D e p a r t m e n t o f E c o n o m i c H i s t o r y

M a s t e r P r o g r a m m e i n E c o n o m i c D e m o g r a p h y

Fertility Transition and Regional Variation of Fertility in Turkey: Panel Data Fixed Effects Estimation, 1975-2000

Alper AVSAR

EKHR01

Masters thesis (15 credit points)

Spring 2010

Supervisor:

Maria Stanfors

Table of Contents

Abstract

1. Introduction 4

1.1 Aim of the Thesis 5

1.2 Research Question 6

2. Background 6

2.1 General Overview of Turkey 7

2.2 Analysis of Fertility and Mortality Trends 9

2.3 Stages of Demographic Transition in Turkey 11

2.4 Regional Fertility Trends 14

2.5 Previous Research 16

3. Theoretical Considerations 18

3.1 Demographic Transition Theory 18

3.2 Economic Theories of Demographic Transition 21

3.3 Cultural Theory of Demographic Transition 29

3.4 Definitions of Variables and Hypothesis 30

4. Data and Method 34

4.1 Source Material 34

4.2 Statistical Method 35

5. Empirical Analysis 37

5.1 Statistical Results 37

5.2 Discussion 41

6. Conclusion 43

References 44

APPENDIX 48

Abstract:

Turkey, similar to other least developed countries, entered into demographic transition process in the second half of 20th century. However, the transition process was not experienced at the same time and in the same way across different regions of the country. The aim of this study is to reveal the determinants of fertility transition and regional fertility variation in Turkey. The period under consideration is between 1975 and 2000 in other words the later part of transition. Different from previous studies, this study covers longer period of fertility transition and applies panel data fixed effects estimation method. The results indicate that education and income is decisive in fertility transition. However, different factors gain importance in different regions.

Keywords: Demographic transition, fertility, regional variations in fertility rate, Turkey.

1. Introduction

Turkey, similar to other developing countries, entered the demographic transition process during the second half of 20th century. The pattern of this process was similar to that experienced in Europe long before the last quarter of 19th century; first infant and child mortality rates decreased and after some time, fertility rates followed this trend and reached replacement level. However, transition process was not experienced at the same time and in the same way across regions of the country. There exist variations in fertility rates among different regions especially between East and West. For example, in West, total fertility rate decreased from 4.35 children in year 1960 to 1.73 in 2008. In East, total fertility rates have always been higher than West. In 1960, total fertility rate was 8.27 children yet it decreased to 3.27 children in 2008[footnoteRef:1]. Fertility in urban-rural residence also varies in Turkey. Turkish Demographic and Health Survey 2008 (TDHS) indicates that total fertility rate in urban residence is 2.00 children but in rural residence it increased and reached 2.68 children. Statistical indicators show that West had completed fertility transition but East is still experiencing the fertility decline. [1: The information about regional total fertility rates for the year 1960 and 2008 belongs to the State Institute of Statistics (1994) page 27, table 3.7 and Turkish Demographic and Health Survey (2010) page 62, table 4.2 respectively.]

Variations in fertility rates across different regions of Turkey indicate that families decide their level of fertility by taking different factors peculiar to region into consideration. It is important to reveal these factors because we can develop effective social and economic policies if we understand how families reach a decision about the number of children.

Turkey offers excellent research opportunities with its unique modernization process and multicultural fabric of society; though challenging because the country, similar to other developing countries, lacks of longitudinal statistical record. Because of the data limitations, the field of demography is newer and untouched in Turkey. However, it is important to know exact number of population and its characteristics, especially fertility levels in order to make efficient social and economic policies in future.

According to Easterlins relative cohort size theory, if the current fertility levels are high, a new born exposes to overcrowding effect in three institutions namely; family, education, and labor market (Macunovich 2000, 236). For example, in family institution, parents have to distribute their limited income to more children if fertility levels are high. This means that each child is made less human capital investment relative to former cohort. In education institutions, physical and labor capital may not meet the demand of larger cohorts unless necessary investments are made. Thus, quality of education decreases. Finally in labor markets, wages decreased and unemployment rates increased if government does not meet employment of active labor force in case of rise in cohort population. On the other hand, a decrease in current fertility also causes problems. Lower fertility has contributed in a major way to population ageing, with economy wide effects on labor supply, consumption patterns, old age security, and so forth (Dribe 2008, 65). Hence, demographic structure of any country should be investigated carefully in order to prevent possible problems in the future.

In this study, I will contribute to the Turkish demographic researches by revealing determinants of fertility transition and the causes of variation in fertility levels across five statistical regions of Turkey.

1.1 Aim of the Thesis

The aim of my thesis is to identify the factors responsible for fertility transition and regional fertility variation in Turkey between 1975 and 2000. According to State Institute of Statistics (SIS) classification, Turkey consists of five different statistical regions which differ in social, economic and cultural background. These different characteristics of regions may play an important role in fertility transition and cause variations in fertility at regional level. In order to achieve my aim, I will benefit from panel data fixed effects estimation method by using population census data belong to 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, and 2000. I employed different theories in order to determine independent variables. The theories that I used are classical, economic and cultural theories of demographic transition. Using these theories allowed me to look at the complete picture of fertility transition in Turkey. Solving regression equation and interpreting results correctly will provide me to analyze factors effective in fertility transition and to find out causes of regional fertility variation in Turkey. I will have specified the independent variable which has the highest magnitude in explaining transition and regional differences.

Moreover, this study aims to make two important contributions to Turkish demography research. First of all, due to lack of longitudinal data, past researches aim to show the determinants of fertility transition and causes of regional variations in fertility, use either descriptive statistics or cross sectional OLS regression. Although cross sectional method is a useful tool under data limitations, it only provides a static view. By employing panel data fixed effects estimation, I include the time aspect to my study which provides a dynamic picture of transition. Secondly, when we look at researches conducted on regional variations of fertility in Turkey, we see that they tend to explain fertility variation by adopting one of the demographic transition theories. For example, either classical or cultural theory of transition is adopted. Rather than adopting one theory, this study employs three fundamental theories of demographic transition to explain the causes of variation in fertility levels. All in all, these contributions provide me to develop better policy recommendations in order to close the gap.

However, a similar study was conducted by Yast (2007) between years 1980 and 2000. Different from her study, I included population census for the year 1975. Fertility transition in Turkey was started in 1950s. Including data belongs to 1975 allows me to cover a wider time span of transition and thus to reach more accurate results. I also increased my observations which will improve the precision of my estimators. Moreover, I selected more accurate proxies for testing different theories of demographic transition. I concentrated on regional variation in fertility.

1.2 Research Question

In this study, I will try to answer two research questions namely; What are the determinants of fertility transition in Turkey? and What factors are important in explaining fertility variation across different regions of Turkey? The causes of fertility transition and regional variations of fertility frequently studied topics in relevant fields. As I stated, Turkish demography field is newer and mostly untouched. For this reason, my research questions deserve to be studied.

In order to answer these questions, I developed hypothesis according to three fundamental theories of demographic transition. These theories are; classical, economic and cultural theories.

Classical demographic transition theory accentuates that modernization process, through affecting socioeconomic structure, is the real cause behind demographic transition. According to theory, different levels of modernization i.e socioeconomic development in each region may be responsible for fertility transition and cause regional fertility differences. To investigate the relation between socioeconomic development and child women ratio, I employed infant mortality rate, rurality, and employment in modern sectors of economy as independent variables. The statistical method will help me to reveal direction, strength and statistical confidence of the relationship between socioeconomic development variables and total fertility rate. I especially answer the question of how economic development affects fertility transition by considering both time and space effect.

Economic theories of fertility transition on the other hand adopt more micro approach and focus on household level of decision. In modern industrialized countries, parents decision on the number of children they want to have is claimed to be affected by income, market prices, preferences, female employment and female education level. In the model, female non agricultural labor force participation rate, rate of high school graduate women, rate of illiterate women and gross provincial product variables represents economic theories of fertility transition. Owing to the study, I will have revealed the effect of variables which show womens position in society such as illiterate women, high school graduate women and female non agricultural labor force participation rate on fertility through time and across regions.

Cultural theories of fertility transition assert that transformation of traditional society into modern, urban society through changing preferences of parents about number of children is the cause of decrease in fertility levels. Theories also suggest that spread of information about modern contraceptive methods via mass media and education institutions further contribute fertility decline. In the model, education level, rurality, employment in modern sectors of economy and number of public libraries variables represent cultural theories. As a result of the study, I will have showed how decrease in rurality, transformation of agricultural economy into modern and spread of information through written media affect fertility.

2. Background

In this section, the main aim is to provide information about demographic structure of Turkey from a historical point of view. In section 2.1, I will give information about Turkish geography, history, economy and five geographical regions. In section 2.2, I will introduce population trends by focusing on mortality, fertility and population growth in Turkey from 1920s until today. In section 2.3, I will discuss the stages of Turkish demographic transition. In section 2.4, I will focus on the causes of variation in fertility rates among regions of Turkey. Finally, in section 2.5, I will analyze previous research on Turkish case. Appendix A. shows five statistical regions of Turkey and Appendix B indicates provinces situated in each of these regions.

2.1 General Overview of Turkey

Turkey is situated in geopolitically important area called as Anatolian Peninsula. In the northwest, she has borders with Southeastern Europe, in the northeast Caucasus and in the southeast Middle East. Turkey has coasts to three seas; in the North, Black Sea, in the West, Aegean Sea and in the South, Mediterranean Sea. Having borders to three continents and access to different sea routes open Turkey to political, social and economic changes coming from these regions. Thus, Turkey can be seen as a social laboratory in which the effects of different social phenomena can be observed at the same time. This unique structure of the country provides excellent research opportunities for social scientists, especially for sociologists and demographers.

Anatolia was dominated by the Seljuqs for almost two centuries (1055-1243) and afterwards she became the core of Ottoman Empire, which ruled also in the Europe, Middle East and Africa for almost six centuries (TDHS 2003, 1). After the collapse of Ottoman Empire by the end of The First World War and following The War of Independence, a new Turkish state was established from the ashes of empire. This new Turkish state was proclaimed as a republic in 29 October 1923. With the leadership of Kemal Ataturk, the country entered into a modernization process. The reformation of Ataturk marked a dramatic turning point in the westernization process that had already started before and the country broke up with almost all its traditional past and began to be transformed into a modern republic. The founding principles of Turkish Republic represent a radical shift from Ottoman traditions.

The modernization efforts taken by founding cadres of Turkish republic must be legitimize at international level to maintain the sustainability of new system. Thus, Turkey established a close relationship with Western countries, especially United States of America and Europe. Turkey is a member of the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and an associate member of the European Union (TDHS 2008, 2).

Economic policies of Turkish Republic show differences in accordance with the necessities of the era. When we look at the situation in 1920s, we see that Turkish economy went bankrupt as a result of The First World War and The War of Independence. The country was poor and undeveloped even though the land and resources were plentiful. The problem was that lack of education, political and economic institutions and capital. The main economic activity was primitive agriculture. Throughout the 1920s liberal policies were implemented; the government promoted the development of industry through private enterprise, encouraged and assisted by favorable legislation and the introduction of credit facilities (TDHS 2008, 4). The outcome of liberal economic policies was not amazing but a moderate improvement in economy was observed and Turkish agriculture was started to be mechanized.

The 1930s were important for Turkish economy because the origin of modern industrialization was laid down in this decade. Industrialization was started in big cities especially Istanbul and Izmir then spread to productive agricultural areas such as Menderes and Cukurova plains. The economic policy of the Republic was changed radically in 1930s as a reaction to Great Depression of 1929. Turkish economy implemented tatist economic policies which mean that the key industries were owned by the state.

Despite Turkey did not engage in Second World War actively, the country faced with heavy restraints on economy (TDHS 2008). Turkish republic returned to apply liberal economic policies with transition to multi party regime in 1950. On the one hand, country encouraged private initiatives on the other hand government business enterprises were also supported. Import substitution policy was adopted as main economic policy until 1980s. After the 1980 coup detat, Turkey initiated to privatize all state initiatives and fully transformed into open market economy. Turkey is a middle income country at the beginning of 2000s (TDHS 2003, 5).

According to SIS classification, Turkey is composed of five different regions namely, West, South, Center, North and East which differ culturally, economically and historically. These different characteristics of regions affect demographic structure especially fertility levels.

The West region is the most densely settled, the most industrialized and the most socioeconomically advanced region of the country (TDHS 2008, 6). Istanbul and Izmir; economic and cultural capitals of Turkey, are situated in this region. The coastal line as well as inland is highly urbanized due to high inflow of migration. The main economic activities are industry, agriculture and tourism.

The South region is a developing region of Turkey. It has a great industrial potential. However, agriculture and tourism are the fundamental source of income in this region currently. An important amount of citrus and cotton which are exported are grown in this region. The South region has witnessed an industrial boom and an inflow of migrants, especially from the East and Southeastern provinces (TDHS 2008, 6).

The Center is another developing region of Turkey. It characterized by less fertile lands and low industry. Industrial production in the region is rising modestly as minor city centers rapidly developed, and Kayseri is the best example of this (TDHS 2008, 6). Cereal, furniture and marble production are the main industrial activities.

The North region has fertile lands but the cultivable amount is limited due to mountains structure of terrain. Mining, tea and hazelnut production are the sources of income in this region. On the other hand, Zonguldak, a western province has extensive coal mine reserves and is a center for coal mining and steel industry (TDHS 2008, 6). There are some infrastructure problems in the region yet larger amount of public (except some of those living in mountain villages) benefit from basic education and health care services.

The East region is the least developed region of Turkey. The geographic situation and climate of region renders agricultural activity difficult. However, the region is suitable for husbandry. Moreover, armed conflict between Kurdish separatists and Turkish armed forces also prevent the development of region. The level of urbanization is low, infrastructure is problematic. In general public faces difficulties to benefit from basic education and health care services. Thus, East region is the most migration giving region of Turkey.

2.2 Analysis of Fertility and Mortality Trends

Central Statistical Office of Turkey conducted first population census of the republic in 1927. At that time, population of Turkey was 14 million[footnoteRef:2]. After 1935, population censuses were updated every five years. The results of first censuses carry the marks of a history of wars, catastrophes and population exchanges (Shorter 1968, 4). Shorter (1985) estimates that 2.14 million Turkish were died in the first decade of 20th cc. by using reverse population projection method. Among these deaths, a considerable number was working age (15-64 years old) men. Naturally, number of widows and hectares of idle agricultural land were increased. Shortage of men and large number of widows led to a decrease in number of births. Underuse of agricultural land deteriorated living standards and resulted in high infant and child mortality. The normal process of population renewal had been thwarted by both depressed fertility and high infant and early childhood mortality during many years before 1923 (Shorter 1995, 9). [2: The information about number of population in Turkey in 1927 comes from Shorter (1985)]

Population of Turkey started to increase in peace that came with the proclamation of republic in 1923 and subsequent reform process. The reforms were realized in the area of secularization, law, emancipation of women and education. Industrialization of country was started and basic infrastructure and health services laid foundation. The position of women in society was strengthened through laws. Their education and labor force participation was supported. The unification of education in 1924 and the acceptance of new Turkish (Latin) alphabet in 1928 increased the level of literates in society.

The fundamental population policy of the early republican period (1927-1950) was to recover the population by increasing number of births. For this reason, abortion was declared as illegal in 1926, importation, production and sales of contraceptives were prohibited in 1930 (condom was exempted to prevent the spread of venereal diseases) and finally sterilization was prohibited in 1936 (Shorter 2000). General public were also side with the government. Political stability, extension of health protection, spread of education, and improving economic conditions brought about gradual increase in population (Taeuber 1958, 103).

Pro-natalist policies of early republican period as well as peace and reformation process were quickly felt as rising fertility and population growth rates. Shorter (1985) estimated total fertility rate as 5.4 children in 1923. It reached to 6.66 children between the years 1935 and 1940. Annual growth rate of population was 1.24 percent in 1927. It also reached 1.70 percent in that period.

Table 2.2 Total Fertility and Infant Mortality Rate: 1935-2005

Periods

Total Fertility Rate

Infant Mortality Rate

1935-1940

6.66

273

1940-1945

6.55

306

1945-1950

6.85

260

1950-1955

6.90

233

1955-1960

6.60

203

1960-1965

6.19

176

1965-1970

5.70

153

1970-1975

5.30

138

1975-1980

4.72

115

1980-1985

4.15

93

1985-1990

3.28

70

1990-1995

2.90

54

1995-2000

2.57

40

2000-2005

2.23

31

Source:Yavuz(2008:7,Table:5)

However, every segment of society could not benefit from improvements in health and education equally. The conditions in rural areas were worse than urban areas. Throughout the period from 1927 to 1950, villages included about three fourths of population in Turkey (Taeuber 1958, 104). Improvement in health and nutrition took place gradually. Thus, infant mortality rate was still high, 273 per thousand births between 1935 and 1940.

The recovery of these key population parameters were interrupted by the Second World War. Turkish armed forces recruited working age men to military against the threat of war. Total fertility rate decreased to 6.55 children due to sexual abstinence in the period between 1940 and 1945. Shortage of men caused to decrease in agricultural production and deteriorated living standards. Infant mortality rate further increased and reached 306 per thousand births. As a consequence of the increased death rates during the war period, the populations growth rate fell from more than 2.0 percent per year beforehand to 1.7 percent in 1940 and 1.1 percent by 1945 (Shorter 2000, 121). Demobilization after the year 1945 showed its positive effect quickly. Total fertility and population growth rate began to increase. Infant mortality rate continued to decrease without interruption until today. The two subsequent periods witnessed the highest growth rate of the republics history. Total fertility rate reached the highest point, 6.90 children between 1950 and 1955 and annual growth rate of population achieved the highest point, 2.85 percent between 1955 and 1960.

Graph 2.2 Annual Growth Rate of Population: 1927-2000

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (2009: 28, table: 3.1)

The demographic pressure of decrease in infant mortality rates was felt quickly among families especially those located in urban areas and hence, fertility rates were begun to decrease from 1950s onwards. However, fertility and annual growth rate of population was thought to be high in the1960s. Hence, Turkish state enacted the first population planning Law in 1965 which legalize sale and use of contraceptives. The policy allowed the importation of modern contraceptive methods, provided services at state health institutions free of charge and supported health education for couples (TDHS 2004, 7). Total fertility decreased from 6.19 children in 1960s to 4.15 children in 1980s. In 1983, the abortion was also legalized which ended pro-natalist policies of republic. According to latest census undertaken in 2000, total fertility rate decreased 2.5 per women.

2.3 Stages of Demographic Transition in Turkey

The beginning of fertility transition in Turkey varies across different regions. Fertility levels in the capital of Ottoman Empire, Istanbul and the most important port city, Izmir were started to decline as early as 19th cc. However, rest of the Anatolia was characterized by higher fertility and mortality rates. Turkey experienced fertility transition in its entire regions from 1960s onwards. In this section, I will analyze fertility transition in three stages.

2.3.1 First Stage of Demographic Transition

The first stage of demographic transition in Turkey took place in the period between 1923 and 1955. The characteristics of this period are that rise in fertility rates and decrease in mortality rates due to peace and reformation process. The positive trend in these population parameters reversed only for a short time during the mobilization for Second World War.

Turkeys particular demographic and socioeconomic history prior to, and during, this first period was responsible for the increase in fertility (SIS 1994, 4). Wars, population exchanges, poor economic conditions and diseases led to shortage of working age men. In order to rebuild family and social life and to overcome the shortages of labor force, particularly in agriculture, both the civil society and the state considered high fertility to be necessary (SIS 1994, 5). As a result of stable political environment and normalization of economy fertility rate increased from 5.4 children in 1923 to 6.6 children in the period 1935-1940. It fluctuated between 6.66 and 6.85 children until 1950.

A decrease in mortality rate in parallel with an increase in fertility rate brought about increase in population growth rate. Annual growth rate of population rose to 2.77 percent in 1955 from its initial level of 2.11 percent in 1931. Population of Turkey increased from 13 million in 1927 to 24 million in 1925. Thus, the population had been doubled in that period.

The first stage of Turkish demographic transition was ended in mid 1950s with the beginning of decline in fertility rates.

2.3.2 Second Stage of Demographic Transition

Turkey experienced the second stage of demographic transition between 1955 and 1985. The most important characteristics of this period is that the beginning of irreversible decline in fertility rates. The decline in fertility started in 1955 and continued throughout this period. Moreover, annual growth rate of population achieved its highest level of all time, 2.85 percent. The main reason behind high population growth rate is the improvements in public health which caused decrease in mortality rate and increase in life expectancy at birth. The population of Turkey increased from 24 million in 1955 to 51 million in 1985. Thus, the population had been doubled again in this period.

The other important development in this period is rapid urbanization. The increasing number of factories in urban areas resulted in increasing number of jobs. The proportion urban rose from 22.5 percent in 1955 to 51.1 percent in 1985 (SIS 1994, 5). The urban life altered fertility behavior of migrants from rural areas. They chose to have low levels of fertility. In fact, part of the motivation for moving was to lead family lives less oriented to large families and more oriented to the economic, educational and consumption opportunities of the cities (SIS 1994, 5). In this new environment, couples had changed their preferences away from children to new opportunities of urban life. The economic transformation that was in progress at the same time reduced the emphasis on family employment and increased the importance of qualifying for jobs in an industrial labor market (SIS 1994, 5). The urban families chose to invest on quality; health and education of their children than quantity. As a result, in the second stage of Turkish fertility transition, urbanization emerged as an important factor that leads to decrease in fertility rates.

2.3.3 Third Stage of Demographic Transition

Turkey entered into third stage of demographic transition in the mid 1980s however; this stage has not been completed yet. The characteristic of third stage of Turkish demographic transition is the irreversible decline in population growth. Annual growth rate of population declined from 1980-1985 level of 2.49 percent to 1990-2000 level of 1.83. Fertility and mortality rates also continued to decline in this period.

The third stage of Turkish demographic transition is expected to be completed when two things happen. First, fertility declines to a level that new generation nearly replace parent generation. Second annual growth rate of population becomes zero. Indeed, current fertility levels decreased to replacement level yet population still continue to grow.

Although fertility decline started in 1950s, annual growth rate of population continued to increase until the mid 1980s due to population momentum effect. Since total fertility rate was above replacement level for many years, number of women who were in reproductive ages was also high. Even fertility rates continued to decrease throughout 1970s and 1980s, annual growth rate of population navigated between 2.85 percent and 2.48 percent from 1960s to 1980s. The other reason why the population keeps on growing is that people get older without dying (Shorter 1995). The improvement in public health services and increase in education level of mother resulted in decrease in infant and child mortality rates. Thus, life expectancy at birth for both sexes increased continuously except from mobilization period until today. Death rates concentrated on higher ages. Thus, population of old and adult ages increased.

There are two important consequences of high population growth rate. First of all, number of young population has been growing in Turkey since 1960s. New generations experience difficulties in educational institutions and labor market. The capacity as well as the scale of educational institutions should be increased. Necessary investment should be made to increase productive capacity of economy. Thus, the unemployment problem of larger cohorts can be solved. Moreover, increase in old age population increases the number of old age dependents. The state should adjust pension system by considering increasing number of old age population.

Table 2.3: Projections for key population parameters

2005 2010

2010 2015

2015 2020

2020 2025

2025 2030

2030 2035

2035 2040

Total Fertility Rate

(per women)

2.33

2.18

2.10

2.10

2.10

2.10

2.10

Population Increase Rate (%)

1.35

1.11

0.96

0.86

0.76

0.64

0.48

Expectation of Life at Birth (year)

69.33

70.06

70.90

71.73

72.61

73.41

73.41

Source: Turkeys Statistical Yearbook (2004: 74: table 4.13)

Table 2.3 shows projections for key population parameters in Turkey. Total fertility rate is expected to decrease until 2020. It will have reached 2.1 children in the period between 2015 and 2020 and stayed constant through out 2030s. It indicates that population of young age people will continue to decrease through the mid 21st c.c. Population growth rate will also slow down and reach approximately zero in 2050s. Thus, we can say that, third stage of demographic transition will be completed in the mid 21st c.c. Expectation of life at birth for both sexes is anticipated to increase continuously and to reach 73.41 between 2035 and 2040. Death rates will further be concentrated on high ages. As a result of increasing life expectancy and decreasing fertility rates, population of Turkey will become older. Turkish population is expected to reach a number between 95 and 98 million by the mid 21st c.c. thus demographic transition in Turkey will multiply the original (1923) population about 7.5 times by the time the transition is completed (SIS 1994).

2.4 Regional Fertility Trends

According to Turkish Statistical Institutes classification, Turkey composes of five statistical regions; west, south, central, north and east which have different historical, cultural, social and economic background. These differences across regions are also reflected to demographic characteristics. Each region initiated the demographic transition in different times which resulted in being different stages of transition thus variation of key population parameters such as fertility. Total fertility rate decreased between 0.33 and 1.47 children on regional level and 0.88 children on national level from 1980 to 2000 (zgr 2004, 5). The numbers indicate that there exists considerable variation in fertility rates in Turkey.

Table 2.4 shows total fertility rates for five regions of Turkey between the years 1960 and 2003. It can be seen from the table that there exist clear pattern of decreasing fertility. All regions experienced fertility transition from 1970s onwards although some regions such as west entered into transition in 1950s or leading cities Istanbul and Izmir had been in process since the last decade of the 19th c.c. However, each region contributes to fertility decline but the amount of contribution varies.

There is an unchanging characteristic in Turkish demographic history that fertility rate increase from west to east fractionally and they have always been lower in west whereas higher in east.

Table 2.4 Total Fertility Rates for Five Regions 1960-2003

Census Based Measures TFR

West

South

Central

North

East

1960[footnoteRef:3] [3: TFR values belong to 1960, 1978, 1983 and 1988 are census based predictions. ]

4.35

6.71

6.56

6.56

8.27

1978

3.53

4.75

4.64

4.98

6.94

1983

2.97

4.32

3.95

4.39

6.72

1988

2.34

3.29

3.06

3.39

5.56

2000

1.92

2.43

2.29

2.28

4.02

Surveys

1989

2.60

3.00

3.10

3.50

5.70

1993

2.00

2.40

2.40

3.20

4.40

1998

2.03

2.55

2.56

2.68

4.19

2003

1.88

2.30

1.86

1.94

3.65

Source: SIS (1994:27, Table 3.7)

1998 Turkish Population and Health Surveys (1998:37, Table 3.2)

2000 zgr (2004:6, Table 1)

2003 Turkish Population and Health Surveys (2003: 48, Table 4.2)

Total fertility rates are high in all regions in 1960. In west, it is 4.35 children yet in east; it is almost double the value of west, 8.27 children. When we come to 2003, we see that fertility reached to a level that is more than half of its 1960 level in each region. In west, central and north, total fertility decreased to 1.88, 1.86, 1.94 children respectively. This indicates that these regions have below replacement level fertility. In south, fertility is near replacement level 2.30 children but east has above replacement level, 3.65 children and seems to be late in fertility transition. Although fertility also declines in east part of Turkey, the speed of decline is slow and it needs more time to converge with other regions. Thus, east and the rest of Turkey exhibits different patterns in fertility transition and east constitute a special case.

Regional variation of fertility is not a unique phenomenon for Turkey. In other developing countries as well as in transitional Europe, regional fertility variations can be observed in different stages of demographic transition. Thus, the question why the timing and speed of transition differ across regions within the same country? has always been an interesting research topic. In order to answer the question, some researchers adopt a socioeconomic perspective which relates differences in fertility rates across regions to different levels of socioeconomic development. On the other hand, the other researchers emphasize cultural differences among regions as a cause of regional variation in fertility rate.

In order to reveal the causes of variation in fertility rates across regions of Turkey, zgr (2004) and Ik and Pnarcoglu (2006) adopt a socioeconomic development perspective. According to this approach, variables which are closely related with the status of women such as female labor force participation, female education level and income can be accepted as determinants of level of fertility and changing percentages of these variables among regions are presented as causes of regional fertility variation.

Table 2.5 Key Socioeconomic Indicators, Turkey, 2000

Regions

Female Non-Agricultural Employment (%)

Illiterate Women (%)

GDP per capita ($)

WEST

Marmara

51.4

6

4026

Aegean

25.3

8

2952

NORTH

Black Sea

10.8

10

2256

SOUTH

Mediterranean

18.7

12

2534

CENTER

Central Anatolia

23.8

7

2423

EAST

East Anatolia

6.6

29

1299

Southeast Anatolia

8.1

39

1511

Turkey

24.4

12

2941

Source: zgr (2004:8,9,10)

Table 2.5 shows the percentage of female non agricultural employment, illiterate women and GDP per capita among different regions of Turkey in 2000. According to the socioeconomic development perspective, there is an inverse relationship between female non agricultural employment and fertility rates. The Pearson correlation coefficient -0.63 indicates a medium level negative relationship between these variables for the period 1975-2000. It becomes difficult to give birth to a child frequently and to raise children for employed women due to career in their job (zgr 2004, 8).

The distribution of percentage of female non agricultural employment across regions verifies the negative relationship. Marmara and Aegean regions, which constitute west of Turkey, have the highest percentage of female non agricultural employment, 51.4 and 25.3 percent respectively. The lowest fertility rate also belongs to west, 1.92 children in 2000. It is not surprising that east part of Turkey (east and southeast Anatolia) has the highest level of fertility, 4.02 children where percentage of female non agricultural employment is the lowest (6.6 and 8.1) in 2000. The other regions also fit the same pattern of inverse relationship. Thus, we can say that one of the reasons that cause regional variation in fertility rates in Turkey can be different percentage of female non agricultural employment.

Womens education is another factor that socioeconomic development perspective put forward as a determinant of regional variation of fertility rate. The fourth column in table 2.4 shows the percentage of illiterate women who are in their reproductive ages. The percentage increases from the lowest fertility rate region (west) to the highest fertility rate region (east) which indicates a positive relationship between illiteracy and fertility rates. The correlation coefficient 0.93 for the period 1975-2000 verifies this strong positive relationship.

In east and southeast Anatolia where total fertility rates are the highest among regions, percentage of illiterate women achieved their utmost level 29 and 39 percent respectively in 2000. However, in low fertility regions, the same rate changes between 8 and 12 percent. Hence, illiteracy is a strong variable that can explain regional variation in fertility in Turkey.

The income level is accepted as another parameter that affects regional variation in fertility rates (zgr 2004, 8). It is expected to increase the fertility rates in low income groups in society whereas to decrease in high income groups. The correlation coefficient of -0.54 between these variables indicate medium level negative relationship.

The fifth column in table 3.4 shows GDP per capita in U.S dollars in regions of Turkey in 2000. It is clear that in regions where GDP per capita is above or close to national average (Marmara, Aegean, Black Sea, Central Anatolia and Mediterranean) fertility rate is below or near replacement level. The income level differences can also explain variation of fertility rates among different regions.

Alper AVSAR

32

2.5 Previous Research

In this section of thesis, I will discuss studies related with fertility transition and regional variation of fertility in Turkey.

The earliest study that is available in data bases belong to Farooq and Tuncer (1974). The main aim of their study is to measure the effect of modernization process undertaken by Turkey to fertility levels. The period under study is between 1935 and 1965 and the unit of observation is province. The related hypothesizes were tested with two different models namely cross sectional chain relationship and pooled OLS regression. This study draws our attention to two independent variables female literacy and female non agricultural labor force participation. According to the results, female literacy affects fertility negatively and this effect is expected to increase its magnitude and significance. However, the effect of female non agricultural labor force participation is found low. The pertinent conclusion is that, in Turkey, continuing modernization and the concomitant spread of female education will result in a continuing decline in fertility rate (Farooq and Tuncer 1974, 273).

Pinarcioglu and Isik (2006) investigate the causes of regional fertility variation at district level by using population census of Turkey for the year 2000. The main aim of the research is to reveal the causes of variation in fertility levels across regions of country. Geographically weighted regression analysis method is employed to solve the fertility equation. Adult literacy, female non agricultural labor force participation, urbanization, migration and GDP variables are regressed into total fertility rate.

The results are interesting. There is an overall negative relationship between adult literacy and fertility levels yet the magnitude and the direction of the relationship changes across different regions. As one goes from east to west, this negative relationship between education and fertility starts to weaken and even turns to positive in regions where the level of education is higher (Pinarcioglu and Isik 2006, 414). The same relationship is also valid for female non agricultural labor force participation and fertility. In regions where the female labor force participation already low, the magnitude of negative effect is stronger than regions with high female labor force participation. The negative relationship between fertility and female participation is stronger in east and south eastern Turkey, and in settlements along the Mediterranean and Black Sea coast (Pinarcioglu and Ik 2006, 414). The impact of urbanization varies according to different districts. If a district has a percentage of urban population above national average, urbanization affects fertility positively yet if the percentage is below the national average, the relationship turns into negative. Out migration and in migration affect fertility levels differently. Increase in in-migration increases fertility whereas increase in out-migration decreases. Finally the effect of GDP per capita on fertility is strong and negative in regions which have low level of GDP. However, in high income regions, GDP per capita loses its effect and the relationship is neutralized.

Yasit (2007) conducted a study to analyze fertility transition in Turkey. The main aim of her masters thesis is to reveal the factors that are effective in Turkish fertility decline and to find causes of variation in fertility between provinces prioritized in development and the other provinces. She applied panel data simultaneous equation model for the period 1980 and 2000.

In her study, variables that represent education, income, socioeconomic development, contraception, culture and population density are used. The main results of the study are that income, education and socioeconomic development are effective in declining fertility levels in order of priorities and the main factor that causes differences in fertility between provinces prioritized in development and the others is the income level.

Different from Yasit (2007), this study covers the period between 1975 and 2000. This brings two advantages to my study. First of all, number of observations are increased which improves the precision of estimators. Secondly, by including 1975 census, my study allowed me to analyze dynamics of transition in wider time span. Moreover, Yasit only looks at fertility differences between provinces prioritized in development and the rest of provinces. This is a problematic approach. Although these provinces share the same level of economic development, they differ in terms of geography, culture and educational level. Yasits division leads to ignore effects of these differences on fertility. For this reason, I analyze the causes of variation in fertility levels between five regions which show different characteristics in terms of social, economic and cultural structure.

Yucesahin and Ozgur (2008) analyze determinants of regional fertility differences in Turkey. In their study, the special emphasis is given to high fertility in the eastern and southeastern regions. The unit of analysis is province. The authors conduct multiple regression models at the provincial level by using population census data belong to 2000. Total fertility rate is chosen as dependent and educational, occupational, ethnicity, gross domestic product and child mortality variables as independent variable. Cultural and innovation-diffusion theory of fertility transition are tested.

According to regression results, percentage of Kurdish population in region and illiteracy of women have positive effect on fertility. The level of secondary schooling of females has significant effect in declining fertility levels. However, in these regions, the main language is Kurdish which further prevent women to reach necessary information about modern contraceptives. The authors conclude that innovation diffusion theory explains the causes of high fertility in the region.

The study only focuses on cultural and innovation diffusion theories of fertility transition however this is only one side of coin. The relative economic backwardness of these regions and political conflicts prevent decrease of fertility. In order to reach a complete picture, economic and classical theories of fertility transition should be considered.

3. Theoretical Considerations

In this part of the study, first the meaning of the term demographic transition will be given and then theories developed to explain the transition will be analyzed in detail. Second, variables that construct our fertility equation will be introduced. Their definitions and hypothesis will be discussed.

3.1 Demographic Transition Theory

In order to analyze demographic transition theory in detail, first we should explain what we mean by the term demographic transition. Demographic transition refers to a shift from high birth and death rates to low birth and death rates. Before transition, there were many births and deaths, life expectancy was short, population was young and growth was slow. However, with the start of transition, this trend changed radically. During the transition, first mortality and then fertility declined, causing population growth rates first to accelerate and then to slow again, moving toward low fertility, long life and an old population (Lee 2003, 167). The reason behind the shift from high births and deaths to low births and deaths has been tried to be explained for almost a century. The early attempts which focus on modernization as a cause of demographic transition are called as demographic transition theory.

In the context of demographic transition theory, modernization refers to industrialization, urbanization, development or socioeconomic development. According to the theory, demographic revolutions are products of the economic and technologic changes of the modern era that have led to economic development, mass communications, effective programs of public health and curative medicine, and related social changes (Hirschman 1994, 204). In other words, demographic transition theory claims that rise in urbanization, education level, spread of industrial economies, improvements in nutrition and health, better infrastructure, individualization, and secularization are all causes of decrease in birth and death rates.

The idea of demographic transition theory was laid foundation in the famous article, Population by Warren Thompson in 1929. Thompson claims that all countries in the world will experience the trends in fertility and mortality levels that Western Europe experienced forty years ago at that time as a result of industrialization and urbanization. Landry (1934) further contributed to demographic transition approach by focusing on an explanation to declining levels of mortality and fertility. He also investigated the beginning time of transition. After Landrys important contributions, it was Notestein who developed the demographic transition theory in 1945.

In his famous essay Population, Warren Thompson (1929) analyzes world countries according to their mortality and fertility levels in three groups namely, A, B and C.

Western Europe, USA and Australia constitute group A countries. In this group, both birth and death rates are tend to decline however; since the decline in birth rate is faster than decline in death rate, population growth rate either low or zero. The age constitution of population is also affected from this trend. There is an apparent decrease in the number of children and reproductive adults. On the contrary, the number of middle age and elder people increase. This indicates further decline in population growth rate.

Italy, Spain and Central European countries constitute group B. Similar to group A, both births and deaths decline in group B countries. However, the death rate is declining as rapidly or even more rapidly than the birth rate with the result that the rate of natural increase will probably for some time remain as great as now, or even become larger in the near future (Thompson 1929, 962). According to Thompson, the reason behind rapid decline in death rates is the improvements in nutrition and health and the spread of communication. Furthermore, group B countries are more rural than group A countries that they were forty years ago. Thompson claims that rurality in group B countries caused further delay in the decline of birth rates.

Russia, Japan, India and rest of the world constitute group C. Group C countries contained approximately 75 per cent of worlds population. The most important characteristic of these countries is that birth and death rates are all uncontrolled. Due to the lack of statistical information, Thompson only focused on Russia, Japan and India where data are available. He concludes that Malthusian dynamics determine population trends in these countries.

Thompsons work is very important because he related decline in birth and death rates with industrialization, urbanization and contraceptive knowledge. He did not attempt to develop a theory for demographic transition. Even, he did not use the term transition. However, he did present the transition as a continuing global generalization (Kirk 1996, 362).

Landry (1934) is the researcher who uses the term demographic transition for the first time in literature. Similar to Thompson, he examines the population characteristics under three categories namely; primitive, intermediate, and contemporary. He also suggests that this new demographic regime is a global phenomenon and all countries will experience it sooner or later. There are two things that make Landrys work very important. First, he focused on the question of when transition began? He points out that birth restrictions are used as early as the latter part of 18th cc in France. Second, Landry brings more detailed explanation to motives behind transition. Landry believes them to be largely egoistical: the cost of children, their ability to cause pain and distress to their parents, the limitation of parents activities and relaxation, and, of course, the problems women experience in pregnancy and child care (Kirk 1996, 363).

As we can see, Thompson (1929) and Landry (1934) indeed formulated demographic transition theory yet they did not call their work as theory. According to Szreter, there simply was no strong social science and policy interest in demographic transition theory and its implications in the 1930s (Szreter 1993, 664). For this reason, their works did not draw attention of other social scientists or research institutions. However, change in institutional context, intellectual developments and political events through 1940s revealed a necessity of population theory (Szreter 1993).

Frank W. Notestein responded this demand by developing a comprehensive demographic transition theory. He is accepted as the founding father of demographic transition theory. In his model, he tried to explain why developed societies experienced a shift from high birth and death rates to low births and death rates. The original formulation of transition theory was presented in terms of three stages of demographic evolution from high birth and death rates-high balance- to low birth and death rates-low balance (Friedlander et al. 1999, 495). In the intermediate stage however, death rates decline faster than birth rates and rate of natural increase is high. This caused the emergence of the issue of high population growth in developing countries. Different from Landry and Thompson, Notestein brought detailed explanations to motives behind decreasing birth and death rates. He defended the idea of attitudinal change against the explanations that took the spread of contraceptive usage at center or biological factors. Notestein emphasized the changing institutional fabric of society that led to the emergence of a new ideal in matters of family size (Hirschman 1994, 211). The importance of individual freedom, rational thinking and education, increase in the cost of child rearing, decrease in the economic contributions of children, emancipation of women through work outside home and finally work and family incompatibility led modern families to use contraceptive methods and decrease fertility.

In the previous paragraphs, we examine the classical formulation of demographic transition theory which takes modernization at the center to explain variations of birth and death rates across countries. However, as it has already been emphasized that modernization is a broad concept which covers changes from urbanization and loss of tradition to economic growth and rise in per capita income. It is hard to explain all these changes in one theory hence there emerge different theories focus on different aspects of modernization. In the next section, I will present these different theories namely; economic theories and cultural theory of demographic transition. These theories should be considered as complement to demographic transition rather than competing.

3.2 Economic Theories of Demographic Transition

3.2.1 Microeconomic Approach to Demographic Transition

In his work An Economic Analysis of Fertility Gary Becker applied principles of microeconomics; the theory of demand for consumer durables to fertility decision process. The most important reason to develop this new approach is that the failure of classical demographic transition theory to explain sharp rises in post war birth rates. He opened a new era in demographic research with his economic perspective and he stepped down to family level decision. Furthermore, his approach is more open to empirical research and gives more concrete results because it is easier to measure economic variables than measuring socio-cultural variables like religiosity or individualism. Thus, the theory was attracted much of attention.

According to Becker (1960), parents are rational individuals who seek to maximize their utility and children are perceived as normal goods. Parents demand for children is determined by income, price and tastes. Under these constraints, they derive utility from consumption of each child. Becker assumes that parents can derive utility in two ways; either they can have more children (quantity increase) or they make additional expenditures on them (quality increase). In case of a change in income, price or tastes, parents make adjustments both on quality and quantity of children. However, any adjustment in child quantity or child quality is determined according to quality-quantity interaction.

Since children are normal goods, the law of demand foresees a positive relationship between child quantity and income. Unfortunately, over a long time period, fertility in developed countries fell even though they experienced considerable rate of economic growth and increase in income. This situation indicates a negative relationship between income and fertility. The secular decline in fertility may also be consistent with a positive relationship since the secular decline in child mortality and the secular rise in both contraceptive knowledge and child costs could easily have offset the secular rise in income (Becker 1960, 231). For example, decrease in child mortality increased the amount of survivors which leads to increase in cost of child, poor families who have gained knowledge about contraceptives limit their fertility more than rich families and this cause a decrease in overall fertility and finally, in societies where the returns on human capital are high parents invest more on child quality than quantity. These forces offset the positive income effect as a result of economic growth and caused families to prefer child quality than quantity.

It is very clear that the relationship between income and fertility is far from being simple and much of attention should be given for explaining quality-quantity interaction. Becker and Lewis (1973) construct a theoretical framework to explain this relationship.

As it is stated in Becker and Lewis (1973, 280) a typical utility function of a family is;

(1)

refers to the number of children, refers to quality of children and is other goods and services.

The family maximizes utility under budget constraint.

(2)

is the unit price of children with a given quality and is the price of other goods and services.

However, is not sufficient to explain quality-quantity interaction because familys decision on the number or quality of children changes according to cost of quality and cost of quantity which are the functions of quantity and quality respectively. Hence, we need real income.

(3)

is the shadow price of children with respect to quantity and is the shadow price of children with respect to quality. It is better here to explain what Becker means by shadow price of children For example, shadow price of children with respect to quantity is the marginal cost of an additional child with a given quality. Similarly, shadow price of children with respect to quality is the marginal cost of adding one unit of quality with a given quantity. In this framework, fertility declines are explained in two ways; income effect and price of time effect.

Income Effect

Since children are accepted as normal goods, we expect increase in quantity and quality when income () rises. However, increase in quantity and quality brings about an increase in shadow price and at the same time. Thus, the percentage increase in real income in the sense of deflated by an index of the s is less than the percentage increase in money income (Becker and Lewis 1973, 281). The real income elasticity with respect to quality and quantity determines the amount of increase in child quality and quantity as a result of increase in income. Becker 1960 observes that both quantity and quality income elasticity is positive but quality income elasticity is larger than quantity income elasticity. This means that when income increases, families spend more on child quality rather than increase the quantity. Since parents demand more quality than quantity, the shadow price of children with respect to quantity increases and brings about decrease in quantity.

Increase in income is resulted by the increase in wage rates which make parents time more expensive. In other words, price of time increases as a result of increase in wages. Since child rearing is a time consuming activity, any increase in wages cause to increase in cost of child thus decreased demand for quantity. This effect is more powerful in societies where social division of labor makes women responsible for child rearing. While these economies grow, sectors in which women have comparative advantage develop and provide women jobs with high wages. Higher wages for women raise the cost of children relatively more than they raise household income, and lead to a reduction in the number of children that couples choose to have (Galor and Weil 1996, 375).

As we can see, parents tend to substitute quantity for more quality because of high income elasticity of child quality. This can be accepted as proof for negative relationship between child quantity and quality. Furthermore, higher demand for quality indicates that children are perceived as consumer durable goods rather than normal good.

Price Effect

Socioeconomic development in a country causes changes in price of quality and quantity of children. These changes in prices result in substitution effect between quantity and quality. It is important to know whether families substitute child quality for quantity or not. For example, thanks to the improvements in health care services child mortality rates declined and the rate of survivors increased in developed countries. An increase in the rate of survivors makes the shadow price of children with respect to quantity more expensive. As a result, quantity demand of children decreases. However, the decrease in quantity leads to a decrease in the shadow price of quality which increases the demand for quality. Even though quantity decreases, quality increases. The same consequence can be reached when price of quality decreases as a result of for example, spread of free compulsory education. In this case, shadow price of quality decreases and families consume more quality. This leads to increase in shadow price of quantity which brings about a decrease in quantity demand of children.

Moreover, Becker emphasizes changing cost of children with modernization as a cause for families to rearrange their fertility decision. He claims that in traditional agricultural societies, children were perceived as a source of labor for cultivating lands and parents expected them to provide old age security. However, with transformation of agricultural-traditional societies to industrial one, children are no longer seen as a source that provides labor for production or accepted as old age security for their parents. On the contrary, parents make contribution to their childrens development even though children do not contribute to parents or household economy. High wage returns on human capital in developed countries cause families to invest for their childs education. Children stay longer in educational institutions instead of entering into labor market and families spend more money on education than it was in past. As a result, net cost of children becomes positive and families limit the number of children.

Although demand theory of fertility transition provides a useful framework for analyzing causes of fertility decline, it has some serious constraints. In general, the model is suitable for explaining cross sectional variations in fertility rates and considers only currently developed countries yet it says little about historical variations and developing country case.

According to the model, womens employment increase the price of time that is necessary for rearing children thus cost of child. This indicates a negative relationship between fertility and female labor force participation. However, in developing countries fertility continues to decline even though female labor force participation rate is lower than in developed countries. On the other hand, the assumption of positive net cost of children as a cause of fertility decline is criticized by Cleland and Wilson (1987) because empirical results do not indicate any relation between changing labor utility of children and fertility response. They noted that some of the most substantial fertility transitions have occurred in labor intensive rice growing areas of the world, where the contribution of children might be expected to be particularly great.

There are some problems with the concept of child cost. First of all, cost of children is defined as costs that are necessary for rearing children. However, there is no consensus on which inputs to children are most important and how their unit prices are measured (Schultz 2004, 5580). Moreover, cost of child also means price of child in the model. Since families determine how much to spend on children, child cost cannot be a suitable indicator of market price of children which is the function of child demand. The same problem also exists in the calculation of price of time. Market wage of women is not a suitable indicator for implicit cost of children.

The model does not include the effect of changing tastes and preferences on child demand even though, increasing variety of goods and services with industrialization caused to change the direction of demand from children to newly introduced consumer goods. Moreover, household demand theory assumes that cost of fertility regulation is zero. This assumption is far from reality because contraceptive methods have both monetary, time and physic costs.

3.2.2 The Theory of Intergenerational Wealth Flow

The theory of Intergenerational Wealth Flow belongs one of the most influential demographers of 20th c.c , John C. Caldwell. In the 1976 study, he attempted to combine economic, cultural and institutional theories of fertility decline to explain causes of fertility transition. Different from other researchers in his era, he focused on anthropological analysis of fertility decline and applied qualitative, micro research methods. The most important characteristic of his theory may be that it is suitable for explaining both high and low fertility regimes.

Initially, Caldwells theory draws our attention to some of the improper generalizations of classical demographic transition theory and reveals that fertility transition is a more complex process than it was thought before. As Notestein mentioned frequently, industrialization and urbanization through supporting individualism and secularity transform previously irrational and superstitious society to the one that is rational. Hence it is expected from these rational individuals of modern society to limit their fertility. Caldwell opposes the idea that pre transitional societies are irrational. He criticizes the definition of rationality because it is highly ethnocentric, relies on Western experience and cannot be generalized for all societies. Rather than using ambiguous definition of rationality, he claims that all societies are economically rational which means that different economic structure of each society affects decision on production, distribution and fertility differently. According to this view, there are two types of fertility regime the one in which it is economically rational to have as many children as possible and the other, being childless is economically rational. However, in any society, fertility rate is neither in its biological limits nor there is any childless society. This indicates that not only economic factors are sufficient to explain fertility decision process. According to Caldwell, non economic factors namely; social, physiological and psychological prevent unlimitedly high fertility or being childless. Obviously, the fundamental choices are social ones and economic behavior is rational only insofar as it is rational within the framework established by social ends (Caldwell 1976, 326).

Caldwells emphasize of social factors is also seen in his second criticism of demographic transition theory. There is a general statement in Notesteins formulation of demographic transition theory that economic modernization by supporting the spread of urbanization causes fertility levels to decline. Urbanization is seen as a process which supports the ones own personal advancement and unsuitability of urban life for child rearing brings about nucleation of families. However, historical evidences do not support such kind of mechanism. For example, in some areas of Europe, fertility started to decline although these areas were not even in the process of economic modernization. At this point, Caldwell claims that there must be a social revolution independent from economic modernization that causes fertility levels to decline. He calls this process as Westernization. Caldwells argument is supported by the fertility declines which have occurred at very low levels of modernization (Kirk 1996, 372). It is clear that Westernization precedes economic modernization in developing countries. Western ideas about familial relations and production are the primary responsible for decline in fertility rates especially in developing countries.

Caldwell states that whether high or low fertility is economically rational is determined by social conditions: primarily by the direction of intergenerational wealth flow (Caldwell 1976, 355). In primitive and traditional societies, socioeconomic structure foresees high fertility as an economically rational response because the flow of wealth is from children to parents. In such societies, cost of child rearing is shared by relatives and children are net contributors to household economy rather than net consumers. They undertake many tasks from farming to nursing younger siblings. Non monetary contributions of children are also important. Children are seen as old age security and it is expected from them to guarantee their parents future. Moreover, having many children increases political power of head of household. On the contrary, in transitional societies, wealth flow directs towards children and parents contribution to children turns into an economically rational behavior. In this context, higher fertility is not economically rational. According to Caldwell, change in the direction of wealth flow towards children is responsible for declining fertility levels.

Emotional nucleation of family is the main cause of change in the direction of wealth flow towards children. In extended family system, conjugal relations are weak or absent and husband and wife have closer relations with their kindredship such as sisters, brothers or cousins etc. This characteristic of extended family system maintains its continuity. However, emotional nucleation erodes the relation between extended family relatives, husband-wife relation strengthens and parents become more concerned about their childrens future. Economic nucleation follows emotional nucleation. Nuclear family which is composed of wife, husband and children, started to act in accordance with their economic interests. Parents concern their childrens future and invest more on them. Nucleation of families is neither caused by economic modernization nor urbanization. The adoption of Western type of family relation is the reason behind nucleation of families.

Western ideals about family relations spread through introduction of mass education in developing countries. Mass education has special importance because the primary determinant of the timing of the onset of the fertility transition is the effect of mass education on family economy (Caldwell 1980, 225). Education transforms family economy thus direction of wealth flow and causes fertility levels to decline. This process takes place in two phases; first it redefines family morality which regulates rules of production and distribution, and then it prepares individuals for market production instead of household production. In primitive and traditional societies, the absolute authority is the male head of household and wife and children are subject his authority. Family morality foresees that children have to work hard, not to expect much return from parents and respect authority of old age relatives. Each members of family are not employed for their private interest but for the sake of goodness of whole family. The flow of wealth is apparently upward, from children to elderly. However, mass education substitutes family morality with community morality by replacing the authority of head of household. Children are no more seen as devoted members of families but independent individuals who are seeking their own private interests. Family production is replaced by market production. Parents invest on their childrens education for better job in future. [T]he society regards the child as a future rather than a present producer and that it expects the family to protect the societys investment in the child for that future (Caldwell 1980, 228). The direction of wealth flow changes towards children. In this new economic structure, high fertility is not economically rational because of increasing cost of children and decreasing immediate economic value.

Caldwells Intergenerational Wealth Flow theory is very important from many aspects however there are some deficiencies in his theory. First of all, Caldwells statement of upward wealth flow of wealth in traditional societies is criticized by evolutionary biology. Biologists expect net wealth flows to be downward in all organisms, including humans (Kaplan and Bock 2001, 5558). Secondly, the theory is very hard to prove especially when researchers come to calculate non monetary contribution of children such as; old age security. Some studies conducted in high fertility regions reveals contradictory results. In those societies, although children are employed in domestic work or farming, their contributions are far from compensating familys expenditure for children throughout life.

3.2.3 The Supply-Demand Framework

According to Easterlins framework for fertility decision process, fertility is the product of the interaction between three mechanisms namely; demand for children, supply of children and the cost of fertility regulation. These three aspects of fertility decision closely interrelated with intermediate variables that directly affect fertility. Before analyzing Easterlins framework in detail, first we should explain what we mean by intermediate variables of fertility decision approach very briefly.

The relation between socioeconomic change and fertility has always attracted many researchers attention in demography literature. There exist a various statistical studies conducted in developed and developing countries to explain the effect of socioeconomic change on fertility. However, the direction and magnitude of socioeconomic variables differs according to country or region within the same country and time interval the study is conducted. Thus, results gained from these studies are far from constructing a general socioeconomic theory of fertility transition. The direct effect of socioeconomic variables on fertility is ambiguous. However, Davis and Blake (1956) and Bongaarts (1978) developed a different approach and claim that there are some intermediate variables which affected by socioeconomic change and directly affect fertility rates. For example, education through increasing the age at first marriage decreases productive life span of women and hence causes fertility to decline. In general, the biological and behavioral factors through which socioeconomic, cultural and environmental variables affect fertility are called intermediate fertility variables (Bongaarts 1978, 105). At first, Davis and Blake defined eleven proximate determinants, and then their work is further developed by Bongaarts and reduced to eight factors. These are;

I Exposure factors

1. Proportion married

II Deliberate marital fertility control factors

2. Contraception

3. Induced Abortion

III Natural marital fertility factors

4. Lactational infecundability

5. Frequency of intercourse

6. Sterility

7. Spontaneous intrauterine mortality

8. Duration of the fertile period

In Easterlins framework, socioeconomic factors operate directly on the exposure and natural marital fertility and indirectly on marital fertility control (Panopoulou & Tsakloglou 1999, 1139). The amount and quality of children is the outcome of the interaction between demand for and supply of children and cost of fertility regulation, which in turn are affected by intermediate variables. These three mechanisms should be analyzed in detail in order to understand Easterlins model.

The Demand for Children

According to Easterlin, demand for children can be explained as the number of surviving children parents would want if fertility regulation were costless (Easterlin 1975, 55). Similar to the theory of demand for children developed by Becker (1960) and Becker & Lewis (1973), Easterlin assumes that parents determine the amount and quality of children they want to have according to income, price of children, price of other goods and services and preferences.

Becker and other economists become successful to formulate the relationship between demand for children, income and prices but they fail to include preferences into theory. Easterlins model on the other hand, while still taking an economic approach, was based on the notion of shifting preferences: preferences (i.e., material aspirations) which changed systematically as a function of the same variables used to predict fertility- income and prices (Macunovich 1998, 54). Easterlin combines sociological and other theories of fertility with economic theory via the concept of preferences. Preferences are formed by cultural, religious, ethnic or individual factors. The stronger are a couples (relative) preferences for children, the greater the demand for children, other things equal (Shapiro 1997, 2). For example; extended family norm in a society can lead parents to have many children or highly educated parents want to become childless for some other reason regardless of income and prices.

In Easterlins model, apart from income, prices and tastes, demand for children also depends on infant and child mortality rates. Since parents concern about number of surviving children, demand for children would be high if infant and child survival rates were low or vice versa.

The Supply of Children

Easterlin defines the concept of supply of children as a potential number of children parents would have if they did not deliberately limit their fertility (Easterlin 1975, 55). Two factors, namely; natural fertility and child/infant survival rates are the determinants of supply of children.

Increase in infant/child survival rates increase the potential number of children. However, even if infant/child survival rates are identical in two societies, supply of children varies due to natural fertility.

We can term as natural the fertility which exists or has existed in the absence of deliberate birth control (Henry 1961, 81). Bongaarts identifies natural martial fertility factors in intermediate variables of fertility scheme. Biologic structure of women and sociocultural fabric of a society through affecting these factors determine the level of natural fertility. For example, genetic disorder, diseases or malnutrition affect the ability to carry a fetus or cultural factors, norms and customs may determine coital frequency, fecundity and fetal mortality (Easterlin 1975, 56).

Cost of Fertility Regulation

The cost of fertility regulation is an important mechanism through which Easterlin includes effect of cultural and diffusion theories of fertility transition into the model. According to Easterlin, there are two types of fertility regulation costs which are physic and market costs. The biases against idea of fertility control and problems emerged from improper use of contraceptive methods constitute physic costs of fertility regulation. Market costs; on the other hand include time and monetary cost of fertility control methods. These costs depend upon the attitudes in society toward the general notion of fertility control, availability of information, price and prevalence of specific techniques (Easterlin 1975, 56). For example, the spread of information about contraceptive methods through family planning programs increase the legitimacy and proper use of contraception thus leading to decrease physic cost. Free distribution of contraceptives decreases market price of contraceptives.

Apart from costs, parents decision about the usage of fertility regulation is also related with their strength of motivation for limiting fertility. Under the assumption of perfect contraceptive society, desired number of children would be equal to supply if parents are motivated adequately.

Easterlin analyzes the transition from high to low fertility rates while modernization is proceeding via the interaction between demand for, supply of children and cost of fertility regulation in five stages. Figure 2.1 shows different behavior of these three mechanisms in different phases of modernization.

In the first stage, there is excess demand for children because the output of children is far from meeting the demand. Infant and child mortality rates are extremely high due to lack of modern knowledge about puerperant and new born care, malnutrition and inadequacy or absence of health services. Thus, infant and child survival rates are low.

In the second stage, social and economic development brings about improvements in nutrition and health services thus infant and child mortality rates decrease. In other words, society experiences mortality transition. The output of children starts to increase while the demand for children decreases.

In the third stage, demand for children continues to decrease because of change in cost and benefit of children. Socioeconomic development by transforming economic and family structure of society increases cost of children and decreases benefit. In this stage, there emerges motivation for fertility regulation however; it is not strong enough to lead parents to use contraceptive methods. The cost of unwanted children is still less than cost of fertility regulation.

Graph 3.1 Trends in supply of, demand for, and number of surviving children associated with modernization

Source: Bongaarts (1993, 439)

In figure 3.1 first, second and third stage of transition is represented between origin and point h. In this interval, demand for children is constant until a point and supply of children continuously increase due to improvement of health and nutrition. The actual number of children parents could have is determined by output of children. The gap between demand and supply of children is further extended between m and h. Fertility is the result of social and biological rather than individual factors in this interval.

In the fourth stage, parents are highly motivated for limiting their fertility because cost of unwanted children exceeds cost of fertility regulation. In the final stage demand and supply reaches equilibrium.

3.3 Cultural Theories of Demographic Transition

There are two fundamental cultural theories of fertility transition namely; ideational theory and innovation-diffusion theory. Ideational theory was developed by Lesthaeghe (1983) as a reaction to new home economics approach. It aims to combine economic theory with sociological theory of taste formation.

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