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Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development in Afghanistan:

A Review based on a Multi and Cross Sector Approach

Chapter 1: Cross Cutting Issues

April 2006 By Amélie Banzet, Christine Bousquet, Béatrice Boyer, Agnès de Geoffroy, François Grünewald, Domitille Kauffmann, Peggy Pascal and Nicolas Rivière

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Acknowledgments

This mission is the result of interactions between many stakeholders. It would be very difficult to mention them all individually but we would like to thank all the organisations, institutions and people who helped us to work in optimal conditions, who took time to give us information, to offer us tour of their projects, and to allow us to collect a sizeable amount of information. The following organisations provided generous support to accommodate the team: Solidarités, AMI, UNHCR and Madera. We would also like to thank the government of Afghanistan for its support in our work as well as the people in the areas visited for their warm welcome. And a final thanks to the European Commission for its continued support and trust Groupe URD And the team members: François Grünewald: Team Leader Amélie Banzet: LRRD Programme Coordinator Christine Bousquet: Independent Consultant, Public Health &Health Economics Béatrice Boyer: Urban Development Agnès de Geoffroy: Education (assisted by Amélie Banzet) Domitille Kauffman: Nutritionist Peggy Pascal: Agronomist Nicolas Rivière: Independent Consultant, Water

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Table of Contents Acronyms…………………………………………………………………………………….……….5

Table of illustrations…………………………………………………………….…………………….7

1 BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................... 8

1.1 SHORT PRESENTATION OF GROUPE URD................................................................................................ 8 1.2 A BRIEF PRESENTATION OF THE LRRD PROGRAMME ............................................................................. 9

1.2.1 Research, Evaluation and Training................................................................................................... 9 1.2.2 The team.......................................................................................................................................... 10

1.3 THE MULTI SECTOR REVIEW ................................................................................................................. 10 1.3.1 Objectives and methodology ........................................................................................................... 10 1.3.2 The itinerary.................................................................................................................................... 10

2 AFGHANISTAN 2006: HOPES AND FEARS ........................................................................................ 12

2.1 ACHIEVEMENTS AND POSITIVE PROCESSES........................................................................................... 12 2.2 NEGATIVES TRENDS AND CONCERNS .................................................................................................... 12

3 REBUILDING OF THE STATE .............................................................................................................. 14

3.1 AT NATIONAL LEVEL ............................................................................................................................ 14 3.1.1 The emergence of lead ministries.................................................................................................... 14 3.1.2 The institutional framework for service delivery: a marked difference........................................... 15 3.1.3 The institutional framework for socio-economic sectors: a slow and complex process.................. 15

3.1.3.1 The agricultural sector............................................................................................................................ 16 3.1.3.2 The water / irrigation sector.................................................................................................................... 16 3.1.3.3 Urban development sector ...................................................................................................................... 17

3.1.4 Dynamics between policy makers and others actors....................................................................... 18 3.1.5 The issue of sustainability ............................................................................................................... 18 3.1.6 Building confidence between the GoA and the community remains the priority............................. 19

3.2 AT SUB-NATIONAL LEVEL..................................................................................................................... 19 3.2.1 Progress is visible but capacities and resources are still limited ................................................... 19 3.2.2 Improved mechanisms for coordination.......................................................................................... 20 3.2.3 The district functioning: not yet addressed ..................................................................................... 21

3.3 AT MUNICIPALITY LEVEL...................................................................................................................... 21 3.3.1 The urban situation: still uncontrolled............................................................................................ 21 3.3.2 Municipalities: subject to multiple and vested interests.................................................................. 22 3.3.3 Administrative city boundaries and responsibilities under question............................................... 22 3.3.4 Limited competences and financial capacities ................................................................................ 22

4 AID STAKEHOLDERS AND COMMUNITIES .................................................................................... 23

4.1 INCREASING COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION ............................................................................................ 23 4.2 RAISING COMMUNITY AWARENESS AND BUILDING CAPACITY .............................................................. 23 4.3 FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION VERSUS FREE DISTRIBUTION OR FREE DELIVERY........................................ 24 4.4 DIFFICULTIES IN ACCESSING COMMUNITIES.......................................................................................... 24

4.4.1 Growing insecurity: a major threat to development ....................................................................... 25 4.4.2 Building trust................................................................................................................................... 25 4.4.3 Dealing with emergency practices inherited from the past ............................................................. 26

5 INTERVENTION STRATEGIES ADOPTED BY NGOS ..................................................................... 27

5.1 A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING OPERATIONAL STRATEGIES ............................................................... 27 5.2 THE CHANGING AFGHAN CONTEXT ...................................................................................................... 28

5.2.1 Changes in access and community relations................................................................................... 28 5.2.2 Changes in funding mechanisms ..................................................................................................... 28 5.2.3 Changes in the stakeholders map.................................................................................................... 29

5.3 THE NGO COMMUNITY ........................................................................................................................ 29 5.3.1 Setting priorities.............................................................................................................................. 29 5.3.2 Which strategy?............................................................................................................................... 29

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5.3.3 Opportunities and challenges for NGOs working in health and education .................................... 30 5.3.4 Main NGO strategies ...................................................................................................................... 30

5.3.4.1 As implementing partners....................................................................................................................... 30 5.3.4.2 Filling unmet needs ................................................................................................................................ 31 5.3.4.3 Are there any other areas where NGOs have added value? .................................................................... 31

5.3.5 Opportunities and challenges for NGOs working in the socio-economic sectors ........................... 31 5.3.5.1 The main evolution................................................................................................................................. 31 5.3.5.2 Main NGO strategies.............................................................................................................................. 32

6 DONORS’ STRATEGIES ......................................................................................................................... 35

6.1 COORDINATION MECHANISMS AS A RESPONSE TO THE EFFECTIVE USE OF AID ...................................... 35 6.2 KEY TRENDS IN RELATION TO DONORS ................................................................................................. 36 6.3 LEVEL OF FUNDING VERSUS ABSORPTION CAPACITY ............................................................................ 36 6.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR NGOS .................................................................................................................... 37

Annexes …………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 39 Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………………………………51

Acronyms ACBAR Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief AD Agriculture Department (Provincial level) ADB Asian Development Bank AGCHO Afghanistan Geodesy & Cartography Head Office AIHRC Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission ANDS Afghan National Development Strategy AREU Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit BPHS Basic Package for Health Facilities CSANDS Civil Society ANDS CAWSS Central Authority for Water Supply and Sewerage CBS Community Based Schools CDC Community Development council CFW Cash For Work CHC Comprehensive Health Centre DACAAR Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees DAI Development Alternatives Inc. DEO District Education Office DH District Hospital EC European Commission EIRP Emergency Irrigation Rehabilitation Programme EPHS Essential Package for Hospital Services FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation FFW Food For Work GAA German Agro Action GoA Government of Afghanistan GTZ German Agency for Technical Cooperation GWT Global war against terror HMIS Health Management Information System HR Human Resources HSF Human Security Trust Fund I-ANDS Interim Afghanistan National development Strategy ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross ID Irrigation Department IDP Internally Displaced Person INGO International Non Governmental Organisation IWRM Integrated Water Resources Management JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency KRBP Kunduz River Basin Programme LRRD Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development LTERA Land Titling and Economic Restructuring in Afghnanistan MAAH Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry MAAHF Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Food MEW Ministry of Energy and Water MMI Ministry of Mines and Industry MoE Ministry of Education MoF Ministry of Finance MoH Ministry of Health MoHE Ministry of Higher Education MoI Ministry of Interior MoIC Ministry of information and Culture MoPH Ministry of Public Health MoRR Ministry of Refugees & Repatriation

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MOT Ministry of Transport MoWA Ministry of Women Affairs MPW Ministry of Public Works MRRD Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development MUD Ministry of Urban Development MUDH Ministry of Urban Development and Housing NEPA National Environmental Protection Agency NDF National Development Framework NGO Non Governmental Organisation NRM Natural Resources Management NPP National Priority Programme NSP National Solidarity Programme PCB Provincial Coordination Body PED Provincial Department of Education PHCC Provincial Health Coordination Committee PND Public Nutrition Department PNO Public Nutrition Officer PPA Partnership-based Agreement PRT Provincial Reconstruction Teams PRR Priority Reform and Restructuring PPHD Provincial Public Health Department PTA Parents and Teachers Association RAMP Rebuilding Agricultural Markets Programme RBA River Basin Authority SCA Swedish Committee for Afghanistan SFC Supplementary feeding centre SMC School Management Committee TA technical Assistance TEP Teacher Education Programme TFC Therapeutic Feeding Centre TFU Therapeutic Feeding Unit TV Television UN United Nations UNAMA United Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation UNEP United Nations for Environment Programme UNHCR United Nations for Environment Programme UNICEF United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women UNO University of Nebraska at Omaha UNOPS United Nations USAID United States Agency for International Development USD United States Dollar USI Universal Salt Iodization WB World Bank WFP World Food Programme WHO World Health Organisation WM Water Management WSS Water Supply & Sanitation WUA Water Users Association

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Table of illustrations

Figure 1: The learning cycle – Groupe URD.......................................................................... 8 Figure 2: Itinerary of the field mission ...................................................................................11 Figure 3: Model of service delivery for the basic package for health services by outsourcing to NGOs ...............................................................................................................................15 Figure 4: Model of functioning for the socio-economic sector ...............................................16 Box 1 : River Basin Institutional Development: an innovative experience .............................17 Box 2: Examples of policy and strategy formulation..............................................................18 Figure 5: Elaborating strategies in a volatile context .............................................................27 Figure 6: Summary of coordination and funding mechanisms..............................................35

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1 BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY

1.1 Short presentation of Groupe URD Groupe URD is a French research institute whose main goal is to: Improve quality of humanitarian practices through debate, research, evaluation, capacity building, training and lobbying. Groupe URD’s members include numerous development and emergency relief actors, academics and training institutions. Groupe URD’s main activities are evaluation, research and training, in line with the collective learning cycle (see below). International solidarity organisations are now fully aware of the dual responsibility they have to affected populations and donors in ensuring quality in their interventions. Groupe URD operates a collective learning cycle, which provides support for aid agencies engaged in this quality assurance exercise. The overall objective of these activities is to ensure continuous improvement of the aid delivered to affected populations. Figure 1: The learning cycle – Groupe URD

AAAFFFFFFEEECCCTTTEEEDDD

PPPOOOPPPUUULLLAAATTTIIIOOONNNSSS

&&& CCCOOONNNTTTEEEXXXTTT

Lesson learning Working to improve programme design and

implementation through evaluation

Bringing together expertise from different

disciplines through cross-sector or topic-based

research projects

Sharing our findings Publishing and disseminating the results of

our work

Providing a space for debate and sharing

ideas

Lobbying Advising and influencing donors,

decision makers, NGOs and UN

agencies

Capacity building Providing training for national and

international aid workers

Proposing new working methods Designing new tools and working

methods for aid agencies

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1.2 A brief presentation of the LRRD programme One of Groupe URD’s main programmes in Afghanistan is the two-year EC funded “Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development” programme. The objective of this programme is to draw lessons from current experience to inform policies and programmes for NGOs, donors, international agencies and governmental institutions. The LRRD programme focuses on six sectors:

- Urban Development - Water / Irrigation - Agriculture - Nutrition - Health - Education

1.2.1 Research, Evaluation and Training

The programme has three main components: 1- Learning and sharing lessons through iterative multi-sector reviews. This component includes (i) an in-depth review for each sector, which are currently under completion, and (ii) this report, which is based on a three-week multi sector field review. The process of “learning and sharing lessons” started with the Quality Project missions (supported by ECHO, the French Government and Swiss Development Committee). In July-August 2002, January-February 2003 and August 2003, a group of experts from Groupe URD came to Afghanistan to conduct multi-sector reviews in the aforementioned sectors, except for the water sector which was introduced in 2005 and the education sector which was introduced in 2006. These field missions enabled Groupe URD to closely monitor the evolution of the aid sector in Afghanistan and improve its understanding of current trends taking place within the humanitarian aid system. 2- Increasing knowledge and experience by carrying out applied research in urban and rural settings in specific fields (including food and economic security). Applied research usually focuses on key issues identified during the learning and sharing lessons process. Junior experts from Groupe URD conducted five-month research in Afghanistan on: Five different agrarian systems throughout Afghanistan; One small city, Bamiyan; one middle-sized city, Jalalabad; and one large city, Kabul. These studies provided Groupe URD with a good picture of Afghanistan’s urban and rural sectors. They were carried out in partnership with NGOs who had shown interest in incorporating applied research into their programmes from the outset. 3- Contributing to the capacity building efforts of relevant ministries and national NGOs through training on farming diagnosis methods and quality assurance. The main findings of these components are regularly presented in workshops and conferences. In this way, Groupe URD hopes to share and discuss the information collected with the widest range of stakeholders possible.

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1.2.2 The team

The LRRD team consists of the following members

- Four specialists from Groupe URD in charge of the Agriculture, Nutrition, Urban Development and Education sectors

- Two independent consultants for the Health and Water sectors - Three junior experts for the urban development sector and seven junior experts in

the rural development sector - A project coordinator permanently based in Kabul - Two translators and one logistician - Backstopping support and guidance from Groupe URD’s headquarters in France

1.3 The multi sector review During the three-week mission, the LRRD team travelled extensively in different provinces.

1.3.1 Objectives and methodology

Main objectives of this three-week field mission were to: - Develop a thorough understanding of the evolution of aid interventions and

strategies; - Identify the current opportunities and challenges pertaining to each sector; - Identify common trends and relevant issues and analyse them from a cross sector

perspective; - Stimulate debate with agencies and key stakeholders through a workshop

organised at Groupe URD’s office in Kabul on 24 April 2006. Data collection was based on a qualitative approach:

- Before the mission, each expert reviewed relevant available documents; - A common analysis framework was elaborated prior to the field trip - Regular meetings gathering all team members took place during the field trip to

crosscheck information and share preliminary findings, and to analyse cross-cutting issues and multi-sector comparisons

- Interviews with national and local authorities, donors, aid workers from local and international NGOs, representatives from the UN, ICRC and the private sector were conducted in Kabul and the different provinces visited; ensuring a balanced representation of the different stakeholders;

- Visits to a number of projects took place enabling the team to make their observations.

1.3.2 The itinerary

It is important to take into account the limitations the team had to cope with during the mission. It was clear from the beginning that it would be difficult to take into account many specificities of Afghanistan due to:

- Time constraints: The three-week time frame was too short for such a large scale mission. This meant that the team had, in some instances, to adjust field visits.

- Access constraints: The mission took place in April, with persisting difficulties to access certain areas due to snow and unopened roads.

- Security constraints: Given the instability prevailing in a number of provinces, the review did not capture the reality of the southern part of the country.

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The selection for the provinces took into account the following criteria: Diversity in terms of culture, geographical situation, landscape and economy. Most of these provinces were visited during previous field missions in 2002 and 2003 which allowed the team to get a comprehensive understanding of the evolutions. The provinces visited were the following (see map 1)

- Kabul - Bamiyan - Samangan - Balkh - Baghlan - Kunduz - Takhar - Nangahar - Wardak - Ghazni

Figure 2: Itinerary of the field mission

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2 AFGHANISTAN 2006: HOPES AND FEARS In April 2006 when the multi-sector mission was underway, the political situation was full of contrasts. Many processes that are being implemented simultaneously are indeed driving the country in opposite directions.

2.1 Achievements and positive processes There are very positive processes:

- Successful presidential and parliamentary elections showed the rest of the world that commitment to building democracy is not in vain. The Afghan people, men and women alike, walked for hours in harsh terrain to cast their ballot papers, despite Taliban threats. The numerous assassinations and damage inflicted on voting stations did not succeed in breaking the will of the population to express their views on the future.

- The end of the Bonn Process and start of the London process mark the end of a

first phase of International Community commitment. The scope of renewed pledges and the rapidity with which decisions were made at the London Afghanistan Compact meeting are indications that Afghanistan has not yet been relegated to budgetary history. The still resolute engagement of the International Community to support the security sector shows how important the stabilisation of Afghanistan is at the highest strategic level.

- In many sectors, there are clear indications of an increased capacity of the

Afghan authorities. This is the result of both a sustained commitment to capacity building by many international actors, and a strong desire by Afghan authorities for ownership of institutions and policy-making. Yet, this improvement is not advancing at an equal pace in all sectors and at all levels. It is a phenomenon that remains largely restricted to Kabul as a result of the presence of many expatriate consultants with advisory roles at high levels in ministries. It has only recently begun to percolate down to the lower levels of central administration and to the provinces. In rural areas, especially at the district level, capacity in general and related absorption capacity are often very limited.

2.2 Negatives trends and concerns However, there are a certain number of negative trends which are a cause for great concern:

- While large parts of the South and East remain grey zones largely uncontrolled by the Kabul government, growing insecurity is progressively encroaching on areas that were previously calm: The North is becoming increasingly affected by this worrying phenomenon and areas between Baghlan and Jawzjan are now regularly plunged into the high insecurity syndrome, with roadside bombs, attacks on UN Convoys, physical eliminations of visible political figures and assassinations of NGO staff. Kabul itself is becoming more unstable and the risk of suicide bombers is on the rise. Are these time-bound distinctive processes or metastases from the GWT (Global War against Terror)? Only history will tell, but agencies have already raised their levels of vigilance.

- The “poppy issue” remains a difficult problem. Is Afghanistan on the road to

becoming a “Narco-state”, as certain observers have declared? Or do

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opportunities exist to control poppy production and eliminate the traders and the transformers, who appear to so deeply-rooted in Taliban circles and the Central Asian mafia? The fact is that draconian measures, such as airborne spraying of herbicide or violent repressive interventions at the field level, run the inherent risk of sending the population straight into the net of military opponents.

- With the growing insecurity, the humanitarian space in which aid agencies

(humanitarian and reconstruction work) are able to work is shrinking dramatically. There are areas where agencies are simply not prepared to work, unless they accept to pay a high price in terms of human life, or to bunker down (armed convoys, armoured vehicles, high protection zones, etc.). For some stakeholders, a solution for the growing pressure on humanitarian space is the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), where armed forces carry out humanitarian and reconstruction work. In contrast to the PRT school of thought, there are those who claim that this solution is more dangerous than the problem itself because it increases the confusion between the different stakeholders and their mandates. These stakeholders believe that the increasingly blurred distinction between armed forces and humanitarian actors is indeed one of the sources of high insecurity currently facing NGOs.

- While the international community applauded the election process that led to the

creation of the Afghan parliament, Afghan civil society is raising many questions about the net outcome of these parliamentary elections. Indeed, although the political process may have intended to install “pro-government” forces at the provincial level, it actually enabled many former warlords to be elected, resulting in widespread disappointment: those who were guilty of causing so much trouble are now back in power.

This picture of contrasts provides an important starting point for the final year of the LRRD programme in its current form. The new security situation will oblige Groupe URD teams to review their working methods and the way in which field research will be conducted. After the shift from emergency to rehabilitation and development, we may well see the reverse process occurring. Is Afghanistan entering into the Fragile States category with the risk that negative trends may overcome positive ones? How will the aid sector adjust to these changes, especially to the impact on operational procedures (security, etc.)? These elements will require careful studying.

3 REBUILDING OF THE STATE Over the past years, political strategy has focused on rebuilding the Afghan state not only through reconstruction of facilities but also through efforts to restore the authority of central government. The objective is to make a system work despite security failings in several parts of the country which are seriously endangering the success of the September 2004 presidential and parliamentary elections. One of the main often-cited concerns are the numerous political challenges present at sub-national level. While Afghanistan has been described as a highly centralised state in administrative, fiscal and political terms, complex political dynamics play a critical role in shaping policy with a de facto decentralisation dominated by regional warlords or local commanders (Evans et al, 2004)1. Another issue of concern for sub-national authorities is the obsolescence of the administrative system inherited from the Soviet period and the general weakness of competences at all levels, a situation which has been exacerbated by two decades of conflict.

3.1 At national level

3.1.1 The emergence of lead ministries

Since 2002, significant changes have taken place that appear to reassert and strengthen Kabul’s authority and its capacity to deliver basic support to provinces and districts. Improved organisation within ministries is apparent although the pace of change is by no means equal in all institutions. For instance, the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) emerged with a strong leadership and experienced staff. In sharp contrast the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Food (MAAHF) seems to lag behind and suffer from a lack of deliberated and clarified strategy and from weak technical and managerial capacity. Despite an improved understanding of the considerable needs in the urban sector, the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing (MUDH) has not yet achieved its overall restructuring, as illustrated by indecision over the ministry’s name: MUDH or Ministry of Urban Development (MoUD). The latter heading implies that responsibilities for housing will come under another ministry, although to date this remains a major issue. As a positive trend, some institutional actors have attempted to better delineate new strategies, roles and responsibilities. For instance in the water sector, there has been an improved division of responsibilities among the various ministries responsible for the management of this valuable resource, i.e. the Ministry of Water and Energy acting as “umbrella” Ministry, the MRRD, the MAAHF, the Ministry of Mines and Industry (MMI) and the MUDH. This observation also holds partially true in the urban sector. Although the MUDH has not yet defined a global urban policy, some of its departments actively work on different urban issues through sector-based strategic approaches. For example, urban development policy is analysed at a regional strategic level with the creation of the Strategic Regional Planning Department. In the same vein, surveys aimed at linking the development and preservation of Afghan old urban centres are conducted by the new Department for the Safeguarding of Afghanistan's Urban Heritage. However, despite these efforts, lack of capacity within the MUDH seriously hampers internal coordination. 1 Evans A., Manning N., Osmani Y., Tully A., and Wilder A., (2004), A guide to Government in Afghanistan,

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit and The World Bank.

Since the fall of the Taliban, new ministries have been set up again, such as the Ministry of Women Affairs (MoWA). However, this ministry, acting as a “policy-maker”, suffers from its imprecise role description and insufficient resources. Its current role is highly limited and some improvements should be devised to better integrate this ministry in the ministerial responsibility framework.

3.1.2 The institutional framework for service delivery: a marked difference

Service delivery for education and health takes two different forms. The education sector is under the management of the Ministries of Education (MoE) and Higher Education (MoHE) with public schools and universities operated by civil servants. Some private higher education institutions are in the process of being created (universities or institutes), but to date the government has not yet officially acknowledged their existence, except in the case of the American University. This form of service delivery is in line with the historical tradition of the Afghan state whereby the ministry covered all the functions. By contrast the health sector2 is characterised by a provider-purchaser split: financing and regulating functions remain with the MoPH while the delivery of the Basic Package for Health Services has been externally contracted to NGOs (Figure 1.1). Figure 3: Model of service delivery for the basic package for health services by outsourcing

3 to

NGOs

Adapted from: Chapter 8. Delivering services to the Afghan people, World Bank, in http:// siteresources.worldbank.org.

3.1.3 The institutional framework for socio-economic sectors: a slow and complex

process

In 2004, the GoA completed the new National Priority Programmes (NPPs) “…to accelerate Afghanistan from a position of recovery and rehabilitation to that of sustainable development”. After an emergency period of five years, NPPs pave the way for development, although current issues are still focusing on rehabilitation. They mostly concern socio-economic sectors such as rural or urban development.

2 The theoretical arguments for separating health care financing from provision are further described in the health sector review conducted in October 2005. 3 Outsourcing: A strategy whereby an external operator will perform an activity an actor has decided to stop

performing himself.

State: is accountable to people, responsible for purchasing, financing, and regulating

Afghan people: contribute financially through taxes and cost-sharing schemes

NGOs: provide health services

Donors: Funding

3.1.3.1 The agricultural sector The first document to outline and define the main policies and strategies was the National Development Framework (NDF) presented in April 2002. This document, followed by the Master Plan in 2005, provides a number of guidelines and principles to guide the reconstruction of the country. The Master Plan stresses the role of the Government (GoA) as regulator, policy and strategy maker, evaluator and promoter of the entrepreneurial investment while production and management of the economy are assigned to the private sector (Figure 2). Figure 4: Model of functioning for the socio-economic sector

Sources: Groupe URD

In addition, the Master Plan addresses the division of responsibilities and roles between the public and the private sectors. While creating an encouraging and friendly environment for the private sector, provision of justice, security and equality, investment in human capital as well as social well-being will remain the responsibility of the state,

3.1.3.2 The water / irrigation sector GoA, donors and other international agencies have taken advantage of political changes that occurred in 2001 and institutional weaknesses to launch in-depth reform. This is also in line with global pressure to develop and manage water resources in the most appropriate and sustainable manner. Water resource management is a great challenge for Afghan institutions because of its various origins, purposes (in rural and urban settings; for agriculture, power, human consumption and industries) and dimensions (economic, social and environment). The institutional development process aims to take into account principles of social and economic development, cost recovery and environmental sustainability in a holistic and integrated manner. This is seen as a dynamic and gradual process, which needs to be monitored and updated regularly with feed-back from the field and from practical experiences. A policy framework was first built around integrated water resources management concepts by the core or lead ministry: the Ministry of Energy and Water (MEW). The policy framework was then followed up by a series of legal, strategic and policy documents developed or revised in each sub-sector (irrigation, groundwater, drinking water and sanitation, hydropower) by the relevant government bodies, such as the Central Authority for Water Supply and Sewerage (CAWSS) and the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA). The reforms also included a reorganisation of ministerial roles and responsibilities , laying the foundations for a highly decentralised system at the River Basin level as illustrated in the box below.

Funding

Afghan people NGOs: provide services (inputs and training to communities)

Donors: Funding Technical assistance and funding

Department of Agriculture at the provincial or district level

M&E

Central ministry: policy maker, regulator, evaluator and promoter of the entrepreneurial investment

Box 1 : River Basin Institutional Development: an innovative experience In terms of institutional development and state rebuilding, the water sector reform is quite unique: it aims for a complete overhaul of political and administrative systems at central, provincial and district levels, as well as achieving a better balance between the public and the private sectors. The concept of Integrated Water Resources Management mentioned in the policy framework emphasises the role of the River Basin as a geographical entity within the new institutional set up. While Afghanistan is divided into five independent river basins, the water sector will be organised in accordance with the hydrological networks and boundaries, and no longer based on the classic and rigid administration sub-national divisions. This new set up will allow stakeholders to undertake integrated and sustainable management of water resources more effectively. Linked to this institutional development, River Basin Authorities (RBAs) will be established in each river basin and certain powers will be delegated to them from central level. Above the River Basin level, the ministry at central level will mainly play a “constitutional” role with responsibilities for national planning, policies, strategies and legislation. Below some operational sub levels will be found such as the Sub-Basin, the Watershed, the irrigation schemes where the communities through the WUA and the shuras will have a major role in regulating water use and users according to defined rules. The Kunduz River Basin funded by the EC is a pilot programme for implementing and testing institutional and organisational changes. This move towards decentralised regional planning and development within the water sector is of great interest. Whether the model is realistic in the Afghan context and can be extended to economic development and natural resources management remain critical issues. Only time and experience will provide answers to these questions.

As for the other socio-economic sectors, there is a significant tendency to give an important role to the private sector. Empowering water users through formal and relevant associations for self-efficient water management, and developing private companies for service delivery are the main objectives. Consequently, the changing responsibilities of the state within the water sector, have been limited to three main functions: legislation, regulation and facilitation, and divided up into several ministries and public institutions. Within the new institutional set-up, "Working Together in Participatory Management of Water Resources”, to coin the official term, is the greatest challenge for all public and private (former and new) institutions.

3.1.3.3 Urban development sector This sector is complex both because of the post-crisis situation and the multidimensional aspects it involves. Institutional urban actors are confronted with vast and uncontrolled urban local extensions in a context of a rigid and obsolete central administration system. Several NPPs are planned before a framework for urban policy is to be developed. In addition, international advice and economic pressure coerced GoA into going ahead with a rehabilitation policy for existing urban areas. This placed the priority on the construction of ex nihilo new cities as a solution for urban issues. However, urban rehabilitation is time-consuming, much more complex than building new settlements and implies taking into account both the various NPPs and other programmes4. In terms of basic urban services delivery, the urban administrative framework, which still based on a 30 year old system, does not take into account the spatial reality of the urban situation and covers only the areas outlined in the Master Plan, omitting an estimated 30-

4 Including Urban Programme, Urban Water (Drinking Water) Programme, Justice & Rule of Law Programme,

Skill Development Programme and Private Sector Programme.

70% of the population from basic urban services. Moreover, the different public technical administrations in charge of power and water supply are not able to cope either financially or technically with existing needs. Currently, the international aid trend is both to reinforce the capacities of the CAWSS under the MUDH and to mobilise international private operators with bidding for management contracts.

3.1.4 Dynamics between policy makers and others actors

While increasing attention has been dedicated to policy-making, the formulation of policies and strategies has also varied depending on the sectors (Box 2). Box 2: Examples of policy and strategy formulation For the health sector: The rapid formulation of a national policy framework for health and nutrition led to a consensus concerning a basic package and the contracting strategy for implementation. The policy formulation process involved intense discussions and debates among key stakeholders including MoPH, donors and UN agencies but NGO contributions were limited. In the agricultural and water sectors: Many actors feel that some degree of external pressure has influenced policy and that imported concepts, poorly connected to reality in the field, have dominated the policy agenda. In terms of agriculture, despite the fact that many documents raise the importance of promoting the development of private sector wheat seeds, free distributions take place every year and dramatically affect the livelihoods of private improved seeds growers. Promoting ownership of Afghan authorities in the process, albeit sought after, has not been optimal. In addition it has been noted that NGOs tended to be excluded from the early stages of the process.

For urban development and housing: In general the urban sector is characterised by thorough needs assessment with strong support and involvement from the international community. However urban policy is not yet defined despite strong support from the main donors. Key difficulties include: misunderstandings between key institutional urban actors such as Kabul Municipality and the MUDH; complexity and limited time frame to implement new mechanisms to solve land tenure issues due to informal housing settlements. Regarding the nutrition sector, it is interesting to note the shift from emergency to development in terms of the way policies have been designed. During the emergency period, nutrition policy was pushed aside and NGOs were in charge of implementing nutritional programmes. At that time, the main objective was clearly the treatment of malnutrition and prevention strategies were not a core issue. Since 2003 thanks to the strengthening of the GOA, nutrition issues have been taken on by MOPH through the creation of the public nutrition department. Nutrition policy is based on various objectives enabling nutrition to be seen as part of an integrated approach where health and agriculture issues are brought together to enhance good practices in nutrition.

3.1.5 The issue of sustainability

Since 2001 critical advances have been made in implementing institutional reforms. While it is encouraging to note that emphasis is being placed on the development of national systems and processes, it remains to be seen if these can become sufficiently robust over the long term. Indeed there is still considerable uncertainty over the funding mechanisms that are required to sustain the reforms. This concern was shared by most of the respondents, especially in relation to improved salaries for restructured ministries and departments as authorised by the Priority Reform and Restructuring (PRR) process, and for the education and health service delivery which rely mostly upon external resources. There is no obvious solution to this issue, other than accepting that GoA and international community commitment and time are central to state rebuilding. The issue of sustainability for the Urban Development suggests the need for thorough technical, economic and social surveys, for example in the field of urban water supply or

solid waste system, as currently investigated by the World Bank. Nevertheless this type of survey will require time, increased databases and synergies between all urban stakeholders.

3.1.6 Building confidence between the GoA and the community remains the priority

After nearly five years of assistance, Afghans are expecting more than immediate survival and relative peace. Although the Afghan government’s decision to include civil society perspectives in the development of economic policy and the setting of development priorities has been a welcome initiative5, the Feinstein International Famine Centre report “Mapping Security in Afghanistan” and the Afghanistan Human Rights Commission’s last report both shows that there are gaps to fill. The AIHRC report6 (2006) highlights very low levels of trust in the functioning of government institutions, such as formal justice, and in their capacity to solve disputes over access to key resources including land, housing and water. According to the report, 55% of the population attempted to solve problems through traditional mechanisms7 while 38% used formal mechanisms8. Sixty percent of the individuals and institutions interviewed identified the GoA and local authorities as unable to provide assistance.

3.2 At sub-national level

3.2.1 Progress is visible but capacities and resources are still limited

In most of the provinces visited during the review, the physical facilities at provincial departments are equipped with the basic set-up but lack means of communication and transport and rely heavily upon NGOs or UN agencies. This is particularly true for the provincial health departments. In most departments, people’s skills are basic. In the agricultural sector, employees are often elderly with outdated skills. Many are asking for more basic research based on the old “research-extension” model. In contrast, capacity in applied research and qualitative research methods are lacking as staff are not trained to appreciate systemic approaches as a means of broadening the scope of rural development. In addition, although at central level the roles and responsibilities for the provincial administrations have been reviewed, these changes do not seem to be fully comprehended at the sub-level. For instance, in the 1970’s and the 1980’s the MAAHF played a service delivery role, including distribution, extension and popularisation. Nowadays, its new role is mainly shaped around policy making and monitoring activities in order to provide a stable environment for private sector development. However, it clearly emerges during the interviews that provincial and district staff have almost no knowledge and no understanding of these new roles. For the majority, the role of the MAAHF is the same as it was in the 1970’s and 1980’s focusing on agricultural inputs delivery, research, extension and popularisation. This lack of knowledge carries the risk that expectations may be raised in the community. The new measures for appointing senior civil servants and competent staff to the provinces are ongoing, albeit slow. For instance, a number of qualified staff including Public Nutrition Officers (PNO) located in the Provincial Public Health Department (PPHD) have been

5 The primary focus for the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) process is the creation of the Civil

Society ANDS (CSANDS) resource group. The CSANDS group was created to increase and widen civil society participation through consultation, research activities, capacity building, and public education. 6

Page 41- 42 7 Shuras, elders, mullahs

8 Government and local authorities, court, and police

recruited through the PRR decree. Nevertheless remuneration levels may be difficult to sustain in the near future when external support withdraws. This evolution is not yet visible in urban sector management. Urban institutional officers (MUDH, CAWSS engineers…) have the necessary capacity to work and manage their sector as long as the situation is related to their know-how and to the areas of the cities limited to administrative boundaries. With urban expansion, there is virtually no evidence of capacity building for staff or improved means of communication in the provincial offices. For example, in the Bamiyan MUDH office, only one engineer was present working with paper and a pen in the absence of communication tools. And yet, in recent years the development of Bamiyan has become an international objective with campaigns, surveys, participation of different ministries and foreign universities, and international funds for “The Preservation of the World Cultural Heritage”. Most of the key informants at provincial level viewed the financial constraints as a source of frustration, leaving provincial staff with no resources to implement their responsibilities and with limited solutions to tackle the problems themselves. This situation, while posing threats to the provincial credibility and legitimacy, forces the staff to be dependent on NGOs or other local actors. Although it is difficult to conclude which weaknesses are contributing factors, budget allocations at the discretion of each ministry, little provincial authority over expenditure, slow disbursement of funds and poor absorption capacity seem to play a role in the shortage of financial resources. Regulatory and monitoring functions at the sub-national level are given less priority and are likely to require support in the future. Furthermore negative perceptions of government capacity and integrity did emerge from the interviews. Many key informants viewed the prospects for institutional improvements at sub-national level bleak because of the influence of politicians and rent-seeking behaviours, including the illegal distribution of land for urban development and housing.

3.2.2 Improved mechanisms for coordination

New mechanisms have also been established to improve coordination among aid actors and provincial departments. In the agricultural sector although coordination has improved between the different key players, the interviews with key informants and respondents suggest that much progress remains to be made. In many places, a competitive frame of mind persists. In some provinces, two main NGOs working on similar programmes in the same area were not aware of the methods, approaches and activities implemented by the other. Now that the emergency period is over and that longer term approaches are receiving the necessary support, it is surely time to move beyond sole operations. Although certain initiatives like the Provincial Coordination Body (PCB)9 have had some impact on coordination mechanisms, exercises for sharing lessons learnt are limited among NGOs. The agenda mainly focuses on avoiding duplication and overlaps but some NGOs pointed out that they would like to learn from other organisation’s experiences, failures and success stories.

9 The PCB are held on a monthly basis at the provincial level. They are organised by the Governor. The main

objective is to improve coordination and avoid duplication between the government and aid stakeholders, and among aid stakeholders.

The parochial attitudes that some NGOs have are certainly an obstacle for improving collaboration. However, it is also true that it is a difficult objective to achieve when NGOs do not agree on common principles and views. The development of a clear strategy by the GoA is a prerequisite for a clear collaboration between the different stakeholders involved in development projects. The CSANDS process aims at ensuring that civil society has a say in the definition of a global strategy. Once this strategy is drafted and accepted by the GoA, donors, UN agencies and CSANDS, any action that goes beyond the agreed framework will be penalised. Those breaking the law could be prosecuted. Whether the decision to include civil society in this process will truly be respected remains to be seen but these efforts are commendable. The process is expected to be terminated by 2008.

3.2.3 The district functioning: not yet addressed

Districts are recognised units of sub-national administration but very few ministries have representation and staff at this level. While little progress has been made in re-activating the basic district system, one key question is what roles and responsibilities district administration will have in the future. Currently this is still unclear and most districts operate under critical financial constraints with virtually no resources. In addition, the challenges of building capacity at this level are great and there is much work to be done to improve their skills and abilities. As an illustration, the Project for Alternative Livelihoods in Eastern Afghanistan (implemented by GTZ and funded by the EC) is an interesting initiative aimed at strengthening community decision-making powers on the one hand and at increasing capacity at the district level on the other.

3.3 At municipality level

3.3.1 The urban situation: still uncontrolled

According to Evans et al (2004) 10… “Municipalities are, in principle, a separate level of government in that they have some limited autonomy in budget execution and in budget preparation. However, the Ministry of Interior (MoI) controls their staffing establishment and approves their budgets. … Municipalities operate differently than other levels of administration; they keep the revenues they raise, develop budgets and manage their own financial and administrative responsibilities, with oversight by the MoI. …Municipalities are self-sustaining entities with responsibility for providing some services and collecting minor revenues from local service charges and retail licences.” Overall, municipalities have seen their populations changing and increasing significantly, surpassing their own management capacities. On the one hand, the lasting years of war with various waves of population displacement and widespread looting, caused by particularly violent conflict in urban areas, have left a chaotic urban situation. On the other hand, all the new housing settlements, inside the cities and around their existing limits, built by returnees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), nomads and rural people, have spread without any planning and strategic development, increasing population concentration.

10

Evans A., Manning N., Osmani Y., Tully A., and Wilder A., A guide to Government in Afghanistan, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit and The World Bank, 2004

3.3.2 Municipalities: subject to multiple and vested interests

At the municipality level, staff capacity is not adapted to the critical urban situations that currently exist. Although the Ministry of Interior (MoI) oversees municipalities, they are the local theatre of power stakes with other actors and are under the influence of the governor and unofficial powerful individuals with vested interests. In this highly politicised context, the interests of the general public are often forgotten and a large part of the urban population has no access to basic services.

3.3.3 Administrative city boundaries and responsibilities under question

All the guidelines for administrative interventions were established more than thirty years ago and there is no connection anymore between the actual city and the administrative city. The most important urban problem concerns the illegal status of many settlements which prevents legal administrative interventions from being carried out. The definition of new administrative limits and clarification of the role of the municipalities, with a New Municipal Law under consideration, are responsibilities at national level.

3.3.4 Limited competences and financial capacities

The present budget established for small cities does not allow municipalities to respond to new needs. As in Kabul, provincial municipalities have to tackle issues that exceed their capacities. Several factors affecting efficient urban management could be observed during the field visits: insufficient budgets, lack of competent staff in terms of socio-economic and technical skills, and poor communication with different administrations.

4 AID STAKEHOLDERS AND COMMUNITIES

4.1 Increasing community participation The relations between aid stakeholders and the communities have evolved a lot since 2001. Communities are increasingly seen as key actors for their self promotion and development. Many acronyms reflect this new reality: PTA - Parents and Teachers Association in the case of the schools, CHW - Community Health Worker, CDC - Community Development Councils for the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), WUA – Water Users’ Association, etc. Nowadays, community participation is often one of the core components of projects. Forms of participation vary depending on the type of participatory tools or methods used during project’s implementation. In some projects, communities are asked to assess their own needs, to implement projects themselves or to maintain new services or assets. For instance, in the case of the NSP’s projects, communities represented by the CDCs are asked to assess their own needs, to establish priorities and finally to implement the project with the support of a facilitating partner. However, one can only wonder whether communities are really capable of carrying out all these tasks. One of the main achievements of the NSP is to have given communities a chance to have a direct impact on their future, more than through the traditional shuras. Thanks to NGOs, the CDCs are seen as a bridge between the communities and the government structures. However, in some cases, the relevance and the sustainability of the community’s choice can be questioned. For instance, in many cases the CDCs chose to buy a generator in order to provide the village with electricity but is electricity truly the highest priority for all and a real need? NGOs implementing NSP programmes are being confined to the role of facilitating bodies and are no longer given a chance to point out the difference between expressed needs and real needs11. It is sometimes difficult for communities as a coherent group to carry out a long-term and general assessment of their own needs. Moving towards a bottom-up approach is without any contest a good and necessary step in the reconstruction process in Afghanistan. However, ensuring that the choices made by the communities are the most relevant and address real needs remains a real challenge.

4.2 Raising community awareness and building capacity A consequence of this new trend related to community participation is the emergence of two key priorities: raising community awareness and building capacity. Taking the education sector for instance, some NGOs provide training on fund-raising and project management for PTAs and for School Management Committees. Within the Rural Development area (irrigation, water supply and sanitation, and Natural Resources Management) policies and strategies implemented by the aid stakeholders are strongly based on users who request capacity building for community self empowerment and management. A Social Water Management approach is developed by some donors and programmes in order to revitalize and modernize the ancient mirab12 system within the traditional irrigation schemes managed by the communities. The setting up of Water Users’ Associations has three main objectives. First, it aims at increasing awareness on water scarcity issues. Secondly, it aims to

11

“One of the most important issues at stake is understanding people’s real needs. This entails bringing together agency expertise and their perception of the situation and the affected population’s expectations and requests” Quality COMPAS see www.compasqualite.org/compas/outil 12

Title and function for water master or manager within a tradition irrigation scheme

emphasize the need for more efficient and equitable management and thirdly to develop proper forms of users organisations. In terms of the emergence of farmer’s groups and cooperatives, it is worth mentioning some ongoing research13. MRRD is currently implementing several large programmes in order to establish democratic community-based structures for improved governance and to decentralise needs-based development planning and implementation. The establishment of the CDCs through the NSP has created important new structures for community-based development. It might be interesting to consider bringing together the CDCs and farmers' associations, cooperatives and common interest groups in the formulation and implementation of agricultural development programmes.

4.3 Financial contribution versus free distribution or free delivery

Financial participation is seen as a way of increasing partnership and sustainability but sometimes conflicting approaches prevail. Regarding service delivery, there are two main approaches: (i) customers have to pay a fee to access a service, (ii) customers have free access. Although the Afghan Constitution guarantees free and compulsory access to basic education (grade 1 to 9), in the case of the CBSs, communities are sometimes asked to pay the teacher’s salary. However, in other cases teachers are paid by NGOs. The rationale behind asking the community to pay teachers’ salaries is to work towards sustainability. It is also a way of enhancing the community’s sense of involvement and facilitating ownership. However, when communities are unable to pay, this policy jeopardises the whole project, bringing its immediate sustainability into question. Within the agricultural sector and regarding the issue of seeds and other agro inputs, the same problem prevails. While some NGOs or programmes provide free seeds to farmers, others attempt to develop a sustainable seeds market system through the support of private initiatives with the aim that producers will sell their seeds at the local market (the creation of wheat seeds enterprises by the FAO for instance). In this case, free seeds distribution jeopardise the nascent private seed market and ruin the work carried out by a number of NGOs. Although community participation is attractive, it also has its own limitations. In the case of CHWs, it appears increasingly difficult to identify candidates and retain them. The fact that they are requested to perform a wide range of tasks on a voluntary basis is a contributing factor to the number of drop-outs. The current situation may call for other forms of incentives if their contribution is to be enhanced.

4.4 Difficulties in accessing communities In Afghanistan, community participation is strongly limited by the issue of accessing the communities which is challenged by a number of factors: security, geographic constraints and cultural barriers. For instance, men and women have neither equal access to health care, nor to education. Moreover, international aid stakeholders do not always take enough time to understand and adapt their projects and policies to firmly entrenched cultural attitudes, sensitivity and habits. Physical access to communities is another constraint. In the mountainous regions, education services delivery is made difficult by the landscape and the

13

Sanne Chipeta, Support to strategic planning for sustainable rural livelihoods – Afghanistan: Concepts for Community Based Agricultural Service Systems in Afghanistan, First Mission Report, Draft, Danish Agricultural Advisory Service, January 2006

harsh climatic conditions. However, in the current situation, the major constraint is the growing insecurity.

4.4.1 Growing insecurity: a major threat to development

Unless the needs and expectations of the Afghan population are met shortly, the country could easily slide back into chaos. The current trend, as illustrated by the events of May 2006, is very worrying. UN agencies and NGOs are increasingly targeted and the insurgents have gained power in the southern parts of the country. In some regions, health facilities and schools are increasingly being targeted: according to ANSO, 23 schools have been attacked since January 2003. It is also increasingly risky to spend time in the field. Even in traditionally “calm” areas, NGOs have been attacked (e.g. Ghor, Baghlan, Jawzan). In general, to improve project quality, substantial time needs to be spent in the field for an in-depth assessment of constraints, assets and people’s real needs. However, field work is hampered since NGOs have become targets and it will difficult to ensure the shift towards development methods if security does not improve. Due to the insecurity problems in some parts of the country, few NGOs are implementing projects in the southern region and many are hesitating. In Kabul, the head of an INGO argued: “Should we go to the south? Can we work there? How can you work if you have to wonder every morning if the people you met yesterday and you plan to meet today are going to organise your kidnapping, or if your car won’t be targeted…” In the southern region, NGOs are finding it increasingly complicated to work in rural areas. Time spent in the field has been decreased to a bare minimum at the expense of quality. Therefore, the most insecure areas are those with the least humanitarian presence. However, insurgents clearly benefit from this situation of fear and maintain it on purpose. In these parts of the country, the gap between the communities and the GoA is undoubtedly widening. There is a risk that if the population feels let down by both the international community and the GoA, there is a high risk that the insurgents will gain in popularity.

4.4.2 Building trust

There are clear indications that aid is orienting towards development tools, bottom up approaches and participatory methods, giving the community a key role to play. In spite of this, in the past two years the population appears to becoming increasingly disappointed in aid inputs or the impact of aid, with resentment being expressed towards external stakeholders14. During the field interviews, some aid stakeholders pointed out the difficulties they have in building community trust, a complex undertaking when it concerns the GoA or NGOs. Nepotism at the local administration level still prevails and this sometimes impairs their legitimacy. In some cases, communities are reluctant to provide information to aid agencies. For example hygiene workers, who visit the same villages several times to collect information, conduct surveys and monitor activities, have sometimes been perceived as potential spies, and have had difficulties persuading the community to cooperate. In order to alleviate this problem, some NGOs started distributing free hygiene kits to motivate the population to open their doors.

14

“Note on Local Perceptions of Assistance to Afghanistan” - Preliminary observations by Antonio Donini

4.4.3 Dealing with emergency practices inherited from the past

Another limitation to community participation is certain types of behaviour inherited from the emergency period, and which are still encouraged today. Communities became accustomed to receiving help without direct participation, and this remains an obstacle to community mobilisation to this day. The PRTs for example are still working in ‘emergency mode’, providing services or distributions for free, without soliciting community participation. This is also linked to the well-known problem of incentives. On the one hand, some NGOs and donors continue to provide incentives in order to increase community participation and meet community expectations. On the other hand, in order to ensure ownership and project sustainability, other NGOs and donors ask the community to contribute or to get involved in the projects. The case of the de-silting of canals is a good illustration of the potential negative impact of aid on communities. Before the war, the community was traditionally in charge of de-silting canals, but during the emergency period, NGOs provided this service. Nowadays some communities are reluctant to take back these responsibilities and neglect canal maintenance duties.

5 INTERVENTION STRATEGIES ADOPTED BY

NGOS During the emergency period, NGOs were used to working with a certain degree of independence. Nowadays, they tend to work in partnership or alongside the Afghan government. This transition between emergency and development is taking place in a highly volatile environment. How are NGOs shifting from emergency to development practices? What impact is the unpredictable environment having on their roles and responsibilities? What is their scope of intervention and what limitations are they having to lay down? What are the particular responsibilities of the aid stakeholders?

5.1 A framework for analysing operational strategies In order to obtain a better understanding of the changes affecting the humanitarian community in Afghanistan and of their impacts on operational strategies, the framework below has been designed as a basis for further analysis. Figure 5: Elaborating strategies in a volatile context

This framework is shaped around four main boxes which influence the decision-making process. The first box (Changing context) identifies the main factors that characterise the volatile context in Afghanistan and that affect the way NGOs work. The second box (Core NGOs’ strategic elements) highlights some of the elements that make up NGO identities and

that need to be taken into account in their decision-making processes. The third box (Setting priorities) lists NGOs’ priorities for designing their operational strategy, an interaction between NGO identity and the changing context. The fourth box (Main strategies) shows basically the three main strategies adopted by NGOs according to their own priorities.

5.2 The changing Afghan context Numerous factors characterise the swiftly-evolving context in Afghanistan. They do not affect each stakeholder in the same way or to the same degree.

5.2.1 Changes in access and community relations

Several elements have been identified as key factors to understand the current Afghan context. Recurring security problems and difficulty accessing the populations in need (including remoteness, female discrimination and winter isolation) are important limiting factors for NGOs. As mentioned above, a certain hostility towards NGOs was observed in some areas, which is partly the result of the five-year widespread humanitarian presence in Afghanistan. People’s expectations have been raised and yet stakeholders have not always succeeding in satisfying them15. However, other factors may also have had an impact on the level of discontent and suspicion. Firstly, the ongoing insecurity has intensified people’s suspicion towards all foreigners. Similarly, an increasing amount of time and attention has been spent on needs assessments, monitoring and evaluations of aid programmes, resulting in numerous visits to households and communities. The purpose of these visits is rarely fully understood by the Afghan population, who grew accustomed to short yet practical interventions during the emergency relief phase.

5.2.2 Changes in funding mechanisms

Since 2001, donor agencies have played a leading role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan by providing direct support to the new GoA and outlining a framework for the distribution of funds. This does not leave NGOs much room for manoeuvre in requesting financial support from international donors for their interventions. Besides this issue, there is a degree of uncertainty as to the future of aid interventions in Afghanistan. Many NGOs are completing their ongoing programmes but have deep concerns regarding the availability of funds for the future. Donors are more and more reluctant to fund overhead costs (or have already stopped, e.g. the EC). NGOs with no or limited core funding are somehow trapped between three options: (i) accept funding to continue implementing their programmes; (ii) reduce the scope or number of their projects or; (iii) close down operations and leave the country for good. These changes in funding mechanisms also raise questions about NGO independence. In some areas, like in Jalalabad, PRTs have a growing influence and deliver free aid (either by means of FFW or CFW). Moreover, according to an interview, PRTs wish to get more involved in urban contexts. In the southern and eastern parts of the country, American PRTs are also present and fund NGOs. From the outset, some NGOs have decided to refuse PRT money as they disagreed with the principle of combining military operations and

15

See: Donini, Minear, Smillie and all, Feinstein International Famine Center, Mapping the security Environment, June 2005 and Donini, Nitland Wermester, Introduction of Nation Building Unraveled? Aid, peace and justice in afghnaistan, Kumarian Press, 2003

humanitarian purposes. Nowadays, since donors are reducing funds for NGO projects such as rehabilitation or food security programmes, even NGOs who refused PRT funds in the past are now tempted to accept them.

5.2.3 Changes in the stakeholders map

Some stakeholders are playing an increasing role. Firstly, as mentioned in section 1, the GoA has reinforced its policies and strategic planning (Master Plan, etc.). Thus, NGOs now have to decide to what extent their interventions should be part of the institutional framework. Besides the GoA, several stakeholders have emerged whose roles and mandates are still not completely determined. These new stakeholders will surely have a key role to play in shaping Afghanistan’s future. This group includes PRTs, the private sector and the communities themselves.

5.3 The NGO community In terms of decision making and strategic planning, several elements that are specific to NGOs need to be considered. First, their degree of financial independence is obviously a key factor in strategy design. Secondly, it is also important to take into account the historical background of NGO presence in Afghanistan. In fact, NGOs who have been working in a region for a significant period of time (over the lasting conflict), and that are well recognized and appreciated by the local population have highly legitimate reasons for staying in the same area. The technical expertise developed by organisations in specific sectors (health, water adduction, animal husbandry, .etc.) is also an influential factor.

5.3.1 Setting priorities

Given the context in which they are operating and certain characteristics which are specific to NGOs, the following priorities have emerged: Principles: principles of neutrality, non-political status, independence, etc. are the main priority; Financial sustainability: i.e. NGOs with little financial independence; Survival: i.e. Afghan NGOs or international NGOs whose activities are restricted to Afghanistan; Legitimacy: i.e. NGOs with extensive experience in Afghanistan and that enjoy a certain recognition for the expertise they have developed; Added value: i.e. NGOs that are capable of demonstrating a “comparative advantage” (specific technical expertise, access to highly remote areas, etc.) over other stakeholders.

5.3.2 Which strategy?

Depending on how these priorities are ranked, three main strategies can be identified: Implementing Partners: NGOs have decided to get integrated into large programmes developed by GoA and donor agencies. They are responsible for implementing pre-defined interventions, such as NSP programmes or BPHS through PPA. Broaden the scope of interventions: NGOs diversify their activities; Windows of opportunity: NGOs implement interventions (beyond the institutional or donor framework) by (i) refocusing on the social and humanitarian mandate of the NGO by targeting vulnerable groups that are often overlooked (street children, deaf, mute and blind people, etc.); (ii) playing a role in advocacy, disaster-preparedness or; (iii) working towards increasing expertise on the specific features characterising the Afghan context (e.g. research programmes).

NGOs tend to adopt more than one of these strategies at any given time, adapting to the changing context and/or to the growing difficulty in finding funds. Further analysis will distinguish two different “categories of NGOs”: those involved in social services (health, education) and those involved in the socio-economic sectors (water, agriculture and urban development). Within this logic, nutrition is a cross-cutting sector that covers both of these groups.

5.3.3 Opportunities and challenges for NGOs working in health and education

For health-related NGOs, scaling up in terms of geographical coverage and scope of activities placed extra demands on human resources and internal systems. Within the Performance based Partnership Agreements (PPAs), as both international and national NGOs moved from a limited geographical area to a cluster of districts or a provincial-wide approach, in the early stages concerns were voiced about their capacity to provide an extensive range of services from health post to district hospital. Experience so far indicates positive and encouraging results. Concerning the education sector, the same phenomenon of scaling up exists for NGOs working with some donors such as USAID. The USAID defines programmes and strategies at national level, and selects implementing partners, which leads to a small number of national and international NGOs in charge of several provinces. In addition the new competitive environment meant that NGOs had to adjust the skills and abilities of their staff. However, for some the shift from an emergency mode of operations relying on short-term volunteers to long-term skilled managers seems still difficult to achieve. The need to take the private sector seriously is increasingly unavoidable if quality of care is to be improved and catastrophic outcomes for patients prevented. However, the role of the private for profit sector is still unrecognised by most actors including NGOs. In the future, opportunities for building partnerships with this sector may be better harnessed. In this respect two examples are illustrative: UNICEF who successfully partnered with iodised salt factories and WHO which set up a partnership with private pharmacies for TB standard detection, treatment and reporting procedures in the city of Gardez. In the education sector, NGOs have made major efforts to harmonise service delivery, signing Memorandum of Understanding with the MoE. In spite of this, there are still conflicting views on the issues of participation: some NGOs are proponents of community financial contribution for the Community Based Schools (CBS), as proposed by the MoE, while others defend free education services and pay for the CBS teacher’s salary. Disagreements have also been noted regarding the quality and the concept of model schools. With quality being the main priority in the current education strategies, some NGOs have set up model schools, which are seen as providing an acceptable teaching level and acceptable learning conditions. In other instances higher standards have been promoted with the introduction of computers and more advanced learning materials. Although quality must not be levelled down, conflicting approaches between stakeholders in a context where basic needs are still unmet can result in resentment and frustration. Resolving this problem calls for better coordination and dialogue.

5.3.4 Main NGO strategies

5.3.4.1 As implementing partners The common trend for NGOs involved in health has been to implement national policies on behalf of the GoA. In the early days, international and national NGOs were seen as a desirable means of service delivery for the BPHS. For those who entered into the process,

the PPAs gave them a significant funding opportunity. The arguments for and against NGO involvement, which have been long debated, are still on the agenda today. In particular there is significant controversy about the roles the GoA and NGOs should play in the future. The capacity of the GoA is another critical element of discussion, especially in the education sector where the handover process from NGOs to MoE is high on the agenda.

5.3.4.2 Filling unmet needs The few NGOs staying outside the contracting strategy for the delivery of health services have attempted to target marginalized groups and work at grassroots level. They strongly defend the principle of neutrality and independence and advocate for people rights. They can be seen as empowering civil society and agents of social changes. In the education sector some NGOs are implementing innovative projects for best practices aimed at improving the quality of the teaching environment. In addition others are targeting marginalized populations, who are not covered by national policies and strategies.

5.3.4.3 Are there any other areas where NGOs have added value? The implementation of the Essential Package for Hospital Services (EPHS) is likely to require substantial contributions in terms of managerial skills and expertise. While it is expected that the MoPH will deliver most of the hospital services, only a handful o NGOs seem well equipped to support EPHS development. In addition the fact that the hospital system in Afghanistan is complex and has a strong political dimension may curb their motivation. Indeed NGOs are well aware of the power, influence and leverage which hospitals confer. The key question is whether NGOs have added value in the implementation of EPHS whose major challenge is to ensure that hospital services are made available to those most in need. In the education sector, NGOs have gained wide experience in needs assessment and monitoring of schools on a relatively large geographical scale. Some NGOs began to get involved in capacity building and training of civil servants at the Provincial Education Department or at the District Education Office levels. Given the crucial role these institutions are bound to play in the area of needs assessment and monitoring, it seems highly desirable for NGOs to get increasingly involved at the provincial and district department levels.

5.3.5 Opportunities and challenges for NGOs working in the socio-economic sectors

5.3.5.1 The main evolution Within the socio-economic sectors, the transition time between Emergency, Rehabilitation and Development has been longer than in the health and education sectors due to the delay in institutional reforms. Pre-2001 funding mechanisms for NGOs have continued to this day in order to fill the institutional gap and respond to immediate needs. This delay has been necessary in order to prepare the relevant sectors and ministries to take over large sector-based programmes. Many projects designed and implemented by NGOs and funded by ECHO, EC or Western governments are due to come to an end in 2005 and 2006. As there has been a clear shift in funding since 2004 towards the government and the line ministries, it is unlikely that these NGOs will obtain funding for project extensions. In the past, NGOs became accustomed to setting up offices in a defined area such as a district or a city and to implement projects which could sometimes last for many years. As for rural development programmes, this strategy was very often related to food security or a global approach tackling water, agriculture and rural infrastructure issues within the same

scope. NGOs have also been involved in urban areas for several years working on water supply and sanitation systems rehabilitation. This is due to a combination of high demand and the fact that local water administrators do not have the capacity to provide these services. Policies and strategies developed in the agriculture and water sectors are broad and flexible enough, allowing NGOs to pursue an independent approach while also supporting the institutional framework. In the urban sector, NGOs are able to continue their activities in water supply in the same cities, by concentrating their technical expertise on management phases according to the new framework of the 2005 NGO Law. However as previously mentioned, most of the funds have been reallocated to the GoA and to sector-based programmes, and traditional donors for NGO activities, such as ECHO, have dramatically reduced their commitment to the country. Consequently NGOs working in these sectors had no other choice than to shift from the past model, in which they were almost the sole actors and were fully in charge of project design and implementation, to a new model where their roles have become more specific and more limited within larger government programmes and technical administrative framework. To date, NGOs are operating in a very competitive multi-actor environment. The number and type of stakeholders have steadily increased since 2001. Private national and international consultants or consultancy companies have participated in the capacity building efforts of the relevant ministries and in the design and implementation of government programmes. At the same time, overall institutional reforms and policies, especially in these socio-economic sectors, opened up a significant role to the private sector, also comprised of emerging contracting companies mostly involved in construction works. It is worth remembering here that the 2005 NGO Law prohibits NGOs from carrying out construction work. Most of the current programmes also encourage the communities, the recipients of aid, to develop local governance and to better organise themselves in their own development. Communities have more responsibilities in assessing needs, designing and implementing projects, ensuring the maintenance of the created assets or services, and continuing the developmental work. Based on the above elements, a significant trend has emerged in the socio-economic sectors with NGO evolving towards software works and services approach. Technical and hardware works are mostly left to local construction and international consultancy companies. These sectors are referred as “technical” and it has been noticed within new stakeholder circles that NGOs are not usually considered to have sharp technical profiles and expertise. As a matter of fact, the role of NGOs is most likely to concentrate on field level and community-based works. Indeed NGOs are seen as the best actors for dealing with mobilising and empowering communities. NGOs will probably also continue to work in activities such as research and training when they have the relevant knowledge, maintaining a close link with the field

5.3.5.2 Main NGO strategies Based on their understanding of the changing and complex context, many (mostly international) NGOs strive to develop their own policy and strategy framework for future decisions and interventions. This reflection, redefinition and reorganisation process is basically a question of survival for most of them, although it also aims at improving the coherence and effectiveness of their interventions within the new development context. Upon the above analysis, three main strategies can be distinguished.

- Positive adjustments and reorganisation built on NGO skills and experience There are many ways in which NGOs can adjust their organisation, management and activities and they should be considered complementary. Developing expertise in certain

fields or technical domains and focusing windows of opportunity that have opened with the new sector frameworks and programmes can be the first adjustment strategy. Diversification is another alternative and does not really contradict the previous strategy as might appear at first glance. In rural areas, NGOs are increasingly tempted to extend their Natural Resource Management (NRM) activities. Rangeland management and reforestation are nowadays included in the portfolio of activities of some NGOs. Diversification also covers an NGO’s capacity to develop flexibility and responsiveness in order to move into new geographical areas or start up new types of services beyond the traditional NGO role. For instance, selling their skills and technical expertise like a private company, or creating a consortium with other NGOs or specific organisations such as research institutes or universities, are seen as ways of adjusting in order to strengthen their financial and technical capacity.

- Adapting to a changing context in grasping opportunities In this case, NGOs basically “passively” follow changes in institutional development and funding mechanisms. They do not take advantage of the situation in proactively questioning their roles, expertise and comparative advantages. Ethical or policy considerations are given less priority and sometimes NGOs will accept funds from any available source. In other situations, certain types of funding would certainly have been considered unacceptable to NGO core principles. The case of PRTs implemented by NATO troops and combining military action and humanitarian affairs is highly symbolic. In spite of strong hesitations from the NGO community since the PRT launching, a significant number of NGOs have been considering PRT funding as a means of survival. For various reasons, since 2003, NGOs are given less room for putting forward recommendations or proposing projects. The different steps in the programmes are defined by the ministries and have to be followed by the NGO in charge of programme implementation. Nowadays many NGOs are playing a major role in the implementation of different national scale programmes like the NSP or the BPHS (Basic Package of Health Services). These NGOs are sub-contracted by the GoA through the relevant ministries (MRRD for the NSP and MOPH for the BPHS) as implementing or facilitating partners. Their skills and experience are used to deliver services to the community on behalf of the government. Moreover, the principle of neutrality which some NGOs claimed in the past is becoming increasingly difficult to protect as the role of IPs (on the government’s side) is growing year by year. For instance, for over a year, more and more insurgents (notably in the south) are associating the NGOs with the GoA and are encouraging people to push NGOs out of the country.

- Departure from Afghanistan on ethical grounds A few NGOs have decided to leave Afghanistan or substantially reduce their operations since they consider the context no longer applies to their expertise and/or their principles16. These international NGOs do not rely on Afghanistan-based interventions alone, and can thus afford to take this position. However, for NGOs like Madera who only works in Afghanistan and has been dedicated to the Afghan cause for eighteen years this decision cannot be taken so lightly. If they have no longer have a reason to be in Afghanistan, they will cease to exist. In reality it is that simple to distinguish or to set the two first strategies against each as outlined in this paper. Most NGOs strive to follow both strategies. The intention of acting positively according to core values and abilities is hard to achieve without an opportunistic approach. Moreover some NGOs combine an opportunistic strategy while internally investing in a complete institution reorganisation as heralded in the first strategy.

16

This was the case for Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) in 2004

For those NGOs following the first strategy of positive adjustment and reorganisation, the new institutional context and the transition towards development is highly demanding in terms of capacity building. Reorganisation and capacity building processes require financial investment that only large international NGOs are in a position to afford. The overall requirements for adjusting and reinforcing expertise and skills are substantial and varied. Discussions with NGOs on institutional and operational changes indicated that the following fields and issues appear most relevant: - Specific skills in technical and social engineering; - Project management capacity (assessments, M&E, etc.) with a developmental approach; - Fostering communication skills in the new institutional frameworks and aid mechanisms

and communicating widely on their experience and expertise through lesson learning exercises and publications;

- Willingness and capacity to collaborate; acquiring other expertise and skills externally by means of institutional or operational partnerships may complement an internal capacity building process. Moreover in this multi-stakeholder environment where every actor has its own specific role and responsibilities, a fruitful collaboration, going beyond traditional coordination work, is urgently required.

6 DONORS’ STRATEGIES

6.1 Coordination mechanisms as a response to the effective use of aid

As illustrated below, different coordination and funding mechanisms exist between central, provincial or regional representatives of the Afghan State and international community (Box 3). Figure 6: Summary of coordination and funding mechanisms

Sources: Groupe URD

International conferences such as the ones held in Bonn and London are a means of coordinating and stimulating international aid. Their main objective was to devise mechanisms that would bring together donors and projects. A number of principles to guide coordination efforts were agreed by international agencies, including leadership by the GoA and adherence to a national plan by bilateral and multilateral donors. In addition, consultative groups have been set up as sector coordination groups chaired by the relevant ministries and supported by a donor or agency. The objective was to increase the effectiveness and the efficiency of aid coordination in support of the national development and poverty reduction objectives. Different funding mechanisms contribute to reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.

- Multilateral funds through the IFI (World Bank, Asian Development Bank) and UN system;

- Bilateral funds which could be either channelled through the Afghan Authorities or through NGOs;

- Private funds from not for profit agencies (NGOs); - Private funds for the commercial sector (trade, construction, etc.) which come

either from the business sector or from individual investment from the Afghan Diaspora

Just how the GoA will oversee these different flows is still uncertain giving rise to a certain feeling of frustration within government circles.

6.2 Key trends in relation to donors The GoA has two different budgets: the ordinary budget to cover mainly recurrent costs, and the development budget. Given that domestic revenue is very low, the GoA is heavily dependent on external assistance to finance its own budget. In addition it faces considerable constraints to disburse the funds accordingly due to poor absorption capacity. Concerning the donors, different trends can be observed. Some are channelling their funds directly through GoA structures while others have created parallel structures. In the latter case, donors retain control of decision making and management. For example USAID is channelling its funds through an ad hoc structure for education programmes, in accordance with the Strategic Objective Agreement signed between USAID and the Ministry of Education. As a result of international donor conferences and the setting of their respective priorities, some agencies have chosen to concentrate resources within a particular sector or geographical area. For instance, USAID was massively involved in the education sector since 2004, prompting the withdrawal of the European Union from this sector. In the health sector, coordination of external resources has become key to expanding the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) and to addressing the existing fragmentation of aid interventions. As a result, the World Bank, USAID, and the European Commission agreed to geographical assignments of funds through a mix of the cluster and province-wide approaches. The concept of channelling the funds directly to central budget has also gained acceptance in certain sectors. In the health sector, donors in the future are likely to contribute to a single pool of funding to support the implementation of the BPHS. Common procedures for the management of external funds will be developed, which may in turn have a broader positive impact on the financial management of the state budget. In this way, the Ministry of Public Health will take the lead in negotiating resource allocation decisions and priority setting at the national level. Central to the notion of pooling funds is the intention to reinforce national leadership, transparent decision-making and to build institutional capacity. In the education sector, there was also a pooling of funds for the Teacher Education Programme, bringing together the main donors: USAID, World Bank, Asian Development Bank and DANIDA.

6.3 Level of funding versus absorption capacity Funding levels should not be analysed separately from absorption capacity: increasing the level of funding without a significant investment in national human resources would probably prove not only inefficient, but also dangerous, because it may result in negative behaviour. As already mentioned, the current absorption capacity of the Afghan government remains relatively limited, especially at the provincial and district levels. In the urban sector for instance17, even minimal urban planning documents are often non-existent. In many situations, corruption is also on the rise and this trend affects the implementation of both aid and private sector programmes.

17

see the LRRD report about urban development, Boyer, 2006, Groupe URD

6.4 Implications for NGOs In the current situation, the most frequent funding strategy practiced by donor agencies is based on relatively short-term funds allocation. This has a significant negative impact on agencies and sometimes jeopardises the implementation of projects which require a long-term approach such as micro finance or community mobilisation. Many NGOs pointed out that a one-year fund is not enough to implement projects which require establishing a relationship with communities over time in order to create both trust (micro-finance programmes) and capacity (management of complex irrigation networks). These projects certainly require longer term perspectives in terms of funding as they include a community mobilisation component, training and setting up of local organisations in order to be efficient and sustainable. In a reconstruction context, the revival of social fabric and community networks is essential and social changes will require sustained involvement and support from all stakeholders. If short-term funding certainly does not encourage the design of long-term strategies, the education sector appears to be an exception given that the majority of funds are medium term (five to seven years funding for main donors). In the health sector, commitments for BPHS funding vary between eighteen months and five years but it remains to be seen whether they can be sustained beyond this period. It seems that contracting with NGOs will evolve over the long term which raises questions over the NGO role and responsibilities in a highly-aid dependent context. Funding availability for NGOs is dependent on the sector and the strategy adopted. The fact that the European community decided to stop the funding overhead costs raised significant problems for NGOs lacking their own funding. These NGOs are either national or international and some boast a lengthy and valuable experience in Afghanistan. Overhead costs have been called into question many times as they were often used to finance the headquarters and huge administrative costs. The lack of transparency in the way overhead costs were used by NGOs has led to different measures to reduce their allocation. However, deprived of part of the necessary funds to implement the project they consider relevant, NGOs are developing different approaches to cope with this problem. Some of them decided to start or increase fund raising efforts in their own international network, while others attempted to develop internal expertise as consultants. In addition some are tempted to accept funds they were refusing in the past for ethical reasons. For instance the funding from the PRTs imposes few conditions and has very limited monitoring. Although perceived as an attractive source of funding, NGOs may be required to provide information on communities to the armed forces in return.

CONCLUSION

At a stage where Afghanistan seems more than ever at crossroads, several key lessons have been learned through this multi-sector review:

- In complex and evolving contexts, it is essential to keep the political evolutions under scrutiny, especially when negative trends, such as security situation and political tensions, become issues at stake;

- Donors policies played a positive role by making relatively large resources

available but the question remains whether quality can be preserved in a fast-paced implementation environment. In addition the limited absorptive capacity continues to pose threats to the effectiveness of aid. This issue is of major importance in managing external resources and will require matching donor’ agenda and institutional capacity.

- The continuous blurring of the borders between humanitarian actions, military

interventions and political positioning is again showing negative effects on the perceptions of the very nature of humanitarian aid;

- Most aid agencies have now switched to the “development mode”, but are still

struggling with many parameters of this new paradigm: socio-economic sustainability, environmental friendliness, empowerment of the most destitute segments of the population, etc.

In addition to this report, an institutional analysis by sector is currently being finalised. These sector-based studies are underlining many of the evolutions that marked the transition between relief, rehabilitation and development in Afghanistan. A series of conferences for the presentation of these reviews and studies are scheduled and will take place in Kabul, Brussels and Washington before the end of the year. They are an integral part of the learning exercise on LRRD as carried out by Groupe URD with the support of the Delegation of the European Commission in Kabul.

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1. List of interlocutors and meetings attended

Urban Development

Meeting to the Municipality In December 05 Visit to Pul-e-Khumri

Meeting to AKDN Visit reservoir

12 to 15 march 06 Visit to Jalalabad

Meeting to the Municipality

Preparation In Kabul

Visit to AIMS Kabul (to get maps of cities to visit) Contact with Dina Amiri, customer service Assistant

22 March Meeting with the ONG Solidarités Contact with Clément Bourse Country Director

Thursday 28 March Meeting to European Commission in Kabul Contact with Giorgio Kirchmayr, Programmme Manager, Infrastructure Sector for Jalalabad information And With Eng. Basher Ahmad, Project officer, infrastructure

Meeting to EMG LTERA (USAID) Preparation for Ghazni , Pul-e Khumri and Kuduz Contact with André Hernandez

Friday 31 March Team meeting: discussing the itinerary

Literature and document review

Consultation to ACBAR

Saturday 01 April

Meeting with UN-Habitat Contact with Suman Kr. Karna, urban Development Advisor

Sunday 02 April Meeting to the MUDH Contact with the Deputy M inister ; M Djallalzada + different Department

Monday 03 April Team meeting: discussing the multi sector framework

Tuesday 04 April From Kabul to Bamiyan by road

Meeting in UNAMA Contact with Dr Ernst Fassbender, Representative Head of Bamiyan Office

Meeting to the provincial MUHD office Contact with Engineer …Head of the Office (the Master Plan)

Meeting in UN-Habitat Contac with Eng. Muharmad, District Manager Contact with Mohammad Yasin Hotak, Acting Director Visit NSP in villages with M. Abd Razaq Provincial technical eng. Visit NSP in Villages with Eng. Yasin Hotak Provincial social eng.

Contact with Solidarites: no more involved in Shelters in Bamiyan

Wednesday 05 April Thursday 06 April In BAMIYAN

Contact with Geres not involved with Construction in Bamiyan

Friday 07 April From Bamiyan to Samangan

Saturday 08 April From Samangan to Mazar-e Sharif

Meeting in CAWSS Office Contact with Technical Head Officer

Meeting in the MUDH Office Contact with Eng.Hamid Basharmal, in charge of upgrading projects

Meeting with UNOPS in the Ministry of Public Works office Contact with Senior regional Mohamad Zia radyar (Ex Head of Un – Habitat in Mazar-e Sharif in 2002-2003)

Meeting in UN-Habitat Contact with Eng Islamudin Amaki ,Provincial manager ( NSP ) Contact with Eng.PadashMir Rahmtzai, Provincial Manager ( HSF)

Meeting to Municipality of Mazar-e Sharif Contact with His Excellency the Mayor. Mr Mohammad Yonus Moqim Contact with Eng. Mohammad Malik Rauf ( ex Head of the Department of Construction Control from 2002 to 2006)

Sunday 09 April Monday 10 April In Mazar-e-sharif

Meeting to ICRC ; Contact with Valentin Magendo, Programme Manager

Tuesday 11 April From Mazar-e Sharif to Kundunz

Tuesday 11 April

Meeting in Kundunz Municipality Contact with eng. Abdul Rahim The Controle Construction department Director

Meeting to the MUDH Office Contact with Mr. Said Shamsudin Sadat department Representative Contact with a Eng. Architect Building Design Depart Officer

Meeting to AGCHO, Cadastral Department of Kundunz Baghland Contact with M. Aga Mirza, Cadastral department Manager

Meeting to CAWSS Office Contact wth Dr. Azimi , Director

Meeting to AIMS Office Contact with M. Naseer Tasmin NE Field assistant

Meeting to German Agro Action (Welt hunger hilfe) Contact with Mr. Amjad Ali Khan, project manager

Wednesday 12 April Thursday 13 April In Kunduz

Meeting to ACTED Contact with Eng. Ad. Qahar, area Deputy coordinator

Friday 14 April From Kundunz to Pul-e Khumri & from Pul-e Khumri to Kabul

Saturday 15 April Workshop preparation

Kabul-Ghazni-Kabul

Meeting in Ghazni Municipality Contact with the Deputy Mayor

Meeting in Ghazni Department of Engineers Contact with eng. Ansami and Eng. Harovullah

Meeting to EMG LTERA With Amir Khan, ghazni Office Director

Sunday 16 April In Ghazni

Meeting to AGCHO Office, Cadastral Department Contact with the administrative Deputy

After the 17 April in Kabul

Monday 17 April Meeting to the WB Contact with Jonathan Parkinson Independent consultant (waste Solid Collect Programme)

Tuesday 18 April Meeting in AGCHO in Kabul Contact with Eng. M. Askar (Falah) , vice president

Meeting to CARE Afghanistan Contact with Dad Mohammad Baheer , Wat/San Programme Manager

Wednesday 19 April

Meeting to ICRC With Valerie Meilhaud, Water and Habitat coordinator

Thursday 20 April Working on presentation

Friday 21 April Workshop preparation


Sunday 23 April Workshop preparation

Monday 24 April Presenting the main findings: workshop

Tuesday 25 April

26 Meeting to the MUDH Contact with the Deputy Minister Ang. Q. Djallalzada

27 Working on EIMS report

28

29 Working on EIMS report

30 Meeting to the MUDH Contact with M. Eberhard Kohlsdorfer , Advisor

1 Mai Meeting to UNESCO Kabul office for Bamiyan Project Contact with Brendan Cassar - Cultural Programme Section

Water /Irrigation Thursday 30 March Paris – Dubaï

Friday 31 March Dubai – Kabul Team meeting: discussing the itinerary

Saturday 01 April Meetings at MEW with Dr Thilo – Advisor for the Ministry of Energy and Water, Hans Husselman (Rodeco/GTZ) – Water sector Reform project team leader and Sayed Sharif Shobair (FAO) – EIRP Coordinator and Chief Eng.

Sunday 02 April - Theo Riedke (GAA) – Country Director - Hans Huselmans

Monday 03 April Marek Stys (People In Need) – Country Director Team work: Methodology

Kabul – Bamiyan

Habib Hussaini (ICRC) – Head of Bamiyan office

Mohammad Yasin Hotak + Eng Muharmad (UNHABITAT) – NSP program

Eng. Saïd Anwar (MRRD/OC) – NSP programme

Wednesday 05 April (Bamiyan)

Jeff (Global Partner) - Head of Bamiyan office

Sylvain (Solidarités Yakawlang) – EU funded programme Manager

Mohammad Yasin Hotak (UNHABITAT) – NSP programme Manager

Thursday 06 April (Bamiyan)

Ing. Shafiq Ullah (MRRD) – Water and Sanitation programme

Friday 07 April Bamiyan – Eibak (Samangan province)

Eibak – Mazar Y Sharif Saturday 08 April (Balgh) Ondrej Horvath (PIN) - Water and Sanitation EU funded Programme Officer in Dare Suf

district (Samangan province)

Sunday 09 April (Sare Pul)

Visit of GAA in Sare Pul province (drinking water project and NSP) - Interviews with Daniel Bronkal (GAA), Nahida Shah (GAA) - Community Health Advisor for hygiene education and Juergen Hofmeister (GAA) – NSP manager

Robert WILKENS (PCI Asia consultant) – ADB EIRRP-TIC team leader

Max Kent McGowan – Consultant for ADB BRIWRM Project

Monday 10 April (Balgh)

Valentino ICRC Watsan

Mazar – Kunduz

ACTED Kunduz

GAA – Walter Osenberg – “Social Water Management” project (KRBP)

Tuesday 11 April (Kunduz)

Ing. WAHAB- Mercy Corps Kunduz – head of infrastructures department

AKDN and Group URD - PMIS (Participative Management of Irrigated Systems) (KRBP) Wednesday 12 April (Taloqan) Eng. SALIM – Irrigation department Director – Taloqan province

M. Khalima AMINI – Irrigation department Director – Kunduz province Thursday 13 April (Kunduz) Jelle BEEKMA – KRBP – Kunduz

Friday 14 April Kunduz – Kabul

Saturday 15 April (Kabul)

Kabul: team work

Benny Werge (Dacaar) – Rural Development Programme Manager; Didier (Dacaar) – Water and Sanitation programme advisor and Jahangir Khan (Dacaar) – Research Support Officer

Valérie MEILHAUD (ICRC) - Water and Sanitation Coordinator

Sunday 16 April (Kabul)

Eng. Hashim Mayar (ACBAR) – Deputy Director

M. Amanullah (Solidarités Afghanistan Belgique) – Field Office Manager

Eng. Anwar (MEW/ID) – Director

Eng. Wali Mohammad (MRRD) – Programmes Director

Jorgen Holmstrom (SCA) – Regional Director + Dr Wakil Ziar and Arif + Quadratullah (NSP PM)

M. Shah Mahdan (Dacaar) – RDP regional coordinator

Monday 17 April (Wardak)

Brendan Whitty (AREU) – Research support Officer

Tuesday 18 April Dacaar team in Jeghatu district (Visits of projects; interviews with farmers and water users)

Wednesday 19 April Visits in chak and Jalez districts

Dr V. Haraprasad – Water supply advisor (MRRD) Thursday 20 April

Gedlu Sima (UNHCR/MRRD)



Agriculture

Tuesday 04 April Kabul-Bamiyan

Wednesday 05 April

Bamiyan

Global Concern Dept. of Agriculture ICRC

Thursday 06 April Bamiyan

Solidarités GERES UNFAO

Friday 07 April Bamiyan-Eiback

Saturday 08 April Eiback AAD Dept. of Agriculture BRAC

Sunday 09 April Mazar-e-Sharif UNFAO UNHCR SCA

Monday 10 April Mazar-e-Sharif WFP / Gain Project WFP/ GAIN IOM COAR

Tuesday 11 April Mazar-Kunduz Dept. of Agriculture (Kunduz)

Kunduz Visit the vet clinic, the Kunduz silo and the diary farm of the FAO FAO – seeds program

Wednesday 12 April

Taloqan (Takhar province)

Mission East Concern

Thursday 13 April Kunduz Mercy corps Mercy Corps ICARDA CFA

Friday 14 April Kabul-Kunduz

Saturday 15 April

Sunday 16 April

Kabul Kabul-jalallabad

Team work

Monday 17 April

Jalallabad

MADERA (meeting) MADERA (field visit) MADERA (vet clinic) If Hope (field visit)

Tuesday 18 April Jalalallabad Dept. of agriculture FAO Mercy Corps GTZ/PAL project

Wednesday 19 April

Jalalabad-Kabul

Thursday 20 April Kabul FAO AKDN

Nutrition

Thursday 29 March

Team Interview: discussing the itinerary

Monday 03 April Team work: Methodology

Tuesday 04 April

Kabul – Bamiyan

Interview with Mrs. Seema Sakha, health & hygiene supervisor, AKDN, Bamiyan

Interview with Dr Sisawo Konteh, Regional Health Programme Manager, Aga Khan Health Services, Bamiyan

Interview with Eng. Taher Ataey, Head of department, Department of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Food, Bamiyan

Wednesday 05 April

Interview with Mrs Fatima Rosalin, nutrition & gender assistant, FAO, Bamiyan

Interview with Amina Hassanpur, health officer, Department of Women Affairs, Bamiyan

Visiting Women Resource Centre, Shuahada, Bamiyan

Interview with Mr Mohammed Rahim, HIMS Officer, Provincial Health Department, Bamiyan

Thursday 06 April

Interview with Sophie Baisse, Programme officer, Solidarités, Bamiyan


Interview with, Dr Allawdin Ammar, Nutrition and TB manager AMI, Samangan Saturday 08 April Eibak – Mazar E Sharif

Interview with Dr Bahrami, health & nutrition officer, UNICEF, Mazar-e-Sahrif Sunday 09 April

Interview with Mr. Morali Mohan, Programme Manager, Save the Children UK, Mazar-e Sharif

Visiting GAIN project, WFP and BRAC, Mazar-e-Sharif

Visiting Tuberculosis male and female clinics, WFP and Lepco, Mazar-e-Sharif Interview with Mr. Waheed, TB programme officer, WFP, Mazar-e-Sharif

Interview with Amed Jama, Head of Porgramme, WFP, Mazar-e-Sharif

Visiting TFU and children cares department, Mazar-I-Sharif Regional Hospital

Monday 10 April

Interview with Dr Mirwais Rabi, Balkh Provincial Health Director, Balkh province Interview with Dr Abdullah Noorzai, PNO, Mazar-e-Sharif

Mazar E Sharif - Kunduz Tuesday 11 April Interview with Daler Javodov, NSP manager, ACTED, Kunduz

Visiting the veterinary clinic of GoA and a diary farm of FAO, Kunduz

Kunduz - Taloqan

Visiting a private mill (WFP flour fortification project, Kunduz Interview with Haji Gholam Mohaiudin, Factory director, Kunduz

Interview with Dr Mohamed Salim, CAF Interim Deputy Director, Taloqan, Takhar Province

Interview with Marie Sadie, Training Manager, CONCERN WORLWIDE, Taloqan, Takhar Province

Wednesday 12 April

Taloqan - Kunduz

Interview with Dr Yamar, PNO and Dr Safar, PPHD Kunduz Province

Interview with Dr. Hedayatullah Saleh, Provincial project officer, Kunduz

Interview with Naida, Administrator, Department of Women Affairs, Kunduz

Interview with Nurul Haque Sarka, Agriculture Programme Manager, CFA, Kunduz

Thursday 13 April

Interview with Xaver Hagensbusch , Mercy Corps, Kunduz


Saturday 15 April

Kabul: team work

Interview with Andrew Pinney, early warning system adviser, MRRD, Kabul Sunday 16 April

Kabul - Jalalabad

Interview with Eng. Abdul Ahad "Samoon", Eastern Field Coordinator, IRC, Jalalabad

Interview with Dr Mashoud, Deputy Director, PPHD, Jalalabad Interview with Dr , PNO, Jalalabad Visiting the TFU, University Hospital

Interview with Dr Abdul Wahid Wahidi, Project officer health &nutrition, UNICEF, Jalalabad

Interview with Heimo Posamentier, Project for Alternative Livelihoods, Livelihoods Advisor, GTZ, Jalalabad

Monday 17 April

Interview with Brishna, health & hygiene supervisor, IRC Visiting “Hygiene promotion” programmes for women, IRC, Jalalabad

Interview with the owner of the factory Spin Ghar, Jalalabad Tuesday 18 April Interview with Eng. Amin, Water Program, Manager, Eng. Sharifa, Female Hygiene promoter

and Eng. Ramatullah, Male Hygiene promoter ,DACAAR Jalalabad

Jalalabad - Kabul Wednesday 19 April Interview with Fazila Banu Lily, HAWA Programme Manager, CARE international

Interview with Malina Fahiz, health and hygiene coordinator, AKDN

Interview with Dr Javed Logarwal, Hygiene Advisor, MRRD

Attendance at the working group on community based food-security and nutrition interventions meeting

Interview with Charlotte Dufour, Household, Food security and Nutrition expert, FAO, Kabul

Thursday 20 April

Interview with Maja Ulrich Hebe, Hygiene & Sanitation Coordinator, and Shakilla Assad, Women's project coordinator, DACAAR


Saturday 22 April

Workshop preparation


Monday 24 April Presenting the main findings: workshop

Interview with Kayhan Natiq, Public Health Specialist, WORLD BANK Tuesday 25 April Interview with Maliha Dost, Donor Relation & Research Assistant, Afghanaid

Wednesday 26 April

Visiting HAWA programme: “Food processing training for women”, CARE international, Kabul district 13 Kabul – Dubai

Health Thursday 30 March

Toulouse – Paris – Dubai

Friday 31 March Dubai – Kabul Team meeting: designing the itinerary

Literature and document review

Interview with Ms Anja de Beer, Coordinator, ACBAR

Saturday 01 April

Contact with Dr Bashir Ahmad Hamid, CAF

Interview with Dr Ahmed Abd El Rahman, Senior Health Advisor, SCA

Interview with Mr Guillaume Bernardeau, Head of Mission, AMI

Sunday 02 April

Interview with Ms Philippa Parker, Hospital Manager, ICRC

Monday 03 April Team work: Methodology

Tuesday 04 April Kabul – Bamiyan

Interview with Dr Sisawo Konteh, Regional Health Programme Manager, Aga Khan Health Services, Bamiyan

Interview with Dr Santanu Sanyal, Hospital Manager, Bamiyan Province Hospital, Aga Khan Health Services

Interview with Dr Syed Sabir, Project Manager, Ibn Sina Bamiyan office

Wednesday 05 April

Interview with Dr Toorkhan Shirzad, Project Manager, IMC Bamiyan

Thursday 06 April Interview with Mr Mohammed Rahim, HIMS Officer, Provincial Health Department, Bamiyan

Interview with Mr Amir Hussein and Mr Daoud, CHW Trainer and Supervisor, Ibn Sina Bamiyan Office

Interview with Mr Saifuddin, WHO, Bamiyan Office


Visiting Eibak District Hospital

Interview with Dr Jamroooz, Hospital Director

Interview with Dr Abdul Hamid, Provincial Health Director

Saturday 08 April

Interview with Mrs Sabza, AMI MCH Trainer/Supervisor

Interview with Dr Najibbullah Oshang, Samangan Technical Deputy Project Manager, AMI Samangan Eibak – Mazar E Sharif ,

Sunday 09 April

Interview with Mr Murai Mohan, SCF-UK Mazar I Sharif Office

Interview with Dr Shameen, Health Project Manager, BRAC

Interview with Dr Mohammed Gahffari, WHO Representative, Mazar I Sharif

Interview with ActionAid team (Dr Bashir Noori, Health Team Leader)

Monday 10 April

Visiting SCA Physical Rehabilitation Department, Mazar-I-Sharif Regional Hospital

Interview with Dr Mirwais Rabi, Balkh Provincial Health Director

Tuesday 11 April

Mazar I Sharif - Kunduz

Visiting Ali Abad CHC, Kunduz province

Interview with Dr Ahmad Kashmiry, Team Leader PHP, SCA Kunduz

Interview with Dr Mohamed Salim, CAF Interim Deputy Director, Taloqan, Takhar Province

Wednesday 12 April

Kunduz - Taloqan

Interview with Dr Yama, PNO and Dr Safar, PHD Kunduz Province

Interview with Dr A.Nazar Ahmadi, WHO, Kunduz Province

Visiting Malaria Referral Centre, Kunduz Provincial Hospital

Thursday 13 April

Interview with Dr Faiz Mohammad Saleh, Regional Programme Manager HNTPO


Saturday 15 April Kabul: team work

Sunday 16 April Kabul - Jalalabad

Interview with Dr Mashoud, Deputy Director, PHD, Jalalabad

Visiting the TFU, University Hospital

Interview with Dr Mohammad Naseem, Programme Manager for Nangahar Province, HealthNet TPO

Monday 17 April

Interview with Mr Augustin Néouze, Eastern Region Programme Manager, AMI

Tuesday 18 April Interview with Gul Asghar, Project Manager, IMC Kunar

Interview with Dr Nazar Ahmadi, WHO Representative, Jalalabad

Wednesday 19 April

Jalalabad - Kabul

Interview with Dr Mohamad Yasin, CAF

Interview with Philippa Parker, ICRC Hospital Manager

Thursday 20 April

Interview with Patrick Beauverie, MDM




Monday 24 April Workshop

Tuesday 25 April Interview with Martine Catapano, EC Consultant for the General and Provincial Directorate, MoPH, Kabul Kabul – Dubaï - Paris

Education

Thursday 23 March

Arrival in Kabul

Wednesday 29 of March

Meeting in the University of Kabul with Mr. Habib Soughadgar; Head of the French Department in the University

Meeting in Kabul with Mr. Habib Rahman, Assistant Education Manager for AKDN

Meeting in Kabul with Mr. Abdul Raziq Azizi, Education Deputy Programme Manager for Care International

Thursday 31 of March

Meeting in Kabul with Mr. Gul Habib, Education Technical Advisor for IRC

Meeting in Kabul with Dr. Ahmad Khalid Fahim, Tech Advisor for Primary education for SCA

Meeting in Kabul with Dr. Suman Kr. Karna, urban development Advisor for UN Habitat

Sunday 02 April

Meeting in Kabul with Mrs. Shahnaz Hakim, Education Programme Management Specialist for USAID

Monday 03 April Preparation for the field surveys and the departure

Tuesday 04 April Kabul – Bamiyan

Meeting in Bamiyan with Mr. Ezatullah Arman, Regional Education Officer for AKDN; Visit of Mother Literacy courses, adult literacy courses and rehabilitated schools in Shibar District

Wednesday 05 April

Meeting in Bamiyan with Mr. Jumaddin, Master teacher trainer for Care International

Thursday 06 April Meeting with Mr. Waseq, Head of the PED of Bamiyan

Visit of a school supported by Care International through the CGSD project funded by USAID

Meeting in Bamiyan with Mr. Noor Mahamad, Admin/Data manager officer for SC Norway/Sweden

Friday 07 April Bamiyan – Eybak

Meeting in Eybak with Mr. Kader, Regional Programme Manager for BRAC Visits of Schools from BEOC project with BRAC

Meeting with Mr. Yahre Nazar head of the PED of Samangan Visits of governmental schools supported by USAID and AKDN

Saturday 08 April

Eybak - Mazar

Meeting in Mazar with Eng. Ahmad Shah Azizar, Education Project Officer for UNICEF

PED Coordination Meeting in Mazar

Sunday 09 April

Meeting in Mazar with Mrs. Marketa Pohankova, Programme officer relief and development for PIN

Meeting in Mazar with Mr. Mustafa Muzundar, Education Programme Officer for BRAC

Meeting with Mr. Morali Mohan, Programme Manager for SC UK in Mazar

Meeting with Mr. Ahmad Jama, Head of Programme on Mazar for WFP

Meeting with Mr. Abdul Rauf Qaderi , Regional Manager for ACBAR in Mazar

Monday 10 April

Meeting with Mr. Ghulam Yahya Abbassy, Education Sector Acting Coordinator and Mr. Moh. Rashid Scandary, Regional Field Officer for CHA

Meeting in the Universisty of Mazar with Mr. Fahim, Sayara Programme coordinator and journalism teacher

Tuesday 11 April

Mazar – Pul-e-Khumri Meeting in Pul-e-Khumri with Mr. Atiqullah Ludin, regional Programme Officer in Baghlan for AKDN

Meeting with ………; , Education Manager for SCA in Baghlan Visit of a SCA model school in Baghlan

Wednesday 12 April

Visit of the teacher training centre in Baghlan, supported by AKDN

Thursday 13 April Meeting with Mr. Abdul Sabur, head of administration of the PED of Baghlan Visit of a governmental girl High Schools and of a governmental boys high School

Friday 14 April Pul-e-khumri - Kabul

Saturday 15 April

Sunday 16 April

Meeting in Kabul with Mr. Shahaduddin, Education Programme Manager for BRAC

Meeting with Mr. Mansory, TEP department in Kabul

Monday 17 April

Meeting with Mr. Karbalawi, director of Planning Department in the MoE

Wednesday 19 April

Meeting with Mrs. Sherezad J. Monami Latif, Education Specialist for the World Bank and Mr. Habibullah Wajdi, Education Specialist for the World Bank.

Meeting with Mrs. Manta Singh, Schools and Clinics Programme Support Officer for IOM and Mr. Bodgan Danila, Schools and Clinics Deputy Programme Manager for IOM

Thursday 20 April

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Urban development sector

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Ministry of Information, Culture and Tourism, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan-United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, Bamiyan, Preserve our Cultural Heritage, brochure published by UNESCO Office, Kabul with the financial support of the Embassy of the United States of America in Kabul, edition 2005 Ministry of Urban Development and Housing(MUDH) , Islamic Transitional State of Afghanistan. Draft minutes of Third meeting of Urban Consultativ group, Thursday 1st May 2003- Rodey, Defining Urban vulnerability within the Kabul Vulnerable Programme, A 2003 Evaluation of the Medair, survey funded by ECHO Schütte, Poor, Poorer, Poorest : Urban livelihoods and Vulnerability in Mazar-I-Sharif, The Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit(AREU), Edition 2004 Shütte, Urban Livelihoods in Jalalabad, draft, AREU May, 2006 The Afghanistan Compact, London 31 january 2006 The German university of Aachen (RTWH University), Afghanistan Bamiyan Master Plan campaign 2005,Second Phase Project of UNESCO/Japan Funds in Trust for the Preservation of the World Cultural heritage in Bamiyan, 2005 Organisation- UNESCO – Ministry of Urban Development and Housing (MUDH)- Ministry of Information, Culture and Tourism (MOIC). Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, National Priority Programs (NPPs), report published in July 2004 Un-Habitat, Desaster Awarness and Mitigation Preparedness (C-Damp) Progress Review, Presentation November, 2005. Un-Habitat: Urban Governance, Website : Un-Habitat-Gouvernance\UN-HABITAT governance.htm Urban Development Sector(ANDS)- 13 august 2005 Urban Development, technical Annex of The Securing Afghanistan’s Future (SAF),Pillar 2 , draft published on January 2004 World Bank, Urban poverty and vulnerability, p 51-67, Afghanistan : Poverty, Vulnerability and Social Protection, an initial assesment, Report N° 29964 A,Human Development Unit, South Asia Region World Bank, Urban Sector, Background and Strategy, Urban Sector Issues in Afghanistan, 2004

Water / irrigation sector Bhattacharyva, Azizi and al, Drought Impacts and Potential for their Mitigation in Southern and Western Afghanistan; working Paper IWMI, 2004 Consortium of donors: Natural Resources and Agriculture Sector –comprehensive needs assessment – final draft report, Medium Term development Framework Multi Donor Phase II Mission, April 2002 EIRP – TIC Inception report summary

FAO - Community based irrigation Infrastructure and institutional strengthening of the water resources and irrigation sub sector in the western region” – project document; 2005 Favre and Kamal, FAO/AIMS: Watershed atlas of Afghanistan – first edition, 2004 Favre, FAO: interface between state and society – an approach for Afghanistan; Discussion paper, 2005 Groupe URD – Final external evaluation: DACAAR Consortium II – Programme for Returnees Reintegration and Community Support in Afghanistan, 2004 ICARDA/Future Harvest Consortium to Rebuild Agriculture in Afghanistan: Needs assessment on soil and water in Afghanistan, Sept 2002 KerrDACAAR: monitoring afghan rural livelihoods: 6 villages in Alingar and Pashtun Zarghun by Alice Kerr Klemm, FAO - Afghanistan – Promotion of agricultural rehabilitation and development programmes – Water Resources and Irrigation , 1996 Klijn, DACAAR: Water Supply and Water collection patterns in Rural Afghanistan – an anthropological study, 2002 KRBP/Landell Mills Limited: Draft inception report Feb. 2005 Maletta and Favre, MAAHF/ FAO: Agriculture and food production in post-war Afghanistan, a report on the winter agricultural survey 2002 – 2003, 2003 MEW: The water law;Reform and revision of the 1981 law 2006 Pain, AREU: understanding village institutions: case studies on water management from Faryab and Saripul, 2004 Pain, Sikin and Kempenaar DACAAR: DACAAR mid term review ; by Adam, 2002 Qureshi, Water Resources Management in Afghanistan: the issues and Options;working Paper IWMI n°49, 2002 RAMP/ Chemonics Intenational, Inc: Looking forward financial independence of WU organisations, thinking outside the box; Point paper for workshop on WUA, 2005 Sheladia Associates, inc: Final report for framework of water resources management & draft report on proposed Water Resources Development strategy, Asia Report N°34 of the International Crisis Solidarités/Groupe URD : The land development in Central Highlands of Afghanistan – Case study of Shaman plain flood control project (Bamiyan Province) – Agrarian system & impact assessments; By David LETTY, 2006 Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan / Ministry of Irrigation, Water resources and Environment (MIWRE): Kabul Understanding on water Resource Management and Development in Afghanistan”; Statement following the Kabul International conference on Water Resource Management and Development in Afghanistan, 2002 Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan / Ministry of Irrigation, Water resources and Environment (MIWRE): A strategic policy framework for the water sector; 2004

Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan / Ministry of Irrigation, Water resources and Environment (MIWRE): Water Resources Management Policy, 2004 Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan / Ministry of Irrigation, Water resources and Environment (MIWRE): Irrigation policy, 2004 UNEP: Afghanistan Post conflict Environmental Assessment; 2003 UNEP: Wetlands shared between Afghanistan, Iran almost completely dry, 2003 UNESCO: Capacity Building for Cooperation in Water Resources Management in Afghanistan, 2003 USAID: Rapid assessment of the water sector – Afghanistan ; Saleh Keshawarz, University of Hartford - department of civil and Environmental Engineering, 2002

Education sector Afghanistan, Comprehensive Needs Assessment, Final Draft Report, Asian Development Bank 2002 Afghanistan: Managing Public Finances for Development, “chp 8: Delivering services to the afghan people”, World Bank, 2005 Spink, Karyar, Zuhal Atmar, AREU, Afghanistan Teacher Education Project, Situational Analysis, Teacher Education and Professional Development in Afghanistan, 2004 Evans, Manning, Osmani, Tully and Wilder, AREU and the World Bank, A guide to Government in Afghanistan, 2004 A new Start for Afghanistan’s Education Sector, Asian Development Bank, South Asia Department, April 2003 Constitution of Afghanistan, year 1382 Karlsson and Mansory, Educational Reforms in the Context of Globalisation and in Afghanistan, Institute of International Education, 2004 “Education in Afghanistan”, Encylopeadia Iranica, volume VIII, Fascicle 3, Mazda Publishers,1998 Investing in Afghanistan’s Future, A Strategy Note on the Education System in Afghanistan, Keiko Miwa, World Bank, South Asia Region, February 2005, 48p Hunte, AREU, Looking Beyond the School Walls: Household Decision-Making and school enrolment in Afghanistan, Briefing Paper, 2006, World Food Programme, USAID, Save the Children USA and APEP, Results and Discussion of Education Data collected in the Afghanistan, National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 2003, Afghanistan Primary Education Programme, 2005 USAID, Strategic Plan for Education (2005-2010), 2004 World Bank, Technical Annex for a proposed Grant in the Amount of US$ 35 million to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan for an Education quality Improvement Programme (EQUIP), 2004 Independent High Commission of Education for Afghanistan, The Revival and Development of Education in Afghanistan, Objectives, Policy and Strategies, 2003 UNESCO, UNESCO education reconstruction programme for Afghanistan, Components and development projects. Transitional support strategy. 2002-2004, 2002

Agriculture Afghan Aid, Responding to new challenges: strategic Framework and three years plan, Sept. 2004. Afghanistan Independant Human Rights Commission, Economic and social rights in Afghanistan, May 2006 Agha Khan Fondation for Afghanistan, Rural development strategy, January 2005 Donini, Minear, Smillie and all, Feinstein International Famine Center, Mapping the security Environment, June 2005 Donini, Nitland Wermester, Nation (?) (first draft), 2005 Duchier and Pascal, Understand need diversity to design sustainable programs, Groupe URD www.urd.org Duchier, 2006. Blé ou pavot? les paysans ont choisi. Memoire de Master, CNEARC Groupe URD, see urd.org EC Directorate Asia, Country strategy paper Afghanistan, 2003-2006 Langenkamp, The aims and impacts of aid in Afghanistan, May 2002 Lind Habenstreit, USDA makes important contribution to help rebuilding Afghanistan’s agricultural sector, June 2005 MAAHF, Master plan for Agriculture, Nov. 2005 Maletta, 2003. The grain ad the chaff, the cost of production of wheat in Afghanistan in a farming-system perspective, MAAHF-FAO Neun & Fitzherbert from Development Research Network, Assistance to the transitional Authority of the Islami State of Afghanistan to elaborate policy guidance regarding food aid utilization in Afghanistan, oct.2003 Riviere, Water and Irrigation sector review, Sept 2005, Groupe URD – LRRD programme WFP and MRRD, Report on findings from the 2003 National risk and vulnerability assessment (NRVA), Dec.2004

Nutrition Duchet, Groupe URD, CNEARC and AfghanAid.. Les femmes Afghanes au coeur de l’économie rurale – exemple d’une vallée dans le Nord de l’Afghanistan, 2005 Dufour, Groupe URD. Nutrition Update in LRRD second semester report, 2005. Ministry of Health (MOH) of the Transitional Islamic Government of Afghanistan. A basic package of health services for Afghanistan, 2003/1382. Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Public Nutrition Policy and Strategy 2003-2006, 2005/1385 World Bank, Direction in Development. Repositioning nutrition as central to Development – A strategy for Large-scale Action, 2006

GENERAL Evans A., Manning N., Osmani Y., Tully A., and Wilder A., 2004, A guide to Government in Afghanistan, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit and The World Bank. Gibson, Mujeeb, Kabir and Soeters , Health Financing Report, Draft version, 2005 Dufour, Groupe URD. LRRD second semester report: Nutrition Update, July 2005. Ministry of Health (MOH) of the Transitional Islamic Government of Afghanistan. A basic package of health services for Afghanistan, March 2003/1382. Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Public Nutrition Policy and Strategy 2003-2006, Update 1384, Dec 2005. World Bank, Direction in Development. Repositioning nutrition as central to Development – A strategy for Large-scale Action, 2006

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