1

Leibniz on Substance and Causation

John Whipple

University of Illinois at Chicago

Forthcoming in Leibniz and Locke on Substance and Identity, eds. P. Lodge and T. Stoneham, Routledge

Abstract Leibniz claims to have a theory of creaturely and divine causation that provides a principled alternative to occasionalism and mere conservationism. However, the exact form of Leibniz’s causal theory has proved difficult to determine and some of his comments on this topic have been taken to suggest positions that threaten to collapse back into occasionalism or mere conservationism. In this paper I (1) introduce the causal theses that Leibniz affirms and explain how several of these theses can seem to be at odds with each other, (2) argue that a recent interpretation of Leibniz’s theory falls short, and (3) develop a novel interpretation of Leibniz’s theory that shows how he can consistently affirm all of his causal theses and provide a principled alternative to occasionalism and mere conservationism.

1. Introduction

“It is rather difficult to distinguish the actions of God from those of creatures;; for some

believe that God does everything, while others imagine that he merely conserves the force he has

given to creatures” (G 4: 432; AG: 40). Thus begins the famous eighth section of Leibniz’s

Discours de métaphysique. Here Leibniz isolates two unacceptable accounts of divine and

creaturely causation. One of the accounts is occasionalism, which recognizes causal powers in

God alone. Leibniz regards this account of activity as wholly untenable; in De Ipsa Natura he

goes so far as to claim that it “seems with Spinoza to make of God the very nature of things,

while created things disappear into mere modifications of the one divine substance, since that

which does not act, which lacks active force…can in no way be a substance” (G 4: 515; AG:

165). Creaturely activity must, for Leibniz, be affirmed; but not at the cost of lapsing into the

other untenable position mentioned in Discours 8—the “mere conservationism” of Durandus de

2

Saint Pourçain.1 In the Essais de théodicée Leibniz characterizes Durandus as holding that:

“God creates substances and gives them the force they need;; and that thereafter he leaves them to

themselves, and does naught but conserve them, without aiding them in their actions” (Huggard:

27). Such a view is unacceptable, according to Leibniz, because it does not sufficiently respect

the dependence of creatures on God.

Leibniz aims to steer a middle course between occasionalism on the one hand, and mere

conservationism on the other; but a number of his remarks concerning creaturely and divine

causation seem to veer dangerously close to one or the other of these unacceptable positions.

Consider Leibniz’s affirmations of the doctrine of spontaneity, which occur in some of his most

carefully written essays, notably the Discours de métaphysique (1686), Système nouveau (1695),

De Ipsa Natura (1698), Essais de théodicée (1710), and the Monadologie (1714). A substance

is said to exhibit spontaneity if all of its perceptual states arise “from its own depths” (G 4: 484;

AG: 143). All Leibnizian substances exhibit spontaneity because they possess a “nature” or

“internal force,” which God bestows upon them in creation. Each substance’s internal force

generates an ordered series of successive perceptual states. This account of creaturely activity

might seem to place Leibniz quite close to the mere conservationism of Durandus.

But not so fast. In each of the above-mentioned essays Leibniz also affirms that

everything positive in creatures results immediately from the divine will.2 In all but one of the

essays (De Ipsa Natura) Leibniz describes this dependence in terms of continued divine creation.

Take, for example, his remarks in the Système nouveau : “all things, with all their reality, are

continually produced by the power [vertu] of God” (G 4: 483; AG: 143). One would expect

assertions of this sort to flow from the quill of an occasionalist, for the continual creation

doctrine has been regarded as one of the strongest arguments for an occasionalist account of

3

causation.3 Does Leibniz locate a satisfactory via media between mere conservationism and

occasionalism, or does he merely shift back and forth between these two positions?

The central thesis of this paper is that Leibniz does have a unified theory of causation,

despite appearances to the contrary.4 I am not the first commentator to defend such a thesis.

One influential recent strategy has been to interpret Leibniz as affirming a version of the

traditional doctrine of divine concurrence.5 This is an initially plausible interpretive move, for

Leibniz does use concurrentist language in a number of texts. It is also what one might expect

from Leibniz because theistic philosophers who rejected occasionalism and mere

conservationism typically affirmed divine concurrence.6

Concurrence theorists agreed with mere conservationists that finite substances were the

bearers of genuine causal powers, but they disagreed with the mere conservationist assertion that

finite substances are capable of producing effects within the ordinary course of nature provided

that God conserves the substances and their active and passive powers. Concurrence theorists

insisted that in addition to conserving substances, God concurs with them in each of their

actions. If God were to withhold his concurrence the substance would not be capable of

exercising its causal powers. One way of describing this disagreement is in terms of mediate and

immediate causation. While the mere conservationist holds that God is only the mediate cause of

effects produced within the ordinary course of nature (in virtue of conserving the active and

passive powers of finite substances), the concurrentist holds that both God and creatures are

immediate causes of such effects. In other words, God and creatures concur in the production of

effects within the ordinary course of nature.

Much can be learned from comparing Leibniz’s remarks on causation with scholastic

accounts of divine concurrence. However, I think we must be careful not to overestimate the

4

extent to which Leibniz’s theory is of a piece with traditional accounts of divine concurrence.

While it is true that Leibniz’s causal theory is in keeping with traditional accounts in several

respects, I shall argue that his theory differs in significant ways from the theories of his

scholastic predecessors. More specifically, I will argue that Leibniz does not take divine

concurrence to involve something over and above divine conservation—a conclusion that a

traditional concurrence theorist would deny. I shall also suggest that one of the keys to

understanding Leibniz’s theory lies in the recognition that he rejects certain features of the

ontological framework within which the traditional debate between occasionalists, mere

conservationists, and concurrentists was framed. Most importantly, Leibniz subtly rejects the

idea that finite substances are spatially and temporally conditioned at the deepest level of reality.

Before proceeding I should make three comments about my interpretive approach in this

paper. First, I will be focusing on texts dating from 1686 and later.7 Second, I take Leibniz’s

oft-repeated claim that his mature philosophy is systematic very seriously: “My principles are

such that they can hardly be separated one from another. Whoever knows one well, knows them

all” (7 November 1710 letter to Des Bosses; LDB: 188-9).8 The extent to which Leibniz’s

philosophy is systematic is a matter of considerable scholarly controversy that I cannot fully

engage here.9 For the purposes of this paper I will assume that Leibniz took the central

principles and doctrines of his metaphysics to be consistent with each other, and that he does not

see himself as affirming causal theses that are incompatible. Third, I take Leibniz’s claim that he

presents his philosophy in an exoteric manner in his published works quite seriously as well.10

The question of what exactly Leibniz’s discours exoterique involves is a difficult one that needs

to be studied in greater detail in the secondary literature.11 I cannot provide a full treatment of

5

this topic here, but I will suggest that Leibniz presents his causal theory in less than full

metaphysical rigor in some of his published works such as the Essais de théodicée.

2. Five Causal Theses

The aim of this section is to introduce the five causal theses that form the core of

Leibniz’s account of monadic and divine causation. Although it is undisputable that Leibniz

affirms these theses, it is not obvious how they should be interpreted. I will begin by discussing

the three causal theses that do not explicitly invoke divine causation.

In Leibniz’s mature metaphysics he affirms an ontology of simple substances,

which he calls “monads.”12 Monads are immaterial soul-like entities whose only

modifications are perceptions.13 In one of his most famous mature texts he defines

perception as “the passing state which involves and represent a multitude in the unity or

in the simple substance” (G 6: 608; AG: 214). Leibniz famously denies that any of a

substance’s perceptual states can be caused by another (finite) substance;; that is, he

denies that there is any (finite) inter-substantial causation.14 However, he does think that

a kind of causation occurs within each finite substance. This account of intra-substantial

causation involves the following three causal theses, which Leibniz affirms in a wide

range of texts:

CT1: Each substance involves a nature/internal force/law of the series.15

CT2: All of the modifications/states of a substance arise from its own nature/internal force.16 CT3: Any state/modification of a substance is a consequence of its preceding state/states.17

6

The first causal thesis speaks of a substance’s nature, its internal force, and its law of the series.

In some discussions of intra-substantial causation Leibniz only appeals to a substance’s nature

and its internal force.18 In other discussions he also appeals to a substance’s law of its series of

perceptions.19 Is the law internal to the substance, or does it exist in God? If it is internal to the

substance, what is the ontological relation between a substance’s law and its internal force? Are

these different aspects or features of a substance or is a substance’s internal force strictly

identical to its law of the series? And what is the ontological relation between the nature, the

force, the law, and the substance itself? A complete interpretation of CT1 needs to address these

questions.

Leibniz’s commitment to CT2 is typically taken to imply that each of a substance’s states

is caused by the substance itself (or the substance’s internal force). In texts where Leibniz

affirms CT3, however, he has been interpreted as claiming that each state of a substance is

caused by the substance’s preceding states.20 But is it possible for a state to be caused by its

preceding state (or states) and by the substance itself? In other words, are CT2 and CT3

compatible?21

A further complication arises when one considers whether substances have an “initial

state.” Leibniz is committed to the thesis that God creates finite substances ex nihilo. One might

suppose, and some of the texts suggest, that Leibniz thinks God’s creation ex nihilo involves

creating substances in an initial perceptual state.22 If this were the case, then it would not be true

that every state of a substance is a consequence of its preceding states. In other words, it would

imply that CT3 is false. It would also seem to imply that CT2 is false. One obvious way to

address this problem would be to modify CT2 and CT3 such that they apply only to non-initial

states.23 Although there are texts suggesting that Leibniz might be willing to make this

7

qualification, most of his affirmations of CT2 and CT3 make no mention of an initial state. Let

us refer to this as The Initial State Puzzle.24

The Initial State Puzzle is hardly the only puzzle that arises when one brings divine

causality into the picture. This is because the Leibnizian God does not merely create finite

substances, but also conserves them in their continued existence. The following two causal

theses, which Leibniz endorses on numerous occasions, express the core of his view on creation

and conservation:

CT4: Everything positive (that is, everything there is of reality) in creatures is

produced immediately by the divine will.25

CT5: There are no two times at which the dependence of creatures on God is

different (that is, there is no t1 and t2 such that the dependence of a creature

on God at t1 is more or less than the dependence of that creature on God at

t2).26

Leibniz’s commitment to CT4 and CT5 lead him to affirm the doctrine of continual creation.

This comes out clearly in the following excerpt from the Essais de théodicée :

The creature depends continually upon divine operation, and…it depends upon

that no less after the time of its beginning than when it first begins…Now there is

no reason why this conserving action should not be called production, and even

creation, if one will: for the dependence being as great afterwards as at he

beginning, the extrinsic designation of being new or not does not change the

nature of that action (Huggard: 385).

8

It is not difficult to see that CT4, CT5, and the doctrine of continual creation raise serious

questions about Leibniz’s commitment to CT2 and CT3. If he holds that God immediately

produces everything positive in creatures, can he also hold that the substance itself is the cause of

its successive perceptual states? In other words, can Leibniz legitimately affirm CT4, CT5, and

the continual creation doctrine without lapsing into occasionalism?

In the remainder of this section I will discuss a distinction that Leibniz draws between

perfection and limitation. Robert Sleigh has suggested that this distinction provides one of the

keys to understanding how Leibniz’s causal theory differs from occasionalism and mere

conservationism.27 Other commentators, however, have argued that the distinction is useless on

this score.28 It will be worth our efforts to get to the bottom of this controversy. I will argue that

a promising model of co-operative production can be extracted from his remarks on the

perfection/limitation distinction.

CT5 states that everything in creatures is produced immediately by the divine will. In a

number of texts Leibniz uses “perfection” as a synonym for “positive.” He claims that whatever

there is of perfection in the actions of creatures comes from God, while the “limitations” (or

“imperfections”) in a creature’s actions come from the creature itself. In Causa Dei, for

example, he states that: “in acting, things depend on God, since God concurs [concurrit] in the

actions of things, insofar as there is something of perfection in their actions, which, at least, must

emanate from God” (G 6: 440). And in the Essais de théodicée , after affirming that all that is

“positive, good, and perfect” comes from God, he writes: “The imperfections, on the other hand,

and the defects in operations come from the original limitation [la limitation originale] that the

creature could not but receive with the first beginning of its being” (Huggard: 31).

9

Leibniz uses the example of a heavy-laden boat traveling down a river to illustrate the

distinction between perfection and limitation. In the example, the current of the river is

analogous to the action of God, while the inertia of the boat is compared with the original

limitation of creatures. The force exerted by the current of the river is always the same, but the

speed of the boat varies depending on how heavy a load it is carrying. The heavier the load, the

greater the inertia will be, and the slower the boat will move. The current, Leibniz says, is the

cause of the movement of the boat, “but not of its retardation,” which results from the boat’s

inertia (Huggard: 30). Analogously, “God is the cause of perfection in the nature and the

actions of the creature, but the limitation of the receptivity of the creature [la limitation de la

receptivité de la creature] is the cause of the defects there are in its action” (ibid.).

Leibniz mentions two sorts of limitation in the barge analogy: the creature’s “original

limitation,” and the limitations in a creature’s actions. Let us consider the former first. In

speaking of the “original limitation” of creatures, Leibniz is drawing attention to the fact that all

creatures are finite. As he remarks in §31, “God could not give the creature all without making

of it a God; therefore there must be different degrees in the perfection of things, and limitations

also of every kind” (Huggard: 31). One can expand on these remarks by bringing in the theory

of simple substances more explicitly.29 Each simple substance expresses (or represents) all of

the other simple substances in the universe (its “worldmates,” as we might conveniently say).

But in virtue of their finitude, each monad’s expression is necessarily imperfect (i.e., confused to

various degrees). So what is the original limitation of a creature? The original limitation is the

creature’s uniquely imperfect expression of its worldmates.30 In other words, the original

limitation of a creature simply is the creature (just as the original limitation of the barge is the

barge itself).31

10

Let us now consider what Leibniz takes the second sort of limitation—the limitations in

the actions of creatures—to consist in. What we need to understand is how this aspect of the

perfection/limitation distinction relates to the production of particular effects (the successive

perceptual states of monads). Here is one way the distinction might be drawn:

Divided Labor Model of Co-operative Production

The effect consists in two (non-privative) parts/components. One part is comprised of

perfection(s), the other is comprised of imperfection(s)/limitation(s). God immediately

produces the perfections and the creature immediately produces the limitations.

A model along these lines is what one might naively expect from an account of divine

concurrence. If God and creatures are said to co-operate with respect to the actions of creatures,

then one might think, and some of Leibniz’s remarks can seem to suggest (his illustrative barge

analogy, for example) that both God and the creature must be contributing part of the total effect.

God contributes the perfections, while creatures contribute the imperfections.

It is highly unlikely that the Divided Labor Model reflects Leibniz’s considered view.

The main reason for this is that if Leibniz were committed to the Divided Labor Model then his

theory would collapse into a version of mere conservationism. Leibniz needs to explain how

God and a creature can co-operate in the production of a particular natural effect. The effect

must (in some way) be immediately produced by God and (in some way) be immediately

produced by the creature. The Division of Labor Model seems to accomplish this by dividing the

effect into perfections and limitations. God is the immediate cause of the perfections in the

effect and the creature is the cause of the limitations. The problem with this picture is that the

strict division between perfection and limitation turns (or at the very least threatens to turn) the

11

effect in question into a composite of two ontologically prior parts—the part comprised by the

perfections and the part comprised by the limitations. In this case, there would not be a single

unitary effect that is immediately produced by God and the creature, but rather two effects, one

produced immediately by God, and one produced immediately by the creature (and thus only

mediately produced by God). The Divided Labor Model, which initially appears to provide a

plausible account of co-operative production, reduces to a version of mere conservationism.32

Here is a second possible interpretation of the perfection/limitation distinction:

The Privation Model of Co-operative Production

The limitation in a particular effect is privative (it is a mere lack of being). Such

privations are attributed to the creature (in virtue of its finitude), while God immediately

produces everything there is of perfection/reality in the effect.

Something along the lines of the Privation Model is suggested by certain of Leibniz’s remarks on

evil and sin. He claims that sin is a limitation or imperfection, and, following Augustine, he

provides a privation analysis of evil/sin: “evil is a privation of being, whereas the action of God

tends to the positive” (Huggard: 29). If Leibniz took all limitations (other than a creature’s

original limitation) to be like sin in this regard, then he would be committed to the Privation

Model of Co-operative Production.

The clear problem with the Privation Model is that it would not allow Leibniz to affirm

CT2 and CT3. If the creature only contributes the limitation to a particular effect, and the

limitation is a mere privation, then the creature would not really be contributing anything to the

effect. Strictly speaking, God would produce everything and the creature would contribute

12

nothing. Thus, if Leibniz were committed to the Privation Model his theory would reduce to a

version of occasionalism.

It has not gone unnoticed in the secondary literature that the Divided Labor Model and

the Privation Model are deeply problematic. This has led some to conclude that the

perfection/limitation distinction does not help Leibniz distinguish his account of causation from

occasionalism and mere conservationism—despite the fact that he appeals to the distinction in

precisely this sort of context.33 I am not convinced that this is the correct interpretive verdict to

draw, however, for there is yet another account of the perfection/limitation distinction that can be

discerned in the texts.

Consider the following remarks that occur shortly after the barge analogy in the Essais de

théodicée :

It is true that God is the only one whose action is pure and without admixture of

what is termed ‘to suffer’: but that does not preclude the creature’s participation

in actions, since the action of the creature is a modification of the substance,

flowing naturally from it and containing a variation not only in the perfections

that God has communicated to the creature, but also in the limitations that the

creature, being what it is, brings with it. Thus we see that there is an actual

distinction between the substance and its modifications or accidents, contrary to

the opinion of some moderns (Huggard: 32; emphasis Leibniz).

In this passage Leibniz links the perfection/limitation distinction to the distinction between a

substance and its accidents or modifications. The actions of a creature (i.e., substance), he says,

are modifications of the creature—modifications that flow naturally from it. His subsequent

13

comments about perfection and limitation could be read in line with the Divided Labor Model or

the Privation Model, but they could also be read as suggesting that the limitations in the actions

of creatures are neither privations of effects, nor parts of effects, but rather effects as wholes. In

other words, the limitations of a creature just are the creature’s effects/modifications/states.

Leibniz more explicitly affirms this account of limitation in other texts. In a 30 June 1704 letter

to de Volder, for example, Leibniz straightforwardly claims that “every modification is only a

limitation” (G 2: 270; AG: 180).34 This suggests a third model of co-operative production:

The Whole Effect Model of Co-operative Production

The successive states of creatures are limitations. The creature is the immediate cause of

each of its states/effects. God immediately produces everything there is of

perfection/reality in each of the effects (i.e. each of the effects as a whole). Thus, both

God and creatures are immediate causes of effects as wholes.

The basic framework provided by the Whole Effect Model helps to explain how Leibniz’s

account of the perfection/limitation distinction might be of a piece with CT1, CT2, and CT3. If

the original limitation of a creature simply is the creature (as I suggested earlier), and the

limitations in the actions of a creature are the creature’s successive modifications, then Leibniz’s

claim that the limitations in the actions of a creature arise from the creature’s original limitation

is merely a different way of affirming CT2, which states that all of the modifications/states of a

substance are caused by the substance itself.

What the perfection/limitation distinction adds to CT2 is that each successive state as a

whole is also produced immediately by God. This important addition to CT2 gives rise to an

obvious and difficult question: how can the effect be produced as a whole by the creature and as

a whole by God? It seems natural to think that if the effect as a whole were (immediately)

14

produced by God then any causal contribution on the part of the creature would be superfluous.

Clearly more details need to be provided in order for this account to be fully intelligible. I do

believe that Leibniz has the resources to do this, but many of the nuances of his account are not

fully elaborated in his more theologically oriented expositions of creaturely activity such as the

Essais de théodicée. Several things can be said about this lack of detail. One is that it results, at

least in part, from a failure to clearly distinguish his solution to the problem of the author of sin

from his efforts to navigate a principled middle way between occasionalism and mere

conservationism. This might serve to explain the fact that several accounts of the

perfection/limitation distinction are suggested in the texts. Second, and more importantly,

Leibniz’s considered account of the perfection/limitation distinction cannot be fully elaborated in

the absence of his monadological metaphysics. In the interest of making the Essais de théodicée

accessible to a general audience, Leibniz does not disclose all the features of his metaphysics.35

If one is to understand Leibniz’s unified theory, the basic framework set forth in the Essais de

théodicée must be integrated with his ground-floor metaphysics. I shall attempt to provide this

integration in §4.

3. McDonough’s Proposal

Recent attempts in the secondary literature to show that Leibniz navigates a successful

middle path between Occasionalism and mere conservationism can be divided into two camps:

those that take Leibniz to straightforwardly affirm the continual creation doctrine and those that

do not.36 I have criticized the former camp elsewhere.37 I have argued that Leibniz understands

the traditional doctrine of continual creation to entail that the states of the world are literally re-

created at every instant. On this view, the duration of a substance consists in a (strictly

15

discontinuous) series of instantaneous states. I have argued that Leibniz does not endorse the

continual creation doctrine in this sense. He thinks there is something right about the doctrine

but he does not think that it provides a literally true description of God’s conservation of finite

substances.38

Not all interpretations that seek to explain how Leibniz’s account of monadic causation

differs from occasionalism and mere conservationism presuppose that Leibniz is largely in

agreement with occasionalists about the truth of the continual creation doctrine. Jeffrey

McDonough takes a very different approach in his recent article on the subject. McDonough’s

general strategy is to carefully distinguish the doctrine of creation ex nihilo from the doctrines of

conservation and divine concurrence. He painstakingly explains how these three doctrines were

understood by leading scholastic philosophers, and subsequently argues that Leibniz himself was

committed to each of the three doctrines. If we consider each of these doctrines individually,

McDonough contends, we can see that none of them pose significant problems for Leibniz’s

commitment to an ontology of causally active substances.

Of particular interest is McDonough’s account of how God and creatures co-operate in

the production of effects within the ordinary course of nature. McDonough proposes the analogy

of a working electric toaster to help illustrate the account that he attributes to Leibniz. One can

think of the toaster and the electricity as two “agents” working through a single, immediate

action to produce a “toasting.” “Neither the contribution of the electricity alone, nor of the

toaster alone, produces a heating or a toasting; it is only with the two agents causally working

together that the relevant action occurs” (McDonough 2007: 43). In other words, the toaster and

the electricity serve as individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the production

of a toasting. In much the same way, one can think of God and a finite substance as co-operating

16

through a single, immediate action to produce an effect (e.g., perceptual state) in the ordinary

course of nature. Although certain “aspects” of such an effect can be attributed to a creature

rather than to God, it would be a mistake to suppose that the effect is a conjunction of two

metaphysically independent effects—one produced immediately by God and one produced

immediately by the creature. Rather, “the effect produced by a concurrent action is to be

understood as a metaphysically unified whole” (McDonough 2007: 44).

It is clear that McDonough’s account is carefully crafted to avoid the main problem that

attends the Divided Labor Model. As we saw in §2, the divided labor model reduces to a form of

mere conservationism because it implies that purportedly co-produced effects are actually

composites of two effects—one produced immediately by God and the other produced

immediately by the creature (the latter of which implies that there are some effects that are only

mediately produced by God—thereby implying mere conservationism). By claiming that the

creature’s contribution to an effect consists in an “aspect” of the effect rather than an

ontologically prior part, McDonough aims to avoid the Divided Labor Model pitfall.

Let us suppose that the appeal to “aspects” rather than “parts” would allow Leibniz to

avoid mere conservationism. Even so, it is not obvious that this interpretation can account for

Leibniz’s claim that everything positive in creatures is produced immediately by the divine will

(CT4). Presumably the “aspects” of effects that are uniquely attributed to creatures are not

merely privations.39 But if they are not privations, then they must be something “positive” and

“real.” The fact that they are uniquely attributed to the creature would appear to imply that God

does not immediately produce everything positive in creatures. In other words, God’s causal

contribution to the effect is something less than creation of the whole effect ex nihilo. And this

is precisely what one would expect given the careful distinctions that McDonough has drawn

17

between creation, conservation, and concurrence: “the ordinary production of effects within the

order of nature depends not only on God’s acts of creation and conservation, but also on his

concurrence in creaturely activities” (McDonough 2007: 46)

One can object that this conclusion is also in tension with Leibniz’s claim that there are

no two times at which the dependence of creatures on God is different (CT5). If God does less in

conserving a creature and concurring with it in the production of effects than he would do were

he to create the effect ex nihilo, it would appear that the creature depends on God more in its

initial state (which presumably does not include a non-privative causal contribution from the

creature itself) than in its subsequent states.

The objections I have raised concerning CT4 and CT5 have force but are not decisive.40

A deeper problem stems from Leibniz’s frequent affirmation of the thesis that divine

conservation consists in a continual creation. By affirming the continual creation doctrine

Leibniz threatens to undermine the careful distinctions between creation, conservation, and

concurrence that McDonough has made on his behalf. McDonough is aware that Leibniz’s

apparent affirmation of the continual creation doctrine poses the most significant challenge to his

interpretation. He is also aware that metaphysical absurdities would result were Leibniz to

affirm that God literally recreates the world at every instant.

McDonough’s strategy in dealing with this formidable challenge is to distinguish a strong

and a weak conception of continual (or continuous) creation. According to the strong account of

continual creation God literally recreates substances at every instant. Leibniz did not affirm the

doctrine in this sense, McDonough (quite reasonably) insists. He locates what he takes to be a

weaker conception of continual creation in an unpublished essay from the mid 1680’s, where

Leibniz writes:

18

God is the conserver of all things. That is, not only are things produced by God when

they begin to exist, but, in addition, they would not continue to exist unless a certain

continued act of God were directed toward them. Were this act to cease, so would they.

This has the consequence that in fact creation is nothing other than the beginning of this

action (A 6.iv: 1596).41

The key claim in this passage is that God’s creation and conservation of the world consists in a

single act. As McDonough glosses it, “God creates and conserves through a single continuous

act that, as it were, begins at the moment a creature comes into existence ex nihilo and ceases the

moment that it is annihilated” (McDonough 2007: 47). So understood, the continual creation

doctrine does not threaten Leibniz’s commitment to the causal activity of finite substances.

McDonough appeals to a physical analogy (admittedly imperfect) to help illustrate the point:

“my freezer can be thought of as creating and conserving particular ice cubes through a single

continuous action that begins when a tray of water is put in the ice box, and ends when the cubes

are removed” (McDonough 2007: 50). Although we might describe the conserving action of the

freezer on the ice cubes as a “continued creation,” this does not prevent the ice cubes from

possessing “their own efficient casual powers as witnessed by the fact that they can be stacked

on top of one another, or support a heavy tub of ice cream” (McDonough 2007: 50). Similarly,

“God conserves finite spirits at every instant, but they are nonetheless able to play a genuine

causal role in the production of their own accidental modifications in virtue of their (preserved)

active natures” (McDonough 2007: 50).

I am sympathetic to certain features of McDonough’s subtle analysis. I agree that it is

significant that Leibniz claims that God creates and conserves the world in a single act (I will

develop this thesis in a different way in the next section). However, I do not think that this

19

account of creation and conservation is compatible with the account of co-operative production

that he attributes to Leibniz. As I noted earlier, McDonough’s initial analysis requires that God

“does less” in conserving creatures and concurring with them in their actions than he does in

initially creating them ex nihilo. This “doing less” would enable Leibniz to maintain that

creatures are the unique causal sources of non-privative aspects of effects produced within the

ordinary course of nature. If the creature and the effect were created ex nihilo, this would not

leave room for the creature to uniquely contribute a non-privative aspect to the effect in question.

But if conservation is only rationally distinct from creation ex nihilo, as McDonough concludes,

then there should not be room for a creature to uniquely produce non-privative aspects of effects

in any of its states (initial or non-initial). The freezer analogy breaks down at precisely this

point. The plausibility of the analogy depends on the fact that the freezer’s “creation and

conservation” of the ice cubes is something less than creation ex nihilo. In other words, the

“weak” account of continual creation that McDonough attributes to Leibniz is not weak enough

to accommodate the account of co-operative production that he attributes to Leibniz.

One final comment is in order concerning McDonough’s interpretation. Although he

comes to the conclusion that for Leibniz conservation is only rationally distinct from creation ex

nihilo, he does think that concurrence is something over and above conservation.42 This is not

surprising given McDonough’s general approach and the fact that traditional concurrence

theorists maintain this position. Some of the arguments that are typically presented for divine

concurrence require this thesis. Consider, for example, the argument from contra naturam

miracles. According to Aquinas miracles are contra naturam “when there remains in nature a

disposition that is contrary to the effect which God produces” (De Potentia, q. 6 art. 2, ad 3).

The most frequently cited example of this sort of miracle is the story of Shadrach, Meshack, and

20

Abednego in Daniel 3. According to the Biblical narrative these three men were thrown into

Nebuchadnezzer’s raging furnace but emerged unscathed. Concurrence theorists such as Molina

and Suarez claimed to be able to provide a more satisfactory analysis of the general structure of

this kind of miraculous event than the mere conservationist could provide.43 Recall that

according to the mere conservationist God’s conservation of a fire and its active and passive

powers would be the only divine contribution required for the fire to be able to incinerate

something in virtue of its own powers (God would also have to conserve the thing being

incinerated, of course). This forces the mere conservationist to say that in order to perform a

contra naturam miracle God would have to counteract the power of the fire in some way (e.g.,

by giving the three men invisible protective shields). Concurrence theorists claimed that this was

inconsonant with divine sovereignty—God should not have to counteract the powers of the fire

by some external mechanism in order to prevent it from incinerating the men. The concurrence

theorist has a tidy solution to this problem. Given that the conservation of the fire is not

sufficient for the fire to produce its usual effect (an additional act of divine concurrence must

also occur), all God has to do in order to perform a contra naturam miracle is to withhold

concurrence in this particular case. By withholding his concurrence God ensures that the fire

will not produce its usual effect (no need for protective shields or other fancy tricks). Contra

naturam miracles are thus done by omission rather than commission—a conclusion that is fully

in keeping with divine sovereignty.44

The main point that I want to drive home here is that the traditional argument from contra

naturam miracles for divine concurrence presupposes a framework in which concurrence

introduces an additional volitional element beyond divine conservation. I have not seen any

texts where Leibniz endorses this framework. Nor does Leibniz present any arguments for

21

divine concurrence that presuppose that concurrence introduces an additional volitional element

beyond conservation. Indeed, Leibniz often describes conservation in terms of the continual

creation doctrine without mentioning concurrence at all.45 This is intuitively plausible. If

conservation just is creation ex nihilo what more could there be for God to do? Leibniz does use

concurrence language in a number of texts but his remarks are either neutral on the issue in

question or imply that he rejects the traditional thesis. In a letter to Bourguet, for example, after

presenting his account of intra-substantial causation in a typical manner, he writes: “But I do not

say by this that the future state of the creature follows from its present state without the

concurrence [le concours] of God, and I am rather of the opinion that conservation is a continued

creation [conservation est une creation continuelle]” (March 22, 1714;; G 3: 566). This text

clearly implies that Leibniz is not thinking of concurrence and conservation as involving distinct

volitional contributions from the deity.46 These considerations strongly suggest that Leibniz is

willing to use concurrentist language but that he does not endorse the traditional thesis that

concurrence is something over and above conservation. I shall now present an interpretation of

Leibniz’s theory that is in keeping with this insight.

4. An Alternative Interpretation

In the remainder of this paper I will present an alternative interpretation that shows how

Leibniz can consistently affirm CT1-CT5. My general interpretive strategy is the polar opposite

of the one pursued by McDonough. Whereas he begins by carefully distinguishing creation,

conservation, and concurrence, my strategy is to begin with the hypothesis that these three things

as more intimately related in Leibniz’s thought. We have already seen that Leibniz does not

think that there is an ontological distinction between conservation and concurrence. I would like

22

to take this one step further and suggest that Leibniz did not think there was an ontological

distinction between creation, conservation, and concurrence. In what follows I will attempt to

motivate and explain this interpretive hypothesis. I shall begin by sketching an interpretation of

CT1-CT3. This will lead us to an alternative ontological framework from which to consider

Leibniz’s views on divine causation.

CT1 is ambiguous. It states that each substance involves a nature/primitive force/law of

the series, but it does not specify the ontological relation between the nature, the force, the law,

and the substance. However, a number of textual and philosophical considerations suggest that

Leibniz strictly identified the nature of a substance with its primitive force, the law of the series,

and with the substance itself. In other words, the substance just is a nature/force/law. In what

follows I shall assume that this interpretive position is correct.47

What we now need is an analysis of what it means for a series of states to follow from the

nature/force/law (CT2). As a number of commentators have noted, Leibniz says much less about

how this is supposed to work than one would have liked. Given that Leibniz does not flesh out

the details of this aspect of his theory of causation, one legitimate task of the interpreter is to

attempt to fill in and extend the remarks that Leibniz has bequeathed us. I will do this by

focusing on the individuation of successive monadic states. The account that I present draws on

Leibniz’s distinction between perfection and limitation (discussed in §2), particularly his

characterization of the modifications of a substance as its limitations, and his claim that

“substances produce accidents by changes of their limits” (Huggard: 395).48 I proceed now to

the account.

A substance individuates a state by reflectively specifying temporal boundaries for an

interval of its duration.49 These boundaries consist in the interval’s interfaces with its preceding

23

and succeeding state. Let us spatially represent the initial interval in Figure 1. In the figure, A is

the initial state, B is the preceding state, and C is the succeeding state.

B A C

Figure 1

B and C make A determinate by bounding or limiting it. This does not imply that B and C make

A fully determinate, however. Full or complete determination would require that B and C

themselves be determinate. This means that B’s interface with its preceding state (call it D) and

C’s interface with its succeeding state (call it E) would also have to be specified. These

additional specifications are represented in Figure 2.

D B A C E

Figure 2

A complete determination of A would still not be attained, however, for the states bounding D

and E would also have to be specified, and so on, ad infinitum. This regress in the determination

of successive states is represented in Figure 3.

24

F D B A C E G

Figure 3

This analysis implies that a state is individuated to the extent that the series of states that bound it

is specified. But no state is ever rigorously individuated as this would require the specification

of an infinite series of states.50 The regress of determination involved in the individuation of the

substance’s states requires that the substance as a non-aggregated whole be ontologically and

conceptually prior to its successive states. It is conceptually prior because the only way to

conceive a state is by conceiving it as a limitation of the whole. It is ontologically prior because

if the substance did not exist as a determinate whole it would not be possible to reflectively

specify a state or a series of states. According to this analysis, any state that is specified “follows

from” the law. And this is just another way of affirming that all of a substance’s states or

modifications can be said to arise from its own depths (CT2). The ontological and conceptual

priority of the monad to its reflectively individuated states is (imperfectly) represented in Figure

4.

25

Figure 4

I have explained the sense in which each state of a substance is caused by the substance

itself. But Leibniz also speaks of each state of a monad as being caused by its preceding state

(CT3). Let us consider how this feature of Leibniz’s theory fits within the framework under

consideration. The regress of determination involved in the individuation of successive states

implies that each state in a specified series of states is limited by every other state in the series.

This suggests that states B, C, D, E, F, G, etc. are each partial causes of state A, while the

substance as a determinate whole is the total cause of state A. This explains how Leibniz can

speak of a substance’s states as being caused by other states and as being caused by the

substance itself, but it does not explain the unique relation between one state and its preceding

state. We can do this, I would suggest, by appealing to the notion of expression (or

representation). Insofar as a series of states is reflectively specified, each state in the series

expresses all the other states. But this expression comes in varying degrees of confusion and

distinctness. Each specified state most distinctly expresses its succeeding state and is most

distinctly expressed by its preceding state. It is only in this sense that one state can be thought of

as the cause of another state.

One possible objection to my interpretation of CT3 is that it would not allow intra-

substantial causation to be more real than inter-substantial causation. In the Discours de

métaphysique and the Monadologie (among other places) Leibniz provides an analysis of inter-

A

26

substantial causation in terms of degrees of expression.51 Although no finite substance can act

on another finite substance, strictly speaking, one substance can be said to act on another in

virtue of expressing that substance distinctly. More precisely, substance P can be said to act on

substance Q when P increases in its degree of expression relative to Q; and Q can be said to be

acted on by P when Q decreases in its degree of expression relative to P. Leibniz is concerned to

contrast this merely ideal inter-substantial causation with real intra-substantial causation. But if

intra-substantial causation is analyzed in terms of distinctness of expression, as I suggested

above, then how can Leibniz hold that intra-substantial causation is real?

One important point to emphasize in this context is that Leibniz need not be working with

a rigid distinction between the ideal and the real (a point that I will discuss in more detail later).

What Leibniz needs to be able to maintain is that intra-substantial causation is more real than

inter-substantial causation, and this is a claim that the interpretation I am suggesting allows him

to make. In the case of intra-substantial causation, the initially specified state literally

contributes to the bounding/determination of its succeeding state—something that does not occur

in the case of inter-substantial causation. This disanalogy is sufficient to show that intra-

substantial causation is more real than inter-substantial causation.52

We can begin to move beyond CT1-CT3 to Leibniz’s account of creation by contrasting

God’s knowledge of a finite substance with a substance’s understanding of itself. A substance

understands itself by reflectively specifying a state and conceiving that state as bounded by a

series of preceding and succeeding states. In order to completely understand the initially

specified state the substance would have to understand an actual infinity of determining states.

Leibniz does not think that a finite substance can attain a complete understanding of any of its

states.53 But the infinite substance does, of course. God does not attain such knowledge,

27

however, by starting with one state of a monad and working his way out to a completed infinite

series. On the contrary, God knows the monad as a non-aggregated whole sub specie

aeternitatis. And it is plausible to think that the Leibnizian God perceives a monad as a strictly

non-spatial and atemporal expression of its worldmates—not as an entity that is conditioned by

Newtonian temporal flow.54 If this is correct, then finite substances are non-spatial and

atemporal at the deepest level of Leibniz’s ontology. The reflective division of a monad into

successive temporal states, in contrast, occurs only at the level of appearances (or phenomena).55

This suggests that Leibniz was committed to the following account of creation: in a single

miraculous act God creates finite substances that are non-spatial and atemporal at the deepest

level of reality. I shall refer to this as the Strict Metaphysical Account of Creation.56

One might object that this account of creation implies that monads do not change, while

numerous texts clearly imply that they do.57 The first thing to note about this objection is that it

appears to assume that atemporality is incompatible with Leibnizian change. It is not clear that

this is a legitimate assumption. Leibniz defines change as an aggregate of contradictory states

where one state “follows from” the other.58 As Michael Futch has noted, this “following from”

need not be interpreted temporally (though it often has).59 Similarly, the “following” of a

monad’s series of states from its primitive force might also admit of a non-temporal

interpretation. In support of the suggestion that activity does not necessarily entail temporality

one can consider that God is an exemplar of a causally active being in the Leibnizian universe.60

And God’s activity is certainly not temporally conditioned. The initial point that I want to make,

then, is that Leibnizian change is not obviously incompatible with atemporality.

Attributing an atemporal notion of change to Leibniz is not the only possible strategy for

reconciling his remarks on change with the Strict Metaphysical Account of Creation. Another

28

possibility (the one that I will explore in the remainder of this paper) is that Leibniz’s considered

view on change is that it is a well-founded phenomenon. In order to explain this interpretive

strategy a few general comments must be made about Leibniz’s ontology. The first thing to note

is that there are degrees of reality in his ontology; some things are more real than others. Recent

commentators have argued that Leibniz’s mature ontology is distinguishable into three “levels”

or “tiers”: the monadic, the phenomenal, and the ideal.61 The monadic level, which is

constituted by monads, is the most real tier in the ontology. On the other end of the spectrum are

ideal things, such as space and time. These entities are “purely mental”, and thereby possess the

least reality in the ontology. The phenomenal level, in contrast, is positioned midway between

the monadic and ideal levels. Bodies and motion are paradigmatic examples of things that are

phenomenal; they are more real than ideal entities like space and time, but they are not fully real,

that is, they do not comprise the metaphysical “ground floor” of Leibniz’s ontology. Their

enhanced degree of reality is due to the fact that they, unlike space and time, are well-founded on

the reality of monads. Although well-founded phenomena are not fully-real, Leibniz is willing to

characterize them as “real.”62 This shows that the mere fact that Leibniz refers to change as

“real” does not imply that it is fully real;; it is also possible that change could be a well-founded

phenomenon.

In order to understand how change could be a well-founded phenomenon for Leibniz a

distinction must be drawn between a monad’s successive states and its détail. Leibniz frequently

claims that monads involve internal détail; he also claims that each substance involves a series of

successive states.63 But what is the relation between a substance’s détail and its successive

states? One might think that a monad’s successive states and its détail are one and the same, but

I think Leibniz is working with a subtle distinction here. In virtue of its “expression” or

29

representation of all of the other substances in the world (the “expression thesis” as it is called in

the secondary literature), each monad possesses détail.64 This détail is something that the monad

possesses from the perspective of divine omniscience. The successive states of a monad, on the

other hand, have temporal boundaries, which are distinguished only at the level of phenomena.

Such boundaries are not perceived from the perspective of divine omniscience. This does not

mean that successive states are not “real,” for the temporal boundaries that are reflectively

specified limit or “carve up” a monad’s détail. There is thus a foundation in reality for any state

or series of states that is reflectively specified at the level of phenomena. In other words, the

reality of a state consists in the détail that it confusedly contains (the détail is the representational

content of the state). But again, no state is more than a well-founded phenomenon because the

boundaries that limit the détail exist only at the phenomenal level (a monad’s détail is not

“carved up” at the deepest level of reality).65 Given that Leibniz defines change in terms of

states this suggests that change is a well-founded phenomena as well.66

The Strict Metaphysical Account of Creation has far reaching consequences for

understanding how Leibniz’s theory of causation differs from occasionalism, mere

conservationism, and standard accounts of divine concurrence. First, it implies that he subtly

rejects a presupposition common to all of these theories, namely that there is a real temporal

distance between a substance in an initial state and the substance in its subsequent states. This

presupposition is particularly important for the mere conservationist, for it allows him to claim

that the dependence of creatures on God at the initial moment of creation is immediate, but that

the dependence of the actions of creatures on God thereafter is only mediate. If one is committed

to the Strict Metaphysical Account of Creation, however, then the mere conservationist position

cannot get off the ground. Given that substances are not temporally conditioned (at the deepest

30

level of reality), there is no room for the dependence of creatures on God to be immediate at an

initial moment of creation and mediate thereafter.

The interpretation I have presented provides a clear solution to the Initial State Puzzle.

Given that substances do not have successive states at the deepest level of metaphysical rigor,

there is no initial state, strictly speaking. A substance only possesses successive states at the

level of phenomena. For any state that is reflectively specified, one can conceive that state as

being a consequence of a preceding state (in the sense specified above) ad infinitum. This

provides a plausible explanation of the fact that Leibniz is willing to affirm CT4 without making

an exception for initial states.67

The conclusion that successive states of a substance are only distinguished at the level of

phenomena suggests that divine conservation is a way of thinking about creation at the level of

phenomena. For any particular state that is specified, one can ask: do I depend on God in this

state any less than at “the time of my beginning”? The answer is always no. The dependence of

a creature on God at any specified state is complete and immediate because every successive

state is a phenomenal limitation of a substance that, at the deepest level of metaphysical rigor,

God creates and conserves in a single act. This single act eminently contains any state that is

reflectively individuated in a substance.

This analysis of the dependence of creatures on God explains Leibniz’s commitment to

CT4 (everything positive in creatures is produced immediately by the divine will) and CT5 (there

are no two times at which the dependence of creatures on God is different), and it is what leads

Leibniz to affirm the continual creation doctrine. As he puts it in the Système nouveau , “all

things, with all their reality, are continually produced by the power of God” (G 4: 483; AG:

143). This does not mean that God literally re-creates a substance in a series of successive states,

31

however, for the duration of a monad is not divided into successive states at the deepest level of

Leibniz’s ontology. Leibniz is willing to affirm the continual creation doctrine, I believe,

because it provides an acceptable way of conceptualizing the dependence of creatures on God at

the level of phenomena.

This conclusion is of the utmost importance for understanding how Leibniz’s theory of

creaturely activity differs in a principled way from occasionalism. His key point of disagreement

concerns the continual creation doctrine. Leibniz takes the occasionalists to be committed to the

re-creation of all things at every instant. Such a view would reduce the creature to a

discontinuous series of instantaneous states, where nothing that is created at one instant could

endure, strictly speaking, to the next. But that which does not endure can only be a modification,

not a substance. The purported “substance” would thereby resolve into a discontinuous

succession of modifications. In order to achieve an ontology of created substances, one must be

able to hold that a series of states arise from the depths of identically the same finite substance.

A straightforward commitment to the continual creation doctrine does not allow for this, but

Leibniz’s more nuanced affirmation of the doctrine does. It allows him to agree with the

occasionalists about the truth of CT4 without having to give up his commitment to CT1, CT2,

and CT3.

At this point one is likely to ask whether Leibniz’s account of causation is a theory of

divine concurrence. I would like to suggest that the label of “concurrence” is not of great

importance to Leibniz. What is of great importance is having a theory that allows him to

consistently affirm CT1-CT5 and to differ in principled ways from both occasionalism and mere

conservationism. The interpretation I have presented explains how Leibniz’s theory attains those

aims. As far as divine concurrence is concerned, I have suggested that Leibniz subtly rejects

32

certain features of the ontological framework that was typically assumed to be common ground

between concurrence theorists, occasionalists, and mere conservationists. I have also suggested

that—contra traditional concurrence theorists—Leibniz does not think that concurrence involves

a divine act that is ontologically distinct from creation and conservation. Nevertheless, one can

see why it would be natural for Leibniz to use concurrence language to describe his theory in

certain contexts. The key thing to note in this regard is that the analysis of CT1-CT5 that has

been provided implies that effects (as wholes) are produced immediately by God and by finite

substances, which is in keeping with a concurrence theory. As we have seen, the regress of

determination that is involved in the individuation of successive states implies that any

reflectively specified state follows from (or is produced by) the substance itself. In other words,

the substance itself is the immediate cause of all of its successive states. But God also can be

said to immediately produce these states because the states are phenomenal limitations of a

substance that God creates and conserves in a single act. These states do not have any reality

over and above the reality of the substance.68 On the contrary, the states just are the substance

considered as limited in one way or another. By creating the finite substance as a non-spatial and

atemporal whole, God is the immediate cause of any successive state of that substance that is

specified at the level of appearances (or phenomena).

Conclusion

I will conclude by saying a few words about the relevance of Leibniz’s exoteric manner

of presentation to the topic of divine and creaturely causation. It is well known that Leibniz

claims to present his philosophy in a popular or exoteric manner in his published works, though

surprisingly little work has been done to determine exactly what this means for the interpretation

33

of his philosophy.69 Because certain aspects of his philosophy were very far from “received

opinions” and “common sense,” he thought that they would be misunderstood and summarily

rejected if they were presented to the general public in a fully demonstrative form. Exoteric

works like the Essais de théodicée were designed to serve as intellectual stepping-stones that

would help his readers attain an introductory grasp of his views and prepare them for a more

rigorous form of presentation. Although the theory of monads, Leibniz’s views on time, and his

distinction between the ideal, the phenomenal, and the fully real are essential features of

Leibniz’s account of divine and creaturely action, they receive very little emphasis in the Essais

de théodicée (and similar works) or are bracketed entirely. This is less surprising than it might

initially seem. These are some of the most difficult features of Leibniz’s philosophy—features

that even his most sophisticated correspondents had great difficulty grasping. Rather than

highlighting the fact that he rejects certain features of the ontological framework within which

the traditional debate about divine and creaturely causation took place (a strategy that would

require explaining his subtle distinctions between the ideal, the phenomenal, and the fully real,

among other things), Leibniz invokes sensible analogies such as the heavy-laden barge to

introduce his readers to the perfection/limitation distinction. Such analogies provide an

imperfect but useful heuristic for thinking about the activity of finite substances and their

dependence on God. Leibniz’s more sophisticated readers will recognize that these are merely

analogies and that the distinctions he is drawing must be understood in a purely intellectual

manner. It is difficult to glean the deeper meaning of Leibniz’s distinctions based on what he

writes in the Essais de théodicée alone. By supplementing this text with what he says elsewhere

concerning the theory of monads, the labyrinth of the continuum, and the distinction between the

ideal, the phenomenal and the fully-real, I have attempted to piece together Leibniz’s unified

34

theory of causation. Although it admittedly goes beyond what Leibniz explicitly affirms on

several points, it constitutes a reasonable interpretive hypothesis about what Leibniz’s account

would have looked like if he had lived to compose a fully esoteric treatise on this subject.70

35

1 Durandus was a fourteenth century Dominican theologian. He is the only well known

Medieval figure to have endorsed mere conservationism. Durandus presents his view in his

commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences (In Sententias Theologicas Petri Lombardi

Commentariorum Libri Quattuor bk. 2, dist. 1, q. 5).

2 (G 4: 439; AG: 46), (G 4: 483; AG: 143), (G 4: 514; AG: 165), (G 6: 614; AG: 219),

(Huggard: 27-31).

3 See Nadler 1998: 219 and Adams 2013: 94. For Malebranche’s argument see OCM 12: 156-

8; JS: 112-6.

4 Sleigh 1990: 185 and Vailati 2002: 230 have expressed doubts about whether this can be

done.

5 McDonough 2007.

6 Well-known adherents of divine concurrence include Francisco Suarez (Disputationes

Metaphysicae, Disputation 22) and Luis de Molina (Liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, divina

praescientia, providentia, praedestinatione et reprobatione concordia, Part 2 Disputations 25-

28). For more on the traditional debate between mere conservationists, occasionalists, and

concurrentists see Freddoso (1991), (1994).

7 For an insightful discussion of Leibniz’s early views on creation and creaturely activity see

Mercer 2001: 225–242.

8 See also LDB: 113 and G 3: 680.

9 Catherine Wilson (1989, 1999) and Daniel Garber (2008, 2009) have been the most vocal

critics of the idea that Leibniz’s metaphysics is systematic. A strong defense of the thesis that

Leibniz intended his philosophy to be systematic has been presented by Maria Rosa Antognazza

36

2008. See also Nelson 2013 for an illuminating defense of the systematic approach to

interpreting early modern philosophers.

10 See e.g., (G 3: 624), (G 3: 66-7; WF: 127), (LDB: 83), and (G3: 302-3).

11 I present an interpretation of Leibniz’s views on the esoteric/exoteric distinction in “Leibniz

and the Problem of Esoteric Philosophy” (manuscript). See also Rutherford (1996).

12 In this paper I bracket the controversial issue of whether Leibniz’s views on corporeal

substance can be squared with a strictly monadological metaphysics. See Garber 2009 and

Adams 1994: 262-340.

13 This interpretive claim presupposes that Leibniz does not treat appetition as a fundamentally

different sort of modification than perception, a position argued for by McRae 1976: 59-60,

Clatterbaugh 1973:8-9, and Kulstad 1990.

14 See e.g., (G 4: 439; AG: 47), (G 6: 607-8; AG: 213-4).

15 (G 4: 478-9; AG: 139), (G 2: 136; LA: 170), (G 4: 507-12; AG: 158-63), (G 2:171; AG:

173), (G 4: 548-9; WF: 104), (G 2: 264; L: 535), (Huggard: 291).

16 (G 4: 439-40; AG: 47), (G 4: 484-5; AG: 143-4), (G 4: 573-4; WF: 139), (G 6: 567; WF:

196), (G 6: 609-10; AG: 215), (Huggard: 65), (Huggard: 400).

17 (G 4: 439-40; AG: 47), (G 4: 573-4; WF: 139), (G 3: 468; WF: 179), (G 6: 610; AG:

216).

18 See e.g., G 4: 485; AG: 144.

19 See e.g., G 2: 275; AG: 181.

20 See e.g. G 4: 440; AG: 47.

21 Another important interpretive question about CT2 and CT3 concerns the kind of causation

that these theses are supposed to involve. One might initially think that Leibniz must be

37

speaking of a kind of efficient causation. After all, he is perfectly comfortable describing simple

substances as “automates incorporels” (G 6: 610;; AG: 215). Nevertheless, in a number of texts

Leibniz claims that simple substances “act according to the laws of final causes,” while bodies

“act according to the laws of efficient causes or of motions” (G 6: 620;; AG: 223). What does

Leibniz think that acting according to the laws of final causes entails? And does he mean to

claim here that neither CT2 nor CT3 involve efficient causation? I will not be providing a full

treatment of this issue in the present paper, though I will briefly discuss some implications of my

view for this issue in note 51.

22 Leibniz does speak of a “premier estat” in a letter to Arnauld (G 2: 91).

23 This is the way that Sleigh interprets Leibniz in Sleigh 1991: 130.

24 See Nicholas Jolley 2009 for an insightful discussion of this interpretive problem. Jolley’s

solution to this puzzle is similar to the one that I offer in the final section of this paper to the

extent that he emphasizes the atemporality of Leibnizian monads.

25 (G 4: 439-40; AG: 46), (G 4: 483; AG: 143), (G 6: 568; WF: 197), (G 4: 514; AG: 165),

(Huggard: 27).

26 Huggard: 385.

27 Sleigh 1991: 185.

28 Adams 1994: 96 and Lee 2004: 208-12.

29 The relation of the theory of monads to Leibniz’s Essais de théodicée is a controversial issue

in the secondary literature. I am broadly in agreement with Antonio Lamarra who has argued

that the monadology is “un des éléments constitutifs de son horizon théoretique” despite the fact

that it is not fully elaborated in the Essais de théodicée (Lamarra 2009: 15). For an opposing

view see Daniel Garber (forthcoming).

38

30 This controversial interpretive claim presupposes that Leibniz does not treat appetition as a

fundamentally different sort of modification than perception, a position argued for by McRae

1976: 59-60, Clatterbaugh 1973: 8-9, and Kulstad 1990. It also presupposes that Leibniz is not

committed to a substratum (or substratum-like) conception of substance.

31 For more on the notion of original limitation see Antognazza (forthcoming).

32 Alfred Freddoso identifies this general problem in his discussion of Durandus’ objections to

concurrentism (Freddoso 1994:143-5). Lee rejects a similar model of co-operative production,

which he terms the “dual productive cause model” (Lee 2004: 212-20).

33 Lee takes Leibniz to be committed to a strict privation/negation account of limitation. As a

result, he is forced to conclude that the perfection/limitation distinction is of no use in

distinguishing Leibniz’s position from occasionalism (Lee 2004: 209-212). Adams also claims

that Leibniz utilizes the perfection/limitation distinction more as a means for avoiding the

conclusion that God is the author of sin than as a means for forging “a metaphysical middle way

between occasionalism and deism” (Adams 1994: 96).

34 See also G 3: 457 and Huggard: 395.

35 Leibniz tells Charles Hugony that he presents his views in the Essais de théodicée “un peu

familierement” (November 1710 G 3: 680).

36 Robert Adams (1994: 94–99) André Robinet (986:418–442) and Sukjae Lee (2004) all take

Leibniz to (relatively) straightforwardly endorse the continual creation doctrine. Jeffrey

McDonough (2007) disagrees on this point.

37 Whipple 2010b.

38 I argue for all of these theses in Whipple 2011.

39

39 Or, more carefully, at least not all of the “aspects” would be privations, for sins would be mere

privations.

40 McDonough could try to finesse this objection by insisting that there is a sense in which the

creature depends just as much on God in its subsequent states as it does in its initial states

because in neither case is the creature capable of existing or producing an effect independently of

God. If the creature is incapable of existing or producing an effect on its own then it is

“completely” dependent on God. Given that the creature is completely dependent on God in all

of its states (initial or non-initial) then there are no two times at which the dependence of

creatures on God is different.

41 Translation by Sleigh.

42 This position is also explicitly taken by Vialati 2002: 209.

43 For Suarez see DM 22, sect. I. For Molina see Concordia pt II, disp. 25, sect. 15.

44 For more on contra naturam miracles see Freddoso 1991: 573-77.

45 See e.g., (G 4: 483; AG: 143), (G 6: 614; AG: 219), (Huggard: 27), and (Huggard: 31).

46 This is also implied in his remarks on divine concurrence in section 27 of the Essais de

théodicée.

47 This thesis has been defended by Cover and Hawthorne 2001: 224 and Whipple 2010a.

48 For Leibniz’s characterization of modifications as limitations see G 2: 270;; AG: 180 and G 3:

457; WF: 201).

49 One question raised by the account I am sketching is whether all monads reflectively

individuate states or only spirits. I believe that only sprits reflectively individuate states because

reflection is a form of apperception and Leibniz holds that only spirits apperceive (see e.g. G 6:

599-600; AG: 208-209). This does not imply that non-apperceptive substances do not have

40

states in any sense, however, for the states of non-apperceptive substances might be individuated

from a third person perspective. I sketch an account of this in Whipple 2011: 16-17. Although

Leibniz is not fully explicit in endorsing the position that I sketch, I suggest that it is in keeping

with the things that he does say on the subject. The details of Leibniz’s account of reflection and

his account of the difference between apperceptive and non-apperceptive monads are notoriously

murky. See Jorgensen 2011 for an insightful discussion of Leibniz’s account of reflection.

50 This consideration does not rule out the possibility that successive states might be individuated

from the perspective of divine omniscience. I discuss the issue of God’s knowledge of

successive states later in this section.

51 (G 4: 440; AG: 48), (G 6: 615; AG: 219). See also Huggard: 66.

52 The interpretation of CT1-CT3 that I have provided has the resources to address the much-

discussed question of how to properly characterize monadic spontaneity. Is it only a kind of

final causation or is efficient causation involved as well? I am in general agreement with

Rutherford (2005) and McDonough (2008) who claim that monadic causation involves both final

and efficient causation.52 Although I do not have the space to fully explore the point here, my

interpretation provides a unique way of conceiving of the complimentary nature of efficient and

final causation in the monadic realm. The short story is that CT3, which focuses on the relation

between the successive states of a monad, is a kind of efficient causation. It is from this

perspective that monads can be described as “automates incorporels,” though it does not imply

that the succession of monadic states is governed by the same laws that govern efficient

causation in the realm of bodies (this latter point is emphasized in Rutherford 2005: 166). CT2,

which concerns the relation between a successive state and the monad as a whole, is a kind of

final causation. As we have seen, each state tends toward and follows from the monad as a

41

determinate whole. The monad as a determinate whole is a representation of the universe—the

best possible world—from its particular point of view. There is thus a sense in which each state

of a substance tends towards the good, which is most naturally described as a kind of final

causation. And just as CT2 and CT3 should be thought of as complimentary (rather than

opposed) causal theses, there is no problem conceiving the monadic realm as governed by

efficient and final causation.

53 See e.g., G 6: 617; AG: 221, and Huggard: 403.

54 Although each substance is an expression of its worldmates no two expressions are exactly the

same because of differences in degrees of the clarity and confusion of the expression. As

Leibniz frequently claims, each substance expresses the universe from a particular point of view.

See DM 14; AG: 46-7.

55 I do not mean to suggest that it immediately follows from the fact that monads are atemporal

that they don’t have successive states at the deepest level of reality. As I note below one might

think that Leibniz has an atemporalist account of successive states and change.

56 Jaques Jalabert presents a single act interpretation of creation in his important (and

insufficiently appreciated) work La Theorie Leibnizienne de la Substance 1947: 167-78.

57 See G 6: 608; AG: 214.

58 See A 6.iv: 569 and A 6.iv: 556. See also Rutherford 2005: 161-2.

59 2008: 161. See also Jalabert 1947: 208.

60 Nicholas Jolley has argued that Leibniz modeled finite causation on divine causation (1998).

61 See McGuire 1976 and Hartz and Cover 1988. This interpretation is opposed to that provided

by Rescher 1979: 84-104 and Mates 1985: 227-240, according to which Leibniz utilized a two-

tiered ontology. Adams has argued that it is misleading to think of Leibnizian phenomena as

42

occupying a single level, for some phenomena are more real than others. One instance of this is

a distinction that Leibniz draws between real and imaginary phenomena (G 7: 319-22; L: 363-

6). I concur with Adams’ general point;; but I am not convinced that Leibniz would go so far as

to affirm that phenomena are best seen ‘as an infinite gradation of approximations to reality’

(1994: 254).

62 See G 2: 253; AG: 178.

63 See e.g., (G 4: 562, WF: 116), (G 6: 608; AG: 214), (G 6: 598; AG: 207), (Huggard: 396),

(G 2: 43; LA: 47), (G 2: 263-4; L: 534-5).

64 See e.g., G 6: 608; AG: 214.

65 Leibniz’s use of terminology fluctuates with respect to the détail/state distinction (as it does on

a number of issues). For example, in some contexts he uses the word “modifications” to refer to

successive states (G 3: 457; WF: 201), (G 2: 270; AG: 180), (Huggard: 395), while in others

he uses it to refer to a monad’s détail (G 4: 562; WF: 115-16), and (G 6: 608; AG: 214).

66 This view is in keeping with that of French commentator Jacques Jalabert, who has argued that

Leibniz’s considered position on change is that it is phenomenal (Jalabert 1947: 208). It also

coheres with the approaches in Nelson 2005b and Pessin 2006.

67 As I noted earlier, Leibniz does speak of a “premier estat” in a letter to Arnauld G 2: 91. One

possible explanation for this disparity is that Leibniz is assuming what he takes to be the standard

temporal framework for the sake of argument in his correspondence with Arnauld.

68 Leibniz emphasizes this crucial point in his 30 June 1704 letter to De Volder, G 2: 270; AG:

180.

69 See note 11.

43

70 I am grateful to Michael Futch, Andrew Janiak, Nick Jolley, Mark Kulstad, Paul Lodge, Jeff

McDonough, Alan Nelson, Robert Sleigh, and Donald Rutherford for discussions of the ideas

contained in this paper and for helpful comments on earlier drafts.