liberal düşünce

Üç Aylık Dergi

Cilt 4, Sayı 14, Bahar 1999

İçindekiler

5-6 Editörden

Fareed Za.karia 7-19 İl.liberal Demokrasinin Yükselişi

Marc F. Plattner 20-28 Liberalizm ve Demokrasi

ÖmerÇaha 29-46 Yüzyılın Son Seçiminde Anadolu'nun Yükselen Sesi

ÖmerCaha 47-61 18 Nisan Secimleri: Ömer f5e",nir Kaybedenler ve Kazananlar

lbrahim Dalmış

Birol Akgün 62-74 Türkiye' q..e Seçmen Davranışının Ekonomi Politik'i Uzerine Bir Model Denemesi

A. Necdet Sezer 75-83 Anayasa Mahkemesi'nin 37. Kuruluş Günü Töreni Açış Konuşması

Peter L. Berger 84-95 Sekülerizmin Gerilemesi

Ali Ulusoy 96-101 Fransız ve Türk Laiklik Anlayışlarının Karşılaştınlması

Mustafa Erdoğan 102-117 · Islam in Turkish Politics: Turkey's Quest for Democracy without Islam

Tanel Demirel 118-133 ~ancur Olson Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme

R. M. Hartwell 134-143 ·Tarih ve İdeoloji

Jean-François J.:,yotard 144-150 "Öteki"nin Hakları

Erdoğan Keskinkılıç 151-155 Bir Osmanlı Özelleştirme Modeli: Reji-Tütün İdaresi

JohnHood 156-161 Kapitalizm: Ayıruncılığın Amansız Düşmanı .Şefaettin Severcan 162-168 Peygamperlik ve Siyaset

Mehmet K. Özgen 169-175 Kitap/ Eleştiri Osmanlı' da ve İran' da Mezhep ve Devlet

Islam in Turkish Politics: Turkey's Quest for Democracy without Islam

Mustafa Erclogan*

Recent Turkish politics have witnessed an outstanding and unexpected triumph of politi­cal Is lam. U nder the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, a senior politician of the Islamist causc, the pro-Islanıist Welfare Paıty (Refah Part isi) emerged from the national elections of December 1995 as the largest party in par­liament. After a six-month struggle, it came to power in June 1996 as the senior partner in a coalition government with Ciller's True Path Party (TPP) and with Erbakan as prime minis­ter. Before that, in March 1994, Welfare Party (WP) won municipal elections in several large cities. These developments vexed the Tur­key's secu lar establishment, which at first they attempted to block Erbakan' s efforts to form a goveıııment. That is why Erbakan 's search for a coalition partner took six nıonth s.

After forming government, the military, who views itself as the main guardian of the secular "Kemalist" state, tended to become involved in daily politics in order to protect the secularist state from so-called Islamicist infi ltrations. in fact, on February 28, 1997, the mi litary-domi nated National Security Council issued a decree that rcquired curbs on Islamic­minded po litical, social, cultural and econo­mic groups. In the end, the mi litary's "super-

*Prof Dr ., il .Ü. İİBF Kamu Yö11eti111i Bölüıııii iiğreıi111 üyesi.

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vision" of Erbakan's government resulted in its forced resignation in June 1997. Following this. the pressure on the lslanıist groups inc­reased, with some secular lcaders hoping fora ''settling of accounts' ' with political lslam.

lt is interesting that thc rise of Islam in recent Turkish politics, particularly in the case of Welfare Party, was considered a surprising event by both Turkish and foreign scholars. Jusr as an "Islamic revival" after the Democrat Party's coming to power in l 950 meant (among other things) adopting a relativcly li­beral policy towards Islam. so today ··ıstarnic f undamentalisnı" is on the agenda not only of political circles, but also of academics. As the Turkish state elite began to think how to han­dle this "thrcat" Lö the secular Republic. it felt ready to find a .. scientific'' treatmcnt for this .. disease". Some fclt a need to address the issue of reconciling Is lanı and denıocracy.

Consequently, thc Jiterature on political Islam in general, and the Welfare Party in particular. started to increase. Neverthcless one thing re­mained unchanged: the advancc of lslaın in Turkey has been considered an accidental, even pathological, phcnonıenon. ln th i~ anicle l want to cxanıine this approach thal sees pro­lslamic tendencies as an abnornıality and try to introduce a beller way to undcrstand this phenomcnon.

liberal düşünce

Paradigmatic Error

According to the dominant paradigm in Turkish schularship with regard to Islamic ca­sc, the rise of Islam is an exceptional pheno­menon that must have a reasonable explana­tion. The main task for Turkish social scien­tists is to reveal the real causes that helped po­litical Islam emerge so that it would be possi­ble to cope with it "scientifically". If it is pos­sible to find out those factors, it could be pos­sible to prevent the politicalization of Islam. This approach seems to be derived from the modernization theory and Kemalist doctrine , which presupposes that as modernization pro­cess advances rcligion will loose its social appeal. A typical Turkish scholar hcavily inf­luenced by the positivist outlook sces religion in general and lslam in particular as a reac­tionary force , "some evi! and irrational force of mere orthocloxy ancl blincl traclition". 1 In his/her opinion, in a modern society therc is no place for religious institutions . For this reason, ali religious-inspired social nıovcments are considered "fundamentalist''. If some move­rnents inspired by rcligion bcgin to appear in public and/or political sphcre , then some unusual factors must have created created this. From a sociological perspective and with spe­cial reference to moderni zati on theory, it is ar­gued that people thrown into the margins of metropolitan areas as a result of urbanization and migration to the cities expcrience "unfaiı .. ' incornc distribution, a quest for identity or an escape to traditional values caused by thc dif­ficulty in adjusting to an urban way of life. According to Sabri Sayari,2 "(a)s a result of socia l and ccononıic changes, particularly through urbanization and emigration. growing nuınbers of Turks appear to havc developed a sense of 'homelessness' following the disin­tegration of conınıunal solidarities."

Somc scholars believe that the asccnt of pol itical lslam in Turkey was aided by foreign financial ,and/or icleological el inanıics . Arab

moııey in particular is seen as onc of the main sources of support for Islamic social and poli­rical movements. For cxample, Birol Yc~ilada nıaintains that '"the flow of Saudi Arabiaıı ca­pital into the Turkish econonıy strengthened the power position of lslamic fundanıenta­

lists ."3 Another social scientist. Sencer Ay ata. inıplics the tıame: The Islamic bourgcoisie who are. it is argued. the Turkish collaborators with intcrnational Islanıic capital is politically significant "due ıo its finance of blamist acti­vities ."4 Bcsides. Ti.irker Alkan referred lo Iran's "atternpt to spot the next country to ex­perience the convulsions of a rcsurgeııt and militanı lslarn" and its seeing Turkey is an appropriatc target of this cffon.5

Sonıctinıes, the ··exceptional'" appemancc of the appearance of lslam in public anc.I pol i­t icat realnıs is attributed to the governnıcnı's favored conduct towards Islanıic groups and activities: "Turgut ÜLal... wantcd to pronıote lslanı in the country. lndeed. in forıııing the Motherlancl Party, he chose 'rundaıııental is ıs. 6 as partnersin carly 1980s. Oıal sm.\ hinıseır as the pcrson who coulcl pronıote fundaıııen­talisnı in the country ... " .7 Sencer Ayala nıakcs a sinıilar argument: A new social class '"grew as a result of the conscious efforts of Islami­cists in the Motherlancl party governnıcnts who provided the Islamicist bourgcoisie ac­cess to creclit fronı official sourccs ... mnny such firıııs bcncfited significaııtly froın sta tc­directed patronage and thesc conıpanies. in turn, financially backed Islanıi s t movemcnts ... x

Howcver, other scholars secnı ready to understand the meaning of lslanı 's involving in politics and to give Muslims their duc. For example , Nilufer Gole contends that. in res­ponse to cxclucling fronı public sphcre as a re­sult of "cultural shift"' or ··civilizational con­version" initiatecl by the statc elite cluring Re­publican era, sonıe Muslinı!> cngagcd in a search for self idcntity. fronı this point of view. ··rslamisrn is the formation or thc Mu~-

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!im subject and agency which has been exc­Juded fronı nıodernist definition of ci\'ili1alion and history-nıaking" .9 Scrif Mardin calls attention to another relevant facı: The Rcpub­lican state tried to dissolve tradiıional Otıo­nıan-Islanıic bonds and replace thcnı hy new insıituıions. ıhcrcby creating rooın for reli­gious influence al thc individual leveı. 10 Sabri Sayari also writes in a sinıilar vcin: "(T)hc popularity of Islanıic revivalist nıovernenıs.

religious orders. traditional Qur'an ic princi­ples and fundanıental isı polit ical ıııovcnıents. ali of which hold ıhe atıracıion of reintcgration the individual into a social ordcr wherc lslanı proviclcs thc basis ror solidariıy aııd iclenti­ıy ." 1 1 Another aspect of Is lanı ic nıovcnıents. ıo which Binnaz Toprak (anıong others) refers. is thaı they try ıo get spacc for thenı­sc lves in ıhe status hierarchy of society. 12

Alan R. Taylor's juclgcmenı seenıs to be fair one about tlıc rise of Is lanı: "Tlıe nıoderate re­lllrn ıo lslanı in Turkey is not a resurgencc buı an aıtenıpt to redress an inıbalance tlıat was an integral parl of tlıe Kemal isi system. lt presents a cle!:>i re or thc Turkish peoplc to creatc avai­Jable synthesis of va lues and iclentitics in which lslanı i:-ı allowed ıo play a part without cxclu­ding ot her clcnıents of national culture.'' 1 J

Democratization and Islaınization

Thc prevailing paradigın in Turkish scho­larship. which considers lslanıization an anonıalous facL, is based on sonıe incorrecl presunıptions. The underlying nıistake is to see Islam as a strangc factor. an ouısider. Lo Turkish society and polity. a fnctor one has lo ignorc in any undcrstancling :ınd analyzing of modern Turke). Tlrnt is nol ali. Sonıe scholar:-ı even sce Islaııı asa ··dangerous'' phenorncııon. n threal. ancl wish thc state would supprcss it asa socie ı a l force and aıı identity.

Is l anı. howevcr, is a fornıati ve conıponent of Turkcy's social ancl cultural fcıbric. Histo­rically and culturn ll y, Turkcy is a Muslim

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couııtry. and nıost ol the nıisunderstanding

about Turkey 's relationship to lslanıic fornıa­tioııs conıes fronı the Kcnıaliq clıtc ' s ignoring of this basic facı. By tah:ing this hi-.,ıory iııto

account. Islanı's visibiliıy in public and poliıi­cal sphcrcs is noı a sıırprising phcnomcnon. in this contcxt. wlıat tlıc Kcınalist elite clıcl not unclcrslancl is that for Tıırkc:;. 1-.,laııı .. i~ ıııorL'

than a cloctrine. nıore th;-ın n pri\'ale bclici" or \\'Orship. lt is also a culturc ancl an İJl',titıılio­

nal frnlllC\VOrk goverııin!l nll aspccts or İnlcr­personal rclatio~s:·J-I hı~· tlıis rnıson. it is not possiblc ıo consolidatc dcmocr<K) in Turh:cy by casting out blanıic factor and curbing Islanıic po litical. social. cconomic ancl cu lt u­ral nıovcments.

As long as fslanı is not supprcssecl lı:\ legal and political mcans. it necc:-ısari l y will be reflectecl iıı Turkısh politics and public dcbatc. To put İl cliffercntly. ullhough thc non-\ i!:>ibi­lity of Isli.ını in Turkish politics during carly Republ ic ( pre- 1950) \\as lhe case. thi:-ı wa:-ı noı because Islanı had no societal b;ı:-ıis buı becau­sc it was not allowcd to exprc:-ıs iı-,eır publicly and politically . ln thi~ coıık\l, \\hat ı' cıllecl

thc "rise of Is lanı ... · · ıslanıic rc\'i\ <ıl ... or "'political Jslanı .. is. in fact. :--imp!) \UpprCSSCU lslanı. which is enıbcdded in Turkcy·:-ı socictal fabric, conıing to the surface tlırough the rcb­tivc denıocrati1ation ol" polit) and ··autoııo­

ınization of civil socieıy·· . 1 ~ In other words. denıocratization has lcd to the politicıl parti­cipation of religiously con'ıcrrnıivc population and a raising of their dernaııd". \\hile autono­mization of civil socicty has leci to nıoderni-1ing clite's "loos(ing) their powcr lo trnıı .. Jorııı thc society fronı abovc.". 16 This pntcııtwl lıad been kepi under thc Keıııalıst state's thuıııb

unti l 1950, when thc first frec and coıııpctilıve elections were hele! and thc Derncıcr;ıt Parıy

caınc ro power. As poiııted out by Say;ırı. "car­ricd out in a lıcm· y-lwnd fu . ..,hion ... Kcııı.ılisl

refornıs created a good deal or hostilit~ amoııg thc stauııclıly re ligiuu' ıııassc'ı . Whrn ılıc

-;aıııe nıasses werc f!_İvcn thc chance to cı..pres..,

liberal düşünce

tlıcir political prefcrcnces following tlıe liber­alization of the Turkish political systcnı. Islaııı eıııerged as an inıportant issue in the elecwral mobilization of the largely pcasant votcrs." 17

During I 980s. a relativelv pluralistic and frec publ ic debatc dcveloped ." thanks partly lo

. t 18 Ozal's liberal-conservatıve govcrnnıen s. lslanıic tcndencies began to rise again both at societal and political lcvels. in thi~ cra thc WP rosc as "'an in~titutional fraıııework ror the voi­celcss and suppressed ıııasses of Turkey and for social nıoveıncnts seeking reclefinc and trans form social. cultural. and pol itical inter­actions ." 19 However. Kemalist elite in both cases rnisunclerstood this proccss and labelecl it "reactionisnı" or ··rundanıentalisrn''.

Some Notes On Republican History::!O

In orclcr to unclcrstand bcttcr why thc rise of lslaın in Turkish politics has been gctting stronger. one needs to ha ve an idea about the political histor; of Republican Turkey . Contrary to the gencrally acccpted vic\v. Turkcy. already had had an expericnce of con­stitutional govcrnment before thc establish­nıcnt of the rcpubl ic in 1923. To an ex tent, a traclition of associational and political plura­lisrn can be tracccl to the latc ninetecnth centu­ry. Botlı of this developnıcnls emcrgccl from the Ottoınan statc's efforts to modernize its sociopolİtical system in the post-Tanzimat (Reorganization) perİocl with thc iıııperial

decrees known as the 1839 Gulhanc Hatt-i Humavunu (the Royal Edict of Gulhane) and thc 1 s's6 Islahat Fcrnıani (thc Reform Eclict). Thc first constitutİonal monarchy came after these ıııcasures. when Abdullıanıit ll put into force a scnıİ-parlianıcntarian, nıonarchical cons­titution in 1876. Although the Sultan soon ab­rogatecl thc con:-.titution ( 1878), the Young Turks forced hinı to put the constitution into effcct again in 1908, ancl in the following years the constitution was anıcnclcd to confornı to that ofa Wcstern-stylc parlianıcntary monarchy.

Dcspıtc official prcssurcs bet\.\Ccıı 1878-1908, associational life <rnd coıısıitutional

movcıııent had nıana!!ed to sun l\C. Iııınıe­

diately aftcr ''proclarn;lion of irccJoın,. 21 by

the Young Turks. the nunıber and activitİes of political. ethnic. cultural anu literary assocıa­tİons be!!an to increase rapidly . lıı lhis peri od nıany as~ocİations rnıd partics iıı, · uhcu in pub-

.,., lJ -lic dcbate and political proce~s.-- nlorlu-nately. a 1913 military con-.pirncy kJ h) tlıe

Unİonİsts, whosc İcleology \\'<lS hascd oıı a positi,· İstic outlook. natİonalİsnı. and soli­darİsnı. stopped thc denıocratİc polilical proccss and attcmptecl to oppres-; ali opposi­tion ıııo, · cnıcnts. whctlıer lslaıııist. liberal. socialist. or ethnic cİ\ il groups. The first World War rollowecl the capturing ol' latc Ottoınan polity by thc Unioııists. aııd tlıl' par­lianıentary process was iııtcrnıplccl until llıe

enci or 1919. when general c lcctİons for ıı

House of Reprcscntati VCS (l\ılec 1 is-i rvlebusan) was Jıcld. Howcver. soon after tlıc ne\\ Ottoman asscıııbly bcgan to opcrate. İl had lo enJ its -v. ork (April 19:20) uııder prcssure !"rom lhc British forces occupying Istanbul. Suh­sequcınly, ılıc Sultan dissoh ed İt o ffİcİall).

Thc closurc of the parlİamcnl pronıpıcd tlıc national-liberntİonist organiı.ations or Ana­tolia. undcr the leaclcrship of Muslafo Kemal. to initiate tlıe Gram! National Assenıbly

(ONA) in Ankara on April 23. 1920. The cleclarcd purpose of GNA \\'ll!-> to liberale thc counlry ancl the sultan-caliph from tlıc forcigıı

occupiers' opprcssion. Thc ıııaiıı prcoccup<ı­

tion of thc GNA. in tcrrns ol" it!-> iııterırnl opc­ration. was to claiın nclusi' c aullıorit:- O\cr the "'a!Tairs of tlıc ııation·". and. asa ıııaltcr of facı. İL showccl ımıch carc nbouı keeping clc­nıocralıc legitimacy. cven lhough tlıcrc c\İstcd an eıııergcncy sİtuation becausc ur tlıc ıııde ­

penclencc war. r:or this reason. the GN,ı\ could hardly passccl an act that ıııadl.' Kemal llıc

conınıander-in-chief of the natioııali<;t forccs. a power tlıal was supposed l0 he pan of the sovcrcign authorİry of thc GNA itsclf.

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Shortly after the encling of "national strug­gle", the way of cloing things in politics began to change, and democratic concern for legiti­ınacy and pluralisnı gradually was replaced by nıore autocratic methods initiated by M. Ke­mal and his close associates . Thc first step in this direction happened when a majority of the GNA , under the influence of M. Kemal. passcd an act for early elections in violation of provisions in the 1921 Constitution. Held in suınıner of 1923. the elections resulted in lhe "c leansing'' of the parlianıentary opposition, the ''Second Group'' (Ik inci Grup),23 which consistentl y had rcsistecl to M. Kenıal's efforts to rulc over the GNA. Thus, the GNA Jost its representativc-denıocratic feature, ancl this, in turn , macle easier for M. Kemal ancl his close associates to nıanipulate the GNA's agenda and to donıinate the pol icy of the nation. ln this era, Kemalist ruling circle did not allow opposition groups to have a voice in Turkish polity . In fact, the first political challenge, that of Republican Progressivc Party which alle­ged that Kemal was ınonopoliLing political powcr and establishing an autocratic govern­nıent .2-+ canıe from somc of M. Kenıal's own fricnds, who had served with him during the war of liberation . But this party was bannecl by the government in 1925, only a few ınoths aftcr its fornıation, and its leading figures werc scn­tenced to life in prison following a court martial.

In 1930. M. Kemal asked his longtime and close friend. A. Fethi , to form an opposition party on liberal lines in order to criticize the government -but not the reginıe , state, or pre­sident, who was M. Kemal himself. However the new Free Republican Party clissolvecl it­self in the sanıe year. after it appeared that the partyt had the potential to gain a considerable electoral support, a situaıion that could chal­lenge Kema l 's Republican People's Party (RPP), especially in rural areas. Those experi­ments showed that "neither Ataturk personally nor the Turkish political elitcs collcctively were ready to proceed to a full-flcdgcd multi­party democracy" .25

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in time, the process of monopol i.1:aıion of the polity by M. Kemal and his ruling RPP was supplemented by iıwading ali civi l society domains . The 1925 Kurdish uprising.26 which broke out in eastern Anatolia. provided the power elite with an excuse to suppress all thc autononıous elemen ıs of society. especiall y ones whose aspiration came from religious belief. Indeed, after 1925 the Republican state grad ually becanıe an RPP apparatus to change radically the soc ial and cu ltural fabric of" the Turkish society in i.lccordance witlı the RPP's blue-print fora secu l ar-natioııalist society and to create a ncw nıan . or. to coin a tcrnı. lıomu Keiııalicııs. For this rcason , thc free prcss was su pprcsscd, the educatioııal sys ı cnı was monopolized by the state (lhe Ac ı of Unificat ion of Eclucation. 19 24). pious endow­ınents were brought under strict statc contro l (1924), and ali civic associations thi.ll had potcntial to reıııain autonomous from the sta tc were banned or dissolvccl . Thus, dervish lodges were dissol veci in 1925. the Turkis h Hearths clubs werc baııncd in J 931, and Turkish Association or Woıııen \.\as cli:-.solvccl in 1935 . To fili the cultural and moral \ oid caused by pruniııg tlıc civil ancl cultural f"o r­nıations, the govcrnnıent establishecl a ııct­

work of People's Houscs . Thcse \.Vere sup­posecl to have an official nıission of incloctri­nating society along sccularist-na ti ona li st lines , tlıat is. to proviclc the state with a cultu r­al-ideological hegenıony o ver the society. Moreover, asa part of the projeci to cut off all linkages of the society with traclitionul institu ­tions ancl knowledge. a reform of highcr eclu­cation was i ntroduced. A ınajor ai ııı of ıh is reform was sh uttin g dowıı of thc Darulfunun, the Ottoman univer~ity located in lstanbul.~ 7

With the oppression of civil society, thc authoritarian one-party govcrnnıent lasted until 1945 , when the ending of Seconcl Worlcl War started "the second wave of dcnıocracy'' throughout the world and. in turn, crcatecl a favorab le foreign nıilieu for Turkcy to trans-

liberal düşünce

form its system into a multiparty government. The ruling RPP , led by ismet lnonu, heir to Kemal Ataturk as prcsident , also decided to open up the political systcm in order to get popular support for its domestic program. Turkey then needed support from the Westem world, especially from the United States, not only on account of its security problems with the Soviet Union but also on account of its bad economic situation. In order to handle the Sov iet threat and to speed up economic recov­ery-Turkey's economy that had been affected badly by the war even though it had not become involved in the conflict. It seemed to be a good decision to introduce competitive politics and to liberate thc legal system. The 22 years or the onc-party governnıent had left a poor record, not only with respect to the econoıny but also in social and cultural ternıs. The general welfare level of the population, was barely above subsistence, except, of course. the growing class of big business, thanks to state support and wartime profitcer­ing, and, to an extent. state officials. The oppression of civil ancı political activities. es­pecially religious-inspired ones, had created a deep resentment and discontent anıong the rural population . In these conditions, there was a real need for the ruling elite to channel the wicıespread discontent into denıocratic institu­tions . Thus , the RPP allowed the social and political opposition to form parties and, the Democrat Party (DP) was established by some former RPP members, who had criticized poli­cies of the government.

ln the first free elections held in May 19:50, the Dcmocrat Party came to power, gaining a majority of seats in the parliament. However, although DP governments followed relatively liberal policies in terms of religious liberties and improved the general welfare of the popu­lation , its general record was far from the full liberalization and democratization and even was illiberal in some rcspccrs . Basically two

reasons hindered genuine denıocratization.

First, since the DP leaders canıe from the RPP tradition , their political career had beeıı

shaped by the RPP's authoritarian style of ru­Jing . Sccond, while RPP paved thc way to multiparty govemment, İl was not really ready to cede control over the political syslem . il seeıns that Inonu and his close associates wanted to introduce "dcmocracy" undcr llıc

tutelage of thc RPP, or a "limited denıocra­cy" ,28 rather than a genuine conıpc titi ve poli­tical system. In his project there v\·e re no pJace for giving up thc ideological nature of the re­gime and allowing sociaJ forces to work according to their own dynamics. RPP leacler­ship was certain that real powcr. in any casc. would rcnıain in their own hands in this new era becausc si nce the founding of thc Rcpublic lhe paıty had strengthened thc systenı with ideological , legal ancı insıituıioııal ınechaıı isms aııd guaranties in l'avor of the Kemalist elite. Thus, DP goveııınıcnts 'Nere bound to operalc within this limited or "'contained" ~pacc.

in the post- 1950 period, one of the most effectivc ways of containing dcmocracy was to chargc DP governments with favo ring "rc­actionism" whcncver liberal policies toward the religion initiated or whenever thc cxerci­sing of civil rights by devouı Muslinıs werc tolerated. To nıake clear what RPP nıeant by the label "reactionisııı'', the party accused thc govcrnnıent of "endangering secularism", or fomenting an "uprising against the Republic" whcnever religious people were allowcd to enjoy thc same liberties that werc, aııd are sup­posed to be, usual in any Wesıern dcınocracy. The RPP charges culminated in military coup d'etat of May 27 , 1960 . The coup was led by army officiers and suppoıted by civi 1 bureauc­rats, intellectuals, and scholars who sharcd tlıe sanıe political outlook as RPP . Even thoug the DP had conıe to power by popular conscııt. the military junta rctaliatcd and, in effecı. reıurned political power back to thc pro-RPP state elilc.

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The new 1961 constitution appeared to be a liberal one. with guaranties for civil ancl poli­tical liberties and a strengthened juclicial re­view. In some respects. however. it providecl Kemalist state el ite with the nıeans of control-1 iııg ovcr thc political systcm by in:,tituting proceclures for the civil and nıilitary bureau­cracy to check the clecisions of electecl boclies. which conservative partics were expectecl to control. The constitution also preservecl the Kemalist icleological nature -secu larism- of thc rcgimc. This ncw semi-liberal cra again endecl by nıilitary intervention in 1980. As a ınatter of fact, some liberal aspects of the cons­titution already had been trinınıed in I 971-1973 peri od , when the political process opera­ted under the military's supervision . The 1980 coup finally abrogatecl the constitutional order as a whole. Thc top gcncrals pronounccd as one lcading cxcusc for their intcrvention thal the state agai n was endangcrcd by "the escala­tion of rcactionary activitics" and "rising threat to secularism ··.

Betwccn 1961-1980 Islanı had began to gain visibility. not only in societa l and cultu­ral splıeres, but abo in the political realm, thanks to the new constitution's relatively libe­ral overtones which macle it cascr for the for­ıııerly oppre:,sed religious groups to voice their clemancls. During this seemin<Tiy favo-

~ c

rablc atrnosphcrc sonıc lslanıic-oricnted

politicians led by Necmettin Erbakan estab­lished the Narional Order Party (NOP) in 1969. However, the Constitutional Court dis­banclecl the NOP in l 971 on the grouncls of "capitalizing on lslanı for political cnds". The Court considered thc NOP uıı anti-secularist party in tcrms of Turkish state crecd of secu­larisnı , which means ııot just separation of religion and state. but also the state's doınina­tion over rcligion (Islaın). Iıı cffcct, thc sccu­lar elite rcjccted granting civil and political liberties to the people who cluimed to be ins­pirecl by the lslarnic faith. This conception of dcrnocrucy, "hus often excluded not only the

108

radical but ulso nıodcratc blanıists" .29 in other words. Erbukan ancl his ussociutes were wrong tt think that ıhe reginıe's .. liberal" ori­entation enıbraced ıhe blami:-ıLs as well.

Erbakun's closc associat<.:s rc-fornıed tlıeir

party in J 972 under thc name of thc Notional Soll'lıtioıı Party (NSP). Accorcling 10 Ilkav Su­nar and Binnaz Toprak.>O in ternı~ of its s~cio­econoınic backgrouncl. the part y representecl "the protest of those who wanted larger politi­cal and cconomic role in tlıc cxpanding worlcl of nıodernity ." But NSP's rhetoric was pro­Islanıic and, it seenıed to be a religious-coıı­servutive pmty. What NS P re al ly sought to do was to help religious people, who hud been exc lucled fronı the public an political rcalnıs

since early days of thc Republic, to influence tlıe political processes uııcl to fcel tlıcmsclvcs

insiclers to thc systcnı, or real citizens. Al­though the electoral recorcl of NSP cluring 1970s wus not inıpressive. Kemalist intcllectu~ uls, scholars. und nıilitary suw it as intolcrablc party in a secularist systenı . Thus . thc NSP was shut down by r!ıe ınilitary govcrnnıcnt in 1981.

following Lhe nı ilitary iııtervention, the ınilitary juntu. institutioııalizecl as thc Naıioııal Security Council (NSC), desigııed u "coııstitu­tion''. which canıe imo effcct in Novcnıber 1982. The nıain preoccupation of the frnnıers of thc 1982 Constitution was to consol idare tlıe seculurist-Kenıa list characterisLic of the rc­gime mıd to narrow the space for politicul conıpctition and civil socicty. Thcrcforc. thc NSC was givcn constitutioncıl status as thc ba­sic platform for the military to influeııce poli­tical process. The coııstitution also strictly ııar­rowed the roonı for the .~ocial and political cxprcssion of religiously-inspircd ci\·ic orga­nizations. A series of Kemalist "Reform Laws'' that aimed to protect the seculurist nature of thc regimc wcrc cquippecl vvith asta­tus of inviolability. During 1982- 1983. thc NSC amcnclccl nıany ba<;ic laws rclatccl to thc franıework of the political systenı so as to

liberal düşünce

facilitate military supervision over the politi­cal process. Ilowever, while thc coup lcadcrs nıeant to curb political Islam , in sonıe respects they favored Islanıi c belief, wiıh the hope of ··create(ing) a more homogenous ancl less political Islanıic community'', aııd they con­sidered Islam "a pacifying and s ubıni ss ive ide­ology preferable to the ıhrcat of conıımı-

. "31 A 1 . nısm . t t 1e same tıme, the coup leaclers ' acıion '·indicates that the tenclcncies and prefe­rences given a relatively free rein in thc three decacles following Menderes' assunıption of power can no longer be suppres~ed or iırnorcd by the official classes who sıcıncl "uaı~ o ver Ataturk's lcgacy"_32 "'

Thc l 980's were, in onc respect. the years of Turgut Ozal. first as pri menı inisrer and la ter as presideııt. Ozal. who had bcen one of the top bureaucrats during the governments of Suleynıan Demirel in l 970s. fornıed Mothcr­bnd Party in 1983 and canıe to power at the cnd or thc same year. Although as prime nıi­

nister Ozal 's liberalisnı in ternı s of econonıic policies did not reflect in political real nı in same degree, his conccpt of state was considc­rably liberal in ternıs of thc goals of statc and ılıe relaıionship bctween individual and slate, and he had a ıolernııı aıtitudc ıowarcl Is lam. These facts contribuıed ın the developnıenı of civil-societal activitics, cspecially anıong Isla­mists , in post-1984 years . During his presi­clency, Ozal challenged the olTicial Kemalist icleals and introduced new issues to the public debate-issues thaı up to his time had been consi­clered forbiclclcn subjccts to cliscuss. ror cxam­ple , he qucstioned the appropriatcncss of the sıate having an ideology. of ıhe nıilitary con­troll ing the policy of nation and or the Kurdish poliey followed by previous govcrnnıents.

Moreover. being a devout Muslinı, Ozal helped to change the official hostile policy toward Is­lanı and rel igious pcople and nornıal ized access of religious people to civil serv ice jobs. Accor­ding to Taylor, "what seenıs ıo be nıost appcal-

ing to a large nunıber of Turks is Ü/al's abilit\ to reaffirnı his coınmitment ı o Islaııı in a sect;­lar setting with which he is coıııfortablc ... 3.-ı

Shoı1ly after Ozal's Jcatlı in 1993. tlıe

political atnıosphere sıarıccl ıo chaııgc aııcl tlıc military, through the NSC, graclually rca!'ı ­

sunıecl the initiative in governnıeııt policics . Thus. a policy of opprcssion coııcerniııg civi l libcrties. especially rrcc clcbatc and freecloııı or association. has increascd. lıı this ınilieu. the ınenıbers and tlıe e lected p~ırliaıııcııtary

deputies of llıc pro-Kurdislı party. \\ lıiclı rq;­resentecl Kurcl ish concern.;, ı ıı ılıc par! iaıııcııl. were prosccutcd and llıeir part) dislxındcd .

Another inıportaııt cveııt during thı.:sc years was tlıc rise of lslaınic-nıinded Welfrırc Pcırty (WP), \Vhich was organizcd in 1983 by soıııe friends of Erbakan after ılıe NSC pcrıııittccl tlıe fornıation of political parties. lııtcrcstİıı\"!.h . as the heir ıo thc NSP of tlıe pre-1980 pnio:ı ~ WP had limited public appeal aııd littlc clcctoral success during Ozal's yems. ,\fıcr Oıal's

death . however, ılıe party woıı tlıe nıuııicipal

elections lıeld in March 1994. Sub;,e4ueııtl; .

tlıe WP reccivcd 21 perceııl or llıc \'Ole GlSl iıı

Decenıber 1995 parlianıcııtarv o::•lecıioııs. a higlıcr pcrcent of votes ılımı ılrnl nhtai neci b) any ot her pol iti cal party .

Even tho u glı tlıc WP hclcl ılıc ı~ıq;öt ııurn ­

bcr or scats in tlıc parliaıncııt. İt \\US ııol ca~\·

to find a coa lition partner wiıh \\·hich ıo f"orı;ı a governnıcnt. The Kemal ist-sccu larisl sector (the military, professioııal organiLation'.). aca­clemia. parties of thc ccnter. big nıcclia and soıne sec ıion s of tlıe civil burcaucracv) an.ı:ued that as an "ant i-systenı" pany. \VP ~oukl not be a l cgitiına te partner ı o any other "sec ular" party. However, the Moıherland Party. kd by Mesut Yilmaz. clid try to form a coalitioıı go­vernnıent v. iıh thc WP but eve ııtu all) ga\C up its initiative. Aftcr the fail of" <1 short-Iİ\'C ci

Motherland-Truc Path Party (TPP) coal ition. the WP at !ast managed to form a coal itioıı

109

bahar 1999

with Ciller's conservative-populist TPP in the suınıner of 1996 despite the harsh criticisıns of the ınedia and other Kemalist ci rcles. These criticisms grew duriııg the course of the WP­TPP coalition government , and by early 1997

the nıilitary - donıinated NSC began to involve itself acıively in daily politics. To the top gen­erals, who saw the arnıy as prime guardian of the secularist Republic, the state of affairs was no longer tolerable . In February they issued a memorandum through the NSC that required the government bas ically to persecute so­called reactionary organizations and activities.

In the end , the NSC forced government parties to resign in June 1997. Thc ınilitary 's

main target was WP , rather than thc TPP. The generals' priority was to drive the WP from the office. This was the case, becausc "the systenı of values inculcated by thc arnıed forces is deemed to be inseparable froın Ataturk's con­ception of the secular statc. Whcn those ideals have been threatened. or public order threatens the stability of the Kemalist republic, senior military officials have felt it necessary to inter­vene."34 The next step was to file a suit against the WP in the Coııstitutional Court, which ordered the disbanding of the party in January 1998. ft ınight be worthwhile to note that, in this process, the big business and asso­ciated big ınedia interests willingly supported the generals. Otherwise , it would not have been so easy to dri ve the WP out of thc govemınent .

However , this does not nıean that political Is­lanı is excluded fronı Turkish politics perma­nently . As Atilla Yayla put il: "Refah is a soci­ological reality that cannot be nıade to disap­pear through legal bans because it is the politi­cal expression of a huge opposition move­ınenı."35 But the Kemalist army officers had

intervencd directly in the political arena again, this time by using a "constitutional " platform , NSC.36 Thus, now ıhe military once more is planning to do what it considers an "easy" bu­siness, that is, "reestablishing deınocracy" .37

11 o

Radical Secularization in Turkey

From outset, the Kemalist state had reacted severely to ali pro-Islamic and civil organiza­tions. Its attitude towarcl Islanı rem a ined unchangcd, albeit in a ınore nıoclcrate ınode after the transition to nıulti -parıy governnıent. The key reason for this , it seenıs, is thc icleo­logical orientation of the Republican state. which from the beginning has becn unfavo­rable to Islam. The statc viewecl Is lanı as the principal cause of Turkey's underdevelopecl status . ln fact, in the first two clccades of the Republic thc power elite tried to dcstroy lslanı and its culturc asa force in Turkcy. After tran­sition to multi-party governrnent, thc Kernıalist elite continucd iıs hosıility to Tslam, and even in thc so-callcd const itutional peri­ods based on 1961 and 1 982 constitutions did not g ive up thaı policy. In the vicw of Kemalists. ali they did originatcd fronı the dic­tates of sccularisnı . 1-lowever, as Kcdou ire observecl, Turkish secu larisnı is differcnı fronı the Western model : ''(l)t is not thc sıate of affairs encountered ın modem European pol i­tics and usually describecl by the phrasc 'a free church in a free state'"' .38

ln order to understand this policy better, it would be useful to glancc at O . E. Snıith's

account of seculari zation policies in the mo­dern world. hı his analysis.39 thcrc are f'our

aspccts of secularization in the modern stale: polity-separation, polity-expansion. polity­transvaluation, and polity-donıinance. These can be considered as stagcs aithou <>h a o iven ._., ' w b

sccularization process nıay or may not f ollow each stagc. At the first sıage, the pol ity is scpa­rated from rcligious iueologies and ecc l esiası i ­

cal structures. "Polity scparation secu lariza­tion involves the severance of conııccıion ...

bctween religion and the polity .... Polity sepa­ration frequently results in the contraction of the polity, as the governnıent ceases to per­forrn traclitional religious practices .''40 In the stage of polity cxpansion , the state begins to

liberal düşünce

perform regulatory functions in the socioeco­nomic sphere that formerly were performed by religious structures. " Here the polity extends its jurisdictions into areas of social and eco­nomic life formerly regulatecl by religious structures. The polity expands its functions at

the expense of religion."41 Polity-transvalua­

tion secularization, that is the third aspect or stage, involves the support or creation of sec­ular political values. Through the polity-trans­valuation secularization process the statc pro­vidcs secularization of political culturc, of the basis of legitimacy , and of national identity.

According to Smith , while " these three aspects of secularization are universal in the developmenl of modern polities over the past century and a half' , only in "profoundly reli­gious" societies do we see a more radical form of secularization attempted: "the dominance of polity over religious beliefs, practices, and ecclesiastical structures. This involves the expansion of the polity into what is recognized

as the purely religious sphere in order to destroy or raclically alter religion."42 ln other worcls, · ' polity-doıninance secu larization in­

volves an open governıneııtal atlack on the re­ligious basis of the general culture and the forcible iınposition ofa secular ideology on the political culture ... In denying any autonomy to the religious sphere, thc state operates on tota-1 itarian preınises , although its overall philoso­

phy neecl not be explicitly totalitaıian."43

In the Turkish case, Kemalist secularisın rested not on the separation between religion

and state but on governınent control over reli­gio. According to Levent Köker, thc state sought to replace Islam ic the value systeın with a "scientific'' onc.44 The Republican state followecl the " polity-clominance", or radical secularization, pattern, as Sınith hiınseit45 and

Turkish scholar Iltcr Turan46 have stated.

With a nuınber of radical reforms, which

included abolishing Caliphate, outlawing lhe

tarikats (Sufi lodges), oınitting lslanı from thc Constitution as the state religion and rcplacing Islanıic law with an adaptation of the Swiss ci vil code, secu ta rizi ng and nıonopolizing

eclucation, abolishing religious ancl traditional dress , and replncing the Arabic nlphabet with

the Latin alphabet, the "Kemalist government systeınatically disınantlecl Islanı as the institu ­tional basis of Turkish life in l 920s anc.I l 930s" .47 ln this era. radical secularisrn be­came "one of the key principles of Ataturk's new state ancl religious expression came under strict governınent supervision and control'': 48

any autonoıny to Islaın was clcniecl .

Raclical secularization of Turki ·h politics originated with Kemalist idcology. which developccl cluring the carly Rcpublic . Thc for­mation of Kenıalisnı as an ideology seenıecl to be a coınplex phenoınenon, influenced in part by nineteenth ccntury positivisnı. which had much appeal to the Young Turks. of whoın M. Kemal was one. Kemnlisın incorporates a po­

sitivistic vision of the Enlightenınent ancl pc­

culiaritics that enıergccl fronı the projcct to

creatc a new nation basccl on main ly ::-.ccu larist

lines in place ofa traditional lslanıic socie ty. This is why Kemalists "aclvocatecl social ancl political progress through a positivist pursuit of science, which it was hoped woulcl rcplacc God-centerecl politics with an enlightcnccl pub­lic mind ... (Therefore) thc legislation enactccl

in the first two decades of the rcpublic was clesigned to replacc Islaınic conınıunnlism w ith

a new mode of social sol idarity constructed along thc \ines of progrcss."..ı.9 In their opinion.

"any kinci of preoccupation with lslam" was "i rrational" and Islam was ''the antonynı of cnlightenınent".50 Thus, a suspicious. cvcn hostile , attitudc towarcl religion. a strong bel ief in pos iti ve science as a nıeam. or progrcss.

nationalism , and a strict conınıitnıent to secu­

larization of politics shaped the idcology of the ruling Kemalist elite.

111

bahar 1999

Turkish Secularism: A Political Religion'!

Not content with just separating lslaın from pol itics. M. Kemal also sought to renıove

Islam's power base in society and subordinale it to the state. For this reason , secularisnı was introduced as thc main political doctrine early in republic. ln foct. lhc process of scculariza­tion of Turkish polity resenıbles the forrnation of"political religion''. The Lerın "political reli­gion .. was coined by David Apter, who observed: "States with nıonolithic structure. autocratic government. and a wide range of conımunity imperatives face a particular poli­tical problem'' which results ali social life being politicizecl in soıııe degree. ''When so­cia l life is heavi ly politicized. goveıııment requires exceptional authority. Such authority tencls to be monopol istic. Monopolistic autho­rity needs to replace oldcr bclief about other forrns of allcgiance. Novv political forms are cleveloped that ha ve the effect of providing for the conrinu ity. ıııcan ing. and purposc of an indiviclual 's actions. The result is a political cloctrinc that is in cffcct a political religion . The effects of political religion are such that they strcngthcn authority in thc state and weaken the flexibility of the socie ı y.'' 51

In a society in which a political religion pre­vails ... oppression obliterates freecloııı. fear replaces spontaneity. aııd everything is pol itici­zed. fronı fanıily ancl kinship to vo luntary asso­ciations" .52 In such cases "(h)arnıony in the political sphere dcrives fronı the nıcssia-nic

lcac!cr who points out the c!angers and noxious poisons of faction. Many such leaciers arc cha­risnıatic who represent the 'one'. They personi­fy thc monistic quality of the systenı. To ach ieve such oneness. mobil ization systenıs

begin by politici zing ali political life. Asa re­sult. politics as such clisappears. Th is is in keeping with nıonistic political belief. Conflict is not only bad but also countetTevolutionary. it runs counter to the naturnl evolution of hunıan society. and ideas of opposition downgradc and

112

confuse the power of positivc thinkiııg. IJeus not only are daııgcrous. cballcııgiııg ıhc Jegiti­nıacy of the reginıe or charisnw or the !ender. They also rcpresent unscientific vötige ,,·hcrc­ver they nın counter to thosc of the rcgimc ,-·53

Christel Lane. who sıudied politicul reli­gion in the Sovieı case. cal lcd our attent ion to the cliff erences between political religioıı aııcl

civil religion.54 First. civil religion links the political orcler with n transccııdcııt puwcr derivecl from the trncliıional rcligioıı or tlw society, wlıcrca'.-> poliıical rcligioıı prc~cnts a sacral izat ion of' thc cx isi ing poliı icnl order. Second, while c ivil rcligion coııfiııe:-; itsclf ı o

thc political affa irs ofa soc ıcıy. poliıical rcli­gion claiıns autlıority O\·e r ali socia l life . "Conscquently, political rcl igion has a systcnı of spccific valucs ancl norıns. \\hile the coıı­tcnt of c ivil religion is at such a higlı le\ el ol generality tlıat it conflicts neitlıer '' itlı coıı­

vention3J religious nor witlı polıtical nornıs

and valucs."55 Thc distinction bccoıncs nıore c le ar when wc turn to C. 13 . B n·~ ını, wlıo

says:56 ··socicty is thc prime nıovcr ~f thc ci\'i l religion: the state the prime 1110\ er or political rcligioıı. Thc collective rcprest' ııtatioııs iıı a civil religion ~1re geııuinely rcpre"cııtatİ\l' ol socıety asa \\·hole, or at kast lıl nıany scctioııs of it( ... ) By contrast, tlıe collecli\e repre-,cııla­

tions ofa political rcligion are superiınpo:--ecl on socie ıy by thosc who control thc statc. Tlıc one is historica ll y rootcd: thc otlıcr is poliıical­ly contrivccl. Altcrnati \'c ly. witlı cİ\ il rcligiom. it is ultinıately the :-.tate wlıich lıee<.ls ~ociety:

with political religioııs it is ulıiınalt'ly socieı~

which submits to the sıate ...

So. we can find rnost cleıncnts of political religion in Kemalist sccularisııı and thi-, fact nıadc thc eady Republicaıı reginıc closer Lo

totaliwrianism. ln foct. Rcpublicın state \\'a~

built in the form or ıııoııolithic stnıc ture, aııcl

hncl an autocratic governıneııt unlil 1950. Fornıerly M Kemal ancl laıcr lnoııu. witlı tlıc

help ol' thc RPP apparatus, 111onopoli1.cd ıxılit-

liberal düşünce

ical power and elinıinated f actual and potenıial rivals . In Kedourie's words.57 "(Republican) People's Parıy was ıııeant by iıs l'ounde r (tlıat is. M. Kemal) to be un iıı~truıııcnt for thc polit­ical control of ıhe ıııasses. and a~ a transnıis­sion-belt. auxiliary ıo tlıc administration, thc purpose of which v\ as to proınotc Mustafa Keına\'s secularist projcct." The RPP wa<; not of the kinci of party that we see in Western con­s tituti omıl and represent::ıtivc deınocracies, but an apparatus through which ıhc population could be indoctrinatecl into Kemalist outlook. secularisrn being ıııost pronıinent in it. in order to nıobilize the ıııasscs. in addition ıo the paıty apparatus, People's Houses werc es tabi ished aııd they wcre supposed ıo work in tlıe same direction. and. a~ a ıııaıter of facı. they did so.

The Keıııalists also had charisnırıtic lead­ers. Kemal Ataturk hinısclf. and later lnonu, even though the lauer ncver eııjoyecl thc saıııe clegrce of respect anct authority as did Ataturk, who represcntcd the ·'one" and pcrsonified ıhc ıııonisıic clıaractcr of tlıe re!!İrne . lndeed , fronı 1922. M. Kemal. .. wlıo w;:ı~ li kc <ı su lı an".58 had been callcd officially '·Gazi''. Although that title refers to any ınan who fought for a holy causc in the con ıexı ofls l aınic culıurc. in this case it implied tlıat M. Kemal was the Gazi. not just one of ıııan y Gazis. in 193..+. thc Grand National Asseınbly. which then was coıı trolled by M. Kcnıal's RPP. gavc hiın the surnanıe Ataturk. which ıııeans "thc ancestral father of Tu rks''. Aııd M. Kenıal's eharisnıa was propagated and strcngthened through the educationa l mechanisnıs , the press that was under strict control or the govcrnınent. and in rnany ccrc nıon i al occasions.

Another intercsting sinıilarity to the politi­ca l systeııı with political religion is that conf­lict wa~ considcred heretical. "not only bad but also counterrevolutionary" in the Kema list icleological context. During thc sing le-ru ling­parıy period, any opposition to the Kemalist tenets, in terıııs of idcas or actions. regardlcss

of their lslaıııic. Kurdish. libe ral. or socialist ori gi ns. was regarded as "unscicnııric ... "sulı­vcrsive". or "reacıioııary". To ıh c rnliııg elite. challcngiııg Kenıalisnı aııcl the ··t1racP11iaıı

nıethods'·5 lJ that wcrc usecl by thc gu' crıııııeııt to consolidaıe secularist policıes \\'rts clıal­

Jenging the naıional goal of .. rising to the inci of comeınporary Cİ\'İlizaıion·'. and disclnsing ıhe inteııtion of making the society go bnck ıo the "darkness of the Middlc Agcs··.

Howcvcr. for any ru ling elite. polılıc,ıl rL·li­gion could not be an enci iıı ibelL Thc !inal objectİ\C of creating a poliıical religıoıı ıs to incorporatc a new value ~ystcın and codc or conduct-a civi l rcligion to reph.ıı:c traditioııal

religion. Thc lernı. bul not thc idea. or Cİ\' il

religion is a modern onc. coined b) .lcan­Jacques Rousscau iıı eighteentlı ccıııury . lıı lıi-.

accouııt. civil religion refcrs to <ı di~ıiııction

betwccıı .. thc reli gıoıı of ınwı·· ~ı-. <l prı' <ıtc

ıııatter and thc " rcli gioıı or citııcıı" \\ ıllı iıs

public connotations. Ilowc\ er. the ıcrııı ".ı-.

giveıı coııteıııpnrar) currcııq \\ itlı Rnbcrt '.\. Bc ll alı 's worb.. ··ci, il Rcligioıı in ,-\nıc­

rica··( l 967) aııcl T/ıi' !Jrden Coı·ı"nwıı: \111 C'­

rica11 Ciı · i/ Religion 111 Tinıt' rı/ /'ı iu/ ( l lJ7) ). B:­civi l rcli gio ıı Bellah rcl'cr~ to .. tlı<ıt rclı~Hıus

diıııcnsİOll. rcıund ... iıı tlıc life ol C\Cr~ j)L'Ppk.

tlıroııgh '' hich it iııtcrpreh its lıisıorıı:<1I C\pcrı­cııcc in tlıe lighl of transccııdcııı rL·:ılıty .··<ııı Accorcling to J. A. Colcnıaıı. el\ il rcligirnı is ··d

set of bel iefs , ritcs <mel syıııboh \\ lı iclı rel<ıtö a man 's role as citizcn nııd his socicty\ pl::ıce iıı

space. time and hisıory to thc condition'> or ultimaıc cx istence ancl nıcan ıng·· .61

In thc case of Turkcy. it sceıııs tlwt ılıc

long-tcrııı goal o[ ılıc Kemalist elite "<ı'- ıo

replacc blaııı with a ne\\' civil rcligioıı thaı

was to grow up lroııı secular idcas rnıd iııstitu­tions. ln clcsigning a political religion \uclı as Keınalisnı. the elite tried to ınake a scculari\t outlook and values rootccl in ıhe fabric o[ soci­ety. and this was expectecl to beconıe the bas is of new citizenship and puhlic moralitv . M.

113

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Kemal tried to replace religion with a ınodem­secular ideology and the values of Republican nationalism and that icleology ''came to consti­tute a 'civic religion' (with its public rituals, to an extent that Islam probably never clicl under the Ottomans)" .62 The new systenı of secular norms, says Şerif Mardin, werc to serve as a ci vic boncl that was supposed to fili society's "ethical vacuum", which rcsulted froın el imi­nating the traditional religious norms, and to bring and keep the citizeııry together as a political society .63 Thus, a new ınode of social solidarity woulcl replace '·Tslamic communa­lism'' .64 In this contcxt, what Heper called "to socialize the people i nto becoming patriotic citizeııs of a secular republic"65 was, in fact, this very process of creating a civil religion . In this regard Kemalism reseınbles the French Revolution which. according to Bellah, "was anticlcrical to the core and attempted to set up an anti-Christian ci vil rcligion" .66

Although Republican state's cfforts to rcplacc Islamic-inspired traditional culture with a secular civil religiotı, Islam dicl not loose its appeal to the Turkish society at large. Asa ınatter of fact, Islam is stil! the main basis of social solidarity, of ınobilizing people for national goals, and an important source of legitimacy in politics. Thereforc. making refe­rence to ls lam in Turkish politics is not, as Kemalists think of it. an indication ofa cons­piracy to "use" religion for political purposes. Perhaps, as Mardin pointed out,67 Turkish Islaın, which has been influenced by the gene­ral sccularization, is going to transfer into a civil religion.

Conclusion

If it is true that Islam has penetrated Turkish social fabric deeply , has shaped inter­personal relations andan individual's conduct, and has remained the main reference for Turks in terms of the mcaning of life, then it is not surprising that lslanı has been ablc to find

114

spaces for itself in Turkish social. cultural, public, and political life . Not only as a reli­gious faith, but also as a code of concluct for incliviclual and public concerns, lslam is embedded in Turkish socicty. lf one considcrs Is lam to be an ouısider , then he fai ls ıo under­staııd whaı is really happening in Turkish soci­ety and polity. And any ruling group that trcats Islarn as a strangcr woulcl be surprised to see Islam continue to grow consistcntly ancl nıust be ready to use foı'Ce if it wants to suppress it. The Republican hisıory slıows that it is iıııpos­sible to unclermine Islanıic social base and Islam's overall appeal to lhc population. By coııtrast. any attempt to supprcss social ancl political ınovements nıotivated by Islamic concems woulcl lead to increasecl fundamen­talist inclinations among M usl i ıns .

Moreover. there is no strangeness ın thc growth of Islamization during clemocratinıtioıı periods. If Lhis process means a wiclcning of the basc of participation, witlı guaranıiccl civil ancl political liberties, certainly, denıocrati.la­tion would enablc thc citizenry, inclucling devout Muslims, to cxpress thcir demancls ancl nıake their access to public clebate aııd

polity easier. Since Lhe transition to coınpcti­tive politics in 1946, this lıas been the case in Turkcy. But the Kemalist elite coıısidcrccl this trenci a counter-secularist uprising and rcactcd to it by force, as in 1960, 1971, 1980 ancl final­ly 1997. Howevcr. it is not a wise policy to apply the politics of coercioıı in response to social dynanıics, rather than allowing Lhese dinamics to cxpress themselves politically.

Finally, an important point what Kcınalists have overlooked is that ınany citizen\ always will see Islam asa sourcc of knowledge, iııspi­ration, guidance ancl action, even asa valuable way of life. This, in turn. will neces-.arily be reflected in the public and political spheres. Some people might define theınsel ves through religious belief and choose lslam as a systcm of values ıo goverıı their livcs. This is not a

liberal düşünce

pathological phenomenon, as Keınalists seem to assume. As long as it allows things to ope­rate in natural ways and is not tempted to exer­cise violence, the state is not fatecl lo see such things as "fundamentalisın", or a "reactionary threat" . Turkey 's political elite has to learn to !ive with Islaın. If Turkey really wants to be a deınocracy, it will do so successfully only with Islaın, not by attempting to cast it off. lndeecl, its history forces Turkey to be a "Musliın dernocracy". Labcling any Islamic­ıninded movement as "fundaınentalism" is not only a false diagnosis of thc state of affairs in Turkey, but also a fatal acl that would destroy the chance for democracy in Turkey, as Republican history showed so far.

NOTES

1. Nur Yalman. "lslamic Reform and the Mystic Traclition in Eastcııı Turkey". Arclıiı·es F.ııropeennes de Suciulugi<', 10. 1969. p. 47: quoıccl in Richarcl Tappcr. '' lmroduction". in Richard Tapper (ed.), ls/a111 in Modern Tıırkey: Religiuıı, Politics and Liıeratııre iıı a Secıı/ar Sraıe (Londun: l.B . Touris & Co Ltd: 1991). p. 7.

2. Sabri Sayari, "Politization of lslanıic Re-tradition­alism: Some Prelinıinary Notes". in Metin Heper & R. lsraeli (eds.), lsla111 aııd Polifics iıı tlıe Modern Middle Eası (New York: St. Martin 's Prcss. 1984). p. 25.

3. Birol Yesilacla . "Turkish Foreign Poliey Toward ıhe Middle East''. in A.Eralp & M.Tunay & B. Yesilada (ecls.). Tlıe f'olifical cıııd Sucioecuııunıic Traıısfomıafion of Tıırkey (Westpoint. CT: Praeger Publishers. 1993), p. 189.

4. Sencer Ayata. "The Rise uf l s l a nıie

Fundanıentalisnı ancl its lnstitutiunal Franıework". in ibid .. pp. 58-9. in another occasion , he writes: "The flow of capital fronı tlıe Gulf States was used to found new banks to finance primarily investıııents underıaken by people in Naksibendi circles." See Sencer Ayata, "Traditional Sufi Orders on the Periphery: Kadiri and Naksibendi lslam in Konya and Trabzon", in R. Tapper (ed.). op. cif., p. 224. Fora sinıilar view. see Ali L. Karaosnıanoglu. "The Liıııits of lnternational lntlucnce for Denıocratization ''. Metin l leper & Ahmet Evin (eds.). T/ıe Poliıics in tlıe Tlıird T11rkislı Repııblic

(Boulder/USA & Oxford/UK, 199.J.). p. 124).

5. Turker Alkan. "The National Salvation Party in Turkey·· . in M. Heper & R. Isracli. op. cif., p. 79.

6. Yesilada does not need to clifferenıiate between pious-conservative people and genuinely fundanıcntal­ists . fn his writing. conservative nıeans fundaıııental ist. Huwever. Binnaz Toprak seems to be ıııore ıneti culous

in using tcrnıs: ''(M)ajoriıy of thosc who arc categorizecl as l s l anıic fundanıentalists are in a ıııisplaced categnry if what is nıeant by fuııdanıcntalisııı is raclical poliıics ." Scc Binnaz Toprak. " lslam anu thc Seculaı State in Turkc) . ._ in Cigcleııı Balim & Ersin Kalaycioglu & Cevat Karata, & Gareth Winrow & Feroz Yasaıııee (cds.J. Tıırkey:

Polifical, Socia/ mu/ /:'co11(J111ic Challenges in ılı!' 1990.ı

(Leiden: E. J. Brill. 1995). p. 95.

7. Birol Yesilada. uµ. ciı .. p. 189. 178. 179.

8. Sencer Ayara. 'The Rise of lslaıııic

Fuııdamentalisnı ...... p. 58.

9. Nilufcr Gole. "/\uthoritari an Sccularısııı and lslanıist Politics: The Case of Turkey''. in Augustus Richard Nortan (ed.). Civil Sociery in tlıe Middle F:asr. v.

2 (Leidcn: E. J. Brill, 1996), pp. 21 -26.

1 O. Serif Mardin, " The Naksibendi Orc.lcr in Turkish Histury". in Tapper (ed.). op. cit. p. 139 .

11 . Sabri Sayari. op . ciı .. 123.

12. Binnaı Toprak, op. ciı .. p. 95.

13. Alan R. Taylar. The /s/aınic Qııesıio11 iıı Midd!I:' Eası Poliıics (Boulder and Landon: Westvicw Press. 1988). p. 91.

14. Alan R. Taylor. ibid. p. 32.

15. M. llakan Yavuz callcd tlıis f'act "norıııali7ation uf state-society relations" . See his articlc, "The Return of lslaın : New Dynamics in Statc-Suciety Relations aııcl thc Role of Is lanı in Turkish Pulitics ... in Turke) : Tlıe

Peııdıılum Swings Back (London: l slanıic World Report . 1996), p. 79.

16. Nilufcr Gole , "Towarcl an Auıonoıııization of Polities and Civil Society in Turkey" . in M. Heper & A. Evin, op. ciı .. p 222.

1 7.SabriSayari.op.ciı.p.126.

18. For rnore infurnıation about Ozal's place iıı

Turkish politics. see my book, Demo/..rasi , Laiklik. Resmi ideoloji (Denıocracy , Secularism aııd ıhe Statc ldeology) (Ankara: LDT Yayınları. 1995) , pp. 11 8-130.

19. See M. Hakan Yavuz. "Political l slanı ancl Wclfarc (Refah) Pany in Turkey" , C0111parariı ·e Po/iıics.

v. 30 (October 1997). p. 74.

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20. Tlıis scction ı' bascd nıainly on nıy book. Tiirkiye'de Alllıyasahır ı·e Siyaser (Constitutions and Politics in Turkcy) (Ankara: Liberte. 1999).

21. ·'Hu rriyetin llaııi ... Tlıis terın was popular durinu tlıe second constitutional cra of Turkey. -

22. Authors wlıo eınplıasize tlıc lack of civil society in Ottoınaıı cınpirc fail to coıısider this poiııt. For an exaınplc. ~ec Ali Kanıncigil ... Tlıc Orıoınan-Turkish

State and Kenıalisın·· , in Ali Ka/ancigil & Ergun Ozbudun (cds.). Aıaııırk: Foııııder ofa Modern Stare (Haıııden/CY: Arclıan Books. 1981). p. 45.

23. On tlıc Seconcl Group in GNA see Ahmet Demirel. Birinci Mecliste ikinci Gnıp (Thc Second Group in Tlıc First GNA) (lstanbul: ll ctisim 1995).

2-l. Elie Keclourie. Po/irics in rlıe Midllle Easr (Oxford: Oxford Univer~ity Prcss. 1992). p.108; Erik Jan Zurclıcr. T11rkn: A Modern History (Loncion: 1. B. Tauris and Co Ltd . rev . paperback ed .. 1997). p. 176.

25. Dankwart Rostow. "Ataturk as an lnstitution­buildcr", in A. Kazancigil & E. Ozbudun. up. cir .. p. 74.

26. Bcing a Musliııı pcople andan activc participant in liberation war. Kurds were assumed to be onc of tlıe founding peoplcs of tlıc ncw statc, tlıe other being Turks .

27. Given this statc of affairs. it is surprising tlıat

1 lepcr writcs as follows: ··rronı 1923. wheıı tlıe republic was fouııded. uııtil the mıd-19-lOs. dcmocracy itsclf gra­dually establishcd··. Sec. Metin Heper. .. lslaııı aııd

Dcıııocracy in Turkey: Toward a Reconciliation··, Tlıe

Midd/e Easr Joumol. V. 51 (Wintcr 1997). p. 33.

28 . Kemal Karpat. T11r/..eı".ı Po/itics: Tlıe Trwısirion ro a Mulri-Parıy Sysreın (Priııccton. NC: Princcton University Prcss. 1959). p. 1-+7.

29. Metin Heper. op. cir. p. 45.

30. llkay Sunar & Binnaz Toprak, "lslam in Politics: Tlıe Casc of Turkcy". Goı•ern11ıe11ı and Oppositioıı. n. 18. (Autumıı 1983). p. 438.

31. Hakan Yavuz. ·'Political Islaııı ...... p. 67.

32. Kcdourie. op . cit.. p. 148. According to anotlıcr rcading, ··tJıat approach wlıiclı was acloptcd is an effoı1 to nvcrcoıııc tlıe serious divisioıı tlıaL tlıen clıaractcri zed

Turkislı socicty ancl had lcft ınore tlıan 5.000 people dcad and 20.000 inJured froııı 1977-1980. A coıııbınatioıı of rcligion and ııatioııalisııı was pcrceivcd as a ıııeans of liııkiııg batlı tlıc ınoderate riglıt and left wings of the Turkish political spectruııı:· See Ben LombarJi. "Turkey:

116

Tlıc Returıı oftlıc Relucıaııt Gencraıs ·.ı··. Politınıl Scieııce

Qııarrerly . v. 112, ıı. 2 (Suııınıcr 1997ı. p. 1%.

33. Alan Taylor. op. ciı .. p. 91 .

34. Loınbardi . op. ciı. , p. 209 .

35. Atilla Yayla. '·Erbakaıı\ Goab··. /ı,,Jidılle Eo.ır

Qflarrerl_r. v. 4, n. 3 (Scptcıııbcr 1997). p. 25 .

36. A foreign ob>crvcr ıı rntc ın ııııd -1996: ··AJI sccm to be sctting tlıc >tagc fora rcturıı to ıııilitary nılc:·

Sce.Loıııbarcli.op.ciı .. p.213. .

37. Erııcst Gellııcr gıvc> ,uclı a nice >kcıch ;ı, fol­lows: "I think it was Mark Tıı aiıı \\ lıo >aic.l. 'Girnıg up smokiııg is casy. 1 've done ıt 'll ıııaııy tıırn::' .' Tlıc

Turkislı arıny could say. 'Rcco,tahli,hing c.lcnıocracy is easy. wc ha1·e done ıt 'o rnaıı) tiıııc ... :·· Scc his articlc. ·'Thc Turkbh Optioıı in Comparativc Pcr,pcctiı· c·'. in Sibel Bozdogan & Rcsat Kasaba (cd, .J. Rerlıi11/..111g

Modenıiry aııd Narioııııl ldeıırirr iıı T11rA ey (Scattlc and London: University of Washington Press . 1997), p. 2-l3. Fora more cletailed accounl of thc Turki>lı politics dur­ing tlıe ycars of 1995-1997. scc 111) book . Re.ıim S11rıı1111 (Tlıc Regiıııe Qucstion) (Ankarn: Vadı Yayiıılari. 1997) .

38. Elic Kcdouric. op. Cif .. pp . 105 - IO(ı.

39. Donald Eugcnc Snııth. !<elıg ıo11 011(/ Po/11irnl Deı ·elopı11enı (Baston: Littlc Bro1-ı ıı and Coıııpan).

1970), pp. 85-123.

-lO. lbid .. p. 91.

-l 1. lbid .. pp. 96-97.

42 . lhid .. p. 85, 86.

-!3.//Jid .. p.119.

44. Sec Levent Kokcr , Mııdemlnı11 e . l\eı110!1 : 111 l"C'

Demokrasi (Moclerni7_atioıı. Kcıııalı~ııı aııd Dcıııncracy)

(lstanbul: llctisinı. 3rd rcp. 1995). p. 1Cı6. 168. 22-l .

45 . Smith, op . cir .. p. 86. 118 . 121 . 268:

46. iller Turan. ··Rcligıon and Political Culturc ııı

Turkcy"· , in Tapper (ı.:d.), op. cir .. p. 3-+ . ··Thc Turki:,lı statc was tlıc ıııosı radical cxaıııpk ()r ıııoLIL' lll 'cc:ular­ization. The republic of Ataturk 1-ı · a, ı ·ound (111 ıı;ıtııın;ılı.'t

and republican priııciplcs aııd undcnuoı.. a ıcritab!L: cul­tural rcvolution to lıquidaıc tlıc attaclııııcııt of ilıc

Turkish peoplc to tlıeir Islaıııic ptbl.·· Scc lra \1.

Lapidus, "Tlıe Golden Agc: Tlıc Pol itıcal Conccpts of lslam'', in Charles Buttcnıonlı & 1. William Z<ınınaıı

(eds.). The Aııııa/s: Poliıical Jslmn (Ncwbury Park : Sagc Publicatioııs. 1992). p. 21 .

liberal düşünce

47 Ser Taylor. llfl. cır .. p. :11. ,\notlıcr (Turki,h) scholar givcs aıı m·crall account nf tlıc mcasurcs tlıat

wcrc nıcant tu 'weep rcligiuw, in>piraıions away froııı

Turkislı socio-cultur<ıl and po liıi cal lives: "tlıc abolition of Cal iphate ( ... ): thc abol iti on of ılıe officc of the Scylı­ul-lslaııı. the highcst in the rcligious hicrarchy of the Ottoıııan Eıııpire( ... ): ıhc abolition of thc medrcscs , thc l slaınic ccl ucat ional instituıioııs for lıigher learning: and ılıe sccularization of thc cducational systenı: ıhc aboli­tioıı of thc rcligious courts and thc sccularization of thc legal ,y, ı enı: the ouılawing of thc nıystical Sufi brothcr­hoods. ıhe tarikat( ... }. and tlıc cl<.ı,iııg or thcir placcs or worship aml ıcntlıcri ıı g: ( ... ) tlıc ouı la wıııg of tlıc vcil for '' oıııcıı workiııg in cİ\ il 'crvıcc jnbs: thc c lıangc in o!Ti­cial oaths. to be ı akcn on une', honour raılıcr tlıaıı on ıhc Koran: ıhc changc of "eck ly hol iday froııı Friclay tLJ

Sunday: thc adoption of thc Latın alphabct instcad of thc Arabic: and ıhc abolitioıı ofılıc ivlusliııı lunar calcndar in la\our of tlıc Grcgoriaıı. At thc sanıc ıinıe. a >Crics of laws wcrc iıııplcnı entccl tn prcvcııt an orıwnizecl politi­cal ıııovcıııeııt baseJ on l slaııı." Scc Binnaz Toprak. op.

cir .. p. 91. Scc also Riclıard Tappcr. vp. cir .. p. '.?.

48. Riehard Tapper. ibid.

49. Faruk Biı1ck. ·· Prospccıs fora Ncw Ccntcr or thc Teıııporary Rise of Peripheral Asabiyah-r. in M. Heper & A. Evin (cds.). op. ciı .. p. 224.

50. Metin Heper. op. cir .. p . ..+2.

51. David E. Aptcr. ··Political Rcligıon in tlıc Ncw Natiuns ... in Cl ifford GeertL (cd.). Old Socierics and Nel1'

Stares: Tlıe Quesr for Modemity in Asia aııd Aji'ica (Ncw York: The Frcc Prcss of Glcncoc. 1963), pp. 58-59.

52. /bid ., p. 68.

S:\. !/Jid .. p. 78.

5-+. Clıristel Lane. T/ıı• Riıes of Rıılers: l?iıual in !ııdıısrriol Socieff- rlıe So ı ·ieı Case (Caıııbridge:

Canıbriclgc Universiıy Prcss. 198 1 ). p . ..+'.?..

55. //Jirl .

56 . Chrisıophcr G. A. Bryanl. ·'Civic Nation. Civil Socicıy. Civil Religion ... in Juhıı A. Hali (cd.) , Ciı·i/

Societv: Tlıeory. Hisıor\' . Coıııparııom ((aıııbridge :

Polity Press. 1995). p. 150.

57. Elic KcJouric. op. cıt .. pp. l07- 108.

58. !bici .. p. 108.

59 . !bid .. p. 106. 108. Loıııbarcli callctl thosc ıııcth­ods ··Aıatuı'k"s brutal rcprcssion ol' rc liıcion "'. Scc Lonıbardi . op . cir .. p. 197.

60. Roben Bcll~ıh. "Cıvil Rclig ıpn ın ı\ıııcrıl«t.".

Daedalıı.ı . \. 96 ( 1967) . p. 1 :1. ·· Ratlı c r tiı<ın .-\ııglo­

Saxon libcralisnı. Frcııch .lcıcnbını-;nı. "ıtlı ıı s higlı!)

cenıraliıcd model of chaııf!c. bcca ıııc ıhc protot) pc for reform of Turkıslı ıııodcrnist~. ilence. seculariıaııon

itsclf bccaınc p<ırt of ıhat procc" of social cııginccrıııg rathcr than an outcoıııc nf ılıe proccss of ııwdcrniı<ıtioıı aııcl socictal dcvclopnıcnt... Scc Nilııkr Colc. "'Secularisnı and lslaıııisııı in Turkc) . Tlıe \lak ııı~ of El itcs and Couıı ı cr-El iıcs··. Tlıe Middle l'.11.11 .lrıımıu/ . ı.

51. ıı . 1 (Wiııtcr 1997). p . ..+8.

61. Cıtecl in Bryant. op. cir .. p . ..+9.

62. Richard Tapper. op. cir .. pp. 5-7

63. Şerif Mardin. "Rcligion and Polııics in Turkcy". in Jaıııcs P. Piscaturi (ecl .). lslaııı in ılıe Polirıcul Pm«'ı·.ı

(Caıııbriclgc: Caıııbriclgc University Pr.:". 19831. p 1-+2. 156.

64. Faruk Bırtck. op. cıt .. p. 224.

65. "By ıııeans of tlıc ıııass ıııcdı a. eclucation. llag saluting. natioııal anıhcııı >inging. >tatc paraclcs a ııd nPn­rcligious Jıolida)S on national annivcrsaries. attcıııph '' cı\' ınaclc ıo socıalizc thc pcoplc into bccoıııiııg patriotic cıti­zens ofa sccular rcpublic ratlıcr tlıaıı pıou,., ııı cıııbcr' nr ;ı

Mu,.,Iim coııııııunity:· Scc Metin Heper. ıııı. cıı. p \..+.

66. Rnbcrt N. Bcllalı. Tlıe Hrol- 1·n Cmmwıı (f\:C\\

York: Thc Scabury Prcss. 1975). p. :ı .

67. Scrif Mardin. ' 'lslaın in rvtass Socicıy: l larnıoııy Vcrsus Polarization··. M. lleper & A. E,·in (cds.). op.

cir .. pp. 167-68.

117