leigh ann jara homeland security program & policy evaluation & analysis 2012

Running Head: Fusion Centers 1

The Value and Effectiveness of Fusion Centers

Leigh-Ann Jara

CCJ 5934 Homeland Security

Department of Criminology & Criminal Justice

University of North Florida

Dr. Jeremy Carter

THE VALUE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF FUSION CENTERS 2

Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................................... 3

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................. 4

PROBLEM STATEMENT .................................................................................................................................................... 4 PURPOSE ...................................................................................................................................................................... 5 IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCH .............................................................................................................................................. 6

II. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE ............................................................................................................... 8

A. OVERVIEW AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE FUSION PROCESS ................................................................................................. 8 B. TYPES OF FUSION CENTERS .................................................................................................................................... 12

1. All crimes approach. ................................................................................................................................... 12 2. All crime, threats, and hazards approach..................................................................................................... 12 3. Solely Counterterrorism. ................................................................................................................................ 13

C. HOW TO EVALUATE FUSION CENTERS ...................................................................................................................... 13

III. POLICY OPTIONS AND ANALYSIS ................................................................................................................. 15

A. “ALL CRIMES” VS. “ALL CRIMES, THREATS, HAZARDS” APPROACH ................................................................................ 15 1. All crimes. ................................................................................................................................................... 15 2. All crimes, threats, hazards. ....................................................................................................................... 17

B. POLICY RECOMMENDATION ................................................................................................................................... 18

IV. POLICY IMPLEMENTATION ...................................................................................................................... 18

A. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS AND REMEDIES ..................................................................................................................... 18 1. Confusion over roles. .................................................................................................................................. 18 2. Mistrust in the community. ........................................................................................................................ 19

B. EFFECTIVENESS OF PROPOSED RECOMMENDATION .................................................................................................... 20

LIMITATIONS OF POLICY ...................................................................................................................................... 21

CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................................................... 23

VALUE OF FUSION CENTERS AND A CUSTOMIZED APPROACH ................................................................................................ 23

REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................................................... 25


Executive Summary

This policy paper will provide a literature review of the role and effectiveness of the different

types of fusion centers throughout the United States, along with policy options and

recommendations. Currently, there are approximately 72 officially recognized fusion centers in

the United States and they operate within a ‘territory’ (which can include a particular county or

state, a metropolitan or urban area, or a portion of a state) to gather information from multiple

sources and analyze it in order to extrapolate trends and potential threats, thereby providing

actionable intelligence for end users (Gaines & Kappeler, 2012; Carter, 2009; Carter, Chermak,

McGarrell, Carter & Drew, 2012a; Foster & Cordner, 2005; Guidetti 2012; Johnson, 2011;

Ladner, Jr., 2010; Roberts, 2011). The partners involved in the intelligence cycle include state,

local and tribal law enforcement (SLTT), as well as private sector companies and citizens. The

flow of information through fusion centers includes reception of raw information, analysis and

recommendations, and dissemination to appropriate agencies or authorities for action. Such

actions include investigation of threats as well as program composition and/or improvement and

also implementation. Once the data has been digested by those working in fusion centers, the

intelligence can help policy makers to see the big picture and make informed decisions regarding

the direction of their efforts. “While much of the initial focus of fusion centers revolved around

counterterrorism and homeland security, that mission has expanded to support all crimes, all

hazard, all threats” (Roberts, 2011, p.76). How effective have these different types of fusion

centers been? This paper will illustrate the performance of fusion centers and offer policy

improvement recommendations, such as which fusion center approach is most effective.


I. Introduction

A. Problem Statement

After the terror attack of 9/11, gross ineptness was exposed within the intelligence

community and there was an emergent call to action for improvement of intelligence sharing.

Hence, the encourage evolution of Fusion Centers throughout the United States, and beginning in

Arizona, Georgia, New York and Los Angeles “to fill the void of combining information and

intelligence sources at the local level to ferret out terrorist activity, thereby underpinning a

national effort to share information that could be used in overall preparedness efforts” (Abold,

Guidetti, & Keyer, 2012, p. 3). Although initially geared for counterterrorism, SLTT and federal

authorities believe modern day fusion centers are indispensables partners when evaluating

conditions around the country as they relate to criminal activities and trends. Additionally,

fusion centers play a role in other issues of homeland security, such as hazards (e.g. hurricanes,

tornados, earthquakes, etc.) (Abold et al., 2012; Gaines & Kappeler, 2012).

According to Carter and Chermak (2011), the precursors to fusions centers, Regional

Intelligence Centers were based on the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area model and were

initially instituted during the 1980s to combat the drug problem. However, modern fusion

centers have taken on varying strategies and forms throughout the United States. This paper will

seek to evaluate which of the following different designations of fusion centers is most effective:

the all crimes centers, counterterrorism centers, or the all crimes, threats and hazards centers. It

is important to determine which fusion center model is most effective in order to avoid the

pitfalls of the past errors within the intelligence process and this will help to secure the homeland

and ensure recovery efforts are more efficient if an attack or hazards does strike the nation

(Abold et al., 2012; Gaines & Kappeler, Carter, 2009, Carter & Chermak, 2011; Forsyth, 2005).


B. Purpose

Gaines and Kappeler (2012) explain that fusion centers facilitate cooperative information

sharing with state and local agencies, as outlined by the Information Sharing Environment (ISE),

throughout the nation and are generally under the direction of the Federal Bureau of

Investigations (FBI) (Ladner, Jr., 2010). The ISE is the partnership between the private sector

and the government whose goal is to identify, prevent and mitigate terrorist attacks on/in the

United States (DOJ, 2008). According to Ladner, Jr., “there are approximately 50 primary and

22 designated fusion centers” located within the United States (2010, p.15). The primary fusion

centers are managed by the state or entity chosen by the state, while designated centers are

managed by private organizations and are found in Urban Area Security Initiative cities; these

cities are the larger cities that contain more than the average amount of critical infrastructure.

Some fusions centers are concerned with a particular city or area while others operate at a

regional or state level; however, they all are concerned with coordinating counterterrorism and

response efforts within their ‘jurisdiction’ (Gaines & Kappeler, 2012; Ladner, Jr., 2010).

The involvement of the FBI is pertinent because one of the agency’s primary

responsibilities is to “collect terrorist intelligence and investigate terrorist activities”; moreover,

fusion centers are involved in implementing homeland security, thus, the two entities share a

common goal (Gaines & Kappeler, 2012, p. 408-409). The FBI ensures the centers are secure

and operate “within legal restrictions” (Gaines & Kappeler, 2012, p. 408).

The initial focus of the fusion centers was solely counterterrorism (i.e. Georgia’s

Information Sharing and Analysis Center) and later included all crimes and threats as ,

“additional state and local entities embraced the concept and began developing their own

centers” (Carter, 2009, p.170). This was done for two reasons: “It was recognized that most


terrorist acts had a nexus with other crimes, and focusing exclusively on terrorism may miss

some important indicators. Second, because there is a wide variety of crime, notabley criminal

enterprises, that were transjurisdictional and represented complex criminality” (Carter, 2009,

p.171). Carter explains that complex criminality occurs when offenders participate in secondary

criminal activities in order to support their primary criminal pursuit(s). While classification of

fusion centers may be mandated by its governing board, whether it be the state or the fusion

center itself, special funding from the Department of Homeland Security goes to fusion centers

addressing “all hazards”. Another reason for the expanding focus is because many criminal

activities cross jurisdictions, thereby making it more difficult to prosecute offenders.

There are differing Fusion center models as they are based on the local area,

characteristics and environment as well as legislative and executive mandates. “The variability

of Fusion Center structures is broad because of functional necessity” (Carter, 2009, p.173); states

and other areas may structure their fusion center based on the available local law enforcement

agencies’ functions and responsibilities.

C. Importance of Research

The roles and players active in a fusion center are not just law enforcement, but first

responders and recovery agencies, and public health agencies or departments. Carter (2009)

asserts that fusion centers are the information hub between SLTT law enforcement and the

federal government sharing terrorism and criminal information. During recovery from an attack

or hazard, information is also relayed as to the magnitude of a natural disaster or (local)

epidemic. Fusion centers operate similarly to a Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) which is a

“national, multi-agency organization that has the responsibility of combating terrorist activities

in the US;” the JTTF is led by the FBI & the Justice Department (DOJ) and includes “small cells


of highly trained, locally based investigators, analysts, linguists, SWAT experts,” and others

(Gaines & Kappeler, 2012, p.229).

Raw information is collected by multiple partners, SLTT law enforcement and other

agencies, businesses and individuals, and analyzed by workers (who may or may not be members

of the military) and ultimately disseminated. Contrary to popular belief, the centers do not

garner their intelligence by “constantly responding to inquiries from officers, investigators, and

agents”, nor are the centers “minimally staffed until there is a crisis” (Carter, 2009, p.175). The

fusion center is only part of a bigger picture of the fight against terrorism, crime and hazards,

which is driven by proactive analysis of the data received from multiple sources. “Prevention is

the essence of the intelligence process.” (Carter, 2009, p.173). See figure 1 which illustrates the

multiple partners involved in the flow of information moving through fusion centers:

Figure 1

Source: Gaines & Kappeler (2012); Fusion Center Guidelines (2006).

Possible entities, or sector,

participating with Fusion Centers

•Agriculture, food, water, environment •Banking and finance •Chemical industry and hazardous materials •Criminal justice •Education •Emergency services •Energy •Government •Health and public safety •Hospitality and lodging •Information and telecommunications •Military facilities & defense industrial base •Postal & shipping •Private security •Public works •Real estate •Social services •Transportation


Consensus among the intelligence community is paramount to the security of the

homeland. Cooperation and communication are pertinent and necessary for effective defense

and recovery efforts. Carter posits that the need fulfilled by fusion centers include “law

enforcement, preparedness, and response and recovery (2009, p.181). The basic theory behind

fusion centers hinges upon both the Broken Window/Community Policing and Intelligence Led

Policing (ILP). Carter (2009) states that ILP is the analysis of criminal activity information

which then enables authorities to act upon the intelligence by developing the most effective

strategy. By determining which fusion center model is most effective, the nation can protect its

people and country.

II. Review of Relevant Literature

A. Overview and Philosophy of the Fusion Process

The Northeast Ohio Regional Fusion center explains the concept of ‘fusion’ as the:

overarching process of managing the flow of information and intelligence across all levels and sectors of government and private industry . . . The fusion process supports the implementation of risk-based, information-driven prevention, and consequence management programs . . . Data fusion involves the exchange of information from different sources—including law enforcement, public safety, and the private sector—and, with analysis, can result in meaningful and actionable intelligence and information. (para. 1- 2) The philosophy of the fusion process is rooted in intelligence-led policing, also referred

to as community oriented policing. An illustration of this approach is described by Guidetti

(2012). He portrays intelligence-led policing as similar to an officer standing on the bank of a

fast-moving river, filled with drowning victims crying for help. The historical approach would

be for the officer to jump in and haphazardly attempt to save victims in a frantic manner,

expending all of his energy, but not solving the problem of people drowning in the water, and


worse, loosing most of the victims to the river. However, in the intelligence-led policing

approach, the officer ventures upstream to determine how people came to be in the river and

addresses the issue at its origin, thereby understanding and countering the problem directly, as

well as preventing further casualties.

According to the DOJ, fusion is also referred to as a flow of “information and intelligence

across levels and sectors of government and private industry” (2006, p.11). Figure 2 illustrates

the fusion process in which users access the information through a common interface, turn the

data into knowledge and then disseminate the findings.

Figure 2

Source: DOJ (2006).


The flow of information processed by a fusion center is reciprocal and a never ending

cycle. As stated previously, the principal role of fusion centers “is to compile, analyze, and

disseminate criminal/terrorist information and intelligence “in order to contribute to the

counterterrorism and crime (DOJ, 2006). Figure 3 below illustrates the flow of information

through fusion centers, beginning with planning, information gathering, processing, analysis,

dissemination and ending with reevaluation.

Figure 3

Resource: ISE, 2012

Fusion centers gather data from any and everywhere – private citizens and companies, police,

firefighters, informants, federal and state agencies, hospitals, etc. – each unit strengthening the

communication and information sharing of the network. On a larger scale individual fusion

centers communicate intelligence to other centers and strengthen the network of centers.

http://ise.gov/national-network-state-and-major-urban-area-fusion-centers


A noted advantage of Fusion Centers is not only does their principal emphasis on

“intelligence/information fusion” facilitate the identification, deterrence and response to

terrorism-related threats, but it also bolsters the efforts of agencies and local law enforcement to

prevent and combat non-terrorism issues by:

allowing state and local entities to better identify and forecast emerging crime, public health, and quality-of-life trends; supporting targeted law enforcement and other multidisciplinary, proactive, risk-based and community-focused, problem-solving activities; [and] improving the delivery of emergency and nonemergency services. (Carter, 2009, p.172)

The 9/11 Commission determined that although intelligence was available, it was held tightly

and not shared by the agencies gathering or receiving the information. However, fusion centers

have sought to resolve this issue and have played a role in the capture of terrorists, such as the

Colorado fusion center transmitting data to the FBI; the information resulted in the capture of al

Qaeda terrorist, Najibullah Zazi, who conspired to detonate explosives in New York (Center for

Investigative Reporting).

When discussing fusion centers, it is pertinent to also discuss two procedural documents:

Fusion Center Guidelines (2006) and Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area

Fusion Centers (2008). The Fusion Center Guidelines is meant to provide guidance regarding

how to implement and operate a fusion center, but its use is voluntary (Ladner, Jr., 2010). The

Baseline Capabilities was produced as an addendum to Fusion Center Guidelines by the DOJ in

September 2008; this document identifies the baseline capabilities for fusion centers and the

operational standards necessary to achieve the four Critical Operation Capabilities (CoCs) (e.g.

Receive, Analyze, Disseminate and Gather) (DOJ, 2008; DOJ, 2009). Ladner, Jr. (2010) stresses

that these documents act as suggested and generic principles on which to operate fusion centers,

but they do not offer practical examples for the centers to follow.


B. Types of Fusion Centers

Not all fusion centers address all threats, crimes and hazards. Additionally various centers

address all threats, while others are designated as centers that focus on combating one of the

following: terrorism, all-crimes, and all crimes, threats and hazards (Carter & Carter, 2009;

Abold et al., 2012).

1. All crimes approach.

While some fusion centers focus only on counterterrorism, most are considered to operate

under the ‘all crimes’ model which includes counterterrorism (Nenneman, 2008). The DOJ

defines the ‘all crimes’ approach as incorporating “terrorism and other high-risk threats into the

existing crime-fighting framework, to ensure that possible precursor crimes are screened and

analyzed for linkages to larger-scale terrorist or other crimes” (2008, p.43). However, because

there is no standardization of fusion center operations, the ‘all crimes’ focus does not

operationalize the same in all centers. For example, some ‘all crimes’ centers focus on all types

of crimes, while others may concentrate on organized crime including: gangs, transnational

organized crime and terrorism (Ladner, Jr., 2010; Nenneman, 2008). In a survey conducted by

Nenneman (2008), he found that of the 43 centers polled, 95 percent stated they were not just

focusing on counterterrorism; 51 percent stated they also focused on criminal activity, while 44

percent stated their focus was the ‘all hazards’ approach. An advantage of a true ‘all crimes’

approach is that it increases law enforcement’s ability to detect index crimes which could lead to

terrorist activity (Carter, 2009). That is to say, these fusion centers and their partners recognize

that the tendrils of terrorism can spread throughout criminal activities and organized crime.

2. All crime, threats, and hazards approach.

As stated previously, fusion centers have shifted from solely concentrating on


counterterrorism to focusing on the most common theme of ‘all-hazard all-crimes, all-threats’.

This shift comes as a result of information and intelligence failures uncovered in the 9/11

response(s). This all-encompassing strategy mirrors intelligence-led policing (Roberts, 2011)

and is sometimes referred to as the ‘all hazards’ approach. Fusion centers functioning as ‘all

hazards’ facilities operationalize this approach disparately, just as the centers do with regards to

the ‘all crimes’ approach, and fusion operations in general (DOJ, 2008). The DOJ states that the

‘all crime, threats and hazards’ approach “refers to preparedness for terrorist attacks, major

disasters, and other emergencies” (2008, p. 43). Some centers have added mitigation and

recovery along with the prevention of ‘all hazards’. Regarding the cooperative relationships with

law enforcement and private sector entities, some fusion centers share information with these

entities externally, while others house their partners within the center and communicate with

them internally (Ladner, Jr., 2010).

3. Solely Counterterrorism.

The most likely fusion centers to maintain their focus solely on counterterrorism are those in

large urban areas containing icons of Americana and/or critical infrastructure such as in New

York City and Los Angeles. Confusion abounds because these centers claim to be reserved for

counterterrorism, but still gather, analyze and disseminate data related to transnational organized

crime, or crimes with a nexus to terrorism (Nenneman, 2008). The SLTT and their partners

understand that if the surveillance strategy focuses only on terrorist activities, pertinent elements

and connections could be missed, leaving the United States more vulnerable to attack (Carter,

2009; US Department of Justice (DOJ), 2006).

C. How to Evaluate Fusion Centers

There is some debate how to evaluate fusion centers and if there needs to be certification or


authentication of their performance. Ladner, Jr. (2010) posits that although there are written

objectives, such as those within the Fusion Center Guidelines and Base Capabilities, there is still

no standardized system to rate or measure the effectiveness or accountability of fusion centers.

Ladner, Jr. (2010) suggests implementing a system to gauge the performance of the centers.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary, Janet Napolitano, referred to fusion

centers as “Centers of Analytical Excellence” (CoAE). This gave inspiration to a study

conducted by Abold et al., (2012) to determine the definition of CoAE and whether fusion

centers should strive to attain the title. Abold et al. (2012) asserts that fusion centers have been

successful because they have been able to bridge the communication gap in the intelligence

community. Some argue that fusion centers can increase their value by developing “unique

expertise and specializations” (Abold et al., 2012) while still performing their primary

objectives. While fusion centers all have the same goal of countering terrorism, the proposed

CoAE designation would indicate a center was specialized in a subject matter of expertise such

as gathering and receiving information, analysis/assessment of the information, and

dissemination; these subjects are also referred to as the Critical Operational Capabilities (CoC)

(Abold et al., 2012). The CoCs include:

Receive: Ability to receive classified/unclassified information from federal partners. Analyze: Ability to assess local implications of threat information through formal risk assessment process. Disseminate: Ability to further disseminate threat information to other SLTT and private sector entities. Gather: Ability to gather locally generated information, aggregate it, analyze it, and share it with federal partners, as appropriate. (Johnson, 2011, p. 62)

The Abold et al., study utilized the Delphi Method by administering a series of three

questionnaires (and given ten days to respond) to nominated analytical experts, as well as a one

and one-half day discussion group. The respondents were notified of the result from each prior


survey before answering the next one. The respondents indicated they would assign fusion

center functions based on the needs of their customers. Customers could include anyone using

the intelligence product(s) furnished by the fusion centers (e.g. local law enforcement or

authorities, other federal agencies, private sector companies, hospitals, etc.). The survey also

revealed that participants felt that if a fusion center aspires to attain CoAE in a specialized

subject, this will put pressure on the centers to narrow their objectives in order to receive the

recognition – which goes along with previous and current criticism that no federal agency or

other entity should “drive in a single-minded fashion toward standardization at the expense of a

fusion center’s ability to meet its customers’ needs” (Abold et al., 2012, p. 9).

Further discussion regarding the promising avenues for the future of fusion centers is

addressed in the next section. Based on the research conducted, the focus of the discussion will

be on ‘all crimes’ or ‘all crimes, threats and hazards’ as well as individualized operations.

Determining the most effective fusion center model should be solved by the proposed policy

because a thorough review was conducted and the recommendations made are based on centers

utilizing the different approaches.

III. Policy Options and Analysis

A. “All Crimes” vs. “All Crimes, Threats, Hazards” Approach

1. All crimes.

Experts suggest that fusion centers should focus on an ‘all crimes’ approach as most

terrorist activity stems from, and is supported by, criminal activity (Nenneman, 2008).

Moreover, the Fusion Center Guidelines suggests an ‘all crimes’ approach (Nenneman, 2008;

DOJ 2006). Reasons for the transition to ‘all crimes, threats and hazards’ (including terrorism)

are that terrorism often is funded through proceeds from criminal activity (i.e. counterfeit goods,


illicit drugs); and since crime is not purely one dimensional and occurs across jurisdictions,

fusion centers can connect the different pieces of the ‘intelligence puzzle’ to investigate and

combat crime and terrorism (Carter, 2009).

The Southern Nevada Counter-Terrorism Center Director, Lt. Tom Monahan, was

interviewed and indicated that fusion centers bring in players from federal, SLTT law

enforcement, fire fighters, and the public health sector. The fusion centers monitor for crime

patterns, using CAD, Computer Aided Dispatcher, which is basically a 21st century version of an

old police scanner; they scan the region for crimes that have occurred such as robberies,

burglaries, assault, sexual assaults, and drug deals, as well as potential crimes. Lt. Monahan

explained that his particular fusion center was not responsible for investigation or capture of

terrorists, but instead objectively reports data to police to get officers to “where the problems

are” and determine trends; thus painting a picture of what is happening locally, with the fusion

centers participating in the information and intelligence process by acting as the “wide end of the

funnel”. The fusion centers are considered to be larger versions of the neighborhood watch “see

something, say something” campaign (Center for Investigative Reporting; Johnson, 2011).

Local law enforcement will benefit from intelligence that is pertinent to their local

jurisdiction, and may feel that fusion centers are more effective if they receive an intelligence

product that directly reduces their crime rates. Additionally, the SLTT may then allot more

funding and/or personnel to such a fusion center based on the local advantages (Nenneman,

2008). An ‘all crimes’ approach is effective, because “frontline law enforcement agencies are

more likely to generate suspicious activity reports relating to gang or narcotic crime than crime

with a terrorism nexus” which provides for more flexibility in the fusion center’s areas of

consideration and intelligence resources (Ladner, Jr., 2010, p. 8).


2. All crimes, threats, hazards.

Intelligence-led policing (ILP) is the model upon which fusion center are built. The main

goal of ILP is to provide policy and program decision makers with the information possible to

make the most informed decisions regarding tactics for protecting citizens and the country. This

premise has been adopted nationwide in the fusion centers, thus the transition from a solely

counterterrorism mission to an ‘all crimes, threats, and hazards’strategy (Carter, 2009; Ladner,

Jr., 2010).

Fusing analyzed information “based on an identified threat, criminal predicate, or public

safety need, with law enforcement intelligence will provide centers with a more complete picture

of crime and terrorism” (Fusion Center Guidelines, 2008, p.14). Further, a study conducted by

Nenneman (2008) revealed that 50 percent of the fusion centers surveyed feel there is not enough

terrorism occurring today to keep analysts busy, nor warrant having a staff dedicated only to

counterterrorism efforts. By focusing on ‘all crimes, threats and hazards’, the analytical skills of

workers will always be challenged and refined; conversely, if a center were to focus solely on

either counterterrorism or crime, analysts would be apt to lose their skills related to other

approaches and may miss details or a nexus of incoming information to other fields (Nenneman,

2008). Another reason why ‘all threats’ approach is advantageous is because threats to the

nation are ever-evolving, from known hostile entities to ‘home-grown’ terrorists (DHSb).

The general public and all other partners of a fusion center benefit from the ‘all crimes, threat

and hazards’ model in that mutually beneficial relationships are fostered upon sharing of

information and situational awareness. The results of a trust relationship are 1) the public will

trust law enforcement more, thereby making them more likely to report suspicious activity,

which will ultimately bolster further social cohesion within communities; and 2) the resultant


informed SLTT law enforcement entities will able to more proactively fight crime, rather than

only react to it, and therefore, public safety will also increase (Carter & Carter, 2009; Carter, et

al., 2012a; Carter, Chermak, McGarrell, Carter, & Drew, 2012b; Chappell & Gibson 2009;

Lambert, December 2010).

B. Policy Recommendation

While the National Strategy for Information Sharing suggests that fusion centers should

designate themselves as centers that have a focus on either ‘all crimes’ or ‘all hazards’, the DOJ

states that the mission of the fusion center should be based on the needs of the local area (2008).

For example, fusion centers in Texas and California (locals containing international and coastal

borders, large immigrant populations and large land masses) will have largely different needs

than a center in Wyoming or Nebraska. Also, a fusion center’s approach may be legislatively or

executively mandated, such as in the case of the Montana All Threat Intelligence Center (Carter,

2009). It is recommended that fusion centers strive to become a center that can handle any

situation and that they implement an individualized approach, based on the needs of the

community and recommendations made by the SLTT law enforcement.

IV. Policy Implementation

A. Potential Problems and Remedies

1. Confusion over roles.

When implementing a novel directive, there may be confusion within the fusion centers and

among their partners regarding roles and responsibilities. It is important that all SLTT members

are on the same page with the fusion centers so that they feel they are contributing to the fusion

process, and ultimately producing the most accurate and relevant intelligence result. After all,

“one of the best resources of intelligence is still the police officer on patrol and in close, personal


touch with drivers and pedestrians. We need to make sure these officers know what kind of

information our fusion centers require and how to communicate information to these centers”

(Sweeney, 2011).

a. Suggested remedy: Improve communications.

In order to improve communications, it is recommended that ample training be provided to

all members of the intelligence community and that standard operating procedures (SOPs) are

developed and adhered to. The SOPs need to clearly state the fusion centers’ mission, goals, and

objectives, and well as the roles played by SLTT, private companies and citizens and other

government agencies (Forsyth, 2005; Carter et al., 2012b).

2. Mistrust in the community.

The public may perceive that a fusion center with an ‘all crimes, threats and hazards’

approach is even more intrusive than one with a singular focus. Racial profiling and ‘big

brother’ fears can slow down the government’s efforts to combat crime and terrorism as citizens

claim their civil rights or freedoms of expression have been violated by the government’s

attempts to maintain order and secure the homeland. The American Civil Liberties Union

(ACLU) has contributed to this counterterror and crime quagmire domestically and

internationally. A prime example is the successful clean-up of the New York Subway system.

The SLTT law enforcement tried to combat the problem of disorder, illustrated by such

happenings as the presence of threatening panhandlers, public drunkenness and farebeaters. The

ACLU spent many hours suing the local government, citing that order maintenance strategies,

such as enforcing loitering regulations by not allowing a panhandler to loiter or lay down in the

subway, infringed upon the homeless individuals’ right to express themselves through

panhandling, public urination, etc. The lawsuits were brought even after the SLTT law


enforcement’s community oriented policing methods, or Broken Windows philosophy, showed

signed of decreasing disorder (Kelling & Coles, 1997). Ultimately, the SLTT community

prepared a strong legal case beforehand and was able to effectively clean up the subways.

a. Suggested remedy: Improve community relations.

A recent survey revealed that 75 percent of participating fusion centers felt community

oriented/intelligence-led policing is not being promulgated and used as much as it should be

(Nenneman, 2008). It is suggested that SLTT law enforcement implement a community

outreach program in the area, with special emphasis placed on reaching those who may be at risk

for prejudicial treatment. Conversely, the police department should offer training to officers

regarding cultural differences and how to effectively communicate with residents in their zones.

A community oriented policing program should also be applied in these areas so that residents do

not feel alienated or fear the police. With improved community relations, the residents will be

more apt to report suspicious activity and trust that the police will protect them (Kelling & Coles,

1997; Nenneman, 2008).

B. Effectiveness of Proposed Recommendation

In order to clarify roles, missions, and duties, training must be provided to fusion center

workers and partners. SOPs must be created, updated and refined. Outreach must be conducted

throughout the local community to foster a trust relationship. Lastly, fusion centers must be

accountable to an authority or review board to ensure they are compliant and effective.

Interagency relations can be improved by placing liaison officers from other agencies in the

fusion center on detail, and allowing them to return to their agency after a stint of service and

replacing them with a novel employee from the originating agency. This rotation would ensure

that more employees have ‘hands-on’ experience in the fusion center and can take their


knowledge back to the ‘home’ agency. Ideally, individual fusion centers should collocate

contributing personnel within the facility. However, if funding does not allow for the

collocation, fusion centers may choose to work together virtually (Forsyth, 2005).

It is also suggested that in order to determine the focus of a fusion center that an

evaluation of the local needs be conducted. The evaluation needs to include local assessments of

the following: current usage of community oriented policing efforts, history of natural and man-

made disasters/catastrophes, demographics of populace, vulnerability/presence of critical

infrastructure/assets, history of terrorist activity, and future likelihood of attacks, as well as the

crime rates and crime mapping reports. Using these sources of data to tailor a fusion center’s

mission is pertinent because as Roberts indicates:

the raw data that are the natural product of law enforcement operation at state and local levels (for example, incident reports, arrest reports, and field interviews) are the fundamental currency that drives much of the intelligence fusion and information sharing efforts nationwide. (2011, p.73)

Evaluating the fusion centers is paramount to measuring their success and their claims to funding

from the state and/or federal governments.

V. Limitations of Policy

The most reoccurring and obvious limitation of the recommended policy is that “there has yet

to be an empirical evaluation of the effectiveness of fusion center capabilities, (Carter &

Chermak, 2011, p. 84). It is recommended that fusions centers strive to achieve the four CoCs:

receive, analyze, disseminate and gather information as outlined in the Baseline Capabilities.

The first nationwide assessment of fusion centers was conducted in 2010 by the Office of

Program Manager for the ISE. The assessment set out to evaluate the capabilities, the four

CoCs, and was conducted in two phases, the first being an on-line self-survey and the second

was an on-site assessment. The assessment further evaluated the “maturity” of fusion centers as


measured by progress towards achieving the CoCs. Fusion centers were then given until

December 2010 in order to mitigate any CoC gaps. As a result of the evaluation and its

subsequent recommendations, fusion centers reported “significant progress in defining their

business processes through the development of final, approved plans, policies, and/or standard

operating procedures” with the most improvement relating to data analysis (DHSa; Johnson,

2011).

A second possible limitation is the perceived purpose and legitimacy of fusion centers

within the community. There has been recent debate within congress and in the public regarding

the legitimacy of fusion centers and whether they are producing results. A key to fusion centers

is their malleability – basing their mission on their environment, thereby providing a customized

approach to best serve their public, private and government clientele. In order to garner the most

support for the individualized approach, the fusion centers need to consider the overall safety of

the neighboring area and weigh it against available funding. Various fusion centers may choose

their field of specialization based on available grants; however, if it does not serve the local area

or the community, SLTT law enforcement may not accept the legitimacy of a fusion center in

their jurisdiction. The fusion center would need to substantiate their focus decision by

illustrating the ultimate benefit to the local area, information sharing on a national level, and

remind their customers that crime does cross jurisdictions (Lambert, 2010).

It is through a customized approach based on the needs of the intelligence partners,

location and environment that will provide for the most efficacious operation of a fusion center.

Again, this calls for communication between the fusion center and its partners, including “the

DHS, the DOJ, the FBI, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the PM-ISE, the

Office of National Drug Control Policy and the Department of Defense” (Johnson, 2011, p.68;


Lambert, 2010), to explain how the center’s approach was derived, and how the information flow

may be stymied by operating under a different approach. A productive fusion relationship

entails sharing information and building a trusted relationship, thereby facilitating the “efficient

flow of information: (Johnson, 2011, p.68).

VI. Conclusion

Value of Fusion Centers and a Customized Approach

The current shift of fusion centers from solely a counterterrorism approach to one of ‘all

crimes’ is based on “relevance and workload; there is just not enough purely terrorist actionable

intelligence to justify all of the fusion centers that are in operation” (Nenneman, 2008, p.53).

Also, solely focusing on terrorism would negate duties held by the FBI, which is tasked with

investigating acts of terror (Nenneman, 2008). The goal is to prevent terrorism and its

underlying causes, thereby interrupting the life cycle of terrorism. Fusion centers have been

described as being the “wide end of a funnel” – taking in information from every available

source, analyzing it and disseminating the reduced intelligence to the appropriate partner (Center

for Investigative Reporting). In order to prevent and combat terrorism, collaboration, facilitated

through continuous information sharing, is paramount.

Fusion centers have considerable value and help to uncover vulnerable target areas, link

cases and revive ‘cold cases’. Fusion centers not only proactively gather information, but also

respond to requests from policy makers to examine patterns and origins of criminal and terrorist

activity. The purpose of involving fusion centers in research is to supplement, not duplicate

current policies and programs (Lambert, 2010). Information sharing paves the way for the

resolution of problems at their origin. By participating in the fusion process the federal and local

governments realize the concerns and limitations of the other parties, and identify ways in which


they can mutually benefit from their information exchanges. Tools such as Suspicious Activity

Reports are crucial because information is provided to the DHS for identifying patterns and

trends, while the information shared with the FBI is investigated for terrorism.

The federal government can connect members of the SLTT law enforcement to the

appropriate federal agency to best assist with their inquiry(ies). For example, a corner store in

New Jersey was selling bad gas, which caused purchasers to break down. The local law

enforcement was unsure how to handles this, and so contacted the New Jersey Regional

Operations and Intelligence Center who connected them to the New Jersey Division of

Consumer Affairs; this division was able to investigate and solve the problem which saved the

local police department money and manpower (Guidetti, 2012). In sum, the fusion process is the

“most comprehensive manner by which to collect and analyze data for a particular geographical

area” which provides for a holistic and “better coordinated response” (Gaines & Kappeler, 2012,

p. 409) to all crimes, threat and hazards.


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http://cironline.org/reports/what-fusion-center-2951%23maptop

leigh ann jara homeland security program & policy evaluation & analysis 2012

Documents

types of fusion centers

crimes approach

fusion process

hazards approach

policy options

policy recommendation

policy implementation

jeremy carter