legitimating leadership

http://epx.sagepub.comEducational Policy

DOI: 10.1177/0895904809354320 2010; 24; 110 Educational Policy

Brendan Maxcy, Ekkarin Sungtong and Thu Suong Thi Nguyen Local Responses to Neoliberal Reforms

Legitimating Leadership in Southern Thai Schools: Considering

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Legitimating Leadership in Southern Thai Schools: Considering Local Responses to Neoliberal Reforms

Brendan Maxcy,1 Ekkarin Sungtong,2 and Thu Suong Thi Nguyen1

AbstractMounting religious-ethnic tensions and broad-scale reform have precipitated reconsideration of the mission, traditions, operations and institutional positions of government schools in southern Thailand. The authors report on a study of a dozen schools located in four border provinces adapting to national reforms and regional unrest. The authors find emergent strategies conditioned by reform policies whereby school leaders seek to reorganize, reestablish, and reposition schools in their respective communities. Through a critical analysis of leadership, the authors explore the interplay of local strategies and broader neoliberal reform logics oriented to relegitimate the Thai state. Drawing on work by Robertson and Dale, and James Conroy, we discuss near-term displacement of legitimation crises through neoliberal localization that may prove problematic over the long haul.

Keywordsleadership, Islamic schooling, school-community relations, Neoliberalism

1Indiana University School of Education at Indianapolis2Pattani campus of Prince of Songkla University

Corresponding Author:Brendan D. Maxcy, IU School of Education, IUPUI, 902 West New York Street, ES 3138, Indianapolis, IN 46202, [email protected]

EPX354320EPX10.1177/0895904809354320Educational PolicyMaxcy et al.



Maxcy et al. 111

Introduction

An outgrowth of a popular push for democratic reforms, Thailand’s 1997 constitution had important implications for the provision of educational ser-vices. Reforms outlined in “the people’s constitution” and subsequent legis-lation promised to expand and improve educational delivery. Beyond expanding access, the education reforms promoted greater sensitivity to and incorporation of local customs and practices congruent with Thailand’s mul-tiethnic society. The financial crisis that beset Asia the same year compli-cated the reform agenda. Ironically, hopes vested in education rose as economic fortunes and educational investments fell. The opening lines of the National Education Act of 1999 (NEA-1999) suggest the dissatisfaction with and hope vested in the educational system as a means to reestablish Thailand’s competitive edge in the global market,

The economic, political, cultural and social crisis has caused all con-cerned to realize the expediency for the reform of Thai education. The urgently needed reform will undoubtedly redeem the country from the downward spiral, so that Thailand will arise in the immediate future as a nation of wealth, stability and dignity, capable of competing with others in this age of globalization. (NEA-1999)

Reflective of this rhetoric, the expansive program encompassed (a) reforms to intensify and expand curriculum and introduce learner-cen-tered pedagogies; (b) new standards for educator preparation, development, and promotion; (c) moves to devolve authority to local agents and decentral-ize delivery through public and private providers; (d) designs to mobilize investment from a wider range of public and private sources; and (e) new educational standards and a quality assurance system (Office of the Education Council, 2004).

Near Thailand’s southern border—a predominately Muslim region—reform intersected with the reemergence of antigovernment activity. Simmering ten-sions between regional separatists and government forces intensified in the late 1990s unleashing a wave of violence claiming more than 2,000 lives since January 2004 (International Crisis Group [ICG], 2007). Extremists targeted government agencies including schools, viewing these as outposts of Bangkok’s administrative and assimilationist program (Sullivan, 2005). Dozens of gov-ernment schools have been firebombed and more than 30 teachers and admin-istrators murdered since early 2004. As a result, educators face intense sociopolitical unrest as they respond to the reform program outlined above.



112 Educational Policy 24(1)

In circumstances of sociopolitical instability, taken-for-granted conceptions of state and politics, society and social life cease to provide secure footing as “platforms for action or as discrete objects of rational planning” (Greenhouse, 2002, p. 1). It stands to reason that mounting religious-ethnic tensions and broad-scale reform precipitated reconsideration of the mission, traditions, operations, and institutional positions of government schools in southern Thailand. In this article, we report on an inquiry into a dozen schools located in four provinces adjusting to the national reforms and the regional destabiliza-tion. We find strategies conditioned by the reform program whereby school leaders seek to reorganize, reestablish, and reposition the schools in their com-munities. Through a critical analysis of leadership, we explore the interplay of local strategies and broader neoliberal reform logics oriented to relegitimating the Thai state. Drawing on work by Robertson and Dale (2002) and James Conroy (2001, 2004), we discuss near-term displacement of legitimation crises through neoliberal localization that may prove problematic over the long haul.

Approach to the StudyPolicies “are both systems of values and symbolic systems; ways of represent-ing, accounting for and legitimating political decisions” (Ball, 1998, p. 124). This occurs in part, Ball suggests, by denigrating past policies, deem-ing these backward and inconceivable in light of new insights. Adopting this view and informed by the work of Ball (1987, 1990, 1994), Gary Anderson (1990, 1996, 1998a, 1998b), William Foster (1986, 2004), Richard Bates (1987, 1995) and others (Gee, Hull, & Lankshear, 1996; Grace, 2000; Gronn, 2003; Lipman, 2004; Starratt, 2003), we offer a critical study of leadership drawing on concepts from critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 1995) and organizational politics (Bacharach & Mundell, 1993; Larson, 1997). These concepts are employed to connect the macro (reform policy) and micro (local actor) logics to “explicate the ruling relations that organize and coordinate the local experiences of the informants” (Campbell & Gregor, 2004, p. 89). Our critique is not intended to denigrate Thai leadership or reform efforts as “back-ward” or poorly conceived. To the contrary, we seek to illuminate the ways in which imposed reform solutions based on purportedly universal neoliberal log-ics resolve into new problems as these intersect with particular local context.

Fairclough (1995) asserts the “power to control discourse [corresponds to] . . . the power to sustain particular discursive practices with particular ideological investments in dominance over other alternative (including oppositional) prac-tices” (p. 2). The study of discourse to unearth the governing mentality or gov-ernmentality of modern society derives from the work of Michel Foucault (1991, see also, Foucault, 1977, 1980). Foster notes the importance of Foucault’s conception of this habit of mind or “technology of thought”:



Maxcy et al. 113

It suggests that an administrative mentality pervades modern society and is exerted through what Foucault labeled technologies of thought. Such technologies, although not completely controlling, do exert a primary influence on the way we think and act, and they are exerted, in a sense, through the influence of leadership. (Foster, 2004, p. 177)

As employed here, analysis of the Thai reform discourse is largely congru-ent with the analytic framework for organizational politics offered by Bacharach and Mundell (1993), particularly as this involves study of political language (see Larson, 1997). That approach focuses on the coalescence of interests around particular means–ends relationships or logics of action, in this case, neoliberal logics emphasizing market forces to animate reforms. Governance logics of this sort suggest coherence among objectives “which then become criteria that can be used to evaluate individual decisions and procedures and organizational practices” (Bacharach & Mundell, 1993, p. 427).

If we see an organization as a collection of resources (be they sym-bolic, as prestige, rules, beliefs, etc. or material, as money, time human resources, capital), the logic of action is the means-end relationship that specifies relationships among these resources. To control the logic of action is by definition to control all aspects of organizational life. As such, the control in allocating organizational resources as means, ends, or both represents the ultimate organizational prize. (Bacharach & Mundell, 1993, p. 468)

By approaching micropolitical analysis of school leadership through log-ics of action, Bacharach and Mundell (1993) offer a window into the align-ment of organizational activity to logics expressed in the wider policy environment in which southern Thai schools operate, whether formalized in policy or enacted as legitimating cultural scripts.

Data Sources and Data AnalysisWe are interested in the interplay of the micro-level (i.e. intra-organizational) and macro-level (i.e. inter- and extra-organizational reform policies, prevail-ing social relationships, etc.) logics. Fairclough’s (1995) three-dimensional framework helps elucidate these and examine ways institutions establish and enforce “regimes of truth”—akin to logics of action—defining social identi-ties and activities in a society such as Thailand. Inquiry focuses on the inter-play among texts, discursive practices, and wider social relationships.




In this study, the primary texts used to shed light on the interplay between the reform discourse and administrative practices include interviews (60 to 120 min) with 12 principals. These interviews draw from a study conducted in 2006 of educator responses to the sociopolitical unrest and the national reforms across a dozen public secondary schools. The schools, spread across four southern provinces, were purposively selected to provide variation in size, type (rural vs. urban), and intensity of local conflict.1 Though not directly quoted in this article, interviews of similar length with teachers, par-ents, and community members provided texts to triangulate findings. Additional texts include government documents such as the text of the con-stitution, facilitative legislation, press releases, and reports; reports and stud-ies from state universities and affiliates; and press releases, reports, and stories available in the print and broadcast media. With the exception of the interviews, all texts are public documents and cited.

Descriptions of pertinent discursive practices derive from these texts. Understanding education reform as a “technology of control” (Ball, 1990), we study how articulation of and commentary on reform policies interact with local discursive practices enacted and embodying the reforms (Ball, 1994). The analysis thereby unearths and maps the changes in and legitima-tion of prevailing social relationships governing work within and among organizations.

Accepting that theory generation is never purely inductive (Habermas, 1972; Schwandt, 1993), the study employs a critical orientation to inform theory development through systematic gathering and analysis of data (Carspecken, 1996). “Informed on the ground and by dialogue,” this type of analysis is critically oriented through “awareness of the historical and persis-tent power dynamics, which have often been unequally and disproportion-ately manifested” (Guajardo & Guajardo, 2004, p. 523). As the usefulness of the account hinges on its credibility, techniques to ensure trustworthiness included member checking, peer debriefing, prolonged engagement, and tri-angulation (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).

BackgroundAn extensive history of Thailand’s educational system and recurrent unrest near its southern border is beyond the scope of this article. An abbreviated overview of recent reforms and reemergence of unrest is demanded to con-vey the complexity of the current operating context. We briefly recount a democratic push in the 1990s, steps to resolve Thailand’s economic crash in the late 1990s, and a short sketch of the reemergence of insurgent activity in the south.



Maxcy et al. 115

A Push for Popular Rule

Founded as a constitutional monarchy in 1932, Thailand has oscillated between authoritarian and democratic regimes under 17 constitutions—and is presently revisiting the most recent. The nation encompasses a multiethnic, multilingual society of Thai (>45%), Lao-Thai (~35%), Sino-Thai (~12%), and Malay-Thai (~4%) citizens and other smaller groups. Beginning in the late 19th century, the Bangkok government sought to politically, administra-tively, linguistically, and culturally unify the country (Forbes, 1982; Suhrke, 1970). Although distinct dialects and cultural forms remain, most citizens now speak the central Thai dialect used in government and promoted in the educational system.

Constitutional changes notwithstanding, center–local relationships in Thailand were relatively stable during the first three quarters of the 20th cen-tury maintaining the unitary governmental form established under Rama V in the early part of the century (Mutebi, 2004). Despite the establishment of local and provincial governments, the three-tiered framework established in the Administrative Law of 1933 effectively subordinated local governments to those above. Economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s contributed to a middle- and working-class press for democratic reform. A notorious 1992 crackdown on demonstrators protesting the 1991 military coup was a water-shed in the popular push to devolve authority, impelling the military to step back and elites to promise electoral and administrative reform (Mutebi, 2004; Painter, 2006).

Devolution took shape in the mid-1990s. At that time, the unitary Thai gov-ernment featured “a highly centralized fiscal system that granted limited local autonomy in terms of functions, area, staffing, funding and decision making” (Weist, 2001, p. 1). The apparent inability of the highly centralized, state bureau-cracy to deliver public services to and resolve issues in the provinces contributed to the press for decentralization (Mutebi, 2004). The Tambon Administrative Organization Act of 1994 and subsequent legislation relating to the promulgation of the 1997 constitution (e.g., Decentralization Act of 1999, Bureaucratic Reform Act of 2002), promised to enhance local self-rule via sub-national governments though the transfer of functional responsibilities and “autonomization” (Bowomwathana, 2005). The effort sought to curb corruption and ensure responsiveness by encouraging citizen participation in policy making and increasing accountability of the government to the public (Mutebi, 2004).

Reforms under the 1997 constitution had important implications for the pro-vision of educational services, expanding rights to education for Thai citizens,




and reflecting greater sensitivity to local customs and practices in the educa-tional program. The challenging reform guidelines sketched in the constitution were pursued through the “holistic reform of education” under the “master legislation” of the NEA-1999, discussed in the following sections.

Response to Economic CrisisNEA-1999 provided facilitative legislation guiding the expansion of educa-tional rights sketched in the constitution adopted in October 1997. The act must be considered in light of Thailand’s dramatic economic downturn the prior summer. After two decades of rapid economic growth, the Thai stock market crashed in July with a sudden devaluation relative to the dollar of the long-stable Thai baht, leading to the so-called Tom Yam Kung crisis.

To shore up the Thai economy, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) pro-vided an assistance package of US$4 billion (ultimately increasing to US$17 billion). As “conditionalities” (Stiglitz, 2002) of the bailout, Thai officials com-mitted to a program of privatization and decentralization of public service delivery (Nimmanahaeminda & Wibulswasdi, 1997). To foster a “slimmer yet more effective state” (Camdessus, 2000), the IMF pressed for austerity mea-sures including a one-third reduction of the civil service (Office of the Education Council, 2004), which included school teachers and administrators.

As a country on the rise in the 1980s and 1990s, the financial crisis and loss of sovereignty under the bailout program demoralized the Thai people (Fry, 2004). The reforms were unpopular and progressed slowly with some indicators suggesting increased centralization (King & Guerra, 2005) mirroring wider trends under the Thaksin regime (Mutebi, 2004; Painter, 2006). Whatever the long-term prospects, the reforms altered taken-for-granted institutions. Roland White, co-author of East Asia Decentralizes (King & Guerra, 2005) offers,

Most countries are caught in an “institutional limbo” between the dis-solution of old, top-down service-delivery mechanisms and the emer-gence of still-weak local government structures . . . A combination of robust political leadership, smart strategic focus, and real technical effort will be required if countries are to make the new decentralized systems effective. (Fossberg, 2005)

These issues are magnified for educators near the southern border—an area in which an intensifying antigovernment sentiment and activity revealed deep social, cultural, and political divisions among residents and government officials.



Maxcy et al. 117

Reemergence of Regional Unrest

A societal schism between the regional Muslim majority (~80%) and the Bangkok government aligned to Thailand’s Buddhist majority (>90%) com-plicates reform in the southern border provinces. Representing fewer than 5% of Thai citizens, nearly 80% of Thailand’s Muslim minority of 4 million lives in this region annexed in 1902.2 This group maintains a distinct identity rooted in Malay ethnicity and language and Islamic faith. This identity sur-vives despite a government program of forced assimilation from the 1930s to the 1970s (Bonura, 2002; True, 2004). Largely unsuccessful, these efforts alienated Muslims and fostered antagonistic relationships with local offi-cials, as many as 90% of whom are relocated Buddhists unfamiliar with Muslim culture and mores (ICG, 2005; Lintner, 2006).

Since the 1940s, the government battled an ongoing if fragmented regional insurgency growing out of this antipathy and led by a number of groups. (Croissant, 2005; ICG, 2005). Owing in part to promises from Bangkok to improve funding to and increase political representation for the south, separat-ist struggles waned during the economic boom of the 1980s and 1990s (BBC News, 2005) but reemerged in the wake of the regional economic downturn and shifting political climate of the late 1990s (Montesano, 2001).

While causes for the reemergence of hostilities are not clear-cut, it is clear that southern Thailand presents an increasingly difficult operating environ-ment for schools.3 Escalating regional violence has claimed more than 2,000 lives since 2004. Public sector facilities are common targets, and dozens of schools have been firebombed since that time. The following section presents and discusses findings relating to administrative responses to the reforms to secure the position of the schools in the region. In the main, these practices appear reasonable and largely predictable responses under the prevailing reform logics. However, conditioned by the setting of the school and proxim-ity to conflict, our findings suggest these reinforce existing cleavages in potentially problematic ways that may ultimately prove untenable. Perhaps an exception that proves the rule, we also note a promising and seemingly unorthodox response in one school in a high-conflict zone.

FindingsThe NEA-1999 reforms and associated legislation such as the Decentralization Reforms of 1999 and Bureaucratic Reform of 2002 restructured the Thai edu-cational bureaucracy decentralizing administration and devolving decision making to local and regional levels. According to the Ministry of Education,




The recent reform of educational administration and management is based on the following three principles: (1) unity in policy and diversity in implementation; (2) decentralization of authority to educational ser-vice areas, educational institutions and local administration organiza-tions; and (3) people’s participation in educational administration and management at central level as well as in educational service areas and educational institutions. (Office of the Education Council, 2004, p. 38

Decentralization in Thailand encompasses reform of funding arrange-ments for public sector services (Office of the Education Council, 2004). Traditionally, Thailand featured highly centralized funding of the public sec-tor. In 1997, local agencies accounted for about 5% of total public outlay, increasing to nearly 9% by 2002 (Amornivivat, 2004). Moreover, local revenues devoted to health and education were subject to substantial central government dictates. Provisions of the 1997 Constitution clarified in subse-quent legislation were intended to mobilize local resources and investment in education. The Ministry of Education bore responsibility to devise a plan to transfer local educational functions and funding arrangements to the local governments, within parameters established at the national level.

As discussed below, new financing relationships accompanying the decentralization reforms may intensify school selectivity of students widen-ing opportunity gaps among students and contributing to “uneven geographi-cal development” (Harvey, 2005) among schools. Conditioned by the unrest, this development may foster increased ethnic-religious homogenization—though we have noted promising instances of “unorthodox” responses (see Maxcy, Sungtong, & Nguyen, in press). We now examine enactment of these principles in the forms of strategic management of enrollments and encour-aging institution of new fees to underwrite and expand services.

Responses to Reforms in the SouthSecuring operating funds through strategic enrollment management. New

pressures to secure school funding were frequently identified as challenges by the principals interviewed, though the nature of the challenges and the responses varied across the region. Furthermore, interviews suggested the reform policies affected administrative practices, directing attention to the local communities, though the attention was distributed somewhat unevenly. Of note, the responses suggested substantial variation in the capac-ity to secure funding through direct appeals to patrons or by maximizing enrollments and thereby funds generated through the per-head allotment. A principal of a large school noted the advantage:



Maxcy et al. 119

The largest budget from the government is distributed to the Ministry of Education (MOE), but [most of] . . . it goes to teachers’ salary . . . . Then the rest of the money is used on the per head support . . . [at about] 1,800 baht/head for the lower secondary level and 2, 700 baht/head for higher secondary level. We have [more than 3000] students in this school and I think you can imagine how much money we get. In case of small schools, I guess you can imagine how much they get?

A rural school principal concurred that the new finance arrangements under the reforms resulted in shortfalls,

There is nothing [left for us] . . . there really is nothing (speaks loudly) . . . . In the past, we had all things, such as expenses for general affairs or constructions, etc. Now, we get only a per head budget subsidy that is not enough for us.

Although Thai schools operate within defined local attendance areas, stu-dents petition for enrollment in preferred schools on a space available basis. In addition, schools are allowed to enroll additional students from outside that zone. A school may set aside up to 30% of its seats for these students. As a result, better resourced schools realize increasing returns as selectivity in admissions leads to increased school performance enhancing the school’s appeal to applicants.

Recently, we found that community members do not have trust in our school. The reason is because there is another good school here [that we are competing with] . . . . Most students will head to that school first. And then, they will come to this school if they don’t pass standard tests . . . . I can’t tell you exactly, but you know. The numbers of stu-dents here go down. The students decrease and we cannot get the number of students expected. We have to wait and we get the leftovers (students with low achievement from other schools).

Issues of trust and securing market share extend to other dimensions of school choice including preference for religious schools. In some areas—notably those with higher levels of conflict and greater antipathy toward gov-ernment assimilation programs—exodus from government schools was exacerbated by the migration of students to growing numbers of private schools teaching Islam (PSTI).




Competing for a share of Muslim student population. As noted, assimila-tionist programs pressed in government schools were antithetical to Mus-lim identity development (Yegar, 2002). Avoiding these, Muslim families in the middle of the 20th century overwhelmingly enrolled in traditional and culturally congruent podoh schools. Beginning with the Prem regime, Thai governments of the 1980s and 1990s pursued more accomodationist policies toward Muslims in the south. In addition to greater political recog-nition of the Malay-Muslim identity and language, the government began to provide funding to those PSTI offering composite religious and academic curriculum.

Historically under-resourced, eligibility for growing levels of government funding allowed PSTI to expand services and increase enrollments since the late 1970s (ICG, 2007).4 Capitalizing on market logics, enterprising Muslim educators leveraged these policies to recruit new students. One principal of a rural government school noted,

In the past, there were a lot of Thai Muslim students who came to study at this school, and they didn’t need to go to downtown schools. Nowadays, it’s the opposite. Thai Muslim people send their children to private Islamic schools. This causes the number of students in this school to dramatically decrease. We just have 470 students left so far; but it increased a little bit compared with the number of students last year.

Consistent with tensions over past assimilation efforts discussed above, the principal believed parental preference for these schools is rooted in cul-tural and religious practice.

Private Islamic schools can better serve needs and ways of life of Thai Muslim people. Thai Muslim parents think that it’s a better opportu-nity to send their children to study at private Islamic schools, not the public schools.

Echoing this, another rural principal noted that the new funding arrange-ments, which provided PSTI access to government monies, allowed these schools to tap pools of potential enrollees through investments in transporta-tion.

When the government supports the educational budget for private Islamic schools, it becomes an educational business for these schools. These schools use the money from the government to buy buses and



Maxcy et al. 121

they can transport students to schools. It’s convenient for students and this is a reason that many students head to private Islamic schools . . . . Thai Muslim parents think that it’s better to send their children to study at private Islamic schools, not the public schools.

Given the large pool of potential enrollees in a region that is predomi-nately Muslim, intensified competition for students from PSTI posed a sig-nificant challenge. As noted below, regional violence further undermined the appeal of government schools in high-conflict areas to Muslim and Buddhist students alike.

Still, neither academic reputation nor preferences for religious education were wholly determinative. Recognizing the appeal of a strong academic reputation, the principal of the King Rama School (a pseudonym) moved to increase the school’s reputation through strategic investment in interschool competitions. This principal believed the school could attract applicants by promoting a value-added approach through which good teaching and extra assistance advanced student performance.

I think we’re successful. For example, from out of the eight competition events on academic contests held in the province, our students won seven competitions in Foreign Language contests. We could beat [a more highly regarded local school] which is better than our school. I can say we’re successful. Students won English speaking contests, story-telling con-tests, English singing contests and English quizzes. We got almost all of the awards. Students from the Thai language section also won competi-tions in Thai composition, speaking, slogan writing contest, . . . and . . . good things also happened in science subject areas. This is because we are promoting academic excellence based on our beliefs that we can develop students’ capacities. Other schools may have good inputs, but if we train our students seriously with good advice and intensive tutoring, we can win. You see . . . we can see good output immediately.

Furthermore, this principal sought to tap the pool of potential Muslim enrollees by introducing more multicultural curricula and promoting the school as a community (rather than government) school by sharing facilities and opening the door to community groups. During our visit to the school, the principal and student representatives impressed on us the school’s com-mitment to interfaith cooperation. The school demonstrated this commitment that day by opening its doors for a sports competition among local PSTI that lacked adequate athletic facilities to host the event.5




Instituting fees and expanding services. Efforts to secure operating funds were not confined to strategic enrollment management. In line with the reform principles, school administrators augmented budgets with various means of direct fundraising from parents. Precluded from charging tuition, some schools added new “development fees” to cover costs. Principal of a heavily enrolled school suggested,

The money that the government gives us is not enough, so we need some more from the parents. We tell the parents that we can’t develop the school using the limited budget [received from the government]. So, we do the fundraising. In this school, students must pay 800 baht per semester for a development fee.

In several cases, direct fundraising provided a mechanism for schools to sustain and improve program delivery. In one case, fundraising allowed a particularly successful school to add classroom capacity to accommodate a growing number of students recruited from outside its immediate enrollment zone. More often, schools solicited funds to purchase computers, science equipment, or to underwrite student activities such as athletic and academic competitions. Not allowed to charge tuition for basic educational services, schools did make available additional fee-based and/or grant-supported pro-grams and services. A number of schools we visited showcased programs to attract students of means including well-resourced language programs staffed by native English speakers and advanced math and science programs.

Administrators expressed discomfort with the need to go hat in hand to solicit funds from cash-strapped communities unsettling and recognized the potential for inequities. In light of the recent unrest, the principal of one large school—well-resourced relative to many border-province peers—referred to advantages enjoyed by schools in wealthier provinces,

At this moment, we feel inconsiderate asking for help from the com-munity members because the economic status in the province is not good now [due to the unrest]. We feel inconsiderate asking for help but, please note that this province is not like [a wealthier tourist focused province]. We are not a wealthy province. People can donate money for the school but that’s based on what they can afford and the economic status [of the community]. What I found is that, not many people donate to us. Most are the same groups who always help the school. [You] ask how the school survives? I can tell you it’s because the parents of students in this school always help and donate. But not many of them can do that.



Maxcy et al. 123

Another suggested that his community found lacking both the logic of funding reforms and a government School of Dreams program intended to assist select schools in fundraising,

To be honest, for the School of Dreams project, the government wants us to do fundraising from resources available in the communities. They want us to find sponsors to support school activities or find resources in the communities. But the problem is . . . we cannot do that. The com-munities around here do not have good resources. They do not have stuff or materials for us. In spite the promotion about this project, the school cannot find any resources to run the program. The government wants the school to be a dream for everybody in the community. But now, it appears that it is only the school [that is] in the dream of students and teachers. Communities think that the School of Dreams project is really a dream. Some call it the “disappearing school dream.”

Schools in urban settings enjoyed distinct advantages over rural counter-parts in direct appeals for funds as well as in efforts noted above to realize gains through strategic enrollment management. A rural school principal noted,

We use money from fundraising. It’s impossible to use the money from the per head subsidies. No way to get computers (with emphasis). That is why we do the fundraising as I just said. When the budget is short, can we promote educational efficiency? Difficult to do, right? So, the money from the fundraising can help us to manage school activities.

However, higher rates of poverty in rural areas impinge on fee setting. Lower fees combined with lower enrollments yield fewer baht to purchase materials and augment instructions.

Challenges Posed by Regional Unrest Not surprisingly, schools in high-conflict zones faced a steeper climb than their counterparts in attracting and enrolling students-given policies allowing some level of client choice in schools. In part, this is reflected in choices of parents to move their children from harm’s way noted by principals in lower conflict areas. One suggested transfers were increasingly common,

There are many students who move here to study at this school. They claimed that they couldn’t stay in the three Southern border provinces.




Their parents wanted to find a safer place for them and I gave them an opportunity to let them study here. In 2005, there were around 100 students move to this school. This is a large number, you know.

A counterpart from the same province suggested transfers were not confined to students and that ethical considerations trumped formal transfer procedures,

there were approximately 20 teachers from the three Southern prov-inces moved to (my) school . . . . A few days ago, a boy from [a high conflict province] whose father was shot to death transferred to us. We thought of his safety, so we admitted him right away without condition.

Though we do not yet have clear metrics to evidence this, the quote sug-gests the unrest may impact the distribution of a key educational resource: teacher quality. Presuming principals exercise some level of selectivity in the approval process, transfer requests from teachers seeking to exit more violent areas will contribute to an uptake in teacher quality in low-conflict areas. Selective granting of transfer requests seems likely given incentives to attract students discussed above.

The rationale to transfer is bolstered by deteriorating educational condi-tions in the high-conflict areas. Beyond the potential for a growing disparity in teacher quality, clients may choose to transfer based on recognition of the reduction in and disruption of instruction due to routine dismissal of schools. A rural school principal noted,

Because of the unrest, many students (from other areas) don’t dare attend this school. They said that schools in these areas were always suspended and students didn’t study much . . .

The principal of an urban school in the area concurred,

. . . the school is often suspended and it impacts students’ learning as well. They can’t learn very much due to the unrest.

Another principal noted losses in instructional time and focus even when school remained open,

All people are scared. We are distrustful due to the unrest and feel fear while we’re doing school activities. For this reason, we have to change



Maxcy et al. 125

the learning schedule for students. Before this, we dismissed the class-room at 4:30 p.m., now we dismiss at 3:30 p.m.

Furthermore, the regional violence deterred school administrators from using valuable historical, natural, and cultural resources in the region that may attract clients,

I think [the unrest] impacts learning resources located in the three Southern border provinces. After the unrest, we can’t take students to those places. My students can’t learn things from authentic places. They just look at pictures. For example, the [wetland area] is one of the good places for students to learn about the ecosystem in the Southern part of the country [but the students can no longer go there].

Finally, schools proximate to unrest were further disadvantaged by new demands on their limited funds. With violence directed at schools, teachers, and administrators, efforts to ensure the safety of educators and students become paramount but costly. Increasingly, principals directed funds to fence in school grounds, purchasing equipment and hiring security personnel to monitor facilities and to arm themselves and school staff.

DiscussionRecapping and Reconsidering Local Responses to National Reforms

As discussed, funding reform policies designed to foster competition for and responsiveness to local clients created substantial challenges and opportuni-ties for schools in the region. These challenges and opportunities were strongly conditioned by proximity to areas that were more affluent, more populous, and experiencing lower levels of unrest. As a result, Thai reforms patterned on borrowed (or IMF-imposed) logics designed to increase local responsiveness may exacerbate geographical unevenness in schooling quality. Promoters of democratic participation deem education essential for effective political par-ticipation (Dewey, 1997; Freire, 1973; Horton, Kohl, & Kohl, 1990). Practices aligned to neoliberal reform logics discussed above may ultimately under-mine the democratic ends pursued through the constitutional reforms.

Improving funding prospects. The role of more and less formal interschool academic competition is noteworthy as it captures the interplay of direct fundraising and funding through enrollment selectivity and management. This establishes a logic of action promoting selectivity of students in the quasimarket established under the reforms (Robertson & Dale, 2002). As




with concerns raised above regarding efforts to reestablish the privileged position of secondary schools vis-à-vis their primary counterparts, the impli-cations of student selectivity seems likely to reinforce existing disparities associated with wealth and with ethnicity. Thus, not all schools nor all patrons are equally well-positioned to take advantage of funding reforms intended to enhance local school–community relationships.

Comments of participating principals suggest the financial means of the parents influenced the degree and nature of participation in school decision making. That is, participation patterns tracked economic, not democratic, lines—a proportional allocation preferred by neoliberal proponents (see Friedman, 1962). Often participatory logics espoused in decentralizing reforms in the U.S.-belied strategies of conflict management, ideological control, and elite collusion (Anderson, 1998b; Malen, 1994). Noguera (2004) expressed concerns regarding the logics of neoliberal localism guiding U.S. reform policies,

It is the linkage of the two phenomena and its consequences—those communities who find themselves with the more intractable problems to preside over with the fewest material, cultural and social resources to govern with—that has presented the state with a major challenge in its assumptions about governing. (p. 468)

Given parallels in the rhetorical content of the Thai reforms, similar cau-tions might apply regarding the potential consequences of these reforms for schools located in those provinces and those rural communities characterized by lower levels of economic development. Such appeared to be the case as principals in less economically developed provinces and communities chafed at the government rhetoric of local funding as little more than pipe dreams.

Countering the prospects of violence. We found the effects of such policies were exacerbated by the regional unrest. Participants reported that residents with the financial means—when not relocating their families completely—increasingly enrolled their children in schools in more secure areas. Declin-ing economic fortunes in higher conflict areas also undermined the ability of schools to raise funds through student fees or other forms of direct fundrais-ing. Moreover, threats to teacher safety increased challenges to recruit and retain top teachers with dramatic consequences for some schools. For instance, one lucrative English language program in an elite school in a high-conflict area was withering on the vine, while similar programs in less affected communities were thriving. Finally, the threat of violence increas-ingly precludes schools from taking advantage of educational resources in the area.



Maxcy et al. 127

Schools throughout the region also faced new and troubling “guns or but-ter” choices. These carried direct monetary consequences, as principals in more conflict-ridden areas reported that they felt forced to invest in security guards, surveillance equipment, fencing, and other means to ensure the safety of students, staff, and property. These priorities diverted funds from educa-tional programs and services to attract students to their schools. Though a full accounting is difficult, security concerns eroded valuable resources such as instructional time with increased school cancellation and curtailed after school activity. These concerns also consumed attention and intellectual energy as administrators and teachers focused on personal and student safety concerns that were once an afterthought.

On a symbolic level, schools in higher conflict areas faced a difficult pub-lic relations dilemma: more visible and dramatic security displays designed to reassure patrons simultaneously drew attention to the school’s vulnerabil-ity confirming fears of potential patrons. Ironically, the security steps gener-ated real threats in some cases as government troops presented insurgent targets. Less immediate and difficult to value, the physical impact of the heightened stress on all involved represents a real cost.

Competing with PSTI. The uneven geographical consequences associated with unrest conditioned competition with nongovernment schools as well. Pro-motion of interschool competition has been something of a boon to PSTI serv-ing the large Muslim communities in some provinces. As discussed, patronage of public secondary schools in two of the provinces studied is marked by eth-nic-religious differences. Though students in the schools routinely underper-form those in the government schools, the escalating regional violence targeting the latter further encourages patronage of PSTI. Estimates suggest these schools currently serve from 70% to 85% of Muslim students in the region (ICG, 2007; Moawad, 2005; National Reconciliation Commission, 2006).

In sum, schools positioned to secure more affluent and high-performing students enjoyed significant advantages in fundraising creating a mutually reinforcing pattern of recruitment and selection. Similarly, proximity to unrest and requirements to secure students, staff, and school property created mutually reinforcing competitive disadvantages for schools that seem par-ticularly difficult to counter. Although this finding is not surprising, it offers a reminder that reforms premised on market logics may exacerbate rather than mitigate uneven geographic development (Harvey, 2005). Benefits seem to accrue to schools positioned to recruit and select higher performing and more affluent students. Moreover, schools positioned in more secure areas or not perceived to be a target of violence become increasingly attractive. Thus, it is not hard to envision the reforms engendering a growing fragmentation of




schooling across region with an increasing homogenization of schools. Following the reform logics, local elites seem likely deploy their influence and material resources to secure for their children high-quality education. In Muslim communities marked by higher levels of unrest and greater antipathy toward government schooling, Muslim residents will likely increase patroni-zation of PSTI and disengagement from the Thai state.

Concluding Discussion As a multiethnic state tentatively adopting elements of Western-style democ-racy, the Thai government’s struggle with the border region exemplifies the difficult negotiation of liberty and popular rule (Mouffe, 2000). The findings above offer a glimpse into efforts to navigate tenuous relationships between majority Thai-Buddhists and Malay-Muslims in southern Thailand. Tense relationships stem from the historical nation-building role of schools and school administrators within this multiethnic state—a role constituted by more and less coercive effort to assimilate the regional Muslim majority.

In many ways, the reform logics promoting decentralization to foster entre-preneurialism seem to offer a “magic solution” (Ball, 1998) to some long- standing and well-entrenched problems. To the degree that Thailand’s neoliberal reforms create an operating environment through which consumer demand selects schools, those schools likely to thrive are those adapted to, or capable of adapting to, the local clientele and conditions. Those lacking in these respects will not survive, leaving a leaner more responsive, efficient, and effective group. Contrasted to Thailand’s tradition of central planning and control, the ascendant logic holds that the greater good will be better served by competitive conditions encouraging individuals to pursue self-interest. Thus, the magic solution depends on Adam Smith’s invisible hand to guide the region from its troubled past and thereby relegitimize the government as a good steward.

The effect of policies of neoliberal localism, according to Robertson and Dale (2002), has been a displacement rather than resolution of the legitima-tion problems of the state. These problems, they argue, are increasingly evi-dent in an education sector managed as “local states of emergency”—a strategy whereby inconsistent (i.e., interventionist) logics are selectively and temporarily deployed to manage areas of risk. These policies engender rea-sonable responses under prevailing logics that potentially create new risks for the state—particularly a state contending with an intensifying insurgency such as the one in southern Thailand.

In other words, the Thai government seems caught between troublesome alternatives with seemingly reasonable responses noted above demanding caution. It seems possible that reforms promising to resolve the problems



Maxcy et al. 129

faced in the south may instead displace these in the short term and deepen divisions over the longer term. The result may be a sociopolitical environ-ment even more difficult to navigate.

Playing to the market logic informing the reforms, school selectivity of clients may lead to economic and cultural homogenization of secondary schools. The result may be local Buddhist elites further isolated from the region’s Muslim majority. Thus, schools adapting to and selected for particu-lar niche markets might further reflect and reinforce social cleavages charac-teristic of the region. As school distinctions magnify, elite schools may attract elite students but also encounter greater antipathy and thus demand further protection or become subject to greater defection.

With mobility in the Thai civil service contingent on access to higher edu-cation, swelling enrollments in PSTI—whose graduates traditionally under-perform on the college entrance exams—may further reinforce Buddhist access to lucrative and/or socially prominent employment. To close the achievement gap, PSTI may call on additional support to accomplish its dual mission. Whereas enhanced responsiveness to local demands may result in some schools becoming increasingly elitist, others may “go native” to appeal to the local majority.6 In any case, “special treatment” of schools in the south may prove untenable. On the one hand, it appears to exacerbate and protect inequities enjoyed by the more privileged. On the other hand, it appears to reward insurgent behavior and embolden the growth of an antagonistic regime in the south.

The intent of our analysis is not to promote a particular set of policies or leadership responses as preferable to those enacted by Thai policy makers and administrators seeking to reform schools and increase educational per-formance. Nor do we wish to denigrate extraordinary efforts of school lead-ers working within these systems—in many cases under extreme duress—to do the same. Historically, social cleavages relating to ethnic-religious iden-tity and poverty have shaped school and social relationships in southern Thailand—and throughout the world generally—in prominent and problem-atic ways. In light of this history, workable accommodations and reconcilia-tion demand those involved with education reconsider the prevailing logics informing local relationships and informing the reform policies. We are con-cerned contradictory logics within the common sense in which consent for these policies is rooted may lead to practices that may ultimately delegiti-mate public education and the state.

This is not an inevitable outcome. Conroy (2004) argues neoliberal orthodoxy—the doctrine from which the restructuring logics reflected in the reforms noted above derive—reflect a discursive closure equating human flourishing with economic success and narrowing education provision to




serving economic ends (Conroy, 2004). Although neoliberalism is dominant and tending toward a closed discourse regarding dimensions of human flour-ishing, it is not coextensive with all such discourses. Alternate discourses may disrupt, enhance, or reinforce neoliberal hegemony. Discussing counter-narratives offered by religious communities, Conroy argues that for such voices to effectively counter the near hegemony of neoliberalism,

they cannot take up a position which is entirely inside the state appa-ratus but neither can they stand completely outside it; indeed I would suggest, they must inhabit a liminal space on the border of the public discourse and the discourse of the state and its mechanisms for main-taining liberal democracy. (Conroy, 2001, p. 554)

Contesting the corrosion of the concept of public servant within the domi-nant neoliberal reform rhetoric of the past two decades, Larry Terry (1995) offered or reasserted an alternate portrayal of public servant as steward of the public trust and conservator of public institutes. However appealing, we must acknowledge degree to which the “public servant” as an agent of the govern-ment disproportionately served “popular” interests of the middle-class and cultural mainstream more than those of the poor and/or culturally marginal-ized (Conroy, 2004; Larson & Ovando, 2001). Social safety nets notwith-standing, public service projects too often reflect culturally narrow conceptions of flourishing. This is perhaps most evident in the colonial enterprises qua mission civilatrice in the “developing” world—practices reflected in the coer-cive assimilation of Malay-Muslims under the Phibun and Sarit regimes.

The theme of trust is central to this discussion, the lack of which eventu-ally raises impediments to reforms or negotiations. As Larson and Ovando (2001) argue, “because we have long accepted the fact that trust in schools is normal and distrust is abnormal, we have acquired too little insight into why some communities have greater difficulty trusting their schools than others” (p. 63). The continuing struggles and unrest in southern Thailand suggest the general and consistent erosion of trust—if it did in fact exist—between the southern provinces and government. To further complicate this issue, it is clear that trust cannot be assumed or taken for granted in these communities given the long historic conflict over this region. Even in regions in which schools face no such physical threats, it is critical to attend to Mike Bottery’s (1996) warnings regarding public sector reforms that public trust is fragile and that we must be ever vigilant. In so doing, we look to southern Thailand to learn lessons that may help enliven our conversations and engender an open undetermined democracy (Mouffe, 1989).



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Authors’ Note

A previous version of this article was presented at the 2009 meeting of the American Educational Research Association in San Diego.

AcknowledgmentsThe authors wish to thank the Research Council and the Richard Wallace Alumni Association Research Incentive Grants at the University of Missouri for funds contrib-uting to the completion of this study. The authors would also like to thank their col-leagues at the University of Missouri and at the Prince of Songkla University in Pattani for assistance with the study and developing the manuscript. In particular, the authors wish to thank Dr. Margaret Grogan, Dr. Kanita Nitjarunkul, Dr. Wassant Atisabda, Dr. Jeffrey S. Brooks, and Dr. Jeffrey Ayala Milligan.

Declaration of Conflicting InterestsThe authors declared no potential conflicts of interests with respect to the authorship and/or publication of this article.

FundingThis study was supported by funds from the Research Council and the Richard Wallace Alumni Association Research Incentive Grants at the University of Missouri.

Notes1. To establish diversity of perspective among respondents, efforts were made to

select for gender and ethnic-religious diversity. Male Buddhist principals make up the vast majority of secondary school principals in the region.

2. The sultanate of Pattani encompassed much of what are now the border provinces of Naratiwhat, Pattani, and Yala. Although large Muslim populations also reside in the neighboring provinces of Satun and Songkla, these areas do not share the historical connection with the sultanate, and the ethnic-linguistic identities of the Muslim popu-lations are less well defined (Bonura, 2002).

3. Impetus for the reemergence is unclear, but speculation about causes focuses on (a) high levels of poverty and unemployment resulting in large numbers of disaf-fected youths and young adults who may be recruited to carry out attacks; (b) a growing influence of anti-Western doctrines of Wahhabist Islam and terrorist organizations such as Jemaah Islamiyah among a small group of strident funda-mentalists, particularly in the wake of the Iraq invasion; (c) policies of the (now deposed) Thaksin regime which consolidated authority, dismantled mediating institutions, fueled separatist sympathies with hard-line responses to violence and demonstrations, and ran roughshod over human rights in a war on drugs and other vaguely identified “dark forces” (ICG, 2005).




4. Where government schools receive 2,900 Baht per student in addition to facilities and teacher salaries, PSTI now receive 10,000 Baht.

5. For further discussion of the efforts at this school, see Maxcy, Sungtong, and Nguyen (in press).

6. In our forthcoming article, we note efforts to actively appeal to Muslim families and the Muslim community generally through inclusive practices in one govern-ment school.

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BiosBrendan D. Maxcy is an associate professor of Educational Leadership and Policy Studies at the Indiana University School of Education at Indianapolis. His research draws on critical and postcolonial theories to examine the interplay of leadership, management, and public-sector reform policies and discourses in schooling. His work has been published in Educational Administration Quarterly, Educational Policy, Educational Management, Administration & Leadership and Urban Education.

Ekkarin Sungtong is Associate Dean for Academic and International Affairs in the College of Education at the Prince of Songkla University’s Pattani campus in Thailand. A native of Thailand, Dr. Sungtong received a B.A. in Education from PSU in 1993, an MA in English Language Instruction from Kasetsart University in Bangkok in 1998, and a PhD in Educational Leadership and Policy Analysis from the University of Missouri in 2007. His work is published in Educational Management, Administration & Leadership and the International Journal of Urban Education Leadership.

Thu Su’o’ng Thi Nguyen is an assistant professor of Educational Leadership and Policy Studies at the Indiana University School of Education at Indianapolis. A native of San Antonio Texas and the daughter of Vietnamese refugees, Dr. Nguyen’s schol-arly interests include spatial and cultural (re)production, vulnerable populations and practices of place-making in and around school settings, and the treatment of differ-ence. Her work has been published in Educational Policy, Educational Management, Administration & Leadership, International Journal of Leadership in Education and the International Journal of Urban Education Leadership.



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