long-term effects of covert face recognition
TRANSCRIPT
Brief article
Long-term effects of covert face recognition
Rob Jenkinsa,*, A. Mike Burtona, Andrew W. Ellisb
aUniversity of Glasgow, Glasgow, UKbUniversity of York, York, UK
Received 20 February 2002; accepted 9 August 2002
Abstract
Covert face recognition has previously been thought to produce only very short-lasting effects. In
this study we demonstrate that manipulating subjects’ attentional load affects explicit, but not
implicit memory for faces, and that implicit effects can persist over much longer intervals than is
normally reported. Subjects performed letter-string tasks of high vs. low perceptual load (Lavie, N.
(1995). Perceptual load as a necessary condition for selective attention. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Human Perception and Perfomance. 21, 451–468.), while ignoring task-irrelevant
celebrity faces. Memory for the faces was then assessed using (a) a surprise recognition test for
the celebrities’ names, and (b) repetition priming in a face familiarity task. The load manipulation
strongly influenced explicit recognition memory, but had no effect on repetition priming from the
same items. Moreover, faces from the high load condition produced the same amount of priming
whether they were explicitly remembered or not. This result resolves a long-standing anomaly in the
face recognition literature, and is discussed in relation to covert processing in prosopagnosia.
q 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Face recognition; Covert processing; Priming; Visual attention
1. Introduction
Observers presented with faces that they do not recognize overtly can nevertheless show
signs of having done so covertly. Perhaps the most striking example comes from the study
of prosopagnosic patients, some of whom show evidence of recognizing familiar people
when tested indirectly (for example through measures of galvanic skin response) despite
reporting no overt recognition (e.g. Bauer, 1984; Tranel & Damasio, 1988). Similar results
have been found in semantic priming studies, in which presentation of a face (e.g. Oliver
R. Jenkins et al. / Cognition 86 (2002) B43–B52 B43
Cognition 86 (2002) B43–B52www.elsevier.com/locate/cognit
0010-0277/02/$ - see front matter q 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
PII: S0010-0277(02)00172-5
* Corresponding author. Department of Psychology, University of Glasgow, 58 Hillhead Street, Glasgow G12
8QB, UK. Tel.: 144-141-330-3948; fax: 144-141-330-4606.
E-mail address: [email protected] (R. Jenkins).
Hardy’s) typically facilitates recognition of a printed related name (e.g. “Stan Laurel”)
presented immediately afterwards (i.e. within a few seconds of the prime item; Bruce &
Valentine, 1986). Normal subjects show this pattern of semantic priming routinely, but so
do some prosopagnosics, despite not recognizing the prime face (Young, Hellawell, & de
Haan, 1988). Normal subjects can also show covert-only recognition in this situation,
when the prime face is presented subliminally (Morrison, Bruce, & Burton, 2000).
Such short-term effects of covert recognition can be demonstrated relatively easily,
using faces or other classes of stimulus (e.g. printed words). By contrast however, long-
term effects of covert recognition, such as repetition priming, have never been found in the
face domain, despite being commonplace in other domains (e.g. word reading; Beaure-
gard, Benhamou, Laurent, & Chertkow, 1999).
Repetition priming refers to a facilitation in identifying an item due to prior exposure to
that item. In the face domain, typical repetition priming experiments require subjects to
perform some task on faces in a prime phase, perhaps a judgement based on physical
appearance. An unexpected test phase follows, commonly about 20 min later, in which
subjects are asked to make familiarity judgements to faces. RTs to make these judgements
are reliably faster for items that appeared in the prime phase than for items that did not
(e.g. Bruce & Valentine, 1985; Ellis, Young, Flude, & Hay, 1987). Unlike semantic
priming, this effect is domain specific. So, at the intervals typically used, faces prime
faces but not names, and vice versa (Burton, Kelly, & Bruce, 1998; Ellis, Flude, Young, &
Burton, 1996; Ellis et al., 1987). This effect is very robust, and can be seen even when
different photographs of the same face are used at prime and test. Moreover, it survives
radical changes in context between prime and test (e.g. changes in location, stimulus
materials and task; Bruce, Carson, Burton, & Kelly, 1998). Repetition priming from
faces is thus very well explored, and is incorporated into current models of familiar
face recognition (e.g. Burton, Bruce, & Hancock, 1999).
Despite the general robustness of repetition priming for faces, it has never been shown
to occur when stimuli in the prime phase are not overtly recognized. Indeed, Brunas-
Wagstaff, Young, and Ellis (1992) found that even prime faces that were successfully
recognized, but only after prompting (e.g. “he’s a politician…”), did not produce repeti-
tion priming. Thus, it appears that face recognition must be not only overt, but also
spontaneous, in order for repetition priming to occur. Although this effect has survived
in the literature for many years, it does seem anomalous. Why should covert recognition so
easily give rise to immediate semantic priming, but resist longer term repetition priming?
In other domains, such as word reading, unrecognized (subliminal) primes have been
shown to produce both immediate semantic priming (e.g. Hines, Czerwinski, Sawer, &
Dyer, 1986) and longer term repetition priming (e.g. Beauregard et al., 1999).
In the present study we sought to induce long-term covert-only recognition for supra-
liminal faces in normal subjects by manipulating attention to prime faces. According to
Lavie’s perceptual load theory of selective attention (Lavie, 1995, 2000), perceptual proces-
sing is capacity-limited. But within these limits, processing proceeds automatically, from
relevant to irrelevant stimuli, until available capacity is exhausted. The amount of task-
irrelevant processing that takes place is thus influenced by the relevant perceptual load: if
the perceptual load of the relevant task is high enough to exhaust capacity, then irrelevant
stimuli will not be processed. On the other hand, if the relevant perceptual load is low, spare
R. Jenkins et al. / Cognition 86 (2002) B43–B52B44
capacity will inevitably ‘spill over’ to the processing of task-irrelevant stimuli. There is now
considerable evidence in support of Lavie’s theory, from both psychological studies (e.g.
Lavie, 1995, 2000) and neuroimaging studies (e.g. Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 1997). The major
finding, which holds true for various manipulations of perceptual load, is that task-irrelevant
processing is only found under conditions of low perceptual load in the relevant task, and is
eliminated under conditions of high perceptual load.
To date, however, any influence of relevant perceptual load at prime, on covert memory
for task-irrelevant stimuli presented at prime, has not been examined. If overt and covert
recognition measures can be dissociated (e.g. Beauregard et al., 1999; Morrison et al.,
2000), it is possible that repetition priming might reveal some covert recognition for task-
irrelevant faces that were previously presented under high load, even if no overt memory
for those faces is reported.
Here we tested this possibility by presenting displays composed of a letter-string super-
imposed on a famous face (see Fig. 1). In the low load condition, subjects were asked to
respond to the colour of the letter-strings, a task thought to place minimal demands on
attention (e.g. Treisman, 1993). In the high load condition, subjects had to identify a target
letter among similarly-shaped letters in the string, a task thought to demand focused atten-
tion, and shown in previous studies to reduce on-line distractor processing (Lavie, 1995).
Incidental memory for the task-irrelevant famous faces was then assessed using two
measures. First, overt recognition memory was assessed using an old/new discrimination
task for the celebrities’ names (e.g. “was Bill Clinton presented?”). Second, repetition
priming effects were assessed using a speeded familiarity task for the celebrities’ faces.
We predicted that faces presented under low load would be remembered better than those
presented under high load. If so, it should then be possible to establish whether the faces
that are not overtly recognized can nevertheless give rise to repetition priming.
2. Method
2.1. Design and stimuli
Displays in the selective attention task consisted of a central letter-string superimposed
on a famous face at fixation (see Fig. 1). The letter-strings could be either red or blue, and
consisted of a target letter (X or N) and five other angular letters in a random order. All
face images were greyscale photographs with the background removed.
The faces and printed names of 72 celebrities served as stimuli. Twenty-four faces were
presented in the low load condition, and 24 were presented in the high load condition. The
remaining 24 were used as new items at test. Between subjects, the three face sets were
rotated around experimental conditions (high, low and new), so that when pooling over the
whole experiment, each face appeared in each condition equally often. Novel photographs
of all 72 famous faces, and matched photographs of 72 unfamiliar faces, were used in the
face familiarity task.
2.2. Procedure
The experiment consisted of three stages, which were separated by 5 min intervals.
R. Jenkins et al. / Cognition 86 (2002) B43–B52 B45
Stage 1: the selective attention displays were presented for 200 ms. Twenty-four subjects
made speeded keypress responses to the colour of the letter-string (red or blue) in the low
load condition, and to the identity of the target letter (X or N) in the high load condition.
Subjects completed two randomized blocks (either low–high, or high–low), each consist-
ing of 24 trials. Each prime face was thus encountered exactly once. Subjects were
instructed to focus on the letter-strings and to ignore the faces throughout. Stage 2:
after the selective attention task, subjects performed a surprise name recognition test on
all 72 celebrities’ names, responding “yes” to celebrities who had been presented in the
selective attention task, and “no” to celebrities who had not. Stage 3: subjects then used
R. Jenkins et al. / Cognition 86 (2002) B43–B52B46
Fig. 1. Example of the type of display used in Stage 1. Subjects responded to a string of letters superimposed on a
task-irrelevant famous face (non-famous face used in this example for copyright reasons). In the low load
condition, subjects responded to the colour of the letter-string (red vs. blue). In the high load condition, they
responded to the identity of a target letter (X vs. N).
keypress responses to make speeded familiarity judgements to 144 faces (all 72 celebrities,
randomly intermixed with 72 unfamiliars).
3. Results
Perceptual load was successfully manipulated. Mean correct RTs and error rates in the
selective attention task were significantly higher in the high load condition (mean RT 767
ms, 29% errors) than in the low load condition (mean RT 310 ms, 5% errors)
(tð23Þ ¼ 13:4, P , 0:05 for RTs; tð23Þ ¼ 11:5, P , 0:05 for errors). The mean percen-
tages of “yes” responses in the name recognition task are presented in Fig. 2.
One-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of experimental condition
(Fð2; 46Þ ¼ 69:9, P , 0:05). Planned comparisons showed that, as expected, subjects
responded “yes” more frequently to low load and high load celebrities than to new
celebrities (tð23Þ ¼ 11:8, P , 0:05 and tð23Þ ¼ 6:26, P , 0:05, respectively). More
importantly, there was a significant effect of perceptual load on recognition memory
performance, with more “yes” responses to low load celebrities than to high load celeb-
rities (tð23Þ ¼ 5:54, P , 0:05).
R. Jenkins et al. / Cognition 86 (2002) B43–B52 B47
Fig. 2. Mean percentage of “yes” responses (n ¼ 24) in the surprise recognition test for famous names (Stage 2).
Overt recognition performance is shown as a function of experimental condition; low load, high load, or new
(foils).
Mean correct RTs and error rates in the face familiarity task are presented in Fig. 3, as a
function of experimental condition.
ANOVA on these RT data showed a significant effect of experimental condition
(Fð2; 46Þ ¼ 6:99, P , 0:05). Planned comparisons confirmed that subjects responded
faster to low load faces and high load faces than to new faces (tð23Þ ¼ 3:23, P , 0:05
and tð23Þ ¼ 3:25, P , 0:05, respectively), indicating repetition priming. However, as Fig.
3 shows, the size of this priming effect was unaffected by the level of perceptual load (43
ms for both load conditions). Error rates were consistent across conditions (15 ^ 1%), and
were not analyzed further.
To provide a more stringent test of dissociation between repetition priming and explicit
recognition memory, priming effects were also analyzed separately for celebrities eliciting
“yes” vs. “no” responses in the overt recognition memory task. Three subjects with empty
cells were excluded from this analysis. Mean correct RTs for the remaining 21 subjects are
shown in Fig. 4.
ANOVA conducted on these split RT data revealed a significant effect of experimental
condition for both the “yes” subset (Fð2; 40Þ ¼ 4:03, P , 0:05), and the “no” subset
R. Jenkins et al. / Cognition 86 (2002) B43–B52B48
Fig. 3. Mean correct RTs (n ¼ 24) in the face familiarity task (Stage 3). Covert recognition performance is shown
as a function of experimental condition; low load, high load, or new (foils).
(Fð2; 40Þ ¼ 3:60, P , 0:05). However, planned comparisons found no significant effect of
load for either subset (t , 1 for the “yes” subset, and tð1; 20Þ ¼ 1:91, n.s. for the “no”
subset). Most importantly, high load faces produced the same amount of priming (50 ms),
regardless of whether or not they were explicitly remembered. Low load faces produced
more priming when they were explicitly remembered (58 ms) than when they were not (13
ms) (tð1; 20Þ ¼ 2:22, P , 0:05).
4. Discussion
This experiment demonstrates, for the first time, a dissociation between overt recogni-
tion memory and repetition priming for faces. Specifically, incidental overt recognition
(Stage 2), for faces that that were irrelevant when first presented, was strongly affected by
the perceptual load of the relevant task at the time of face encoding (Stage 1), with poorer
performance on faces presented under high relevant load. However, this load manipulation
had no effect on repetition priming from the same faces (Stage 3). Note that the priming
observed at Stage 3 cannot have been influenced by the explicit memory test at Stage 2;
although the explicit name recognition test always preceded the face familiarity test, it is
R. Jenkins et al. / Cognition 86 (2002) B43–B52 B49
Fig. 4. Mean correct RTs (n ¼ 21) in the face familiarity task (Stage 3) as a function of experimental condition
(low load, high load, or new), shown separately for celebrities eliciting “yes” vs. “no” responses in the name
recognition test (Stage 2).
well-established that repetition priming onto a familiarity decision does not cross stimulus
domains (e.g. names do not prime faces; see Section 1). In any case, since all 72 celebrities
were presented at Stage 2 and at Stage 3, even priming from the names could not explain
the differential priming effect seen here. Instead, it appears that faces presented as irrele-
vant stimuli during a high load relevant task are nevertheless processed by the face
recognition system. Moreover, this processing is evidently relatively deep, involving
access to the person’s identity, since it survives a change in image between prime and
test. Given that perceptual load has previously been shown to modulate processes such as
on-line distractor processing (e.g. Lavie, 1995) and even motion-related activity in early
visual cortex (Rees et al., 1997), the depth of covert processing for the high load faces here
is quite striking. However, it is consistent with reports from other domains (e.g. word
reading) of repetition priming from unattended stimuli (e.g. Kellogg, Newcombe,
Kammer, & Schmitt, 1996; see also Jacoby, Toth, & Yonelinas, 1993, for similar disso-
ciations between overt and covert measures).
How do the present results relate to the Brunas-Wagstaff et al. (1992) finding that
spontaneous recognition is needed for repetition priming? The data in Fig. 4, which
show no significant priming from unrecognized celebrities from the low load condition,
may provide a clue here. It is commonly found that only familiar faces produce repetition
priming, and that this effect arises in the part of the system responsible for retrieving
identity (e.g. Ellis et al., 1987, 1996; but see Goshen-Gottstein & Ganel, 2000, for recent
claims of repetition priming from unfamiliar faces). It also seems likely that in any set of
‘celebrities’, there may be a few who are actually unknown to some subjects. Clearly,
unknown people cannot be overtly recognized by their names, even if their faces have been
fully processed. Thus, it seems plausible that at least some of the ‘unrecognized’ celeb-
rities from the low load condition were rejected at Stage 2 simply because they were
unknown. However, celebrities from the high load condition could be rejected for two
reasons; either because they were unknown, or because there were insufficient processing
resources available at the time of encoding (due to the experimental manipulation).
Indeed, the finding that rejected celebrities from the high load condition nevertheless
produced priming suggests that at least some of those rejected celebrities were known
to the subjects, and hence produced facilitation. We suggest that the results of Brunas-
Wagstaff et al. (1992) may be analogous. It may be that the faces in their study that
required prompting for recognition were actually rather poorly known by the subjects.
If so, one could explain their result not in terms of the spontaneous/prompted dimension
currently thought to be critical, but in terms of the degree of familiarity of the faces. Future
studies could test this directly by deliberately manipulating the familiarity of the prime
faces.
Finally, we return to the issue of covert recognition in prosopagnosia, which has been
the focus of most research in covert face processing (e.g. Burton, Young, Bruce, Johnston,
& Ellis, 1991; Farah, O’Reilly, & Vecera, 1993; Young & Burton, 1999). One important
aspect of covert face recognition is that it may play a role in mediating provoked overt
recognition, a phenomenon whereby some prosopagnosics can achieve transient relief
from their condition, given appropriate cueing (DeHaan, Young, & Newcombe, 1991;
Sergent & Poncet, 1990). Thus, a direct method for studying the interplay between covert-
only and normal overt face recognition may provide a significant step towards treatment.
R. Jenkins et al. / Cognition 86 (2002) B43–B52B50
To date, such a method has remained elusive, partly because covert-only recognition for
supraliminal faces has never previously been demonstrated in neurologically intact
subjects. In the present paper we have provided a method for inducing long-term
covert-only face recognition in normals. This technique provides a platform for further
experiments aiming to tap these effects which could inform the development of rehabilita-
tion strategies for prosopagnosic patients.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by an ESRC grant to A.M. Burton and A.W. Ellis (R000 23
8246).
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