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Lithuania and Belarus: Neighboring States Comparative Study

By: Zuzanna Gos

Both Lithuania and Belarus are neighboring countries that had been members of the

USSR until they gained independence in the 1990s. According to Freedom House and Polity

scores Lithuania had immediately democratized and has continued to be a democratic state to

present day. Belarus, however, transitioned in 1992, but the attempt failed after a few years.

What factors during their movement toward independence affected their level of democracy

today? Can Lithuania’s success be attributed to the fact that it had prior experience as an

independent state before it was annexed by the USSR in 1940, or could Belarus’ choice of

executive and their incredibly strong economic relations with Russia be to blame? My paper will

compare Lithuania’s and Belarus’ decisions regarding government and leaders, international

economic ties, and Russia’s overall influence on both states.

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Currently, it is simple to see the stark difference in levels of democracy. However, when looking

upon Polity scores that have recorded both Lithuania’s and Belarus’ levels of democracy during

their break from the Soviet Union, one can see that both of the two states began democratic.

However, a drastic drop had occurred in Belarus during the mid-1990s.

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Lithuania Belarus

Freedom House Scores 2015

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When analyzing a state and its transition to democracy, factors for and against

successful democratic transition can be determined by several structural factors. As argued by

Barbara Geddes, these structural factors may include the type of authoritarian regime it is,

whether it is a personalistic, military, or single-party regime. “These regimes are supposed to be

vulnerable to different degrees of democratizing forces (Christian W. Haerpfer, 2009, p. 86).

Other structural factors that can help a state transition into democracy include: modernization,

income equality, and geography (Christian W. Haerpfer, 2009, p. 128). However, even if the

resources and opportunities for democracy are present, democracy cannot emerge if the

people do not mobilize and push for a democratic transition. The structural approach cannot

successfully explain the actual transition that must take place from an authoritarian regime to a

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democracy. Agency must also be taken into consideration to transform “structure into action”

(Christian W. Haerpfer, 2009, p. 128). Actual human beings, their beliefs, and their actions are

required to make any change. “Peoples beliefs are the intervening variable between social

structure and collective action” (Christian W. Haerpfer, 2009, p. 128). Without mass beliefs and

action, transitions into democracy cannot be sufficiently explained, for it is well understood

that the elites do not wish to strip themselves of power unless dissatisfaction among the people

is strongly visible.

Although many will agree that democracy is the best possible method to govern, it is not

sufficient for the people to merely have this preference. When many define democracy, they

associate it with superficial qualities, such as wealth and “socially desirable” items and

freedoms (Christian W. Haerpfer, 2009, p. 129). Although most people would very much want

these qualities in their lives, they would never risk their lives, or even the chance of living less

comfortably, for this idea of democracy. In order for people to legitimately want the actual

freedoms that democracy can offer, emancipitative values must be strongly present. These

values include equality, tolerance, liberty, and the empowerment of people to self-govern

(Christian W. Haerpfer, 2009, p. 129). If one has strong belief that these values are very

important and necessary for a decent quality of life, they will be motivated enough to risk their

lives to achieve this. However, if the people have weak emancipitative values, they will resolve

to giving their leaders all authority to decide whether these values will be implemented. People

with weak democratic values tend to prefer centralized authority to make such decisions

(Christian W. Haerpfer, 2009, p. 131).

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In order for the people to successfully demand and receive democratic reforms,

“material” and “mental” empowerment must emerge. Modernization is the material

empowerment that supplies the civilians with more access to resources to not only be exposed

to freer states and other democracies, but also to push for similar freedoms for all people, not

just the elites (Christian W. Haerpfer, 2009, p. 86). As a result, an increase in emancipitative

values emerges, fostering the “mental” empowerment that encourages and motivates the

people to further demand freedom (Christian W. Haerpfer, 2009, p. 87). When people are

inspired enough to fight for democracy, oppression by the government or elites will not be able

to control the people forever. They will eventually have to give in and work out negotiations. As

a result democracy may emerge, empowering the people legally.

Geddes also acknowledges that each state has opportunities for antidemocratic factors.

For example, presidential systems are typically “most vulnerable to antidemocratic challenge”

(Christian W. Haerpfer, 2009, p. 86). There are some democratic transitions that centralize

power and resist demands and pressure from the people, such as the “enlightened

democratizations” and “opportunistic democratizations”. Of all methods of democratization,

the only type of democratization where actual democratic values are not only accepted by

elites, but also implemented, is responsive democracy (Christian W. Haerpfer, 2009, p. 88).

In “enlightened democracies”, the elites may overcome the mass pressures by

demonizing alternate forms of government, particularly democracy, by giving bad examples of

failed democracies and using the example of post-World War II democratic failures (Christian

W. Haerpfer, 2009, p. 88). Other times, elites may pursue what is called the “opportunistic

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democratization.” “They believe they can easily corrupt democratic standards in practice when

pretense of democracy is perceived as a useful means to open the doors to the international

community” (Christian W. Haerpfer, 2009, p. 88). They are elected democratically by posing

false support for democratic reforms. Once they are elected, they remain corrupt, slowly revert

back to their true corrupt and elitist ways, and lose fear of exposure.

Belarus appears to have a past of an opportunistic democratization. This state was a

part of the USSR for 70 years before it gained independence in 1991 (CIA World Factbook). It

has closer ties with Russia than any other post-soviet state, where over 40% of exports and over

50% of imports are through Russia (CIA World Factbook). Belarus is a “puzzle” because it was

economically more successful in the USSR than other states (Fritz, 2007), and the state became

among the poorest once the Soviet Union had fallen apart (Potocki, 2002). External

involvement/assistance during regime change affected relations with Russia (Vanderhill, 2014).

Russia and Belarus had signed the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty in 1995 (Silitski, BELARUS

AND RUSSIA: COMRADESHIP-IN-ARMS, 2007). This allowed Russia into Belarus’ territory to use

it as a transit quarter for imports and exports with the West, while Belarus manufactures

tractors and other machines in Russia (Silitski, BELARUS AND RUSSIA: COMRADESHIP-IN-ARMS,

2007). The current level of democracy of Belarus, however, can only be explained through

examination of its past, when the Soviet Union had first fallen and Belarus had the chance to

determine which kind of regime it will adopt.

The people of Belarus had always practiced very little nationalism, especially after the

countless tragedies during not only Stalin’s but also Hitler’s reign during the 1930s and 1940s

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(Potocki, 2002). After the “invasions, occupations, and purges”, Belarus had a very poor

economy, ranking lowest among all post-Soviet states, whereas the state was among the most

prosperous under the Soviet regime. Consequently, the people believed, “that only

strengthened and centralized rule will make acceleration of progressive reforms possible”

(Shushkevich, 2003), despite the bad examples given by both Stalin and Hitler. Many

Belarussians, particularly the elites, strongly opposed weak governments and democracy.

Veterans from former USSR even openly voiced that they would do whatever possible to

prevent democracy from occurring (Silitski, Preempting Democracy: The Case of Belarus, 2005).

They merely remembered the success and peace that was present while under the USSR.

As a result, Aleksandr Lukashenko was able to win the support of the people and come

into power by mirroring the Soviet regime. Lukashenko first gained political power as chairman

of a committee in parliament that investigated corruption once Belarus gained independence in

1993 (Potocki, 2002). He gained popularity through his charisma, appearing relatable to the

common people and presented himself as an outcast on a mission to “tame an unruly

parliament” (Potocki, 2002). Once he attained this position, he publicly criticized and

demonized the communist nomenklatura and any push for privatization (Potocki, 2002).

However, Lukashenko lost much support one year later, and only a few months after his

inauguration, once the economy began to decline and his administration was unable to conceal

the mass inflation rate (Silitski, Preempting Democracy: The Case of Belarus, 2005). As a result,

he took control of most of the state institutions and enforced a high level of censorship on

media, in order to combat the opposition and to silence the accusations of his corruption

(Silitski, Preempting Democracy: The Case of Belarus, 2005). Additionally, he strongly pushed to

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deepen ties with Russia and even issued a dialect blending Belarussian and Russian (Potocki,

2002). As a result, Belarus has become viewed as a miniature replica of Russia.

As he gained power after achieved presidency in 1994, Lukashenka became more and

more controlling and paranoid of opposition. He evicted 22 ambassadors in 1998 due to

paranoia that they were spying on his home, but claimed there were plumbing issues in the

building (Potocki, 2002). Lukashenka has also even encouraged other states to gain strength. He

thought highly of Hitler and his strong leadership in Germany, offered weapons to Syria to use

against NATO, and criticized Russia for taking its nuclear weapons away (Potocki, 2002). Shortly

after his inauguration as president, Lukashenka started to enforce legislation that strengthened

his powers, while weakening all other branches of government.

Although Lukashenka was elected president democratically, the referendum that gave

him legitimacy has been criticized as fraudulent. “Through a series of edicts and directives

premised on the results of a bogus 1996 referendum, he has abolished the separation of

powers and local self-government and instituted direct rule by the presidential

administration—the infamous vertical” (Potocki, 2002). Lukashenka replaced the highest

legislative body, the Supreme Soviet, with the National Assembly with members he personally

chose. Additionally, all independent strands of media, such as newspapers and radio stations,

were shut down, and any signs of opposition were either intimidated, immediately forced to

back down, or jailed (Potocki, 2002). To this day, Lukashenko has control over everything in the

state, including administration, economy, and media (Silitski, Preempting Democracy: The Case

of Belarus, 2005). Although there had been some visible opposition through civil society, it had

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always struggled gaining strength and support due to its inability to “agreeing on a political

strategy” and organize. The people within the civil society were also unable to pose a good

alternative to Lukashenka and his neo-Soviet regime. As a result, Lukashenko had little trouble

silencing them as well.

Once the economy began to recover, people began to become more accepting of

Lukashenka. Western diplomats had even tried advising the Belarusians to push for a change in

regime, but they voiced their preference for the “old communist nomenklatura of both Belarus

and Russia” (Shushkevich, 2003). They had become accustomed to having one executive make

all decisions for them through communist methods and even believed it to be most lucrative

this way, adhering to their motto: “You are the boss, and I am the fool” (Shushkevich, 2003).

In addition to his push to reenact Soviet history within Belarus, Lukashenka became

quickly known for his peculiar behavior and appearance. He combs his hair in a particular

fashion, grooms his mustache in a “Stalinesque” way, often appears on television in a track suit,

has closed down streets to roller blade, and even plays hockey with the national team to this

day. He even tried seeming more personal with his people by insisting on being called “Batka”,

which means “Daddy” in Russian (Potocki, 2002).

In contrast to Belarus, Lithuania had a much more successful transition to democracy.

However, looking onto its history, it can be debated whether the state transitioned, or whether

it merely returned to its previous methods of democratic governance that were already

implemented before it had been taken over by the Soviet Union. Currently, Lithuania’s largest

import and export provider is also Russia, but no more than 22%. It also has more import and

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export partners than Belarus, dividing dependence a little better (CIA World Factbook). To this

day, Lithuania has been able to keep farming in its economy (Fritz, 2007). In contrast, Belarus

has become predominantly industrialized, partially due to the Chernobyl disaster in 1986 in

Ukraine (Potocki, 2002). Additionally, Lithuania has been described as similar to the Western

states and modernized. It has little to no ethnic issues, is predominantly Catholic, and its culture

is strongly influenced by Poland (Fritz, 2007).

Previous independence from 1918 until 1940 enabled Lithuania to not only develop a

strong sense of nationalism, but also allowed for the state to more quickly and smoothly

transition back as an independent state once the USSR had collapsed, while other states had to

start from scratch. Lithuania had even already elected a parliament before being taking under

USSR (Silitski, BELARUS AND RUSSIA: COMRADESHIP-IN-ARMS, 2007). Because the state had

experience as modern and independent, “it also [meant] a shorter period under communist

rule. By the mid-1990s, such historic differences vis-à-vis other post-Soviet states were

reinforced when the EU decided to accept the Baltic states’ applications for membership” (Fritz,

2007). Lithuania’s experience as not only a state, but also democracy, gave the state a secure

“jump start” back into the Westernized world and an overall democratic regime.

Among the Soviet states, Lithuania was able to reform with the highest speed and

success (Fritz, 2007). This could possibly be due to the fact that it was the most Westernized of

the region (Fritz, 2007). While under the Soviet Union, several movements began to develop

throughout the Baltic States (Fritz, 2007). Among those movements strengthened the Sajüdis

movement in Lithuania. By 1989, members of this movement had gained 36 out of 48 seats in

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the All-Union Congress of People’s Deputies. One year later, the party won 91 out of 141 seats

in the Lithuanian Supreme Court, where Sajüdis leader Vytautas Landsbergis was elected

primary chairman (Fritz, 2007). This enabled the Sajudis movement to strengthen, enforce

democratic change into the government, and even push for independence. However, the

“radical” demands for independence did not go unpunished. 13 people were killed due to

street fights after Soviet troops entered Vilnus (Fritz, 2007). The element of nationalism

through the Sajüdis movement strongly motivated and united the Lithuanians. In contrast, the

people of Belarus had “very little to no nationalism” (Fritz, 2007). The state’s history had always

been a part of the USSR and was never exposed to anything different until the fall of the Soviet

Union.

The current situations of both states ensure that neither will be making any transitions,

unless a crisis emerges. In order to better examine why two states that had both been under

Soviet Union rule during the 1990s had taken two completely different paths, one must

examine that time frame. When analyzing both Lithuania and Belarus during this time, their

current levels of democracy appear to be due to one factor that caused a number of factors,

both for and against democracy, to emerge within the states, including: whether or not the

state had existed prior to the affiliation with the Soviet Union, support from the West, and,

possibly the strongest factor, “people power”. These elements enabled the sense of

nationalism to develop and strengthen in Lithuania with fewer repercussions. As a result, the

people also practiced higher democratic values, causing them to push for a leader and

administration that were obliged to pursue democratic legislation. These elements were not

found in Belarus, primarily because the state had never existed independently before the

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emergence of the Soviet Union. Traumatic events caused the people to long for the Soviet

Union and choose a strong leader who mirrored their beloved past when they were successful.

Once Lukashenka was democratically elected, he was able to silence most opposition. Even

though civil societies had emerged, they had never been able to organize and centralize their

fight toward a common goal, giving Lukashenka more legitimacy, which encouraged the people

in Belarus to support his ways and communism. As a result, this leader was able to take

advantage of the desperation of the people while using his appearance and charisma to woo

the public. He removed all opposition and created a very oppressive regime in a short period of

time. Consequently, Lithuania and Belarus are complete opposites of each other during present

day, despite their similar history.

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Bibliography

CIA World Factbook. (n.d.). Retrieved from cia.gov.

Fritz, V. (2007). A comparative study of Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, and Russia. Central European

University Press.

Potocki, R. (2002). Dark Days in Belarus. Journal of Democracy, 142-156.

Shushkevich, S. (2003). Belarus: To Democracy through Neo-Communism. Demokratizatsiya, 55-62.

Silitski, V. (2005). Preempting Democracy: The Case of Belarus. Journal of Democracy, 83-97.

Silitski, V. (2007). BELARUS AND RUSSIA: COMRADESHIP-IN-ARMS. POLITICAL TRENDS IN THE NEW

EASTERN EUROPE: UKRAINE AND BELARUS, 1-15.

Vanderhill, R. (2014). Promoting Democracy and Promoting Authoritarianism: Comparing the Cases of

Belarus and Slovakia. Europe-Asia studies, 255-283.