Chapter 4

LIBERATION THEOLOGY AND KERALA: A POLITICAL ENQUIRY

introduction

erala is a narrow strip of land extending some 600 kms along the south

west coast of India. Situated between the Arabian sea in the west and the

Western Ghats in the east,' Kerala has an area of 38863 sq. k m ~ . ~ Its

topography is marked by three natural divisions - coastal lowlands, midland

plains and highlands. The geographical isolation of Kemla from the rest of India

gives it a distinctive socio-economic and political identity. While the mountain

range on its eastern border protected the land against incursions from

neighbouring provinces, the kingdom of the south west coast lay exposed on its

western front to foreign influences from as far back as Graceo-Roman times.

The development of this land owes not a little to centuries of maritime trade with

Arab countries and countries further west. The state gets an abundant supply of

water from its forty four rivers and several major hydro-electrkal projects have

been set up to tap this valuable resource. The land currently being utilised for

farming makes up 57% of the total land area of the state.3

Kernla's rural areas, where 81 per cent of its population live, mainly

depends on agriculture and allied occupations for their live~ihood.~ Kerala is an

agricultural state with rice5 as the staple food. Although the state is rich in

natural resources it has to depend on other states for agricultural products.

Unscientific farming methods have led to a sharp decline in production and this,

coupled with exorbitant labour and fertiliser costs, has forced farmers to turn

their attention to cash crops like rubber: tea: cashew,' coffeeg and spices.10

Kerala contributes about twenty five per cent of the total export of cash crops of

the country." There exist in Kerala so many conditions favourable to the

development of industries: raw materials, minerals, high rate of literacy, water

resources, transport and banking facilities, moderate climatic conditions etc.

Besides fishing industry, handloom, handicraft, beedi, bricks and tiles

manufacturing provides employment to thousands of people.'2 However, the

fad remains that Kerala has not yet been able to take advantage of its 600 krn.

long seaboard and exploit fully its potential for coastal and marine industries.

With 749 persons to a sq. krn. as against the all India average of 273,

Kerala ranks among the most densely populated states in the country.13 Of its

total population of 29098518'~, the rural population numbers 21418224 and the

rest constitutes its urban population. Kerala has the highest literacy rate in the

country: 90.59 per cent15 as against the 52.21 per cent of the all India average.

Kerala may be described demographically as an overpopulated state with

retarded economic growth. Power shortage continues to be the major handicap

in the development of the state.16 The situation has been made worse by

problems arising from an exclusive dependence on hydro-electric power, failure

to make any significant addition to capacity since 1977, delay in commissioning

of new projects owing to labour troubles, contract failures, defective planning,

local pressure, rehabilitation of evictees etc. Per capita consumption of electricity

in the state is 231 Kwh which is the lowest among the southern states." To tide

over the power crises, the government has been resorting to loadshedding and

power cuts. In view of severe constraints on resources for setting up new power

plants, the private sector needs to be encouraged to take up projects in power

generation. While the current demand for power is 7220 Mu, the supply is only

5820 Mu.

The Formation of Kerala - The historical and Political Background

The present Kerala State was formed by merging three admin'istrative

units - Travancore, Cochin and Malabar - of which the last mentioned had

formerly been part of the Madras Province. These three regions had their

distinctive social, economic and political features as was evident from their

markedly uneven development patterns and differences in agrarian relations.

The development of these areas was in part due to cultural divergence arising

from the distribution of the major communities among the three regions.'' Of

the three units, the largest was Travancore whose modem history begins with the

re i~n of Marthanda Varma, who annexed a part of the Cochin State, subdued

the petty chieftains of North Travancore and consolidated Travancore as a state

with Thiruvananthapuram as its capital. The history of Cochin is intertwined

with that of Travancore and Malabar. Among the rulers of Makbar, the Zamorin

of Calicut was the most powerful. The Portuguese, the Dutch and the English

had establihsed trade relations with him. The three different regions had been

knit together by a common language and thii provided a strong bond between

the princely state of Cochin and the socially backward Malabar. It must be

pointed out, however, that the Congress party had been a major political force in

Malabar; the region remained the nerve-centre of Congress activity in the 1920s

and 30s. In 1928, there were widespread demonstrations against the Simon

Commission. Other important activities included the Salt March of 1928 and the

Great Civil Disobedience campaign from 1932 to 1934.

Like people anywhere in the world, Kerala society, too, has had to

contend with divisive forces in social, cultural and economic spheres. Differences

relating to religion and caste - in particular, the caste factor which deeply

influences people's attitude and behaviour - have played a dominant role in

the Keralites' life. The two main minority communities, Muslims and Christians,

have played a vital role in Kerala's social and political history. The Muslims,

though socially, economically and educationally, a minority community,

dominates the Malabar area while the Christians, who had made themselves into

a strong well-knit social organisation through their churches are predominant in

Central Travancore and ~ o c h i i . ' ~ In the early days casteism and communal

rivalry were influential factors in the politics of Travancore. But during the days

of the "Malayali ~emorial,"" people cast aside their communal and caste

considerations for the common cause of getting out of Kerala the people who

were not Keralites, especially, the Tamils, who had grabbed the majority of the

public jobs. Malayali Memorial, a landmark event signalled the political

awakening of the people of Travancore and gave warning that no ruler of the

region should ignore the c h i of its native population. At the time of the

Malayali Memorial, the assembly seats were monopolised by the representatives

of the highest caste. The ~zhavas," Ch nsbans ' . and Muslims demanded proper

repre~entation.'~ The "abstention movementn forced the Maharaja to introduce

some reforms. Sri Narayana ~ u r u , ~ an Ezhava reformer, sought to purge

Kerala society of its evil practices and cwtoms. He campaigned against the evils

of caste system and the high-handedness of the upper caste. His advaitha

philosophy may be summarised in his famous mantra, "one caste, one religion,

and one God for man." He exhorted the Ezhavas to organise themselves in

order to acquire power. Today, a h a t all communities have their own

organisations for the protection of their interests.

In 1938, the Travancore State Congress was formed under the leadership

of Pattam Thanu Pillai who called for responsible govemment with proper

representation of all sections of the society. When the British rule ended, the

Divan wanted to set up an "Independent Travancore." The Congress was

against it and demanded the merger of Travancore with the Indian Union. On

September 4, 1947, Travancore acceded to the Indian ~ n i o n . ~ ~ The first

popular government in Travancore was formed in 1948 with Pattam Thanu Pibi

as the leader. Cochin, too, though not so politically conscious as Travancore,

desired a popular government. The Maharaja of Cochin also welcomed people's

participation in administration. As a result, a legislative council was inaugurated

in 1925 and through the Reform Act of 1938, Cochin became the first

principality to form a responsible government, though, with limited powers to the

ministersz5. In the election that followed, Cochin Congress, one of the two major

political parties won the mandate and assumed office on June 17, 1 9 3 8 . ~ ~ The

Cochin Pmja Mandal party which was established in 194lZ7 strove hard to

establish a popular govemment through constitutional means. On August 16,

1946 the Maharaja announced, in a message to the legislative council, hi

intention to transfer more power to elected representatives and enhance the

number of ministers. As a result, a popular minishy came to power on

September 9, 1946." Shortly before the country became independent, the

Maharaja transferred all powers to the ministers in deference to the wishes of the

people and Dewanship ended on September 11, 1947. The people of

Travancore and Cochin wanted the integration of the two regions. Leaders of

both states met Sardar Patel and a pact was made. Both Maharajas of

Travancore and Cochin signed it. According to the covenant, the Maharaja of

Travancore, Sri Chithii Thirunal Balarama Vanna, became the titular head of

the new state and the unification of Travancore and Cochin came into force on

1 July, 1949.'~

While the princely states of Travancore and Cochin travelled along the

path of democracy by acceding to the Indian Union, Malabar which was under

the direct rule of Britain took an altogether different course. Malabar, a district of

Madras Province, was caught up in the freedom movement and it was in

Malabar that a regional wing of the Indian National Congress started its

a~tivities.~' Socialism also won many supporters during the freedom struggle in

Malabar due to the concentration of landed property in the hands of the minority

caste Hindus. The Malabar District Congress Committee was launched under

the able leadership of Sri. K P. Kesava Menon in 1908. The year 1921 was

marked by the violent uprising of Muslims known as the "Mapilah Rebellion."

The fad that during the Quit India Movement of 1942, six hundred and fifty

people3' were arrested from this region gives some indication of the impact of

the freedom movement in Mabbar region. When India wrested freedom from

the British in 1947, Mabbar was a part of the Madras Province.

The Travancore-Cochin Assembly held its first meeting on July 11, 1949

with 178 members. The new ministry, under the leadership of T. K Narayana

Pibi resigned on Februay 24, 1951 and then C. Kesavan took over for a short

period. The Indian Constitution came into force on Januay 26, 1950 and the

designation 'Prime Minister' till then used for the head of the cabinet in

Travancore-Cochin was changed to Chief Minister. The first general election on

the basis of adult franchise was held in December 1951 and no party won

absolute majority in Tmvancore-Cochin. In order to avoid president's rule the

Indian National Congress formed an alliance with the Tmvancore Tamilnadu

Congress and, as a result, the A J. John ministry took over the admin.htion.

But the Tmvancore Tamilnadu congress withdrew its support to the ministry over

the language question and the government fell on September 23,1953.

In the mid term election that followed, no party won the majority required

to form a government. Again, to avoid presidential ~ l e and a coalition headed

by communists,32 the Congress supported Sri. Pattam Thanu Pillai, the P. S. P.

leader, to form the ministry but the ministry collapsed on February 8, 1955 when

the Congress withdrew its support to the government. Panambilly Govinda

Menon, the Congress leader, took over in March 1955 but had to step down the

following year due to dissension within the party. Presidential rule was imposed

on March 23,1956.

Another significant development in Kerala politics was the "Aikya Kerala"

33 movement. The Tamil speaking areas of Southern Travancore wanted to

merge with Tamil Nadu while the Malayalam speaking areas of Malabar

preferred a merger with Travancore-Cochin. On the recommendation of the

State Re-organization Commission, the State of Kemla was formed by uniting the

three provinces of Travancore-Cochin and Malabar on November 1, 19.55.~~

Kerala - An Analysis of Major Trends in Its Political History

Tbe first communist minlstry

A striking feature of Kerala politics throughout its histoly has been the

absence of single party dominance and the administrative instability that resulted

from it. At the time of the formation of United Kerala there was no elected

government in Travancore-Cochin and the President of Indii appointed

P. S. Rao as adviser to the Rajapramukh. The fmt election after the formation of

the State of Kerala, on the basiis of adult franchise, was held along with the

second general election of 1957. The election results attracted the attention of

political analysts within and outside the counby. In this election, the people

chose a Communist Government to govern them - an electoml feat with few

precedents in the history of free elections. The communists got s i ~ 3 r ~ ~ out of one

hundred seats they contested.36 The table below sets out the details of the

results.

Assembly elections 1957 - ~ e s u l t s ~ ~

Total seats Uedomte Votes polled Percentage of votes

Political parties Seats contested Seats won Percentage

Congress 124 43 37.84

Communist 100 60 35.28

RSP 28 Nil 3.22

Muslim League 75 13 12.87 and independents

One independent candidate, Umeshwara Rao. from Manjeshwar, was elected

uncontested.

A major reason for the remarkable victory of the communists was the

inclusion of Malabar in the State where the commun'& had gained decisive

influence and the exclusion of South Travancore where the Congress was

Communal rivalry also contributed to the victory of the commun'kts.

Christians supported the Congress while the majority of lower class Hindus were

attracted to the Communist programme. The Commun'kt ministry was sworn in

on April 5, 1957 under the leadership of E. M. Sankaran ~ a m b o o d i r i ~ a d . ~ ~ But,

as a result of the so-called "liberation struggle", the E. M. S. ministry was

dismissed on July 31, 1959. The President's rule that ensued lasted up to

February 1960. In the subsequent election, Congress made an alliance with

Muslim League and PSP who had turned against the Communists and won 94

seats while the Communists got only 29 seats4' But in percentage of votes,

communists got a better deal, from 35.28 of 1957 to 39.14 in 1960. This means

that the Communists were able to broaden their base though they lost the

election

Results of Assembly Elections, 1960~'

Total seats Electorate Votes polled Percentage of votes

126 9601601 6919312 85.08

Political parties Seats contested Seats won Percentage

Congress 80 63 34.42

PSP 33 20 14.14

Muslim League 12 11 4. %

Communist 108 29 39.14

Jan Sangh 3 Nil 0.07

Independents 76 3 7.27

Congress supported PSP and its leader Pattam Thanu Pilhi f o m d the

ministry on February 22, 1960. The Pattam ministy marked the beginning of

coalition government in Kerala. Relations between the coalition partners

suffered a set-back with the death of Seethi Sahib. C. H. Muhammad Koya was

elected Speaker. Congress was not vey happy about the choice of the Speaker.

The impending parliamentary elections and the Congress's reluctance to

coaperate with the Muslim League resulted in the exit of Muslim League from

the coalition.42 The two party (Congress-PSP) coalition continued. But the

leadership question created problems. Congressmen like P. T. Chacko and R

Sankar were reluctant to serve under the minority party (PSP) leader. To mend

fences and save the m i n i i , the then Home Minister of India, Lal Bahdur Sastri,

visited Kerak and talked to various parties and leaders. A compromise was

reached by which Pattam Thanu Pillai was offered the Governorship of Punjab

which he accepted on September 25, 1%2 without consulting hi supporters. A

new ministry was formed on September 26, 1962 with R. Sankar as Chief

Minister. PSP did not join the Government. Thus the co-alition experiment

ended in single party rule.

Soon, casteism and communalism asserted themselves. The Nairs and

Christians were not ready to serve under an Ezhava Chief Minister - R. Shankar. The untimely and unexpected death of P. T. Chacko on August 1,

1964 became a rallying point for the rebel groups within the ruling Congress.

There followed the defection from the party of fifteen MLA's loyal to

P. T. Chacko. As a result of the passing of a noconfidence on

September 8, 1964, presidential rule was imposed on the state once again which

lasted till February 1965.

The year 1964 is important in the politics of Kerala. This year saw two

major splits in two major political parties. The Communist Party broke into two:

Communist Party of Indii (CPI) and Communist Party of Indii-Mamist (CPI-M).

1964 also witnessed the birth of Kemla Congress as a result of the split in the

Congress party. In the 1965 elections, therefore, there were more political

parties in the arena than in any previous elections. There was no attempt made

at governing coalitions, probably because of recent failures in the experiment.

Resub of AssembIy Elections, 1%5~

Total seats Electorate Votes polled Peroentage of votes

133 8557716 6428937 75.12

Political parties Seats contested Seats won percent&

INC 133 36 33.58

SSP 29 13 8.13

Muslim League 16 6 3.83

CPI 78 3 8.10

Kerab. Congress 54 23 12.58

Independents 175 12 13.90

No party got absolute majority. No party was ready to co-operate with

any other to form a coalition government. As a last resort the Resident

d i i Ived the assembly on March 24, 1965 and again Kerak came under

Resident's rule.

FormatJon of an alliance

After the abortive election of 1965, the political parties had to accept the

fact, howewr unpleasant, that no party could rule the state single-handedly.

During the 1%7 elections, seven political parties formed an alliance named "The

United Front" under the leadenhip of CPI(M). The United Front was obviously

anti-Congress. The year 1%7 marked the end of Congress hegemony in many

states. In the elections the United Front bagged 117 seats and a CPI(M) led

m i n i i took charge on March 6, 1%7 under the leadership of E. M. S.

Results of Assembly Elections, 1967~~

Total seats Electorate Votes polled Percentage of votes

133 8613658 6318272 72.92

Political parties Seats contested Seats won Percentage

CPI (M) 59 52 23.50

CPI 22 19 8.57

Muslim League 15 14 6.40

RSP 16 6 2.71

SSP 21 19 1.10

KTP 3 2 6.52

KSP 1 1 35.43

INC 133 9 7.56

KC 62 5 0.21

Swathanha Party 6 Nil 0.88

Jana Sangh 24 Nil 0.22

PSP 7 Nil 4.13

Independents 55 6

Before long, the adminiition got bogged down in a spate of akgations

and counter-allegations. The Chief Minister having gone abroad for medical

treatment, there was little hope of resolving the crisii. The situation got steadily

worse until, on hi return from abroad, Nampoothiripad found it virtually

impossible to cany on. He handed in hi res ignat i~n~~ on November 1, 1969.

The Achutha Menon ministry came into force but the defection of three MIA's to

PSP wrecked hi m i n i i . Achutha Menon resigned on August 4, 1970 and

Kernla came under President's rule. After the resignation of Achutha Menon, the

parties set to work to form alliances. As a result, there appeared three groupirigs

among the political parties: (i) The CPI-led "mini alliance" consisting of CPI,

UML, RSP, PSP supported by Congress (R). (By this time the Congress had

split to form Congress (R) led by Prime Minister lndira Gandhi and Congress (0)

kd by those opposing her leadership). (ii) Marxist coalition, consising of

CPI (MI, KSP, KTP, SSP with the tacit support of ISP. (iii) Kerala Congress,

Congress (0) alliance supported by the Swatantra and Jan Sangh. In the mid-

term election held on September 17, 1970, the CPI "mini alliance" emerged

victorious and won the rnaprity of seats.

Results of Assembly Elections of 1970~'

Total seats Electorate Votes polled Percentage of votes

133 10169467 7634451 75.07

Political parties Seats mntested Seats won Percentage of votes polled

CPI 29 16 8.97

RlML 20 11 7.55

RSP 14 6 4.39

PSP 7 3 2.43

Congress (R) 52 30 17.63

CPI (M) 73 29 23.83

KSP

m SSP

ISP

Kemh Congress

Congress (0)

Swatantra

Jan Sangh

DMK

suc

1

1

6

3

12

Nil

Nil

Nil

Nil

Nil

Independents 205 15 17.40

The second Achutha Menon ministry, comprising nominees of the CPI,

IUML, RSP, PSP came to power on Odober 4, 1970. The Congress, which

supported the government from outside, also joined the ministry on September

25, 1971. Though the joining of the Congress strengthened the min-khy, six

IUML rebel MLA's withdrew their support to the government due to inner party

conflids. On May 8, 1975, the IUML speaker resigned and joined the All India

Muslim League (AIML) formed by the rebel MLA's. The government had by

now completed its term and fresh elections were expected in September 1975;

but because of the unusual political situation prevailing in the country, the

governments' life was extended to six months.

Meanwhile, the Kerala Congress which had fought the elections against

the CPI alliance expressed its desire to join the government. After hectic

deliberations, the Kerala Congress nominees, K M. Mani and R Bakkriihna

Pillai joined the ministry on October 26, 1975." The Achutha Menon minisby

proved a welcome relief from the instability that plagued the State since its

inception in 1956. It also showed that able and impartial administrators like

Achutha Menon can give political stability to the State.

After the "emergency", general elections were held on March 19, 1977.~'

There were only two powerful alliances (UDF and LDF) in the fray as against the

three competing alliances in the 1970 elections. The United Democratic Front

(UDF) consisting of Congress, CPI, Kerak Congress, IUML, RSP, National

Democratic Party (NDP) and PSP were ranged against the Left Democratic Front

(LDF) consisting of the CPI (M). Janatha, AlML, Kerak Congress (Pillai) on the

other side. The UDF had a massive victory over the LDF and won one hundred

and eleven seats while the LDF got only twenty nine seats.

Results of Assembly Elections of 1 9 7 7 ~

Total seats Electorate Votes polled Percentage of votes

Political parties Seats contested Seats won Percentage of votes poUed

INC 54 38 19.3

CPI 27 23 9.6

Kerak Congress

ML RSP

NDP PSP

CPM

BLD (Janata)

N O )

KC ( m i ) 15 2 4.3

Independents (U.F) 11 1 3.18

Congress (Radicals) 2 Nil 0.52

KSP Ind. 1 Nil 0.36

NRSP 1 Nil 0.26

Independents 288 Nil 3.78

The UDF under the leadership of K ffimnakaran came to power on

March 25,1977.~' Only C. H. Muhammad Ibya of lUML joined the ministry on

that day. Thirteen others joined the minishy only on April 10, 1977.~' It points

to the fact that the formation of the minii was not an easy task internal and

inter party rivalries held up the expansion of the minis-. The ffimnakaran

ministry had to resign on April 25, 1 9 7 7 ~ ~ due to the infamous "Rajan casen. On

April 27, 1977~~ . A. K Antony was sworn in as Chief Minister. Meanwhile, the

Indian National Congress underwent another split, this time into Congress (1) led

by Mrs. India Gandhi and Congress (S) opposing her. This split had its impad

on Kemk politics also. K Karunakaran and others who supported Mrs. Gandhi

were suspended from the KPCC and thrown out of the UDF. Prof. K M.Chandy

was elected President of the KPCC which supported Mrs. Gandhi. The split in

the Congress weakened the UDF. On February 4, 197€i5', NDP, a partner of

the UDF withdrew from the UDF and decided to sit as an independent bloc in

the state legislature.

The Chief Minister, Mr. A. K Antony, resigned on October 26, 1 9 7 p , in

protest against the decision of the Indian National Congress Central

Parliamentary Board to support Indim Gandhi, in the bye-eledion to the Lok

Sabha from Chikmangalore constituency in Kamataka. Consequently, the

leadership of the coalition passed to the CPI. P. K. Vasudevan Nair, the CPI

leader was swom in Chief Minister on Odober 29, 1978.'~ The UDF lost all four

byeelections (May 18, 1979) to the assembly. It pointed to the gradual erosion

of popular support to the UDF.

The UDF was further weakened by a split in the Kerala Congress, into

Kemla Congres (M) led by K M. Mani and Kernla Congress (J) led by

P. J. Jmeph. K M. Mani resigned from the government on July 26, 1979.~'

Owing to his party's stand on the "Gift Deed" (land reforms) Bill,

P. K Vasudevan Nair resigned on October 7, 1979.~' After hectic parleys

between coalition partners, C. H. Mohammad Koya of the IUML was elected as

a compromise candidate to lead the UDF and the m i n w under his leadership

was sworn in on Odober 12, 1 9 7 9 ~ . The Congress and Kerak Congress were

keen to ensure the passage of the Land Reforms Bill and supported the

government. When the Bill had been passed, the co-alition parties, especially

Congress and Kerala Congress, showed little interest in bringing the ministry

through to the end of its term. Kerab Congress (M) on November 14, 1979, left

the coalition and joined the opposition.61 Congress withdrew its support on

November 27, 1979. The Chief Miniier advised the Governor to di i lve the

assembly and the Governor did so on November 30, 1979.~' The following day

Muhammad Koya, the Chief Min'ier, resigned and once again the state passed

under President's rule on December 5. 1979.

Preparations were made to conduct a fresh election. Two equally strong

and well-knit political alliances were in the fray - one led by the CPI (M),

namely the Left Democratic Front (LDF) consisting of Congress (A), CPI, AIML,

RSP, KC (M) and KC (Pihi) and the other the United Democratic Front (UDF),

consisting of Congress (I) , IUML, KC (Joseph), PSP and NDP. The elections

were held on Januay 21, 1980. The LDF won ninety three seats while the UDF

got only forty six seats.

Results of the 1980 AssembIy ~ l ec t ions~~

Total seats Uedomte Votes polled Percentage of votes

140 13266064 %I1455 75.74

Political palties Seats mntested Seats won Percentage of votes polled

MC (1) 51 17 17.34

IUML 20 14 7.17

Kc (J) 15 6 4.94

PSP 4 1 0.11

NDP 11 3 3.65

SRP 6 Nil 0.33

CPI (M) 50 35 7.79

CPI 22 1 7 10.94

INC (S) 30 21 3.02

RSP 8 6 3.51

AIML 11 5 5.24

KC (MI 17 8 0.80

KC (PG) 2 1 0.80

Janata 29 5 7.57

Independents (UDF) 4 Nil 2.24

Independent elected 1 1 0.29

The LDF government led by E. K Nayanar of CPI (M) assumed office on

January 25, 1980. Withii a year of the LDF coming to power, the political

situation in the state became unstable. There were frequent alegations of the

breakdown of law and order: the excesses of ClTU activism, and clashes

between CPI (M) and RSS activists etc. created an explosive situation. Serious

differences of opinion emerged among the coalition partners and on Odober 16,

1981, Congress (S) led by Sri. A. K Antony withdrew its support to the

g~vernment .~~ On Oaober 20, 1981, the Kerab Congress (M) atio withdrew its

support and E. K Nayanar tendered his resignation on the same day. Thus on

October 21,1981, Kerala came under President's rule and the assembly was kept

under suspended animation. The Congress (S) leader made intensive

negotiations with the UDF to form a government but the central leadership of

Congress (S) asked its Kerala unit to stop all consultations with the UDF. But the

Kerab leader, Sri. A K Antony, defied the orders of Congress (S) centml

leadership and this brought about a split in the Congress (S) in Kerala. The

breakaway gmup was known as Congress (A) led by Sri. A. K Antony. With

the tacit support of Congress (A), K Karunakaran, the leader of the UDF and of

the Congress (I) was sworn in as Chief Minister on December 28, 1 9 8 1 . ~ ~ Both

the UDF and the LDF started political manoeuvring aimed at discrediting each

other. With the defection to LDF of a KC (M) M. L A, Mr. Lonappan

Nambadan, the UDF lost its majority, and this forced the resignation of

Ka~nakaran's minkby on March 17, 1 9 8 2 . ~ ~ On the same day, the President of

India took over the administration of the state.

Both alliances set to work to fight the elections. In the elections held on

May 19, 1982, there was, in addition to the UDF and the LDF, a new entrant,

the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The election results awarded the victory to the

UDF which won seventy seven seats. K brunakaran, the leader of the UDF

from the Congress (I) , was sworn in Chief Minister on May 24, 1982.~'

Results of the 1982 Assembly ~ l e d i o n s ~ ~

Total seats Uedorate Votes polled Percentage of votes

140 13117012 9649083 73.56

Political parties Seats contested Seats won Percentage of votes polled

Congress (1) 35 20 11.88

Congress (A) 28 15 9.62

IUML 18 14 6.17

Kc (MI 17 6 5.85

KC (J) 12 8 4.55

Janata (G) 8 4 2.75

NDP 8 4 2.67

SRP 6 2 2.14

RISP (S) 4 1 1.20

PSP 1 1 0.30

DLP 1 1 0.37

Independent (UDF) 1 1 0.38

NRSP 1 Nil 0.36

CPI (M) 51 26 18.77

CPI (M) Inde. 9 3 2.65

CPI

CPI Inde.

Congess (S) RSP

AlML Janata

KC (S)

DSP

Independent Lok Dal

BJP

Other Inde.

13

Nil

7

4

4 4

1

1

Nil

Nil

Nil

Nil

The Karunakaran minishy enjoyed enough legislative support but was

driven by interparty and intraparty feuds. Personal rivalries occupied the

attention of the m i n i i in place of good Qovemance. It was alleged that

K Karunakamn, the Chief Minister, gave undue importance to the Muslims and

the Christians at the expense of the State as a whole. Sri. Karunakaran himself

precipitated the political crisii in the State by hii frequent talk of reshuffling of the

ministry which every body understood as a tactic for ousting the powerful home

miniir , Vayalar Ravi, of Karunakaran's own party. Karunakaran was forced to

call new elections to the Assembly in March 1987, two months before the

completion of its five year term.

1982 and the following years witnessed the merger and split of more than

two political parties. In December 1982, Congress (A) merged with Congress (I).

1985 saw the merging of the Kerab Congress factions, but the re-union was

short lived; two years later, they split again. AlML merged with IUML in 1986.

AIML had been a CPI(M) ally since its inception. It had four MLA's and the

merger was a blessing to the UDF. In 1987, a section of Congress (S) merged

with the congress (I). Around thii time, the M)P and SRP too divided into

smaller factions, while the Janata (G) with its four MIA's dippeared from the

political scene.69 Even the much disciplined CPI (M) was not free from internal

dissension. Differences arose in the party over its "political linen. M. V.

Raghavan, the then Secretary of its legislative party advocated that in order to

defeat Congress (I), the party should align itself with any party other than BJP.

Three more MIA's supported his political line. AU of them were expelled from

the party and later they formed the Communist Marxist Party (CMP).

In 1987, the LDF d i i i a t e d itself for the first time from communal

political parties. The emergence of Hindu Munnani with WP links was a new

feature of the political scenario and provided a third front on the election scene.

The CPI (M) was prepared to alienate the Muslim votes and in so doing they

hoped to cash in on the Hindu votes and thereby reduce the strength of the BJP.

The Congress, fearing a Hindu backlash, tried to make up for it with concessions

to Muslim fundamentalist^.'^ In the 1982 election, the UDF had only managed

to gain a majority of less than one kkh votes and the margin of victory in many

constituencies had been meagre. In thirty four out of one hundred and forty

constituencies, the victory margin happened to be just less than two thousand

votes. The UDF had won forty two of its seventy-six seats by a mere majority of

less than five hundred votes. Kerak presented 28 kkhs of new voters in the

1987 elections. The new voters which would have numbered 20,000 on an

average in each constituency, was the decisive factor in the p o ~ ; ~ ' going by past

experience, the voters could not have been vey optimistic about the outcome.

They had by now tried both fronts. Their experience with either front hand not

been satisfactoy. Besides the two fronts, the presence of the Hindu Munnani

and an anay of independent candidates - 1254 - in the fray compounded the

situation for the electorate. The rebel Communist Marxist Party (CMP) of

M. V. Raghavan added to the confusion of the already complex party political

alignments. The two front leaders - the Congress (I) and the CPI (M) - played

'big broither' to their partners by contesting seventy-six and seventy-nine seats

respectively. Even the threat of a walkout by CPI from the LDF didn't help to

change CPI (M)'s attitude. In the UDF, the Congress (I) rejected outright the

exaggerated c b i of the Kerab Congress and SRP.

The LDF approached the people as a truly secular outfit without any

communal allegiances." It presented itself as a caste-free alliance. By thii they

hoped to entice the new voters and a part of the Hindu votes of the UDF who

were dissatisfied with the pressure tactic of the communal partners of the UDF.

The LDF strategy focused on the Ezhavas who constituted the traditional vote

bank of the LDF. The CPI (M) put up twenty-five fresh candidates and dropped

seven sitting ML4's from their list. They also tried to field intellectuals like

M. K Sanu where they couldn't hope to win on their own. The LDF never

made known the name of the leader who would lead the combmation if it won

the contest. However, the name of Mrs. K R Gowri, 68 year old veteran, an

Ezhava, who had successfully contested eight assembly elections, was widely

touted, with the party's tacit support, as a tactic for enticing U a v a votes.

The Congress also dropped seven sitting MLA's but failed to infuse young

blood into the array of the old guards. The State Executive of the Youth

Congress resigned en rnasse in protest against being sidelined but was later

pacified by the leadership.n The UDF was considerably weakened by factional

infighting between two of its partners. The fight between the Kerala Congress

(M) and Kerak Congress (J) caused much headache to other coalition partners

of the UDF. Even withii the Congress (I), the intraparty rivalry between the hvo

groups owing allegiance to A K Antony and K Kamnakaran seriously

compromised the party's electoral fortunes.

CPI (M) General Secretary E. M. S. Namboodiripad drew a parallel

between the 1957 and 1987 elections. According to him, as in 1957 the

comrnun'kls were putting up a fight on a matter of principle-a fight against

communal and casteist forces.74 He was confident that the people would

appreciate the basic distinction between his front and the UDF; he described the

latter as ". . . a shameless produd of opportunistic flirtation of the Congress with

communal forces"." On the other hand, the AlCC General Secretay, Mr. A. K.

Antony was sure, though he was not quite happy with the UDF style of

functioning, that the people ". . . cannot and will not afford the luxuy of another

experiment with the ~ a r x i s t s " . ~ ~ The presence of the CMP and the near total

alienation of the Muslim voters adversely affected the LDF. Ps a matter of fad,

the LDF, despite its loud secularist protestations, had taken care to field

candidates belonging to the dominant communities in evey con~tituency.~ The

caste'& and communal card played astutely though secretly by the LDF brought

in rich dividends. Neither the LDF nor the UDF seemed confident of victoly.

And so, they spoke in guarded terms of their plans for the govemment to be

formed.78

There were 1241 candidates for a total of 138 seats.79 The three political

fronts and the CMP together had only 480 candidates. The remaining

candidates, independents and rebels, had entered the election fray to express

various grievances against the prevailing regimes. In Ranni, in Pathanamthitta

d i d , 12 independents joined forces to form a people's front. In Kottayam

district, several independents got together and organised a convention. Many

retired government officials, too came fonuard to contest the elections. AU

Kerah S e ~ c e Pensioners Association put up some candidates because they felt

that their representatives alone would be able to redress their grievances.

Autorikshaw driven, lottey vendors, sanyasins like Swami Gangadham Thirtha

( b b p a r a ) , Swami Pethambarachalya (Kaduthuruthy) were in the fray. The

inmates of Keezhmadu school where the police had reportedly beaten up the

blind students, were in Mak to campaign against Chief Minister, K Karunakamn,

along with a team of women, representing the outraged womanhood of

Thankamani village in ldukki district. In Chertala, Sebastian, a traditional

fisherman, put himself up as an independent where former Home Minister

Vayakr Ravi was seeking r e e l e ~ t i o n . ~

The election results favoured the LDF. The SRP, which claimed the

support of the Ezhavas, lost all of its four candidates. The Ezhavas expe&d

K R Gouri, an Ezhava, to be the next Chief Minister and voted for the LDF.

The NDP which chimed the support of the Naii' and had bargained for and

obtained nine seats from the UDF list, was able to win only one seat. A large

number of its votes went to the BJP-Hindu combine which won more than ten

thousand votes in nineteen constituencies. The Kerala Congress factions

suffered heavily and won only nine seats though they had fifteen seats in the

outgoing assembly. The infighting of the Kerala Congress factions had split the

Christian votes. The "policy of annihiitionn pursued by either of the Kerala

Congress factions resulted in their own annihilation. The CMP had fielded

eighty eight candidates; not many of them were able to secure more than a

thousand votes.

Though the BJP-Hindu Front won no seats, they were able to evoke a

response from the voters.*' Th.s indicated the widespread resentment among

Hindus against the UDF policy of communal appeasement. In nearly sixty

constituencies it bagged more than five thousand votes each and emerged

second in three constituencies; it polled more than ten thousand votes in

nineteen constituencies. The BJP-Hindu Front cut mainly into the UDF vote

banks, and did not make any gains at the expense of CPI (M) votes. The secular

.mge of the IDF was appealing to the people, particularly to the urban elite and

the middle class. The LDF won in most of the urban centres. However, it must

be conceded that though the LDF emerged victorious, the difference of votes

between the LDF and the UDF was just below one per cent of the total votes.

Results of the 1987 Assembly ~~ections*

Total seats Electorate Votes polled Percentage of votes

140 15948137 12846620 80.58

Political parties Seats contested Seats won Percentage of votes polled

INC 76 33 24.81

RIML 23 15 7.72

Kc (J) 13 5 3.53

KC (MI 10 4 3.33

NDP 9 1 2.23

SRP 4 Nil 1.21

=IJ (s) 1 Nil 0.23

Independents (UDF) 2 2 0.58

CPI (M) CPI (M) Independent

CPI

CPI Independent

IC (S) Janata

Lok Dal

RSP

WP-Hindu Munnani

Independents

CMP

Other Independents

38

4

16

1

6

7

1

5

Nil

Nil 1

1

On January 29, 1991n, the LDF held the first ever district council

elections. The Congress (I)-led front's defeat in these elections was grievous and

humiliating. The LDF won decisive majority in 12 of the 14 councils. On the

strength of thii massive victory, the LDF decided to go in for fresh assembly

elections ewn though they had one more year to complete their term. The

Chief Minister, E. K Nayanar, declared that they planned to hold simultaneous

elections to the k m b l y and Parliament in order to avoid unnecessary expense

to the state. The LDF accepted KC (J) as its partner, though E. M. S. had once

dubbed it as a Christian communal party. He justified the induction of KC (J)

into the LDF by saying that it ". . . had disowned its ecclesiastical leadership and

was secular in The newly formed Samvamna Samudaya

Munnani (SSM), (an organisation of communities eligible for reservations) bied

its pressure tactics to influence both fronts. The SSM - the protagonist of

caste-based reservation - carried littie weight with the people. The two fronts,

the LDF and the UDF, didn't pay much attention to them. But both fronts were

careful to take account of caste and religious equations in choosing the

candidates for each constituency.

The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi on May 21, 1 9 9 1 ~ changed the whole

political scene. The LDF had to concede that there was a sympathy wave. In

order to counter the sympathy wave, the LDF tried to create an anti-sympathy

wave. They marched through the towns holding up tom and disfigured banners

which they claimed had been vandalised by UDF workers. But even in such

demonstrations, the left front instructed the poll campaigners not to utter slogans

maligning Rajiv Gandhi. The LDF withdrew anti-Rajiv cassettes and the LDF

leaders had to garland the urn canying Rajiv's ashes and attended condolence

meetings;% they had to shower praise on the late Indian leader. In the elections

on June 12, 1991, the UDF got a massive victory

Results of the 1991 Assembly €ledionss6 -

Total seats Electorate Votes polled Percentage of votes 139* 19512248 14333377 73.46

Political parties Seats contested Seats won Percentage

INC (I) 90 53 32.27

ML

KC (MI CMF' BJP

BSP

CPI

CPM

lcss JP

19

9

1

Nil

Nil

12

29

2

Nil

KC 10 1 3.03

NDP 3 2 0.93

RSP 6 2 2.15

JD 12 3 3.80

SJP 1

DPI 2

UCPl 3 0.03 Lok Dal 4 Nil

Social Action Party 1 Nil

MGR MMK 1 Nil "1 Independents 115 4 5.79

* Election to a constituency was countermanded due to the death of a candidate.

K Ka~nakarn of Congress was sworn in as Chief Minister on June 24,

1991.'' But due to conflicts within the Congress and between Congress and its

allies, he was forced to resign on March 16, 1995 and A. K Antony was sworn in

as Chief Minister on March 22, 1995." The UDF, under the leadership of A. K

Antony, decided to ban the sale of anack from April 19% and to hike the exc'ke

duty on Indian made foreign liquors from twenty rupees to two hundred rupees

per proof litre. Prohibition had been an item in the UDF manifesto. Antony

said he had made thii decision "to wipe out the tears of suffering

Opposition leaders were not quite prepared for this daring initiative. They didn't

know how to react to this policy. The UDF and the LDF were racing neck and

neck in the 19% elections. The elections were scheduled to be held on April 27,

19%. A. K Antony's leadership and the liquor ban raised the morale of the

UDF. There were internal party problems in the LDF. Kerala Congress (J),

Janata Dal, and to some extent, the CPI, were all plagued by internal problems.

In the UDF, the Karunakaran and Antony groups were out to scuttle the chances

of their opponents. The LDF had a slight edge on the UDF on communal lines

as the Nair service Society (NSS) had vowed to defeat the UDF. The NDP was

not happy with Antony over his declared stance on the question of job

reservation and had parted ways with the UDF.

In order to attract Ezhava votes, the UDF formed an alliance with

Janathipathya Samrakshana Samithi (JSS) of K. R. Gouriamma who had been

expelled from CPI (M) and had bunched her own party in 1994. The UDF also

reached an understanding with Sree Narayana Dharrna Paripalana Sangham

(SNDP) which openIy declared its support to the UDF. The UDF took steps to

soften up the People's Democratic Party (PDP) of Madhani which posed a

serious threat to IUML vote-banks. On the other hand, the LDF went in for an

understanding with the Indian National League (INL) of Ibrahim Sulaiman Sait

who floated hi party in 1994.''

There were two other fronts besides the UDF and the LDF, one led by

PDP and other by W. The people voted the LDF to power. Neither the clean

image of Antony nor the liquor ban appears to have made much impact on the

people in their eledoral options. The election was mainly a vote against the

UDF. In the Kollam and Thiruvananthapuram districts, the NSS contributed to

the defeat of the UDF. In some constituencies the INL tilted the balance in

favour of the LDF. The difference of votes between the two fronts was only 1.32

per cent of the total votes.

Results of the 19% Assembly Elections9'

Total seats Electomte Votes polled Percentage of votes 140 20667409 14706806 71.16

Political parties Seats contested Seats won Percentage

AlCC (T) 8 Nil 0.06

J3JP 127 Nil 5.48

CPI 22 18 7.62 CPM 62 40 21.59

INC 94 37 30.43 JD 13 4 4.12

JP 21 Nil 0.06

SAP 9 Nil 0.01

ICS 9 3 2.49

KEC 10 5 3.18

MUL 22 13 7.19

BLP 1 Nil 0.03

BSP 12 Nil 0.13

CMP KSC 3 Nil 0.49

FBL 6 Nil 0.02

ILC 1 Nil 0.00

INL 15 1 0.45

JPSS 4 6 1.28

KEC 10 1 3.10

Kt32 (B) 2 2 0.64

KEc (J) 4 Nil 1.14

PDP 50 5 0.72

RSP 6 Nil 2.07

SHS 16 Nil 0.03

SLAP 1 Nil 0.00

SWJP 1 Nil 0.00

Ind . 672 5 7.68

Communalism in Kerala Politics

The Ezhavas, Christians, Muslims and Nairs constitute twenty-six,

twentyane, nineteen and sixteen percentage respectively of the Kerab

population.g2 As may be seen from a cursory view of electoral vicissitudes,

communalism has proved itself a major force in Kerah society and politics.

Inequalities, both economic and social, exist between different communities.

Each community has its own interests to protect and promote. According to

Paulose Mar Paulose, communalism comprises three elements: the identity, the

ethos and the shield.% Of these, communal ethos has a predominance among

the four communities competing for an upper hand in Kerak politics.

Communal rivalry and hostiIity is bound to have an impact on the social, political

and economic life of Kerala.

The Hindus are mainly divided into "Savarna" and "Avama" castes and

numerous subczdes. The avamas are generally deprived of the privileges

enjoyed by the savamas and are characterised by social and economic

backwardness. Each community has its organisation set up to protect its

interests. The communal equations could be shuffled if, by doing so, a

community's interest could be better served. The tendency to form communally

based parties has led to a proliferation of political parties in Kerala.

Muslims and Politics

The Indiin Union Muslim League (IUML) was set up in Malabar in 1937

as a branch of AN I n d i Muslim League which had been bunched in Dacca three

decades earlier, in 1906. The IUML may claim the dubious distinction of being

the fust communal political party in Kerala. The Muslims are considered as a

backward community both socially and economically. The Muslim League

stands for the overall development of the Muslim community. Already in 1957,

the League proved itself a wellarganised political party in Kerab and played a

vital role in the "liberation struggle" aimed at ousting the communists from

power. After the diimissal of the E M. S. Ministry, the Congress, P. S. P. and

the Muslim League formed an alliance. 94 From then onwards, except during

1987-1991, one faction or other of the Muslim League has managed to stay in

power through calculated moves in the political game. It is second only to CPI

(M) and Congress (I) in strength and size. But splits and personality clashes

have considerably weakened its bargaining power. Of late, the Indian National

League and PDP haw made inroads into its stronghokis. But IUML, INC and

PDP all have the Muslim community's interests at heart and aim at promoting

them.

Christians and Politics

Christians are next only to Ezhavas in strength in Kerala. They are

powerful, both sacialty and economically and are generally thought to be

anticommunist. Before the formation of Kerala Congress, Christians had given

their whole-hearted support to the Indian National Congress.95 They had the

feeling all along that Congress was neglecting their interests.% But they had no

choice but to support the Congress. It was against thii background of growing

discontent among the Christians that the Kerala Congress was formed on

October 9, 1%4 under the leadership of K M. George. Right from the start, the

Kerala Congress has been considered as a kontal organisation of the Christians

enpying the tacit support of the Church. It is true that the Church, especially,

the Syrian Christians, have exerted considerable power on the government,

through one faction or the other of the Kerala Congress. Today, it has four

factions originating from personality clashes within the party.97 The Kerala

Congress (Mani) pined the CPI(M)-kd Left Democratic Front on November 14,

1979.~ In the 1980 assembly elections, KC (M) went to the polk in alliance with

the leftist parties. Till then, the Church had considered the Commun'Lsts as their

arch-enemy. The "Mani Factorn in the Left Front mollified the Church's stand

towards the Communists. Some Bishops, though reluctantly, lent heir support

to the LDF. Mani's argument that hi party had joined the D F with a view to

influencing the leftists with their positive approach found favour with many

Christians. In that election many Christians voted for "Sickle and Hammer."

Since then, one faction or the other of Kerala Congress has allied i&lf with the

LDF. The Church no longer considers it anathema to work with the leftists. For

their part, the Leftists also have shed their prejudices against religion. In Calcutta,

the CPI (M) volunteered to build a temple for the people." Religion, which they

once saw as the "opiumn of the people, is now seen as a useful instrument for

widening their power base.

Nairs and Politics

The enormous gains made by IUML and Kerak Congress inspired the

Naii to form their own political party. When the N a m b d i i Brahmins

dwindled in number in positions of power, the Nairs took their place and became

the privileged caste in Kerak's power structure. However, over the years, with

the number of job reservations for various communities steadily increasing, the

Naii found they had to give up many of their traditional privileges. Nor were

they versed in the arts of agriculture and business so as to compete with a

powerful community like the Christians. The Naiirs decided to organ.& their

people. Thus, the NSS was founded on October 31, 1914 under the leadenhip

of Mannathu Padmanabha PiUai.'* The aim was to promote the community's

social and educational interests. Eventually, they realised that in order to exert

political influence, they needed a party of their own and so they formed the

National Democratic Party (NDP) in 1973 as NSS's political wing.lO' Since then,

the community has thrown its weight behind the NDP to wrest its share of power

in government. However, much of its vitality has been drained by corruption

and inner party feuds. The NDP is indulging in evey kind of political

manoeuvring to protect the interests of its community. They find little difficulty

in lining up with either front to protect their interests. The party has consistently

advocated the policy of reservation on economic basii.

Ezhavas and Politica

The Ezhavas, though a majority community, was reeling under such

diminat ions as untouchability, unapproachability etc. In order to uplift them,

the Sree Narayana Dharma Paripalana Sangham (SNDP) was formed. Before

the founding of SNDP, the Ezhavas had contented themselves with signing

memoranda for redressal of their grievances. The "Malayali Memorial" of 1891

and "Ezhava Memorialn of 1896 are examples of this. But they received no

positive response. They too realised from experience that "unity is strength" and

that only pressure tactics would pay good dividends. Thii recognition had led to

the formation of the SNDP, the first communally based organisation to be set up

by a backward community in the state. But the SNDP took almost seven

decades to start its political wingSocialist Republican Party (SRP, 1974). The

Ezhavas had at last learnt a valuable lesson from the experience of other

communities like Muslims, Christians and Nairs. Now no political party can

ignore SRP. It has been pursuing vehemently the interests of the Ezhavas. Both

fronts are eager to appease the Ezhavas through concessions to the SRP.

The Caste Factor In Kerala Politics

To a great extent, Kerala politics has been guided by the caste affiliations

of the people. In the rise and fall of each ministry might be d i i m e d the unseen

hand of caste politics of different leaders. The Sankar ministry of 1%2 collapsed

due to caste clashes within the mini*. Sankar, an Ezhava, was not ahwed to

discharge hi duties effectively by high caste Nairs. Communal parties like

Muslim League and Kerab Congress supported the CPI-led Achutha Menon

ministry of 1971-77. The Church was not averse to the CPI which had drifted

from CPI (M) and allied itself with the Congress. However, the Education Bill of

1972 aroused communal feelings among the Nain, Christians and ~zhavas.'"

Due to mass agitation led by the leaders of different communities, the

government had to concede several demands.lm The policy of resenmtion in

govemment jobs for the backward classes has also inflamed caste and communal

feelings. The Nairs, in 1971, demanded reservation on economic basis. The

SNDP and SRP also held mammoth demonstrations to put pressure on the

govemment so as to forestal changes in the current reservation policy. The

Supreme Court accepted the Nettoor Commission ~ e p o r t ' ~ which

recommended reservation on economic and communal basis. The reservation

policy has proved to be a contentious issue calling for unequivocal commitment

to communal or anticommunal policies and programmes.

During the 1977 elections the ruling front made an alliance with SRP and

NDP. They supported Antony ~ovemment in 1977 in the hope of securing

certain demands on''' the reservation i ~ s u e . ' ~ On the basii of the assurance of

"Front" leaders, SRP and NDP urged their community to vote for the ruling

front. Thus communalism has been politicised and has retained its unhealthy

influence in the social and political spheres to thii day.

The political parties are not averse to forming alliances with communal

parties in order to keep their opponents away from power. In 1980, CPI (M)

made an alliance with Muslim Lague and Kerala Congress to keep the Congress

out of power. But, in 1982, almost all communal parties rallied to the camp of

the UDF under the leadership of the Congress. The communal parties secured

thii-four seats out of the seventy-seven seats won by the UDF camp.lo7 But

Congress was not so happy with the communal parties. G. Karthikeyan

expressed the sentiment of the party when he said that Congress was bullied by

communal parties and that the party had tarnished its image on thii count.'''

E. M. S. Namboodiripad, too, admitted that the LDF also was no different from

the UDF in appeasing the communal parties.1w In the 1987 elections, though

the LDF proclaimed itself to be a purely secular front, it projected an Ezhava,

K. R. Gouri, as its Chief Minister-to-be, with a view to attracting Ezhava votes. In

the 1991 and 19% elections, the LDF resorted to the same tactics of projecting

certain Ezhavas as its prospective leader, in order to woo the Ezhava voters. For

their part, the UDF made an open alliance with communal and caste forces.

Communal Election Politica

The political behaviour of the people in Kerala is influenced more by

caste and communal considerations than political ideologies. Every political

party selects its candidate on a communal basii. The geographical diibution of

the major communities is a crucial fador in the choice of candidates. The four

major communities are more or less concentrated in four different regions of the

state: the Muslims in Mabppuram, Kozhikode d i ic t s ; the Christians in

Kottayarn, Idukki, Pathanarnthitta and Emakuhrn diicts; Nain in

Thi~vananthapuram, Kollam d i ic t s ; and Ezhavas in Pabkkad, Alappuzha

districts. This makes it easy for parties to choose their candidates with an eye on

communal wte banks. The fobwing tablel10 shows the number of seak won by

communal candidates in various elections in the state, a state which boask the

highest literacy rate in the country!

Number of Communal Parties in each Assembly Elections in eral la^^' No. of o o m n a l pa* Seats won by mmrrmnal

Year of election which contested in parties in the elections elections

1957 1 8

1960 1 11

1965 2 29

1967 2 19

1970 2 23

1977 5 43

1980 6 37

1982 7 39

1987 6 25

1991 6 31

19% 9 28

Usually people are asked to vote on the basis of caste and community

affiliations. AU parties haw members from almost all castes and communities.

So, it is not diff i l t to find suitable candidates belonging to the predominant

caste in each constituency. During elections, ideology takes a back-seat and a

s'kable section of the people vote on the basis of communal and caste feelings.

The leaden miss no chance of inciting caste and communal feelings among the

people to win the elections.

Though some political parties may proclaim secularism as their hall-mark

and may declare that they have no relations with any communal parties, their

actual practice gives the lie to this anticommunal rhetoric. In actual fad, evey

political party is seen to cash in on communal issues and strike a secret deal with

the communal parties. During the 1987 elections, the LDF, despite their open

n 111 professions of secularism, sought the secret assistance of the "radical priests .

They expkied it away by saying that any priest as an individual has the

freedom to support any political party of hi choice. In the 19% elections, the

LDF had reached a secret understanding with the NSS.llZ The NDP, the political

wing of the NSS, had been a partner in the UDF. But before the elections, the

NDP left the UDF. According to the NSS leaders, the LDF approached the NDP

and promised them eight corporations instead of five promised by the UDF. The

public stance of the NDP was that they had offered their support to the LDF

without pre-conditions. This means that even the LDF which prides itself on its

ideological purity is not averse to sacrificing principles to political expediency in

its drive for political power.

lhlrd Force

Kerala's political scene has mainly been dominated by caste politics,

communal rivalry and competition between different communities. The smaller

communities, too, following the example of the major ones, have formed their

own groups to protect their interests. The recently organised WP-Hindu

Munnani represent caste Hiidu~."~ Till the 1984 elections, the LDF and the

UDF dominated the political scene of Kerak. &It the eve of the 1984 elections

saw the birth of a new political force - the BJP-Hindu Munnani - in the

political arena. The Muslims and Christians had already entrenched themselves

in Kerab politics, but the Hindus as such were not organ'ked except in certain of

their sections such as Nairs and Ezhavas. The Hindu-Muslim clashes of 1982 in

~hiruvanantha~uram"~ and the "Nilakkel issuen115 of March 1983 between

Christians and Hindus helped intensify the "Hindutwa" sentiment and polarise

the communal elements to form the Hindu ~ u n n a n i . " ~ Today, the WP-Hindu

Munnani rope in supporters by inciting religious feeling and, is hying to pride

over militant Hinduism. Though it is not able to win a single seat, its strength has

been on the increase and both fronts are not too happy about this. It can tilt the

balance between the LDF and the UDF in many constituencies since the margin

between the two is often very slight.

Liberation Theology and Kerala Politlcs

Until the 1980 elections, the Christians had given their support either to

Congress or to Kernla Congress. The Communist-regimes' repressive policies in

East European countries had instilled fear in the Church in Keraia and they

wanted to prevent Communists from coming to power. The Communists, too,

had taken a hard anti-religious line but a change occurred during the 1980s.

Many Christians, even against the instructions of their Bishops, supported the

Communist Party. Many radical priests found nothing wrong in joining hands

with the Marxists. They even questioned the authority of the Bishops who

aligned themselves with the Congress which they considered as cormpt,

anti-poor and unjust. The Kerala Congress (Mani), considered by many to be an

extension of the Christian community, was an ally of the UDF in 1980. That

means many Christians voted for "sickle and hammern and many leftists voted

for Kerala Congress. In 1982, Christian radicals openly supported the LDF. The

"Priests Forumn, a liberation theology activist's movement, instructed people to

vote for the LDF. Their attempt in 1982 did have little effect on the bi, but it

was a new approach, all the same. In the 1987 elections, the political scenario

was more favourable to radical thought than in previous years. In 1982, the

radical priests were considered as revolutionaries and the people rejected them.

But by 1987, the situation had changed in their favour. Because of their active

support to the fishermen's agitation of 1984, and because of the many hardships

they willingly endured for thii cause, they came to be seen as 'victims' rather

than as violent agitators. The laity, especially those in the coastal areas, saw the

radicals as more dedicated, approachable, dependable than the official Church.

The Church, on the other hand, had tried to suppress the pro-poor movement

and punish the people involved in it. People's sympathy was with the radicals.

In 1987, the Church supported the UDF, but the radicals and the laity opted for

the LDF. The leftists also stood by the fishermen's agitators and worked for the

success of their cause. So the poor saw hope in a government led by the leftist

and voted for them. Thus, liberation theology may be said to have brought

about certain changes, though in a minimal way, in the outlook of both the

Communists and a section of the Christian community. Under the influence of

the liberation movement, Christians were abk to co-operate with the leftists

without feeling guilty about it. The Communists supported the liberation

activities in the hope that, by doing so, they would be able to close the gap that

is felt to exist between Orthodox Christians and communists.

In the eighties, liberation theology activists in Kerala were working on the

principle that there was a real and valid diindion to be made between the

"official Church" and "people's Churchn. Sr. Alice, the 'liberation fire-brand',

openly opted for socialism and saw nothing wrong in using violence for attaining

socialist aims. It probably did not occur to her that even before the birth of

liberation theology cornmunists had come to power in Kerak through the bah t

box and many communist chief ministers had ruled the state without resorting to

armed revolt."' Fr. Thomas Kocheny, the unquestioned leader of the liberation

activists, does not look up to the cornmunists as saviours of the poor. In hi

view, they, too, are not fully committed to the cause of the poor. However, he

admits that, on balance, the leftists are much more sympathetic than the UDF to

the cause of serving the poor. But he expects the u)F"* to take a more radical

line in the service of the depressed classes. For their part, the communists

consider religion as an instrument of revolution. Beyond that, they are not

prepared to accept liberation theology either as a science or as a discipline.

According to the leftists, the dialogue in liberation theology is between

god-oriented theologies.11g Thii taught the leftists the valuable lesson that they

can no longer claim to be the sole saviours of the poor, that anyone with

genuine interest in the uplift of the poor will have the support of the people and

that one need not be an atheist to be able to work for the poor. They also

realised that ideological jargon and mere lip-service will not go down with the

poor. Leftist and liberation activists are action oriented and both try to learn

from real life situations. They - liberation theologists and communists - give

prime importance to human beings. The communists in Kerab, especially in

coastal areas, like to have a healthy relation with liberation movements, in order

to widen their power base.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the political upheavals in the M

European countries came as a bolt from the blue and communists all over the

world have since been reconsidering the validity of their own ideology. It is

bound to have its repercussions in the practice and theoy of the Kerala

communists a h . Nowadays they are not too keen on carrying their ideological

baggage with them; more pragmatic than before, they are silent about their

athe'htic and materialistic stance. Now the communists in Kerak, like their

counterparts in other parts of the world, are not averse to relegionlZ0 and

consider it as a requirement of social life.

Moreover, no liberation activists today like to be bracketed with leftist

parties. Clccoding to Fr. Thomas Kocheny, the leader of the fishermen's

agitation of 1984, the liberationist prefers to keep equal d i i nce fromo both the

LDF and the UDF. They are prepared to co-operate with any political party

which may extend its help to solve the fishermen's problems. According to Fr.

Kocherry, the KSMF only believes in issue-based politics. In the 1987 election,

they supported the LDF and soon came to the realisation that even the LDF is

less interested in helping the fisherflock than in securing their votes. So, during

elections, the liberation activists bargain with the candidates and political parties

and support only those who promise to work for them. In Kocheny's opinion,

the liberationists cannot profess unquestioning loyalty to the communists.

Sometimes, too, they might line up with Congress if circumstances wananted

it.

According to Sr. Patrisha Kuruvinakunnel who had undertaken a

twenty-three day fast in front of the Secretariate during the fisherman's agitation,

the liberation activists no longer enjoy the patronage of the communists. In her

view, the leftist approach to the problems of the poor and the fisherfolk is just

"eye-washn calculated to win votes. They may make loud professions of

solidarity with the poor, but that is just about all. There is a lot of difference

between the preaching and praxis of the communists. But the sister is reluctant

to put the blame on the party entirely. In her opinion, the party may be under

pressure to accommodate various interests. She feels that under the guidance of

the liberation theologians, the fisherfolk are now able to operate as a pressure

group. Today, no one can ignore them. The liberation activists, inspired by

Christ's championship of the cause of the poor, would like to make a defmite

option for the poor and support those who support their cause.'= Today,

neither front can take for granted the support of the f~herfolk Social activists

drawing inspiration from liberation theology have made the fisherfolk fully

conscious of their rights and have enabled them to work on their own without

the patronage of any political party. Consequently, they are now able to stake a

claim for their share of power in regions where they constitute a sizeable

majority.

Kerala is a politically conscious state. People do take an active part in

political activities. According to Prof. Aravindakshan, famous psephologist,

Kerala politics is mainly guided by caste and communal fadors.lP Caste and

communal feelings are deep-rooted in the Keralite's psyche. The dawn to dusk

bandh organised by the backward classes' Liberation Front in protest against the

move to introduce creamy layer in job reservation was a general strike carried

out to preserve caste and communal privileges.'24 Long before the Mandal

Commission Report became an issue in the county, Kerab had sanctioned

substantial reservation on the basii of social as well as economic backwardness

of lower caste Hindus and the bandh indicated the strong resolve of these

sections to preserve the concessions they have been enjoying.

Even the so-called secular parties are secular in name only. The

communists as well as Congress have from time to time sought alliances with

communal forces. At a recent meeting, the CPM asked its followers to intervene

effectively in religious activities to prevent BJP and the Muslim League from

making serious inroads into the segment of the religious minded people of the

state. The central committee resolution asked the CPM followers to befriend and

rope in the religious minded people to widen the party's power base. Thii shows

that the party has deviated from its declared anti-religious stance and that it no

longer wants to alienate believers. The Central Committee Report also admits

that "casteconsciousness is a growing tendency among party followers of

n 125 different levek . It is alleged that the CPM leadership has always been in the

hands of high caste Hindus.

Against this background of communal and caste consciousness, liberation

theology could not make much headway. In Kerala, as elsewhere in the world,

the new theology was favourably disposed to the left parties; however, long

before the advent of thii theology, Kerala had given the reins of power to the

communists in a fair and free democratic election.

In Kerak, the liberationists' political activities were a h a t wholly confined

to their championship of fiherman's rights and the leadership they gave to their

agitation. In the 1987 election to the state assembly, although the new theology

had by now become fairly popular, the results showed little evidence of a change

from established voting patterns.

Undoubtedly liberation theology has been responsible for educating the

fishermen in their democratic rights and empowering them in political terms.

The libemtionists were able to eliminate the power broken who were misguiding

and cheating these people with insincere promises. They showed these deluded

people that neither the CPM nor Congress will save them, that they should

m o b i i their own men to fight for their rights. As a result, they haw been

enabled to bargain from a position of strength. The political leadership can no

longer take their support for granted. They are obliged to strike a deal in real

terms with the fisherfolk if they want their support in the election. Having been

made fully conscious of their right, the feherfolk can now operate as a close-knit

pressure group. They can play the polifical game with skill and competence and

this much may be pbced fo the credit of the liberation activists.

Notes

1 Government of Kerak, Economic Review 1995 (Thirumnanthapuram:

State Planning Board, 19%) 32.

h o r n Year Book (Kottayam: Makyala Manorarna Publications.

19%) 182.

/bid 31.

Government of Kerala, f i r& Sfate Gazetteer, Vol. I1 (Trivandrum:

Kerak Gazetteers Department, 1989) 728.

The area under rice cultivation is declining. In 1992-93, it was 537608

hectres; in 1993-94, 507832 hectres; in 1994-95 it dropped again to 503290

hectres. Government of Kerala, Economic Review 1995- 35.

The area under rubber cultivation is increasing. In 1992-93, it was

428864 hectres; it rose to 437138 hectres in 1993-94 and 443300 hectres in

1994-95. Government of Kerala, Economic Review 1995- 35.

7 Indii is a major producer and consumer of tea. /bid 124.

Kerala accounts for 37 per cent of the total production of cashew in

India. /bid 1222.

Coffee is cukvated in eighty countries. Of these, 25 countries produce

more than 5000 MT of coffee and India is one of them. 85 percent of the

country's production comes from Kamataka. Kerala and Tamil Nadu are other

major coffee producing states in Indii.

10 Pepper, cardamom, ginger and turmeric are the major varieties of

species produced in Kemla. Kerak accounts for 97 per cent of the total

production of pepper in the country, for 67 per cent of the total production of

cardamom, for 26 per cent of ginger. Alleppey ginger turmeric is rated highly by

international traders. /bid 121-122.

l1 Robert L Hardgrave (Jr.), h y s in the Political k i o k of South

India (New Delhi: Usha Publications, 1979) 37.

* See, for detaik, Government of Kerak, Economic Review 1995

91-101.

l3 Manonma Year Book 1996 (Kottayam: Malayala Manorama

Publications) 336.

14 Registrar General and Census Commissioner, Census of lndia 1991

Ser. /(New Delhi, 1995) 16.

l5 Literacy, life expectancy and income are the three indicators used in

measuring human development index. In these, Kerala's achievement is unique

among other Indian states. According to the 1991 census, Kerala's literacy rate is

89.81 whereas the all lndii level is 52.21 per cent. Female literacy rate is 86.17

per cent in Kerak as against 39.20 per cent at the national level. The literacy

rate among the scheduled cates is 79.66; scheduled caste female literacy is 74.31

per cent and scheduled tribes literacy is 51.09 per cent in Kerak. Government of

Kerak, Eoonomic Review I995 128.

l6 The pattern of energy consumption in the state shows that the industrial

sedor is the largest consumer (36.97%); the domestic sedor comes second with

32.74% during 1994-95; the commercial sedor consumes 13.57%. See, for

details, Government of Kerak, b n o m i c Review 1995 73.

17 Government of Kerala, Kkrah: Yesfeday and Today (Trivandtum:

Department of Public Relations: 1981) 1.

l8 George Wookcock, &I&: a Porbzv't of the Mlabar Coast (L~ndon:

Faber and Faber, 1%7) 243.

19 R Ramakrishnan Naii, Social Sbucture and Poltical Lkwbpment in

&I& (Trivandtum: The Kerak Academy of Political Science, 1976) 10.

20 In 1891, the people of thii region belonging to various castes and

religious groups signed a memorandum in which they requested the Maharaja

Moolam Tirunal to give public jobs only to Kerallites. The petition came to be

known as "Malayali Memorial." See, k Sreedhara Menon, Adunika &rahm

(A Concise P o b h l H&y of W e m &I& h m 18t51957) (Kottayam:

NBS, 1988) 5.

21 The Ezhavas submitted to the Maharaja a rnemorndum signed by

13176 pemns under the leadenhip of Dr. Palpu, the frst medical graduate from

that community on September 3, 18%. A. Sreedhara Menon, Adhunika

&mhm (Ibttayam: NBS, 1988) 22.

" In 1933, the three communities - Ezhavas, Christians and Muslims -

passed a resolution seeking proper representation in government and threatened

to boycott the assembly if thii was not granted. The Maharaja of Travancore

accepted some of their demands. The boycott resolution is known as "The

Abstention Movementn.

T. K Ravindran, Asan and Social Revo/utio~s in &rah (Trivandrum:

Kerala Hiirical Society, 1972) 30.

24 K S. Nayar, Con- and && Politics (Trivandtum: College Book

House, 1984) 54.

25 R. Rarnalqishnan Nair, Constitutions/ Wn'imenG in fir&

(Trivandrum: St Joseph's Press, 1%4) 29.

26 K S. Nayar, Congress and f i r a h Politics (Trivandrum: Cokge Book

House, 1984) 35.

27 K. G. Krishna Moorthy and Lekshrnana Rao, Poltical Pehmnces in

fimb-An .Ekclvral AnaIjsis of the Kerala Elections 1957,1960,1%5and 14167

(New Delhi: Radhakriihna Ptakashan, 1968) 181.

hid 181.

29 Government of Kerala, Glimpses of %tab (Trivandrum: Department of

Public Relations, 1988) 37.

30 K N. Nair Perunna, kkrahthik Con- hasthanam (Cochin:

Ptathibha Publications, 1985) 14.

31 V. S. Keraleeyan, firalathik Veeraputhmn (Calicut: K R Brothers,

1959) 330.

32 T. J. Nossiter, "Communism in Kerak: A Study in Political

Adaptation," Journal of Kernla Studies (Trivandmm: Department of H i i r y ,

1977): 115.

33 The Political Conference held at Ottapakm in 1921 signalled the start

of the 'United Kerak' movement. See, K V. Krishna Iyer, A Short Hiszby of

kkmb (Ernahlam: Pai and Co., 1966) 184.

34 A. Sreedhara Menon, Sow'al and Cuhial Histry of Ilerab (New

Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1979) 3.

35 The communists contested in 100 seak and won 60 of them and

communist-backed independents got five seak.

36 T. J. M i t e r T. J., YCommuni~m in Kemla: A study in Political

Adaptation," Journal of &mb Studies 116.

37 Government. of Kemla, Backgrounder to 1987 Assembly Uections

Part/, (Trivandrum: Deparh-nent of Public Relations, 1987) 13.

3 S ~ . J. Nossiter , "Communism in Kemla: A Study in Political Adaptation,"

Joumal of Kkmh PoJtics 123.

39 /bid 123.

40 Government of Kemla, Assembly Ekction Reportage 1987

(Trivandrum: Department of Public Relations, 1987) 3.

41 Government of Kemb, Backgrounder to 1987 Assembly Uections

Part/, 14.

42 The Hindu (Madras, November 11, 1%1).

The No-Confidence Motion was passed with a majority of 73 votes

against 50.

44 Government of Kerala, Backgrounder to 1987AEsembly Hection

Part 1 16.

45 Ibid 1 7.

46 Manorama Year Book (Kottayam: Malayala Manomma Publications,

1996) 165.

47 Government of Kerala, Backgrounder to 1987Assembly Election

Part/ 19.

48 Deepika (Kottayam, Odober 27,1975).

49 Lkepika (Kottayam, March 18, 1977).

50 Government of Kerala, Backgrounder to 1987Assembly Uection

Part J 20.

Deepika (Kottayam, March 26,1977).

52 Ikepika (Kottayam, April 11, 1977).

53 Deepika (Kottayam, April 26,1977).

50 Deepika (Kottayam, April 28,1977).

55 Deepika (Kottayam, Febmaly 5,1978).

55 Deepika (Kottayam, October 27,1978).

" Deepika (Kottayam, October 30,1978).

58 Deepika (Kottayam, July 27,1979).

59 Deepika (Kottayam, Odober 8,1979).

Deepika (Kottayam, October 13,1979).

61 Deepika (Kottayam, November 15,1979).

62 Deepika (Kottayam, December 1,1979).

63 Government of Kerala, Badgrounder fu 1987Assembb Election

Part? 22.

64 Bepika (Kottayam, Odober 21,1981).

65 Deepika (Kottayam, December 29,1981).

66 Dzepika (Kottayarn, March 17,1982).

67 Deepika (Kottayam, May 25,1982).

Government of Kerala, Backgrounder to 1987Asrernbly .%don

h r t / 24.

69 Two of its members joined Kerala Congress and the others merged with

Congress (I). (M. Karnalam formed Democratic Janata Party (DJP) and later

joined the Congress (I).

70 The Week 6,13 (March 1987) 14.

71 ?bid 14.

" bid 18.

bid 20.

74 lbjd 20.

75 bid 20.

76 bid 20.

7he Week 6.14 (March 1987) 15.

78bid 16.

79 Elections for two seats had been countermanded foUowing the death of

two independent candidates.

80 The Week (March 29-April 4 , 1987) 45.

The Week (April 5-11, 1987) 16.

Government of Kerala, Assembly Wection Reporhge 1987 7 .

93 n e Week (April 7,1991) 36.

84 Deepika (May 22,1991).

85 The Week (June 16,1991) 21.

86 Based on the information provided by the Election Department,

Thiruvananthapuram.

87 hepika (June 25, 1991).

88 Deepih (March 23,1995).

The Week (April 7,1996) 48.

b id 41.

91 Based on the information provided by the Election Department,

Thiruvananthapuram.

9~ N. Jose Chander, "Political Culture" Dynamics of State Poltia in

Kernla, Ed. Jose Chander N. (New Delhi: Sterling Publications, 1986) 16-17.

43 ECORomjC and Political Wee& (May 5,1984) 752.

94~ournal of krala Studies (Trivandrum: Deparbent of Histoy, June-

September 1977) 479.

95 Deepika (Kottayam. February 9.1957).

% Deepika (Kottayam, January 29,1957).

97 Deepika (Kottayam, August 17,1976).

98 Deepika (Kottayam, November 15,1979).

99 The Indian Expres (Cochi, May 20,1997) 4.

100 Deepika (Kottayam, December 1, 1914).

101 Deepika (Kottayam, August 18, 1973).

im Deepika (Kottayam, June 27,1972).

lm The formation of the Calicut University in 1969, by the E. M. S.

Namboodiripad ministry was meant to appease the Muslim community, and was

sanctioned under pressure from its leader C. H. Mohammed Koya - the then

educational minister.

I W The Nettoor Commission was constituted in 1967 by the E. M. S.

ministry to examine the reservation problem. Kerala humudi (Trivandrum,

September 5, 1990). See also, T. Ramakrishnan and E. M. S.

Namboodiripad, Nettoor Commission Reporturn Supreme Kodathi hidhiym

(Trivandmm: CPI(M) Publication, 1976) 20.

105 The NDP demanded the non-implementation of the Nettoor

Commission Report and implementation of reservation on the basis of economic

backwardness. SRP on the other hand, wanted the continuation of reservation

on communal basis.

'm The Indian .&press (September 30. 1977).

lo' India Today (June 1, 1982) 26.

lo' The Indian Express (Cochin, April 23, 1984).

lW hid. 110 The Hindu (January 6, 1980); Uedion Guide, Socialirt &dam

Magazine (Kochi, 1996). 111 Information provided by the Uection Department,

Thiruvananthapuram.

'I2 Mathmbhumi (September 25, 1996).

"3 Deepika (August 18, 1984).

"4 See, for the details of the Hindu-Muslim clashes in Chala,

Thiruvananthapuram on December 30, 1982 Mathrubhumi (December 31,

1982); Malayala Manorama (December 31, 1982); Chandrika (December 31,

1982). 115 The Week (August 6 , 1983).

The Hindu Front was formed on the initiative of the Vihal Hindu

Sammelan on November 26. 1984 at Ernakulam. See, Mathrubhumi

(November 27, 19841. 117 Matter collected through personal interview.

'I8 Matte) collected through personal interview.

' I9 Sachithanandan. "Class War in the Christian Church" a marxist

approach, a paper presented in a seminar held at Thrissur in December 1985. 120 Malayala Manorama (Kottayam, January 4, 1991).

121 Matter collected through personal interview.

Matter collected through personal interview. 122 Matter collected through personal interview. 124 The Indian fipres.s (Cochin, Februay 22, 1997). 125 The lndian Express (Cochin, February 22, 1997).