letter on humanity

8/10/2019 Letter on Humanity

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Introduction

The Letter on Humanism is a work that was written in response to a series of questions by

Heideggers French Colleague Jean eaufret !"# $o%ember "&'() with regard to *artres address+gi%en at the Club ,aintenant in -aris+ France+on .ctober /&+ "&'0+ which was published in "&'(

as Existentialism is a Humanism1 Heideggers letter+ originally 2nished in 3ecember "&'(+ was

formally published in the following year+ ha%ing been e4panded into an essay1 5n the following pages+ 5

will analyse Heideggers Letter+ not only as a free6standing essay+ but more speci2cally as a direct

response to *artres attempt to characterise e4istentialism as a form of humanism1 5n this di7cult

piece+ it is important to read each sentence slowly and carefully in relation to the ongoing train of

thought+ but also in relation to the essay as a whole !of course+ this is a heuristic+ poetic illusion8 as

we are already thrown+ etc8

The position of this essay in Heideggers creati%e output as a whole is signi2cant as it is his 2rst ma9or

work following the end of the second :orld :ar+ one which was an attempt to re6establish his

reputation during the intense scrutiny to which he was sub9ect in the de6$a;i2cation hearings after the

:ar1 The e4change between Heidegger and *artre is also signi2cant as it is perhaps the 2rst fruitful

philosophical e4change between French and


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Heidegger begins his Letterwith an attempt to lay out a pro%isional conte4t for his contemplations

which will follow in this essay1 :ith an ob%ious reference to *artre+ he writes that :e are far from

pondering the essence of action decisi%ely enough1 !LH+ p1 /"+ "'0) The key to this sentence is the

phrase decisi%ely enough+ since Heidegger is not suggesting that we do not ha%e any theory of action

or method for the practical assessment of action+ but that we are far away from thinking decisi%ely

about action1 5ndeed+ we !moderns) see !theorein) action as causing an eDect and we %alue an

action on the basis of its utility1 These 2rst sentences moreo%er already resonate strangely with

*artresExistentialism1

For+ in the 2rst instance+ Heidegger has indicated an essencefor action1 *uch an indication was not

suggested by *artre as he merely assumes we know what he means by the term1 5f we will recall+ the

latter stated that e4istence precedes essence+ and that what we areis established by what we do+ by

our action+ by our deeds1 Get+ Heidegger has already taken a step back from such a routine and facile

characterisation of action by asking after the essence of action1 5n other words+ if+ for *artre+ our

essence is determined by our actions or deeds+ but if+ for Heidegger+ the essence of action has not

been pondered decisi%ely enough+ then our essence cannot be determined by actions or deeds+ if

that is+ we ha%e not yet thought clearly about action and its essence1 .r+ on the contrary+ we will be

forced to state that our essence+ which follows our e4istence is determined by an act or e%ent+ the

essence !:esen) of which precedes our essence !essentia) and our e4istence !e4istentalia)1

Heidegger writes that the essence of action !which itself is not determined by any particular action or

deed) is accomplishment+ !Vollbringen) !LH+ p1 /"+ "'0) which is+ as accomplishment+ an unfolding

of something into the fullness of its essence1 5n other words+ that which is accomplished in this

unfolding must in some sense already be1 5n this light+ the essence of action+ as accomplishment+ is an

unfolding of that which already isE and therefore+ if action is that which determines our essence+ for

*artre+ it is an accomplishment of a being that already is1 5n this light+ for Heidegger+ in a %ery

signi2cant sense+ e4istence does not precede essence+ but %ice %ersa+ essence precedes e4istence+

this latter being produced+ in the sense of the Latinproducere !to be lead forth+ unfolded as

accomplishment)1

:e will recall that it is precisely this word that *artre contested in his characterisation of the

theological and technological paradigm of essence as an idea+ plan or method which preceded the

e4istence of the thing1 ut+ though it might seem that Heidegger is merely seeking to reverse the

reversalof that *artre which had already asserted+ his ne4t sentence is %ital in his attempt to

distinguish his own criticism of *artre from that of Christianity and Communism+ or in other words+

from the %iew of humanism as either an imago dei!image of


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the maker+ as in ,ar4ism+ Hannah =rendt+ et al1)1 Heidegger writesA ut+ what isI abo%e all is eing1

!LH+ p1 /"+ "'0) 5n this way+ that which is and is prior to action+ prior to e4istence and its

pragmatic essence+ is eing1 ,oreo%er+ it is through thinking+ Heidegger writes+ that the relation of

eing to the essence of man is accomplished+ unfolded+ not as action in the modern sense E as

making or eDecting E but as that which is brought to eing as something that is handed o%er to it from

eing1 !LH+ p1 /"+ "'0) 5n this recei%ing from eing and gi%ing back to eing+ eing itself comes to

language1 Heidegger writes+

Language is the house of eing1 5n its home man dwells1 Those who think and those who create with

words are the guardians of this home1 Their guardianship accomplishes the manifestation of eing

insofar as they bring the manifestation to language and maintain it in language through their speech1

Thinking does not become action only because some eDect issues from it or because it is applied1

Thinking acts insofar as it thinks1 *uch action is presumably the simplest and at the same time the

highest+ because it concerns the relation of eing to man1 ut all working or eDecting lies in eing and

is directed towards beings1 Thinking+ in contrast+ lets itself be claimed by eing so that it can say the

truth of eing1 Thinking accomplishes this letting1 Thinking is the engagement par l?tre pour l?tre

engagement by eing for eingK1 !LH+ p1 /"6/"+ "'0)

That which is signi2cant for an understanding of this di7cult passage is the attempt+ already

mentioned+ to pro%ide a pro%isional conte4t for a questioning of *artres facile and super2cial appeal to

action as that which makes our essence1 Heidegger would agree with *artre that the essence of man

is not in an a prioriidea of


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sub9ect+ either inside or outside the world)1 Heidegger will regard any attempt to impose the

interpreti%e frame ofsubject and objectupon our e4perience as a metaphysical falsi2cation of ?k6

sistence1

5mmediately following and owing from this rather di7cult passage that we ha%e 9ust considered is a

rather prosaic consideration of the historical meaning of the metaphysical framework of sub9ect and

ob9ect1 Heidegger writesA

5n this regard sub9ectI and ob9ectI are inappropriate terms of metaphysics+ which %ery early on in the

form of .ccidental logicI and grammarI sei;ed control of the interpretation of language1 :e today

can only descry what is concealed in that occurrence1 The liberation of language from grammar into a

more original essential framework is reser%ed for thought and poetic creation1 Thinking is not

merely lengagement dans lactionengagement in the actionK for and by beings+ in the sense of the

actuality of the present situation1 Thinking is lengagement by and for the truth of eing1 The history

of eing is ne%er past but stands e%er beforeM it sustains and de2nes e%ery condition et situation

humaine1 !LH+ p1 /")

The liberation of thought from grammar is a freeing of oursel%es from the technical interpretation of

thinking laid out originally by -lato and =ristotle1 For the latter+ thinking is technN+ a process of

reection in ser%ice to doing and making+ !LH+ p1 /"+ "'() or+ ofpraxisandpoiesis1 For Heidegger+

thinking is not a practical endea%or+ as it is not in ser%ice to action1 $either is thinking merely

theoretical1

5ndeed+ and this point resonates in our own era+ Heidegger contends that the merely theoretical is a

reacti%e posture which seeks to preser%e the autonomy of thought in the face of action1 =nd+ while

this posture attempts to maintain the prestige of thinking through the emulation of science+

Heidegger contends that thinking loses its essence when it becomes a science or a merely theoretical

acti%ity1 That which is lost+ abandoned in the technical interpretation is the question of eing+ an

abandonment which is sanctioned by Logic+ the ne4us of rules which formulates the beha%iour of the

technical interpretation as the technical6theoretical e4actness of concepts1 !LH+ p1 /"&+ "')1

efore Heidegger e4plicitly addresses the 2rst question of Jean eaufret+ he notes that it would

perhaps ha%e been better to respond to the questions in the form of speech+ which+ he contends+

remains in the element of eing and maintains the multidimensionality of the realm peculiar to

thinking+ !LH+ p1 /"&+ "') 5t is writing+ which forces us to consider deliberate linguistic formulation+

and thus+ which facilitates the establishment of the grammar of technical thinking1 5t is important+ at

this point+ to note that the di7culty of some of the sentences in theLettercan be understood against


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the background of the question of the ontological diDerence+ of the diDerence between eing and

beings+ and of the necessity of a diDerence in conceptuality+ or language+ in respect of this

diDerence1 5n this way+ Heidegger articulates a distinction between a technical interpretation of

thinking+ once compatible with beings and with science+ and a poetical interpretation of thinking+

which is that which can allow eing to come to language1 :e should+ again+ also keep in mind the

intimacy of speech with eing+ and hence poetry+ o%er again written language and beings and

science1

The First Question: How can we restore meaning to theword humanism?

Heidegger begins his answer to the question E which is not going to be gi%en any clear answer until

page /' E by raising his own question as to the necessity of maintaining the word humanism E a

word 2rst made rele%ant by $iethammer1 He suggests that Eisms ha%e already caused enough

damage in an ob%ious reference to the %arious ideologies associated with the :ar E fascism+ $a;ism+

=mericanism+ Communism+ etc1 He moreo%er makes the suggestion that these labels are demanded

by the market of public opinion+ a point that *artre also made in his Existentialism1 Get+ this suggestion

makes the implication that such Eisms are unoriginal+ as are the di%isions in thought itself between

logic+ ethics and physics E e%en the term philosophy itself only arose when original thinking

comes to an end1 !LH+ p1 /"&+ "') =ll of these terms+ again associated with -lato and =ristotle+ would

be emblematic of the technical interpretation of thinking1

ut+ immediately after these suggestions+ Heidegger enters+ shifts+ into another saying+ a diDerent

way of speaking+ the di7culty of which must be understood as a stepping back into a more original

saying that is seeking to articulate a poetic thinking of eing prior to ideologies and di%isions into sub6

disciplines+ such as logic+ ethics+ and physics E or+ into the discipline of philosophy itself1

This other way of thinking is attempting to retrie%e the element in which thinking can properly beE for

without this element+ it can no longer be a thinking at all E but a technical interpretation of thought+ or+

in other words+ an ideology or a world%iew1 The element+ in this way+ enables thinking+ or in other

words+ it brings thinking into its essence E it allows thinking to be accomplished+ or+ as we ha%e heard+

it brings the essence of man into relation with eing through thinking1 Thinking is thus a thinking of

eing in the sense of+ 2rst+ that thinking+ as with all things+ acts+ etc1 belongs to eing as an aspect of

eing itself+ and secondly+ thinking of eing is a thinking of eing itself+ a listening to eing1 Thinking

arises out of the element of eing as that which belongs to and listens to eing1 ut+ as that which


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arises from eing itself+ as that which unfolds from eing+ thinking is the unfolding of the essence of

eing+ an essence which eing fatefully embraces1 !LH+ p1 //#+ "')

Heidegger poetises that the embrace by eing of its own essence is a fa%oring or lo%e of its own

essence+ a lo%ing which means to bestow essence as a gift1 !LH+ p1 //#+ "') This fa%oring+ gi%ing+ is

the essence of enabling+ as with the enabling of thinking in the element+ in eingM it lets thinking be+ its

lets being be by enabling+ fa%oring+ by gi%ing the gift of eing+ of itself1 ?nabling+ as the element which

allows something to be+ is that which is most possible+ it is the condition of possibility1 Heidegger

closes this shift in his language+ saying+ =s the element+ eing is the quiet powerI of the fa%oring6

enabling+ that is+ of the possible1 !LH+ p1 //#+ "')

Heidegger shifts back into critical prose with a consideration of the meaning of possibility once

thinking has slipped out of its element in the epoch of logic and metaphysics1 :ithin these hori;ons+

possibility only has meaning in contrast to actuality1 .r+ in other words possibility !potential) and

actuality !actus) are thought in the same way+ and are related to+ the distinction !as we indicated

earlier) between essentiaand existentia1 =s we ha%e noted+ these are not the terms which are of

concern to Heidegger1 .n the contrary+ for him+ possibility refers to eing itself+ prior to the scholastic

distinction between essence and e4istence E a distinction+ which we should note+ which is operati%e in

*artres Existentialism1 eing+ for Heidegger+ watches o%er thinking and through the relation the latter

engenders+ o%er the essence of man+ and seeks to keep thinking in its element1

Heidegger contends+ howe%er+ that thinking does not E and has not E remained in its element+ but has

become a techn!+ a technique of e4planation from highest causes1 There is no longer thinking+ but

the technical discipline of philosophy+ which is fragmented into the Eisms of the competiti%e+ modern

marketplace of ideas1 The hegemony of ideologies+ Heidegger states+ is based upon the peculiar

dictatorship of the public realm1 !LH+ p1 //"+ "'&) ,oreo%er+ a merely pri%ate e4istence+ withdrawn

from the public realm merely shows its own weakness in the face of the dictatorship1 The dictatorship+

for Heidegger+ arises from the dominance of sub9ecti%ity+ and is the metaphysically conditioned

establishment and authori;ation of the openness of indi%idual beings in their unconditional

ob9ecti2cation1 !LH+ //"+ "'&) 5n this way+ language becomes dominated by the necessities of the

public realm+ and thereby+ becomes technical+ grammatical communication1

5n this light+ the technical matri4 of the public realm becomes the historically established regime which

decides that which is proper and improper with respect to language+ and thus+ of e4istence1 ut+ since

language was originally+ when it was in its element+ the house of eing+ its technical+ grammatical

transformation under the metaphysics of sub9ecti%ity prohibits us from culti%ating a relationship with


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Humanism is furthermore+ for Heidegger+ an ambiguous term as it relies on au4iliary terms such as

freedom and nature which diDer according to the interpretati%e conte4t1 For instance+ Heidegger

remarks that neither ,ar4 nor *artre would need to return to antiquity to use the term humanism in

their own senses1 Christianity+ moreo%er+ has its own sense of humanism which is concerned with

mans sal%ation+ where all of history is seen as the drama of the redemption of man1 $e%ertheless+

irrespecti%e of their disagreements+ each of these interpretations of humanism relay on an already

established interpretation of nature+ history+ world+ and the ground of the world+ that is+ of beings as a

whole1 !LH+ p1 //0+ "0O) 5n this way+ Heidegger contends+ e%ery humanism is already a metaphysics+

and thus already presupposes an interpretation of beings E and in this way+ e%ery humanism has

already suppressed the question of eing1 $e%ertheless+ Heidegger remarks+ the task of re6asking the

question of eing will take place in the labyrinth of metaphysics and will appear initially as a

metaphysical question1

:hat is important in the preceding is the ob%iousness with which the %arious interpretations of man

presuppose a %ery elaborate metaphysics without e%er admitting this fact to be the case1 =s we can

see+ for instance+ *artres contention that the e4istence of man precedes his essence and that his

essence is determined by his actions E is already a metaphysical position and one that presupposes a

historically established notion of the essence of man1 *artre opposes the theocratic and technological

conceptions of man+ but has not recognised that these are 9ust %arying species of humanism to which

his own philosophy has a marked family resemblance1 5ndeed+ *artre not only bases his philosophy

upon 3escartes+ but also speaks of the necessity of the dignity of man in connection to his choice of

the Cartesian philosophy1 Howe%er+ this is not to begin in the nothing+ before essence+ but only one

particular notion of essence1 5n fact+ e%ery the %alorisation of action is assuming a particular

historically established essence of man1 That of which *artre is not asking is the eing of man E and

he does not do this as this question has already been suppressed by hismodus operandi1

Heidegger contends that all of these %arious humanisms or humanistic ideologies are dependent on a

uni%ersally recognised essence of man as an animal rationale+ or a rational animal1 ut+ it is so

ob%ious+ and so uni%ersal E and unquestioned !for instance+ animal+ ratio+ these words are

interpretations of e4istence+ of life which are not at all ob%ious or true)+ that it is the type of

assumption that is ne%er noticed1 =nd+ as it is not noticed+ it is established as an answer to the

question of the eing of beings1 ut+ in this way+ the question of eing itself is suppressed as is the

ontological diDerence which has been 24ed by a speci2c metaphysical interpretation1

5n this conte4t+ the question of eing has been forgotten as it is no longer possible as a question within

the conte4t of metaphysics1 ,an becomes 9ust another being amongst beingsM that which is essential


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to man is forgotten1 Heidegger writes+ ,etaphysics closes itself to the simple essential fact that man

essentially occurs in his essence+ where he is claimed by eing1 .nly from that claim hasI he found

that wherein his essence dwells1 .nly from this dwelling hasI he languageI as the home that

preser%es the ecstatic for his essence1 *uch standing in the clearing of eing 5 call the ek6sistence of

man1 This way of eing is proper only to man1 !LH+ p1 //6//+ "00)

?k6sistence+ as a clearly distinct e4pression that *artres e4istence+ is meant to point out the

peculiarity of man as one who asks after the essence or meaning of his own being !in Being and "ime+

man is the being for whom eing and his own eingK is an issue)1 =gain+ ek6sistence is not that which

is traditionally entitledexistentia1 He quotes from eing and TimeA The essenceI of 3asein lies in its

e4istence+ but states that he is concerned in this passage !which resembles *artres e4istence

precedes essence) with pointing out that the essence or meaning of man occurs to the e4tent that he

is the 3asein+ the be6ing there+ or that he is the clearing of eing1

5n other words+ man is an ecstatic openness in the midst of the truth or self6showing of eing1 eing+

as we ha%e seen+ is the element which gi%es itself+ which shows itself+ its truthM it is thinking which

brings the essence of man into relation with eing and it is poetic language which maintains this

relation with eing+ as man li%es ecstatically !standing out in the open+ as neither sub9ect nor ob9ect)

amidst the truth of eing1 y standing outside her eing in the truth of eing+ the human preser%es

the essence of her eing1 *he is placed freely in the clearing of eing+ in the world of language+

which is the clearing6concealing e%ent of eing itself1 !LH+ p1 /O#+ "0) ,oreo%er+ Heidegger writes+

=s ek6sisting+ man sustains 3a6sein in that he takes the 3a+ the clearing of eing+ into care1I ut+

3a6sein itself occurs as essentially as thrown1I 5t unfolds essentially in the throw of eing as the

fateful sending1 !LH+ /O"+ "0) 5n this way+ with the main action being that of eing E as eing throws

us into the world+ into its manifested truth+ the main player of this thought is no longer sub9ecti%ity E

or+ eing is not sub9ecti%ity1

Heideggers Criticism of Sartre

Heidegger begins his treatment of *artre with a consideration of the latters ma4imA e4istence

precedes essence1 5mmediately+ Heidegger situates this ma4im in the traditional distinction

between existentiaand essentia+ and comments that+ from the time of -lato+ it has been held

that essentiapreceded existentia1 He asserts that *artre merely re%erses the order of priority+ and

writes+ ut+ the re%ersal of a metaphysical statement remains a metaphysical statement1 :ith it he

stays with metaphysics in obli%ion of the truth of eing1 !LH+ p1 /O/+ "0&) Heidegger wishes to take a

step back and to ask out of what destiny was this distinction between existentiaand essentiamade in


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the 2rst place1 Howe%er+ he adds+ from within the antithetical matri4 of the distinction itself+ the

question can ne%er be thought or asked1 5n this way+ Heidegger states that e4istentialism+ as

concei%ed by *artre+ has nothing at all to do with the statement from Being and "imethat the

essence of man lies in his e4istence1

=t the same time+ for us to being about to take the step back from the dichotomy of

existentiaand essentia+ we must ask how eing concerns man and how it claims him1 !LH+ p1 /OO+

"(#) The answer to these questions comes with the notion that+ as we ha%e seen+ the essence or

eing of man is his ek6sistence+ or that man comes near to eing in the ecstatic inherence in the truth

of eing1 !LH+ /OO+ "(#) =nd+ if this is the eing of man+ his essence+ Heidegger contests+ than

humanism as traditionally concei%ed is inadequate to the higher essence of man !as the one who is

the guardian of the house of eing+ as the one who li%es in language+ as the one who speaks)+ and in

this way+ he continues+ Being and "imeis opposed to humanism1 Get+ this higher essence of man is

not meant in the sense of metaphysical sub9ecti%ism !or as anthropocentrism) in which man is the

tyrant of eing to which each and all is sub9ect1 5nstead+ he writesA

,an is rather thrownI from eing itself into the truth of eing so that ek6sisting in this fashion he

might guard the truth of eing+ in order that beings might appear in the light of eing as the beings

they are1 ,an does not decide whether and how beings appear+ whether and how


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metaphysical+ sub9ecti%ist representation1) Heidegger writes+ concerning the relation that subsists

between the essence of man and eingA

eing itself is the relation to the e4tent that 5t+ as the location of the truth of eing amid beings+

gathers to itself and embraces ek6sistence in its e4istential+ that is+ ecstatic essence1 ecause man as

the one who ek6sists comes to stand in this relation that eing destinies for itself+ in that he

ecstatically sustains it+ that is+ in care takes it upon himself+ he at 2rst fails to recogni;e the nearest

and attaches himself to the ne4t nearest1 He e%en thinks that this is the nearest1 ut nearer than the

nearest and at the same time for ordinary thinking farther than the farthest is nearness itselfA the truth

of eing1 !LH+ p1 /O0+ "(O)

:e become ensnared+ we fall into beings+ and belie%e that these things are the nearest+ are our

essence+ are what is closest to us1 This allusion to the contention that the cogito+ the sub9ect+ is that

which is nearest and most known E absolutely clear and distinct to us E underscores Heideggers

attempt to distance himself from *artre and his metaphysical sub9ecti%ism+ which contrary to his own

self6understanding+ forces a tacit answer upon him of the essence of man+ e%en before his actions E

and+ e%en his actions are still orchestrated in the con2nes of metaphysics and in ser%ice to the

theoretical construct of the sub9ect+ of thecogito1 *artre is ensnared in beings+ alludes Heidegger+ and

has thus foreclosed upon his own ecstatic relation to the truth of eing+ a relation which is of and by

eing in its gift of the truth of eing+ and into which man is thrown1

The nearness of eing+ Heidegger suggest+ is mysterious in its go%ernance of the situation of ek6

sistence1 This unnoticed go%ernance+ moreo%er+ takes place through or as language+ concei%ed as the

house of eing+ and not as the metaphysical6animal e4pression of the sub9ecti%e and rational animal1

5n this way+ language+ as a gift of eing+ is the home of mans essence1 !LH+ p1 /O+ "(') ,an ek6sists

dwells in the truth of eing and guards it+ and thus+ that which is central in the determination of the

essence of man+ for Heidegger+ is eing and not man+ not sub9ecti%ity1 eing is the dimension of the

ecstasis of ek6sistence1 !LH+ p1 /O+ "(')

5n this way+ Heidegger contends that his indication of the essence of man as ek6sistence is not a

humanism if that term is meant metaphysically1 He writes+ furthermore+ disclosing his criticism of

*artre quite clearlyA

Certainly not if humanism is e4istentialism and is represented by what *artre e4pressesApr!cis!ment

nous sommes sur un plan o% il & a seulement des hommes:e are precisely in a situation where there

are only human beingsK1 Thought from Being and "ime+ this should say insteadApr!cis!ment nous


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sommes sur un plan o% il & a principalement lEtre:e are precisely in a situation where principally

there is eingK1!LH+ p1 /O+ "(0)

The situation+ which is a crucial term for *artre+ is not of the sub9ect+ but of eing itself+ a situation as a

clearing+ the place of truth+ gi%en by eing1 Heidegger writes+ The self6gi%ing into the open+ along

with the open region itself+ is eing itself1 !LH+ /O+ "(0) eing+ to repeat our indication of the

ontological diDerence+ is not a being among beings1 5t is meant+ Heidegger reminds us+ in the sense in

which -armenides said+ esti gar einai E For there is eing1 *uch a sense is repeated by =ristotle

se%eral centuries later when he asked+ :hy is there something+ rather then nothing1 This is a sense of

eing which is neither concerned with whatthings or beings are !essentia)+ nor with howthings or

beings are !e4istentia)+ but instead+ it is a sense of eing which is concerned with thatanything is at

all1 *uch a sense of eing+ Heidegger states+ is unthought today+ but the possibility of such a thought

is indicated by Heidegger in his es gibtA There isQit gi%es eing1 5ndications+ moreo%er+ of this sense of

eing can be traced in the history of eing in the words of essential thinkers1 !LH+ /O+ "(0)

5n this way+ a thinking which thinks eing+ is historical+ as it recollects the truth of eing from out of

the dispensation of eing itself1 The history of eing+ as that which houses the truth of eing+

Heidegger alludes+ is a history which happens as the destiny of the truth of eing8 eing gi%es

itself+ a gi%ing which as alethea+ is also a concealing !eing withdraws with the dispensation of beings)+

and from this gi%ing the history of eing shows itself1 Heidegger states that this gi%ing of the destiny

of eing is to some e4tent disclosed through the philosophy of Hegelian philosophy of =bsolute

metaphysics+ and in the ,ar4ian and $iet;schean in%ersions of this philosophy !and each of which was

in its own way concerned to o%ercome mere sub9ecti%ism)1 Howe%er+ this disclosure has taken place

as metaphysics+ and indeed+ Heidegger contends+ the history of eing has had only one epoch to date+

and that is the metaphysical1 eyond the epoch of metaphysics+ Heidegger assumes that man will be

able to think eing from the ecstatic openness of ek6sistence+ as standing out in the truth of eing+ and

not from the perspecti%e of the ensnarement of beings1

5n this sense+ and as a further strand in his criticism of *artre+ Heidegger states that eing is not a

positing or creation of the consciousness of man1 He reminds us of his statement from the opening

pages of Being and "imeA eing is thetranscendenspure and simple1 5n many other te4ts+ from his

earliest to his latest writings+ Heidegger criticised the modern contention that eing is a positing of

theego cogito+ from 3escartes through Rant and in the present situation to *artre1 =gain+ that which

Heidegger is calling into question is the arrogant pretensions of the sub9ect of metaphysical

representation1 He writes that eing is essentially broader than all beings+ because it is the clearing

itself1 !LH+ p1 /'#+ "() =t the same time+ since we are embedded in the historical epoch of


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metaphysics+ it is at once necessary+ on the one hand+ to retrospecti%ely consider the essence of eing

from the perspecti%e of the clearing of eing+ and on the other hand+ to prospecti%ely seek to 2nd

=riadnes thread out of the labyrinth so that we can begin to think the truth of eing1

5t is in this way that Heideggers approach to the history of eing+ or to metaphysics+ diDers essentially

from the anti6metaphysicians of the Sienna Circle and of the =nalytic tradition generally1 Heidegger is

not seeking to simple cut out metaphysics root and branch+ but through his method of

phenomenological destructuring+ to retrie%e the question and the truth of eing as it has been

disclosed through its pre%ailing dispensation as metaphysics1 This is the meaning of the destruction of

the history of ontology+ not a crass elimination+ but a dismantling of the artefacts of thought so as to

approach the e%ent of nearness that lies at the heart of an essential thinking1

eing+ which is not a creation of sub9ecti%ity or


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Heidegger contends that $iet;sche was the last to e4perience this homelessness+ and that his only

recourse E and one of futility E amid the situation of metaphysics was a re%ersal of metaphysics1 The

re%ersal is futile as $iet;sche remains+ according to Heidegger+ within metaphysics1 Holderlin+ on the

other hand+ as pre%iously suggested by Heidegger+ !LH+ p1 //0) has already transcended humanism

with his non6metaphysical poetry1 5n the conte4t of his poem+ Homecoming+ the homeland has the

signi2cance of the nearness to eing+ in the sense of language !in this case+ the


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$e%ertheless+ despite the early ,ar4s thematisation of estrangement and historicity+ ,ar4ism

remains+ for Heidegger+ ensnared in the metaphysics of sub9ecti%ity+ in that+ following

Hegels *henomenolog& of +pirit+ it regards material labour as the self6establishing process of

unconditioned production+ which is the ob9ecti2cation of the actual through man e4perienced as

sub9ecti%ity1 !LH+ /'O+ "") Heidegger contends that the sub9ecti%istic essence of materialism remains

%eiled by the seemingly impersonal operations of technology+ which itself is a destiny within the

history of eing as a mode of truth+ of aletheuein+ for the disclosure of beings1 :ith regard to this

destiny of technology as the unconditioned ob9ecti2cation+ and its impact on the world on a

geopolitical alignments between Communism+ =mericanism and ?uropeanism+ Heidegger writesA

$o metaphysics+ whether idealistic+ materialistic+ or Christian+ can in accord with its essence+ and

surely not in its own attempts to e4plicate itself+ get a hold onI this destiny yet+ and that means

thoughtfully to reach and gather together which in the fullest sense of eing now is1 !LH+ p1 /''+ ""6

/)

$either nationalism nor internationalism !nationalism raised to a global system) can confront the

threat to the essence of human e4istence that is posed by the destiny of metaphysics as technology in

that each of these solutions is itself metaphysical E and still regards man as an animal rationale1

Get+ Heidegger+ in preparation to an more e4plicit answer to eaufrets question+ contends that man is

both more and less than a rational animal1 .n the one hand+ he is more in that such a description

does not disclose human e4istence in terms of its essence E in the sense of his nearness to eing1 .n

the other hand+ man is less as he is not truly bound up with the arrogant pretensions of metaphysical

sub9ecti%ity1 Beminding us of our essential thrownnness+ Heidegger declaresA

,an is not the lord of beings1 ,an is the shepherd of eing1 ,an loses nothing in this lessM rather+ he

gains in that he attains the truth of eing1 He gains the essential po%erty of the shepherd+ whose

dignity consists in being called by eing itself into the preser%ation of eings truth1 The call comes as

the throw from which the thrownness of 3a6sein deri%es1 5n his essential unfolding within the history of

eing+ man is the being whose eing as ek6sistence consists in his dwelling in the nearness of eing1

,an is the neighbour of eing1 !LH+ p1 /'0+ "/6O)

.nce again+ Heidegger reminds us of our utter 2nitude E and of the 3ionysian character of e4istence

amidst the temporality of a makeshift world1 :e are called+ in our thrownness E with the dignity of a

shepherd8

$e%ertheless+ Heidegger reects upon his own language of ,an and concedes that his thinking is a

humanism in an e4treme sense E though not to be metaphysically construed1 He writes+ 5t is


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humanism that thinks the humanity of man from the nearness of eing1 ut at the same time it is a

humanism in which not man but mans historical essence is at stake in its pro%enance from the truth of

eing1 !LH+ p1 /'0+ "O) ut+ again+ Heidegger reminds us that he is not speaking of human e4istence

in the sense of the ego cogito!or in light of the distinction between essentiaand existentia+ but as ek6

sistence which is the ecstatic dwelling in the nearness of eing1 !LH+ p1 /'(+ "O) *uch a

comportment with eing is that of care and not that of the ob9ecti2cation of representational thinking1

Heidegger+ in the spirit of his own radical phenomenology+ asks us to step back and to e4perience

eing for oursel%es !as in Holderlins poem)E and to disengage from a philosophy which throws up

barriers and obstructions to the mo%ement to the matters themsel%es1 He indicates his meaning by

stating that to philosophi;eI about being shattered is separated by a chasm from a thinking that is

shattered1 !LH+ p1 /'(+ "') 5n other words+ it is not su7cient to merely parrot the words of a

philosophy E as he seems to be suggesting was the case with *artres reading of Being and "ime+ but

to actually e4perience these things for oneself E i1e1+ hence+ the title phenomenology1

5n our present case+ the truth of eing must come to languageM thinking must+ as we suggested earlier+

accomplish the relation of eing to the essence of man E or+ thinking must descend to the depths of

eing+ and Heidegger suggests that such thinking would be much better characterised as one of

silence !:ittgensteins showing)+ far away from the idle chatter of propositional philosophy !cf1

Collingwoods$utobiograph&)1 :hether or not his indication of the pathway is a blind alley or a free

space in which freedom conser%es itself !LH+ p1 /'+ "')+ Heidegger will lea%e to the reader as a

decision must be made by ones self in his wandering amid homelessness toward a possible

homecoming in neighbourhood of eing1

!eturning to the Question of Humanism

=fter a nearly /& page preparatory detour+ Heidegger returns to the question set forth by eaufret+

How can some sense be restored to the word humanismIP =ssuming we wish to retain the word+

Heidegger suggests that the problem of the word is that is has become metaphysical E in other words+

that it is se%ered from the question and truth of eing1 $e%ertheless+ the se%ering is a breach that has

forced us to consider the meaning of humanism in a deeper way+ and has gi%en us the chance to

fathom an older !


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man is his ek6sistence as the clearing of eing E as the shepherd of eing+ as the one who cares for the

truth of eing E and indeed+ as one that is essential to eing1

=fter gi%ing a pro%isional answer to the question+ Heidegger asks whether it is indeed necessary or

e%en desirable to retain the word humanism as it is bound up with misunderstandings and openly

metaphysical obstructions to the truth of eing+ and hence+ to our %ery essence1 Heidegger writes+

.r should thinking+ by means of open resistance to humanism+I risk a shock that could for the 2rst

time cause perple4ity concerning the humanitasofhomo humanus and its basisP 5n this way+ it could

awaken a reection E if the world6historical moment did not itself already compel such a reection E

that thinks not only about man but also about the natureI of man+ not only about his nature but e%en

more primordially about the dimension in which the essence of man+ determined by eing itself+ is at

home1 !LH+ p1 /'+ "()

Heidegger lays out an answer to his questions in the form of an e4tended poetic engagement with the

reader+ much in the manner of $iet;sche in some of his rhetorical engagements in"hus +poke

,arathustraand in other writings1 Let us turn to this e4tended passage !pp1 /'&6 /0#)

From this passage+ it can be fathomed that Heidegger is attempting to break out of the one6sidedness

of what he regards as sterile antitheses which surround any statements in%ol%ing ad%ocacy or enmity+

or the for and against1 5ndeed+ he is again calling into question the entire plane of propositional logic

as the seat of truth and as the method by which such truth is disclosed1 For+ as he suggests+ logic is

concerned with the representation of beings in the eing !and this in terms of a %ery particular notion

of eing+ such as substance+ sub9ecti%ity+ or some other being)1 ut+ what of eing itself+ in the sense

that has been de%eloped in hisLetterP How do we speak of the pre6logicalP Heidegger writes+

To think against logicI does not mean to break a lance for the illogical but simply to trace in thought

the logosand its essence+ which appeared in the dawn of thinking+ that is+ to e4ert oursel%es for the

2rst time in preparing for such reection1 .f what %alue are e%er far6reaching systems of logic to us if+

without really knowing what they are doing+ they recoil before the task of simply inquiring into the

essence of logosP

Heidegger contends that his pre6logical reection upon logos!language) is not that which is irrational+

but instead+ it is logic which is irrational for denying access to the question of logos1 That which

Heidegger is calling into question+ through his attacks on %alue+ etc1 is not the humane considerations

of culture+ art+ human dignity+ etc1+ but instead the notion of %alue itself+ which in the neo6Rantian

legacy from which he himself was liberated+ roots all %alue in the positing of the sub9ect1 He contends+


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?%ery %aluing+ e%en where it %alues positi%ely+ is a sub9ecti%i;ing1 5t does not let beingsA be1 Bather+

%aluing lets beingsA be %alid E solely as the ob9ects of its doing1 !LH+ p1 /0"+ "&)

That which Heidegger is suggesting is similar to what $iet;sche had already stated concerning the

essence of nihilism and the death of god1 $ihilism occurs when the highest %alues de6%alue

themsel%es E


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5n other words+ that which is disclosed in Being and "imeis an adequate concept of 3asein+ or a

phenomenological analysis of the being of the questioner E of the one who asks after eing1 This is the

preliminary analytic of 3asein that is necessary before we can turn to a consideration of eing pure

and simple1 5n other words+ and as has been already suggested+ there is much preliminary work to be

done before we can e%en begin to ask about the question of


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The second question from eaufret is whether or not ontology in the manner considered in

the Lettermust be supplemented by an ethics which would instruct us on how we should li%e in light of

our essence as ek6sistence1 5ndeed+ we ha%e been told a lot on how we ought not think and be E we

should not be sub9ecti%ist+ as we are not the centre of all eing1 5nstead+ we ought to be open to the

truth of eing E we are this openness+ but ha%e forgotten this truth+ as we ha%e become ensnared in

the ob9ecti2cations of things+ entities+ beings1 Heidegger does in fact e4press sympathy with such a

desire+ especially+ as he remarks+ our predicament upon the planet is e%er more dangerous and

perple4ing !technology+ nuclear warfare+ the destruction of language+ etc1)

Heidegger also e4presses caution in that the call to think eing has only been heard and it would be

equally dangerous to establish a set of rules E rules which are only rele%ant for the moment

!makeshift) 6 once and for all+ and without any more thought about eing and about the dynamic

essence of human e4istence1 Heidegger suggests that before we attempt to fashion such an ethics

and consider its relation with ontology that we more clearly and carefully consider what in fact

ontology and ethics are E and whether such considerations are attuned with the nature of thinking

and its task to think and care for the truth of eing1

5n the wake of this caution+ Heidegger makes the suggestion that ethics+ ontology and with these+

logic+ physics+ etc1 are disciplines which were established quite late in the history of philosophy in

the school of -lato E who was+ for Heidegger+ the founder of metaphysics1 Heidegger raises the

possibility that the task of thinking associated with the truth of eing may no longer be tenable in

terms of the narrow disciplines and sub6disciplines which are the myriad threads which articulate the

history of eing as metaphysics1

5ndeed+ Heidegger is seeking to deconstruct these historically disseminated disciplines in the history of

metaphysics through an unco%ering of an older conception of ethics in the ethos of *ophocles and

Heraclitus1 Just as with logos+ethosis that indication of a pre6ethical state of eing E not+ again as the

un6ethical+ but as an abode or dwelling place !also+ attunement in


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sto%e+ warming himself1 Heraclitus said to them+ sensing their disappointment+ Here too the gods

come to presence1 Heraclitus had said+ Nthos anthrpi daimn1 This has been translated+ Heidegger

remarks+ in a ,odern way as = mans character is his daimon1 Heidegger uses =ristotles story to

gi%e a diDering translation+ one that seeks to be attuned with the ancient


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destiny to unfoldM it is our task to think this unfolding destiny as it is eing which is the actor+ and its

unfolding+ the fruition of the unity of opposites+ of Lo%e and *trife+ of Healing and Bage1

5n this way+ Heidegger sets forth a 2nal attack on *artres philosophy of sub9ecti%ity+ denying to him his

claim that the essence of man is in his action1 5n this way+ the question of ethosandlogosE and

of nomosas law E resol%es itself into the question of eing and the thinking of eing+ as that to which

we must attune oursel%es as we build the house of eing with our language and poetically dwell within

the truth of eing to which we ha%e been thrown1 Heidegger writes+

Thinking attends to the clearing of eing in that it puts its saying of eing into language as the home

of ek6sistence1 Thus thinking is a deed1 ut a deed that also surpasses allpraxis1 Thinking towers

abo%e action and production+ not through the grandeur of its achie%ement and not as a consequence

of its eDect+ but through the humbleness of its inconsequential accomplishment1 !LH+ p1 /(/+ "&"6&/)

=s we poetically dwell in the house of eing+ our poetic thinking brings eing to language1 5n this way+

as we ek6sist in the openness of the u4 of eing+ the latter is always on the way to language and it is

our task to remember eing in its mysterious and per%asi%e eruption1

The Third Question

Heidegger anticipates an ob9ection that can be made to his forgoing account of thinking by asking

:hence does thinking take its measureP :hat law go%erns its deedP !LH+ p1 /(O+ "&/6&O) This is

necessary due to the misunderstandings that will arise from those+ like Rant+ who regard the

Copernican sub9ect as the primary lawgi%er of $ature1 5f we are merely to respond to eing and its

destinal action+ then how are we to be assured that our thinking will not fall prey to arbitrariness1 The

question from eaufret is more elegantA How can we preser%e the element of ad%enture that all

research contains without simply turning philosophy into an ad%enturessP !LH+ p1 /(O+ "&O) Heidegger

immediately mentions poetry+ which he claims+ is sub9ect to the same ob9ection as thinking1 Howe%er+

9ust as immediately+ he cites =ristotles *oetics+ where the latter contended that poetic composition is

truer than e4ploration of beings1 !LH+ p1 /('+ "&O)

That which is essential in this claim is that poetic composition+ for Heidegger+ acts under the law of

eing+ which is prior e%en to the laws of logic1 -oetic thought is claimed by eing+ guided by eing

and its task is to bring eing into language1 5n this way+ and we should keep in mind the thought of

the eternal recurrence of the same in pre6*ocratic philosophy+ that which is being said by thought is

always the *ame+ as the unfolding of the recurrence of eing1 =rbitrariness is a charge that has not

freed itself from metaphysical sub9ecti%ism and the %oluntarism that is its dangerous possibility1 eing


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is not arbitrary1 .n the contrary+ the demand is to culti%ate an ethosof thinking that remains attuned

to eing and its law1 =s Heidegger counselsA

To attend to the 2ttingness of thoughtful saying does not only imply+ howe%er+ that we contemplate at

e%ery turn what is to be said of eing and how it is to be said1 5t is equally essential to ponder whether

what is to be thought is to be said E to what e4tent+ at what moment of the history of eing+ in what

sort of dialogue with this history+ and one the basis of what claim+ it ought to be said1 The threefold

thing mentioned in an earlier letter is determined in its cohesion by the law of the 2ttingness of

thought on the history of eingA rigor of meditation+ carefulness in saying+ frugality with words1 !LH+ p1

/(0+ "&')

Thepoiesisof thought in its e%ent is the openness to all that is+ that it is+ and in the stillest hour

creates the words that come on do%es footsteps1

UUU

letter on humanity

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