AN .ANALYSIS Ol!' SELF CONSTRUCTS AND SELF VARIABLES

L.L. Viney

Being a report of an investigation submitted as

a partial requirement for the degree of ~[aster of Arts in Psychology

at

The .Australian National University

1965

6

CEAPTER I

A HISTORY OF THE SELF

7

The atter.rpt to study the antecedents of the meaning

implicit in the various uses of the term •self' by contempor­

ary psychologists in theory and measurement is a task w~ich

has been avoided by historians to date. Examination of a

range of the general psychology-psychiatry-philosophy history

texts gives merely a sketch of one or two of the main trends.

This state of academic under-achievement is, in part, a

function of a scarcity of source material and the complexity

of the material available; yet it remains remarkable in the

light of the increasing amount of research time occupied by

psychologists in examination cf the self.

This increase in research time is ected clearly in

a survey of publications listed in the complete set of tte

Psychological Index and in the Psychological Abstracts to

date. In no year, in its publication from 1894 to 1935, does

the Index list more than five works under the heading of

1Self 1 • The placement of this heading itself interesting:

'Self-consciousness' appeared in the early vol~~es in the

category of 'Consciousness' which changed in 1900 to

'Cognition'; in 1910 'Self' was included under 'Attitudes and

Intellectual Activities'; while from 1915 'Self' was found in

the section labelled 'Social Functions of the Individual'.

Just as these changes mirror the opening up of elds in

psycholo5; so they mirror the dominant interests of those

psychologists evolving concepts of self.

8

Topics pertaining to the 'Self' listed in the Psycholo-

gical Abstracts (1927- ) , on the other hand, show little

change over the years. A random sample includes 'self­

acceptance', 'self-assessment', 'self-concept', •self-attitude',

'self-consciousness•, •self-esteem•, 'self-image', 'self­

perception•, and 'self-rating'. Examination of the Abstracts

indicates the increase in the number of research publications

under the above headings. Commencing at the half-century

(1950) the incidence of publications listed has doubled three

times in ten years. (For visual presenta"ion of the growth of

the incidence of publications concerning the 'Self' see

Figure I of the Appendix).

It is appropriate, therefore, to explore the history of

the construct of self, although the material examined may

not always be dignified by the label of psychology. Contri­

butions from the related areas of :Philosophy and psychiatry

are considered for their influence on Western thought and,

therefore, on the Western psychologist. A strictly chrono­

logical assessment of contributions appears to be the most

fruitful method up to the twentieth century, when the

increase in the number of publications enforces examination

in terms of themes.

It should be noted that there are two associated trends

in the development of the concept of self omitted in t

9

history. Much of the nineteenth centu:F,{ German contempla-

tion of 'das Ich' ignored because its implications are

felt to be rr;aiilly philosophical. The only direct psycholo­

gical offspring of this move~ent, psychoanalysis, is not

examined in detail here but treated in another context of the

self in contemporary theories of personality.

The Earliest Constructs of Self

Since man first saw his neighbour he has been conscious

of himself. The concept of self, however, was rarely

recorded in literature. In fact, the literature of classical

Greece provided one of the first records of a similar concept

in the 'soul' of Plato. The 'soul', as described in the

Phaedo (Trans. Church, 1951), as the initiator of activity,

conscious, lifegiving and immaterial, appeared as the proto­

type of the centre of the self psychology devised by r~ry

Calkins. She denied the similarity (Calkins, 1917); but

the case against her is strong (Case et al., 1918), Aristotle,

following master in third century B.C., has been

described as 'the first to make a systematic enquiry into

the nature of the ' (Altschule, 1957, p.24).

Then followed a gap in the date line broken only by the

speculations of Plotinus (c. 200 A.D.), noted by philosophers

as the first discussant of the concept of self (Calkins, 1917).

It was St Augustine (354-430), however, who provided the

first glimpse of introspeccion into a personal self:

••• in that vast court of memory. For there are present with me, heaven, earth, sea, and whatever I could think on therein, besides what I have forgotten. ]'here also I meet with myself, and recall myself, and when, where, and what I have done, and under what feelings.

(Trans. Pusey, 1939, p.2ll).

10

Although not then accessible to the Western world, the

literature of classical Indian philosophy, for example the

Upanishads, Sankhya - Yoga and Advaita Vedanta, contained

extensive discussions of the possibilities of gaining more

knowledge of the self or atmavidya (Organ, 1964).

Seventeenth Century Revisions

This QUestion of self-knowledge remained a rhetorical

one for the few thinkers who raised their heads above the

bog of religious and philosophical dogma which stifled

creative thought during the Middle Ages. It was rapidly

changing Europe of the seventeenth century which provided

the stimulating background for the search for certainty

reflected in the thought of Descartes, Hobbes and Locke.

Writers studying the contributions made by Rene Descartes

to the construct of self have r.1ade r:uch of the equation

which he stulated between soul and self (Calkins, 1917;

Kehr, 1916). Kehr stressed the constructs he inherited

from St Augustine, for example the explanation of will for both

men necessitates the self. This construct is cor.1mon to many

11

later authors, as is t~e centrality of the self in systems

of cognition and consc:i.ousness, implicit in his examinations

of the aphorism 'cognito ergo sum' (I think, therefore I a~).

To let Descartes speak for himself:

••• I recognized that I was a substance whose essence or nature is to be conscious ••• Thus this self, tnat is to say the soul, by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from the body and is even more easily known.

(1'rans. ,Anscombe & Geach, 1962,p. \ j.

Across the Channel Hobbes, in his Leviathan (1951), was

propounding an ethical code based on self-interest. G.W.

Allport (1954) hailed this doctrine as a herald of social

psychology, which 'foreshadows modern doctrines oi' s

esteem ••• and self-regard as pivotal motives' (1954, p.l4).

Hobbes disagreed with some of Descartes' notions as did

Locke. Critics, for example F·rondizi (1953) and Altschule

(1957) 1 agree that these later writers place more emphasis

on the material of sensory experience. John Locke conceived

of man as 'a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason

and reflection, and can consider self as elf'; then he

added, '··· it is always as to our present sensations and

perceptions; and by this everyone is to hims that which

he calls self' (Locke, 1960, p.l88). An :essay concerning

h~~an understanding, first published in 1688, expanded

personal identity dependent on sense data to dependency on

two concomitants of this data: consciousness and memory.

12

'The self is not determined by identity or diversity of

substance, which it cannot be sure o£, but only by identity

of consciousness' (Locke, 1960, p.l96), 'Continued

existence makes identity' (1960, p,200). This description

of self foreshadowed that of William .7ames (1890).

The Sceutics

British writers continued this examination of personal

identity into the eighteenth century, The sceptic Hume

carried the argument of sense-based identity through to a

logical conclusion:

For my part, when I enter mast intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist.

(1928, p.252).

This elusiveness of the empirical ego, as expressed in A

treatise on human nature in 1740, remains an unsolved problem

of measurement. Hume's reduction of the self created some

gaps in the logical framework of his philosophy (Wilson,

1926); yet his system is estimated free of the grosser

inadequacies of that of Bishop Berkeley (1684-1753), one of

which is the d:i.fficulty in accounting for the self' (Reeves,

1958; Russell, 1945).

13

To recross the Channel yet remain in the religious

orders, Abbe de Condillac appeared as a philosopher working

within this trend of sensory empiricism. Ryding (1955)

maintained that his notion of self was not only the sum of

man's perceptions but included the band which holds them

together. ~his approach reminiscent of the earlier

inclusion of memory. The influence cf Locke is noticeable.

'What we understand by this word "l" seen;s to be only

possible in a being who notices that in the present moment

he is no longer what he has been'. (1930, p.43). Frorr. this

reasoning Condillac concluded that his famous statue, without

a sense of smell, and with no memory, would have no self­

concept.

The Self as Subject und Object

The Critioue of pure reason of Kant, first published in

1751, made a welcome contribution to self theory in concept­

ualization rather than content, thus fulfilling the classical

Germanic tradition. He introduced the distinction between

the self as subject and object (Alexander, 1911), ~he

aspect of self treated by Locke and Hume Kant saw as a unity

attained through synthesis: the empirical self. also

saw, however, the self as an agent: the pure ego,

This distinction, while clarifying the aims and functions

of philosophical specula-zion to this date, also pointed the

14

way to v1hat may well be an insuperable barrier to any useful

contribution by self psychology. Empirical psychologies may

extend our knowledge of human behaviour. Within this :frame-

work, phenomenology, through response-response designs, may

sketch some picture of the empirical self of the individual

(to :follow the above terminology). The pure ego, however,

is defined only in terms of deductive psychologies, the

premises of which are too often inadequately validated.

The Kant ian tradition carried on into the nineteenth

century in Germany in the writings of Hegel (1770-1831) and

Schoper~uer (1788-1860). Hegel, following the epistemology

o:f Kant, undertook to snow that the universe of knowledge is

so constituted that no concept concerning it, being abstract,

is adequate to explain its nature (Pilenomenology of mind,

first published in 1810). This being so, he found self-

consciousness to be the highest form of ~nowledge. Schopen-

hauer, on the other hand, followed the Kantian division of

selves:

Selfishness contains ••• a knower and a known ••• the ~nower himself, as such, cannot be known ••• As the kno~n in self-consciousness we find exclusively the will ••• all striving, wishing, shur~ing, hoping, fearing, loving, hating.

(Schopenhauer, 1948, p.4l2).

This emphasis on will as the content of the self makes an

interesting comparison with the descriptions by St Augustine

and Descartes of that :phenomenon in which the se}.f is simply

a necessary activating constituent.

15

Psycholo~r. Physiology and Phrenology

cvlaine de Biran the first of the writers considered

who might properly be described as a psychologist, albeit

a mystic rather than a itivist by present day standards

and not regarded as a materialist by the standards of his

own day. The self was the central pivot of his psychology.

This self had not the substance of that of Descartes, nor

was it simply the subject or object of Kant. He saw it as

the self which causes and is aware that it causes bodily

movements, which creates language in order to handle ideas

in accordance with own interests, which endures and

recognizes itself in memocy, which cultivates itself morally

at the same time as intellectually by reflectively liberating

itself from dependence on sense objects (Hinrichs, 1953).

l'l':aine de Biran was also responsible for the first attempted

description of the development of self-awareness in infancy

and childhood, the di inction between self and not-self

as defined wi-chin their own frameworks of the twentieth

century by Piaget (1959) and Sullivan (1955).

A treatment of the history of this psychological

construct without some mention of the British associationists

would by unthinkable; for they too had their comments to

make on the self (Sen, 1933). John Stuart Nrt.ll (1806-1873)

would appear to afford an appropriate example. His account

of cognition, emotion and conation in terms of association

is indeed credible until his attempt to deal with the subject

of these activities. In A system of logic ratiocinative

and inductive he wrote:

There something I call ]'{zy-self, or, by another form of expression, my mind, which I consider as distinct from these sensations, thoughts, otc.;

16

a something which I conceive to be not the thoughts, but the being that has the thoughts, and which I can conceive as existing for ever in a state of quiescence, without any thoughts at all. But what this 1:Jeing is, thougn it is myself, I have no knowledge, other than the series of its states of consciousness.

(1904, p.40).

After such psychological speculation a sample of early

nineteenth century physiological psychology, however macabre,

comes as a breath of fresh air. Cabanis, famous for his

study of the after-effects of decapitation by guillotine,

endeavoured to give a description of the physiology and

anatomy of the self in his Rapports d~ physique et du moral

de l'horr~e in 1802. The historian, Brett, translated his

concept, 'le moi central', as •an epitome of all the separate

centres which the nervous system creates. Tne apparent

gns of life which might be exhibited by the decapitated

body are then explained as activities of neural ganglia which

are relatively independent of the brain or central ego' (1953,

p.459). The essence of self, then, appears to be the physical

substrate of consciousness. This concept of Cabanis is one

for which the physiologists have not the rr.eans as yet to

indicate acceptance or re~ection.

The physical representation of the self was so the

subject of study of tnose arch-materialists, the phrenologists.

Krech, in his article on the cortical localization of

function in Psychology in the making (ed. Postman, 1962),

presented a delightful description of the organ of s

esteem by Spurzeim in an English publication of 1815:

Gall first found this organ in a beggar: in examining the head of this person, he observed in the midst of the upper posterior part of the head an elevation which he had not before observed

a degree: he asked him the cause of his city; and the beggar accused his pride as the cause of his mental state •••• We have a great number of proofs as to this organ, and can establish its existence. Proud ons, and those who,

17

alienated by pride, imagine themselves to be emperors, kings, ministers, generals, etc. possess it a high degree. ( ~ ) l9o2, p.39 •

The system of sarcognomy of Buchanan, a later extension of

answer to a typologist's prayer, which included the

entire body, also localized the organ of self-esteem. The

annotated figures reproduced from Roots of modern psychiatry

eem apparently

resided in the left shoulder, visible in the young lady

facing away from the reader. (See Figure 2 of the Appendix).

For all the laughter with which the rr:odern psychologist

may greet the phre:ctologists and their kind, for all the

derision which logic of their method deserves, their

work does represent several inporc;ant developments in the

concept of self during the nineteenth century. Firstly,

that self-esteem was considered to be a sufficiently ir:Iportant

personality trait for analysis by phrenologists, who were

18

essentially practical people, reflects conte~porary thought

in a wider scope some of the more esoteric philosophical

meditations. Secondly, some the phrenological methods

of investigation, such as tl1.e examination of the beggar,

show the hallmarks of later speculations, (for example,

l'LcDougall, 1908). Thirdly, examination of the ' enated',

observation of the malfunction of normal processes to aid in

description of these processes, a tecrilli~ue used in many

recent attempts to isolate the self-concept (for example,

ce, 1954; Zucker, 1962).

:Problems of JUneteenth Century Self Ccnstructs

Since was a lull in the mid-nineteenth century in

the publication of contributions to the theory of self, with

the possible excepticn of that of G.H. Lewes which might be

better class as a contribution to general personality

theory (Cardno, 1962), it is appropriate to pause here to

examine some of the questiorili which the literature reviewed

so far poses. May the concept of self be regarded as an

antecedant of psycho

in psychology? Is

? Is the self an essential concept

self, indeed, a te~ble concept for

psychology? Partial answers, at least, may be given this

stage, before consideration of the great days of the self

psychologies (1890-1930).

Several problems, however, present therneelves. The

soul concept of Plato and Aristotle has been presented as

a pseudo self; but what of the -w,ystical aura of

19

concept, that indefinable something which distinguishes :r.en

fron: n:acl:ines? Can psychologists accom.'1Jodate this indi vid-

uating aspect of the self without sing to a 'little

man in the machine' level of explanation? Perception,

memory and consciousness witnessed through introspection

have all beer. cited as necessary concomitants of the self:

but psychologists have experienced grave difficulties of

criterion selection in attempts to validate the evidence

of introspection. Can these difficulties be overcome?

distinction between knower and does not solve this

problem. The temptation to ve up and share the thought

with David Hu.me that it is impo to observe, much

define, self, is very great, Yet, strange as it may

seen:, is the phrenologists who provide a few small

of hope at this period in : it is they who pointed

to the attitude to self as a significant aspect of man and

(note response of the beggar) a significant determinant

of man's beP~viour.

sum, then, here are answers to those searching

questions, given in the 1.ight of cmmnentaries relating to

the s published prior to 1890. If psychology be defined

20

as the st·udy of human behaviour, the construct of self may

be regarded as one of its antecedants. The answer "to the

second question depends on that given to the "third, concern­

ing the te:r:ability of the construct. This is, indeed, in

doubt within a strictly empirical study of behaviour. An

emphasis on measurement is a frarr:ework which does not

easily include the notion of self.

William ;;ames

Theories of personal identity have been described as

falling into three categories: "those concerned with

relational phenomena, of which Hobbes' is the earliest

exar;;ple soon to be followed by those many social psycholo-

gists; a search for the pure ego or element of consciousness,

of ch the sceptical treatise Eume is tr.e prime example;

and the type of theory put forward by William Jar.~es which

somatic data is shown to provide a basis for sense of

personal identity (Price-Williams, 1957).

William James' great textbook of psychology appeared on

this scene of doubt in 1890. His treatment of habit, the

stream of thought, the consciousness of self, attention,

me~tory, the emotions and will: each of these in its own right

would have formed a useful contribution to psychology. His

unique contribution for his time, however, was the scope of

C'he princinles of psychology, encompassing alrrost every

aspect of h~'llan behaviour. His refutation of £iw:r.e • s

scruples is an encouraging concerning the fate of the

concept self in psychology.

Capek (1953) has pointed James was opposed to

the olving of the self into immaterial, as, for

example,

to cons

mat

abstract concept of Hegel. Nor was he prepared

it to the neurological rag-bag of some of the

-'-"'-'--'·"'ts. He ~ prepared, however, to define it.

its possible sense ••• a man's Self is the sum

of that he can call his •• , 1 (1890, p.291). went on

to deal with the constituents of

emotions they arouse and the

The empirical self, or

self, the feelings and

to which they give

made up of three cons

e.

ents: the material self, or body, clothes and possessions;

the social self or the opinions and knowledge a man's fellows

have him; and the spiritual se , or inner being of

abilities and traits. These are presided over by the

unity of the pure ego, the I. each kind of self ••• men

distinguish between the iwmediate and actual, and the remote

and potential ••• • (1890, p.315). Of the emotions se

selves arouse James wrote: 'My own body and what ministers

to its needs are thus the primitive object, instinctively

determined, of :r:y egoistic erests. Other objects may

becorr:e interesting derivatively through association with any

of p.324). This is his self-

emotion. For the parallel actions cTames distin-

and self-estimation,

reference to the topic of personal identity, the

provided one of the mo concise accounts of the

history of the construct available at the time of publication.

The contribution of .:;ames to this notion, reflecting

bis formulations of the stream of consciousness and att

was ed on this foundation.

sense of our own personal identity, then, is exactly like any one of our other perceptions of sameness among phenomena. a conclusion grounded either on che resemblance in a fundamental respect, or on the cont ty before the mind, of

phenomena compared. (1890, p.334).

The originality of this contribution lies not in the nevmess

of the concepts; dependence of identity on memory was a

speculation of the fifth century and the mechanics of this

memory were the well-known princ of association, s

larity and contiguity of stimuli. It lies rather in James'

expres of this tmity within thinking, feeling,

willing being of his psychology.

:Philosophical Speculations D.t the Close of the Hineteenth Century

Other publications of this period tended, in the main, tc

stray vo inconclusive speculations based on b~zarre hypothetical

23

experiences of tne self (for exrrmple, Ladd, 1895; Baker,

1897). One philosopher, howeveT, made an important contri-

bution to the theory of personal identity or self-

consciousness. He was Josiah Royce, who published a series

p'l.pers in the :t'sychological Review and the Philosophical

Review (l895a; l895b). In these papers he emphasized ~;t~e

importance for the development of en"tity in the individual

of the interplay of self-consciousness and social-

consciousness, ' ••• each helped and each limited the otl:er,

since each exists only in contrast with the other, get

organi and developed in the endless giving md taking

Eoyce's

contribution of the relativity of tne s oncept, dependent

on communication, was best expressed in this excerpt:

••• I am co::1scious of myself ••• as ie1 relation to some real or ideal fellow, and apart from my consciousness of my fellows I have only secondary and derived states ru1d habics of self-consciousness.

(l895a, p.468)

What did the writers of the tv:entieth century make of

the mate:::ial so far presented? :Psycholo was established

by the year 1900 as a distinct frame of reference for thought

on tbe subject of man, if not as a sci.ence. How were these

advocates of the new study and its rr:ethods to deal with the

backlog of speculations surrounding the construct of self?

The answers to this problem were almost as varied as were the

24

pe:::-sonalities of the writers with time and talent to devote

to it, although they may be grouped in certain ways. In

view this, the nstory will no longer be :;;r.Irsued chrono-

lo cally but in terms of the trends followed by the writers

up to 1935. ·::his -vime limit for the his-vory is arbitrary

but convenient, based as it is en the ces ion of publica-

tion of the Psychological Index in that year the

consideration that the thirty years dating to the preser~t

may be appropriat described as the time-span of modern

psychology.

Early ~wentieth Century ?hilosop~r

The remainder of c:ae history, then, j_s concerned

the construct of self as developed in rliffering responses to

the pre-twentieth century tradi tior~s. The writers are

considered these general categories: those who contributed

one or two speculative articles; the authors of comprehens

psychological textbooks; the experimenters and measurers;

the social psychologists; and the phenomenologists, The

formulations of several individual psychologists, for

exarr:ple, -;;.'lat of Mary Calkins, are examined detaiL

Many of the articles published as referring to the self

during the early decades of this century were written wi-;;hin

the framework of philosophy, their contents contributing "':;0

the areas of epistemology, logic and ethics (e.g, Perry, 1910;

25

Wright, 1920; :Brightman, 1934). Similar arti are

included in the 3ibliography :for the sake of completeness.

O'thers were written in the no man's land between philooophy

and psychology, particularly those dealing with self as tr.e

agent of will (Stoops, l90l;.Lovejoy, l9G7; Boodin, 1912),

Some writers were content simply to examine the arguments

r and against the study of self in psychology, ger:.erally

deciding in its favour (JYm.cDougal1, 1916; cher, 1927;

Brotl:.erton, 1935). Others, perhaps some aimir..g toe i:r1 on

lucrative possibilities of the popular self psychology,

produced books to help improve the self and to indicate e

means to 'do it younself' therapy. This development occurred

towards the end of' -che d under consideration, yet most

of these books are now out of print. Self direction and

adjustment (Fenton, 1926) and r~1e omnipotent self: A study

in self-deception and self-cure (Bousfield, 1923) serve as

examples which more may be found in the Bibliography.

Few of these works may be said to have influenced the

course of psychological thought. are many manuscripts,

however, which have done so; those of Eduard Claparede, for

example. Claparede (1911, 4) took identity as a fact of

observation, he went on to exanine the locali.zation of

'le moi' individuals. ':'his procedure tas followed

successfully, witness the experirner..t of Horowitz (1935) t;O

determine the localizations of s in studentE and

children.

The contribution of Claparede was not an extension of

the work of others, as was tr~t of Tawney (1902) who

endeavoured to clarify the concept of consciousness as

related to self. These two constructs had been examined

conjured with until tney res the proverbial chicken

and 'l'awney tistinguished varieties of consc

Self-consciousness in the sense includes the empirical qualities of t:he body itself, together with a sense of externality to everything else within

of perception and menory. Heflective self­consciousness is based t:.pcn the recognition tr~ t

belongs in classes other selves, that it a sense one Vlith them, that its experiences,

therefore, possess a for them, and for it.

(1902' p. 596).

of ego and the enpiri ego of Emmanuel Kant, or

s:

the t- • ar:d the 'me' of William A further di ion

along e lines was attempt by Hughes using the terms

self and ego, which by 1906 were both in general use and

even

cons

the cause of some . . self I would indicate s an idea present in self-consciousness of any individual; oy ego, individual who is or can be self-conscious, who or may have the sense s and not-self.

(1906b, p.289).

forrr.ulation was amplified by Cunningham who equated

of self with the 'contrast between 'the se

and its ot~er ••. the other ••• being the entire content

of consciousness.' (1911, p.534).

Definitions of consciousness of self with no definit

of s create an u_nfortunate sion of early twent

century psychology. For some attempts at definition were

made. This one, a product of the prevalent instinct theory

of behaviour, is particularly interesting:

self ••• is the psychic correspondent of a conplex tive system which throbs as a unit, b"Jt which

is not differentiated by the excessive or emphat activity of any part the con:plex system

the mass of 'feeling' so called by many; it part of the moment's conscious experience ch

we are warranted in des as the field of inattention.

( I'£ars hall, ' p.ll2).

This throbbing, pulsating mass inattention was a much more

dynamic s than had hitherto been expressed.

is interesting to note at this stage that at least

one anthropological study of self-concept had been

carried out. Todd (1916) inves ed the idea of self

primit races such as the , the Maoris, and the

Eskimo and discovered that r e people it included

the name of the individual, shadow, and his property.

Ee that the concept of s nay be subject to

consciousness of the group s , and, observing that in the

primit individual t?le self-concept was not modifiable,

until er the Industrial

28

·The Self 1'heory of Mary Calkins

To present a survey of the speculative articles

concerning the s without first presenting sometC.ing of

the theory of :nest enthusiastic self psychologist of the

earlier decades of this century, may been sorr;ewhat

misleading. T~le publications Mary Calkins were numerous,

indeed it might be said that she never sed a cl'...ance t:;

advertise the importance of 'the self within a study of r:mn

( 1918). :Many ::;f e concepts examined above may have been

in part the result of communications wi tl:l Miss Calkins.

Calkins • earliest cor:tribution, Tl:le persistent problems

of pnilosop!J,y, was first published in 1907. Thi<J cons ts

of a hist::;ry of philosophical treatments of the problems of

tne self, a:1d is merely preparatory to .A first book in

ps,ycholog;y pubEshed in 1909. ·J:his textbool' covered the

topics usual for a general survey of that time but the treat-

ment of each was carefully tailored to fit in the jacket of

self psychology. Calkins' descriptior. of this jacket was as

fellows:

Psychology has been defined as science of the se being-conscious; and we rightly therefore ask r a further description, even if only a preliminary description of the self. The conscious of each one of us is not a reality which is merely inferred to exist: it is irrooediately experienced as possessed of at least four funda:rJental characters. 'I'"1e self as imJLediately experienced is (I) relatjvely persistent ••• (2) complex ••• (3) a unique,~~ irreplaceable self ••• and (4) related to objects which are either persor£1 or impersonaL

(1911, pp. 2-3).

c. A conscious individual in union witL an organized body.

d. The individual regarded as a progressively organized system of mental functions ar,d processes ..

e. The subject of consciousness (or experiencer) accompanying any complex of mental processes attentively experienced,

f. A specific complex or intergration content in which the body as object of consciousness is fundamental.

(1918, p.93).

30

These, then, were the definitions of self, six of therr,,

as listed at the end of tr,e second decade tl:is century.

s:'hey suggest an examination of the general tex-;;books available

in that period, excluding '~!le rather biased work of Calkins

reviewed above. She recognized the ~ntroduction to psychology

of Yerkes (1911) as a sa~ple of se psychology (Calkins,

1912): it was only a few years later that he produced his

Outline of a study of the self (1914), Yet the b e::' known

texts of Scout (H398), Ward (1918), and Woodwor'tr, (19 ) , too,

made their contributions to self psychology.

Self Constructs in the ·:rextbooks

In the introduc"tory chapter of the ;vlanual of psychology,

Stout asked 'what ~·h· . .., I 1:::"' '"'' ~ '.,....t. ~s m1na ,or se i.) W1U..cn ov;ns

consciousness ir. distinction from the consciousness wr..ich it

owns?' (1932, p.l4), Stout not ge:cerally knovm as a self

psychologist, but he does appear to have visualized psychology

as a science of selves. He stressed the social factor in the

31

formatio~ of the self-concept. This excerpt describes the

individual:

t:.e continually noting the points Every advance in advance in :01is

comparing others with hi8s of agreement and difference.

knowledge of t is also wledge self.

(1932, p.583).

an

Hughes (19C6b) included Stout in list writers to be

considered before forrculatir.g a concept of self.

Neither is James Vlard lmown primarily as a self psycholo-

; yet his recent hi. story Hea.rnshaw wrcte: 9.Ct

unitary self, or subject, was t keystone of Ward's

psychology' (1964, p. 6). i'lara distinguished between the

Kantian pure and empirical egos (Laird, 19 ) ; the me, to

use the terminology of Willitom: James, being made of

sons ive and apperceptive self, the imagining and desiring

self, a::J.d the thillicing and willing self. '[It is] ••• the I

and. acting, essential to a:ny

experience, whilst t:t.e me is essential only to some' ( 3,

p.379).

In contrast, Woodworth's Psychology indexed no mention

of self (1928) yet Anderson could write in the Australasian

;ournal of Psychology and Philosophy of 1928 ••• text-

books of psychology it is custor.Jary to find a ohapt;er devoted

to 'The Self' ••• By sol::, we discover is intended the mind,

or it may be the soul' (19 , p.93).

Contributions of Social Psychologists

social psychologists to be considered, J.

J3aldwin was the first of this period. He emphasized the

so determinants of self ( ) as Stout did in the

following. It was George , however, w~,o provided

the contribution to the sociological conceptualization

of Mead saw the self as result of a social process,

an outcome of a long evolutionary process which mt~st be

approached empirically. Por him, the self eor~prised be

the I, action and impulse,

the me, the atti tt:des c;f o organized and taken over

the s • tTbe self, as tfiat can be an object to

itse essentially a social structure and arises in so

experience' (1934, p.l40). In more detail:

Any self is a social so , but it is restricted to the group w':lose roles it assumes, and it will never abandon this self until it finds itself entering

tr_e larger society and maintairo_ing itself t'::lere. (1925, p.276)

object self is part tl::e reflexive self, and

wholEl distinguished by the characteristic of self-

consciousness. The predominantly cognitive and social s

construct of Mead exorcized a strong influence en later wo

not only of social psychologis and sociologists but also

The approach of William l was, in rr.any ways,

similar, though his claim to be as a social psychologist

is somewhat more in doubt. Certainly his contribution to

the development of the construct of self in psychology is

33

of major importance (Martin, 1927). His system was based on

the principles of instincts and sentiments in man, the

sentiments being non-i:nherent, organized collections of

'emotional dispositions centered about the idea of some

object' (1928, p.l37). At the pinnacle of the pyramid of

these sentiments came the self-regarding sentiment, which

developed as 'essentially a social process, one that is

dependent throughout upon the complex interactions between

the individual and the organized society to which he belongs'

(1928, pp.l50-51). 'There are two principle varieties of

the self-regarding sentiment, which VIe may distinguish by the

names of 'pride" and "self-respect".' (1928, p.l65), both

involving positive and negative self-feeling. Mcilougall's

diagram of the structure of the character of John Doe (1928,

p.440) illustrates the centrality of the self in his theory

of personality. Here, too, was the fulfilment of the promise

of Hobbes of the prime motive in social psychology.

The Early Phenomenologists

A different trend in psychology which, like social

psychology, contributed something to the modern constructs

of self was one deriving from themes found in the works of

the classical introspectionists, Brentano, Ebbinghaus, and

34

Kulpe; is, - - 1 pnenomeno .• ogy. Ec:.ss

is as the writer who founded approacr~ as it

ences s

(1913) and Cartesian ~editations (1929) he portrayed

the as trancendent, certain beyond question. In

fourth ~editation he stress transcendental ego as

'inseparable fror:l the individual's process of life, the

centre of identity, and made of every act and percept'

(1960, p.65).

phenomenological had great appeal for

Gestaltists, whom Howie (1945) credited with one

most fruitful approaches to the s f. Lundholm (1946)

tbJ. t Kohler 1 equated ·t experieneed self and

body-percept, scrapping entirely that otheT ac-;;ing but non-

perceived self' (1946, p.l29). whole of the self plus

environrnent was the world of individual, according to

th:.s of the Gestalt point of ew:

may be regarded as an assirr:ilative system eds and grows on its ences, which in turn

are deterrr:ined by the of chit is a part. makes intelligible effect of enviroru"ent

on the formation of character and personalit.y. (Josey 1 1935, p.54).

This exc reflects the ew of whic::C1 Koffka took

Principles of Gestalt psychology published in 1935.

35

}mpirical Analysis of the Self up to l9d5

The theory of sol~ in psychology by 1935 might be

express as ing conclusion that there is evidence

for an active, functioning, conscious s , distinct from

bodily organism but closely related to (.Allen, 1935),

The main problems for psychologists appeared to fall into

three n:ain (:at

to organism,

ries: the natu:::;e of the self, relation

and its relac;ion to the environment (1\iioore,

1933). Psychology, however, is an empirical ccience; so

VJhat the activities the experimenters and measurers

up to 1935?

Probably the first ex:::pirical attack on the problem of

self was tr,at E.B. Titchener (19::.1) in an att t to

validate the self theor; of Calkins. Titchener found

three ways in which the f might become ccmsciouo: a

class of mental processes may carry self-meanir~, the self

~ay be felt in body sensations, or may oe inherent in all

conscious expe~ience. He asked stu6ents to int=ospect

for any trace consciCJusness self; from their

a2:1swers, which did not fall

concluded that psyoholo

the above trrree cate

may not be defined as 't:he

science of t:he self as cor:.scious' (Calkins, 1911).

This t:y of exper].nent was very different in method

s of rqpotheses concerning the self.

es 1

36

One of tr1e most favoured tech."liques today is that of self-

rating, probably t applied J. fi:cKeen Cattell in his

studies of Amer:i.car: men of science (190 ' / . Cne of "7Jhe

early experiments along e lL'les worth reporting in

detail: that of Cogan, Conklin llollingworth (1915).

?hey took a group of 25 female subjects known to each other

and asked then; to rank themselves and other menbers of

the group on each of nine traits intervals of from two

weeks to a month. :rhe trait names are an interest

reflection of the times: neatness, intelligence, humour,

conceit, beauty, vulgarity, sno shness, refinement and

sociability. A ery of tests was given and other data

collected and compared. Conclusions drawn from the eriment

included that errors of self-estimation were greater than of

friends' judgem , that with possession of desirable traits

judgeme:cLts of those traits were good but with non-desirable

traits results were reverse, that scores on i:cLtelligence

tests a:nd self-estimates tended to agree. Here was the

beginning of the collection of evidence rather than specula-

tion on the structure of the concept of self.

:Many similar studies followed during period;

Gern;any, for example, tJ:-,e self-concept the delinquent child

was exan;ined (Stern, 19 ), and the accuracy s

(19 , 1933a, 1933b) gauged s oncepts through ad~

che

est

In the United. States, experiments in self-

ion .showed the first s of becoming as popular as

they are today (Hcffrr.an, 1923; Shen, 1925; Jackson, 1929;

Simpson, 33). The work of Baumgartner, measuring self-

respect (1935) and of Bernreuter (1933) on self-sufficiency,

both to the impression of the considerable amount of

study put in~o empirical analysis of the self by

year 35.

Historians' Heflections on the Self

One question co:r:.cerr.ing hj.story of the self

·Jlc what exter,t do the recognized storians of psyci~,o

portray this development? answer to chis

quos

Of

l.s somewhat disappo

historiE.n psycho , Boring in his

of experi:ne::J.tal psychology ( 1929) mentions on::.y tr_e soul of

Descartes, Peters • edition of Brett's r.istory of psychology

(1953) only that of St Augustine. Hearnshaw (1964),

examining the wor£ of Brl.tish chologists, con1111<:mts on

James Viard only; and it remains to !1iurphy (1960) to describe

in some way notions of se Huree, r{aine de Biran,

James, Adler and 'Piaget. The survey of the historical

ground of social psychology Handbook of sooial

(1954) is the most complete examination of the

38

self witr~n its context. Histories of psychiatry are no

more ill~~inating. Roback (1961) does not mention self.

The history by Hall (1944) is chiefly interesting for the

survey of the names of psychologists which appeared in the

psychiatric textbooks in the United States between 1861 and

1942. Of the psychologists whose contributions to the

construct of self are reviewed above a large proportion

feature in that list (1944, p.449).

An Analysis of the Parent Self Constructs

A summary of the early self constructs which preceded

and influenced current theories of the self would entail

selection on such rigorous principles as to be altogether

misleading. For this reason, although a diagram represent­

ing the interaction of the early self theorists has been

drawn up against a chronological background it is relegated

to a place in the Appendix (Figure 3). The preferred method

of analysis is one through which the essence of each notion

is represented and compared. Such a procedure re~uires the

setting up of a set of categories into which the individual

ideas may be classified. The seven definitions which English

and English (1958) provide for the word 'self' serve well as

these categories, since they represent current technical

use of the word and embody important distinctions made by

psychologists such as that between self as subject and

object.

M:e &. Whole Agent Person- Centre of Self- Self-~ Bein_g ali tv Ps;y_cholog;r Conoe-12t S'Eintiment

Plato St.Augustine I:escartes

Lo Huree Condillac

Kant i Scr,op<mhauer

de Biran J.,S.

Cabanis I

Spurz James E0yce

Tawney Iwrshall

Calkins Stout

Ward !toad

McDougall Kohler

·:ritchener

I Cogan et

al ..

Table I. A Content Analysis of Self 'I'heories (t,OO B.C. to 1935 A.D.)

40

The se construct sed by a s cific theorist is

assessed from Lis writings and sv.:mmary of them cent

Lore. The assessment is direct at the establishment of a

unitary concept as proposed by each author which catego:r--

ised as predominantly concerned with t!le phenomena

referred to in one of the defini ti op..s of lish and English.

The definitions are described below the lab of their

distinguishing phenomena shown in brackets:

1, That a person his ovvn ( &'1d Mine)

2. 'I·he total lh"ing b (Whole Being)

3. part of the person psychological acts (

carries out the

4~> The characteristics which dist ind:!.vidual (l'ersonality)

~~ the

5. which is observed by person to the centre of £S;,rchological processes, including both the subject and the object (Centre of Psychology)

6, The cas, feelings and strivin9s that are reccgnised by the individual as his ovm ,self-Concept)

7. That which is not o:rlly the object o:f p:ropriate experience but the :feelings str~vings organiseci about tha c ob jeot (Self-Sentiment).

1i'he resulting categorisation is shown in Table I,.

surnJTiary it appears tr1fht the majority of the early

ers on the topic of s were cone what

the individual defined as part of belonging to himself,

as :pure ject or tl1e s as both subject aad

41

object. The object self was described to a lesser extent

as were the feeling which the individual tight hold towards

himself. One little knov:n philoso pher-psycho1ogist useu

the term self to refer the le b , while Stout was

unique in equating the term with the presen"G day use the

term of personality.

42

CI1AJ?TER 2

is a considerable body of current opinion

agrees t the appreciation of t self, theoretically

for the understanding

of behaviour. Hilgard (

(1960) Holt (1962) have

oni view. Lowe (19

term 's t refers to an art

to exp experience* Since

well to the more recent

\ J

), Brandt (1957),

most influential

suggested. that the

created by psychologis

definition would

tion of the self' coEstructs evolved by theorists of

field :indicated.

Classical Psychoanalytic Constr~cts of and Self

t section of this o±' self in pers

theory contain tt:e picking up of the threads of the

of the construct. The contributions of Freud

his followers and critics, taking root: :_n the s

centuTy thougl:-.~.t, are best examined as the cant

ary ories of behavio;u they are. The self psycholo

claimed psychoanalysis as a self psycc10logy

& Gamble, 1930), b science of ;;~ae cons

t

(or self) and the unccrJB (the dissociated se )

in to the physic and social environment. ?sycho-

to CaLl::ins, however, c ed the works of ' and Adler, almost exclusively.

r-

44

Esychoanalytic cont ions to constru of self

are f to fall the fo ovring s che::ua .. tLe

of a aphori cal pyra;;1id lies prime innovator,

Sigmund FrE,ud, giving of orthodox

followers such as chel and Rado, writing a little

closer to the ent a.ay ~~ These, in stimulated me..ny

minor psychoanalysts grap11ling recently with problen:s oi'

ego-strength, self-estee:n and ty. On another face of

the pyramici rc:re folJnd those psychoan.qlysts who have developed

emphasized one pa:rcicular aspect ]"reud 's tern: the

ego-psychologists (Hartmann, Kris, Loewenstein a."ld Eapaport)

concerned with e rational cesses in thinking,

perception and adaptation; the social chiatris (Adler,

Horney, Fromm and V311) c::nc erned vvi th relationships

between the individual 'lnd his inter-pers environment;

and the nr;stics, cor::pris Jung and s f'olloVIers analysing

the collective and individ.u_al uncons ous :.n process

individuation. Indepenclent rsychologists, who ne ... ,r ss

owed much to Freud, lie on the third ce of the pyramid.

On this ce significant c::mtributions to the cons"truct of

self have been by Hadfie , Anderson and Symonds.

At the ou-:;set, it a ars impo e to agree with

Calkins t:b2. t Preud was the inst OX' 0~ ~ "" self-psyo hology.

:::t would seem that she arbitrarily equated the terms ego S.."l.d

45

self, ignoring their ffering comwtations. Munroe (1955)

he.s J~aintained that this claim is a repudiation of the

basic libido theory while allowing that conceptualiza-

tions about the self sed by later psychoay;,.alysts ste:n

from the original concept ego .. ego grows out

O .,...;g4 -al nroma a . . of th . ~ t ("'ro'u", 1.q2c;;'. ,~ ~u y ~"· ry n rcJ.SSJ.sm e ln""an L - " __ ~ •

Under the in:fluenco of the real external world which su=ounds us, one portion of the undergone a spacial development, From originally a cortical layer, provided th organs for receiving s-vimuli and with e.n apparatus for protection against excessive scin:ulati::m, a s cial organization has sen ch hen rth acts as an intermediary cetween id and the external world. ':'his of our r.:ental life been en the r.ame of

Essentially, , t~e ego is 'a coherent orgar~za~tion of

mental processes ( ( 1927, p.15), rather t~an the biological

unit or unique object introspection prominent in

later theories. Cons c~ousness ego actior1s is custo:Jiarily

taken to be mi:ni:nal. Ego might, indeed, be regarded as

referring to a set of processes rather than an entity*

Franz Alexander (1944) has traced development of

the up to 1933 and attempted to t this pro'blerr:

the consciousness ego tionslil concluded because

t:he ego is so close to t individual, al t!:loug:r-" is aware

of it at all times he :i.s not conscious of . .,. lvS ons (1948).

This statement may have intuitive m ' but does ttle to

46

;;he conceptual problem l ved, Of more :neri t is

the contribution of Rado (1928) who postulated a cone

entailir~ a feeling of self as a whole being, later lab

s

how

ant

tho

when

each

b

of t

eem (Benedek, 1961).

use of this

anxiety experienced by ve

feeding, cuddling

chel, another orthodox

(1937, 1954), descri

young children in

so on is the first det

level of "their self-este err!.

Of the minor wri-ters de Groot (19~7), also, accepted

on of self-esteen w!lich

is a balance beoween

of the ego. Dorsey (19 )

s

maintained is observed

narcissistic and

von Fieandt (19 )

consciousness on ed the influence

latter espe stressing the somatic

cal ego or objective self and its dependence

on memory. Here is the shadow of some of the earlier

so culations on the c::!: the self in cant

s

to the measurements cf behaviour related to the self such as

those of Fren:&:el-Br:L'llswick ( ; 1941) on self-reports.

Jlhe w of Hunberg (1931; 1948) and Gottesman (1959) on o-

cone

follows this li:ne

c ego-concepts.

therapeutic _practice

validation of

psychoanal;,rsis some

of self is usually taken into account. Transference

47

regarded as takir"tf; place in accordance with e self-

concept the individual (Gut, 1954). The feelings of

uniqueness and entity have been examined by the case study

mc"';hod with indications chat painful clings of uniqueness

lead to building of a strong defensive phantasy

system to maintain ego-integrity (Shugart, 1962). A marked

resemblance to an aspect of the Rogerian approach to person-

ality therapy is apparent. Themes familiar from the

client-centred preach are o foand the recent psycho-

a11alytic work on self-alienation Cllenkart, 1955; Spiegal,

1959; Rubins, 1961; Schschtel, ; Weiss, ) • !xormal

early growth of self involves the formation of a self-concept

out of experience and id ifioation h self-consoiouBness

to give ity. seeking personal identity, people o

focus on cor.cepts which are alien to the "true self.

enation the result the ne•;r c process wbich

acceptance is with-held 1 the self rejected, an:i the ideal­

self coveted. Stroh & Buick (1964), also anong the orthodox,

treated the rsonality growth of the child in "terms of the

development of self-consciousness. Such is t eu:phasis

psychoanalytic psychotherapy on both European and American

continents today.

re some concern over t confusion endered by

the parallel 1xse the terms se and ego among the

48

psychoanalysts (for example, Miller, Isaacs & Haggart, 1965).

Solutions have ranged from the all embracing self-system

Kaywin (:9 ; 1959) which incorporates parts of t:ae id,

se -representatio:'ls and the super-ego (super-self) to the

theory that ego is a structured set of interrelated

motives centred about awareness of tr..e self (Chein,

1944). Jacobson, in studies of the self and tJ:e object

world (1954, 64), provided or:.e of the sost useful defining

solutions in ma£j_ng this distinction:

~he meaning of the concepts self and self­repc:>esentations in distinction from the ego, become lucid when we remember that the establish.'llent of the system ego sets in th the discovery and grow distinction of t self and the object world ..

(1954, Jl• ) •

Further, the conceJ;Jt of self was related to that of sc::per-ego.

Whereas self-perception represents always an ego-function, t self-ev2.luation of an adult person is not exclusively a super-ego function. Found on subjective inner experience and on objective perception by the ego oi' the physical and mental self, it partly or even predominantly exercized by the super-ego, but it is also partly a critical ego function whose maturation weakens the powe::> of the super-ego over the ego.

(1954, p.l23).

self construct Jacobson owed much to the notion of

self-representation £orr:mla -:;ed by Hartmann as the psychologi-

cal mearcing of t bodi:y, social and s tual identity of

the individual within the ego system.

49

The Psychoanalytic Dissenters

second face of the psychoanalytic pyramid now

in NeaJ'est to the base (the most recent development)

st the ego-psychologists who hc.ve been avowedly concerned

whh self-evaluations within social contexts (Mchenstein,

1965) , Hartmar.22, Kris, Lcewenste have been the me

prominant renovators of J?reud's construct of ego, ::naintaining

that it must defined Ily its functions of organization and

controL Papers by Hartrr,arm, especially, empl::asized this

constrc1ct (1950, 1959), For 11::.m the self con;prised the id,

ego and super-ego and exists pr to differentiation

of the ego. An interesting con:parison of views can be

with those of another ego psychologist, Federn, who

'reinstated ego its righ;; place as the actual s

experiencir.g part of the bodily and n;ental ects of

personality• (Weies, 1957, p,21G). l!'or Federn self

comprises the ego ( ~ect) and self (object) (1952), He

dealt with feeling rathEr than structure, and is

consider co have formulaced a dynamic phenomenological

theory behaviour combini~g the best aspects c= t Freudian

determinism with phenomenological approach to obnervation

and collect ion of data (Hinsley, 1962). ExaDination a

paper written by Federr.:. in 1928 reveals that he anticipated

the work of Sheerer (1949) and Stock (1949) by ,;wenty

50

in his l:Lef that the way an individual reacts to himself

determines to some exter.t his reactions to other persons,

one of the main tenets client-oente:r·ed perso:nali ty theory,

On the sane surface of the pyramid the social

psychiatrists; interested not in ego concepts based on

Freud's theory but in importance of interpersonal relation-

wi trcin the psychoar.alytio franework, and owing much

their approach to t

Adler, billls elf,

early disagreeu:em;s of Alfred Adler.

not llow through some aspects of

theory which logically would have led to a central posi <;ion

for t:'le notion of s -es"teem .. emphasized only a creative

self cbscur defined,. Closest: to him in spirit was Fromm,

-;,~' ho , writing in 39, put fonvard the that what was

wrong with the vtorld. was there was too much selfisi:Lness

and not enough self-love, a similar interpretation 00 that

of Federn yet in terms of soc ty and culture rather than

individuaL

Karen Horney, ale o, was interested in cul tu:::·al a::1d inc or-

personal ctors detern;ining behaviour, psychoanalytic

ory emphasized the functions rather than libid:i.nal devel-

opment. Anotfler heT quarrels INi th :?reud concerrm. the sel.f

directly. While Freud n;aintained that self-esteem has its

roo"ts in narcissisrr:c, Hor::1ey claimed tr..at self-esteem a'ld

self-aggrandizement are mutually exclusive, the latter sing

51

ou~ of narcissism (Horney, 1947). Her central concept of

basic anxiety was a pe of self-awareness. In neurosis

the real s becomes lost in an effort to eserve the

unrealistic, exaggerated, ideal of the self (Horney,

1945). Self-acceptance is l&cking. Psychologists (Munroe,

1955; Vollmerhausen, 1961) have agreed "that the idealiz

image of the s is one of

tions to psychoanalytic ory<s alienat from the

core self \'{hich occurs neurosis t:te acceptance which

is achieved through therapy has been des ed by one

r :followers (';; enkart, ) as taking part on trJee levels:

concerning the self as of the universe, as a member of

the h-tk"'llan orgaxlization and as the self' within oneself,

Stack Sullivan used some const:ruct entitl se

as the central pivot cf his psycc1otherapeut theory.. Yet as

l'homps 0::-1 ( 19 58) s pointed out, it is not clear ·vvhe~:!'ler his

-esteem and ro.is co:a::;ept of s f are identical. d

lJrban (1963) had no do about this: the self-system,

groups of anxiety avoidance behaviours, m ntained, is

not to be confused the ps :rsonificatio:n of tt;,e ' identity.. T:t1e development of s self-syste;n was descr ed

at length in t papers up

~syc>l-; at>"• tl 1 .!-,.._ J.L,{-<> child gracluc.lly ff ere::1tiat es hir:us elf fror:1

his n.ment 0 categories the good me (giving

sa fa

s

comparison

\ llj'

not the entire

tb the various

me (terror) ..

li ty, which is in

cts the self. For

Sullivan the s was the dynamisr:; which egra1:es erience

from Green (1962), after tracing the antecedents of

the Sullivanian notions of se back to James and I:Iead,

subscuned all such notions u.11.der the one definition: ' .. , • the

self is that as peat of man in his interaction wi tl:1 others

which has the task o:: minimizing anxie11y' ( p"' 280).

Sullivan's inter in the development of e individua:

was shared by E.H. Erikson who saw ~he self-image as a sub-

structure of the ego { 1950), concept

:r;erso~l ntit y to be the r;,os t fruitful in t area.

1\.'t the t , it w:Lll appear t c :r to a conscious sense of indiy,.d.dual iVy; another to an Lmcons us st:riving r a continuity ners character; at a third. as a c e:rion the e , synt11es~s; as a an lnYler sol1. 's

c on, 1959, p.102) ..

re examined the de,velo t of the s in chilo-

hood (e.g. Fordham, ~I., 194 7; 1951), giving a pictm'e of

self func the child so as to integrate

:perso~ltoy and ensuri:ng C. eve lo~pment of ego. J:1ng has

coupled th as a \Vri t er who .::12::: add to e

ult pr lerr a psyc.holo cal concept of (Boss,

53

1960), Yet ( 19 ) he rna de qui ;;e

clear the di stincti.on b etvveen s el.f ego as sav1 :i.t.

~Ie dei'ined tbe as the ect of consciOllsness, whereas

the s '{lhi inc OS the , ts the subject of one 1 s

total personality invo unconscious as well as

cOrllicious ter~en • Realization of self the of

the individuat process of Ju.ngie.n (ACiler, 1951)

in which a new centre of personality amerges9 This new

centre called the self.. F'rieda rdhe,m has point out

in her lican introduction to Jungian psychology (1961),

that Jung uo ed this 1NDrd :in East or::1. marx or so that it

overtones of supreme oneness of 0 of

thought.

Fron; study of ns ~Tung f_.:. case 0

r a defini tio~1 self as e central arohety?e

1955) as well as the ality as

outl d above. examined the 'tWO co:nce s

in detail (1964), latter and

cono'2_udtr:.g tb.at in psychology self is conceived

as not only a dynamic ar...d s tructu:re l::::tt o as an

i egrating-deintegratiruJ stem' ( 64, p.lOl).

Tl:1e e iude:pendent psycholo s makJ.ng ~..!? 8 third

c£ t psychoanaiytic I'yra"':lid are so ,:':/ as rep:resenta-,,

54

tive a ty of reasons.. ::f!he f \"Jl:.o2e vvork is

examined, Canilla :preciBe

statement which s has of self theory of the

dynamics uf beha;,riour one paper publis in 1952.

The t!1eor~r is best e ted in her ovm ern of

of every individual a livir~.1· cut s el.f ir:1ag e.

(ps236) ··~Each person a ical self-image and a

psychological self-image ••• The se -image campo

, and part conceived of as having both

anatomy and physiology' (p.228). In other words, the s

self cture into id, ego, 0 ego eal.

As to t development t~:Je ir .. di vid"J.al said: tThe

psychologic is C6• formed early in as a

result of the successsion experiences of the child with

si g:.'li cant poop in -:he

psychologi self-image h_as been .form , be:r_._aviour es

-f'~_, cee OX' exn""''ffi"ll+al ndture 1 p ?')c;\ - .... -.t'~- .1- ! ..... "" 11 ,;;~;. ' \ ~'- .-Y}. long as the

person car: maintai~ his intact and futlct ion.i:ng

accC:::'ding to cipation he ll be e from anxiety (p.237) .. 1

Fi:t:ally, agre tb. pe':s onal ity this

statem goal of all neurotic behaviour is self-

image ~aintenance, goal of all therapy is self-e.cceptanqe 1•

(p.244). conoeptual around how ·.vhy

55

o.f persc!k':ll whi~h Anderso:2 d one of the r1ost

succint la't: le date.

The theory of behaviour· which J. A. Hadfield pres ed

his Psycl::oloiijy and morals ( 3) m:.ght well have a place

in above chapter on the to-::y of t concept of self

due to its date of publicat and the obvious affinity of

tbe theory with McDougall. The debt ch Hadfie

owed to hoa;nalytic thought, however, ensures him a

place on the th:.rd face o: the hypothetical pyramid. Trzt

was at eat pains to account for o parti aspects

of behaviour especially, the development of t indivi

and :uent illness a::1d. 11herapy, rei'l ects s la r frar.Je

reference. pite these affinities, is s trar~ge

r;Iary Cc:tlkins never welcomed Had.field to t brotherhood of

s theor·ists to which he s belonged.

Certainly a construct of self is central to the concep-

tual systerr: of personality organization which he built

The term organization, too, was a cent one in flighly

cogni theory .. r -The tto:rganized s

the orge.nization of all t 2.cce:pted sentiments and

:Leal constella-cj.on accepta. to e inu::.vid=l cmc th

· · , " · , · ~ t · r· ' · 1~ • ( 24 1 W!llcn .u.e conscJ.ous..Ly lu.en ·l- 1.es n1:mse ..;. p. J, and

sitions differing 1 from sentiments in tflat ey are

56

unconsciously accepted' (p.25), sentiments and

s:pos ad to a common purpose and t function of

this organization is \"if'i • was defined as self in

movement le character is quality the self ..

development of the individu~·:tl takes place in stages o=.'

organization of s :

( . ' l)

( ii)

(iii)

self-co_nsciousness (3 to 4 years)

18 years)

(iv) character development (adullihood)

e

Arres-t tr.d.s developme1:t les.:J.s to mental 1Jreakdovn1 a~3 does

identification with the self-pl:antasy, wl:.icih 1 tmlike the

self-image, is unconscious not bound by reali. ty. 'I::O.ese

cor<B tracts are remi.r,is cent of the id - super- struggle;

while cons tru of sentirrents and disposit are

common to :ticDougall a!ld Hadfield, although for the latter

the self was not a sentiment but e total personality. ~e

looked forward to the day of the holistic personality

theorists (Angyal and rAaslovJ) and to some exter.t Carl

he said: 'The craving of tLe self r completeness is

shown dreams, in neuroses, in c::J:'lscious effo

tc:v:ards self

As a concluding representative of fiers of psycho-

analyt tJ:1ought, Symonds selected r survey af

contemporary theories (19 \ J •

57

psychoanalytic point of view,

Symonds brought to sometj_me-s confusir.J€

co;1fliLeting theoretical constructs of rx.:ychoanalysis ar:d

pher_omenology d

data. This results in an important treatment of the self a!ld

the e , inclc;.ding comparisons of ego, super-ego and self,

and the st:ruc'>ure, fu..'lctions and development of both phenomena.

Commencing his survey, Symonds a pproaohed the con::'\;. sian of

the differing C:JhS't::'Ucts of by offering his own

definitions:

henceforth ll be used to refer to that e o personality which deternd.nes adjustment to the outside world in the interest of sa-visfying in:1.er needs those sit:lations where choi.ce and decision are i:r..volved...... se t on t other hand, refers to t bo and a:r:td to ·oolidy and mental processes as th are observed and reacted to by tt:..e individuaL

(1951, p.4.)

3xa~ination of the treatme4t t e tvvo constructs

clarifies tl1is d:!.stinction: the o is viewed as actor,

adaptor, execute~, kncy;;er, perceiver, thir_l{er and will, >sl'..ile

the self discussed terms of tb·eat it 1 change it,

as a value and as a goal to be realized. other wo

self the passive otject of active sub j ec't, the ego ..

This distinction merit o:' clarity does not

ct curre:::~t :psychclcgical nor, more narrowly, psychoana-

lytic use. e representative are the aspects of sel£' ch

58

Symonds different pers

emphas:ize: the self as directly perce:ived, sel£' as a

concept 1 self as a set values and self as a oi'

act tos .. claim. bol"'ne out :i.n

1 the last-nam aspect, :or ~ be

don:inant ii':e nex-::; construct

G .. W* Allp::::rt: the proprium

Both the not of ego wntch evolved, a nal,

O!'ganizing yet ssive

of ego-psychologists appear to bear at least sorr:e

tionsl:.ip -::o the cons0r"'ct labelled Self various au •

The framework of Barto (19L5) serves to clari least

one aspect of rel onship. Following the argwflents

of G.W. Allp:lrt (19 ) he formulated this s stion:

hypothes here suggested. is that 'I 1 s to a complex; unitary activity of sensi :Lr!iagining, percei , wanting, fe These acti vi ti.es are -the dynamic ...: by the word s This self is enduring t.t.."1iqv.e 1

and es diverse criptions of the e2;o and clarifies function of the ego ·personali organiz

(1945, pp. ) . He empl"'w.sized that s elf both

ego never t lat , 2-Yld defined t ego as t self's

evaluation ~¢ s act ies in s n. ~L

0 i"J \I"\, • us the terr:.s and se inter-

changea-bly,. Of es hed :pers:.:;nality t~eori treat

59

in this chapter he is only one, to dat.e, YJho

att an honestt detailed response to tion

the realm theory.. postulated a construct which

includes l the a~d personal aspects t

the 'propriuK', its functions of bodily sense, s

"'.":,y, ego-enhance::nent, ego-extens rational a:;tivity,

sel:-image, propria striving and knowing (1955, pp. ) . traced. development of these tio:r:s in t

child (1961, .. llC-138). His a_YIDvver, then, was as f"ollows:

ascribed_ to a cr scientific s are nct 1 however, coextens1ve

e.. ~hey G.:re r ~he s litv that vtarmth, unity,

a senSe of pe~rsonal rtance .. ~.,. the Teader prefers, he call t self-functio::Is, and in this sense self be said to be a necessary psychological conce~t. is unnecessary and inadn:issible a self (or soul) that said to perform acts, to solve problems, to steer conduct, in a trans-psychological manner, inaccessible to psychological analysis.

(1955, p. 55).

Allport made an impO!'"vant theoretical po It is unfortun-

ate that theoreti acw"Uen did not, apparer~tly, enable

him to gene:r·ate hypotheses amenable to en;piri verific ion ..

Gardner Murphy: a soc'al self

The bic-social t of be regarded

as a chology of persor..ality ed on e o~ganizatior of

60

the sel.f'. an eclectic theorist, , like

, v1as in sear t

was seen by as a tens

tern. corJ:~ tructs ar:

a psychological co self in

The j_s a perceived, it also a t£llng c::;n::; bo it COYJS l;ly :responded to. r.. :c·ge t.~at constitutes :;ersonality is

( 19 47' ted haviouT$

made a ian distinction beti:veen self f3.:rl:'l not-

8

• orl of 8 in the

psychoanalytically-:naued :processes ident:Lfica

j was also c8ncerned le

the ir:_fluences o£ soc=.ety on the j_ndividv_al. stressed

the 00 e of the coin of tween self-

co co t others to t bv •

vlhcn 'The indi.vidual is ed the group

a:rld accepts its structured ps.tt erns values; l':.enc e the

ty of s f-portrai t la defined ';he subcultural

4 7; :p.? 54) (t Not only~ runs the

ical assur.1ptiDn, does opinion the ix!di of

elf influence: that f.;e has of the gToup, but e

in sees the group its values 8 es

the he of hiJTlE elf ..

61

e con'tribu~ions to the eld

The of s interests wide as te

recen ~ ction s (19 ) which includfJ

contri iorlS to the areas oi' :pe:rso:nali stru and

theory, mot on, cal J:ol ' soc

~· genev~cs .. It is with t self ~ers ity t

tl:a.t we are concerned hov1ever, so j_ t is

of Cattell in personal des ptiO:t:' ~· mo vl on measure-

relevance to t~is the s. has been concerned

measurement; of personality va and ir

tr.:.e colle of

data, Q.Uestionna:i:::::e data objective tests.. As well as

the fa an0.lyzed from this d a (e.g!!' cyolothyrn:.a,

, intclligsnce a~d ency) , he has examined

mot:i:\ration (attitudes, i:ct , Qynamic structures, conflict

) lJy the sa.--re methods. He has :recogr:iz and

at ro1 re:easure the e personal

-osc OE, fluctuation, learr..ing and

rr.a t·:;raticn.

Cattell to several s

of te:rr,,inology o;:· the fr&r1ework of s distinct

bodies of knowl e. the clinical ch

common to t of perscna~ ty theorists disctu3sed,

he v;rote of peraona.lity as 'a more or less teere.ted s

of origi:nally discrete dynamic trends' (19 , :p.22l) ..

]'ctorial1y, it dimensionsof benavioural space for

beings 1 (1950; p. 2). In su~n, is that

which determines beha"'{iour in a situation' ( 5C,

p,.222). were

derived from experime-nts ~n :factor E<.Jlalysis o: quest

re data yieldf3d a number of source t:catts,

' . . U T "~. ) lQ a11onc:; WDlct:t was ,._ .. i..'·i v or Self Sent t Con~rol ..

Defi:::li ti ~n and of this ctor has beer:, necessarily,

the }_ong and la borio:ls cess o~f question and irically

based answer. Cattell gave a his work

( 1957) which inclt~ded e ccrrelates. Of q_uestionnaire

. ~ " lvems ana respo~es have factor loadings (+ ,60

ar,d above) for Q3

, there are:

do you believe in more strongly?

(a) luck (b) i nsuranct::

Do you tt ... ink t~'1at you are less energetic than r:;ost

people are at tting work done?

be too hard, v:~~ ich do you d

(a) try another problem (b)

It appears envirorment an 8-to ratio to heredity

63

i:a cletern:ining scores. Bac}cground variables associated

Yvi th this source it elude subject a itting to

Leing a he thy child and not very obedient to father (1 per

cent level). I:n occupational ar~alysis Q3 in

c chnicians, policemen, mechanics, executives t:Utd

electricians.

the to tal munber made (l :per cer:t level)

and correlac;ion with receiving leadership positions

abcut + 0.4.

D .l. ( Q) 18 thus defined~ This does not, hcwever,

make clear Cattell's posit ion with regard to the constr:.Ict

of self in personali theory. The self-sentiment d

undefir,ed. He was impressed by the hypothetical system of

subsidiary attitudes goal p:'oposed by Uiurray ( 1937) and

explored this lattice by or analysis. A of

factors described as ergs and sen0iments result ' rming

iee ...

Tllany of Cattell's early experiments were relat to

2'1 tti tudes, wL~l ch he e_ as follov1s: 'a.n atti is a

vector, definable by direct as well as r:.tagni't~J.de,

further by point of application (obj ) sti:rm.1lus

situation' (1947, pp.221-2). 'J:his coro_cept is ve

to tf'_..a t of sentiment in he f::llowed EcDougaU (1933):

a sen-r:iment as a com:pcund of dynamic pur-

es cent on one object' (1947, p.227).

64

tech..YJ.iques enabled Cattell to verify the existence of

several ergs and sent:L'llents (1952) among which was the

self-sentiment,

Analagous to the self-regarding sentiment of McDougall

although not presented as the pinnacle in a theoretical

system of motivation components, the self-sentiment is:

••• the factor and system of attitudes centered on the conceived, contemplated self and directed to maintaining its physcial, social and moral integrity as a basis for other sentiment and ergic satisfactions.

(l957,~p.900).

In other words, the self-sentiment is a set of attitudes

centred around the self for the survival of the self. The

pattern of attitudes does not contain high correlates with

the factor as reported from experiments to date; thoe e of

+ 0. 4 and above being:

I like to have good control over all of my mental

processes - my memory, impulses, and general behaviou.r.

I want never to do anything that would damage my self-

respect.

Clarifying experiments by Horn (1961), Cattell and Horn

(in publication) and Gorsuch (in publication) are much needed.

The contribution of Cattell is not made to the construct

of self as such but rather to concepts of attitude to self.

The task which he set himself is the measurement and empirical

definition of such variables, and measuring instruments he

has supplied. The SixteeE :Personality or Ques~ionnaire

vides a sccre 18, ·while aspects

of the dynamic s entiment are measured by the tivat:'.on

Analysis (

S .. Il~ Jourard may as cc:ncurring th tell

in tbe importa~ce placed on ical analysis of the s f.

did not, hov1eve:r, derive some tl~eoreti c

relat to self from collected , but sea:c:ched such

for evidence to support hls precJnc thea • This data

ccllect in a series s desi,:,~1ed to examine

aspects of body image and cathexes (Secord &

Jourard 6:: 7 1937), identification (tTourard & Pemy, 55;

Jourard, ) and self-disclosure (Jourard, 1958; Jc:urard

& Lasakow, 1958; Jourard & 1962).

The theory adjustnent \Vb.i.ch a:r:rpears to lie behi:l!d these

eriments owes to

Hogers and :2uber.. What amounts almost to

is cular1y t when JourarQ was for

layman (1964). :By W8,y of aefin=.tior: for :psychologi }lP

this to

The s Lwhich b

ab the s

is a constructicn of ego .... is o:r:· source all instrument

] .. ".. refers to t b ,. pe:::::·cept::.ons, , expectations, an(:_ demands a person h-as

66

corrze to fornr:J~ate ct to his own behaviour

) . self is up of several components; the self-cone

(the beliefs· the indivi.dual has what

b . ' person ... e lS; , the self-ideal (beliefs about how he should

p:;~.blic selves. :n to tbe last-

named quoted ' .. ... • a man :1a s as social

selves as ·the~e are recognize •••

Jcurard has establ:ished some pictwe t:he

of self-dis sG.re he has !hade tle cor: tri bu-

tion tovvaris a systemat theory of the sel_f is both

explar:.atOY~J End "'.;estable.. Su was theory pro ed

tested by Edelson elaborate

theory e cOJ1ceptual s -sys-cem

as ' or:-: o.f conceptions elf

to s e:cvirc:nment 'Nhich t ividual u:::1es aq es

for interac envirorbuent so as to

hom eo by reeol affective (1954, p.

es ..

The t one hypothest8 involved intr

each ject to seve rol.e-playing situatJ_ons, after each

of vvhich they made Q-sorts of self-evaluative i terns. Factor

analysis of the result data justified acceptance of the

experimental hypothesis.

67

Organismic Theorists: Goldstein, Angyal, Maslow

The theories of personality examined so far have shown

nothing of the influence of Gestalt -chougl::t on approaches to

the behaviour of the individual. The significance of this

influence may observed in those theories described as

organismic by Hall and Lindzey (1957), more specifically

those of Goldstein, Ivlaslow and Angyal. Essentially, man is

studied as a whole and not part of a whole (the envirorurent),

and not in terms of sene selected piece of behaviour (for

example, perception) which forms a frame of reference for

some so-called Gestaltists today. To the organismic person-

ality theorists personality is to be considered as a whole

even it disorganized as in schizophrenia.

Goldstein (1939) is credited with the publication of

the first such holistic theory of personality. He postulated

that there only one chi motive r behaviour under which

may be subslJ.'Tied all the others. 'l'his motive he calle.:I self-

actualization. l':Tasloy;~ with early e~:Qhasis on s -esteem

and self-evaluation iYL abnormal psychology (rvie.slow

mar.n, 19 41) , took :1p tl1is cor:cept motivat as the

creative trend in the berJaviour of can. He was particularly

cc:ncerned with individual

1954;

and tcloser to the £• core OJ..

may be described as self-

more tr"'"lly

59' 1::; .. ' ; .

68

an individual more effi ent percept:Lons of

more comfortable relatJ.ons it, :nore

Self-actualization, per se, was des

owth of is in

, or more acc<.1rately of what the o:;oganimr; i·tse1f

motivated

d ciency cont:rast, Angy-al's

on he interactio:a between the

individual and bio ) Wll.i was

cribed in terns self-det erm and self-surrender ..

of blo-sphere exists a s of s ~concepts

symbo s-~.1bjeot - object

relationship \Vhi may Ol" not distort reali

t '.2he rela t segregation of c s

most vulnerable of the

onali ty or:' (1941, :p.121),

The :L:r:fluence of Gestalt t is also in

phBnotleno lo gi approach to personality which been

rapidly gaining popularity (:I1undin, 1964). T-he

phe.r:mnenologies described by Landsmarc ( 19 ) ' se

eory of awareness Jones ( 49) and the jective and

objective ons of extc:r~ded striving selves of

69

40) all tness to ~'he mo useful

colle c: CO!rl1T:8!l on these t:}·1eories is the volt{J"'ne

ed by

e cor:tmo:n to all

is each thel"e is a phenornenal fields

space, reali or b

envircrli'Tlent iNhich of

that individual .. hougb.

frame reference to dis terms se

ego as phenomenal and non-phenom sides of t same

ooin, ed cri Ti sorr._e impo:rtant points. '1:1hese

the a ons ttult phenomenc ignores lo-

cal facts as tence of unconscio-~ls determi1:ants

of its ccnztructs are eript

than explanatory~ The defense Snygg Combs,

pHrhaps t:he mo,~t ardent rters t pheno;nenological

approa~h, up ( "' . Vj lS not essive ..

r:.g the early development of their t!·leory Combs v;as

concerned \Ri th use of concepts

in non-direct1ve ( 1946; Snygg

es-tablished -:he res:p ecta bili ty pb.enomenclogy as a

a system superior to the obj ve approach, he

no c:::-1 of terms necessa:r·y

::he can lead to predi ons e.bout individual

70

rather ( is

true that .it has ed seve vvidely read text-boo

(Combs & Snygg, 19 afid much research (for

example, Soper & Courson, 63). S14ch a system doeE,

course, require scme type of self construct forming

of the _p:tenomeEal field ... self includes all

those parts o: t phenomenal

experiences s.s part or characteris elf' (Snygg &

) , There or.:.ly one actualiz-

ation o:f the self, a Jear:tTing t:J ..,

self-conce:pt. onal eco:~orr::/ of vidual,

cone of s ~ seerJ.s to represent

gc:.ide to behaviour' (Combs, 1949, p. 31). is concern,

, depending

as does on self-repcrt. Combs So ( 57) li eel

t:.te itfluenoes on self-report as follows~

' ' \ ll; clar:.ty of e ject 1 s awareness

( ) lack of adequate symbols

( 1) social expectancy

(iv) c::-c~eration the subject

and (v) frcm threat and personal adequacy~

r.rhese enoes are illustrat a;nply be low the se OTIS

on measurement ..

7l

Such a::: empirical of theory

coJ::struction within the all

tao unusual.,. lhe in-';;erests of ( 6; 6:1), for

example, co t rr:arkedly • Similar in i

however, the hormic theory of anality Lecky ( 51)'

unfortunately pv.bli.shed posthuD_cusly.. .According to ck.y,.

all sl:.ovvs ar: ine-v":: table s self--

consistenc;;t. :1 personality as 'a s cher:1e

o.f experience, an 811iza tion of values are cons tent

th orre ~nether' (1951, p.l60). 1 According to the theor·y

of self-cons ia tency, we seek those experiences 'Nhich

support our s 1 and avoid, t, or necessary,

forcibly reject those which are consistent them'.

(1951, p. 9). Leck;.y showed h:Lmself to be aware of ~he

dangers of an att cal sy.ste:n to

support both the doctrine of the unconsci:Jus such a

self-c as is lmpli in the do of self-

consistency.

The phenomer_olc cal for a ory of anality

c on was Ut."'t=l;:; Q~U Carl Hogers h•'JC:: =~ been much

influenced Snygg Coml;s, amongst others, theory

construe ""'v"·'·• ?ri-marily, Eogers j.s a :psychothe:ra_pi~Tt, Cut

naturally found some delineation a co:1struot

of i ty and personality fm1.ctions is x::.ecessary to

the formulation of ge"!leral therapy.

ctief cons~ructs in th.e o-::y are the

the phenomenal .field and e self develops out of

interacti02:1 between the and the environ.rnent. T:-le

:process is t of e s "

~:rhe organism s s pe:rpetue.lly to eri:1£crtc e elf; tl:mt is,

the chief rcotive Eogers' construction -cay be to

co:Lncide with_ Gol , self-actualization.

as :::ecordeO. up to 19 bi~lior;raphy

of research construct~. or:. so-called

client-centered which encompasses tb.e work of Rogers

Ei:i.'Hl h:is follov;ers is iL'lpressive. A selection reports of

such resear collected into just o·cte volume alone, (Rogers

Gordon & Cartwright~ Grumrnon & John, Eudikoff, Seeman,

Vargas concerning changes in self) a usefv.l

contributicn to an empirical bas for the construct of selL

Several i:nte:!."'est:i.ng of the persoral theory

underlying ent-centered are available ( Shli er..,

Gendlin, althoug~1 the tulates

are exami:r:.ed here.

Ro st::itement of personality orgar:.iz,..,

o+l·~~ \'l9"1 '"' u u .. i _ J ' pp .. ) was delivered in a series of

proposi , the first seven of whic?-2. were

pheno:neno cha~acter ~d referred to the b

as 01xtl above. The re:naini:ng

due const:ruct of s and elabo_ra ~ tl:eme

to wl1at is indeed a self :psychclogy:

•••

...

...

...

A portion of ~he total perceptual field gradually becomes differe:c.tiated as the self ... fl-

As a result of interaction th the environment, anC ic~~larl:; as a result of evalua 'tior_..B~l interactions ~v'ltl. th others, the structure of ·":;he self is rl - an organized, fluid, buG corJ.S tent conceptual pat rn of peTceptions of characteristics and r ionshi.ps Jf the 'I' or the 'me' together th tl:e values attached to e concepts. ~ ~

values at to ences, and the values r::. part the self-str:_!cture ~ in. some , are values experienced

:::tly the organism, and so~ne es are values introjected or taken over from others, but percei-v-ed in dis fashion~ as if they l".rE .. d bee~ experienced dire:;t"'; ....

As experiences occur ir the life of individua.l, they are r:

(a) symbolize:l, perceived ar:.d soE:e relationship -:o the s

(b) ig:tlOT·ed because is perceived tio to the self-s

e

0

(c) ed symbolization or sywbo1ization because the i.x:consistent w'3... tl:e seli' •••

ven a torted experience is ct:;.re of the

...

...

•••

• • •

•••

• • •

•

TT .L~ ..

,. "'. XIX ..

!»Yost adopt bJr are consist e:r:t

are sc which of the s

74

... "Behaviour be brOl).ght

vvhich ur

-cne s , in such not 'ovrned t by

Psychologi the organism denies ;:;o avvareness s"·i;,H.J..o. senso and vis experiences, which conseeJ.ue:ttly are sy~:1boli a::1d

c the self-S"truc-:;uret this s, is basic or potential

logical tension.6u

Psych-oloc;ical justmen"t exis-ts the cone of the se :.s sv"c}l all the sensory and ce~al experiences of the o:rga::Usm syL;bolic vri th

are or may assimilated on e. into a consistent ions

co:1ce_pt of s • ,. !!<

Any ence ch is inCcn.o . .co

CJrgar:izatio:tl or stru.cture perceived as a th:reat.,

there is

certain e abBence of

ent vzi t~1 be

se

S"':Jructu:;:-e

tsten~ exa"'ltined., and the

assiEilat e and lude such

the indi vi::lv.al one e1:·:; and

sensory visceral ences, then he is necer:,sa:.rily more m:de:cstand of others and is more of others as se"9arate

duals ....

the perceives self-structure mvre his

accepts organic

0

...

75

experiences, he finds that he is re plac1ng his present va1ue system - based so largely upon introjections which have been distort­edly symbolized - with a continuing val·uing process .....

This statement of the self theory of rogers appears to

hold through all. tl:1e adjustments Eogers has made in his thera-

peutic technig_ue. These adjustments may be traced in Hogers'

major publications (1942; 1951; 1961).. In the first of these,

Cov_ns elliYlg and psy chothera-c\z, Rogers emphasized the

importance of recognition and accepta::.r1ce of self; in the

second, Client-centered therapy, he described therapy in

terms of self-perception, self-evaluation and sel.f-actualiza-

tion; while in his latest collection of papers, On becoming

a persor;, direct experiencing of the self appeared to be the

goal of the therapeutic r)rocess. In all this writing,

hovvever, Rogers found it necessary to provide a definition

of self only once, claiming the terrE as equivalent to 'the

awareness of being, of function:tng' (1951, p.498). Similar

definitions appear in the chapter Eogers contributed to

Koch's volumes (1959).

Development Psychology and the Growth of the Self

_An exa:mina.Jl~ion of the self has been made within a survey

of Cl)..rrent personalit:y theories, ranging from the self as

organizer of the psychoanalysts to the humants tic and

experiential self of Carl Rogers. The fra'!lework has been

76

of the pers , the ion c f t self in

to some The

the eonstruct of z. developm :psycho

examira tion ..

onali-ty o:rists -whose contri buti.on.s are out-

above r:::;.ve not, of cou:::se, avo ed q_ue_stion of ~-C1e

s in t entirely. fact, the psychoanalysts :r·

ex2.lliple,. keeping thei:r· on t luence of

d.ev-el0pm e::z::p erienc es, have be en at ~)e,ins to

stulate tb.e a sense of s in

children as observed by }JTles (1952). Y.fash (1961),

1)_£:- ed. test i oriented to tl:e theo es of Eriksen,

, :T?rom:n, Eor.n.ey a.:nd 'to ascer the

levels of self-co za t:.o:n high-s l studei~_ts ..

I:r. study identified x patter:::1.s; SSITB tic -

p::rimitive se d entself, -;;he detached

se the outer JJing se inner

lJ.ip,_g the zing se

Of t d eve pnental s, most cont a

sect:_ on ed growing Gesell,

' 19 56) le others rurport to

question of the e con~~

s rdon, ) . Such

S G'USSiOllS C around impoTtance ;:;f s es

77

in , hOVI e self evol·'.re

how 2;,dults can e e

•

Ad oles ce:ac e, texts e, comprises a period

in in self is no

exception. ;_rn:_s l'ws bee:n substz:nrtiated. studies

such as that Smith & Lebo ( ) • Rube postulated

self related the \Tth of his

, and sees is prevelent adoles-

cence as 'the procecs of r

ovalue,tion of o:1e's se ) . o bs e:rvc.. t ion some hundred colle students,

po step 1escence

(1') from the two

s co very .. ~Chis step he called t advent

cognition' ( co:tJl;truct of Belf refe:es

to a concrete sub the ;,vhich

self e 's 1 of 0\TD.

(1961, p.29),

It is t a.nd

concernin:;: ad.oles cence t c011Struct !lamed. 0 eal

self often e :Y::ar~ti:ne cl. It oe t of ty but r

(imagined or otherwise) re:latively amenable to

moasurement.. Hoyc;-e (18951J) suggested t self-cor"l.ce:p"t

was assessed tion some id thflt tl'ie

id rm r Carl cs, but only

to the extent t is the cal v ca-

tion es derived from t; :Jr:,r o_f

therapeutic process .. is 0 it cult

to formulate a en the terrn vlhieh purely

operatione.l. Studies of the development

in ctildren rzve tend to use cal procedures to gain

apprOJ?riate ueasurc;s: Hevighust, Eo bins on & J)orr (1946)

eler (1961) both set essa:r t person I would

like to be •. pons es tended to into t categories

parents, glamorous adul·i;s, at; and visible _young

adults and composites, the

figures fro:r: environment

identi • and. v:acDon'l.ld ( 1955),

Glockol ( ( 1965) have :Lllus

similar fferent oultu:eeEJ.

It appears t c!ev_elcpmental psycholoc;ists some-

to add to the construct self. is al;;.1o true

of psyc!lologiots workinz::, in othcr :related. to of

personE,lity ry

theorists, J::ocrceptionists c;e concerned with the :problems

79

of mo As is to be

s have found no a s comtruct; yet

there se important ..

ld of lea:rnir~, sti~lulus-resp::n:se theo os

no need of,

a s corJB truct would necess

by Ilollard and

eo

the Gonce:pt of s

existence a. concept

d su a process and

e self -co:::1cepts

of sv_ch cone ept s

male s je s but not

for

the :perce:ption::__sts

on

is

be.

( 19 ) ;

are us

+ "

e

a theory perce:p on.

ct carefully av d

ttle blaclc 1)ox'

Such 2. thec~y ..: c•

'"'' t

• Yet tl:is

individual YJhcn

Helper (1955)

2nd their parents.

were assc:

those

lood, fo:;;

it=..es and rolaticns become present to a s

as te re, novv real' ( cleod, 1960, p.233). It vvas, of

course, ) ' ssted

eo

be defined as interactio~ between self

the ob ct.

of motivation has been. taken more recent

by Harvey (1963) who c cognitive

aspects 8f the self is cheir defin~t

of self is o:t int Self des bed as

v:i-t}:1 'an i:rldividual' s totality of rr;o of order-

of chological , Yii t h 0::1e t s cone a tens. t

of more or ss ed c tendencies or conce};t-

Sch:r'Oder, 63, p.97).

An attempt to divorce :perso f;:om social

loglsts, as from mot t~on ts, is

likely tc bear the ha-l of r-s The theory

of s involving

preroga i;i ve of GO

psycb .. olo ) treats

st ru.ctu:res whicb

crz} as exp:::-essed

~ested hypo

s as one

be 1:ni'erred

'10~2\ \..!-)J --)

is worthy of delineat=.on r

the tive

be~J.aviour~ 3a.rbin r s

anc. as a generator of

' 1952;

area as

a ely cognitive conceptualization of self~

sta-'::emer..t of the t~e is eceded some

seven postulates, e :Lnt ural ld of

( bly to the e c

or the phenomenal ch includes the se -cancer:t),

a o£ se and e co ons V!hic~n

the se -cake 'l'he 8 is T

of the responses the organism to s lS

selves~ in des ed

in detail of these substc"act-c:res, each one

being

are:

( )

( i)

of the

the somatic se}_f, somes

rencmi-r

.:reaction to t

( the intro~ecti:ng a cruie use of

( v)

adulthooC

po

) . ' '

order of they

res por:.st:s up to one

+n "v

\ . J '

cr sel !7, to

bal '~

, at "Nhi objec

montl1s) ;

cfl .. :n

U:Ct-3',

co!:s tru.ed or the jecting extrojec

be whi is

e of t J:;_e t:C1eo::·y. terrL as app d

82

to self does n.ot La-ve co Kant

be een lYU.re s

avoided thts e ject chotomy

re.ct ion the :<_nte.rb eld.,

the

SOCl sav; as

as e o1;j ect learned, so

it is not tnnate dete:rmir~e d 'by experie~ce of the

envi::u • Change in the substructures and therefore in

the total s el truoture occurs !!Iaturation and

learning, and is a function of the strength of the boundaries

cf the s and arebiguity tJlerance that structure~

C:::;uohed in these the the ears to be both llE:lrd-

headed and useful; however, t hypotheses whieh in

t·J t test do net ap derive eliTe .from

Ciiffioult to an~r vvhich • may be more

profi ble tc turn to w::::;-:rk of in to self

bo:rrowed sev

of o::1 c ~:;er pe

is ..

ur as a of

our o c c;;,rs f postulat

na::red the c-s cc of

83

the

self e:2:.peri ls fie

a 'icle:r:ti

e self vv.:Lth vvho tality' (1935,

p .. 61), o bs OYlB

be ar~ indivi le ons of the so-

led ( e::ttample, clc :::r the n:o

ma;y ltJ.ded in the sslf~ ars;

much less i::l e child

( ;::: 't

' .,...' / are the mod~ifications

in the J.on o_f the

self ne sees as havJng e es ' , conceptual and ~Jo phases, cor tc

those of

anCl been r;:tad-e use

not cnl:y sa~.::' bin

\VflO d 0 on but ts like

e terest

Slt:'Vi ve of s and

s is en seen as b :::;entrally rtant,

Bocio-c:~_l refe ( ) GS.'vV i--s aS

ped at t s of a

of 2 de ~.re1o:ped different ups~ and

represe~~ttl an on of

se and seco selves 4

84

ptance of this point of view raise's tl::e ql;.estion

of tlle relationship between roles, a ques n

e se

roles, t even

s

vn rious approaches social psycholo

to construct of self Pnd them to three catego

' tradition which the self-concep·c

in t.:!TY:lS

the '

the 'eituationist'

conformity rejected these

including the concept which may be inc

ed st, and construct of Gelf

metaphysically as to the Uilique, human

t self is a necessa:r:-y con:struct for social

o bvj_ oas • J.'o a

as a key construc·t in

socio the behaviour rather-

to be, cs lly as derived the thee ries , J'ames

and {Go:Jld f} Kolb, 1964). T{easurer:ent of the s

c s

85

1961) as :i.t 'Nas the

( ) . )

VJh&t 'othe:r t for us lS ed as self .. Such

gations a:;:·e of course extremely depende:r:_~ on

t1.rre so that r ::nust :;Jr-

ely. because these

soc;io gist s ::1 one of

neas c.rable :1 efini t

..... a J}ersc n r s idea the of as his

~ . e- j n:.:._mse..:.f as a.n act-ive of

c 8 of the -:.:::;e of s

a

cl2a::t"'est artd

that ers tion tovJs.rds

awareness of tiator

constructs by

logical thec:ris deserve s cial attenticn ..

ru-:d gJ.S of s made e

ion e self as subject .~nd cbj c ainl·;:/

self as snbj the moti"la the

exper self, the er subjective voice

of so ety _prominant in self oonst:ruct

s. 'l:he s as clJje

too, eaci1

individual .. part of co t o::

teem as it vvas rtaL1.ed the phTeno lo gists

86

or :f:'-e on as narne d. by :..Tames.

ive ive ct is des bed various

?enchel~ , Cattell an\i gers as self-estee;n,

se

as cts construe besides t of

division of subject object a'l:·e common to c

oollS t:r'llcts and the_ ries were E:L""lcestors ..

self ccnstru:::ts, classi ed

to the tions ed

( 58) as vve:::e a:ncest constructs, carried out ..

results sDovr.;,--1 2.

Frorr. analys~s appears that ~che majority

cor..t pers::::nal y theorists are concerned wi the

obje recogniseU by the ind_:_vidual as as vith the jeet

er

the and sel enti:rr:ent are

noti or:.s to day. A Gheorists the cen

:psycholo as enviro:G-

rr:ent, t~1e or the s

e cf as a

of thea es ' ' J.Ongea to uhe ed a lone

CO YlS t of self as ent .. w, Gestaltist

referred to q Q, a

Sullivan

Allport

1\'Iaslow

Lewir::.

A

Jacobso_n Hartm&.rln

Earv & Schrod.er

is Se

Sarbin

Self­"'o~~ept \..; .u.,,.-}

Symonds

MU::.'phy

Jo-u:rard

Angyal Snygg &

Combs Iecky

Theor~es ( 35-1965)

Self­Se~timen

chel

Fede:c:n -_y '"'"'rl18 , •

. L<.V"- ,;/

Cattell

Eogers

88

'J:he unique pla of constrt..:ct :t whose

'tJ:1eories quj~te popular were ge!lerated rnuch earlier,

up dif betwee:J. hist cal r:intecedents

and cu:rre:::lt s constrLlcts. (See ~G l) • le of

th a self ch was pur·e

c.Tu:ngians urge a construct to There

s 1::·een an incree.se hologists use

term to refer to the onali ty of tre ividual and

a decrease its use t:J inlii cat e ' is rnine 1 " The

general trend of the change over bee1:.

self as subje to the s as ob ct. Such f~ trend ap:p ears

tc be a reflection of ~ en

verifice"t of theo es. A paral:el analysis t:he self

variables examined by experimentalists has en this

hypothesis.

The results of ' ed on the stuCi es

repo as evidence conce the self, not

require tabular en on. It

of va~cis. accordi.ng "~ ~ the v '~ and English

defini t:Lons 1 is deteTmined. by the measure

employed .. used in these s exc lO

s -reco n.,

claim

strivings are re ed :;he indiviclus.l as his OW'll

(se:f cone ) or the feel::.:ngs and strivings organised

around that object ( entime1:t). Self variables,

tl:en, are object - self, by ve necessity

tional defin.i.t ion. ':lhe

self constructs indicates f~n affinity with t

variables to be exe.mined.

opera-

self

89

90

91

of of variables

have beer~ repo:rted Although

apparent i;:; is cal egc tL

ch researc~€rs are a"TT.s of d on are

r.:.ot solved the operati0nal ap Stat err: en ts

as cone iO:tlS

-accepta::1ce the s oncept,

o·:- these, ope:rationally defir.;.ed, a separate

variac In otller ' a

concl "J_sions to :pertain

no theme to justifJ!· sucn a ~on ..

no conolus2.ons -be dravv11 as to the

deternined

co

A.

+ -0SvaD

r:~os t

of the

examinat

s orr: e

8

self

It also tru_e t

t.he

of has been

wi tl'l no

self as a vari

may attempt; ed t~ese :ttions _into

erature 80llectecl suc~>J. a way as to

emphasize . t. examlna"lon of self

frames reference ..

-:perc

concept arc exarnir:ed, as

theses co:nnec :raria bJ..e r:1

Soc inte on t errr;s

seve

:r·e ted to

the cture of

hypo-

va;:··i

re1..a-:: between

s and e cts

of t:".tudes on the eelf-conc rec on.

pmer~t self va call;y

cn1s~H.:d in :nore d , and the

drB}Nn to the o e-s h::::.ve been

s

ters as eke and Etur:e, who wei'e

cone of f, introapecti0~1 was

na t"J.r'al mect11s of t;ing any related.

been e

alate 0he sel£ e s ~w1e

A :in earl~r

w ( 6; j ed es ion

the sel:i: in on trai-ned

subjects, and two fOI'IT;S

0:::-.Le of "tO

le other a subje ive

cons ousness tr~e el

sa oy;J1 appearance

d. s ion \ ' '

Superficiall~l ed

tJsing que

es m.easures

93

d as -to vvhether it

to measure the -cone

or to the self as more sophisticated than the

intros ctior: metho::1s o_:: I_jocke • the ta

of methcds, Kitamura to ted a

negat reac-tion in :-'eco tion of self \ , :core

particularly, re on the physical s +-,. v!1lS

ion b psycl1oge:ni c nature m1i not mere

re:?lect o:: aesthetic ( \ j •

s conce early deve of

tion j1..1s t as eas have

:::: o:r Hume, or C

James tf ... eir tere se -rc~c

(1957) bed eess of

rroT reco on in the ycung SiX Cl' SDVe:::J.

e-rved some to e te to

self lve e rec tion

'l'Li.s lende. some credence -to t

t would descri

this as de vela the intro j

0::1 t 0 t ) ' to

reco rJames ! E:e ' 2'"_8

of "'+' ( \ s e e:rest t}:::.e J-L I

cto:cs BU ch a:re

t to ( ed a

s to t of s pos e a.n

unc on.s s c 0mpared con,scious

uncons

uncons

, be t as it

;judgements a bo'U_ t S OV1"11 sions , yoice

or hands are

rrccstly

It e

ego or steem is

judgen~_ents are aLlJlost enti:r:ely

the s be corr:e more co e:

as cts mod

from th

cone o:: self cess~ ral

t (1962)'

prod uc;e t atti

to by r,:eans of cond ced one

expe:r:l.men:Sal of jec r a ne

an6 fo::c a i. s -concept by appr te

95

re~;po11_z es of '

a and t-ffieasure self-cone ;,v~:1ich. 1-vas found

to te C.i faction up

rein for for po In sa:ce

it that changes s itudes oc:cur as a t iO::l

suc(:ess , success

result rease in evallJ.ations in a

) . T:tese hold

jects f:mr di

own s.nd ing ~hems on ten t ts

(D .1" l_J..e:r, 1954). Afte-r success experi.ences atti to self

are at -both conscious

a positive r att to

r failure s -atti are not ccrrela:ted..

at to others.

uphold. stulates

experience

self-c in tre

As evidence, di ct_a:nges

been successfully s of in

-::;_ne no that the vi. dual

se to 911 1dentity by rr:oans of e:h to

se el£' and_ a 'tua tion

( \ I '

extent ex:pe:rience determ

attitudes a:nd ce versa net t

~ecf;niques causa n are not a •.rai

re a:'E7, .hovrever, some factor-s ch

since

is

icul fac-cors. One such or is sex,

vli th the self-cone

exc in so as derr:3.n.ds act as

as inde

terms ,...,.;:> Vl

96

:nts,.

ese

ct,

a scale r twer1t s, rated

' id

appeared (

adjec:t ltJOmen t

rr. ivatior1al fo::r:ces

•

ctives decreas th

socisl fi

I!'i€11

'

1 no sex d

'7 \ ' I ; t

je ives

se

for :;he first

e

tJ:e sex difference increased wi e.ge

a recent study relating -perception to

v,roman, So yea ( 196

above a career ir s

ences

che

of

97

Oft l:Lsh some corme

e s

vari o:ne of the nost is a

' tt

of t subject .. and

an e of corJ.Bcious

ss a substratwr of ur:cons ous aggressiveness ..

The vvas in subjects with

scores err Eosenzweig ?icture-Fru_stration

the l in

as n:ore d

there tvas no ence .. AnotheT interes reference

v,rhich colour rences are to sel_f-conc

(y,---..t""Ol' lCJk.i=;) \.1\·'----' <.n , 7 --' j_.l , unfor-tunately, al it

is parent some

cal ad ted to

discrepancy measures ra tt:er to ~~he self-

cone , :_:ret att to tc:s t

1atter hypottesis .. f]r-./"- "\ \ .'::JO.i) v-ras able to r + u s

st;j. tement that d \riduals to a

i;:; e:rr;s as true ems

v1ould a group :ma ed s ected

98

cians .. ( d eel

malad~UBted j_n te:cms

scores 011 , J_! and K scales,. ~ects

described the ' eal selves and of

on 1ar scales based on a

sele of All:po:r·t-Cd~cert ad j

of these scores, see

as more t s

~j 1.13 to the srune sexed r

do the rly ad just ed P"'e fer the opposite sex ent,

concept is _:'onned thTough iCentif.: lar

i:n the envirorrrr:cnt .. differences

were also ed: fems.le subjects see themselves as more

like parents t~:J.an je

o.f the behaviour i:n is

involved learning ce;::1ses9 U::;;ing

Adjective "t as a cle 8 r both self

otl:ers for each su ect, eri and T (19 \

thes me ed gene

ed ·t~lat ease to associate na11es of

to adjectives rele to is a

e pe:r·ce::Lved ty of f) persons to

self.. T te recall as r tc the

cone were

the s

Actually

of the

-cor~istenc:;r

:recall

+ v

ruct

es ;a.rose out

tt_:.ei'e is no

ents wi .. ::l1 t s trJ.cture and those which are

be sarne for ad sted

were I'f7 j ecte ..

series

hypotheses 011t of the

•NO r~c ain"ted co ngru en c e

self- anct :ustment. lS52

us er: formed ;3. se

by e ve' ' s

concept. ti:J.8 ea.sure De sta

and subjec -oonce:pts are

better just than those vvith self-concerJt;s ..

Hv used a Q-s as a

r::easu::::·e of ' ~ Se.J...I - id e Cal

:for a.n ad tment score. an

ove t t'1CY en self id

100

-;t:l.ve e

Thon:a s ( 55), on othe:c

ted self-ace s

:rather to ad.jnstrc

of measure

rro ject~L ve te s t;) for

jects. a

bet\veen e variables, a.nd r:ot a linear

as pred.icted .. ed r s result

t are tvvo peo who are rat adequate

one ty no to e s f- o:r

-concept, e to so.

dorkoff's des v.Jever, is sus

doubtful of the ors

measures justment t

cont:rast ::-!lo:ce recent Turner er-

(19 ) fro10 a o£ 175 co studon"'cs

ext one of ye sub~ects est

s ideal r o::'

and e on

cri t, bei

des bed as:

a .. n:cre vit

c.

scores, e,

would :re es exist sorne it

ad;J e as

mode

relatio examined more ci_f:L c:

set e di ttor1 of succef3sfu1 _from :c1011-

the

po

su:;c:essful o

r

( appears 1.

e

L of t

i~o res

the

unsuccess

also bee:::J. esta'bli

the rnore s

&

nnance on 11roba. bili ty learnine;

The s

mora sely

su ect

more

ive

describing

s1.ibjects with high

wllile those wi tb c:repa.ncy are more a the

es tions ( es & Duvall, 60).

Differ en ~ved ITeasures 1 also ed

ac8eptance, yield reSlll ts in corre

T!le self-ace e s the ity

Invent (Sa), us t

ad for

' a s

( ) D

\lJeTe rcoveC.. ( Jo ' 1

:i?arL'1.6S ( ) ths.t more

t;i.sn: st en.ts ..

t well ed

o£' se

ard sent 1, br the self ee:n of' o,

true so of

the o:'l of ve e

of s (19 )

l s to measure s

esteer:1 .. sir ex:per cnt e t

er scttroe

s dis-

agree;nent r::ore OL e c

8 e 0::1

) g:resented j ects fort

VJO couns st-

rec

the v;ords s a:r:d

103

c of his a tt :i tude::.1

self d s

the j lS

~s :more ed,

visual percept as

con cts di in ups

to j_n_d_ t eer:~

s.:cd a t -fXJ teem ' ts was r~e asure d

eem of subj s,

better s

been des :::~'1 t e:rns €1'-

ex:peoted.

the

se

ancy

Eo

a mctive 7

jects (

\ 1.

., the

es

d. to

of

to

ed to e in ~he

t:i_on, the

the

er the se

8

n is to be

l'S 1 belj_eve

some :rrn of

the s

e:r ~sctive

need, as

sere;·-

\Vi th lOVJ

104

self-esteem were to ra-ce t i11_teresus in a. ety

o:' seouri le

ens of St:Lot erests

vve:::e more t by r-~cssl ties ::;f success v1ere

ica1 h self-esteem

(

-_perc 8

ce t of ·01:. e :re ls_ v-5 ti on,

one not r, 1957)"

to

bler" th data f:rom

c:f the EOI'Scllach Test, C

goa1-:3et re cd f of actequaey 7

are:

( 5) e fo~Jld nc corre o:::1

between of as on c e:r.LC e

and ideal se

of s Oll~_ble

r or

in that :r:lot

cnsi ty tls es

th rea.se

8

() ::;:Les th

ands ess

on self les~ :r·oots for sucl::. e ents

:psy

, or

there \\~11 bs no

such as rea

on

the .::rub ject t;::;

orr thr

fa d to

1 scores as

va:riety resul

l~o ',"!ever 1 was :not

.l-ace

es

t :Ln a v;ord as B

r 0'"'-v'e '1 \ 0 ,1 - '

d

\ 1 we:re

a

, reccgnj_t

e v,;as

' ) . GolC~

s ·;;res s ..

Ole to cone

relat

t

e sJ:;-

perse>rt-

bs -b.veen

on t~:e

CU_ty

a

e

i::1 c

accuracy

106

q,uestj~ on of the condi ons under v;hi defensiveness

is likely to occur receives a clearer ~"1.swe::·. Chodorko

supported nction t

betv;een the inc1iYidual' s self-

description an objective description of , the less

perceptual defence he

multiple measures -concep-t

a_"'ld defen~Jiveness,. Y1ylie (1957) concluded that defensiveness

is a fu....."'tcti on of z elf-concept; discrepancies, rather

dictable frcm the observer~s knowledge of objective

o:r ti subject's insicht that reality.

comes tion of deferlS

self mard.fest. It ears that in generally

described as defensive, unoo"1Soious self-evaluation entails

ereater dislik8 of than that modera e

ople (Rogers and 1959). Subjects with self·

ideal discrepancies were :::·m:md to be n:ore hostile under

similar experimental d of Hosenbaum Stmmers (1961)

theJ' were • Perhaps t~e answer this paradox lies

the experi.'llent conducted by Veldman aad

data irom vthich SUJ0ported thesis that va

o:f self-acceptance defensiveness interact to influence

the expression o£ tili ty.

107 - v'

framework ( 62) iso the use of G

Cl8 subj ss

become more hos~ile and use reore

defences :face anxie

A rec of t es

inii vidual to hj_s e on

s e:t~.s scale, a scale whic1: d the char act e:r-

i mcde of r ind the

most e:Lemental de to in-te

and its like" rsing t to

sta that re rs sitalle self - crep-

s do sensi (Altroc ff,

:receives adC..ed rt

of e.nd 1'' (

cts of st::ess en the re io pbe

ac se and acceptance of o d.

ts of s

of stress, was a

ress

1T:OT0 e, rate

s An xi

as meas1lrea b~f the

:.s ass ted

ace

but se ance at a greater rate

lOS

s.c 2J,nce so 8

e - accepiJaneH

ao e measures were

de v , in case, the

1964),.

t

ze the in e:r-

action v;i th o indivi

theme ht::ill been up ex.pe attempt

to te three ers.ct

tb.ere 8:<r'e stud. att

e of s and t::.o of ac ee

i:::1vo l vvi indi 0 are

t:bDs c studies c with :Jht

of L group OT• t CO:!:IC of u e

cf ons o"' the the

to assess of s 1o factors on the

udes

cribers to t + is a i

se

d in Eogei'S.

t e sr..l ch a:::-::.

( ) "'

Ope :rat s s

(25 (25 ems)

co ci

was ::.c t

t:t:"ated vv-lth 52;

52; 1:no,n, 19 53) , ro m et:tSLITE:B •

Ft 38 s e '-Ni

the mlst

to the rc:lat

-S ancl,

d

FL _pO tj_ve 0 e and

S COI'BS "{!8.f.3

54). a reps o~1 of t

"l;::jt C:,l', th of scores e

c ic c~coren,

to ace t

by ed

e vn~ sel ~:corE;s ( 1955) ..

( :recent

en

l~O 2.e;.t:LOES fi'OD se ou::: of es 'Jtere ele d

pro·'irided s

a_cce 0 ETf3

have been reported ..

(1955)' tions , correlated

scores wl s. TZ'eYLGedy ( ) , was a

support erst dictum t VlhO ,g himself

and other:::. ·,c;i ll better

e easures

t of - '"' \_ :) ;,: )

self-conce

were self

scores t::~s as e v;i '

these

r a tt:i sB o others ..

s t~c.eo TJ' lS

Gbj and

the s ere

hi~TlS r t t

lll

aec C-CC e he -'cook Q-sorts

r t ;_;_e s ' e:r

o_ns for ace ance of ea tever

se

of ot

1 t:L e

·" rece s::;me t:reatrce tive .socio-

rne are f3 to ao s -des ior..:.s,

seri:pt ion of

tive so str end is sd to

Gromwell c\:

were 88 i

at 0 s:L

sex soc et ce, t

b een se -des _ions and

_positive site sex sociG:E'; 0

56). 1ess t tJ.ve;

t to c t decree.se :U: self-

estee:Cl ( ' 61) <> d :-lis

ved an as

TO ose .s to

j •

e r o ~te ar::.c n cf

f:ci the s j_n terrns o

t scores11

Ad co:;:lcluded that

o['

• Hal rn ( 55) rr easuremen ";;

it to be correlat with ---'che ;:;

or

of pr VJit£=. o JT j_n that

to

;;>-co nee of

' cf

' / ' ( '

"l \

.L),

), and (

been Ghovn::.. to occur in !'81:3 co

c>2 no exce s

dual's know1eG.ge o_t

an d o:r

A Swedi I -s ,.L 195 oated

acce e of up of e s

sf to

the

suc?l

S01ll"'C8 1

scurce

(

pe a

iOUI' of

s -cone

+

the eval1.1a tions (

the group,

Ol:lB (

~) " " 'J; snoweu

1

, :.s well

q_uestion

' ) .

Se

se

uence

ct

Cot

subj

8

nand e

•

t to

re te

1ey 5 ).

asGess-

se ti o:r_._ o :f ~ov-:

erce, 1963),

)

be iour on t 0c8

t~"or.,. of the

e nc e e-ncs t

e views d l:y others*

( 1) , 5.n ans-v:e:r·,

ed er:; i~- s in a on

in c

controlled" te have

on s is :1ot • nore

ductive was t LehneT ( ; , al sGveral tv

l gro not

·.vitl1 ac of e:e :Lon .. ;:r;us·t;

conclude ".:; no rf: 8l1 es

o~r Jlr"lS been 8 lisheCL

e sto.-t;em f3 can about s

tud.es cJnd. att es to t g:ccn:t;: as a whole, es

whe::'l

of

e

v1hil e

seen fron

be e

on a test

whc

sees

(Gos

54).

d

C) 1 "-I ,.

are mos-t

e:i

e out by an isolc.te ..

the

e s

54),

the

to pre t how

j ects

s,

( Eas:nus s e:r1

OtJ t the

the

l

Sociolo f' ors interact 0 'Ni f-"'

c e.l ' ass t "' such c " pres se fo r "" en, a:r:C.. a.s a S9.-

t process ,, no "' been SllO?Tt:l to ' + ( lOr:;?\ "'

,, :tnv ./ ~· , ) .

' so al mobi ::Ls, ho';veve:r,

I ' \ "

soc ly mo 8 college s

d +'' -COJTil

vvomen, or1

has su:ppl:!.ed er1ce of

it d ::1ot help to clarify t

invoi:ved ( 6 5) •

0Ee of' t

5ation

m

re

self eem,

rr:ost success rcea.sured

e:rest is J

a

c.hologiE~

re la t~ion t c the :~l

1 cren are s pre

:r subjects

QD,.i)_S'SS c£ C E?S in

\ j

an

)

s.

rences

rmse

' and so

ce

tl: less

cri.bed

ce as

rest

h

116

as the res t pressu:re to a ti ve consist enc:y

tn ce are

ed :;o self ;yho score

on n~easures sccre on the

ti tu ::tons (

' ) . ~;ion was

ve ab:c

t self va:ri in c

, to sane extent, e SSXGe

self-co:nc as those For

'lCJ ~" J the s ts_ bili t:y the self-con in

ad.o cence ti:VO

are relati s

v tend be les;:; ths.n t and are

less n ac

J_n rr:ore C_etail in c!:t

8

se erne hence better adj~sted lor

to e

' 'n \ e ' e,_ _Lj I . '

vre:re to be des to

z, 55),.

t

a

t well, ~Jel

cor:c ons t.h these es"';:;ima.tes

been c so

uniq_ue to ::.::ducators are

see e of

in the

e to

Bome extent :i. s l 1964-) ~

' ) .

accou:n1; c:nce

) . ct. s

e ences

to end, sue b as s l '9;:,~\ ..L, ,_,,_j} "

'I rt~os t inte 2::es t wo co the

the

l

tb.es es

'-\ t the

are

.L c s di~:; c lS

to

s eli' -cv:nc rents

e

re therJ s In s conne

it i.s aJ.so interes ~co note

e

i

kno e

to -that of

used

ir

children divorced par

' \

8~15!

;r:re eli

\ ) '

o in::1er

t expec

of both ;se sets

of self farrrily

d emOYL3 con o:n was t ffit

s shov: lov,rered self-..esteem ..

Rosenberg (1963) indicated that extreme parental disinterest

r s to low self-esteem. :::reating the fa;nily as a group

with the necessity for role specialisation, Couch (1962)

\ I

119

'iemonstrated that in terms identification there is a

positive co:rrelation between the degree of role specializa-

tion and self-identific and a

negative corTelation between these two variacJles for girls.

Self-Estirr.a tes

Since the

-est es

en

It would seem

e the esttmate

necessari part of

ra:ce o

on

empt es

es

se -cone

s be

:Ls

\ J

Et:ss

con cJ..-:AB i o11.s

s

je V'C

re

OllS

en

es

lities

3r1d a s o:f

the

8 to so::r:e

e, 5 j "

t1or::,,~\,' + 0 \,J--_l.,/''"'•' v e

o:? 1 in s co

120

accuracy of such self-estimates, this appears to increase

with age in children to a certain level. Brandt (1958)

derived this conclusion from the self-estimates and actual

performances of children in arithmetic, spelling, vocabulary,

broad jumping, strength of grip and baseball throvang, in

which boys are n1ore accurate in assessing these academic and

physical abilities than girls although they tend to overrate

themselves more. Such self-estimates attain a certain

validity; for exa.11ple, those who think of themselves as

musical receive high scores on the Seashore tests although

many contaminating variables such as opportunity for learning

must be kept in mind here (]'arnsworth, 1941). From a study

conducted in the same period, Arsenian (1942) suggested that

subjects wnose estimates are not so accurate are usually

less intelligent and less well-adjusted than those with more

accurate perception. There are no reports of confirmation

of this prediction for estimates of abilities.

The status of self-estimation of personal variables is,

however, a little clearer. In 1951 Stanley published a

report of a measure of insight into interests: subjects

predicted the ranks of their values on the Allport-Vernon

Study of Values and compared them with the actual ranks of

the scores. The median Spearman's rho was reported as +. 39,

the range of coefficients being quite wide. A similar

121

comparison of self-predictions &~d actual scores on the Bell

Adjustment led to the conclusion, not that insight or accurate

self-estimation is related to adjustment, but that there is

a relationship between adjustment and the success of rating

of self by others (Wittich, 1955). An ident!cal experiment,

this time making use of t.te on Personality Inventory

and the Gordon Personal Profile showed no difference in

insight scores between the groups of subjects scoring highest

and lowest on the emotional s·tabili ty factor of the Hescon

Personality Inventor.r (Arbuckle, 1958).

The Value of the Evidence

This exhaustive collection of empirical conclusions

pertaining to self variables has been made on the understand­

ing that no conclusions may be dra~n about the sel£, or

indeed a self construct, but only about a specific self variable

as defined operationally in a certain experiment. Even under

these conditions appears that some hypotheses deriving

from self theories are supported and consequently provide

validation for these theories. Such validation sa tis facto

if the link between the operational definitions of the se

variables and the self constructs of the theories is beyond

question, The author underta£es to demonstrate, however,

that these links are not adequate in that the meaning of the

operational definicions not clear. The lack of descriptive

122

evidence concerning t~e measures comprising the operational

definitions demonstrated by reviews :Jf reported studies

and by a series cf operational checks.