations conducted due to rain and fog that con-tinuod all day. A Merry Christmas was had by all. 26 December - Rcfualed USS PORTERFIELD and HMS CHARITY,

    271706/

    USS PORTERFIELD detached to proceed on night patrol assignment in the- PAEGl\TYONG-DO area.

    Only 10 flights (2 of which wore defensive) were flor~, due to inclement weather.

    VJI.lF-212 aircraft accomplished the follo1'dng:

    ORDNANCE EXPENDED

    8 1000 lb. GP bombs

    19 500 lb. GP bombs

    159 511 HVAR rockets

    94 3.5!1 rockets

    4 Napalm bombs

    38,000 Rounds of .50 cal. ammo

    MISSIONS

    10 CAP

    8 Arnod rtoc0nnaissance

    8 Strikes

    15 TarCap

    HMCS ATHABASKAN departed to night patrol assignnont in the PAEGNYONG-DO area.

    28 December- USS HANSON temporarily detached to join TU 90.82.7 as convoy screening ship and CAP control. However, duo to reduced visibility in tho convoy area, GAP was not launched. Tho HANSON returned to TE 95.11 about 1230,

    281650/

    USS HANSON and IJMCS ATHAHASKAN refueled during the day. USS HANSON detached to carry out night patrol assignment in tho PAEGNYONG-DO area and directed to join the Hl'.1CS SIDNEY who assumed GTE 95.11 on 29 December 1951. Tbo USS HANSON also carried tho "TURNOVER" notes that were to be passed

    6

  • ..

    281922/

    282130/

    ' '

    OECLI\SSlf\ED CVE;ll6/GRP/jM Al2/10 Ser: 005

    to lli!AS SIDNEY. The BADOENG STRAIT with HMCS ATHABASKAN and HMS CHARITY in company, and VMF-212 embarked, took departure from the operating area for Sasebo, Japan.

    HMCS ATHABASKAN detached to proceed to the port of Kure, Japan independently.

    The Commanding Officer, Hr~ SIDNEY, assumed command of Task Element 95.11 in area MIKE. The BADOENG STRAIT con-tinued course for Sasebo, Japan in company with HMS Cl"IARITY.

    Inclement weather curtailed flight operations this date. 8 flights (all of which were combat) were flown.

    ,nMF-212 aircraft accomplished the following:

    ORDNANCE EXPENDED MISSIONS

    8 500 lb, GP bombs 4 Armed Reconnaissance

    62 5d HVAR rockets 4 Strike

    4,800 Rounds of .50 cal. ammo

    Conducted AA gunnery firing drills ( to'N'ed slee,re) enroute to Fleet Acti,Tities, Sasebo.

    29 December - las CHARITY detached to proceed independently to Kobe, Japan.

    291723/ Moored at bu~ #18, Sasebo harbor, to remain through 6 January 1952 for replenishment and recreation.

    Part III - E!'RFOJ11i!AN(l; OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPI!ENT INCLUDrm M~"lUNITION EXPENDITURE

    A. The gasoline heating unit for mixinG NAPALM, as described in enclosure (3), was evaluated operationally durin?: this period. The resul t.s proved extremelY satisfactory and a separate report is under preparation pointing out the capabilities and ap~licability of the equiument as designed.

    B. The assembly, arming, and stowage of Mk 77 Mod 0 Fire Bomhs presented several problems, Assembly was time consuming due to the care that must be exercised in tightening the tie-rod nut to the prescribed 425 in/lbs. torque. Of' the .36 bombs used, tie-rod threads .were stripT"Jed on 4, making the entire bomb useless in all four cases. An additional t~ree bombs separated Tihile planes were being catapulted. This was believed to be caused by the stripping of the tie-rod threads also.

    _c. The disengaging of hung-rockGts during nrrGsted landing created an awkward situation. The most efficient method involved, to prevent damage to the ship or other aircraft by these rockets traveling down the flight deck was the innovation and use of the "Fredericks Barrier", This consisted of lashing

    7

  • DECLASSIFIED CVEll6/GRl' /.J he Al2/10 Ser: 005

    six cargo nets together - forming two sections of three nets each. These two sections uere strung across the flight deck just aft of the forward ele-vator to serve as a deck-level barrier in which vrandoring rockets nere caught and then jettisoned. After landing M aircraft with··bung .. rockets the nets were pulled apart, gate fashion, to allowing taxing forward. Tan plano handlers were required to open and close the nets. A total of 74 hung-rockets were returned to the ship during this operational period.

    D. The fire-power umbrella of this ship does not extend the full 360 degrees around the ship. Thel:'e exists a vacant 20 degree sector on the bm'l, 10 degrees on either side, This was caused by the authorized removal of tho forward 40MM mount.

    E. The fire control system is not completely adequate for night radar firing as the computer system installation has no direct method of designation of air targets from ere to the Gun Control Platform.

    F~ Facilities are not available for developing gun camera film aboard the CVE-105 typo carrier. Damage assessment is consequently a matter of memory or personal evaluation at de-briefings.

    G. The ASVl allowance of Mk 24 mines, that is required to be carried, consumes valuabla storage space that could otherwise be used to advantage to store armament more in line ~ith the mission of the ship during this type operation.

    H. Ammunition expenditures:

    1. During the operating period covo:rod by this report tho follo11ing ordnance was expended.

    UY VMF -

  • . . . . DECLASSIFIED

    Part IV - SUMMI.RY OF OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

    A. Own battle damage -

    CVEll6/GRP/jho Al2/10 Scr: 005

    1. None of the ships of the task element sustained battle damage.

    2. For damage sustained by aircraft see Naval Air Warfare reports (OpNav 338,5 Revised 4-51) submitted tor this operating period.

    B. Battle damage inflicted on the enemy -

    1. Ships of this task element infl~oted no damage on the enemy while operating as part of the screen during the period covered by this report. ·

    2. For battle damage inflicted on the enemy by aircraft of the task element see Naval Air rarfare reports (OpNav 338.3 Revised 3-51) submitted for this operating period.

    Part V - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

    A. Personnel performance was considered to be excellent and in the general high standard of the Navy and Harine Corps •

    B. Casualties -

    1. On 18 December 1951, Major R. F. STUEBING, USMCR, was forced to bail out over water after his aircraft uas hit by enemy ground fire from enemy held territory in North Korea. He was recovered by helicopter. He suff"orcd minor burns and lacerations on the face.

    C. The recommended wartime complement as submitted by this command to COUAIRPAC on 10 October 1951, reflects CVE-105 personnel requirements for this type operation. Comments from individual departments aro as listed belou:

    1. Executive Dopartmont: RequireS 1 additional YN'T2, as legal yeoman; 1 typewriter repairman,

    2. Air Department: Total numbers adequate. Recommend dropping 1 ADC, 3 fJDl, 4 AD2, and 6 AD3, totaling 14 men, to be replaced b,y 7 AN 1s and 7 AA 1s.

    3-. Dental Department: Recommend th0 allo'ilancc of dental officers on CVE 1s be incrGasod to 2.

    4. Navigation: Adequate.

    5. Supply Department: Inadequate. Additions required arc 1 DKl, and 5 non-rat0d men.

    6. Gunnery Department: Rocommcnd 12 more non-rated men in order to more efficiently maintain Condition TiiREE watches.

    9

  • ,. ' .

    DECLASSIFIED CVEll6/GRP /i he Al2/l0 Ser: 005

    7. Operations Department:

    a. Under the present method of having Quartermasters and Signal-men considered a.s one rating, it is recommended that the present allowance of 17 QM's be increased to 20 ratings to include 12 ratings with Signalmen quali-fications (NJC 0230-0239), in order that continuous around the clock watches may be stood.

    6 (1 PH3, b. That the photographer allowance

    and 2 AN(PH) additional), be increased by :3, to total

    c. Increase of three RD3 and three radarman strikers. Pro VI - SPECIAl COMMENTS ON DOCTJ!INE AND OPERATIONAL PROQE!J!JllWl

    A. The operation of' the BADOENG STRAIT and VMF-212 ae part of' TE 95 .11, in conjunction with other surface units, was considered to have been most effective in the enforcement of a seaward and coastwise blockade of tho West Coast of' Red hold Korea between latitudes 37-30N and 38-50N, Tho taotical advantage afforded by- GTE 95.11 closing to within 3:3 miles of the enemy coastal area for daily launchings made it possible to schedule two hour missions, oach composed of from six to eight aircraft, continuously during dnylight hours. A veritable shuttle on lldemand" targets vtas conducted in the face of tho con-tinual threat of 11hit-and-run11 attacks by Manchurian based Red air forces. B. Tho employment ~f VMF-212 fighter-bomber F4U-4 aircraft as CAP for troop convoys proceeding along the West coast of Korea detracted to a great degree from the primary mission of TE 95.11. Fully realizing the need for this CAP, it is believed, hor1ever, that carrier planes of this type could be more profitably employed wherein their armament carrying- oape.bilitiae -were exploited against the enemy.

    C. At the present time CIC has no satisfactory means of positively identi-fying friendly aircraft. In the event the enemy elected to launch token or all-out air attacks against TE 95.11, the situation would become quite critical with the enemy in an excellent position to strike the first blow and thus temporarily take command of the situation.

    D. The maximum numbor of screen ships available during daylight hours vms three. At darkness, and until da.,m, the size rlf the sereen was automatically reduced to two ships, as the third was d~vorted to night patrol around islands lying off the Rod held coastline. A definite submarine threat uould pose a very difficult problem with such an in~doquate ASn screen. E, LESSO!iS LEARNED -

    1. Weather prognostications 1'l(!rc so difficult as to try the _pe.tience of the boat, because reports from tho P.ostward were aim~ non-existent.

    Sea area. Facsimil0

    RECOMMENDJI.T!O!h l!;mploy acrologists ~i th experience in the Yellow Equip carriors oJA;r=r.ting :lu thl"l Yull~)W Sc:ra arua with Rawinscnde and Trans Cf) i vurs.

    10

  • DECLASSIFIED CVEiJ.6/GRP/jhc A12/l0 Ser: 005

    2. Intelligence data of all type:!s is continua.lly pouring in, requiring accurate interpretation and evaluation at all hours of the day and night.

    R,ECOMM!:NOATION: A minimurtl ot two officers and six enlisted personnel who are graduates of advanced schools of Combat Intelligonce should be ronde available to carrier task clement commanders.

    3. Panoramic photo intelligence was not available upon deployment and was a great hindrance in the debriefing anelyaie. After every fresh snott fall the features of tho target orcas would take on new profiles. Present AMS (1:50,()(X)) charts, though acC'Urato and detailed, bccn.me as confusing ns a.do.-lescont finger-paintings.

    RECOMJ,~NDATION: That photo nircraf't and pilots bo assigned to onch carrier. A dotnch."lcnt of' tTio of the typo planes employed by the squadron om• barked would suffice on a CVE carrier.

    4. A lnck of pro~oployment training in close-air support and target interdiction work, ~here available shipboard intelligence plays a major pnrt, created a. temporary difficulty in understanding maey problems of tho cmborkod squadron.

    RECOMMENDATION: Coordinate training with Marino Squadrons based o.t El Toro prior ~o deployment to the Far East eroa. Tho pro.ctico of the relieving carrier, arriVing from CONUS, sending key personnel on the last period of oper-ations to embark on the oarrter tn TF-95 is considered an extremely sound and essential practice.

    5. Tho projection of enemy nir nnd submarino attacks against this small task elmnent would very radically alter the present, almost complete freedom of action enjoyed.

    RJ,j:COMMEN!2ATION: That additional escort vessels for air defense and ASW bo assigned insofar ns practicable in order that the aurrent freedom of action would not be aurtailed in the event of ovort attacks.

    Copy to: (ADVANCE) CliO ComMo.rCorps CINCPACFLT COMNAVFE COI17thFLT CTF-95 CTG-95.1 COMAIRPAC COMCARDIV l?

    AUTHENTIC'l1 '!'F.D;

    G. R. PALUS

    CGairFMFPac CGFMFPac CGJ.stMAll USS BAIROKO (CVE-115) USS BATMN (cvt-29) USS SICILY (CVE-J.lS) USS RENDOV4 (CVE-114) 00 MAG-12 co 1TMF-21Z

    Corn""'r>do:r, U.S. Navy

    ll

  • .. '

    u .s.s. BADOENG· STRAIT (CVE-116) e/o Fleet Post Office

    Se~ ECL~SSi {\ltlornio 27 Jnnuary 1952

    FLIG!IT S CBEDULE FOR SUNRISE 0749 27 J:mU'lry 1952 SUNSET 1805

    . Mi§.aion Launch Ln.nd . A:lll!!Q. F-.;_cl Event

    A-1 A-2 A-3

    2 2 6

    CAP 0730 Tl~RC.i\.P 0730

    0925 Note 1 380 g~ls. 0925

    B-4 B-5 B-6

    C-7 C-8 C-9

    D-10 D-11 D-12

    E-13 E-14 E-15

    F-16 F-17 F-18

    NOTES:

    2 2 4

    2 2 4

    2 2 4

    2 2 4

    2 2 4

    STRIKE 0730

    CAP 0910 Tl~RCAP 0910 lliVER RECCO 0910

    CAP 1045 TARCl..P 1045 STRIKE 1045

    CAP 1220 TAR CAP 1220 STRIKE 1220

    CAP 1400 TARC:,P 1400 COi.ST RECCO 1400

    CAP 1535 TARCAP 1535 STRIKE 1535

    N0te 3 " 0925 Note 4 " 1100 Note 1 " 1100 Nnte 3 " 1100 Note 3 " 1235 Note 1 " 1235 N0te 3 " 1235 Note 5 " 1415 Note 1 " 1415 Note 3 " 1415 ~~.~ote 6 " 1550 Note l " 1550 Note 3 " 1550 Note 3 " 1730 Note 1 " 1730 Note 3 " 1730 Note 5 "

    1, All A/C full load .50 Cal. 2. Mc..inta:i,.n 2 A/C on ConditiOn 11 after each launch from one-hnlf hour

    before sunrise until sunset. 3. 500# 4/5 delny, 8-HVAR 4. 4 .\jc r;ith 1000# GP/DC, 8-HVAR

    2 A/C NAP!>.LM, 8-HVAR 5. 2 A/C - 500# GP/DC, 8-llP

    2 l1./C - N.._"~PM,M, 8-WP 6, 500# GP/DC, 8-HV:.R

    J.pproved:

    G, R, P..:\LUS CDR, USN Opera.tion Officer

    Submitted:

    A. S, IRISH LCDR, USN Air Oper. Officer

    " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " "

    Enclosure (1) to USS BADOENG STRIIIT ltr Serial 005 of ------

  • -- ·-·--...,-·

    (

    ,;t:""..v .... r 4 R T/Yu;J 1/-~: VAt 6,Afsr.: j

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    i-~~~-"'--__ ,·,_.s_rt------c.cj(t..!~4.._ __ si.::E:..:/-__,'1 __ , I

    OF

    ---·f----

  • •' " U.S.S, BADOENG BTRAI~ (GVE-116) c/o Fleet Post Office

    San Francisco, California

    DECLASSIFIED From: Commanding Officer, U.s.s. BADOENG STRJl.IT (CVE-116) To: Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet Via: Cornnander Carrier Division SEVENTEEN

    Subj: Mixing of Napalm in Cold Weather

    Ref: (a) COMAIRPAC ltr serial 30/14896 of 30 August 1951

    C'lE116/JCA/mvb S23/29 Ser: 1341

    20 NOV 1951

    Enol; (1) Photograph of Strainer shell (a) Photograph of 5/8" Copper Tubing (Coiled)(three prlnts) (3) Photograph of Baffle Plate welded to coils (4) Photograph of Readcr (two prints) (5) Photograph of Temperature Gauge (Wel1 type)(tuo prints)

    1. It is tha purpose of this letter to describe, in response to reference (a), a napalm heater unit developed by this ship,

    2. The basic idoa of the heater, as developed, is thRt tho gasoline is heated by steM! directly rather than by means of water. The heating system is pre-pared in a reamed aut strainer shell as pictured in enclosure (1}. The two coils of 5/811 copper tubing total 9J r~ot in length, 50 :f'eet in tho la.:rger coil and 40 flet in the smaller coil as pictured in enclosure (z), A baffle plate is wolded in the center of the coils causing tre flow of gasoline to circulRte properly throughout the longth of the unit to give tho desired in~ crease in temperature for heating of the gasoline as pictured in enclosure (3). The header nith a baffle plate is used to control the floD of stcP.m from tho inlet to tho discharge point as pictured in enclosure (4). Enclosure (5) pic-tures tho-unit installed_, a...l'l.d the location of' the 1/l'oll type temperc.ture gauge and ~~nd vnlvo to control the steam entering the unit. This unit uses a steam ~essuro of 35 pounds in the copper coils uith 65 pounds of gasoline oressure from the m.unp room. The increase of gasoline temperature under test '.'"JaS 45° With 35 pounds at the mixinr,- hopper uhich is bcli~"'vcd to he sufficient for mixing of napalm under most adverse ~oather conditions.

    3. It is believed thet the hontcr described has the follouing advantag&SI

    a. Greater safety. introduce steam (water)

    Complete drainback {e- accbnplished. Any lenka will into thO gasoline which does no harm.

    b'., Cfl\ooter aecessibility. Units can be easily instal:;ed o.t any fUeling station desire¢, olther""nlgbt or hangar dook. This permits •palm t"'lb to be invariably filled on the Planes and ~liminates the hnnSling of filled tanks.

    Enclosure (3) to GVE-116 letter ser 005"of ---------

  • r .- ' . . '

    DECLASSIFIED

    c. Greater convenience. No bulky equipment in the mw. No ':later splashing about on dcck6

    d. Greater speed. A minimum of equipment to hnndle. haating units can be increased to per~it mixing nnualm in of time.

    2

    Tho number of n minimum lnngth

    Enclosure (3) to CVE-116 letter ser n05 of --- ------·--