Letters

ICO Approaches to Tropical ForestConservation

Romero and Andrade (2004) arguethat powerful international conser-vation organizations (ICOs) distortthe value of tropical forest resourcesin developing countries by treatingthese resources as private rather thansocial assets. They perceive ICOs asbeing overly influenced by preser-vationist agendas that ignore theneeds of local people and restricttheir participation in resource man-agement and policy making. Witha warning that narrow preservation-ist approaches to conservation couldthreaten the very existence of forestsand people, the authors plead withICOs to give greater consideration tolocal stakeholders. Such an appealmay have been appropriate whenRice et al. (1997) first argued for trop-ical forest concessions to be loggedof their valuable timber and then re-tired from production and given per-manent protected status, but Romeroand Andrade’s concern over that kindof proposal now seems outdated. Al-though many ICOs focus their activ-ities on protected-area systems, andmany projects face the challenge ofachieving higher levels of involve-ment of local communities, the cur-rent strategies of ICOs are more var-ied and multifaceted than the authorssuggest. In fact, most tropical conser-vation strategies include sustainable-use approaches that are intendedto strengthen local institutions, localresource-use rights, and the participa-tion of stakeholders in managementdecisions.

Our response is informed by Bo-livia, where ICOs are partnering withlocal communities and supportingsustainable resource use in a vari-ety of ecological and social contexts.Nowhere in the country are ICOs

pursuing strategies that purposefullylimit or restrict local resource-userights or the involvement of local com-munities in resource management. InBolivia, as in many other developingcountries, ICOs have recognized thatsocial needs and political realities willnot permit a strictly protectionist ap-proach to the forests that are cur-rently in concessions or those thatcould be designated as such. Even inexisting protected areas, such as Bo-livia’s national parks, the presence orproximity of human populations re-quires working with local stakehold-ers and addressing their immediateneeds and long-term economic aspi-rations.

The BOLFOR II sustainable forestryproject now underway in Bolivia isan example of how large ICOs areworking to augment the role of lo-cal communities in long-term tropicalforest management and to increasethe economic benefits they derivefrom sustainable resource use. Thefact that several major ICOs submit-ted proposals for the implementationof this large-scale sustainable forestryproject is evidence that ICOs haveevolved beyond the debate Romeroand Andrade attempt to rekindle. TheBOLFOR II project—funded princi-pally by the U.S. Agency for Interna-tional Development—is designed tohelp strengthen a national forestryregime that emphasizes the rightsand responsibilities of local commu-nities and municipal authorities. Bo-livia’s forest law, the centerpiece ofthis regime, allows previously disor-ganized and illegal forest users toform legally recognized associationsand receive new forest concessions.Through this process, local peoplesare encouraged to undertake long-term planning and develop a proac-tive role in resource use decisionsand forest management. We believe

that the BOLFOR II project repre-sents one of the many practical ef-forts that ICOs are undertaking toachieve the kind of balance betweenICOs, regulatory institutions, and lo-cal stakeholders for which Romeroand Andrade (2004) argue.

Steven V. Price∗ and Steffen Reichle

The Nature Conservancy–Bolivia Program,Casilla #6204, Santa Cruz, Bolivia.

∗email svprice@tnc.org

Literature Cited

Rice, E. R., R. E. Gullison, and J. W. Reid. 1997.Can sustainable management save tropicalforests? Scientific American 276:44–49.

Romero, C., and G. I. Andrade. 2004. Interna-tional conservation organizations and thefate of local tropical forest conservation ini-tiatives. Conservation Biology 18:578–580.

Romero and Andrade criticize inter-national conservation organizationsfor failing to incorporate local stake-holders in their conservation efforts.In particular, they focus on the exam-ple of efforts by R. Rice and othersat Conservation International (CI) toobtain land-use rights over forestedareas. However, they mischaracterizeour perspectives and methods. Webelieve that, in fact, Romero and An-drade have far more in common withus than they realize.

They express particular concernthat the purchasing power and po-litical influence of international con-servation groups may marginalize lo-cal communities. We believe that amore pressing concern is that, atpresent, the only parties offering lo-cal resource owners anything forforests and other habitats of impor-tance to conservation in the trop-ics are those interested in destructive

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exploitation. We fear that without ef-forts to level the playing field by pre-senting alternative offers that pro-mote conservation, many of thesehabitats will be lost. Fortunately, inour experience resource owners arevery open to such alternative offersin many instances.

The design of effective alterna-tives, though, requires a slightly dif-ferent perspective than has informedmany efforts to date. Until now, manyconservation efforts reflect the as-sumption that the only way to pro-vide resource owners with an incen-tive to conserve is to facilitate en-try into markets for less-destructiveextractive activities. This approachhas encountered difficulties for a va-riety of reasons. Markets are unreli-able or nonexistent and, of criticalimportance in developing countrycontexts, persistent short-term needscontinually exert pressure to acceler-ate extraction at the expense of long-term needs. In other words, projectsbased on continued extraction rarelyresult in unambiguous incentives forconservation, a problem that stemsfrom the lack of explicit agreementsabout conservation outcomes. Suc-ceeding with this approach would bedifficult under the best of conditions,and the best of conditions rarely char-acterize the places we seek to con-serve.

We are finding that a differentapproach, which we call conserva-tion incentive agreements or commu-nity conservation agreements, avoidsthese difficulties. This approach re-lies on negotiated agreements un-der which conservation organiza-tions guarantee a steady stream ofcompensation to resource ownersin exchange for their commitmentto conservation. Compensation cantake many forms, including mone-tary payments; social services, suchas health and education; jobs inresource management; and invest-ments in alternative livelihoods. Suchlong-term agreements offer incen-tives in the form of dependable ben-efit streams that can be adapted to lo-cal circumstances and changing con-ditions. This approach is a far cry

from deals with governments at theexpense of local communities. Tothe extent that governments are alsostakeholders, their role must be ad-dressed in overall project design, butthe emphasis is on reaching mutu-ally beneficial agreements with thosewho have the most direct impact onnatural habitat—the people living inand near a project site.

Moreover, agreements do not in-volve a blanket ban on all communityaccess to resources. Instead, commu-nity conservation agreements seekcommunity commitment to workwith conservationists to manage re-source use. Insofar as conservationmanagement includes constraints onresource extraction, agreements com-mit conservation organizations toproviding benefits that replace fore-gone resource access. The key isthat the flow of community bene-fits depends not on the success ofstruggling sustainable extraction en-terprises but on meeting achievableconservation objectives.

Thus, CI’s mission and strategiesembrace the principle that peopleliving in and around forests are themost critical determinant of successof conservation efforts. A number offactors shape how community con-servation agreements embody thisprinciple. First, many areas of con-servation importance are found inremote regions beyond the reachof government social services. Sec-ond, remote communities are oftenrelatively voiceless when it comesto relations with their governments.Third, these communities are disad-vantaged by poor access to marketsand economic opportunities. As aresult, the people in question haveneeds and few ways in which to meetthese needs. At the same time, theyhave access to and influence over ar-eas of high biodiversity value, cre-ating room for a negotiated agree-ment between conservation organi-zations and communities. In our ex-perience, local communities see “out-spoken and powerful” conservationorganizations less as a threat than asvaluable partners in their efforts toobtain social services, attract devel-

opment assistance, and conserve theresource base on which they depend.

Romero and Andrade state thatRice and others at CI rely exclusivelyon acquisition as a strategy. Let us beclear: CI does not believe that acquisi-tion, community conservation incen-tive agreements, or any other singlestrategy provides the solution to for-est loss in every area of conserva-tion interest in the world. Develop-ing countries house areas of immensebiodiversity value, but communi-ties and governments lack ways tocapitalize on biodiversity values. Insome contexts, acquisition, commu-nity conservation agreements, orother negotiated deals offer a meansto do so; therefore, such mechanismsbelong in the toolbox of both con-servationists and local communities.In some situations, “selling” biodiver-sity conservation services can yieldgreater benefits than timber exploita-tion or agricultural conversion, andwe should not deny communities thatoption.

At the same time, we do not be-lieve that this approach is an answerto poverty throughout the develop-ing world or that it can fully ad-dress the lack of public services inall areas where we work. But it canhelp to mitigate these problems ona project-by-project basis while giv-ing resource owners a tangible in-centive to conserve. Romero and An-drade conclude by saying that wemust strive to make forests sustain-able sources of prosperity instead ofpoverty traps. They challenge us tofind a balance between preservation-ists, concerned solely with biodiver-sity conservation, and devolutionists,focused solely on empowering localpeople with control over forest re-sources. We believe that incentiveagreements do just that; they rein-force local ownership through con-tracts that specify reliable compen-sation in return for concrete conser-vation outcomes. Far from “thwart-ing the hopes of local people for im-proved access to jobs . . . and socialservices such as schools and hos-pitals,” incentive agreements en-able communities to leverage their

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influence over natural habitat and ob-tain these benefits without sacrificingbiodiversity.

Richard E. Rice and Eduard T. Niesten

Conservation International, 1919 M Street, NW,Suite 600, Washington, D.C. 20036, e.niesten@conservation.org

We are heartened by the responseselicited by our critique of the heavy-handed approaches to tropical forestconservation of some internationalconservation organizations (ICOs)and trust that further reflection onthis complex topic will benefit boththe environment and society. Weagree with Price and Reichle thatmany ICOs now espouse fairly so-cially sensitive agendas. We hopethat their particular project in Bo-livia has positive impacts on peo-ple’s livelihoods without compromis-ing resource conservation or localautonomy. Special care is needed intheir host country given that a na-tional park’s recent expansion in thename of carbon sequestration andconservation cost local communitiesthe option values of their traditionalresource-use rights, engendering de-pendency and mistrust (Aisquith etal. 2002). We disagree, however,with Price and Reichle’s statementthat the debate over the “log-and-then-preserve” approach is outdated(Bulkan 2004; Niesten & Rice 2004a,2004b). We believe that the issueof fencing people out of tropicalforests after extracting the most valu-able timber species has not beenadequately discussed. More broadly,claims that preservation is the onlyviable way to save biodiversity still re-sound among conservation biologists(Terborgh 2004) in spite of the richdiscussions of this issue during the2003 World Park Congress and the2004 International Society of Tropi-cal Foresters conference, People inParks: Beyond the Debate.

Similarly, we share with Niestenand Rice (2004a, 2004b) the de-sire to achieve conservation with-out sacrificing social welfare but ap-parently disagree with them about

how this complex goal can best beachieved. We objected specifically totheir log-and-then-preserve approachand their disregard of sustainable for-est management as a tool for biodi-versity conservation and poverty al-leviation. Despite their recent renam-ing of conservation incentive agree-ments (CIAs) as “community conser-vation agreements” (Niesten & Rice2004a, 2004b), we doubt the pro-cesses by which these agreements arenegotiated, and question their long-term ecological, social, economic,and political viability.

Niesten and Rice’s apparent as-sumption that markets can solve so-cietal problems presumes that it isto the advantage of rural communi-ties on forest frontiers in the tropicsto substantially increase their incor-poration into market economies. Weare not economists, but we under-stand that poverty is not simply a re-sult of low income. Furthermore, werecognize that poverty is not effec-tively eliminated unless its underlyingcauses are determined and the con-sequences of low asset accumulationare assessed (Boyce 2003). We alsobelieve it important to acknowledgethat market integration can have nu-merous adverse effects (e.g., Godoy2001; Godoy et al. 2004). This issueassumes greater importance whenwe realize that local community pref-erences might not always follow thewidely assumed rationale of optimiz-ing short-term benefits (Henrich etal. 2001; Berkes 2004).

Legitimacy conflicts exist betweenbiodiversity-rich developing coun-tries and wealthy ICOs that reflect thepractical consequences of asymme-tries in power (Andrade 2003). Un-fortunately, these asymmetries can beexacerbated by the creation of lo-cal ICO offices that can damage localand national nongovernmental orga-nizations, but that is another issue.Rectification of power asymmetriesrequires more than financial trans-fers of wealth (Agudelo et al. 2003;Torras 2003) in spite of the poten-tial positive contributions of inter-national compensation for environ-mental services to biodiversity con-

servation (Bulte et al. 2002). Majorinvestments in local systems of gov-ernance that encourage local actorsto build their own terms of represen-tation and compromise and to chal-lenge the politics of power becomerelevant in power asymmetry rectifi-cation (Pretty & Smith 2004).

Although the economic dimensionsof direct versus indirect payments forconservation have been critically an-alyzed by several researchers (e.g.,Simpson & Sedjo 1996; Ferraro &Simpson 2000; Ferraro 2001; Ferraro& Simpson 2004), we worry thatRice, Niesten, and other negotiatorsrepresenting well-funded ICOs arenot paying close attention to the po-tential pitfalls of these approachesand are neglecting the importance ofcontributing to local social and po-litical capital (Boyce 2003). For ex-ample, how will funds be transferredto local communities that lack for-mal institutions and that operate onwhat seem like diffuse and ad hocrules without engendering undesir-able effects (e.g., community frag-mentation)? We believe compensa-tion for lost option values shouldnot be given in isolation from thegeneral relationships between devel-oped countries and less-developedcountries, especially when biodiver-sity conservation and developmentare at issue. After all, biodiversityconservation and poverty alleviationrequire structural and thus politicalchanges, not just good intentions andtechnical solutions (Fisher 1997; Vee-man & Politylo 2003).

The core challenge in efforts tomarket environmental services for con-servation and social benefits is thedifficulty of valuing natural resources(Markandya & Richardson 1997; Free-man 2003). For example, annual pay-ments for conservation range from$39.22/ha in the United Kingdom(Lovett 2002) to $9.88/ha in Tan-zania (Gichohi 2002), and down toonly $1.25/ha in Guyana (Ferraro &Kiss 2002). The repeated mention byCIA advocates that biodiversity-richtropical forests can be purchased atbargain prices in financially strappeddeveloping countries seems to reflect

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a fundamental misrepresentation ofthe importance of these areas. Fairvaluation provides a solid foundationfor negotiation and long-term conser-vation. Determining fair values andannual compensation rates is madeespecially challenging by the needto disaggregate discount rates amongcommunity members, lest existing in-equalities be exacerbated.

We worry that unless the power-ful ICOs involved in negotiations ofCIAs or other conservation initiativesare careful to avoid simply seekingthe lowest price, these strategies willconstitute just another top-down out-side proposal leading to the alien-ation of resource-use rights (Neu-mann 1997). Furthermore, to datethere is no empirical evidence thatCIAs or other direct payments forconservation contribute to improvedrural welfare, secure long-term con-servation, or support democratic pro-cesses while promoting the transfor-mation of resources into natural as-sets (Boyce 2003; Ferraro & Simpson2004). As much as we recognize theimportance of mitigating the adverseeffects of loss of forest cover and land-use change, we also encourage effortsto address the critical problems thatimpede individuals and local commu-nities from influencing political pro-cesses for more permanent long-termstability and sustained wealth (Oliver& Shapiro 1995).

We hesitate to endorse efforts toconvince donors of the efficacy ofmarketing nature to achieve the com-plex goals of biodiversity conserva-tion while at the least avoiding socialdamage. Although we welcome sim-ple solutions, lasting solutions needto be based on fair negotiations anddemocratic efforts at policy building,with due attention given to the pro-cess and the participants, especiallythe less powerful.

Claudia Romero∗ and German I. Andrade†

∗Department of Botany, University of Florida,Gainesville, FL 32611-8526, U.S.A., emailcromero@botany.ufl.edu

†Fundacion Humedales de Colombia, ApartadoAereo 101447, Bogota, Colombia

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