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G.R. No. 135817 November 30, 2006REYNALDO RODRIGUEZ and NANCY A. RODRIGUEZ, Petitioners, vs.CONCORDIA ONG LIM, EURESTES LIM AND ELMER LIM, Respondents.

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the spouses Reynaldo and Nancy Rodriguezseeking the reversal of the Decision1dated July 18, 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 27440. Theassailed decision affirmed that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City, Branch 58, declaring, inter alia,

Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. T-128607 in the names of petitioners Reynaldo and Nancy Rodriguez null andvoid and directing them to vacate the lots subject of litigation. Likewise sought to be reversed is the appellatecourts Resolution dated October 5, 1998 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.As culled from the respective decisions of the RTC of Lucena City, Branch 58 (court a quo) and the appellatecourt, the factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. filed with the court a quo a complaint for cancellation of certificate of title and injunctionagainst the spouses Rodriguez. In his complaint, Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. alleged that his mother, DomingaGoyma,2was the owner of two parcels of land (subject lots). The first parcel,3containing an area of 28,051square meters, more or less, is situated in the Sitio of Tulay-Buhangin, Barrio Ilayang Palo, Municipality ofPagbilao, Province of Quezon. The second parcel,4containing an area of 260,590 sq m, more or less, is situatedin the Sitio of Tulay-Buhangin, Barrio of Laguimanoc, Municipality of Atimonan (now Padre Burgos), Province ofQuezon. The subject lots were registered in the name of Dominga Goyma on February 6, 1948 under TCT No. T-2857.Dominga Goyma died on July 19, 1971 and was survived by her only son, Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr., a spurious sonacknowledged and recognized by her.The complaint also alleged that during her lifetime, Dominga Goyma exclusively possessed the subject lots andupon her death, Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. succeeded to all her rights of ownership and possession. However, thespouses Rodriguez, despite their knowledge that Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr., was now the owner and possessor ofthe subject lots, allegedly unlawfully and fraudulently made it appear that they had purchased the subject lotsfrom persons who were not the owners thereof.The spouses Rodriguez allegedly caused the cancellation of TCT No. T-2857 despite the fact that the ownersduplicate copy thereof was in the possession of Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. On February 10, 1975, TCT No. T-128605was issued in the name of Frisco5Gudani, estranged husband of Dominga Goyma. This title was cancelled byTCT No. T-128606 issued in the name of Eduardo Victa also on February 10, 1975. The latter certificate of title, inturn, was cancelled by TCT No. T-128607 issued in the name of the spouses Rodriguez also on February 10, 1975.

Since May 1975, the spouses Rodriguez allegedly tried to enter and occupy the subject lots by force andintimidation. Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. thus prayed in his complaint that the spouses Rodriguez be permanentlyenjoined from entering and occupying the subject lots; TCT No. 128607 be declared null and void and TCT No.T-2857 in the name of Dominga Goyma be reinstated; and the spouses Rodriguez be ordered to pay PabloGoyma Lim, Jr. damages, attorneys fees and the costs of suit.In their Answer, the spouses Rodriguez denied the material allegations in the complaint. They alleged thatDominga Goyma was not the mother of Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. They averred that the subject lots were theconjugal property of Frisco Gudani and his wife Dominga Goyma. When the latter died, Frisco Gudani was hersole surviving heir.According to the spouses Rodriguez, Frisco Gudani and Dominga Goyma, as husband and wife, jointlyexercised acts of ownership and possession over the subject lots. When Dominga Goyma passed away, FriscoGudani executed an instrument of extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased. By virtue of the saiddocument, Dominga Goymas share in the subject lots was adjudicated in favor of Frisco Gudani as her solesurviving heir. The extra-judicial settlement allegedly complied with the requirements of publication under theRules of Court.Thereafter, Frisco Gudani allegedly sold the subject lots to Eduardo Victa who, in turn, sold the same to thespouses Rodriguez. The latter claimed that they were purchasers in good faith and for value. Further, theydenied that they had tried to enter the subject lots by means of force and intimidation. On the contrary, thespouses Rodriguez claimed that they have been in possession of the subject lots by themselves and theirpredecessors-in-interest.At the pre-trial, the parties stipulated on the following facts:

1. that plaintiff Pablo Goyma [Lim], Jr., the plaintiff in this case, is the same person mentioned in the birthcertificate as Pablo Go Yma, xerox copy of which was submitted during the previous preliminaryhearing, marked as Exhibit "A";2. that Pablito Goyma Lim mentioned in the Individual Income Tax Returns of the deceased Dominga

Goyma, xerox copies of which were submitted during the previous preliminary hearing and marked asExhibits "B", "C" and "D" and in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of the deceased Dominga Goymamarked as Exhibit "E", refers to the plaintiff Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr.;3. that according to plaintiff Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr., he is an illegitimate child other than natural of thedeceased Dominga Goyma;4. that the deceased Dominga Goyma died on July 19, 1971 and that at the time of her death, she wasthen the registered owner of the two parcels of land mentioned in paragraph 2 of the complaintcovered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2857; that under the aforesaid Transfer Certificate of Title,said lands are registered in the name of Dominga Goyma, wife of Frisco Gudani;5. that at the time of the death of Dominga Goyma, plaintiff Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr., was then more thanthirty-five (35) years of age;
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6. that previous to the instant case, there has been no judicial inquiry as to the maternity or filiation ofplaintiff Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr.x x xx6

Efforts of the parties to enter into an amicable settlement of the case fell through. Consequently, trial on themerits ensued. In the meantime, in the course of the trial, Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. died on September 8, 1988. Hewas duly substituted by his surviving spouse, Concordia Ong Lim, and children Eurestes and Elmer Lim.During trial, both parties adduced their respective evidence. Among those presented to support the allegations

of Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. were the following: Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 13, 1945 (Exhibit "I")covering four parcels of land, including the subject lots, purchased by Dominga Goyma from Marciano andMarina Rodriguez; Marital Consent dated March 19, 1932 (Exhibit "K") executed by Frisco Gudani and DomingaGoyma; TCT No. T-2857 (Exhibit "A") covering the subject lots issued in the name of Dominga Goyma; PabloGoyma Lim, Jr.s Certificate of Birth (Exhibit "B") indicating that his mother was Dominga Goyma; Statement ofAssets, Income and Liabilities for 1958 (Exhibit "C") of Dominga Goyma indicating Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. as herson; Income Tax Returns for calendar years 1953 up to 1955 (Exhibit "D" to "F") of Dominga Goyma, where sheinvariably claimed personal exemption as head of the family and stated therein that she was "separated" fromher husband and claimed an exemption for her son Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr.; and Real Property Tax Receipts from1955, 1957 up to 1975 (Exhibits "H," "H-1" up to "H-22") covering the subject property paid by Pablito Goyma Lim,Jr.For their part, the spouses Rodriguez presented the following documentary evidence: Deed of Absolute Saledated February 3, 1975 (Exhibit "I") covering the subject lots showing that the spouses Rodriguez acquired them

from Eduardo Victa; TCT No. T-128607 (Exhibit "II") covering the subject lots issued in the name of the spousesRodriguez on February 10, 1975; TCT No. T-128606 (Exhibit "V") covering the subject lots issued in the name ofEduardo Victa on February 10, 1975; TCT No. T-128605 (Exhibit "IV") covering the subject lots issued in the nameof Frisco Gudani on February 10, 1975; and TCT No. T-2857 (Exhibit "III") covering the subject lots in the name ofDominga Goyma.Also admitted in evidence by the court a quo was the deposition of Frisco Gudani taken on October 22, 1977.The court a quo summarized the contents of his deposition as follows:x x x From the deposition, it appears that Prisco M. Gudani, a 77 year-old laborer resident of Barrio Binahaan,Pagbilao, Quezon, was married to Dominga Goyma on March 22, 1922. They lived together for eleven (11)months and they were separated when Prisco Gudani left the conjugal dwelling one night without theknowledge of Dominga Goyma, never returning to the conjugal dwelling since then. He knows that DomingaGoyma is now dead. He knows too that Pablo Goyma Lim is the son of the late Dominga Goyma. His statement

in his Affidavit, dated June 25, 1976 (Exhibit "C-Deposition") that Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. is not the son of DomingaGoyma is not correct. He said that it was Atty. Alejandro B. Aguilan who prepared said affidavit and told him tosign it otherwise what property he will receive will be forfeited in favor of the government. He does not knowanything about the two parcels of land subject of this case. On the affidavit, dated March 15, 1973 (Exhibit "D-Deposition") adjudicating unto himself the property stated therein, including the two parcels of land subject ofthis case, he explained that said affidavit was prepared by Atty. Alejandro B. Aguilan, who must have knownabout the properties left by Dominga Goyma and made him understand that he is inheriting the three (3)parcels of land left by Dominga Goyma, the truth being that he had never set foot on these properties and hedoes not know anything about these properties. When he arrived, the prepared affidavit was read to him andhe was told to sign. Atty. Aguilan explained to him that if he will not sign the document, the properties will go tothe government and, because he did not want these properties to go to the government, he signed theaffidavit in order to get the properties. Had it been explained to him that these properties will not be forfeited infavor of the government, he will not sign the affidavit. The first time Atty. Aguilan told him about the propertiesof Dominga Goyma was about two years after her death. Atty. Aguilan went to him in his residence inPagbilao, Quezon and told him that if he will not agree to get the property of Dominga Goyma, thoseproperties will go to the government. Atty. Aguilan told him that because he had not contributed anything inthe acquisition of said properties, his share is one-fourth. On March 15, 1973, Atty. Aguilan made him sign aprepared petition for the issuance of a second owners duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2857(Exhibit "E-Deposition"). On the same date, he was also made to sign an "Affidavit of Loss" prepared by Atty.Aguilan (Exhibit "E-1, Deposition"). He had not at any time been in possession of the owners copy of TransferCertificate of Title No. T-2857. He signed both the foregoing documents on the explanation of Atty. Aguilan thathe will use them in order to look for the title. He does not know Eduardo Victa and had never met himpersonally. When shown the "DEED OF CONDITIONAL SALE OF REAL PROPERTY," dated September 10, 1974(Exhibit "F-Deposition"), he admitted he sold the property. Said document was prepared by Atty. Aguilan whotold him that the P20,000.00 constitute his one-fourth share of the properties of Dominga Goyma, but Atty.

Aguilan told him to receive only P10,000.00 because the P10,000.00 will be used to cover the expenses of

litigation. Of the P10,000.00 left, P5,000.00 was given to him and the otherP5,000.00 was taken by Atty. Aguilan,

as they are share and share alike in the P10,000.00. He explained that when he signed the deed of sale, he was

made to understand that he was selling only the one-fourth share of the property that he owns and the pricefor the one-fourth share is P20,000.00. On the document entitled "DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF REAL PROPERTY,"

dated January 17, 1975 (Exhibit "G-Deposition") he claims not to have received the P60,000.00. Atty. Aguilan,

who prepared the document, told him to sign it and he (Atty. Aguilan) will deliver the money later. Atty. Aguilandid not mention the P60,000.00, but only P20,000.00. It was only Atty. Aguilan who was present when he signed

the document. He met defendant Reynaldo Rodriguez once when he went to the office of Atty. Magadia andAtty. Uy at the Baas Building, Rizal Avenue, Manila, in the company of Atty. Aguilan. He was invited to arestaurant and told by Reynaldo Rodriguez that he purchased the properties for a very low price and he would
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give Gudani an additional amount of P1,500.00 upon the termination of the case that may be filed by Pablo

Goyma Lim, that is why he was holding the P10,000.00 to be spent for the expected litigation. After eating,

Reynaldo Rodriguez gave him P50.00 for him to buy betel leaves. He said that Atty. Alejandro B. Aguilan is a

lawyer in Pagbilao, Quezon, who persuaded him to agree to recover his share from the properties of DomingoGoyma. x x x7Based on the evidence presented by both parties, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of PabloGoyma Lim, Jr. and against the spouses Rodriguez. In support of its conclusions, the court a quo made the

following factual findings:Dominga Goyma married Frisco Gudani on March 22, 1922. However, after living together for only eleven (11)months, Frisco Gudani left the conjugal abode and never returned. They never had any children. On March 19,1932, Frisco Gudani and Dominga Goyma executed a public instrument denominated as "MARITALCONSENT,"8the contents of which are quoted below in full:

MARITAL CONSENTKNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

That I, Prisco Gudani, Filipino, of legal age, married and a resident of Pagbilao, Tayabas, declares:That I am the husband of Dominga Go Imco Ima, Filipina, of legal age, and also a resident of Pagbilao, Tayabas, for whom I make thismarital consent.That since the year 1924, for certain reasons which are delicate to state or mention herein, my wife and I have been living separately.It was agreed by and between us from the time we separated that each could then live the life of a single person as if we did not takeeach other as husband and wife, and that each could then make his or her own living without the intervention and responsibility of theother.Under this state of life that we have, living separately, and upon request that I grant her a marital consent, by these presents I do hereby

give and grant unto my wife, Dominga Go Imco Ima, full power and authority and consent to do and perform any and every act and thingwhatsoever requisite, necessary or proper to be done in whatever she may undertake to do in which under the law in force and in theseIsland my presence and personal intervention is necessary, as fully to all intents and purposes as I might or could do if present andintervening in person, and specially the following acts:To buy or sell, hire, lease or mortgage, lands or buildings, and other forms of real property, upon such terms and conditions, and under suchcovenants as my wife may deem proper;To purchase and sell, hire or pledge, goods, wares, merchandise, chattels, choses in action, and other forms of personal property that areor may come into her possession as owner or otherwise;To borrow or lend moneys, with or without security, upon such terms and conditions as she may approve; and to transact any and allbusiness, operations and affairs with any institution as may be deemed proper and convenient by her;To make, sign, execute and deliver contracts, documents, agreements, deeds and other writings of whatsoever nature, kind anddescription, with any and all persons, concerns, and entities, upon terms and conditions acceptable to her;To prosecute and defend any and all suits, actions and other proceedings in the courts, tribunals, departments and offices of theGovernment of the Philippine Islands, and to terminate compromise, settle and adjust the same.I do hereby renounce any and all rights, title, interest and participation, rights of actions, if any I have, in connection with the properties,

real or personal, that my wife might have acquired by purchase, exchange, or otherwise, from any person from the time we wereseparated, in 1924, and to all that she may acquire in the future.In consideration of all that is provided above in this marital consent, and in consideration of the renunciation made by my husband, I,Dominga Go Imco Ima, hereby agree also to renounce any and all rights, title, interest and participation, and also any right of action, that Imay have in connection with any property, real or personal, acquired or which may be acquired by my husband since we were separatedin 1924, and that any debts or obligations incurred or which may be incurred by me since we were separated in 1924, and in the futurepursuant to this marital consent, are my sole debts and obligations in which my husband can have no responsibility.IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we together have hereunto signed our names below as signs of our conformity with the things mentioned above, atPagbilao, Tayabas, P.I., on this 19th day of March, 1932.(SGD) PRISCO M. GUDANIPRISCO GUDANIHusband(SGD) DOMINGA GO YMCO YMADOMINGA GO IMCO IMAWifeSIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:

(SGD) SEVERINO F. MARTINEZ(SGD) IllegibleUNITED STATES OF AMERICAPHILIPPINE ISLANDSMunicipality of Pagbilao)Province of Tayabas ) S.S.Before me, a Notary Public in and for the Province of Tayabas, Philippine Islands, personally appeared Prisco Gudani, exhibiting to me hiscedula personal No. G-4219255 issued at Pagbilao, Tayabas, and dated December 15, 1931 AND Dominga Go Ymco Ima, without apersonal cedula by reason of her sex, personally known to me and known to me to be the same persons who executed the foregoinginstrument, and they acknowledge to me that they executed the same freely and voluntarily for the uses and purposes therein stated.IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my notarial seal at Pagbilao, Tayabas, on this 19th day of March 1932.(SGD) MARIANO P. DULDULAONOTARY PUBLICMy Commission will expire onDecember 31, 1933Doc. No. 15Book No. 11Page No. 5Series of 1932.

After Frisco Gudani had left the conjugal abode, Dominga Goyma and Pablo Lim cohabited with each otheras common law husband and wife. They had a son, Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. who was born on March 28, 1935.On December 13, 1945, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit "I"), Dominga Goyma purchasedfrom the spouses Marciano and Marina Rodriguez four (4) parcels of land, including the subject lots. As a resultof the said sale, the certificate of title (TCT No. 11473) covering the said lots were canceled and, in lieu, thereofTCT No. T-2857 was issued in favor of Dominga Goyma, "wife of Frisco Gudani," by the Register of Deeds of theProvince of Quezon.
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The subject lots were purchased by Dominga Goyma from her personal funds when she and Frisco Gudaniwere already separated and after they had executed the instrument denominated as Marital Consent datedMarch 19, 1932. He did not contribute anything in the purchase of the subject lots nor did he know about theirexistence.The owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-2857 was in Dominga Goymas custody and during her lifetime, shetook possession of the subject lots and instituted therein as tenants Dominador Torres, Loreto Estopace andSimeon Estopace. Before she passed away on July 19, 1971, Dominga Goyma gave TCT No. T-2857 to her son,

Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr., who immediately took possession of the subject lots.Two (2) years after Dominga Goymas death, Atty. Alejandro D. Aguilan went to see Frisco Gudani in Pagbilao,Quezon, and informed the latter about the properties, including the subject lots, left by the deceased. Atty.Aguilan falsely made Frisco Gudani to believe that if he would not acquire the properties for himself, the samewould be forfeited in favor of the government. Frisco Gudani was then persuaded by Atty. Aguilan to affix hissignature on the following documents: (a) an Affidavit dated March 15, 1973 adjudicating to himself theproperties mentioned therein, including the subject lots; (b) a Petition dated March 15, 1973 filed with the Courtof First Instance of Quezon for the issuance of a second owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-2857; (c) anAffidavit of Loss dated March 15, 1973 for the loss of the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-2857; and (d) anAffidavit dated June 27, 1976 stating that Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. was not the son of Dominga Goyma.After the subject lots were adjudicated in favor of Frisco Gudani and the second owners duplicate copy of TCT

No. T-2857 was obtained, Atty. Aguilan likewise made the former sign the Deed of Conditional Sale of Propertydated September 10, 1974 covering the subject lots in favor of Eduardo Victa. The two parties to the instrument

never met each other and it was only Atty. Aguilan who was present when Frisco Gudani signed the same. Thenotary public before whom they supposedly acknowledged the same was not present.For the said purported sale, Frisco Gudani received P5,000.00 only because, according to Atty. Aguilan, he did

not contribute anything to the acquisition of the subject lots. Thereafter, Frisco Gudani was made to sign byAtty. Aguilan a Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 17, 1975 transferring the subject lots to Eduardo Victa.For a time, the subject lots continued to be covered by TCT No. T-2857 in the name of Dominga Goyma. OnFebruary 3, 1975, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit "I"), Eduardo Victa sold the subject lots tothe spouses Rodriguez. Aside from the said instrument, the following documents were given to the spousesRodriguez: (a) the second duplicate owners copy of TCT No. T-2857; (b) Affidavit dated March 15, 1973 ofFrisco Gudani adjudicating to himself the properties of Dominga Goyma, including the subject lots; and (c)Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property dated January 17, 1975 executed by Frisco Gudani in favor of EduardoVicta.

All these documents were presented by a certain Atty. Magadia to the Register of Deeds of the Province ofQuezon on February 10, 1975. On the basis of these documents, TCT No. T-2857 was canceled and, in lieuthereof, TCT No. T-128605 was issued in the name of Frisco Gudani on February 10, 1975. Thereafter, TCT No. T-128605 was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-128606 was issued by the same Register of Deeds in thename of Eduardo Victa also on February 10, 1975. Finally, TCT No. T-128606 was canceled and, in lieu thereof,TCT No. T-128607 was issued by the same Register of Deeds in the name of the spouses Rodriguez also onFebruary 10, 1975.Based on its factual findings, the court a quo concluded that the evidence showed that the transactionsinvolving the subject lots, particularly the transfers thereof from the deceased Dominga Goyma to FriscoGudani and from him to Eduardo Victa were fraudulent and made through the machinations of Atty. Aguilan.The latter, according to the court a quo, "took advantage of his legal training in making Frisco Gudani, asimple- minded laborer, an unsuspecting and nave tool in a grand scheme to dispossess plaintiff Pablo GoymaLim, Jr. of the property rightfully his by inheritance from his mother, the deceased Dominga Goyma."9Given the fraudulent character of the transactions, the court a quo held that the spouses Rodriguez could notavail of the protective mantle of the law protecting purchasers for value in good faith. The spouses Rodriguezwere declared to be purchasers in bad faith because they had prior knowledge of the claim of Pablo GoymaLim, Jr. over the subject lots and even anticipated his filing of the case against them.The court a quo also stated that even granting arguendo that fraud attendant to the transactions were notsufficient to vitiate consent as to nullify the transactions, still the transactions entered into by Frisco Gudanirelative to the subject lots were void for want of authority to sell them.The court a quo explained that since Dominga Goyma died on July 19, 1971 without a will, legal or intestatesuccession takes place following paragraph (1) of Article 96010of the Civil Code. Under the law on intestacy,particularly Article 99811thereof, the widower or widow who survives with illegitimate children shall be entitled toone-half of the inheritance and the illegitimate children to the other half.However, in Frisco Gudanis case, he did not contribute any amount in the purchase of the subject lots.

Moreover, these were acquired by Dominga Goyma after her de facto separation from Frisco Gudani. Theestate left by the deceased, including the subject lots, should have first been partitioned in an appropriateestate proceeding to determine those entitled thereto. Without the said proceeding or prior thereto, FriscoGudani could not lay valid claim, if he had any, over the subject lots as sole heir and he could not have beenthe owner thereof who could legally transfer ownership by means of sale.The decretal portion of the Decision dated May 17, 1990 of the court a quo reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the substituted plaintiffs,CONCORDIA ONG LIM, EURESTES LIM and ELMER LIM and against the defendants, the spouses REYNALDORODRIGUEZ and NANCY A. RODRIGUEZ, as follows:

a) Declaring as null and void all transactions relative to the properties in question submitted to theRegister of Deeds for the Province of Quezon on February 10, 1975;
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b) Declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-128607 in the name of defendants as null and void andordering the reinstatement of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2857 in the name of "DOMINGA GOYMA,of age, the wife of Frisco Gudani," plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest;c) Ordering the defendants to immediately vacate the premises of the properties subject of thislitigation;d) Ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiffs the amount of P24,000.00 as attorneys fees; and

e) Ordering the defendants to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.12

Aggrieved, the spouses Rodriguez filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailedDecision dated July 18, 1995 affirming in toto the decision of the court a quo. The appellate court substantiallyaffirmed the factual findings and conclusion of the court a quo. It stressed that Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. was theson of the decedent Dominga Goyma as evidenced by a voluntary acknowledgment made in his record ofbirth (Exhibit "C") and in the other documentary evidence presented during trial. His right to succession wastransmitted when Dominga Goyma passed away on July 19, 1971 following Article 77713of the Civil Code. Onthe other hand, Frisco Gudani could not dispose of the subject lots before partition of the estate of DomingaGoyma and without authority given by Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr.On the matter of whether the spouses Rodriguez purchased the subject lots in good faith and for value, theappellate court ruled in the negative, as record was replete with evidence disproving their claim of good faith.Rejecting the argument proffered by the spouses Rodriguez, the appellate court held that Frisco Gudani andEduardo Victa were not indispensable parties because they were not in possession of the subject lots and their

interests therein were inferior and irrelevant to, and could not affect, the right of Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. to adesignated portion of the subject lots by inheritance from his mother Dominga Goyma.The decretal portion of the appellate courts decision reads:PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.14The spouses Rodriguez filed a motion for reconsideration which the appellate court denied in the assailedResolution dated October 5, 1998.Forthwith, the spouses Rodriguez (petitioners) filed the present petition for review on certiorari and in supportthereof allege the following:

ITHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST, PABLO GO IMA LIM, WAS A CO-OWNER OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES AND ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF OF

THE SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND DESPITE THE FACT THAT SAID PABLO GO IMA LIM WAS NOT RECOGNIZED BY HER[SIC] PARENTS AS AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD AND THE ALLEGED DOCUMENTS PROVING HIS VOLUNTARYACKNOWLEDGMENT DO NOT SUFFICE TO PROVE HIS FILIATION TO HIS PARENTS.

IITHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE VENDEE OF THE SUBJECTPROPERTIES, PRISCO GUDANI, COULD NOT VALIDLY DISPOSE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES BEFORE PARTITION ANDWITHOUT THE LEGAL AUTHORITY GIVEN BY THE ILLEGITIMATE CHILD, PABLO GO IMA LIM.

IIITHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS WERE PURCHASERSOF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE.

IVTHE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE VENDEES OF THE SUBJECTPROPERTIES, PRISCO GUDANI AND EDUARDO VICTA, NOT BEING INDISPENSABLE PARTIES, THEY WERE PROPERLYNOT IMPLEADED AS DEFENDANTS IN THE COMPLAINT.15The petition is bereft of merit.Petitioners assail the filiation of Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. stating that he was not duly acknowledged or recognizedby either of his parents. This contention is erroneous. It is axiomatic that factual findings of the trial court,especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive and binding on the Court.16In this case, thecourt a quo and the appellate court are in agreement that, based on the evidence presented, Pablo GoymaLim, Jr. was the illegitimate and acknowledged son of Dominga Goyma.The Court has laid down the manner of establishing the filiation of children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, asfollows:The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing inthe civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a privatehandwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved

by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowedby the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, astatement before a court of record, or in, any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act ofacknowledgment of the child, and no further action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not justa ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separateaction for judicial approval.17Various documentary evidence were proffered by Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. to prove that he was the illegitimateand acknowledged son of Dominga Goyma. Among them were his certificate of birth (Exhibit "B") indicatingthat his mother was Dominga Goyma; statement of assets, income and liabilities for 1958 (Exhibit "C") ofDominga Goyma indicating him as her son and; income tax returns for calendar years 1953 up to 1955 (Exhibits"D" to "F")) of Dominga Goyma where she invariably claimed personal exemption as head of the family and
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stated therein that she was "separated" from her husband and claimed an exemption for her son, PabloGoyma Lim, Jr. These pieces of documentary evidence, whose authenticity were not refuted by petitioners,were properly considered by the court a quo and the appellate court to establish that Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr.was acknowledged by Dominga Goyma to be her illegitimate son.The court a quo, as affirmed by the appellate court, likewise correctly nullified TCT No. T-128607 in the name ofpetitioners. In fact, all the transactions relative to TCT No. T-2857, i.e., affidavit of Frisco Gudani adjudicating tohimself the subject lots and their purported sale by him to Eduardo Victa and by the latter to petitioners, were

declared null and void by the court a quo on the ground that, as established by evidence, these were allmade through the fraudulent machinations of Atty. Aguilan.It should be recalled that Atty. Aguilan made Frisco Gudani affix his signature on, among other documents, aPetition dated March 15, 1973 filed with the Court of First Instance of the Province of Quezon for the issuance ofa second owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-2857 and an Affidavit of Loss dated March 15, 1973 for the loss ofthe owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-2857. Obviously, these documents contained falsehoods because TCTNo. T-2857 was never lost and, in fact, had been in the possession of Dominga Goyma during her lifetime and,when she passed away on July 19, 1971, in the possession of Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr.It has been consistently ruled that "when the owners duplicate certificate of title has not been lost, but is in factin the possession of another person, then the reconstituted certificate is void, because the court that renderedthe decision had no jurisdiction. Reconstitution can validly be made only in case of loss of the originalcertificate."18In such a case, "the decision authorizing the issuance of a new owners duplicate certificate oftitle may be attacked any time."19Applying this rule, it is apparent that the second owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-2857 issued upon thepetition of Frisco Gudani was void. Further, the certificates of title (TCT No. T-128605 in the name of FriscoGudani, TCT No. T-128606 in the name of Eduardo Victa and TCT No. T-128607 in the names of petitioners) thatwere subsequently issued covering the subject lots may be nullified because they all emanated from a voiddocument, i.e., the second owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-2857 that was procured by Frisco Gudani, ormore particularly by Atty. Aguilan, in behalf of Frisco Gudani, through fraud. Transfer certificates of title may beannulled if issued based on void documents.20Petitioners cannot raise the defense of indefeasibility of a Torrens title with respect to TCT No. T-168607 because"the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title does not apply where fraud attended the issuance of the title.The Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud."21They cannot deny any knowledge of the fraud thatattended the transactions involving the subject lots, including their acquisition thereof. Stated differently,petitioners cannot claim that they were purchasers in good faith and for value because the transactions

involving the subject lots were so replete with badges of fraud and irregularities that should have put them onguard about the defects in the respective titles of Frisco Gudani and Eduardo Victa.To recall, TCT No. T-2857 was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-128605 was issued in the name of FriscoGudani, on February 10, 1975. The latter was thereafter cancelled by TCT No. T-128606 issued in the name ofEduardo Victa also on February 10, 1975. The latter certificate of title, in turn, was cancelled by TCT No. T-128607issued in the name of the spouses Rodriguez also on February 10, 1975. These highly irregular transfers ofownership, i.e., cancellation and/or issuance of certificates of title, involving the subject lots all transpiring onthe same date eloquently betray the fraud that attended the transactions, including petitioners acquisitionthereof. It is certainly unlikely that petitioners had no knowledge of these fraudulent transactions.Petitioners claim of being purchasers in good faith and for value was debunked by the court a quo, thus:Defendant spouses, under the premises, cannot avail of the protective mantle of law protecting a purchaserfor value and in good faith, as they are not purchasers for value and neither have they acted in good faith.Defendants cannot successfully put up a picture of innocence as to the fraud that characterized thetransactions relative to their ultimate acquisition of the properties subject of this litigation. Defendant ReynaldoRodriguez was well aware that on his acquisition of the properties, Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. will file suit against himthat is why he retained P10,000.00 of the purchase price, which amount is intended to be used in the expected

litigation. In fact, defendant Reynaldo Rodriguez admitted to Frisco Gudani that he purchased the propertiesat a very low price because of which he promised to give Frisco Gudani an additional amount of P1,500.00

upon the termination of the case.22On this point, the appellate court succinctly stated that "as to the contention that appellants (referring topetitioners) purchased the properties in good faith and for value, the record is replete with evidence negatingsuch contention and the issue had been thoroughly discussed in the appealed decision which would renderany further discussion a superfluity."23Contrary to the petitioners contention, Eduardo Victa and Frisco Gudani are not indispensableparties.1wphi1 The complaint filed by Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. was for the cancellation of TCT No. T-128607 in the

name of petitioners and to enjoin them from entering the subject lots. The following discussion on who is or is notan indispensable party is apropos:An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the courts action in the litigation, and without

whom no final determination of the case can be had. The partys interest in the subject matter of the suit and inthe relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties that his legal presence as a party to the

proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the partiesbefore the court which is effective, complete, or equitable.Conversely, a party is not indispensable to the suit if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is distinctand divisible from the interest of the other parties and will not necessarily be prejudiced by a judgment whichdoes complete justice to the parties in court. He is not indispensable if his presence would merely permitcomplete relief between him and those already parties to the action or will simply avoid multiple litigation.24
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A final determination could be had in the complaint for cancellation of TCT No. T-128607 and injunction evenwithout Eduardo Victa and Frisco Gudani. Only the petitioners are indispensable parties therein and theirinsistence that Eduardo Victa and Frisco Gudani should likewise be impleaded deserves scant consideration.Having established that petitioners TCT No. T-128607 emanated from a void document, i.e. the second ownersduplicate copy of TCT No. T-2857 procured by Frisco Gudani and/or Atty. Aguilan through fraud and whenDomingas owners duplicate certificate of title had not been lost, and that petitioners were not purchasers ingood faith and for value, the Court concludes that the nullification of petitioners TCT No. T-128607 is warranted

under the circumstances. The appellate court therefore committed no reversible error in affirming the decisionof the court a quo which, among others, declared as null and void TCT No. T-128607 in the name of petitionersand, instead, reinstated TCT No. T-2857 in the name of Dominga Goyma, mother of Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. (nowsubstituted by his spouse and children) respondents Concordia Ong Lim, Eurestes and Elmer Lim.The Court finds it unnecessary, at this point, to determine the successional rights, if any, of Frisco Gudani to theproperties left by Dominga Goyma. Such matter is better threshed out in the proper special proceedings for thesettlement of the intestate estate of Dominga Goyma. As held by this Court, matters which involve settlementand distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in theexercise of its limited jurisdiction.25WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 18, 1995 and Resolution dated October 5, 1998 ofthe Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 27440 are AFFIRMED in toto.SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 167707 October 8, 2008THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVEDIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI, REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU,REGION VI PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, AKLAN, REGISTER OFDEEDS, DIRECTOR OF LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OFPHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY, petitioners, vs.MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and in behalf of

all those similarly situated, respondents.x------------------------- xG.R. No. G.R. No. 173775 October 8, 2008DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO, joined by THE LANDOWNERS OF BORACAY SIMILARLY SITUATEDNAMED IN A LIST, ANNEX A OF THIS PETITION, petitioners, vs.THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL TECHNICALDIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI, PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURALRESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO, AKLAN, respondents.

AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants of Boracay Island to secure titles overtheir occupied lands.There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for review on certiorari of theDecision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which

granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and orderedthe survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus,and nullification of Proclamation No. 10645>[3] issued by President Gloria Macapagal -Arroyo classifyingBoracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.

The AntecedentsG.R. No. 167707

Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand beaches and warm crystallinewaters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist destination. The island is also home to 12,003 inhabitants 4 wholive in the bone-shaped islands threebarangays.5On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) approved the NationalReservation Survey of BoracayIsland,6 which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons.7

On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 18018 declaring BoracayIsland, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves underthe administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTACircular 3-829 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an application forjudicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimantsMayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for declaratoryrelief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raiseddoubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or throughtheir predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession andoccupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for taxpurposes and paid realty taxes on them.10Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not placeBoracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was susceptible ofprivate ownership. Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise known as the PublicLand Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfecttitles.The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory relief. TheOSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the massof lands classified as public forest, which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of

Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code,11 as amended.The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3 -82 wasmisplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. SinceBoracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot

ripen into ownership.During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following facts: (1) respondents-claimants were presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of land wereplanted with coconut trees and other natural growing trees; (3) the coconut trees had heights of more or lesstwenty (20) meters and were planted more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondents-claimants declaredthe land they were occupying for tax purposes.12The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal: whether Proclamation No. 1801posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of the lands in Boracay. They decided to forego withthe trial and to submit the case for resolution upon submission of their respective memoranda.13The RTC took judicial notice14 that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island, more particularly Lots 1 and 30,Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of


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Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before the RTC of Kalibo,Aklan.15 The titles were issued onAugust 7, 1933.16

RTC and CA DispositionsOn July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, with a fallo reading:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82pose no legal obstacle to the petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire title to their lands in Boracay, in

accordance with the applicable laws and in the manner prescribed therein; and to have their lands surveyedand approved by respondent Regional Technical Director of Lands as the approved survey does not in itselfconstitute a title to the land.SO ORDERED.17The RTC upheld respondents-claimants right to have their occupied lands titled in their name. It ruled thatneither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable orcould not be the subject of disposition.18 The Circular itself recognized private ownership of lands.19 The trialcourt cited Sections 8720 and 5321 of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private ownership of landsin Boracay and that only those forested areas in public lands were declared as part of the forest reserve.22The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.23 The Republic then appealed to the CA.On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision, disposing as follows:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the appeal filed inthis case and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court.24

The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the lands theyoccupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.25 Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.

G.R. No. 173775On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issuedProclamation No. 106426 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land(protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienableand disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of thecenterline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forestland protection purposes.On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,27 Wilfredo Gelito,28 and other landowners29 inBoracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation

No. 1064.30They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their prior vested rights over portions of Boracay.They have been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They havealso invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and building internationally renowned first class resortson their lots.31Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into agriculturalland. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to thePhilippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act.32 Thus, their possession in the conceptof owner for the required period entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a vested right over theiroccupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No.705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicialconfirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts, which has authority toreclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a positivegovernment act in order to release the lots for disposition.On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as they principally involve thesame issues on the land classification of Boracay Island.33

IssuesG.R. No. 167707

The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legalobstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in BoracayIsland.34

G.R. No. 173775Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:

I.AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE

AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THEPETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLICAGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLICFOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD 705?

II.HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIPOVER THEIR OCCUPIEDPORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIALCONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE?

III.IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN]INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLEUNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?


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IV.IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATEOWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THECONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.

V.CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE SURVEY AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEYPLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN

BORACAY?35

(Underscoring supplied)In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707 andpetitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay.The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141, asamended. They do not involve their r ight to secure title under other pertinent laws.

Our RulingRegalian Doctrine and power of the executive

to reclassify lands of the public domainPrivate claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title,namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 190236 in relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or superseded by Act No.2874 and CA No. 141;37 (b) Proclamation No. 180138 issued by then President Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No.106439 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to determine their rights to apply forjudicial confirmation of imperfect title under these laws and executive acts.

But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to reclassify lands of the publicdomain.The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber. 40 Meanwhile, the1973 Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential,resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other classes as may be provided bylaw,41 giving the government great leeway for classification.42 Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935Constitution classification with one addition: national parks.43 Of these, only agricultural lands may bealienated.44 Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly andadministratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the publicdomain.The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is thesource of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. 45 The

doctrine has been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.46All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to theState.47Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant,belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.48 Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine iflands of the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state,is possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the favored recipients ofpublic lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege, not excluding the placing ofobstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.49Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines,ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.50 The Regaliandoctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,which laidthe foundation that all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant,belong to the public domain.51The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Lawof 1893. The SpanishMortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims.52The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law53 partly amended the Spanish Mortgage Law and the Laws of theIndies. It established possessory information as the method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, undercertain conditions which were set forth in said decree.54 Under Section 393 of the Maura Law, an informacionposesoria or possessory information title,55 when duly inscribed in the Registry of Property, is converted into a titleof ownership only after the lapse of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public,and adverse,56 from the date of its inscription.57 However, possessory information title had to be perfected oneyear after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to theState.58In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be founded on royal concessions whichtook various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2) concesion especial or special grant; (3) composicion

con el estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria orpossessory information title.59>The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under American rule was embodied inthe Philippine Bill of 1902.60 By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified intothree (3) grand divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest lands. 61 The act provided for, amongothers, the disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute grant (freehold system) and by lease (leaseholdsystem).62It also provided the definition by exclusion of agricultural public lands.63 Interpreting the meaning ofagricultural lands under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court declared inMapa v. Insular Government:64x x x In other words, that the phrase agricultural land as used in Act No. 926 means those public landsacquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. x x x65 (Emphasis Ours)


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On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land RegistrationAct. The act established a system of registration by which recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible, andimprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens system.66Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926, which was the first PublicLand Act. The Act introduced the homestead system and made provisions for judicial and administrativeconfirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted corporations regardless ofthe nationality of persons owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of the public domain.67 Under

the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the nextten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.68On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise known as the second PublicLand Act. This new, more comprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos andAmericans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial confirmation oftitle, possession and occupation en concepto dueo since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, wasrequired.69After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874 on December 1, 1936. To thisday, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the existing general law governing the classification and dispositionof lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands,70 and privately owned lands which revertedto the State.71Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of possession and occupation oflands of the public domain since time immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was

superseded by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942,72 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period forjudicial confirmation of imperfect title. The provision was last amended by PD No. 1073,73 which now providesfor possession and occupation of the land applied forsince June 12, 1945, or earlier.74The issuance of PD No. 89275 on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence in landregistration proceedings.76 Under the decree, all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registrationof their lands under Act No. 496 within six (6) months from the effectivity of the decree on February 16, 1976.Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered lands77 shall be governed by Section 194 of the RevisedAdministrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known as the Property RegistrationDecree. It was enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration of property. 78 It governs registration oflands under the Torrens system as well as unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages.79

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of State

ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government ,such as an official proclamation,80 declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural orother purposes.81 In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to those lands whichhave been officially delimited and classified.82The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is onthe person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of theapplication is alienable or disposable.83 To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must beestablished that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.84 There must still be apositive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject ofan application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of thegovernment such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigationreports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. 85 The applicant may also secure acertification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number ofyears is alienable and disposable.86In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certificationwas presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions ofBoracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienableand disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission thatlands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of landclassification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.87

Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or portions of it, agricultural lands.Privateclaimants posit that Boracay was already an agricultural land pursuant to the old cases Ankron v. Governmentof the Philippine Islands (1919)88 and De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government (1909).89 These cases were decidedunder the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old cases that inthe absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is

shown.90Private claimants reliance onAnkron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases did not have the effect ofconverting the whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into agricultural lands. It should be stressed that thePhilippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely provided the manner through which land registration courts wouldclassify lands of the public domain. Whether the land would be classified as timber, mineral, or agriculturaldepended on proof presented in each case.Ankron and DeAldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had no power to classifylands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to makecorresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending uponthe preponderance of the evidence.91 This was the Courts ruling inHeirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palancaand Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic,92 in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:


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x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be formally released by an act of theExecutive before it can be deemed open to private ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of Landsand Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.

x x x xPetitioners reliance uponRamos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government is misplaced. These caseswere decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the PhilippineCommission on October 7, 1926, under which there was no legal provision vesting in the Chief Executive or

President of the Philippines the power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber and agriculturalso that the courts then were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested withimplicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.93To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then necessary to devise apresumption on land classification. Thus evolved the dictum inAnkron that the courts have a right to presume,in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contraryis shown.94But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an argument that all lands of thepublic domain had been automatically reclassified as disposable and alienable agricultural lands. By nostretch of imagination did the presumption convert all lands of the public domain into agricultural lands.If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 would haveautomatically made all lands in the Philippines, except those already classified as timber or mineral land,alienable and disposable lands. That would take these lands out of State ownership and worse, would be

utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine.The presumption inAnkron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases brought under theprovisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically those cases dealing with judicial and administrative confirmationof imperfect titles. The presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or administrative conformation ofimperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to landowners, such as private claimants or theirpredecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their landremained unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian doctrine, continued to be owned by the State.In any case, the assumption inAnkron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land classification was, in the end,dependent on proof. If there was proof that the land was better suited for non-agricultural uses, the courtscould adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite the presumption. InAnkron, this Court stated:In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General admitted in effect that whether theparticular land in question belongs to one class or another is a question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of

land has trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and theother, mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent and present or future value of the forestry and ofthe minerals. While, as we have just said, many definitions have been given for agriculture, forestry, andmineral lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry

or mineral land the proof must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains thanit is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists some trees uponthe land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by reason ofthe exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reasonof the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified as agricultural today maybe differently classified tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that particular case, havingregard for its present or future value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however, considering the factthat it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural landsthat the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case thelands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular landregistration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value for onepurpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular case. The fact that theland is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry,or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or the other of said classes of land. The Government, in thefirst instance, under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of publicland shall be considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is made.In the latter case, whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until privateinterests have intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itselfwhat portions of the public domain shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs.Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175;Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, supra)95 (Emphasis ours)Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands from the facts of each case,

except those that have already became private lands.96 Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced inSection 6 of CA No. 141, gave the Executive Department, through the President, the exclusive prerogative toclassify or reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest.96-a Since then, courts no longerhad the authority, whether express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the public domain.97Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title in 1933,98 did not present ajusticiable case for determination by the land registration court of the propertys land classification. Simply put,

there was no opportunity for the courts then to resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are now claimingwere agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874 in 1919, without an application forjudicial confirmation having been filed by private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were nolonger authorized to determine the propertys land classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on ActNo. 926.


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We note that the RTC decision99 in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila,100 whichwas decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive with the sole power to classify lands of the publicdomain was already in effect. Krivenko cited the old casesMapa v. Insular Government,101 De Aldecoa v. TheInsular Government,102andAnkron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.103Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different issue. The pertinent issueinKrivenko was whether residential lots were included in the general classification of agricultural lands; and if so,whether an alien could acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as an alien, Krivenko was prohibited by

the 1935 Constitution104

from acquiring agricultural land, which included residential lots. Here, the issue iswhether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural.Notably, the definition of agricultural public lands mentioned inKrivenko relied on the old cases decided priorto the enactment of Act No. 2874, includingAnkron and De Aldecoa.105 As We have already stated, thosecases cannot apply here, since they were decided when the Executive did not have the authority to classifylands as agricultural, timber, or mineral.Private claimants continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption that the land is

alienable. Private claimants also contend that their continued possession of portions of Boracay Island for therequisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926106ipso facto converted the island into private ownership.Hence, they may apply for a title in their name.A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of Appeals.107Collado, citing theseparate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and NaturalResources,107-a ruled:Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902.The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for thehomesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed theterms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided forthe issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands, for the establishment of town sites andsale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanishconcessions and grants in the Islands.In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title topublic lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government; and that the governments title to public

land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. Theterm public land referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government andare thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of thegovernment and the friar lands.

Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926,mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable anddisposable.108 (Emphasis Ours)Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior

to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705. TheDENR109 and the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority110 certify that Boracay Island is anunclassified land of the public domain.PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest.Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as a mass of lands of the public domain which has not beenthe subject of the present system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forestpurpose and which are not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island,

are ipso factoconsidered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to itseffectivity.The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705 may seem to be out oftouch with the present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of its forest cover topave the way for commercial developments. As a premier tourist destination for local and foreign tourists,Boracay appears more of a commercial island resort, rather than a forest land.Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach resorts on the island; 111 thatthe island has already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 willdestroy the islands tourism industry, do not negate its character as public forest.Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution112 classifying lands of the public domaininto agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks , do not necessarily refer to large tracts ofwooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes.113 The discussion in Heirs ofAmunategui v. Director of Forestry114 is particularly instructive:A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because

loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actuallybe covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have tobe on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, andother trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptiveof its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless anduntil the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part

of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do notapply.115 (Emphasis supplied)There is a big difference between forest as defined in a dictionary and forest or timber land as a

classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what appears onthe land while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes. 116 At any rate, the Court is tasked to


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determine thelegal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest coverhas been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not beenautomatically converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The

proclamation did not convert Boracay into an agricultural land. However, private claimants argue thatProclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to judicial confirmation ofimperfect title. The Proclamation classified Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist zone. Private claimants

assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is susceptible of private ownership.Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of Boracay into an agricultural land.There is nothing in the law or the Circular which made Boracay Island an agricultural land. The reference inCircular No. 3-82 to private lands117and areas declared as alienable and disposable118 does not by itselfclassify the entire island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not only to private lands andareas but also to public forested lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides:No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from the PTA. All forested areas in publiclands are declared forest reserves. (Emphasis supplied)Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely recognizes that the island can beclassified by the Executive department pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of theCircular recognizes the then Bureau of Forest Developments authority to declare areas in the island as

alienable and disposable when it provides:Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development.

Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island asalienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposableor forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in ProclamationNo. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the declaration of BoracayIsland, together with other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserveto be administered by the PTA to ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and private sectors in thedevelopment of the areas tourism potential with due regard for ecological balance in the marine

environment. Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at administering the islands fortourism and ecologicalpurposes.It does not address the areas alienability.119More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but sixty-four (64) other islands, coves,and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental

Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and surrounding areas inPalawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the designation ofBoracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all theother areas mentioned would likewise be declared wide open for private disposition. That could not havebeen, and is clearly beyond, the intent of the proclamation.It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as alienable and opened the

same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141120 provide that it is only the President, upon therecommendation of the proper department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the publicdomain into alienable o

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